





SYNONYMS DISCRIMINATED.



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A COMPLETE CATALOGUE OF

Synonymous Words in the English Language.

WITH

DESCRIPTIONS OF THEIR VARIOUS SHADES OF MEANING, AND ILLUSTRATIONS
OF THEIR USAGES AND SPECIALITIES.

ILLUSTRATED BY QUOTATIONS FROM STANDARD WRITERS.

BY

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P R E F A C E.

It has appeared to the writer of the following pages that, without depreciating the labours of others in this department of Literature, occasion fairly exists for a new book on the Synonyms of the English Language, which should be written in some respects from fresh points of view, and should be of a fuller character than the narrow limits commonly belonging to works on this subject.

That he has succeeded by a single effort in producing a perfect English Synonymicon, he has not the presumption to suppose; but he sends the work forth with every desire to avail himself of such fair and enlightened suggestions as may help him to improve and expand it if future editions be called for.



SYNONYMS DISCRIMINATED.

ABANDON. FORSAKE. DESERT.
RELINQUISH.

The etymological force of ABANDON (Teutonic *ban*, which appears in the old French *bandon*, outcry, proclamation, as *vendre a bandon*; the low Latin *abandonnare*; the old English *bandown*, meaning possession, jurisdiction; and the modern English *ban* and *banns*;) has well-nigh disappeared from this word. To abandon is now, in the most comprehensive sense, *to give up finally and absolutely*, with the implied idea, in many cases, of transference to some power or person external to ourselves. A trace of the old meaning, that of placing beyond jurisdiction or outlawry, and so disclaiming possession, appears in Shakespeare:—

“Madame, wife, they say that I have dreamed
And slept alone some fifteen years or more.
Lady. I (for aye) and the time seems thirty
unto me,
Being all this time *abandoned* from your
bed.”

Spenser used the form *aband*. No praise or blame is absolutely expressed by the term abandon, which is one of the widest in the English language, though it has a tendency to imply blame when used of *persons without qualification*. So to abandon friends sounds blameworthy, because, under this simple expression the mind contemplates nothing but the deserted friendship. Yet it is right to abandon friends if they betake themselves to what is dishonest or disgraceful. We may abandon persons or things; in particular, places, positions, ideas,

opinions, hopes, expectations, offices, possessions, good or evil habits, as the case may be. Where loss or injury is entailed on the person abandoned, or the abandonment is a dereliction of duty, this moral colouring belongs not to the force of the term, which is, essentially speaking, no more than that of *final leaving*, but to the circumstances of the case, as in the following from Milton:—

“See how he lies at random carelessly dif-
fused,
As one past hope, *abandoned*,
And by himself given o’er.”

It is only when all efforts to save his ship are hopeless that the captain *abandons* her to the rocks and waves. In times of early Christianity, men were called upon to *abandon* houses, lands, and relatives, in such a way as would be now not only uncalled for, but an unjustifiable desertion of them. We may observe that a twofold idea seems inherent in abandonment (for the noun follows all the forces of the verb). We may abandon directly or indirectly, by actively transferring or putting away from ourselves; or by merely avoiding and taking ourselves off. It is the former force which was the more predominant in the old English, the latter in the new.

FORSAKE is the Saxon *forsacan*, being compounded of the prefix *for*, which has the negative sense of forth, or away from, as in forbid, and *sacan*, from *sacu*, *sac*, strife, contention, connected with the English *seek*. Its radical force, therefore, is

the opposite of seek, namely, to aim at separation. In usage it implies some degree of *antecedent habituation or association* which is given up. We forsake relatives to whom we were naturally bound, friends with whom we once associated, habits which we had contracted, opinions which we had constantly entertained, places which we used to frequent. The term does not go beyond this breaking off of previous habit or association; the making that a matter of avoidance which before was matter of seeking; and like abandon, implies, in itself, neither praise nor blame, which depend upon the *circumstances* of the forsaking:—

“Then answered Peter and said, “Behold we have *forsaken* all and followed Thee.”—*Bible*.

There is implied in forsake a former personal connexion with ourselves; hence we are not commonly said to forsake abstract forms of good. It would be natural to say to forsake houses, lands, or friends, but not rank, station, or wealth. Here we should use the widely-available term abandon, or renounce.

To DESERT (Lat. *deserere*, *de* and *serere*, to join or bind together, as opposed to *asserere*, to fasten; fasten hand to hand and so *assert* a claim) is applicable to persons, places, causes, principles, or joint undertakings. We abandon, not desert, efforts or undertakings of *our own*. It always implies blame, except when used of *localities*. To desert a person, a principle, or a cause, for instance, is, by the force of the term, blameworthy. Not so to desert a locality, which may be indifferent, justifiable, or compulsory. It was from overlooking the fact that *places* might be deserted that some have laid it down that all desertion is disgraceful. A “deserted fortress,” a “deserted village.” On the other hand, it is opprobrious in the following, where the word “land” means more than locality:—

“No more excuses or delays. I stand
In arms prepared to combat hand to hand
The base *deserter* of his native land.”

Dryden.

Like forsake, desert implies some degree of previous habituation and reciprocal association, and is not applicable to cases in which a mere momentary relationship attaches to the thing given up; hence we cannot say to desert a statement, or a presumption, or an expression; but we are said to desert principles as having stood by and supported them.

To RELINQUISH (Lat. *relinquere*, *re* and *linquere*, to leave) is to give up under pressure of some influence, power, or physical compulsion. We relinquish as an act of prudence, judgment, or necessity, that which, had we been left to ourselves, we should have held. The voluntary and involuntary are blended together in relinquish. A wounded hand may be compelled to relinquish its grasp. I relinquish my scheme on finding it impracticable, or my opinion on finding it untenable, or my hope on finding it vain. Some degree of previous struggle with ourselves has been gone through before we finally resolve to relinquish:—

“The Disdaine met him, and brought to him from Her Majesty letters of revocation, with commandment to *relinquish* for his own part the intended attempt.”—*Hackbvt.*

It may be observed that abandon and desert are more positive acts of the mind than forsake and relinquish.

ABANDONED. PROFLIGATE. REPROBATE. UNPRINCIPLED. DEPRAVED.

ABANDONED (see ABANDON) is strictly a participle passive of the verb abandon, though used as an independent adjective. In the former capacity it follows, of course, all the meanings of its verb. As an adjective, it has the meaning of self-abandoned, and that to vice. It is used of persons and character, and so, reflexively, of life and conduct. It denotes a voluntary surrender of self to a life of self-indulgence; self-control, and the estimation of others being disregarded and defied. The abandoned man is emphatically not the misguided, seduced, or over-

tempted man. This systematic character of the abandoned prevents the term from being applied to solitary acts :—

“Nor let her tempt that deep, nor make the shore

Where our abandoned youth she sees
Shipwrecked in luxury, and lost in ease.”
Prior.

REPROBATE (Lat. *reprobatus*, tried and rejected) expresses that character in which a course of self-abandonment to vice results; one cast away without hope of recovery, the very desire and recognition of good being lost; all repentance cast off, the bitter becoming sweet and the light darkness, by a confirmed blunting of the moral perception. This state the abandoned has not of necessity reached :—

“*Reprobate* silver shall men call them because the Lord hath rejected them.”—*Bible.*

The PROFLIGATE man (Lat. *profligare*, to dash away or down) is he who has thrown away, and becomes more and more ready to throw away, all that the good and wise desire to retain: as principle, honour, virtue, possessions. Hence it follows that the very poor or obscure man, though he might be abandoned, and even reprobate, could not be profligate. For profligacy is a characteristic vice of the great, the powerful, and the rich. We speak of a profligate monarch, nobleman, court, ministry, aristocracy; of a corrupt or demoralized, but not profligate peasantry. Profligacy is characterized by shamelessness and defiant disregard of morals. The old physical use of the term has disappeared, as in Bishop Hall's Letter to the Pope :—

“Is it for thee to excite Christian princes, already too much gorged with blood, to the profligation and fearful slaughter of their own subjects?”

The modern use of it appears in the following :—

“Hitherto it has been thought the highest pitch of *profligacy* to own, instead of concealing, crimes, and to take pride in them, instead of being ashamed of them.”—*Eoling-broke.*

The UNPRINCIPLED man is not

necessarily abandoned or profligate. He may be, in matters of sensual indulgence, abstemious, and in matters of expenditure even penurious. But as the abandoned man sins against sobriety and self-control, so the unprincipled man against justice and integrity. The abandoned man injures himself primarily, and others only indirectly; the unprincipled man is ready to erect his own interests on the ruins of the interests of others. The term unprincipled has a twofold meaning, first, wanting in good principle, or marked by an absence of it; in which sense it is applicable to acts, plans, or proceedings, as well as to persons; and secondly, not acting on good principle, or the acting on its contrary, towards others, in which it is applicable to persons only. The first employment appears in the following, for the word is not of ancient standing in the language :—

“Others betake themselves to State affairs with souls so *unprincipled* in virtue and true generous breeding, that flattery, and courtships, and tyrannous aphorisms appear to them the highest points of wisdom.”—*Milton.*

The second in the following :—

“Whilst the monarchies subsisted, this *unprincipled* cession was what the influence of the elder branch of the House of Bourbon never dared to attempt on the younger.”—*Burke.*

DEPRAVED is a term which points to external circumstances, or continued practices, which have gradually *perverted* the nature (*pravus*, bad, distorted, crooked). Depravity is perversion of the standard of right; and the term is employed not only of morals but of manners, taste, and the arts, and even of depraved humours of the body, which phrase illustrates the radical meaning of the term, as corruptly departing from the state of wholesome function.

“When reason and understanding are *depraved*, and as far corrupted as the very passions of the heart—when then the blind leads the blind—what else can we expect, but that both fall into the ditch?”—*Sherlock.*

By the constant keeping of evil company a man's taste and character will of necessity become *depraved*. There is danger that he may become un-

principled in his dealings; that he may *abandon* himself to allurements and temptations; that he may go on to exhibit an open *profligacy* of conduct; and finally sink into the condition of a *reprobate*, whom conscience ceases to encourage or to warn.

ABASE. HUMBLE. DEGRADE.
DISGRACE. DEBASE. HUMILIATE.
DISHONOUR.

There was a time when the word ABASE (Fr. *abaisser*, *bas*, low) was used in a purely physical sense, as by Shakespeare:—

“And will she yet *abase* her eyes on me?”

To *abase* is, now, to bring low, or lower, in such a way as that the person lowered shall be *deeply conscious* of the lowering. But this is not of necessity on account of heinous guilt or conduct disgraceful. That of which the person *abased* is primarily conscious is *unworthiness* in reference to the estimation of others or his own. It may even be meritorious to *abase* or humble oneself. (Of these two *abase* is the stronger term.) This never could be said of *degrade* or *disgrace*. The penitent man humbles himself, the contrite man *abases* himself. In either case a conquest is gained over pride, or arrogance, or self-will.

“He that exalteth himself shall be *abased*, and he that *humbleth* himself shall be exalted.”—*Bible*.

To HUMBLE (Lat. *humilis*, humble, *humus*, the ground, connected with the Greek *χαμαί*, on the ground); commonly bears reference to some former condition of exaltation or estimate of self, as the proud man may be humbled by reverses of fortune. When a man is so humbled that his state becomes externally manifest, or is reflected in the condition and circumstances of the person humbled, he may further be said to be *humiliated*, that is, brought both to a *sense* and a *condition* of humility. So strong a part does this external element play in the word, that one who is only self-conceited may be humiliated by being thrown suddenly into an undignified and ludicrous

position. The proud man is humbled, the conceited humiliated. The case is a little different with the noun *humiliation*, which is sometimes employed as an independent noun instead of employing as a noun the participle *humbling*. In the phrase “a day of fasting and *humiliation*,” the term conveys the idea of external self-humbling.

To DISGRACE is to deprive of respect (Lat. *gratia*, favour). He who disgraces himself deprives himself of the respect of others. Disgrace is to the feeling of respect what *dishonour* is to its outward tokens. Hence disgrace is rather in a man's self, dishonour depends rather on others; so that while conscience may excite in us a feeling of disgrace, we can have none of dishonour except it be inflicted upon us by others. Yet in the term disgrace there seems to be a blending of the two ideas of the Latin *gratia* and the English *grace*, namely, internal comeliness and external favour. The minister who is capriciously dismissed by his sovereign is said to be disgraced. Yet it is plain that he is so in no other sense than as being merely thrown out of favour, while, as regards his own character, he is rather dishonoured than disgraced. The general who is taken captive after a gallant resistance never could be disgraced, though he might by an ungenerous victor be dishonoured or insulted.

“It was not meet for us to see the king's *dishonour*.”—*Bible*.

We have exemplifications in the two following of the twofold idea of *grace*, from which the double aspect of disgrace flows:—

“And with sharp quips joy'd others to de-
face,
Thinking that their *disgracing* did him
grace.” *Spenser*.

“He that walketh uprightly is secure as to his honour and credit; he is sure not to come off *disgracefully* either at home, in his own apprehensions, or abroad, in the estimations of men.”—*Barrow*.

DEGRADE bears reference to some standard or level, moral or social, beneath which the person degraded, or who degrades himself, is supposed

to have fallen (*de*, down, and *gradus*, a step); nor is the term confined to persons. In this point it differs from disgrace, which is applicable to persons, and not to things. So we might say:—

“Art is *degraded* when it is only regarded as a trade.”

“The lifting of a man’s self up in his own opinion has had the credit in former ages to be thought the lowest *degradation* that human nature could well sink itself to.”—*Locke*.

To **DEBASE** is to deteriorate or make base the *intrinsic nature* in regard to worth, dignity, or purity, and is only employed of material value in the case of coin.

“The coin which was adulterated and *debased* in the times and troubles of Stephen.”—*Hale*.

“Even reason itself, which, if we have any original faculties, is surely one of them, is subject to the same law of habit, as the means of improvement or of *debasement*.”—*Beattie*.

ABASH. CONFOUND. CONFUSE.

To be **ABASHED** (Old Fr. *esbahir*, connected with the English *bay*, to gape or stand at bay as a wild beast) is to be under the influence of shame, and therefore will vary according to the degree and character of the shame felt. The over-modest are abashed in the presence of superiors, the guilty at the detection of vice or misconduct. Abase stands to *the reason* and *the judgment* as abash stands to *the feelings*. The former implies a sentence of unworthiness passed against oneself, the latter shows itself in the downward look, the blushing cheek, or the confused manner, and may even be the pure effect of natural modesty.

“But when he Venus viewed without disguise,

Her shining neck beheld and radiant eyes,
Awed and *abashed*, he turned his head aside,
Attempting with his robe his face to hide.”

Congreve.

To be **CONFUSED** (Lat. *confundere*, *confusus*, to pour together, or confound) denotes a state in which the faculties get more or less beyond control, when the speech falters, and thoughts lose their consistency,

though practical power is to a certain degree retained.

“*Confused* and sadly she at length replied.”
Pope.

To be **CONFOUNDED**, though another form of the same verb, is a far stronger word, denoting an utter inability to exercise, to any practical purpose, the powers of thought and speech; the reason being overpowered by the shock of argument, or testimony, or detection. To confuse is in itself a milder term than confound. Things are confused when they are in a state of promiscuous disorder. They are confounded when their very identity is lost, and they are undistinguished or indistinguishable from one another.

“So spake the Son of God, and Satan stood
Awhile as mute, *confounded* what to say.”
Milton.

ABATE. LESSEN. DIMINISH. DECREASE.

Of these the simplest and most widely applicable, and therefore the least specifically characteristic is **LESSEN** (A. S. *læssa*, masc., *lasse*, fem., less), meaning, to make, or to grow, less, as in force, bulk, number, quantity, or value.

“St. Paul chose to magnify his office when all men conspired to *lessen* it.”—*Atterbury*.

DIMINISH (Lat. *diminuere*, *minus*, less) is the exact Latin equivalent of the Saxon *lessen*, but is commonly substituted for lessen in the intransitive sense. The receding object diminishes rather than lessens.

“I will *diminish* them that they shall no more rule over the nations.”—*Bible*.

ABATE (Fr. *abattre*, to beat down) refers to *force* only, the idea of which is always latent if not explicit. A storm, pain, mental emotion or excitement, the vigour of youth, abates. Of old the word had a strong active force in a *physical* application; as to abate, that is, beat down, the walls of a castle. This active force is still preserved, but not in its physical application. The term has grown milder. We speak of abating pride, zeal, expectation, hope, ardour, a demand or claim, and, in legal lan-

guage, of abating a writ, a nuisance, or a tax. The word is employed with singular force in the following passage from Paley's "Moral Philosophy":—

"The greatest tyrants have been those whose titles were the most unquestioned. Whenever the opinion of right becomes too predominant and superstitious, it is *abated* by breaking the custom."

DECREASE (Lat. *de*, down, and *crescere*, to grow) differs from diminish in denoting a more sustained and gradual process. We might speak of an instantaneous diminution, but hardly of an instantaneous decrease. To decrease is gradually to lessen or diminish. Yet we use the term decrease in some cases to express more strongly the idea of diminution by *inherent force*, or from an *internal cause*, as distinguished from external and more palpable influences, at least when speaking of physical matter or objects; as the cold decreases through the spring of the year. Property is diminished by extravagance. To decrease is relative; to diminish is absolute or positive. It is more commonly applied to size and quantity, diminish to number.

"He must increase, I must decrease."—*Bible*.

ABATEMENT. *See* DEDUCTION.

ABBEY. *See* CONVENT.

ABBREVIATE. *See* ABRIDGE.

ABEDICATE. *See* RESIGN.

ABERRANT, ABNORMAL. ECCENTRIC. EXCEPTIONAL. ERRATIC.

ABERRANT (Lat. *aberrare*, to wander away) denotes that which has unaccountably deviated from the uniform mode or law of operation and production. ABNORMAL (*ab*, and *norma*, a rule), that which exhibits a type or form dissimilar to the ordinary. ECCENTRIC (*ex* and *centrum*, a centre; Gr. *κέντρον*, from *κεντρέω*, to prick, the point round which the circle is described) denotes that which is a departure (or analogous to it) from movement in a natural orbit. EXCEPTIONAL (Lat. *excipere*, *exceptus*, to except) is applied generally to any-

thing which strikes common observation as unlike what it is familiar with in similar cases. Of these the two first are terms adopted by modern physical science, to the types and productions of which they apply. Eccentric and exceptional are applicable to other matters. The former term was astronomical before it became moral or descriptive. An eccentric body is one which moves in a circle which, though coinciding in whole or in part with another in area or volume, has not the same centre; hence deviating from ordinary methods, or usual appearance or practice; irregular, odd. It is opposed to concentric. The primary and secondary ideas appear combined in the following:—

"For had I power like that which bends the spheres

To music never heard by mortal ears,
Where in her system sits the central sun
And drags reluctant planets into tune,
So would I bridle thy *eccentric* soul,
In reason's sober orbit bid it roll."

Whitehead on Churchill.

EXCEPTIONAL is taken from the French *exceptionnel*, and not found in the older English literature.

ERRATIC (*errare*, to wander) differs slightly from eccentric when spoken of human conduct, to which it is confined (while eccentric may be employed of the personal appearance), in denoting want of moral self-control, which shows itself in the sudden doing of eccentric things. The eccentric character is inoffensive and simply odd; there is danger that the erratic person may involve himself or others in mischief. This force has been acquired in recent times.

"The season of the year is now come in which the theatres are shut and the card-tables forsaken, the regions of luxury are for awhile unpeopled, and pleasure leads out her votaries to groves and gardens, to still scenes and *erratic* gratifications."—*Rambler*.

ABERRATION. *See* MADNESS.

ABETTOR. ACCESSARY. ACCOMPLICE.

AN ABETTOR (probably having for its root the sound *bet*, an old cry, in

hounding dogs on to game) is one who in any way promotes the execution of a scheme *without taking a direct part* in it. If he do so, he becomes, according to circumstances, something more than an abettor. He is an ACCESSARY (Lat. *accessarius*, *accedere*, to approach, join oneself to) if he assists *directly*, but in an *extraneous capacity*. An ACCOMPLICE (*ad* and *complicare*, to fold together), if he is intimately bound up in the project and responsibility of the scheme as a prime mover. It is in this way that in treason there are no abettors, the law not allowing the supposition of indirect agency in the case, but regarding it as necessarily direct. Advice, promises, rewards, or even the observance of silence, and a forbearing to oppose, may constitute an abettor; but no one can be negatively an accessory or accomplice. Generally speaking, it may be said that abettors urge and promote; accessories aid or assist; accomplices design and execute.

In law, an "accessary before the fact" is one who procures, counsels, or commands another to commit a felony. An "accessary after the fact" is one who, knowing of the felony, assists, comforts, or conceals the felon. It deserves to be remarked that these terms are by usage almost universally restricted to *bad* or *unlawful* deeds and causes, although Woolaston, in his "Religion of Nature," speaks of "abetting the cause of truth."

The older use of Shakespeare is still the common one:—

"And you that do *abet* him in this kind
Cherish rebellion, and are rebels all."

"An *accessory* is he who is not the chief actor in the offence, nor present at its performance, but in some way concerned therein, either before or after the fact committed."—*Blackstone*.

Dryden, in the following passage, uses the term in the sense of a partner in guilt:—

"Link'd hand in hand the *accomplice* and the
dame

Their way exploring to the chamber came."

The ordinary use is that of Johnson in the following:—

"And thou, the curs'd *accomplice* of his
treason,
Declare thy message and expect thy doom."

ABHOR. DETEST. ABOMINATE.
LOATHE.

Of these the plainest is LOATHE (A. S. *lādhan*, to hate), which is also the most purely physical, being in the first place employed to express nausea or physical disgust. The sick man loathes his food. When employed of moral objects, it is so by a strong metaphor or analogy:—

"A wicked man is *loathsome*, and cometh to shame. The word translated loathsome properly denotes such kind of persons to be as nauseous and offensive to the judgments of others as the most loathsome unsavoury things are to their tastes and smells."—*Bishop Wilkins*.

To ABOMINATE (Lat. *abominor*, *abominatus*, *ab*, from, and *omen*) is literally to discard or protest against, as ominous or foul; a close association existing between the physically foul and the morally evil. Abominate occupies a place midway between loathe, which is strongly physical, and detest, which, as we shall see, is emphatically moral; and in either case denotes that kind of strong dislike which would excite protest and avoidance. ABHOR (Lat. *abhorvere*, to shudder at) differs from abominate in being more expressive of strong *involuntary* recoil, while abominate is more reflective and voluntary. The person who abominates would destroy, or remove; the person who abhors would shrink from, and avoid.

"That very action for which the swine is *abominated* and looked upon as an unclean and impure creature, namely, wallowing in the mire, is designed by Nature for a very good end and use, not only to cool his body, but also to suffocate and destroy noisome and importunate insects."—*Ray*, "Wisdom of God."

"Abhor that which is evil, cleave to that which is good."—*Bible*.

Where the recoiling of abhorrence is illustrated by its opposite idea, that of voluntary *adherence*.

DETEST (Lat. *detestari*, *testis*, a witness) denotes a purely sponta-

neous and energetic *hatred* and denunciation of what is *bad in principle*; not the feelings only, but the judgment being concerned in it. It is a perversion of the word, though a common one, to apply it to what is physically impure or personally disagreeable. We abominate what is offensive, we abhor what is essentially uncongenial to us, we detest what is contemptible or evil, we loathe what is nauseous and disgusting. Detestation is that kind of hatred which does not rest in feeling, but tends to find energetic expression in words.

"By reason of his cruelty he became *detestable* not only to his own subjects but also to his neighbours round about."—*Usher*.

ABIDE. SOJOURN. DWELL. RESIDE.

To ABIDE (A. S. *abidan*) expresses no more than a personal halting or staying. It is wholly indefinite, and may be temporary or permanent, according to circumstances; we may abide in a place for a time or for life. It implies, however, some antecedent state of unsettlement. The radical idea seems to be that of remaining fixed, in which sense it is purely used in such phrases as to abide by a decision, that is, to adhere to it with moral fixity of purpose.

SOJOURN (Fr. *sejour*, *sub*, and *diurnus*, *dies*, a day) expresses a personal stay *necessarily temporary*. Hence it is commonly connected with some locality which is not one's own or one's home. A sojourner is, by the force of the term, a stranger.

To DWELL (Dan. *dvåle*) indicates a permanent stay in a place which, to some extent at least, has become one's home. The idea of permanent resting may be illustrated, as in the case of abide, by other applications of the term, as when a speaker is said to *dwell* upon a word, or a singer on a note.

To RESIDE (Lat. *residere*, *re* and *sedere*, to sit) is a more dignified term, which carries with it a certain notion of civilization and society, with elegance of living and rights of property. The poor man *dwells* in an

humble cottage near the hall where the lord of the domain *resides*.

"Abide with us, for it is toward evening, and the day is far spent."—*Bible*.

"Now the *sojourning* of the children of Israel who *dwelt* in Egypt was four hundred and thirty years;"

The two words sojourn and dwell, at once indicating considerable duration, which, however, did not do away with their strangership.

"His Grace (Henry VIII.), therefore, willing and minding to revoke you all by little and little, except you, Sir Gregory, being his ambassador, there continually *re-siding*."—*Burnet*.

ABILITY. SKILL. CAPACITY. CAPABILITY. CLEVERNESS. TALENT. GENIUS.

Of these, ABILITY (Fr. *habile*, Lat. *habilis*, from *habere*, to have, having or possessing resources, handy) is the most generic, inasmuch as it may be physical, moral, intellectual, conventional, legal, or casual. It deserves, however, to be observed that, while the adjective able is employed in the widest manner in specific connection, as, "he is able to commit passages rapidly to memory," or, "he is able to lift a great weight," this adjective, when *not* so connected, is never used (any more than the noun ability) to mean *physical* power. For instance, we could say, "I doubt your *ability* to move that stone." But we could not say, "he moved the heavy stone with comparative ease, being a person of great ability." Ability, in its mental meaning, is partly a gift of Nature, partly a product of training. "Natural abilities," said Bacon, using the term in the plural, "are like natural plants, that need pruning by study." In its widest sense, ability means the power of doing, the possession of needful means or needful faculties for the performance of an object, as opposed to inability; or the power of applying knowledge to practical purposes. Quickness of mind combined with readiness in contriving means to an end, whether material or mental, is called CLEVERNESS (Prov. Dan. *klöver*, *klever*). Cleverness in

things of pure physical treatment is *dexterity*. (See DEXTERITY.) It is remarkable that cleverness is not a term of English literature: the old adjective clever having been only of late put into the form of a noun. That cleverness in things physical which requires not only adroitness of manipulation, but judgment and discernment, the result of experience, is SKILL (A. S. *scilian*, to separate or distinguish). The old meaning of skill was discernment, such accurate knowledge as *sees and allows for difference*. So the old phrase, "it skilleth not," that is, it makes no difference. Hence, it came to mean a professed art, which was called a *skill*, and finally it was restricted, as mentioned above. Skill is neither of purely abstract knowledge nor of mere physical habituation, but lies mid-way between the two, and practically comprises both.

"The ship would quickly strike against the rocks for want of *skilfulness* in the pilots."—*Search, Light of Nature*.

CAPACITY (Lat. *capax*, *capio*, to take or hold) is potential rather than actual, and may be no more than undeveloped ability. It is employed commonly of the intellectual nature, though not excluded from the moral nature (as a capacity for virtue), and is not employed at all of the physical powers of men. Generally speaking, capacity stands to understanding as ability to action; though the same person may possess both. So the capacity of a great general would lie rather in his power of remembering, interpreting, and calculating the movements of the enemy, in grasping and recognizing the character and resources of a country in reference to the movements of the campaign; his ability, in his actual direction of those movements, and in the disposition and employment of troops in action.

"An heroic poem," says Dryden, "resembles the accomplishment of some great undertaking, which requires the duty of a soldier and the *capacity* of a general."

CAPABILITY, when employed passively of things and not persons, means specific practicability; as a

plot of ground intended for landscape gardening may be said to have great capability for the purpose. When applied to persons, it may be said generally, that as capacity is the inherent faculty of understanding, so capability is the inherent faculty of action, especially of mental action. So we should say of a hopeful student of philosophy, that he had capacity, the main end being knowledge; of a hopeful student of oratory, that he had capability, the main end being action.

"Sure he that made us with such large discourse,

Looking before and after, gave us not
That *capability*, and godlike reason,
To rust in us unus'd."

Shakespeare.

TALENT, a term borrowed from the Scripture parable on the subject, and GENIUS (Lat. *genius*, a supposed tutelary deity, born and dying with every person, and directing his actions) differ, in that talent is the capacity of learning rules, and the capability of readily acting upon them; genius is that innate intuition which is hardly conscious of rules, and can in a measure, by natural force, supersede the use of them.

"Like many other men of *talent*, Fielding was unfortunate."—*Sir W. Scott*.

"Homer was the greater *genius*, Virgil the better artist."—*Pope*.

In the oldest English, as in Chaucer, the word *talente*, of which the accent was on the final syllable, is used in the sense of desire or propensity, the Latin *affectus*. This comes, no doubt, from the idea of weight, bias. For the Greek *τάλαντον* meant a certain weight as well as a certain value of metal. So Gower:—

"But not to steal a vestment,

For that is nothing my *talente*," i.e., propensity.

Talent may be hid, requiring to be searched for; genius develops itself. Genius creates, talent learns and executes. Talent needs opportunities: genius makes them for itself.

ABJECT. See MEAN.

ABJURE. RECANT. RETRACT.
REVOKE. RECALL. RENOUNCE.
REPUDIATE.

All these terms refer to the verbal undoing of what has been or might be maintained or professed. To ABJURE (Lat. *abjurare*, to give up with an oath) retains much of the character of its Latin original, and expresses a deliberate and solemn giving up. Hence, it applies to what is or may be solemnly maintained, as principles of belief or conduct, allegiance to a sovereign. Yet it must be observed that, in order to abjure a thing, it is not necessary to have actually held it. We abjure what we declare *ought* not to be held. So in this country we abjure allegiance to the Pope not the less for having never rendered it. It implies a protest against the thing abjured; whereas we may renounce what we regard as trifling, or what we still value, though we renounce it; as also we may recant in form, not in heart.

"A Jacobite who is persuaded of the Pretender's right to the crown cannot take the oath of allegiance, or, if he could, the oath of *abjuration* follows, which contains an express renunciation of all opinions in favour of the exiled family."—*Paley*.

To RECANT (Lat. *recantare*, *re*, back again, and *cantare*, to chant or repeat a form of words) refers not so much to any inherent solemnity of what is given up as to the *formality and publicity* of doing it. A man may change his opinions in secret, but he recants them openly. So entirely does the idea of *publicity* occupy this word, that the recantation might be feigned and hollow, so long as it be openly made. Moreover, the idea of change of opinion, real or professed, is implied in recant, which abjure, as we have seen, does *not* necessarily imply.

"How soon would ease recant
Vows made in pain as violent as void."
Milton.

To RETRACT (Lat. *re*, back, and *tractare*, from *trahere*, to draw) is a taking back for the purpose of undoing the practical effects of what has

been said. Hence, we retract promises on which *others* have calculated, expressions by which *others* may have been wounded or misled, and opinions, only so far as we may have stated them in the hearing of *others*. Though Henry IV. of France *abjured* Calvinism, he would not *retract* the promise of protection he made to the Calvinists.

"I would as freely have *retracted* the charge of idolatry as I ever made it."—*Stillington*.

A recantation is in words of mouth, a retraction may be in writing.

REVOKE and RECALL are the same word under a Latin (*revocare*, to call back) and an English form; but, though identical etymologically, they are employed with some little difference. Recall is more generic, more conversational and ordinary, less formal and authoritative than revoke. We recall generally, or, in particular, inaccurate or objectionable expressions; but formal acts, authoritative decrees, commands, and solemn promises, are revoked.

RENOUNCE (Lat. *renuntiare*, *re*, back, and *nuntius*, a messenger) is a wide term, applicable to anything which bears a *close relationship to oneself*, whether mental or external; as hopes, designs, claims, one's friends, the world. It is to proclaim against all personal connection, actual or possible, between oneself and the thing or person renounced. Obligations and duties may be renounced as well as pleasures or possessions. It is an act of direct or indirect preference of something over the thing renounced.

"A solemn *renunciation* of idolatry and false worship under the general title of the devil and all his pomps."—*Waterland*.

Unlike all the foregoing, REPUDIATE (*repudiare*) is essentially relative, and can only be where an actual relation has been established towards us *from without*, either by individuals or in the course of nature or of circumstances. We may renounce opinions entertained irrespectively of others, but we can only repudiate them when others have fastened upon us the charge of holding them.

It is *relative renunciation* under a feeling of indignation. The idea of repudiating obligations or debts is recent.

"Servitude is to be *repudiated* with greater care by us than domination is effected by them."—*Prynne*.

ABLE. *See* ABILITY.

ABLUTION. *See* WASHING.

ABNORMAL. *See* ABERRANT.

ABODE. *See* ABIDE and HABITATION.

ABOLISH. ABROGATE. REPEAL. REVOKE. ANNUL. CANCEL.

Of these, ABOLISH is the most general, and, indeed, is applicable to many things to which the rest are inapplicable. It implies the exercise or operation of extinctive power. *Anything* which is entirely done away with, so that it is as if it had never been, may be said to be abolished. (Fr. *abolir*, Lat. *abolere*.) As a synonym with the above terms, it denotes the total doing away with laws, customs, and the like, by any power gradual or sudden, personal or impersonal; as a specific act of legislation may abolish a right, or the silent influence of fashion may abolish a custom. The application of the term *to persons* is now obsolete.

"The *abolition* of Spiritual Courts, as they are called, would shake the very foundation on which the Establishment is erected."—*Warburton*.

On the other hand, each of the remaining synonyms has its specific application.

REPEAL (Fr. *rappeler*, Lat. *reappellare*) is literally to call back, but is applied characteristically to the acts of a *number*, as an assembly or council may repeal a law or a resolution, or a social community may consent to repeal a custom. An irresponsible ruler would hardly be said to repeal, because the word wears an air of legality.

"I leave him and the noble lord who sits by him to settle the matter as well as they can together. For if the *repeal* of American taxes destroys all our government in America, he is the man; and he is the

worst of all the repealers because he is the last."—*Burke*.

To ABROGATE, though primarily applicable to laws (*abrogare*, to repeal in the general assemblies of citizens at Rome, literally to ask off or back), has been extended to customs as having the force of law. The essential force of abrogation is the exercise of *authority* to undo what authority had previously established or recognised.

"It appears to have been an usual practice in Athens, on the establishment of any law esteemed very useful or popular, to prohibit for ever its *abrogation* and *repeal*."—*Hume*.

To REVOKE (*revocare*, to call back) stands to individual and personal, as *repeal* stands to collective, authority. As a despot does not repeal, so a parliament does not revoke. As laws and customs are abrogated or repealed, so edicts may be revoked, and, indeed, any formal expression on the part of individuals; as to revoke an epithet or a promise whether in word or writing.

"A devise by writing may be also *revoked* by burning, cancelling, tearing, or obliterating thereof by the deviser, or in his presence and with his consent."—*Blackstone*.

ANNUL (Lat. *ad*, to, *nihil*, nothing) expresses no more than the rendering inoperative what before had force, whether by law, custom, or consent.

"Your promises are sins of inconsideration at best, and you are bound to repent and *annul* them."—*Swift*.

To CANCEL is relatively to annul (*cancelli*, grating, which the diagonal lines of erasure resemble), that is, to undo the force of something which affected the condition of another, as a promise, or a contract, or an obligation. It is like the erasure or tearing up of a bond. A thing may be annulled virtually, as by the force of circumstances which neutralize or invalidate it, but it is cancelled by some deliberate or specific exercise of power striking out what had operative force.

"Shake hands for ever, *cancel* all our vows."—*Drayton*.

ABOMINABLE. *See* EXECRABLE.

ABOMINATE. *See* ABHOR.

ABORIGINAL. *See* INDIGENOUS.

ABORTIVE. *See* INEFFECTUAL.

ABOUND. *See* TEEM.

ABOVE. OVER. BEYOND. UPON.

These terms all have both a physical and a figurative meaning. Physically, ABOVE indicates a superiority of physical altitude; as the sun is above the earth, *an interval being supposed*, without exact verticality. OVER indicates what is expressed by above, with the addition of the idea of verticality; as a cloud hangs over the sea. UPON denotes what is expressed by over, with the addition of contact or the *absence of the interval* supposed by above; as "the crown is placed *upon* the king's head." BEYOND relates to the horizontal; or to the measurement of length and not height, though it may chance that this length is measured vertically, and may or may not imply adjacency; as the river and the country beyond; the ivy has grown beyond the first story of the house. This analogy is preserved in the metaphorical uses of the word; so, if we said that the general was above the captain, we should mean that he was of higher rank in the army; over the captain, would mean that he exercised authority in regard to him specifically. When one misfortune comes *upon* another, it is as if there were no respite or interval between. When a thing is *beyond* conception, it is as if the stretch and grasp of the mind were insufficient to reach so far.

ABRIDGE. ABBREVIATE. CURTAIL. CONTRACT.

Of these ABRIDGE and ABBREVIATE are the same word etymologically, the Latin *abbreviare* becoming the French *abrégé* (*brevis*, short). Yet abbreviate is hardly ever used but in the simple sense of to shorten, with a somewhat politer force, while abridge is applied with more play of metaphor, as to abridge powers and privileges. We speak peculiarly of abbreviating words in writing, as Dr., Lieut., Esq.

"This book was composed after two old examples of the same kind in the times of Ethelbert and Alfred, and was laid up as

sacred in the church of Winchester, and for that reason, as graver authors say, was called Liber Domus Dei, and by *abbreviation*, Domesday Book."—*Sir W. Temple*.

To abridge is to shorten by condensation or compression; to abbreviate is to shorten by cutting or contracting. In literary abridgments we have the same substance in smaller compass; and if the abridgment is well made, the original runs a risk of being neglected for it. Differences deserve notice between abridge, CURTAIL (*Fr. court*, short, and *tailleur*, to cut), and CONTRACT (*Lat. contrahere*, to draw together). When used of things not purely physical, abridge refers to number and duration, curtail to extent, and contract to power of exercise. Hence, for instance, pleasures or privileges are abridged and contracted when they are made fewer or shorter, curtailed when the sphere of their exercise is in any way diminished, contracted also when the inherent power of enjoyment is lessened in individuals. Commonly also, the exercise of personal power curtails, and the force of circumstances contracts, privileges or enjoyments. It should be observed that, unlike abridge and abbreviate, which may *accidentally* involve diminution of value, incompleteness, or deficiency, these are *necessarily* involved in curtail and contract. We may say, generally speaking, that *pleasures are abridged; privileges or expenditure curtailed; powers contracted*; but they are employed to a large extent interchangeably.

"That man should thus encroach on fellow-man,
Abridge him of his just and native rights."
Couper.

"Have the burdens of the war compelled them to *curtail* any part of their former expenditure?"—*Burke*.

"In all things desuetude doth *contract* and narrow our faculties."—*Gov. of the Tongue*.

ABRIDGMENT. COMPENDIUM.
EPITOME. DIGEST. SUMMARY.
ABSTRACT. DRAUGHT. SYNOPSIS.

These are all literary terms. An ABRIDGMENT is anything which purports to give the substance of a larger work in a shorter form. Some such

abridgments are formed by the simple omission of portions which are regarded as subordinate; some by a condensation of the style; but the substance of the original is, in an abridgment, supposed to be unaltered. It is the same thing shortened, and is itself a work. It will be seen by the following that abridgment may be regarded as a generic term including the others.

"An *abridgment* or *abstract* of anything is the whole in little; and if it be of a science or doctrine, the abridgment consists in the essential or necessary parts of it contracted into a narrower compass than where it was diffused in the ordinary way of delivery."—*Locke*.

A COMPENDIUM, on the other hand (*compendium*, *con* and *pendo*, a sparing, or saving), is *not of a work, but of a subject*; purporting to give as much as need be known of some branch of science or knowledge in a concise form, and is also a work; as a compendium of universal history.

"All those excellent persons of whose acts and sufferings we have a *compendium* or abridgment in this chapter."—*Bishop Hall*.

Like abridgment, and unlike compendium, *summary* and *abstract* bear reference to an antecedent form of which another and shorter form is reproduced; but, unlike abridgment, they may be a reproduction in which the form has been much altered by the reproducer, who may have assimilated the subject matter and have re-expressed it in a style of his own. Of these, SUMMARY (*summa*, a sum or total) professes to give the heads and general results, as in the headings prefixed to chapters; ABSTRACT (*abstrahere*) the general tenor and drift; *these are not works*.

"The Sermon on the Mount, which is a summary of a Christian's life."—*Bp. Taylor*.

DIGEST (*digerere*) has for its object arrangement or re-arrangement of given materials in a more orderly or convenient shape, as of the Roman laws by order of Justinian.

"If we had a complete *digest* of Hindu and Mahommedan laws, after the model of Justinian's celebrated Pandects, we should rarely be at a loss for principles and rules of law applicable to the cases before us."—*Sir W. Jones*.

A DRAUGHT commonly precedes the work, and is of the nature of a sketch or outline, intended for the guidance of another who is to fill it up and finish it.

"And thus poetry and the writer's art, as in many respects it resembles the statuary's and the painter's, so in this more particularly, that it has its original draughts and models for study and practice."—*Shaftesbury*.

EPITOME is a word formed from the Greek ἐπιτέμνειν (to cut into, or cut short), with the view of expressing that which gathers up the substance and essential points of a matter, and prunes and shapes them into a concise compass. We may observe, as regards present use, that as compendium is of science, so epitome is of history.

"This sentence (St. Matthew vii. 12) I read unto you is very fitly placed towards the close of our Saviour's admirable Sermon on the Mount, as being in great measure the epitome and sum of what the Divine Preacher had there expressed more at large."—*Bishop Atterbury*.

SYNOPSIS (a Greek word meaning a collective view) differs from the preceding in not aiming at any style or consecutiveness, and in giving nakedly and disjointedly a view of all needful matters of fact, as in a chart or table.

"Not to reckon up the infinite helps of interlinearies, breviaries, *synopses*, and other loitering gear."—*Milton*.

ABRUPT. RUGGED. ROUGH.

These terms may be taken in their order to express the same thing in gradually lessening degrees. That which on a large scale is precipitous, on a lesser is ABRUPT (*abruptus*, broken, or broken away). Abruptness on a smaller scale is RUGGEDNESS (Sax. *hreoð* and other forms); and this on a smaller again is ROUGHNESS. An abrupt style or manner is that which passes from one point to another by jerks, and without easy transitions. Such abruptness is shown in the combination of manner and words; as an abrupt salutation, an abrupt departure.

"Or if thou hast not broke from company
Abruptly, as my passion now makes me,
Thou hast not lov'd."—*Shakespeare*.

Of rugged and rough in their secondary senses, we may observe that the former is an epithet of appearance, the latter of character and bearing, yet not exclusively so. Scott, in his "Christian Life," speaks of that unmanly sharpness and *ruggedness* of humour which renders us perverse and untractable in our conversation. In this sense it is less coarse and violent than roughness, which carries with it the idea of overbearing.

"To take a cause out of your hands into mine I do but mine office. You meddle further than your office will bear you, thus *roughly* to handle me for using of mine."—*Burnet*.

ABSENT. ABSTRACTED. DIVERTED. DISTRACTED. ABSORBED. ENGROSSED.

Of these the simplest is ABSENT (*absens*, *absens*, to be absent), which denotes either the occasional or the habitual state of one whose mind is inattentive to what is going on immediately before him. It may be the result of habits of abstract thought, or the opposite, namely, an impatience of pure reflection, or casual inattention.

"What is commonly called an *absent* man is commonly either a very weak or a very affected man."—*Chesterfield*.

ABSTRACTED, on the other hand (*abstractus*, *abstractus*, to draw away), implies the influence of something sufficiently strong to *draw off* the mind from present things, and fix it in a state of wrapt contemplation of others. It differs from DISTRACTED in being a single influence, while distraction (*distractus*) may be manifold, and it has not the uneasiness and disturbance belonging to distraction. Moreover, distraction implies an influence in *contradiction* to some proposed matter of thought, for which the mind is accordingly incapacitated, while in abstraction it is wholly given to it.

"Whether dark presages of the night proceed from any latent power of the soul during her *abstraction*, or from the operation of subordinate spirits, has been a dispute."—*Addison*.

"As for me, during my confinement to this

melancholy solitude, I often *divert* myself at leisure moments in trying such experiments as the unfurnishedness of the place and the present *distractedness* of my mind will permit me."—*Boyle*.

DIVERTED is a term of lighter meaning, and is applicable to cases of mental recreation or amusement, in which the mind is turned aside (*divertere*) from studious thought to matters less serious. ABSORBED (*absorbere*) and ENGROSSED (*grossus*, the main body, Fr. *gros*, from the Latin *crassus*, and so literally absorbed into the main body of a thing) differ from the preceding as denoting not a *drawing off* from present matters, but an intense or excessive *contemplation* of them. Absorption excludes distraction and diversion of the mind, which is swallowed up with present employment. Engrossment of mind is relative absorption; that is, absorption *to the disregard of other matters* which may possibly have more or less of claim upon the attention. So it may be well to be absorbed, but it is not altogether well to be engrossed.

"Circe in vain invites the feast to share,
Absent I wander and *absorpt* in care."
Pope.

"Too long hath love engrossed Britannia's stage,
And sunk to softness all our tragic rage."
Tickell.

ABSOLUTE. DESPOTIC. ARBITRARY. TYRANNICAL.

Of these ABSOLUTE (*absolutus*, *absolvere*, loosed, or free from restraint) denotes simply the possession of unlimited and irresponsible power, without implying anything as to the way in which it may be exercised.

"An honest private man often grows cruel and abandoned when converted into an *absolute* prince."—*Addison*.

DESPOTIC may be used either in the abstract of the power, or relatively of the way in which it is exercised. Despotic power may have been acquired with the consent or through the instrumentality of others, as in the case of the Greek *δεσπότης* or *τύραννος*; who commonly owed his elevation to some party in the state. When employed in a moral sense of

character and proceedings, the despotic character is he who expects implicit obedience to his commands.

"Whatever the will commands the whole man must do, the empire of the will over all the faculties being *absolutely* overruling and *despotic*."—*South*.

The ARBITRARY character (*arbitrium*, the will or pleasure) expects submission where nothing but his own will constitutes the principle of government; hence, as imperiousness belongs to the despotic, fickleness is associated with arbitrariness.

"By an *arbitrary* proceeding I mean one conducted by the private opinions or feelings of the man who attempts to regulate."—*Burke*.

TYRANNICAL, in modern parlance, relates not only to the disposition and proceedings of the governing party, but to the result upon the governed. It associates *the suffering or oppression* of the latter with the *domination and caprice* of the former.

"These poor prisoners eat nothing but rice and drink water, and are *tyrannically* insulted over by their rigid creditors till the debt is paid."—*Dampier's Voyages*.

"Every wanton and causeless restraint of the will of the subject," says Blackstone, "whether practised by a monarch, a nobility, or a popular assembly, is a degree of *tyranny*."

ABSOLVE. ACQUIT. EXONERATE.
CLEAR. EXCULPATE.

To ABSOLVE (Lat. *absolvere*, to loose) had originally a religious force, which it has not yet entirely lost. It refers to the loosing of solemn obligations, and the setting free from the consequences of sin and guilt, or from such ties as it would be sin and guilt to violate, as oaths, promises, and the like.

"Compelled by threats to take that bloody oath,

And the act ill, I am *absolv'd* by both."

Waller.

ACQUIT bears reference to a specific charge only (Fr. *acquitter*, from the Latin *quietus*, to release with quiet of mind to the person released).

"Those who are truly learned will *acquit* me in this point, in which I have been so far from offending that I have been scrupulous

perhaps to a fault in quoting the authors of several passages which I might have made my own."—*Addison*.

To EXONERATE is less formal than acquit, and is used of cases in which blame is imputed without any public indictment; it indicates, however, some superiority, real or assumed, in the person who exonerates. So the magistrate acquits, but it is only as a man that he exonerates (*ex* and *onus*, a burden). It is used of obligations.

"I intreat your lordships to consider whether there ever was a witness brought before a court of justice who had stronger motives to give testimony hostile to a defendant for the purpose of *exonerating* himself."—*State Trials*.

Exonerate implies a purely moral, acquittal a magisterial, decision.

To EXCULPATE (*ex* and *culpa*, a fault) denotes a process of evidence and argument of which the result is to prove unworthy of blame. A man may be excupated, or he may *excupate himself*; he may also be *exonerated* by himself or *by another*.

"In Scotland the law allows of an *exculpation*, by which the prisoner is suffered before his trial to prove the thing to be impossible."—*Burnet*.

Exculpation is a riddance of the guilt, exoneration from the charge and liabilities, of an offence or obligation. To CLEAR is to prove absolutely innocent, and, like acquit, exonerate, and excupate, denotes the *antecedent blamelessness* of the party; whereas *absolve*, except where it is used in the simple sense of to free from an obligation, denotes an *antecedent offence*. The innocent are cleared, the guilty are absolved.

"Although innocence needs no defence as to itself, yet it is necessary for all the advantages it hath of doing good to mankind that it appear to be what it really is; which cannot be done unless its reputation be *cleared* from the malicious aspersions which are cast upon it."—*Stillingsfleet*.

ABSORB. See ABSENT and IMBIBE.

ABSTAIN. FORBEAR. REFRAIN.

Of these, ABSTAIN is the most general, meaning simply to hold aloof

from anything (*abstinere*), which may be with a great struggle, or with almost no effort. Some degree of enticement, however, it is necessary to suppose, otherwise the case is one of mere avoidance.

"He that can apprehend and consider vice, with all her baits and seeming pleasures, and yet *abstain*, and yet distinguish, and yet prefer that which is truly better,—he is the true wayfaring Christian."—*Milton*.

FORBEAR (literally, to bear or keep, and for (with the sense of negation)—to withhold) and REFRAIN (*re*, back, and *framm*, a rein or bridle) differ in the degree of the impulse, in the nature of it, and so, to some extent, in the object affected. We for the most part refrain from doing that which primarily affects ourselves; we forbear from doing that which primarily affects others. A more essential distinction is, that refrain expresses an effort of *the will*, by which we leave an act undone. Forbear expresses an antecedent *reflection* or *judgment* on its consequences, which induces us to abstain from doing it.

"In pretence of *forbearance* they resolve to torment him with a lingering death."—*Bishop Hall*.

The force of refrain appears more plainly in the reflective use of it.

"Then Joseph could not *refrain himself* before all them that stood by him."—*Bible*.

ABSTINENCE. FAST.

These terms are technically distinguished. ABSTINENCE (*abstinere*) is a refraining from certain sorts of food.

"The temperance which adorned the severe manners of the soldier and the philosopher was connected with some strict and frivolous rules of religious *abstinence*; and it was in honour of Pan or Mercury, of Hecate or Iris, that Julian on particular days denied himself the use of some particular food."—*Gibbon*.

FASTING (allied to fast, meaning firm) is to refrain from food altogether.

"From hence may an account be given why the inhabitants of hot countries may endure longer *fasting* and hunger than those of colder; and those seemingly prodigious, and to us scarce credible, stories of the *fastings* and *abstinence* of the Egyptian monks be rendered probable."—*Ray on Creation*.

ABSTINENT. SOBER. ABSTEMIOUS. TEMPERATE. MODERATE.

ABSTINENT (see ABSTAIN) expresses the power and the habit of abstaining from indulgence of appetite.

"Be *abstinent*, show not the corruption of thy generation. He that feeds shall die, therefore he that feeds not shall live."—*Beaumont and Fletcher*.

Abstinence is the power of refraining altogether; temperance, the power of enjoying with moderation. We are temperate in what is good, we abstain from what is not good. It supposes a state of self-discipline, so that some are abstinent from feeling their inability to be TEMPERATE (Lat. *temperare*, to moderate). When abstinence is employed on matters of food and drink, it is called ABSTEMIOUSNESS, a word most probably of kindred origin.

"Promis'd by heavenly message twice descending,
Under His special eye
Abstemious I grew up, and thriv'd amain."
Milton.

SOBER (Lat. *sobrius*, opposite to *ebrius*) denotes the character which by its natural gravity is constitutionally untempted to excesses of any kind.

"*Sobriety* is sometimes opposed in Scripture to pride, and sometimes to sensuality."—*Gilpin*.

TEMPERATE denotes the character which is well balanced in its appetites, and to which moderation, though it be the result of effort, is yet congenial. MODERATION (Lat. *moderare*, *modus*, a limit) and temperance are very nearly alike, but moderation is a somewhat wider term, referring both to the desires and to the gratification of them; so we might say a person of *moderate desires*, *temperate habits*, and *sober disposition*, character, or life.

"What goodness," says Bishop Hall, "can there be in the world without *moderation*, whether in the use of God's creatures or in our own disposition and carriage? Without this justice is no other than cruel rigour, mercy unjust remissness, pleasure brutish sensuality, love frenzy, anger fury, sorrow desperate mopingness, joy distempered wild-

ness, knowledge saucy curiosity, piety superstition, care wracking distraction, courage mad rashness."—*Hall, Christian Moderation.*

"*Temperance*," says Woolaston, in his "Religion of Nature," "permits us to take meat and drink not only as physic for hunger and thirst, but also as an innocent cordial, and fortifier against the evils of life, or even sometimes (reason not refusing that liberty) merely as matter of pleasure. It only confines us to such kinds, quantities, and seasons, as may best consist with our health, the use of our faculties, our fortune, and the like, and show that we do not think ourselves made only to eat and drink here."

ABSTRACTION. See ABSENT and ESTRANGEMENT.

ABSTRUSE. CURIOUS. RECONDITE.

As applied to matters of knowledge or learning, that is ABSTRUSE (*abstrusus*, thrust away, and so hidden) which is removed from common or easy understanding, as abstruse ideas, abstruse learning, or abstruse reasoning. RECONDITE (*reconditus*, hidden) is that which lies out of the beaten path of inquiry, and so is known to few, without being of necessity perplexing to the understanding, like the abstruse. A matter is recondite in itself, but it may also be abstruse from the way in which it is put. The CURIOUS (*cura*, care in inquiry) denotes that which is the result of minute inquiry, and strikes us when discovered with a mingled feeling of unfamiliarity and use. Abstruse investigations in recondite branches of learning or science often bring to light curious results. Unlike the abstruse and the recondite, the curious is accompanied by a strange feeling of surprise and pleasure, the unfamiliar being brought into juxtaposition with the familiar. Unlike the others, curious is applicable to the strange in objects of nature and art.

"Let the Scriptures be hard, are they more hard, more crabbed, more *abstruse* than the Fathers?"—*Milton.*

"It is true our bodies are made of very coarse materials, of nothing but a little dust and earth. Yet they are so wisely contrived, so *curiously* composed."—*Beveridge.*

"To qualify the Christian to make a judicious application of these rules, no skill is

requisite in verbal criticism, no proficiency in the subtleties of the logician's art, no acquisitions of *recondite* learning."—*Bishop Horsley.*

ABSURD. FOOLISH. IRRATIONAL. PREPOSTEROUS.

ABSURD (*ab* and *surdus*, deaf, or dissonant) denotes that which jars against common sense and received notions of propriety and truth, as when an argument is reduced to an absurdity, on which every man's judgment is competent to determine; or men form absurd, that is, practically improbable expectations, or conduct themselves in an absurd manner, that is, one in which even common persons would observe a palpable unfitness. Hence it follows that the ridiculous, or the ludicrous, are not of the essence of the absurd, though the absurd, when exhibited in matters of demeanour, dress, action, and the like externals, will be probably attended with such ludicrous effects.

"That we may proceed yet further with the atheist, and convince him that not only his principle is *absurd*, but his consequences also as *absurdly* deduced from it, we will allow him an uncertain extravagant chance against the natural laws of motion."—*Bentley.*

IRRATIONAL (*in*, not, and *ratio*, reason) is employed to express sometimes the entire want of the faculty by nature, as in the phrase the "irrational animals," sometimes a deficiency in its exercise, and, like the rest of these synonyms, is applicable to persons, to principles, and to conduct. It is a more serious term than absurd, involving more serious results, as a dereliction of that reason which is the distinctive light and guide of men.

"These are all of them suggestions of internal sense, consciousness, or reflection, which we believe because we believe them to be true, and which if we were not to believe them, would bring upon us the charge of *irrationality*."—*Beattie.*

As irrational denotes the contradiction of reason, so FOOLISH denotes a deficient or heedless exercise of it, even on a small scale. So the conduct of children is never called irrational, though it is often foolish.

"It is *foolishly* imagined in France that to deprive one great man of his dishes of silver and gold, and another of his money, will be of advantage to the poor."—*For.*

As the irrational is unsound in principle, so the foolish is unsound in purpose and motive. As the absurd contradicts every-day notions of fitness, so the PREPOSTEROUS (*præ*, before, and *post*, behind; the putting, as it were, of the cart before the horse) contradicts every-day notions of right relationship; hence, to say that a thing is preposterously absurd, is to say that it has such gross unfitness as might be demonstrated to amount to a contradiction of the common sequences of cause and effect.

"What's more *preposterous* than to see
A merry beggar—mirth in misery?"

Dryden.

ABUNDANT (Latin *ab* and *unda*, a wave). See COPIOUS.

ABUSE. MISUSE.

As verbs and synonyms (of which the root of both is the Latin *uti*, to use), these words seem to be in the following manner distinguished. To MISUSE is simply to use in a wrong way; to ABUSE is to misuse in such a way that hurt accrues to the thing misused or to some other. To misuse may be the consequence of *inexperience*; to abuse is *always intentional*. Misuse, then, has reference rather to the *mode* of employment, abuse to the *purpose* or *result*. In misuse, one offends against reason, order, propriety, interest, method; in abuse, against justice or honesty. In misuse, there is derangement; in abuse, excess. Excess is the characteristic in the idea of abusing one's powers, or the patience and forbearance of others. It deserves, however, to be remarked that in the case of abusing one's own powers, this may be from imprudence, or even from generosity; that is, in cases where the anxiety to serve or benefit others has made us forget the care and consideration due to ourselves.

"The gravest and wisest persons in the world may be *abused* by being put into a fool's coat."—*Tillotson.*

"How much names taken for things are apt to mislead the understanding, the attentive reading of philosophical writers would abundantly discover, and that perhaps in words little suspected for any such *misuse*."

—*Locke.*

ABUSE. See INVECTIVE.

ABUSIVE. See SCURRILOUS.

ABYSS. See GULF.

ACADEMY. SCHOOL. COLLEGE. UNIVERSITY. SEMINARY.

ACADEMY is a term borrowed from the Greek *ἀκδημία*, or *ἀκαδημία*, a gymnasium in the suburbs of Athens, where Plato taught. Hence, the Platonic schools were called academies; and societies of learned men have since been called academies, as the Royal Academy of Painters in England. It is therefore an affectation to call a school for young boys an academy. It is evident that *no common living together* is involved in the simple idea of an academy, which is constituted simply on the principle of a community in learning or art, and denotes more than their first rudiments.

"In a conference of the French *Academy*, one of the *Academicians* desired to have their opinion on the conduct of Paul Veronese, who, though a painter of great consideration, had, contrary to the strict rules of art, in his picture of Perseus and Andromeda, represented the principal figure in shade."—*Sir J. Reynolds.*

This is rather expressed by the modern term *school*, which conveys the idea of youthful students and the discipline of elders, except when the word is used in the sense of a school of art; as of painting, meaning a succession of artists of the same style. Even here, however, the preceding painters are regarded as "masters," and their imitators as "pupils." SCHOOL is also derived from the Greek (*σχολή*, which meant leisure). As in the word academy (as at present used) common study is implied in school, but not of necessity common living together.

"This place should be at once both *school* and university, not needing a remove to any other house of scholarship, except it be some

peculiar college of law or physic, where they mean to be practitioners."—*Milton*.

In COLLEGE, on the other hand (*collegium*, a collection or society of persons), there is common living as well as common study.

"When we consider the greatness of our wants in this kind, we should be tempted to wish for a college destined for the supply of a sufficient number of able missionaries in constant succession, brought up from their early youth in such a discipline as may be judged best fitted for such a service."—*Warburton*.

A SEMINARY (*seminarium*) is a graceful term, which expresses the idea of a nursery or seed-plot in which the young are trained up, and so live under discipline as well as systematic instruction. There is also the additional idea of some institution, profession, or state of life, to which the seminary is subordinate, and from which the young plants are after a while transplanted.

"Those pious benefactors to mankind did not mean to establish *seminaries* to prepare men for the world, but to teach them to despise it."—*Knox, Essays*.

A college, like academy, is sometimes used for a formally constituted body which is not educational, as the College of Cardinals. A college in the educational sense is supposed to be under a more public government than school and academy, which may be strictly private. An aggregate of colleges may form an UNIVERSITY, which, however, is not thereby constituted, but rather by being a place of learning *universally* (*universitas*). It has commonly a corporate existence and rights, which are recognised by the state to which it belongs. An university may consist of one or of more than one college.

"As it resembled a royal court in regard of those many noblemen and persons of quality that lived in it, so one might esteem it an *university* for those many accomplished men in all kinds of knowledge and good learning that were his domestics."—*Strype*.

ACCEDE.	YIELD.	ASSENT.	AC-
QUIESCE.	CONSENT.	ACCORD.	
AGREE.	CONCUR.	COINCIDE.	
COMPLY.	CONFORM.	SUBMIT.	

Of these, the simplest and most comprehensive is AGREE (Fr. *agreer*, from *gratus*, agreeable, and from the present sense of which, namely, to accept, the English agree is a deviation), the rest being so many modes of agreement. For agreement may be equally between persons and things, and may imply either harmony of will or mere external similarity, or, in short, anything which is not difference or disagreement.

"Knowledge," says Locke, "seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnance of any of our ideas."

To YIELD (Sax. *gildan*, *geldan*, to pay, yield) is to conform in consequence of some external pressure or some force of entreaty or argument.

"I was not born to yield, thou haughty Scot."
Shakespeare.

It is practical, as to ASSENT (*assentire*) is purely mental, and denotes a concurrence with approval as an act of the judgment.

"Subscription to articles of religion, though no more than a declaration of the subscriber's assent, may properly enough be considered in connection with the subject of oaths, because it is governed by the same rule of interpretations."—*Paley*.

To ACQUIESCE (*ad* and *quies*, rest) is to concur with what is said or done by another in some degree short of a full and hearty concurrence, even with the mere absence of opposition.

"Submission to God's will, and acquiescence in the event disposed by Him."—*Barrow*.

To CONSENT (*consentire*) is to concur for some practical purpose, to agree to act according to the will of another.

"My poverty, and not my will, consents."
Shakespeare.

While to ACCORD (*ad* and *cor*, the heart) denotes an internal harmony and agreement in sentiment, opinion, or character. When one statement accords with another, it is that the meaning, not the form, of one is compatible with the other.

"It strikes me as a very observable instance of providential kindness to man, that such an exact accord has been contrived between his ear and the sounds with which, at least in a rural situation, it is almost every moment visited."—*Cowper*.

Of the above synonyms, it will be seen that accord, concur, and coincide, are involuntary; while accede, yield, assent, acquiesce, consent, comply, conform, and submit, are voluntary, that is, imply a direct inclination of will, and are acts of the mind. AGREE is sometimes voluntary, as to agree to do a thing; sometimes involuntary, as when two things agree. Indeed, agreement may be predicated of number, quantity, size, weight, opinion, feeling, fact, &c. To CONCUR (*con* and *curro*, to run) is to agree in matters of opinion or judgment, as when one judge concurs in the decision of another. So we accord with the sentiments of others, and concur in their views. In short, any things may be said to concur which combine in the same point, or tend to produce the same result.

"The seriousness of his temper and purity of his morals *concurred* with his unappeasable thirst of knowledge to give the presages of future eminence in that profession."—*Hurd, Life of Warburton.*

To COINCIDE denotes an *external* parity or commensurateness, and so is used (*coincidere*, to fall in together) of facts, statements, and views, not of the harmony of feelings, which belongs to accord. It might be used of things purely mathematical, as two triangles may coincide.

"A perfect *coincidence* between truth and goodness."—*South.*

COMPLY and CONSENT (the former from *complicare*, to fold together) very nearly coincide; but compliance implies far more strongly than consent, the surrender of one's own will to that of another; we comply with the wishes of another, *simply as such*; but we might consent to do a thing on its being shown to be for our own interests, or if a sufficient *inducement* were held out to us.

"He that *complies* against his will
Is of the same opinion still."—*Hudibras.*

CONFORM (*con* and *forma*, a form) denotes, as the structure of the word expresses, an external, or, at least, *formal* agreement. We conform only in matters of externals, or in such

opinions as are necessarily connected with them, as in modes of worship, or the doctrines which lead to them, or the opinions, and yet more strictly, the habits and customs of society. The difference between conformity and compliance appears in the following of Locke:—

"I think those who make laws and use force to bring men to church-conformity in religion, seek only the *compliance*, but concern themselves not for the conviction of those they punish."

SUBMISSION (*submittere*) is stronger than yielding. It is the giving up of oneself altogether, the substitution of another's will for one's own. To yield may be negative, but to submit is positive.

"And courage never to *submit* or *yield*."
Milton.

Submit is capable, as the others are not, of an absolutely physical signification, when used transitively.

ACCELERATE. HASTEN. SPEED.
EXPEDITE. DESPATCH. QUICKEN.
URGE. INSTIGATE.

Of these, *hasten*, *speed*, *quicken*, are used both as active and neuter verbs. *Expedite*, *despatch*, *accelerate*, and *urge*, only actively. It is as active verbs that they are here considered.

ACCELERATE (*celer*, quick) has much the sense of the simpler English form quicken (quick, alive, lively, rapid), which is the most generic of all. Accelerate refers to some progress *already begun*, and is applied *not to the object* itself but its movement. In this respect it differs from hasten, which may be employed where *no movement* has as yet begun, in the sense of shortening the interval before something takes place, as to hasten a person's departure. It has a character more purely mechanical than hasten. URGE is employed (*urgere*) in matters in which the operation of persons is concerned, and is only poetically used in the sense of propel mechanically. We say, however, to urge a consideration, argument, plea, and the like. It conveys the idea of hastening, from a feeling of the danger or undesirable-

ness of delay. SPEED in this sense is somewhat old-fashioned, but is used when the idea of prosperous or successful furtherance is intended, without of necessity an increase in the rate of movement. EXPEDITE and DESPATCH (*expedire*, and *dis* and *pangere*) are employed of transactions in business, but expedite refers rather to the hastening of the process, despatch to the attainment of the end. So that both *may* concur in the same phrase, as to expedite the despatch of business. INSTIGATE (Lat. *instigare*) is only used towards persons, and commonly in an unfavourable sense. We urge to honest exertion, and instigate to crime. It may be observed that though the verb accelerate does not admit of the accusative of the object, as to accelerate a horse, it admits the accusative of abstract movements, as to accelerate the speed or the pace. We also sometimes say to accelerate a conclusion. This is no more than to accelerate the process of the completion of which the conclusion is evidence. It is an act of judgment which induces us to accelerate a thing. It is a sustained eagerness which makes us hasten it. It is a favourable wish for the result which makes us speed it. It is consideration which makes us expedite it, and impatience which makes us despatch it. It is conviction which makes us urge it, and distrust of the readiness or energy of another which leads us to instigate or urge *him*.

"Motion may be in an endless variety of directions. It may be quick or slow, rectilineal or curvilineal. It may be equable, or accelerated, or retarded."—*Reid*.

"The two Houses, finding things in this posture, hastened the departure of their commissioners to the Isle of Wight, with powers and instructions to treat with the king."—*Lubbock*.

"Speeder of Night's spies,
And guide of all her dream's obscurities."
Chapman's Homer.

"Your imperial majesty's just influence, which is still greater than your extensive power, will animate and expedite the efforts of other sovereigns."—*Burke*.

"Ere we put ourselves in arms, dispatch we
The business we have talked of."
Shakespeare.

"Like a fruitful garden without a hedge, which quickens the appetite to enjoy so tempting a prize."—*South*.

"My brother did urge me in his act."
Shakespeare.

"He hath only instigated his blackest agents to the very extent of their malignity."
—*Warburton*.

ACCENT. EMPHASIS. STRESS.

Of these, STRESS (Old Eng. *stress*, a shorter form of *distress*, from *dis* and *stringere*) expresses simply that effort at greater force in pronunciation of which *emphasis* and *accent* are different kinds. Metaphorically, stress is used of ideas, as to lay great stress upon such and such a fact or argument. *Accent* is of syllables only, *emphasis* is of words. The object of ACCENT (*accentus*) is grammatical, for the purpose of distinguishing words, that of EMPHASIS (*én* and *φάνω*, to exhibit) is rhetorical, for the purpose of aiding the sense and drawing an idea into prominence. It may be studied and deliberate, or the result of emotion or feeling.

"Agreeably to this (short pronunciation of our words) is a remarkable peculiarity of English pronunciation, the throwing the accent farther back, that is, nearer the beginning of the word, than is done by any other nation."—*Blair*.

"The voice all modes of passion can express,
That marks the proper word with proper stress;
But none emphatic can that actor call,
Who lays an equal emphasis on all."
Lloyd's Actor.

ACCEPT. RECEIVE. TAKE.

Of these, to TAKE, which is the most purely physical (Sax. *tacan*), is employed in the twofold sense of spontaneous assuming and of ready receiving at the hand of another; in other words, to assume with or without the intervention of another person. This twofold force does not belong to either RECEIVE or ACCEPT, which are different forms (*recipere*, and *acceptare*, from *accipere*) of *capio*, to take. To receive implies not of necessity any voluntariness on our part, as we may receive a blow or an insult. Accept implies some voluntariness on our part, which may amount to the

greatest readiness and pleasure. The difference may be illustrated by receiving an apology or an invitation, and accepting it. It is to be noted that accept is not used in this sense of *persons*, whom we always *receive*, sometimes gladly, sometimes ungraciously: while *accept* is an *active and conscious reception*. So much of the purely passive is there in receive, that an inanimate object may be said to receive an impression. We receive what is given us, we accept what is offered us. We receive thanks, and accept services. Receive denotes no more than not refusing. We ought to be always grateful for benefits we have received, and to be very slow in rejecting what we have once accepted.

"And toward the education of your daughters
I here bestow a simple instrument,
And this small packet of Greek and Latin
books,
If you *accept* them, then their worth is
great." *Shakespeare.*

"Justification always supposes two parties, one to give, and another to *receive*, whether without any act at all on the receptive side, as in the case of infants, or whether accompanied by receptive acts, as in the case of adults, who may be properly said to *accept* and assent to, as well as to *receive* and enjoy."—*Waterland.*

ACCEPTABLE. GRATEFUL. WELCOME.

That is **ACCEPTABLE** (*see ACCEPT*) which is gladly to be received as a relative good, that is, which coincides with our circumstances and requirements. But this only within limits, for it is not a strong term. The appropriate belongs essentially to the acceptable. We should be speaking ironically if we said of any gift of great value that it was acceptable. That is acceptable which is suitable in itself and pleasant to receive. The acceptable is determined as much by the judgment as by the feelings. So Reid says:

"If the mind is at any time vacant from every passion and desire, there are still some objects that are more *acceptable* to us than others."

GRATEFUL (*gratus*) expresses generally what is sensibly delightful or consonant with the feelings. Hence, un-

like acceptable, it may be predicated of things which are not gifts at all, nor are of the nature of possessions. A donation of money is grateful to a poor man, but so also is the cool breeze to the fevered patient. As the acceptable excites satisfaction, so the grateful excites joy or pleasure.

"Hope's *grateful* stimulus produces a pleasing and salutary flow of the animal spirits, and diffuses a temperate vivacity over the system."—*Cogan on the Passions.*

WELCOME, as the word plainly indicates, is that which comes to us gladly, but includes, like grateful, many things which are *not gifts*, as for instance, *events, persons, and intelligence.*

"O *welcome* hour." *Milton.*

ACCEPTANCE. ACCEPTATION.

These are two different derivatives of the same word (*see ACCEPT*), but differently employed. **ACCEPTANCE** is *active*, and denotes the *act or process* of receiving.

"Such with him
Finds no *acceptance*, nor can find."
Milton.

ACCEPTATION is *passive*, and denotes the *mode* in which the thing or word is received. So acceptance precedes acceptation. The acceptance of a word would mean the recognition and reception of it into the vocabulary of a language; its acceptation would be its force and meaning after it had been so received.

"Friend, quoth the cur, I meant no harm.
Then why so captious, why so warm?
My words in common *acceptation*
Could never give this provocation."

Gay.

ACCESS. APPROACH.

Both these words are employed of drawing near, and of the line of movement by which it is effected; but **ACCESS** (*Lat. accessus, accedere*) bears reference rather to the *capabilities*, **APPROACH** (*Fr. approcher, proche, prope, near*) to the *way* of drawing near. In approach, the question is as to the *right or wrong line* or method, or the safety or expediency of making it at all. In access, it is as to the *ease or difficulty* of finding or procuring it.

"They anon
With hundreds and with thousands trooping
came
Attended, all access was thronged."

Milton.

But approach is used in more varied senses than access, which commonly means capability of reaching. Approach is the act of drawing near, and is applicable to time as well as space; or, in a secondary sense, bears the meaning of resemblance. It may be observed also that access is a complete, approach a partial, act.

"By thy approach thou mak'st me most
unhappy."

Shakespeare.

ACCESSIBLE. See ACCESS and AFFABLE.

ACCESSION. See ACCESS and INCREASE.

ACCESSORY. See ABETTOR.

ACCIDENT. CHANCE. See CHANCE.

ACCIDENT (Lat. *accidens*, from *accidere*, to befall) is *relative*. CHANCE (*cadentia*, *cadere*, a befalling). The word chance has two distinct meanings; one the absence of assignable cause, the other the absence of design, the cause being nevertheless plainly observable. It is in the second of these that it is more strictly synonymous with accident.

ACCIDENT. CONTINGENCY. CASUALTY. INCIDENT.

All these terms express the occurrence of events in the producing of which our own design had no part. Of these *accident* and *casualty* are more closely *personal* than *contingency* and *incident*. It is to be remarked that though the term accident means in itself no more than a befalling, it is never used without qualification to express the chance occurrence of a *positive good*, in which point it resembles CASUALTY, which always implies *loss or misfortune* (Fr. *casualité*, from *casus*, see CHANCE). A casualty is entirely independent of ourselves; as, for instance, the death of another at a certain moment, or our own. An accident may be partly referrible to our own acts or neglect; but there are

casualties which no prudence could foresee or prevent. A CONTINGENCY (Fr. *contingence*, Lat. *contingere*, to touch upon) is a dependent or resultant occurrence, an event which flows out of antecedent circumstances, themselves fortuitous, and so itself a fortuitous combination. INCIDENT (*incidere*), like accident, betokens a befalling, but without of necessity involving the idea of chance, an event regarded irrespectively of what led to it, but not necessarily precluding the ascertainment of its cause; as an incident in a voyage or a history. It belongs as an additament to some larger transaction or course of events which comprises it. The adjectives formed from these substantives, accidental, contingent, incidental, casual, follow their force, with the exception of the last. The notion of harm which belongs to casualty is not attached to casual, which means simply introduced collaterally, without being to the purpose of the main matter in hand, yet found to coincide with it, as a casual remark in the course of conversation. We see how the term accident was on the turn in Shakespeare's time from an unexpected occurrence to an untoward one in the line.

"Of moving accidents by flood and field."

"The remarkable position of the queen, rendering her death a most important contingency."—Hallam.

"The cause why the children of Israel took unto one man many wives, might be lest the casualties of war should in any way hinder the promise of God concerning their multitude from taking effect in them."—Hooker.

"A writer of lines may descend with propriety to minute circumstances and familiar incidents."—Blair.

ACCIDENTAL. See CASUAL.

ACCLAMATION. See CLAMOUR.

ACCOMMODATE. See ADJUST.

ACCOMMODATING. See CIVIL.

ACCOMPANIMENT. CONCOMITANT. ADJUNCT.

An ACCOMPANIMENT (see ACCOMPANY) is that which goes by nature.

or may be made to go, with another thing by reason of its fitness or harmony. It serves to make more complete.

"We have the same representation of Hymen in an epithalamium, the usual indispensable accompaniment of a wedding."—Warton.

A CONCOMITANT (*con* and *comes*, a companion) is that which follows another by its natural or moral force and tendency, or belongs to it in time.

"The length of this account, I flatter myself, will be excused, as it contains a few curious particulars which are not foreign to the subject, and which concomitantly illustrate the history of the arts."—Walpole.

AN ADJUNCT is that which is joined to another thing, not being of the essential nature of it, or may with advantage be attached, though it is in itself separate (*adjunctus*, participle pass. of *adjungere*, to adjoin).

"The nature, properties, *adjuncts*, and effects of God's law."—Barrow.

ACCOMPANY. ATTEND. ESCORT.

TO ACCOMPANY (to be a companion (*com* and *panis*, bread, literally a messmate) is used both of things and persons. When applied to persons, it indicates an equality of station between the two. TO ATTEND (*ad* and *tendo*, to tend) denotes an inferiority in him who attends. TO ESCORT (Fr. *escorter*, Lat. *ex* and *corrigere*, to correct or set right) implies accompaniment or attendance upon persons for the sake of protection from danger or insult. It is not used with strict correctness of the protection by a single person. When applied to things, accompany indicates rather a simultaneous, attend a consequent, association. So we say such a thing is attended with serious consequences, where we could not employ accompanied. This force the word has in common with the noun attendant, which means often not only an inferior companion, but one who waits or follows upon another. One accompanies another out of regard, or to show him honour, or as an act of friendship, implying pleasure in his society. One escorts from fear of danger on another's behalf to whom we entertain deference;

one attends him out of a more diligent regard, or as discharging a duty, which consists in being ready to take his orders or supply his wants. The subordination implied in attendance may be voluntary, as when a friend out of friendship attends another in sickness.

"The Persian dames
(So were accustom'd all the Eastern fair)
In sumptuous cars accompanied his march."
Glover.

"All knees to Thee shall bow, of them that
bide
In heaven or earth, or under earth, in hell,
When Thou, attended gloriously from
heaven,
Shalt in the sky appear." Milton.

The term escort, which is not one of long standing in the English language, is used of a single person escorting in the following, from Francis's translation of Horace.

"To-day shut out, still onward press,
And watch the seasons of access.
In private haunt, in public meet,
Salute, escort him through the street."

ACCOMPLICE. See ABETTOR.

ACCOMPLISH. EFFECT. EXECUTE. ACHIEVE. PERFORM.

TO ACCOMPLISH (Fr. *accomplir*, Lat. *ad* and *complere*, to fill) denotes the complete fulfilment of a plan proposed in some measure by oneself. One is not said to accomplish the designs of another, but one's own. This is done by no adherence to a fixed course, but by the employment of any resources of which we may be possessed, and any instruments of which we can avail ourselves.

"So shall my word, that goeth forth out of my mouth, not return unto me void, but it shall accomplish that which I please."—Bible.

In this respect it differs from EXECUTE (*execui*, to follow out) which implies a set mode of operation and subservience to another.

"Would it not redound to the discredit of an earthly prince to permit that the attendants on his person, the officers of his court, the executors of his edicts, should have the least injury offered them—should fare scantily or coarsely, should appear in a sordid garb?"—Barrow.

To EFFECT is near akin to accomplish, but we are said to accomplish an object and to effect a purpose. To effect commonly implies some degree of difficulty contended with in the subject-matter, while accomplishment is commonly the result of perseverance and skill.

"The Christian dispensation was necessary to fulfil the purposes of God to man, and to effect that which the divine counsels had decreed in relation to him."—*Hard*.

To ACHIEVE (*achever, chef*, a head, to bring to a head) is to accomplish under special circumstances of difficulty, but differs from to effect in that some degree of *excellence* is attached to the idea either in the striving, or the end striven for, or both.

"No exploits so illustrious as those which have been *achieved* by the faith and patience, by the courage and prudence of the ancient saints. They do far surpass the most famous *achievements* of pagan heroes."—*Barrow*.

To PERFORM (*per* and *forma*, a form), like to execute, is methodical and regular, but performance is more protracted than execution. We may execute well, but it is a defined *work*; we may perform well, but it is a defined *part*. On the other hand, we accomplish, achieve, and effect, in matters in which we are thrown upon our own resources and show ourselves sufficient to help ourselves.

"Some men are brave in battle who are weak in counsel, which daily experience sets before our eyes. Others deliberate wisely, but are weak in the *performing* part."—*Dryden*.

ACCORD. See ACCEDE.

ACCORDANCE. See MELODY.

ACCORDANT. See CONSISTENT.

ACCORDINGLY. See CONSEQUENTLY.

ACCOST. SALUTE. ADDRESS. GREET. HAIL.

ACCOST is from the Latin *ad*, to, and *costa*, a side, to come to the side or up to a person. It had in Old English writers the form *accoast*, which was employed as a geographical term.

"So much of Lapland as *accoasts* the sea."
Faller.

The term denotes of necessity the use of words in a somewhat *unpremeditated* addressing of oneself to another, whom chance circumstances have thrown in one's way. Hence in accosting there is an abruptness which is to be justified by familiarity or necessity.

"If you would convince a person of his mistake, *accost* him not upon that subject when his spirit is ruffled or discomposed with any occurrences of life, and especially when he has heated his passions in the defence of a contrary opinion."—*Watts*.

SALUTE (*salus*, health) is to exhibit on meeting some sign of friendship or respect, which may or may not consist in or be accompanied by words; among acquaintance it is hardly a voluntary act, and is required by the usages of society. It is momentary, and not sustained, like accost and address.

"The most common *salutation* was by the conjunction of their right hands, the right hand being accounted a pledge of fidelity and friendship."—*Potter's Antiquities of Greece*.

To ADDRESS (*Fr. s'adresser, directus*), unlike accost, may be without personal meeting, as by letter. It is more sustained than accost. So we might accost a person for the purpose afterwards of addressing him at length. It involves some matter which is to be placed before him for consideration. Both accost and salute belong to the moment of first meeting. The verb address is sometimes applied directly to the person, sometimes to the thing addressed.

"The shortest and best prayer which we can *address* to Him Who knows our wants and our ignorance in asking, is this, 'Thy will be done.'"—*Bolingbroke*.

GREET (Saxon, *gretan*) is to salute with some demonstration of personal feeling. This is commonly favourable, as to greet with smiles; but usage employs the term in reference to the contrary, as the appearance of an unpopular orator, for instance, is greeted with yells and hisses. It is demonstrative recognition.

"The churches of Asia *salute* you. Aquila and Priscilla *salute* you much in the Lord, with the church that is in their house. All the brethren *greet* you. *Greet* ye one an-

other with an holy kiss. The *salutation* of me Paul with mine own hand."—*Bible*.

HAIL (connected with *heal* and *health*) is in English what salute is, as derived from the Latin, but the etymological force is quite lost, so that the word now merely denotes such an accosting as shall arrest the attention, as when a vessel hails another at sea. It is short and demonstrative address.

"I prayed for children, and thought barrenness

In wedlock a reproach. I gained a son,
And such a son as all then hail'd me
happy.

Who would be now a father in my stead?"

Milton.

ACCOUNT. *See* SAKE.

ACCOUNT. BILL.

As synonyms these words express in common a representation or statement of charges in money. **ACCOUNT** (*computare*, to compute, of which count is an abbreviation) enters more into details than a **BILL** (Old Fr. *bille*, a label or note of the value of anything). Hence bill has commonly but *one* side to it, embodying a charge of one person against another. An account may have *two* sides to it, when a balance is finally struck in favour of one side or party in the account.

"To love's *account* they placed their death
of late,

And now transfer the sad *account* to fate."

Parnell.

The term bill has borne the different senses of a statement in writing of different things, as a bill of indictment, of exchange, of costs, of charges. In the last sense it is familiar enough.

"Ordinary expense ought to be limited by a man's estate, and ordered to the best, that the *bills* may be less than the estimation abroad."—*Bacon*.

ACCOUNT. NARRATIVE. NARRATION. DESCRIPTION. RELATION. RECORD. HISTORY. TALE. MEMOIR. STORY.

Of these **ACCOUNT** is peculiarly specific, and refers to some individual event, or to a subject viewed in its

unity. Yet in itself it is very general, and may be of *any such* matter, as of a political or domestic occurrence, an historical transaction, or a natural phenomenon. It is not a term of high historic dignity. We could not say "Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian war." It bears the broad sense of a detailed or systematic representation, as when Bishop Jewel says—

"For this cause chiefly we thought it good to yield up an *account* of our faith in writing."

Accounts may be vague, coming in from various and unverified sources. Narrative, description, and relation, imply a narrator, describer, and relater.

A **NARRATIVE** (*narrare*, to relate) is of a compound transaction, giving its details in the order of occurrence and with a certain rhetorical style. **NARRATION** differs from it only as the subjective from the objective, that is, the narration is the narrative viewed in connection with the mind and act of the narrator. An account ought to be correct, a narrative full, clear, elegant, yet concise.

"In the *narration* of the poet, it is not material whether he *relate* the whole story in his own character, or introduce some of his personages to *relate* any part of the action that had passed before the poem opens."—*Blair*.

RELATION (Lat. *referre*, *relatus*), which is French in its character, connects the matter closely with the speaker. It is such an account as is given by an individual of facts which he has himself experienced, or at least reproduces as having assimilated or made them his own. A true relation is consonant with personal observation; it is faithful. **HISTORY** is a formal and connected account of many events in series, for which some degree of importance is claimed as illustrative of men and nations; an account standing to a history as an item to a general sum. So we might say the account of the plague of Athens given in the history of Thucydides.

"Secondly, we have likewise a most ancient and credible *history* of the beginning of the world. I mean the *history* of

Moses, with which no book in the world in point of antiquity can contend."—*Tillotson*.

The presumption at least is, that a history is true. This is not necessarily the case with STORY, which may be fictitious; where it is not fictitious, there is still implied an inferior degree of dignity and importance. The word itself is a shorter form of history.

"A story in which native humour reigns,
'Tis often useful, always entertains."

Cooper.

In TALE (which is connected with tell) the subject-matter is commonly fictitious; not of necessity, but because the *primary object is not truth*, but sentiment or amusement, or some other by-purpose, as in *tale-bearing*, or *tale-telling*, which is likely to be a compound of truth and falsehood. A piteous tale may be true or false, but its sentimental character is expressed by tale.

"In thy faint slumbers, I by thee have watch'd,

And heard thee murmur *tales* of iron wars."

Shakespeare.

A DESCRIPTION (*describere*, to write down) professes to be a portraiture in language, giving the fact or the object as it strikes the eye or the mind, with fidelity of representation. It need not therefore be of the nature of a story in itself, though it becomes a kind of story to him to whom it is given; as a description of the appearance of a person, where the sequence is the order of representation, and not of occurrence. Its excellence consists in fine and life-like accuracy. Spenser used the form *discrive*.

"How shall frail pen *discrive* her heavenly face,

For fear, through want of skill, her beauty to disgrace."

A RECORD (*recordari*, to remember) aims at no style, nor at anything but a placing of fact in registration, in such a way as that it may be referred to at some future time.

"The judgment itself and all the proceedings previous thereto are carefully registered and preserved under the name of *records* in public repositories set apart for that particular purpose."—*Blackstone*.

A MEMOIR or MEMOIRS (Fr. *mémoire*, Lat. *memoria*, memory) is a connected though not necessarily complete or exhausting account of incidents, which are given either as the most prominent or the most accessible. Memoirs are the materials of history.

ACCOUNTABLE. ANSWERABLE.
RESPONSIBLE. LIABLE. AMENABLE.
OBNOXIOUS.

ACCOUNTABLE (*see* ACCOUNT) means literally liable to be compelled to give an account. It is sometimes, like *responsible*, used in the abstract sense of being possessed of reason, and being master of one's actions. As a synonym with the above-mentioned, it denotes in a marked manner a personal service or relationship, which is subordinate to some superior power, as a steward is accountable to his employer.

"The first point to be endeavoured after is to impress upon children the idea of *accountableness*, that is, to accustom them to look forward to the consequences of their actions in another world."—*Paley*.

This specific *subordination* does not belong to RESPONSIBLE (Lat. *respondere*, to give an answer), which is far more general, as when one says of another that he holds a responsible office, we may mean one of great personal influence and dignity, but one of much *moral*, not necessarily personal or *political*, responsibility.

"He has been pleased to ask, 'Is the doctor willing to be *responsible* at last for the nature, quality, and tendency of all his notions?'"—*Waterland*.

ANSWERABLE, which is in English what responsible is in Latin, commonly implies a liability voluntarily incurred, as when a man makes himself personally answerable for the conduct or obligations of another, or is answerable for the consequences of his own acts. Accountable and answerable express the fact; responsible the nature and condition.

"If I pay money to a banker's servant, the banker is *answerable* for it."—*Blackstone*.

Hence, there is in answerable a

latent force which does not belong to responsible, that of being *liable to punishment* in case of failure in trust or duty. It is this sense which comes out more strongly in *OBNOXIOUS* (Lat. *obnoxius*, liable, answerable). It commonly denotes that the stage has been reached when the possible position of the answerable has become actual, and punishment or resentment may be expected in consequence of the liability incurred.

"Our *obnoxiousness* to the curse of the law for sin had exposed us to all the extremity of misery, and made death as due to us as wages to the workman."—*South*.

AMENABLE (Fr. *amener*, to lead or guide) means liable to some thing or person which has an inherent power to bind or compel, as laws, rules, authority. It sometimes has the further sense of a natural willingness to recognise such power, as when one is amenable to discipline, advice, or reason.

"The sovereign of this country is not *amenable* to any form of trial known to the laws."—*Junius*.

LIABLE (Fr. *lier, ligare*, to bind) expresses in a simple and comprehensive manner a relative capability of being acted upon, and not only has nothing of the moral dignity of responsible, but is applicable even to merely physical influences, as liable to be tarnished by damp. It is used of certain common obligations, as to be liable for the debts of another. This would mean that a power would be forthcoming to compel their payment. To be answerable for them would mean that this power resulted from some relation to the debtor, natural or assumed, on the part of the third party. I am liable by law. I am answerable by my own acts or self-incurred obligations.

"In geometry we are not *liable* to adopt the same paradoxical conclusions as in algebra, because the diagrams to which our attention is directed serve as a continual check on our reasoning powers."—*Stewart*.

ACCREDIT. ENTRUST. DELEGATE. COMMISSION. DEPUTE.

These words express in common the idea of reposing trust or authority

in another for a purpose of one's own. The simplest and most general is to **ENTRUST**, literally to place in a position of trust, of which the others are varieties. We may entrust persons with offices, property, and even secrets.

"He (the Lord of all the families of the earth) will enter into a severe scrutiny how we have employed all those talents that He hath *entrusted* us with."—*Sharp*.

ACCREDIT is to place in the position of acting as one's representative, and of showing himself to be so in a formal and public manner if necessary, as by giving him credentials. It is a term of diplomacy. (Lat. *accreditare, credere*, to believe or trust.)

"I am better pleased indeed that he (the reviewer) censures some things, than I should have been with unmixed commendation, for his censure will (to use the new diplomatic term) *accredit* his praises."—*Courper*.

It differs from **DELEGATE** (Lat. *delegare*, to depute) in being more general, and implying a greater freedom of responsible action, while delegate implies a specific appointment for a certain purpose, beyond which the powers of the person delegated do not extend.

"This change from an immediate state of procurement and *delegation* to a course of acting as from original power, is the way in which all the popular magistracies in the world have been perverted from their purposes."—*Burke*.

DEPUTE is more restricted still, the duty being more defined and pointed; the deputy has little or no discretion, and merely does what the other is not present to do in person.

To **COMMISSION** differs from *depute*, in that the latter may refer to a continuous charge or vicarious office. To *commission* does not go beyond a single act or work. There is not so strong a character of personal representation in commission as in depute. A commission, for instance, may be one of investigation or inquiry in the public interest.

"The assembling of persons *deputed* from persons at great distances one from another,

is trouble to them that are sent, and charge to them that send."—*Sir W. Temple.*

"We are to deny the supposition that he (Moses) was a private person at that time of killing the Egyptian, but that he was even then *commissioned* by God, Governor of Israel; and, consequently, in the right of a governor, might revenge the wrong done to his subjects."—*South.*

ACCURUE. SUPERVENE. RESULT.

The idea common to these terms is that of one thing coming upon another. In ACCURUE (Fr. *accroître*, Lat. *accrescere*) that which accrues comes by the natural tendency of its cause to induce it, as wealth accrues from industry, that is, there is in industry an inherent tendency to produce wealth. Accrue is also a relative term. It involves the idea of some person to whose benefit or harm the thing accrues.

"Good men consult their piety as little as their judgment and experience, when they admit the great and essential advantages *accruing* to society from the freedom of the press, yet indulge themselves in peevish or passionate exclamations against the abuses of it."—*Junius.*

SUPERVENE (Lat. *supervenire*, to come upon another thing) expresses the fact of sequence without any palpable connection of cause and effect, but rather implying that the second occurrence came unexpectedly, as a man broke his leg by a fall, fever supervened, and he died. RESULT (*resilio*, *resulto*, to spring back), on the other hand, denotes that the second occurrence is what might naturally be anticipated from the first. See RESULT.

"His good will, when placed on any, was so fixed and rooted, that even *supervening* vice, to which he had the greatest detestation imaginable, could not easily remove it."—*Fell's Life of Hammond.*

ACCUMULATE. See HEAP.

ACCURATE. See EXACT.

ACCUSE. See CHARGE.

ACHIEVE. See ACCOMPLISH.

ACHIEVEMENT. See EXPLOIT.

ACKNOWLEDGE. OWN. CONFESS. AVOW. See RECOGNIZE.

To ACKNOWLEDGE is, as the word expresses, to admit that one has knowledge. Its element of publicity it has in common with the other synonyms. It denotes the public recognition of certain sorts of relationship, as to acknowledge a fault, or to acknowledge a son, a favour, a debt. These relationships are of the nature of simple facts, and stop short of actual claims of property or possession, which are expressed by to OWN, as to own a son (Old English *owen*, an adjective, as in my "own," from which the verb is derived). Hence, to own is the more comprehensive of the two. It is to acknowledge before another what is referrible to oneself. Both to acknowledge and to own commonly imply some *degree* of ignorance, doubt, or previous concealment, as in the case of faults acknowledged or owned, which before were only imputed. We acknowledge and own in cases where one evidence supplements the suspicion of others. On the other hand, to CONFESS (Lat. *confiteor*, *confessus*) may be of some action of which the persons to whom we speak may be *absolutely* ignorant, as in the voluntary confession of a penitent to a priest. If the action be known, but not the author, the declaration would be an owning of it, or acknowledging the fact of one's authorship of it. The essence of acknowledging an offence, however, consists in declaring our own consciousness of it; so that we may acknowledge a fault even after we have been known and proved to have committed it. If both the doer and the deed were known, we should hardly use the term confess. Yet a prisoner is said to make a full confession even after he has been judged and sentenced. This is probably because his confession is regarded as perfecting the evidence against him, or making his crime a matter of *absolute* knowledge. We confess actions, we acknowledge facts, we own our participation in those facts. It may be added that acknowledge and own are applied to matters of less grave moment than confess. We confess sins and crimes,

we acknowledge and own errors, mistakes, faults, and minor offences.

"To acknowledge and confess our manifold sins and wickedness."—*Book of Common Prayer.*

"I follow'd Nature's laws and must avow
I broke my bonds and fled the fatal blow."
Dryden.

" 'And now my dear,' cried she to me, 'I will fairly own that it was I that instructed my girls to encourage our landlord's addresses.' "—*Goldsmith.*

TO AVOW (*avouer*) is to own, acknowledge, or confess with frankness. We do not avow what we are ashamed of; but we avow our motives, reasons, opinions and the like spontaneously, as holding them to be right; we confess spontaneously, as admitting to be wrong; we acknowledge and own what we are charged with.

ACQUAINT. See INFORM.

ACQUAINTANCE. FAMILIARITY.
INTIMACY.

ACQUAINT is from the old French *coint*, a form of *cognitus*, *known*, in Latin. ACQUAINTANCE is that slight knowledge of another which springs from occasional intercourse. The word acquaintance has, however, a generic force which may be modified, so that we may speak of a slight or an intimate, a superficial or an accurate acquaintance with persons or subjects, literature or authors.

"Contract no friendship, or even acquaintance with a guileful man. He resembleth a coal, which, when hot, burneth the hand, and when cold, blacketh it."—*Sir W. Jones, Translations.*

FAMILIARITY (*familiaris*, belonging to the family, *familia*, a household) is the result of continued acquaintance and daily intercourse, which brings us in contact only with the outside of a person's character and circumstances, and produces freedom of demeanour without any deep sympathy with, or close knowledge of him. Familiarity is often employed of such close acquaintance as is either barely permissible morally, or somewhat contrary to the customs of society, as in the case of easy intercourse between persons of unequal standing.

"All this was before his (Horace's) acquaintance with Mæcenas, and his introduction into the court of Augustus, and the familiarity of that great emperor."—*Dryden.*

INTIMACY (*intimus*, most close) implies such sympathy and knowledge supported by friendship, sustained intercourse, and interchange of thought and feeling. Acquaintance and familiarity may be also used of facts and processes or circumstances. Intimacy is confined to persons, though we say an intimate knowledge or acquaintance.

"If it were so needful before the Fall, when man was much more perfect in himself, how much more is it needful now, against all the sorrows and casualties of this life, to have an intimate and speaking help, a ready and reviving associate in marriage."—*Milton.*

ACQUIESCE. See ACCEDE.

ACQUIRE. OBTAIN. GAIN. WIN.
EARN. ATTAIN. PROCURE.

TO ACQUIRE (*acquirere*) is a continuous process, in which we get something by our own efforts and abilities. Industry and talent are commonly requisite for acquiring, and we use the term of solid and beneficial results (but sometimes of the contrary, as to acquire a bad name).

"No virtue is acquired in an instant, but step by step."—*Barrow.*

TO OBTAIN (*Fr. obtenir*, Lat. *obtineo*) implies less of continuousness in the efforts to get the thing obtained, which may even be done through the means of others; as when a young man obtains a valuable appointment through interest, without having acquired by patience and industry the qualifications of the position. One may obtain by patience, by energy, by honourable or dishonourable means, by entreaty, fraud, force, or luck.

"Some pray for riches, riches they obtain."
Dryden.

GAIN (*Fr. gagner*) implies personal effort, which has resulted in the valuable or desirable.

"What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?"—*Bible.*

So we acquire learning, we obtain our object, whatever it may be, we gain rewards, distinction, public favour, a livelihood, advancement.

To WIN (Saxon *winnan*) is to gain with the notion of specific chances against us or against competitors. To have gained is satisfactory, to have won is happy or lucky also. It may be even purely lucky, as to win a toss. So a general gains a battle, or obtains the victory abstractedly; but he wins the day as against his adversary and all the chances of war. Hence it follows that there is attached to the idea of winning an exercise of skill or tact, which does not belong by any means so prominently to obtaining, gaining, or acquiring.

"And whereas religion is the greatest *winner* of men's affections, he (Essex) endeavoured to allure unto him the Puritans and their ministers, whom the queen did not at all like of, and withal the Papists, by seeming to pity their afflicted condition."—*Camden*.

To EARN (Saxon *earnian*, *gearnian*) is a relative term, and signifies the getting of a thing by exhibiting such an amount of qualification as leads or entitles to it, as a labourer earns his wages by rightly doing the right amount of work, or a soldier earns distinction or promotion by doing his duty, or by his bravery. Like acquire, it is sometimes used in an unfavourable sense.

"You then who are initiated into the mysteries of the blindfold goddess, inform me whether I have a right to eat the bread I have *earned* by the hazard of my life or the sweat of my brow."—*Burke*.

To ATTAIN (Lat. *attinere*), which is used as an intransitive as well as an active verb, indicates a mark proposed beforehand, or abstractedly, which has been reached. All degrees of effort are implied in it, and sometimes no effort at all, as, "he has attained the age of forty years." When used as an intransitive verb, it is commonly found associated with some expression indicative of degree, as to attain to perfection, or to attain to a high degree of excellence.

"While we are curious in tracing the progress of barbarism, we wonder more that any arts existed than that they *attained* no degree of perfection."—*Walpole*.

PROCURE (Lat. *procurare*) denotes acquirement through a careful use of means to the end, and applies to such things as are regarded as needful or desirable to possess; so we should say, to obtain honour and to procure the necessities of life.

"Such dress as may enable the body to endure the different seasons, the most unenlightened nations have been able to *procure*."
—*Johnson*.

ACQUIREMENT. ACQUISITION.

Both are from the same verb, *acquirere*, to acquire; but the former regards the process, the latter the result. We say the acquirement of learning or good habits (or loosely, even bad habits), and the acquisition of wealth, because when they denote results, acquisition is applied to material or physical, acquirement to moral and intellectual things. The acquirements of literature, the acquisitions of fortune.

"It (the Gospel) is not confined to persons whose intellectual excellences are superior to their neighbours, or who exceed others in understanding and the *acquirements* of the mind."—*Watts*.

"His cook, an *acquisition* made in France, Might put a Chloe out of countenance."
Churchill.

ACQUIT. See ABSOLVE.

ACRIMONY. ASPERITY. ANIMOSITY. TARTNESS. HARSHNESS.

ACRIMONY (Lat. *acrimonia*, from *acer*, sharp) denotes a deep-seated bitterness of feeling, which shows itself in language and manner. It may or may not be personal, and may be generally excited by the recollection of circumstances, as, "he could not allude to the event without acrimony." Acrimony is the result of disappointment or wrong, real or supposed, or personal dislike, or may be roused by ill-tempered disputations and criticisms. Acrimony is a kind of habitual bitterness of character showing itself in small things. It is the mark of a small mind. As a scientific term, it is applied to a certain character of the humours of the body or of plants, which corrodes other bodies, as the acrimony of the bile or of the juices of certain herbs; hence its secondary meaning of a

biting sharpness produced by an embittered spirit.

"Those milks (in certain plants) have all an *acrimony*, though one would think they should be lenitive."—*Bacon*.

"Like a lawyer, I am ready to support the cause; in which give me leave to suppose that I shall be soon retained with ardour, and, if occasion be, with subtlety and *acrimony*."—*Bolingbroke*.

ANIMOSITY, on the other hand, is *essentially personal*, it is an active and energetic dislike (Lat. *animosus*, vigorous). It commonly springs from some personal or party feud, as the animosities of race and of religion. It is a violent, irritable, and inconsiderate hatred.

"How apt nature is, even in those who profess an eminence in holiness, to raise and maintain *animosities* against those whose calling or person they pretend to find cause to dislike."—*Bishop Hall*.

ASPERITY (*asper*, rough) relates rather to the *manner* than to the disposition. It is a rough way of dealing with others, which is not incompatible with kindness of heart, and is widely different therefore from acrimony and animosity, which are essentially uncharitable. Asperity is opposed to mildness, as when a reproof just in itself is conveyed with asperity.

"I hope it is no very cynical *asperity* not to confess obligations where no benefit has been received."—*Johnson*.

HARSHNESS is much the same thing in English as asperity derived from the Latin. We commonly use the term not of the manner or nature generally, but of some incidental act or word, and it conveys for the most part the idea of *needless or unwarranted severity*, proceeding from want of feeling, as a harsh observation.

"No complaint is more feelingly made than that of the *harsh* and rugged manners of persons with whom we have an intercourse."—*Blair*.

TARTNESS is that *slight asperity* which is more unbecoming than bitter, and indicates inconsiderateness and self-conceit. It is the fault especially of some women and of children. When used of words and acts, it denotes a pungent readiness, as in the following:

"One jeeringly saluted him, Good morrow, bishop quondam; to whom Bonner as *tartly* replied, Good morrow, knave semper."—*Fuller*.

ACT. See OPERATE.

ACT. ACTION. DEED.

ACT and DEED are etymologically almost the same thing, act (*actum*, *agere*) meaning deed (or thing done). They are, however, viewed from different points. The deed is the simple result, viewed as it were historically; the act is the result viewed in connection with the power and will of the doer. Deeds are good or bad; acts are voluntary or involuntary. In many cases action and act are convertible, but some distinction between them is observable. Act is never used of things mechanical; when so used, action is equivalent to mechanical movement, as the action of a steam-engine. An act is the simple exertion of physical or mental power; an action is a complex exertion of the same, and is more continuous, and occupies more time. To poke the fire is an act; to reconcile friends who have quarrelled is a praiseworthy action. Hence the action often comprises several acts under itself which go to make it up. The act emanates simply from power. The action involves the mode in which the power is exercised. Momentary intentions and impulses show themselves in acts, especially hasty decisions in rash acts; but, as the life and character of a man, such are his actions. When we speak of the moral character, or of any quality as specifically manifesting itself in something done, we use the term act, not action. So generally, good or bad actions; but specifically, an act of faith, of charity, of prudence, of folly, of desperation.

"'Tis a rule that great designs of state should be mysterious till they come to the very *act* of performance, and then they should turn to performance."—*Howell*.

"The Lord is a God of knowledge, and by His *actions* are weighed."—*Bible*.

A deed is the result of an act, or an act regarded externally in its issues and consequences, and with reference to what is visible and

tangible about it. It is remarkable that the acts of bodies or communities are not called deeds, which belong to individuals only. In many cases act and deed may be used interchangeably. Yet it is no tautology to say, This is my act and deed. It is my act so far as I myself and no other does it. It is my deed, inasmuch as the thing is completed in form and validity.

"The monarch, blinded with desire of wealth,
With steel invades his brother's life by stealth;
Before the sacred altar made him bleed,
And long from her concealed the cruel deed."
Dryden.

ACTION. See ATTITUDE and BATTLE.

ACTIVE. See BUSY and DILIGENT.

ACTIVITY. See ENERGY and ALERTNESS.

ACTOR. PLAYER. PERFORMER.

Of these, PERFORMER is the least specific, inasmuch as the performance may be not of a dramatic character at all, as a performer on a musical instrument. (See ACCOMPLISH.)

"It is usual, I believe, to thank the performers in a new play for the exertion of their several abilities."—*Sheridan.*

The difference between ACTOR and PLAYER is that the latter is incompatible with high art. So we should say an actor of celebrity, a strolling player. A player is essentially professional, and acts for hire; an actor might exhibit his talent in private theatricals, or for mere love of the art. Hence when persons perform, as it were, insincere parts on the stage of life, professing what they do not feel, or dissembling for their own ends, we call them *actors*, not players. In the following the poet purposely uses the lower word—

"All the world's a stage,
And all the men and women merely players."
Shakespeare.

Not so the following—

"Like a dull actor, now I have forgot my part,
And I am out even to a full disgrace."
Shakespeare.

ACTUAL. TRUE. POSITIVE.
VERITABLE. REAL. CERTAIN.

Of these, TRUE is the simplest (Saxon *treowe*), and VERITABLE expresses, in a more learned way (*veritas*, truth), that which may be *ascertained* to be true on inquiry or evidence, as opposed to the feigned. Truth is expressed whenever subject and predicate are rightly united in an affirmative or negative proposition.

"Our ideas being nothing but bare appearances or perceptions in our minds, cannot properly and simply in themselves be said to be *true* or *false*, no more than a single name of anything can be said to be *true* or *false*."—*Locke.*

The use of *veritable* is a little strained on purpose in the following—

"This emperor was so wise in all things, that among them that were merry he was of great mirth; and in verities he was very *veritable*."—*Golden Book.*

More simply in this—

"Where the real works of nature or *veritable* acts of story are to be described, digressions are aberrations."—*Brown's Vulgar Errors.*

POSITIVE implies that the truth is so ascertained as to exclude all possibility of doubt or question, being a matter of demonstration, as distinct from inference (*ponere, positus*, to lay down). ACTUAL belongs to that which has passed out of the state of mere probability or possibility. As a term of the scholastic philosophy, it was opposed to potential. It is the *conceivable realized*. As actual is opposed to possible, probable, or conceivable, true to false, positive to dubious, or illative and veritable to supposititious, so REAL is opposed to imaginary. It belongs to that which has an existence of its own, and not only such as our fancy might attribute to it. That is CERTAIN of which the necessary cause has happened or will happen. The cause being ascertained, *the effect is certain*. Hence, unlike the rest, it may be predicated of that which has not yet occurred; as the rising of the sun to-morrow is certain, that is, follows from the knowledge or experience which we possess. Certainty is the subjective form of truth,

the recognition of a thing as sure. (See SURE.)

"How insensibly old age steals on, and how often it is *actually* arrived before we suspect it."—*Corper*.

"'Tis *positive* 'gainst all exception."
—*Shakespeare*.

"Our simple ideas are all *real*. All agree to the *reality* of things."—*Locke*.

"I hope before I have done to make it evident that this way of *certainty* by the knowledge of our own ideas goes a little farther than bare imagination; and I believe it will appear that all the *certainty* of general truths a man has lies in nothing else."—*Locke*.

"That something has *really* existed from eternity is one of the *certainest* and most evident truths in the world, acknowledged by all men and disputed by none."—*Clarke*.

ACTUATE. IMPEL. INDUCE.

ACTUATE (Lat. *actus*, an impulse) refers to such motives as are felt to be sufficient to lead us to a line of conduct. It involves a deliberate choice of action, whatever the nature of such action may be.

"He that studies to represent one of known and eminent merit to be a mere fool and an idiot, gives himself the lie, and betrays that he is either *actuated* with envy or corrupted by a faction."—*Bentley*.

TO IMPEL (*impellere*, to drive on) expresses rather the involuntary yielding to a force irresistible or unresisted, as to be impelled by passion or by threats.

"A bloodhound train, by Rapine's lust *impelled*."
—*Falconer*.

INDUCE (*inducere*, to lead on) expresses a milder constraint, and such as results from reason, judgment, or persuasion, as one may be induced to do so and so by a consideration of all the circumstances of a case. It is applicable not only to matters of practical preference, but also to mental action, as to be induced to expect, hope, or believe something; while impel and actuate belong only to courses of conduct practically.

"Offer a man a gratuity for doing anything, for seizing, for example, an offender, he is not obliged by your offer to do it. Nor would he say he is, though he may

be *indured*, persuaded, prevailed upon, tempted."—*Paley*.

ACUTE. KEEN. SHREWD. SAGACIOUS. SHARP. See KEEN.

SHARP and ACUTE are much the same (*acutus*, *acuo*, to sharpen). Sharp (Saxon, *searp*) expresses the lowest order of human quickness of perception, like the animal's; while acute expresses sharpness of observation and understanding. KEEN (Saxon, *cene*) belongs more to sensation or quick perception of things, as a keen insight into the nature of a case, or a keen sense of the ridiculous. Sharp, acute, and keen are employed of matters of pure sensation, or in which the idea of mental perception is entirely subordinate, as sharp pain, acute disease, a keen sense of shame; where it will be seen that the two former belong more naturally to physical, the last to moral pain.

"Many other things belong to the material world, wherein the *sharpest* philosophers have not yet obtained clear ideas."—*Watts*.

"Chrysippus, the *acute*st of all the Stoics, was at first a racer."—*Bentley*.

"Their weekly frauds his *keen* replies detect;
He undeceives more fast than they infect."
—*Dryden*.

SHREWD is originally the perfect participle of the verb to shrew, and has passed through several meanings before reaching its present. It signified first, disposed to scold, then to find fault, and lastly to be critical or discerning. It still savours of its origin, and the shrewd person is he who is practically clever at analyzing motives, and accounting for conduct by a kind of intuitive power. SAGACIOUS (*sagax*) is less objective, and has less to do with others and more with oneself. It is a higher quality, involving practical wisdom of conduct, the manifestation of certain faculties of practical understanding inherent in the nature. Sagacity is practical intelligence. It is penetrative and separative, but, unlike shrewdness, goes on from perception and discrimination to action. It detects the hidden, unravels the complicated, tracks the intricate, solves the difficult, elucidates the obscure.

"Some of the observers on board the Centurion *shrewdly* suspected from the appearance of his armour, that instead of steel it was only composed of a particular kind of glittering paper."—*Anson's Voyages*.

"A quickness in the mind to find out these intermediate ideas (that shall discover the agreement or disagreement of any other), and to apply them right is, I suppose, that which is called *sagacity*."—*Locke*.

ADAGE. See PROVERB.

ADAPT. See FIT.

ADD. ANNEX. APPEND.

To ADD (Lat. *addere*) is simply to put one thing to another, and is applicable both to number and quantity. The process of addition presupposes a material mass, a numerical sum, or a logical aggregate, as to add to a heap of gold, or to two hundred, or to the comfort and happiness of mankind.

"All the praises and commendations of the whole world can *add* no more to the real and intrinsic value of a man than they can *add* to his stature."—*Swift*.

To ANNEX (*annectere, annexum*, to tie or bind together) is not used of number, and implies the inferiority, subordination, or relative smallness of the thing annexed, as a province of an empire, or a condition to a grant. The term wears a legal air.

"With regard to the other adjacent islands which are subject to the crown of Great Britain, some of them are comprised within some neighbouring county, and are therefore to be looked upon as *annexed* to the mother island, and part of the kingdom of England."—*Blackstone*.

To APPEND (Lat. *appendere*) is to join in such a way that the purpose of that to which it is joined may be more fully answered. It implies a posteriority of relationship, and may even be the result of after-thought. The latter case is more distinctly expressed by *subjoin*; but *append* admits, as *subjoin* does not, of a purely physical application. We may append a seal to a watch-chain, or a codicil to a will, or a clause to a document, which shall have a modifying force in amplification or restriction.

"There is a further purpose *appended* to the primary one."—*J. Taylor*.

ADDRESS. See DEXTERITY and TACT.

ADDRESS. SPEECH. ORATION. HARANGUE.

Of these, ADDRESS (Lat. *ad* and *dirigere*, to direct) derives a specific character from the character of the person or persons to whom it is made. This may be an individual or an assembly. The address may be purely spoken, or read, or written; and recognizes a peculiar capacity in the object of the address. It is a formal statement in reference to some subject or occasion. The address should be appropriate, clear, and tempered to the quality, character, and circumstances of the persons addressed, whose attention it is desired to interest. It must not be wanting in tact, or tedious in length; nor over elaborate on the one hand, nor flippant on the other; respectful, yet truthful and without fulsomeness. It is the generic term under which the others are comprised, so that the term is often used of the *mode*, as well as the matter of address.

"See, they approach.

This grove shall shroud me till they cease their strain,
Then I'll address them with some feigned tale."—*Mason*.

A SPEECH is essentially unwritten, and is a kind of unwritten dissertation upon some *subject to which it owes its unity*, without being specifically directed to any person, but only uttered in their hearing, as bearing upon topics of common interest to speaker and hearer. It should be ready, fluent, neat. In the case of speeches in Parliament, the speech sometimes rises to the dignity of an oration; on the other hand, speeches from the hustings are commonly harangues.

"Every circumstance in their *speeches* and actions is with justice and delicacy adapted to the persons who speak and act."—*Addison*.

In a play, a set form of words of some length is called generally a speech, even though it should be a soliloquy. An address always implies some other to whom the address is made.

AN ORATION (*oratio*) is a formal public speech, laying claim to a lofty and refined character, being necessarily, what speeches are occasionally, the result of premeditation and study, which is only due to its gravity and dignity, for the term is applied, not like speech, to ordinary, but only to extraordinary occasions of rhetorical effort.

"And after the procession, the king himself remaining seated in the quire, the Lord Archbishop, upon the grace of the quire, made a long *oration*."—*Bacon*.

HARANGUES (Fr. *harangue*, possibly connected with ring) are such speeches as have for their object the raising of the feelings, or the giving vent to them, and so are not subject to the rules of an oration, but admit of any style, however discursive, and are untrammelled by the laws of taste. They are modes of address often resorted to on occasions when orations would be thrown away or unlistened to.

"The author of the Ecclesiastical Polity had in so many books of his own endeavoured to *harangue* up the nation into fury against tender consciences."—*Marcel*.

ADDUCE. ALLEGE. ASSIGN.
ADVANCE.

ADDUCE (*adducere*, to lead to) is simply to bring in what generally bears upon a statement or a case to be established, as an argument, a quotation, or even, abstractedly, a consideration.

"The price had, it seems, before the tax, been a monopoly price, and the argument *adduced* to show that sugar was an improper subject of taxation demonstrated, perhaps, that it was a proper one."—*Adam Smith*.

TO ALLEGE (Fr. *alleguer*, Lat. *allegare*) is to bring forward something which is of the nature of a plea, excuse, or justification, and therefore implies some kind of antecedent charge or burden of proof.

"Courageous chief!

The first in flight from pain, hadst thou
alleg'd

To thy deserted host this cause of flight,
Thou surely hadst not come sole fugitive."

Milton.

TO ASSIGN (Lat. *assignare*) is specifically to point out something by

way of cause, origin, or account to another.

"The only adequate and assignable reason of the difference is, that the latter have a source to draw from which was unknown to the former."—*Bishop Porteus*.

TO ADVANCE (Fr. *avancer*, *avant*, *ab ante*) is voluntarily to put forward something against which we challenge argument, and which we are prepared to defend. In argumentative attack we *advance*, in defence we *allege*.

"I have heard of one that having *advanced* some erroneous doctrines of philosophy, refused to see the experiments by which they were confuted."—*Johnson*.

ADEQUATE. SUFFICIENT. COMPETENT. PROPORTIONATE. COMMENSURATE.

ADEQUATE (Lat. *adæquatus*, *æquus*, equal) means literally made equal to, or brought to the level of another thing. It expresses the equalisation, not of quantities, but of forces, powers, or resources. It is the coming up to some mental or ideal requirement in reference to a practical, intellectual, or moral standard.

"To fear God, that is wisdom, that is, is the proper and *adequate* wisdom suitable to human nature and to the condition of mankind."—*Hale*.

SUFFICIENT (Lat. *sufficere*) bears reference to some pre-existent demand, or some future purpose, or both, which the sufficient is enough to meet or supply.

"Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof."—*Bible*.

COMPETENT (*competere*, to be able) is used of mental endowments and attainments, or of personal qualifications or attributes, as a competent person, a competent knowledge. PROPORTIONATE (Fr. *proportion*, Lat. *proportio*) is not necessarily personal, and indicates the just relationship of one thing to another in magnitude, quantity, or power. COMMENSURATE (*con* and *mensura*, measure) expresses a coincidence or equality in measure or extent of a fixed character, while proportionate might denote a concurrent relationship, according to

circumstances, which may make it variable. Proportionate is equally applicable to physical and moral things, while to use commensurate of equality of length or space would be forced and pedantic. The idea of proportion is not identical with that of commensuration. In the commensurate there are only two terms, in the proportionate there are at least three, perhaps four. A is commensurate with B. But, in proportion, as A is to B, so is C, or as A is to B, so is B to C, or as A is to B, so is C to D. Proportion presupposes a rule of relationship. Commensurateness only asserts, as it were, a geometrical coincidence. The rental of a man's house is commensurate with his income, would mean that all his income went to pay his rent. His rent is in proportion to his income, presupposes a rule that what a man pays in rent ought not to exceed a certain *portion* of his income. Hence, in commensurateness, there is no idea but that of totality; in proportion there is that of division and distribution also.

"There is, I think, not one of the liberal arts which may not be *competently* learned in the English language."—*Idler*.

"O let us be sure then our confidence, our claims to heaven, improve not above their *proportion*, that we preserve this symmetry of the parts of grace; that our hope be but *commensurate* to our sincerity, our daringness to our duty."—*Hammond*.

ADHERE. See CLEAVE.

ADHERENT. FOLLOWER. PARTIZAN. DISCIPLE.

Of these, the simple word FOLLOWER expresses one who follows another in a capacity of common subordination, as in the case of Falstaff and his followers. Afterwards one who follows parties, or principles, as a follower of the creed of Mahomet, a follower of Calvin, a follower of the doctrines of the French Revolution. When the follower is such in consequence of an inherent belief in the truth or right of such doctrines or principles, he becomes a DISCIPLE (*discere*, to learn), as learning or having learnt to believe in them. An ADHERENT (*adharere*, to stick to)

manifests his attachment in a public way, and the term is commonly employed of those who *openly* support persons or causes. PARTIZAN indicates more strongly such an attachment to a cause or to opinions as leads to an attachment to those who hold them. It is the feeling of the relationship of disciples in an energetic and exclusive degree, and is commonly taken to involve an excessive or one-sided attachment to a party or cause.

"Luther and his *adherents* hold this heresy, that all holy order is nothing."—*Sir T. More*.

"No Indian prince has to his palace
More followers than a thief to the gallows."
Hudibras.

"The monarchy and aristocratical and popular *partizans* have been jointly laying their axes to the root of all government, and have in their turn proved each other absurd and inconvenient."—*Burke*.

"We are not the *disciples* of Voltaire."—*Burke*.

ADJACENT. See CONTIGUOUS.

ADJECTIVE. See EPITHET.

ADJOINING. See CONTIGUOUS.

ADJOURN. See PROROGUE.

ADJURE. See IMPORE.

ADJUST. ARRANGE. ACCOMMODATE. ADAPT.

ADJUST is to set right (Fr. *juste*, straight, right). Hence the word implies some relative order, shape, or standard, to which matters have to be brought, or some antecedent condition of *inherent* fitness, to which they have to be reduced. To ADAPT, on the other hand, is to modify or alter, so as to suit some *external* object or purpose (*ad* and *aptus*, fit). ARRANGE (Fr. *arranger*) is to place in an orderly condition. Arrangement is the exercise of free will, choice, taste, or judgment in establishing the collocation of many objects, physical or ideal, in suberviency to those principles. It is an action involving juxtaposition and separation of many things, and may be for the purpose of practical efficiency and availableness, for scientific

precision, or pleasurable effect, or any other such cause.

ACCOMMODATE (*ad, con, and modus*, a limit, or measure) is to bring one or more things into conformity with one or more others. Like adapt, accommodate implies a modification to meet a required end; but as the end of adaptation is an external purpose, so that of accommodate is internal convenience and harmony or fitness of affairs or parts one with another, so as to make them square. We accommodate when we make one thing supply what the other demands, as to accommodate an event to a prophecy.

"The progressive action depends for its success upon the nicest and minutest *adjustment* of the parts concerned."—*Paley*.

"In vain you attempt to regulate your expense, if into your amusements or your society disorder has crept. You have admitted a principle of confusion, which will defeat all your plans, and perplex and entangle what you sought to *arrange*."—*Blair*.

"It is not the endeavour of Moses or the prophets to discover any mathematical or philosophical subtleties, but rather to *accommodate* themselves to vulgar capacities."—*Bishop Wilkins*.

"I think myself very happy in my country, as the language of it is wonderfully *adapted* to a man who is sparing of his words and an enemy to loquacity."—*Spectator*.

ADMINISTRATION. See CHARGE.

ADMIT. RECEIVE.

When employed in reference to persons, the essential difference in usage between these words is, that the former does not imply what the latter does, a close *connection with self* as the result of the process. To ADMIT is to open an entrance to another (*admittere*), to RECEIVE is so to open it that he is brought into a peculiar personal relationship as the result of it (*recipere, re and capere*, to take). I may admit a person into a public building, but I receive him into my own house. Hence to receive implies a more distinct exercise of the will. I admit him into my house, that is, I do not refuse him entrance; I receive him, that is, I make him feel that he is welcome. Both admit and receive

are, however, applicable to merely physical objects and processes. Yet the same analogy is preserved in that case. Admit only involves the absence of obstruction or exclusion, receive, an adaptation between the two objects. This difference is exemplified in the following sentence of Locke:—

"There are some ideas which have *admittance* only through one sense which is peculiarly adapted to *receive* them."

ADMIT. ALLOW. GRANT.

Of these terms as they regard matters of speculation and argument, to GRANT (Old English *graunt*) is strongly *relative*, and denotes such a concession as benefits or strengthens the position of him to whom it is made. To ADMIT is abstract, and refers *generally* to the propriety, truth, or justice of what is conceded. The concession is the result of the force of persuasion, which renders it impossible to deny. To ALLOW (*allocare* and *allaudare*) indicates for the most part a *reserved concession*, where what is granted may even be accompanied by a refusal to grant something else, as to allow the truth of a remark, but to deny its applicability to the present case. Indeed, to allow may be negative, to admit is positive. I admit what I cannot deny. I allow what ought in fairness to be granted. Logical necessity compels me to admit. Argumentative honesty requires that I should allow. Admit implies what is due to the case, allow to him who argues it as a claim.

"Even a real miracle cannot be *admitted* as such, or carry any conviction to those who are not assured that the event is contradictory to the course of nature."—*Farmer*.

"The ruin'd spendthrift, now no longer proud,
Claimed kindred there, and had his claims
allowed." Goldsmith.

There is more freedom and voluntariness in grant than in either allow or admit. So that the term commonly refers to such concession as is antecedent to all argument whatever, as in the following—

"I take it at the same time for *granted*

that the immortality of the soul is sufficiently established by other arguments."—*Steele*.

ADMITTANCE. ADMISSION.

Of these, ADMITTANCE refers more simply to the mere act of allowing to enter. ADMISSION in a moral sense to the reception with some sort of sanction; hence admittance is commonly purely local, as to grant a person admittance to a building. Admission commonly bears the meaning of a right of admittance, or the power of demanding an entrance. It is the right of admission which procures the admittance. The admittance of light into an apartment. The admission of the truth of a charge.

"Of the foolish virgins who watched not, neither had trimmed their lamps, but went too late to buy oil when the bridegroom came; 'tis observed that they found no more place of admittance than if they had been slothful still."—*Clarke*.

"Our bishops are made in form and order as they have been ever, by free election of the chapter, by consecration of the archbishop and other three bishops, and by the admission of the prince."—*Bishop Jewel*.

ADMONISH. ADVISE. CAUTION. WARN.

ADMONISH (Lat. *admonere*) respects the moral conduct, and is the act of a superior. It bears reference to something done in the past, or likely to have been done, thus in sense closely approaching censure, and to something also likely to be done in the future, from which the person admonished is sought to be kept; thus approaching to warning. The personal expression of authoritative advice constitutes admonition.

"It has long been charged by one part of mankind upon the other, that they will not take advice, that counsel and instruction are generally thrown away, and that in defiance both of admonition and example, all claim the right to choose their own measures and to regulate their own lives."—*Adventurer*.

ADVICE (Fr. *avis*, Lat. *advidere*) bears reference solely to the future, and is positive in its effects, as admonish is negative, and prompts rather than deters.

"The person who pretends to advise does, in that particular, exercise a superiority over

us, and can have no other reason for it but that in comparing us with himself he thinks us defective either in our conduct or our understanding; for these reasons there is nothing so difficult as the art of making advice agreeable."—*Spectator*.

TO WARN (Saxon *warnian*) bears simply upon the hurtful, as a possible event of the future, and not upon the past; and upon the moral only so far as it is prudent. CAUTION (Lat. *cavere*, to beware, *cautus*) is less positive than warn, which is a simpler and more matter-of-fact word. So we might caution another against probable inconvenience arising from a certain step, and warn him against certain evil accruing from it. In caution we draw the attention of another mainly to his own conduct, in warning mainly to certain perils or injuries external to himself. Admonitions come only from persons, but events may serve as cautions and warnings; for admonition enters more into the moral reasons of things. Advice considers the interests of others. We caution against acts. We warn against dangers.

"Cautioning us to take heed lest we be overcharged with surfeiting and drunkenness."—*Tillotson*.

"As two broad beacons set in open fields
Send forth their flames far off to every
shire,
And warning give that enemies conspire,
With fire and sword the region to invade,
So flam'd his eyne with rage and rancorous
ire." *Spenser*.

ADORE. REVERENCE. REVERE. VENERATE. WORSHIP.

ADORE (*adorare*) expresses primarily the honour which is paid to a divine Being whose superhuman power constitutes it an object of prayer. It is by an exaggerated metaphor that the term is employed to designate the warmest devotion to other persons or objects. It involves a higher and more purely intellectual estimate of its object than worship, which is also more purely external. So the lowest forms of religion consist in the worship of material objects, while the highest consists in the sincere and intelligent adoration of the one supreme God. It is a conception of power which leads

to worship, of purity also which leads to adoration. We adore God for His perfection. We adore the creature in spite of its imperfections. We adore when we pay the tribute of divine admiration as to a being of a higher nature. It is sometimes employed to denote no more than the fervent love of an inferior, as good princes are sometimes said to be adored by their subjects. Adoration of God is primarily the rendering to Him the homage of reason, which, however, so naturally expresses itself in outward homage that the term is sometimes employed to express this directly.

"Rejoicing, but with awe,
In adoration at His feet I fell
Submit." Milton.

To REVERENCE (Lat. *reverentia*) is to pay that homage which is due to inherent sanctity of character, whether divine or human, and is the more external manifestation of that feeling which is expressed by *revere*. Between *reverence* and VENERATE (Lat. *venerari*) there seems to be this difference, that the object of veneration is not so far removed from ourselves as the object of reverence; that is, there is more of worship in reverence, as of the name of God, and more of esteem in veneration, as of the good and aged. WORSHIP (Eng. *worth, worth-ship*) is a word which has gone through many degrees of meaning, from that of paying respect, as in the title worshipful, to that of rendering divine honours. It is now confined to the latter sense, and to the external character referred to above. Revere is more intimate to the feelings, and may denote what is preserved as sacred in the mind, independently of any signs of respect at all, as to revere the memory of a friend. It is possible to reverence even material objects for the sake of those persons to whom they have belonged or those persons or things with which they have been closely associated.

"The Jews made him an object of terror more than of awe and reverence, and their religion was a system of the rankest superstition, for nothing can be more true than what St. Austin quotes somewhere from Varro that they who are religious revere, and the superstitious fear, God."—*Bolingbroke*.

"Veneration is a higher degree of respect, in which the mind seems to be more forcibly struck with wisdom connected with the sterner virtues. Hence, we speak of characters which are more venerable than amiable."—*Cogan*.

"Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and Him only shalt thou serve."—*Bible*.

ADORN. DECORATE. EMBELLISH.

Of these, ADORN (Lat. *adornare*) expresses the addition of beauty in the truest and gravest sense. The word implies that the process is one of taste and value. It may be used of things purely moral, as a character adorned by many virtues. No such moral weight belongs either to DECORATE (*decus*, an ornament), or to EMBELLISH (Fr. *embellir*, Lat. *bellus*, neat, handsome). When a thing or person is adorned, it is as if an increase of beauty were extended over the whole object into which it penetrates, and the entire character of which it enhances.

"At church, with meek and unaffected grace,
His looks adorn'd the venerable place."
Goldsmith.

Decoration implies the external addition of what is materially ornamental, and is in a general sense what embellishment is in the particular sense of more purely adventitious decoration. When decoration loses the character of natural grace, and becomes purely artificial, with the purpose of attracting attention, we use the term embellishment. The rustic beauty decorates herself with wild flowers; the tradesman embellishes his shop-front to attract attention. Embellishment may be otherwise than material, while decorate is only material, as a narrative may be embellished by clever and striking anecdotes, or adorned by passages of eloquence. There is in the term embellish a tendency to mean foreign and adventitious decoration.

"I have been told by them that have seen both, that our church did even then exceed the Romish in ceremonies and decorations."—*Marvel*.

"Milton, though he fetched this beautiful circumstance from the *Iliad* and *Æneid*,

does not only insert it as a poetical *embellishment*, like the authors above mentioned, but makes an artful use of it for the proper carrying on of his fable."—*Spectator*.

ADROIT. CLEVER. SKILFUL.
EXPERT. DEXTEROUS.

ADROIT (Fr. *adroit*, Lat. *ad* and *dirigere*, *directus*) is literally the faculty of going straight to an object. Adroitness is that apt and ready management which comes especially of natural agility. It is sometimes used metaphorically of other matters than physical manipulation, as an adroit answer. It implies an unfixedness of subject-matter. So we could not say, adroit upon a musical instrument. It denotes versatility, and so may be negative in its character. We may elude or parry as well as thrust adroitly.

"May there not be a great deal in the ingenuity versatile, in the skill and *adroitness* of the artist, acquired as yours has been by repeated acts and continual practice?"—*Bishop Horne*.

CLEVER (See ABILITY) denotes an ability to adapt or invent with readiness means to an end, and points primarily to *natural* qualifications, as SKILFUL (Sax. *scilian*, to separate) to those which are *acquired*. Cleverness is only in common things. Skill is acquired cleverness, or the adroitness of practice. EXPERT (Lat. *experior*, *expertus*) denotes also that cleverness of manipulation which is the result of practice. But as *mental* practice is needful to give skill, as in the physician, so *manual* practice alone may give expertness. DEXTEROUS nearly resembles adroit (*dexter*, the right hand), but bears reference to the *specific* use of some implement, as dexterity in the use of the bow, while adroitness may be predicated *generally*. Clever is very commonly used in the sense of one who makes active use of his faculties in conversation or study, handling his thoughts like tools with skill, dexterity, and despatch, as in the following of Goldsmith—

"But no matter, I warrant we'll make up the party.

With two full as *clever* and ten times as hearty."

"The distribution of land and water, say the philosophers, is admirable, the one being laid against the other so *skilfully* that there is a just equipoise of the whole globe."—*Goldsmith*.

"There were no marks of *expertness* in the trick played by the woman of Endor upon the perturbed mind of Saul."—*Cogan*.

"They smooth the plank very *expeditiously* and *dexterously* with their adzes, and can take off a thin coat from a whole plank without missing a stroke."—*Cook's Voyages*.

ADROITNESS. See DEXTERITY.

ADULATION. See FLATTERY.

ADULTERATED. See COUNTERFEIT.

ADVANCE. See PROCEED and PROMOTE.

ADVANCEMENT. See PROMOTION.

ADVANTAGE. BENEFIT. PROFIT.

These terms are synonyms in so far as they denote something by which a person is bettered; that is, they are all relative forms of good. But the good is viewed from different points of view. An ADVANTAGE (Fr. *avantage*, *avant*, Lat. *ab*, *ante*, is that which places a person in a better state in reference to society or his place in it, as the advantages of a good education. BENEFIT (*benefacere*) is something good which is conferred by another or comes to us as the result of some process directed to the purpose, as a rich man may heap benefits upon a poor man, or one may walk for the benefit of one's health. Benefits commonly bear reference to matters of the body or the estate. PROFIT (*proficere*, to make way) is some real and substantial addition to the sum of our well-being. It is a relative term, like benefit. As benefit implies a person *conferring* the benefit, so profit implies something which is the *source* of the profit. Advantage is *gained*, benefit is *conferred*, profit *accrues*.

"Whatever *advantages* I obtain by my own free endeavours and right use of those faculties and powers I have, I look upon them to be as much the effects of God's providence and government as if they were given me

immediately by Him without my acting.”—*Woolaston*.

“He now found that such friends as *benefits* had gathered round him were little estimable. He now found that a man’s own heart must be ever given to gain that of another.”—*Goldsmith*.

“The revenue derived from labour is called wages; that derived from stock by the person who manages or employs it, is called *profit*.”—*Adam Smith*.

ADVENTUROUS. ENTERPRISING.

Of these, the ADVENTUROUS (Fr. *aventure*, Lat. *adventura*, a happening, from *advenire*) is one who is primarily led by a spirit of boldness, and either courts, or, at least, disregards danger. The ENTERPRISING (Fr. *entreprendre*, to take in hand) is primarily led by a desire to achieve a bold scheme, which is in itself *profitable or good*. The enterprising combines calculation with boldness to a greater extent than the merely adventurous, whose character is liable to degenerate into the rash or foolhardy. The enterprising is not deterred by peril, the adventurous loves it for itself.

“I thence

Invoke thy aid to mine *adventurous* song,
That with no middle flight intends to soar
Above th’ Aonian Mount, while it pursues
Things unattempted yet in prose or rhyme.”

Milton.

“Through hardy *enterprise*
Many great regions are discovered.”

Spenser.

ADVERSARY. See ENEMY.

ADVERSE. CONTRARY. OPPOSITE.
INIMICAL. HOSTILE. REPUGNANT.
AVERSE.

ADVERSE (Lat. *adversus*, *advertere*, to turn to or against) is commonly employed of that which tends to thwart our plans or movements by an opposing force or influence, as adverse circumstances, adverse winds; the adverse is the opposite to the favourable.

“Happy were it for us all if we bore prosperity as well and wisely as we endure our *adverse* fortune.”—*Southey*.

CONTRARY (Lat. *contrarius*, *contra*,

against) is employed rather of the course or character of events, as contrary to one’s expectations or designs. The adverse is the contrary in operation. But contrary is a far wider term, embracing what opposes itself to lines of movement or force, points of locality to extremes of moral unlikeness, mental belief or supposition, logical statement. Contrary is to operation what opposite is to position. So virtue is contrary to vice in its practical effects and manifestations. It is opposite to vice as a conception or in the scheme of morality. An opposite wind is one which blows from the opposite point of the compass; a contrary wind is one which retards the progress of the vessel. OPPOSITE (Lat. *opponere*, *oppositus*, to place against) rather belongs to that which is widely unlike in its nature and intrinsic properties, without necessarily coming, or being ready to come, into active collision, which is implied in inimical and hostile, as two opposite characters—the sluggish and the energetic. INIMICAL (*inimicus*, *in*, not, and *amicus*, a friend) and HOSTILE (*hostilis*, from *hostis*, an enemy) belong strictly to *personal* character and feeling. Inimical is less strong than hostile, implying the *private* possession of such feelings or qualities as would lead to opposition or a refusal to aid, while hostile denotes a more *public* and positive display of opposition. REPUGNANT (Lat. *repugnare*, to fight against) is now almost exclusively confined to that which excites a feeling of dislike, or is essentially discordant, so being an epithet of things, not of persons, as cruelty is repugnant to the spirit of Christianity.

“Many of them (the bones of the human body) conspire to one and the same action, and all this *contrarily* to the laws of specific gravity.”—*Ray*.

“Novels, by which the reader is misled into another sort of pleasure *opposite* to that designed in an epic poem.”—*Dryden*.

“We are at war,” says Burke, applying the term in its secondary and impersonal sense, “with a system which, by its essence, is *inimical* to all other governments.”

The *public* display of enmity so closely adheres to hostility, that the term hostile may mean belonging to the state or condition, rather than the feelings of the enemy, as in Pope—

“From the war
Safe he returned without one *hostile* scar.”

“*Repugnant* to the principles of human nature.”—*Stillingfleet*.

AVERSE (not Lat. *aversus*, from *avertere*, to turn away, but Fr. *averse*, from *ad versus*) differs from adverse in applying only to beings of consciousness and will, in reference to inclination and tastes.

“What female heart can gold despise?
What cat’s *averse* to fish?” *Gray*.

ADVERTISE. PUBLISH.

To **PUBLISH** (literally, to make public, *publicare*) is the more general. So we may publish by openly speaking of a circumstance, or a general mass of information is published as in a book. To **ADVERTISE** (Fr. *avertir*, from the Latin *advertere*) is to turn the attention of persons or the public to some specific fact of presumed interest, and is not taken to include oral, but only written or printed forms of notice, when the noun advertisement is employed.

“The great skill in an *advertiser* is chiefly seen in the style that he makes use of. He is to mention ‘the universal esteem or general reputation’ of things that were never heard of.”—*Tatler*.

“Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public. To forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he *publishes* what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity.”—*Blackstone*.

ADVICE. COUNSEL.

Both **ADVICE** (Fr. *avis*, Lat. *advicere*) and **COUNSEL** (*consilium*) are given for the practical direction of conduct. They differ in the source from which they are derived. *Advice* is imparted by one who is, or affects to be, possessed of superior knowledge. Hence advisers may be official or professional, as being conversant with some particular depart-

ment of affairs, as a legal or medical adviser. *Counsel* is given by those who are, or affect to be, of superior wisdom or experience. The *trained man* is qualified to give advice, the *sage* or *wise man* to give counsel. Advice is less reciprocal than counsel, for advice is often offered gratuitously, but counsel is generally felt to be needed. Advice is commonly individual, counsel collective.

“We may give *advice*, but we cannot give conduct.”—*Franklin*.

“*Counsel* is where a man saith do, or do not this, and deduceth his reasons from the benefit that arriveth by it to him to whom he saith it.”

From the above use of the term, we may draw the distinction that advice means giving practical information, making a man acquainted with something, as letters of advice. Counsel makes him acquainted, or is an attempt to do so, with *grounds* of preference in matters of conduct, which is sometimes included, but not necessarily, in advice.

ADVISE. See **INFORM**.

ADVOCATE. See **PLEADER**.

ÆRA. See **DATE**.

AFFABLE. COURTEOUS. CONDESCENDING. ACCESSIBLE.

AFFABLE (Lat. *affabilis*, from *affari*, to address) is literally, easy of address. By usage, a *superior* in whom no pride makes him difficult of access, who is naturally disinclined to shut himself up in his own dignity, is said to be affable. His demeanour springs from his nature, as that of the **COURTEOUS** man (literally, he who has the manner of the court) springs from training and good breeding. Affability is essentially in a *superior*; but courtesy may be between equals. Affable is not used objectively. A courteous reception; an affable manner. Courteous expresses no more than the gracefully respectful; affable extends to the look, the voice, the conversation, the demeanour at large. One might be punctiliously courteous, yet by no means affable. Indeed, a

studied courtesy is sometimes substituted for affability, in the case of those who wish to keep others at a distance. CONDESCENDING is a term which denotes no more than such a stooping to the condition of inferiors as is compatible with a great amount of actual pride, and often carries with it an assumption of the meritorious or the elevated, in short, an arrogant politeness. ACCESSIBLE commonly denotes a readiness to communicate where communication is desired, as on matters of business with persons high in office.

"This led him (Charles) to a grave reserved deportment, in which he forgot the civilities and the *affability* that the nation naturally loved, to which they had been long accustomed."—Burnet.

"We cannot omit to observe this courtly (shall I call it) or good quality in him, that he was *courteous*, and did seem to study to oblige."—*Strype*.

AFFAIR. BUSINESS. CONCERN.

There is a loose conversational use of these words, in which it may be well to distinguish them, though in this loose sense they are hardly dignified enough to have any literary connection. We speak of an AFFAIR (Fr. *affaire*, Lat. *afficere*) when we refer to something which has happened, without caring to be specific in reference to it, but allude to it in a light and superficial manner. The same character belongs to the word BUSINESS (that which busies or occupies the time), but with an implication of the part or parts which the *agents* have had in it. A sad affair is a sad event; a sad business is one in which the state and doings of *certain persons* are unfortunately involved. CONCERN (Low Lat. *concernere*, to regard) is an event in its bearings upon the feelings or interests of persons connected with it.

AFFECT. CONCERN. INFLUENCE.

As AFFECT (*affecture*, from *afficere*) expresses that which takes effect upon the condition, so INFLUENCE (*influentia*, a late Lat. word in this sense, formed from *influere*, to flow upon) is, when used of persons, applied to motives, feelings, and con-

duct; while CONCERN (*see above*) is applied to matters of interest. Concern is therefore only used of persons and their state, while affect and influence are also used of physical agencies; as we might say, the temperature of the air affects or influences the thermometer; but as applied to persons, the distinction given will generally hold good. He was little affected by the argument, would mean that his state of mind or feelings underwent little change. He was little influenced by it, would mean that his acts or resolutions were but little likely to be altered in consequence. He was much *concerned* with what he heard, would mean that his feelings were wrought upon and his interest enlisted. Things are affected directly or indirectly: they are influenced slightly or strongly. That which affects usually operates in a palpable manner, while influences are often extremely subtle.

"Incorporal it (light) cannot be, because it sometime *affecteth* the sight of the eye with offence."—*Raleigh*.

"The fall of a cottage, by the accidents of time and weather, is almost unheeded, while the ruin of a tower which a neighbourhood hath gazed at for ages with admiration, strikes all observers with *concern*."—*Hurd*.

"It shows the anxiety of the great men who *influenced* the conduct of affairs at that great event to make the revolution a parent of settlement, and not a nursery of future revolutions."—*Burke*.

AFFECT. ASSUME. PRETEND.

These words have in common the idea of taking to oneself and exhibiting, as really belonging, that which in some way or degree is not so. To AFFECT (*see above*) implies the forced, studied, and sustained assumption of something which is *more than a matter of externals*; as to affect a love of art, or a manner, when that manner is the index of something else, as to affect a certain style of conversation or of living.

"Few know thy value, and few taste thy sweets,

Though many boast thy favours, and *affect*
To understand and choose thee for their
own." *Corper*.

To ASSUME, on the other hand, may mean, and commonly does, a mere *external* taking to oneself of that which is not naturally or truly one's own, as to assume (*assumere*, to take to oneself) the demeanour or the attire of one's superiors in rank—an assumption of superiority.

“Nothing has been more common in all ages than to see faction and ambition assuming the mask of religion.”—*Porteus*.

To PRETEND (*pretendere*, to hold forward to observation) is *less external than assume*, and *more fictitious than affect*. One affects what is not suitable or natural, or which does not sit easily upon one; but one *pretends* that which, though put forward as true, is in fact false. Yet this attaches by no means so strongly to the noun pretension. We might say, he has considerable pretensions to learning, without at all implying that they were groundless. If I assume indifference in a case in which I am not really indifferent, this is by a false air or manner. On the other hand, I might pretend it in words, without any other outward tokens. In the one case I deceive the observation, or seek to do so; in the other, I mislead the mind.

“It is the shallow unimproved intellects that are the confident *pretenders* to certainty, as if, contrary to the adage, science had no friend but ignorance.”—*Glanvill*.

AFFECTING. See PATHETIC.

AFFECTION. LOVE.

These words are largely interchangeable, yet there are differences. For instance, AFFECTION is towards objects not far removed from oneself in nature and circumstances, so that it implies either community or equality of state. A mother has affection for her child, and friend for friend. So far *love* might have been employed as well; but though man may love God, it would be unnatural to say that man could have affection toward God. Affection longs to benefit, to tend, to protect. Love aspires also to obtain, and enjoys even the mere presence of its object. LOVE (Saxon *lufe*) is such a strong

mental or sensual drawing to an object as varies in every degree of purity and right; affection is commonly more orderly, regular, and constant.

“When we remark that a person has an *affectionate* heart, we mean to applaud his being under the influence of the best *affections* of a social and relative nature.”—*Cogan*.

“In peace *love* tunes the shepherd's reed,
In war he mounts the warrior's steed,
In halls in gay attire is seen,
In hamlets dances on the green.
Love rules the court, the camp, the grove,
And men below and saints above,
For love is heaven, and heaven is love.”

Scott.

AFFINITY. RELATIONSHIP. CONSANGUINITY. KINDRED.

Of these, the first stands to the second as species to genus. AFFINITY (Lat. *ad* and *finis*, a boundary) is a kind of *relationship*, namely, that kind which follows upon an *internal* resemblance, or essential community of nature. This may be natural, conventional, or artificial. There is an affinity between the husband and the wife, in consequence of the marriage tie; it is well if there be also an affinity of sentiment and taste.

“Some have thought the camelion's name not unsuitable unto its nature; the nomination in Greek is a little lion, not so much for the resemblance of shape as *affinity* of condition.”—*Brown's Vulgar Errors*.

RELATIONSHIP (*referre, relatus*) expresses, in the broadest and most abstract way, the union of two things in reference to some third term, as the relationship of a son to a father in the matter of consanguinity, or the relation of the base of a triangle to its sides, or of a speech to its subject-matter.

“The most universal public *relation* by which men are collected together is that of government; namely, as governors and governed, or, in other words, as magistrates and people.”—*Blackstone*.

CONSANGUINITY (*con* and *sanguis*, blood) is blood relationship.

“Am I not *consanguineous*? Am I not of her blood?”—*Shakespeare*.

KINDRED (*kind*, in the sense of community of nature) is that sort of

relationship or affinity which may be supposed to produce sympathy or fellow-feeling, as the philanthropist claims mankind as his *kindred*. So words may have an *etymological* affinity; they may also have a *kindred* signification. Blackstone regards consanguinity and kindred as virtually identical. He says—

“Consanguinity or *kindred* is defined by the writers on these subjects to be *vinculum personarum ab eodem stipite descendendum*—the connection or relation of persons descended from the same stock or common ancestor.”

AFFIRM. See ASSERT.

AFFIX. ATTACH.

AFFIX (*fixus*, participle of *figere*, to fix) is more commonly used in a purely external and physical sense, as to affix a placard to a wall; and sometimes metaphorically, as to affix a stigma to a person. The notion is that of something arbitrarily placed upon another without any *inherent* unity. To ATTACH (Fr. *attacher*) is to affix because of a feeling that the one thing *ought* to go with the other by way of necessary use or natural fitness, as to attach horses to a carriage, or the idea of disgrace to certain professions.

“We see two sorts of white butterflies fastening their eggs to cabbage-leaves, because they are fit aliment for the caterpillars that come of them. Whereas, should they *affix* them to the leaves of a plant improper for their food, such caterpillars must needs be lost.”—*Ray*.

“There is no man but is more *attached* to one particular set or scheme of opinions in philosophy, politics, and religion, than he is to another. I mean if he hath employed his thoughts at all about them. The question then we should examine is, how came we by those *attachments*?”—*Mason*.

Affix is never used in any moral sense, as attach may be, in the sense of affectionate relationship, as to be attached to one's home or country. Physically that which is affixed rests with the body if stationary, or moves bodily with it if it be in motion. But a thing attached may have some freedom of motion, while that to which it is attached is fixed. To attach in-

volves connection, but not necessarily contact, which is involved in affix.

AFFLICTION. DISTRESS. TROUBLE. GRIEF. SORROW.

AFFLICTION (Lat. *affligere*, *afflictus*, to strike hard) is a deep and grievous malady of mind or body, which is in no apparent way the consequence of our own actions. So it is commonly said that man inflicts, and God afflicts. It includes both the event and the state of mind produced by it.

“I do remember now; henceforth I'll bear Affliction till it do cry out itself, Enough, enough, and die.”

Shakespeare.

DISTRESS (Lat. *distringere*) implies such a feeling of mind or body as is accompanied by great anxiety and an interference with the powers of the mind, and a difficulty or an inability to act. It is in its worst forms a thing of distraction, struggle, and restlessness of soul.

“Distress of nations with perplexity.”—*Bible*.

TROUBLE (Fr. *trouble*, *turbulare*, *turba*, a crowd) is such distress as ruffles the current of life, and prevents the usual discharge of duties.

“Our people greatly rejoiced of their great good hap to have escaped so many hard events, *troubles*, and miseries, as they did in that voyage, and had great cause therefore to praise the Almighty, Who had so mercifully preserved and delivered them.”—*Hackluyt*.

GRIEF (Lat. *gravis*, heavy) and SORROW (Ang. Sax. *sorg*) are very nearly alike; but while grief expresses rather a poignant state of mental suffering, sorrow is more reflective, and is commonly tinged with regret. It contemplates the event as it *might* have been, or regrets the fact of its occurrence; and being more reflective than grief, it is less selfish, and is often found mingled with compassion on account of others, and remorse on our own.

“Grief is sometimes considered as synonymous with sorrow, and in this case we speak of the *transports of grief*.”—*Cogan*.

Grief complains, affliction suffers,

sorrow mourns. Affliction is sharp and deep, and, being prolonged, affects the course and character of life. Distress is embarrassing, distracting, severe. Trouble is saddening and burdensome. Grief is violent and demonstrative. Sorrow, deep and brooding. On the other hand, affliction is allayed, grief subsides, sorrow is soothed, distress is mitigated.

AFFLUENCE. See WEALTH.

AFFORD. YIELD. PRODUCE. BEAR.

Of these, YIELD (Saxon *geldan*, to yield or pay) is the simplest and most general. The tree yields fruit, the mine yields metal, the sea yields fish. The term yield, however, always implies *value or worthlessness* in the thing yielded. The other terms denote each some peculiarity in the way of yielding. To AFFORD (Old Eng. *afeerd*, connected with *forum*, market) is now taken to signify a relative or proportionate production. The sea yields fish, would mean that the fish come out of it in consequence of man's efforts to procure them as valuable. The sea affords fish, would mean that they are naturally forthcoming to meet certain wants, whether in sufficient or insufficient quantities. It is a relative yielding. I cannot afford to pay so much, means, there is no power in me to *proportion* the supply to the demand. To PRODUCE (Lat. *producere*, to bring forth), strictly speaking, belongs to the operation of natural laws bringing the thing into existence. So the sea does not produce fish as the vine produces grapes, or, metaphorically, drunkenness produces misery. It might be admissible to say the mine produces minerals, but it would be much better to say it yielded or afforded them, for it is the forces of Nature which really *produce* them; while they are yielded or afforded to man's efforts at procuring them.

"The quiet lanes of Surrey, leading to no great mart or general rendezvous, afford calmer retreats on every side than can easily be found in the neighbourhood of so great a town."—*Gilpin*.

The root idea of yield is to give up in answer to the seeking of another, as appears in the following from Spenser:—

"There he tormenteth her most terribly,
And day and night afflicts with mortal pain,
Because to *yield* him love she doth deny,
Once to me *yold*, not to be *yold* again."

"The divine will is absolute. It is its own reason. It is both the *producer* and the ground of all its acts."—*South*.

That which is afforded, yielded, or borne, is either part of the substance of the original, or something very closely connected with it. Produce is employed of cases in which a considerable interval may intervene between the origin and the result, and also of cases in which, unlike the other terms, the thing produced is contrary to our efforts and desires, as, the contact produced a violent explosion. It is as true that vice produces misery as that virtue produces happiness.

BEAR (Saxon *beran*) is used, as almost all Saxon words are, in the simplest and most familiar reference, and is the plainest synonym for produce. It belongs almost exclusively to the processes of natural generation, as the mother bears children, the tree bears fruit. Less direct bearings are expressed by produce, as the plant bears seed, and the seeds produce flowers. The fountain affords or yields, but does not bear or produce water.

"Here dwelt the man divine whom Samos bore."—*Dryden*.

AFFRAY. See FRAY and QUARREL.

AFFRONT. See INSULT.

AFRAID. See TIMID.

AFTER. BEHIND.

AFTER (Saxon *after*, and probably the comparative degree of *af* or *aft*) respects an order to which two things belong. BEHIND (Saxon *behindan*) is physical, except when used metaphorically, and reciprocal, that is, respects the position of one person to another. One man comes after another in rank or in a procession.

He is behind his chair, or behind him in talent. Behind commonly implies little or no interval. After may be used of time as well as place; behind, only of place.

AGE. *See* DATE.

AGED. *See* OLD.

AGENT. *See* FACTOR.

AGGRAVATE. *See* EXASPERATE.

AGGRESSOR. ASSAILANT.

The latter is a stronger form of the former. The AGGRESSOR (*aggredior*, to approach in attack) is simply the person who begins the quarrel; this may be by a strong act of provocation short of attack. The ASSAILANT (*assilire*, to leap upon) commits the first overt act of violence.

"Self-preservation requires all men not only barely to defend themselves against aggressors, but many times also to prosecute such, and only such, as are wicked and dangerous."—*Woolston*.

"An assailant of the Church."—*Macaulay*.

AGILE. *See* NIMBLE.

AGILITY. *See* ALERTNESS.

AGITATION. TREPIDATION. TREMOR. EMOTION.

Of these, TREMOR (which is a Latin word, meaning trembling) is a term of purely physical meaning, though the state may have been induced by a mental cause of excitement.

"Then the earthquake mentioned by Josephus shook the whole land of Judæa; and the disaster at Nicomedia, as Marcellinus informs us, was occasioned by a tremor, which went over Macedonia."—*Warburton*.

TREPIDATION (*trepidare*, to tremble) is applied to a general confusedness and irregularity of action, of which alarm, fear, or excessive anxiety is the specific cause.

"The irresolute repugnance of some, the hypocritical submission of others, the ferocious insolence of Cromwell, the rugged brutality of Harrison, and the general *trepidation* of fear and wickedness, would, if some proper disposition could be contrived, make a picture of unexampled variety and irresistible instruction."—*Idler*.

AGITATION (*agitare*, to shake or move about) is that disturbance of mind which shows itself in a perturbation of manner; yet agitation enforces the manner, as trepidation weakens it. It may be the result of something which has occurred externally, or of grief, tears, hope, desire, disappointment, or any passion. It is the iniquitude and restlessness of the soul.

"We all must have observed that a speaker *agitated* with passion, or an actor who is indeed strictly an imitator, are perpetually changing the tone and pitch of their voice, as the sense of their words varies."—*Sir W. Jones*.

EMOTION (*emovere*, to move) is purely mental, as tremor is purely physical, and agitation is combined of the two. It is a strong sensation raised by a specific exciting cause, and may be of joy or grief, pleasure or pain. Though the emotion is moral or mental, it will probably manifest itself in the countenance or physical condition or tone of voice.

"I resolved not to exasperate him by passion, hard words, or damning sentences; but calmly, and without seeming emotion, discussed the business with him."—*Glancill*.

AGONY. *See* PAIN.

AGREE. ACCORD. SUIT. COINCIDE. CONCUR.

Of these, the most comprehensive is AGREE (*see* AGREEABLE), for by usage the word is taken to comprise every sort of combination. All harmony in taste, fact, form, statement, feeling, appearance, motive, or purpose, is expressed by the word agreement. So that the remainder of these synonyms may be regarded as expressing some character, or as part of agreement.

"When we possess ourselves with the utmost security of the demonstration that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, what do we more but perceive that equality to two right ones does necessarily agree, and is inseparable from the three triangles?"—*Locke*.

So to ACCORD (*cor*, *cordis*, the heart) is that agreement which is of the feelings, and is a term of less exactness than agree. It is more general

and undefined signification, or sense, or general character and spirit. Opinions agree; feelings, or sentiments, narratives, descriptions, statements, accord.

"My heart *accordeth* with my tongue."—*Shakespeare*.

SUIT, on the other hand (Fr. *suite*, *suivre*, Lat. *sequi*, *secutus*, to follow), expresses either an external fitness, or fitness of purpose. It is a term of common things and occasions.

"You expect that they will apply to their own case just as much of your doctrines and examples as *suits* your pleasure."—*Burke*.

COINCIDE (Lat. *coincidere*, to fall in with) is a metaphorical expression, which represents the two things as commensurate. When two statements or opinions coincide, they fall together as it were geometrically, as if covering the same space, or converging to the same point. This may be matter of accident, and indeed the idea of chance is expressed in the term coincidence if it be used without qualification.

"If a rational being as such is under an obligation to obey reason, and this obedience or practice of reason *coincides* with the observation of truth, these things plainly follow."—*Woolaston*.

CONCUR, on the other hand (*concurrere*, to run together), is applied, as coincide is not, *directly* to persons as well as things. Concurrence in persons is coincidence of will or of opinion voluntarily expressed (but mere coincidence may be involuntary), as when a judge says that he concurs in the judgment of his brother judge. It denotes union of judgment from an independent quarter. By a reflective use of the word, we apply the term concurrent to such judgments, and to statements, testimony, and the like, as falling in with or moving parallel, and so tending to support the same point. The term concurrence is broadly used of a meeting of causes, opinions, or wills.

"The Egyptians, as we are assured by the *concurrent* testimony of antiquity, were among the first who taught that the soul survived the body and was immortal."—*Warburton*.

AGREEABLE. PLEASANT. PLEAS-
ING.

AGREEABLE (Fr. *agréer*, from *gré*, pleasure, thanks, connected with *gratus* and *gratia*) expresses in no very strong manner anything which is *in harmony* with our tastes, temper, feelings, or character.

"As nothing that is *agreeable* to us can be painful at the same time, and as such, nor anything disagreeable pleasant by the terms, so neither can anything agreeable be for that reason (because it is agreeable) not pleasant, nor anything disagreeable not painful, in some measure or other."—*Woolaston*.

PLEASANT (Lat. *placere*, to please) is a *more active* degree of the agreeable, and like it is applicable to things both moral and physical. PLEASING differs from pleasant in not applying to matters *purely* physical: so we might say, pleasing sounds, as exciting pleasurable feelings; but we should not say, a fruit of pleasing, but of pleasant taste. Moreover, pleasant refers rather to the effect specifically produced; pleasing, to the general power of producing it. A pleasant manner would denote primarily one which was pleasant to us; a pleasing manner, one which would be so to people in general. Where they are applied to the same object, pleasing is more decided than pleasant, but of less extended meaning. The manner, the countenance, make persons pleasing; the mind, the humour, make them pleasant. Wit, humour, geniality, and cheerfulness of disposition make men agreeable. Complaisance and the absence of affectation make women agreeable. Localities are pleasant. Prospects are sometimes pleasing. Generally speaking, that which satisfies the senses is pleasant; that which satisfies the mind, taste, judgment, or imagination, is pleasing. Moreover, pleasing is active; pleasant, passive: that is pleasant which produces pleasure, or in which pleasure is to be found; that is pleasing which imparts pleasure.

"There is great pleasure in being innocent, because that prevents guilt and trouble. It is *pleasant* to be virtuous and good, because that is to excel many others. It is *pleasant* to grow better, because that is to

excel ourselves. Nay, it is *pleasant* even to mortify and subdue our lusts, because that is victory. It is *pleasant* to command our appetites and passions, and to keep them in due order, within the bounds of reason and religion, because this is a kind of empire—this is to govern.”—*Tillotson*.

“Pym’s speech was esteemed full of weight, reason, and *pleasingness*, and so affectionate it was, that it obtained pity and remorse in the generality.”—*Wood, Athenæ Oxon.*

AGREEMENT. CONTRACT. COVENANT. COMPACT. BARGAIN.

AGREEMENT expresses, in the broadest manner, the consent of individuals or parties formally or informally expressed by word or by writing. (*See AGREE.*)

“And thus the covenant that ye made with death shall be disannulled, and your *agreement* that ye made with hell shall not stand.”—*Bible*, 1539.

A CONTRACT (*contrahere, contractus*, to draw together) is a binding agreement between individuals formally written and legally executed.

“It is impossible to see the long scrolls in which every *contract* is included, with all their appendages of seals and attestations, without wondering at the depravity of those beings who must be restrained from violation of promise by such formal and public evidences.”—*Johnson*.

The COVENANT (*convenire*, to agree) is a contract or item of a contract sealed, signed, and delivered. In technical usage, the verb *contract* has reference to a complex transaction, *covenant* to a single act. I covenant that I will pay a sum of money before a certain time.

“A *covenant* to do any action at a certain time or place is then dissolved by the covenanter when that time cometh, either by the performance or by the violation.”—*Hobbes*.

A COMPACT (*compingere, compactus*), unlike contract and covenant, may be among many persons or parties, while contract and covenant are between two. It may be entirely informal, as when an association enters into a compact to preserve secrecy. BARGAIN (*Fr. baragouin*, debate) is confined to trade, or, at

least, matters of giving and taking. The bargain is so far informal or not legally binding, but only binding in honour. The process and the result of debating the terms of transfer are both called bargain. When the terms are definitively settled, the parties come to an agreement; but it is often found necessary to keep persons to such agreements by compelling them to enter into a contract, and to go through the complete process of a covenant.

“It is adjusted, however, not by any accurate measure, but by the higgling and *bar-gaining* of the market, according to that sort of rough equality which, though not exact, is sufficient for carrying on the business.”—*Adam Smith*.

AGRICULTURIST. *See FARMER.*

AID. *See HELP.*

AILMENT. *See DISEASE.*

AIM. OBJECT. END. VIEW. SCOPE.

These denote the same thing under different aspects. The AIM (Old Fr. *aesmer*, from the Lat. *æstimare*) is the immediate, the END (Sax. *ende*) the ultimate OBJECT. VIEW (Lat. *videre*) denotes a definite though wide purpose, and sometimes bears the meaning of opinions or judgment. SCOPE (Gr. σκοπός) is wider still, combining the idea of range with that of aim. Some persons *aim* at amassing a fortune as a step to rank, with others wealth is itself the *end*. The speaker or writer will sometimes eliminate superfluous matter, as not falling within the scope of his treatise or remarks. The framer of a legal document on behalf of a client, in endeavouring to give validity and technical exactness to his wishes, will naturally ask whether in that shape the document meets his views. Our views are often better felt than expressed or analyzed; so that it is possible to entertain imperfect and vague views.

“Vain hopes, vain *aims*, inordinate desires.”
Milton.

“It ought not to be the leading *object* of any one to become an eminent metaphysician, mathematician, or poet, but to render himself happy as an individual.”—*Stewart*.

"The chief end or happiness of a thing."—*Wilkins.*

"Not present good or ill, the joy or curse,
But future views of better or of worse."
Pope.

"The main scope and design of all divine revelation hath been the gradual discovery of this great mystery of the mediation."—*Scott.*

AIR. MANNER. MIEN. DEMEANOUR.

AIR (Lat. *aer*) is taken to denote the general or unanalyzed impression produced by the movements and aspect of another. It seems born with us, and strikes at first view; while MIEN applies more specifically to the movements and the dress (Fr. *mine*). Air and mien differ from manner and demeanour, in that these latter are more strongly relative, that is, concern the person as he comes in contact with others. The MANNER (Fr. *manière*) is the regulation of the movements in intercourse with others. It is influenced by education and training, while DEMEANOUR (Old Fr. *demener*) is a graver word, implying the part which the character and disposition or feelings bear in influencing the manner in regard to oneself and others. One gives oneself an air, one affects a manner, one wears a mien, one exhibits a demeanour. Demeanour is commonly specific and relative bearing of certain persons at certain times or certain occasions. It is that bearing which persons assume consciously or unconsciously as being fit and appropriate: the demeanour of a judge on the bench, of a victor to his captive, of a friend to a friend or an enemy. Slight changes of feeling may affect the manner. A total change of mind or of opinion in regard to one who had been one's friend, will alter one's whole demeanour towards him. An air is composed, a manner studied, demeanour regulated.

"It is certain that married persons who are possessed with a mutual esteem, not only catch the air and way of talk from one another, but fall into the same traces of thinking and liking."—*Spectator.*

"The boy is well fashioned, and will easily fall into a graceful manner."—*Steele.*

The term *mien* is used by Boyle in the sense of expression of the eyes.

"I observed in his eyes a *mien*, a vivacity and sprightliness."

And by Gray in the sense of attitude and gesture.

"With thund'ring voice and threatening mien."
Hymn to Adversity.

"Their demeaning of themselves when they were come to the highest or thrown down to the lowest degree of state."—*North's Plutarch.*

ALARM. TERROR. FEAR. FRIGHT. CONSTERNATION. TREPIDATION. PANIC. APPREHENSION.

ALARM (*all'arme*, to arms) retains its etymological character of suddenness. Of all these terms, FEAR is the most comprehensive (Sax. *fær*, a sudden coming). It expresses the natural feeling produced by the instinct of self-preservation at the actual nearness or supposed nearness of the perilous, or, in a milder way, of the odious. When this nearness is rather supposed than manifest, we use the term APPREHENSION (Lat. *apprehendere*, to lay hold). TERROR (Lat. *terror*) is a strong confusing sense of fear. As alarm implies a distinct view of the nature of the danger, so terror is vague and indistinct, being in this way allied to apprehension or the dread of possible harm, as at the sight of an apparition. The object, however, which excites terror is always near and palpable. FRIGHT is the sudden confusion of the senses by an external appearance which produces in an instant an unreflecting fear. Trepidation and consternation are terms which regard the fear in its personal effect upon ourselves. TREPIDATION (Lat. *trepidare*, to tremble) produces agitated movements and a troubled and confused state of mind, while CONSTERNATION (Lat. *consternare*) is that state of powerlessness which is the combined result of terror and amazement. PANIC (of which the god Pan was supposed to be the author, especially in striking terror

into the Persians at the battle of Marathon) is commonly taken, in accordance with the origin of the term, to denote that sort of fear which is at once sudden, indefinite, and contagious among a multitude, though used also in reference to an individual in the sense of an *unaccountable* fear.

"All men think all men mortal but themselves—

Themselves, when some *alarming* shock of fate

Strikes through their wounded hearts the sudden dread." *Young.*

"*Terror* is that species of fear which rouses to defend or to escape."—*Cogan.*

"*Fear* is a painful sensation produced by the immediate apprehension of some impending evil."—*Ibid.*

"The pain of death is most in *apprehension*." *Shakespeare.*

"When lo! the doors burst open in a trice,
And at their banquet terrified the mice;
They start, they tremble, in a deadly *fright*,
And round the room precipitate their flight." *Francis' Horace.*

"*Consternation*: this species of fear is a strong foreboding of tremendous evils which are likely to follow misfortunes which have already taken place."—*Cogan.*

For *trepidation*, see AGITATION.

In the following the term *panick* is used of groundless fear in an individual.

"But the serpent said unto Adam, Tush! this is but a *panick* fear in you, Adam; you shall not so surely die as you conceit."—*H. More.*

The origin of the term is given below.

"The first author of it (the general shout) was Pan, Bacchus's lieutenant-general, in his Indian expedition, where, being encompassed in a valley with an army of enemies far superior to them in number, he advised the god to order his men in the night to give a general shout; which so surprised the opposite army, that they immediately fled from their camp; whence it came to pass that all sudden fears impressed upon men's spirits without any just reason were called by the Greeks and Romans *panick* terrors."—*Potter's Greece.*

ALERTNESS. ALACRITY. AGILITY. ACTIVITY.

These differ first, the two first from the third, in that *AGILITY* (*agilis*, from *ago*) denotes purely physical activity of body and limbs, as in the monkey or the acrobat. *ACTIVITY*, another derivation of the same verb, is applied to both body and mind, and denotes such a general combination of life and movement as answers the practical business in life. *ALERTNESS* (*al'erta*, on the mound or rampart, the situation of the sentinel) and *ALACRITY* (Lat. *alacritas*) very nearly resemble each other. Alertness comes from natural or constitutional promptitude, while alacrity comes rather from the impulse of the will set upon its task. So a person not naturally remarkable for alertness may show alacrity in complying with the request of another. *BRISKNESS* (Welsh *brysg*, from *brys*, haste) is that liveliness of mind which shows itself in liveliness of manner and movement, a constitutional alertness shown in the minor requirements of life, in matters of recreation no less than matters of duty.

"The mountain torrents on every side rushed down the hills in notes of various cadence, as their quantities of water, the declivities of their fall, their distances, or the intermission of the blast, brought the sound fuller or fainter to the ear, which organ became now more *alert*."—*Gilpin's Tour.*

The ideas belonging to *alacrity* are humorously contradicted in the following:—

"The rogues slighted me into the river with as little remorse as they would have drowned a blind bitch's puppies, fifteen in the litter; and you may know by my size that I have a kind of *alacrity* of sinking."—*Shakespeare.*

"He that before wholly attended upon his body to make it excel in strength or *agility* that he might contend victoriously in the Olympic games, then made it his business to improve and advance his soul in knowledge and virtue."—*Bates, Immortality of the Soul.*

"Man is an *active* creature, he cannot be long idle."—*Hales.*

ALIEN. See FOREIGNER.

ALIENATION. See ESTRANGEMENT and MADNESS.

ALIKE. *See* EQUAL.

ALL. WHOLE. EVERY. EACH.

These are not so much synonyms as words which are employed in kindred ways, on which it may be well to remark. ALL is collective (Sax. *al*, connected with the Greek *ἅλος*, and so with *whole*). EVERY is single or individual. EACH is distributive. All respects a single body regarded in its numerical totality, WHOLE, a single body in its quantitative totality; all men being equivalent to the whole human race. Every person is justly treated when each receives his due share.

ALLAY. *See* APPEASE.

ALLEGE. *See* ADDUCE.

ALLEGIANCE. LOYALTY.

ALLEGIANCE (Low Lat. *alligantia*, from *alligare*, to bind) is the recognition of a binding and authoritative relationship, and so a principle of action; but LOYALTY (Fr. *loi*, law) is a personal sentiment of attachment to an individual ruler. Allegiance might be to any government, as to a republican form of it. Loyalty is even applicable to relationships of minor superiority, as to leadership of a party. It carries with it in that case the ideas of pure, frank, and generous deference and consent, and support, rendered at once without compulsion and without effort.

"Hear me, recreant, on thine *allegiance* hear me."

Shakespeare.

"Unhappy both, but *loyal* in their loves."

Dryden.

ALLEGORY. *See* FABLE.

ALLEVIATE. *See* APPEASE.

ALLIANCE. LEAGUE. CONFEDERACY.

ALLIANCE (Fr. *alliance*, the Low Lat. *alligantia*) denotes generally the state of being bound, and is applicable to individuals, families, and states. The word LEAGUE is derived from the same Latin word, *ligare*, to bind. It is nearly synonymous with CONFEDERACY (*con* and *foedus*, a league); but the latter is sometimes also employed to denote the result of the league or the persons or states

which form it. Alliances, leagues, and confederacies admit of every degree of formality and solemnity in their sanctions. The bonds of relationship and of friendship, the advantages of superior knowledge and experience, and the assurance of assistance in time of need, are the ordinary motives to alliances. The object of a league is commonly the reduction of a common enemy, or a defence against his attacks. It is an union of force and design to carry out a particular scheme or enterprise, in hope of reaping the fruit of it. A confederacy is an union based on mutual interest and support, and is seldom used but in a political sense, while the others are as often used in a moral sense. But in this latter, league does not admit, like alliance, of a pure and favourable sense, but suggests the idea of being animated by no other principles than those of force and interest. League and confederacy are only applicable to persons and powers, alliance also to things, as the alliance of the principles of the world with those of the gospel, or of the efforts of art with those of nature. Alliances are for the great, the powerful, and the wealthy. Confederations for those under trouble, or oppression, or difficulty of state, leagues for the designing and malicious. An alliance is sought for satisfaction sake. Confederation for action, league for victory, success, or gain. The life of alliance is harmony, of confederation concert, of league the impulse of a common spirit. The alliance unites, the confederation associates, the league binds. Friendship will form an alliance, patriotism a confederation, division and discontent a league. The wise ally themselves. The prudent confederate themselves. The oppressed league themselves.

"Adrastus soon with gods averse shall join
In due *alliance* with the Theban line."

Pope.

"And let there lie
'Twixt us and them no *league*, no amity."

Denham.

"We find nothing like a combination among the apostles as to matters of doctrine; and if there had been, it would have ren-

dered the faith which they delivered more suspicious, in that they durst not trust particular persons with delivery of it without an antecedent confederacy among themselves."—*Stillington*.

ALLOT. APPOINT. DESTINE.
APPORTION.

ALLOT (literally to give in lot) is applied to things and to persons only when *collectively* considered, APPOINT (*punctus*, a point) and DESTINE (Lat. *destinare*) also to things. The nature of the act of allotting and of appointing is immediate, that of destining is in abeyance, or takes full effect in the future and under reservation. Allot is proportionate, with-inasmuch as the allotment may be to one or to many persons. To allot is a final act, but to appoint implies some further purpose for which the appointment is made. To allot, whether used of time or space, is more general than to appoint. We allot a certain space for a garden, or a certain time for study; we appoint a *specific hour* or place of meeting, or an individual to a *specific office*. To APPOINTMENT is to allot according to proportion (*portio*), and a standard or principle of distributive giving established beforehand.

"As no man can excel in everything, we must consider what part is *allotted* to us, to act in the station in which Providence hath placed us, and to keep to that."—*Mason*.

"Man hath his daily work of body or mind
Appointed, which declares his dignity,
And the regard of heaven on all his ways;
While other animals inactive range,
And of their doings God takes no account."
Milton.

"Mark well the place where first she lays
her down,
There measure out thy walls, and build thy
town,
And from thy guide Bæotia call the land,
In which the *destin'd* walls and town shall
stand."
Addison, Ovid.

"God having placed us in our station,
He having *apportioned* to us our task."—*Barrow*.

ALLOW. PERMIT. SUFFER.
TOLERATE.

It ought to be observed that ALLOW bears two distinct meanings. This is

best accounted for by considering the French *allower* to be the representative of the two Latin words *allocare* and *allaudare*, so that it would have the double sense of to permit and to afford. PERMIT (Lat. *permittere*) is used rather in the passive, while allow has a more active sense. If I allow him, I give him some degree at least of sanction, however small. If I permit him, I merely do not prevent him. To SUFFER (*sufferre*) is more passive still, and may be against the natural inclination; on the other hand, it may be purely negative, as the indolent master suffers his pupils to be idle. There are in allow, permit, and suffer, three degrees as regards the exercise of the will. I allow what I myself sanction or will, I permit what another wills, and I suffer that about which I am content to have no will. TOLERATE (*tolerare*), on the other hand, implies the endurance of that which is *opposed* to my will or inclination.

"Without the king's will or the state's
allowance."—*Shakespeare*.

"If by the author of sin is meant the *permitter*, or not a hinderer of sin, and at the same time a disposer of the state of events in such a manner for wise, holy, and most excellent ends and purposes, that sin, if it be *permitted* or not hindered, will most certainly and infallibly follow, I say, if this be all that is meant by being the author of sin, I do not deny that God is the author of sin (though I dislike and reject the phrase, as that which by use and custom is apt to carry another sense): it is no reproach for the Most High to be thus the author of sin."—*Edwards, Freedom of the Will*.

ALLOW. GRANT. BESTOW.
AFFORD. (See also ADMIT.)

The synonyms which here follow ALLOW, belong to it in the sense of *allocare*, as the former to the sense of *allaudare*. The leading idea in allow is *proportionateness*, or measured giving; in GRANT (Old English *graunt*), favor, or willing giving; in BESTOW (a compound form of *stow*), substantial benefit, or valuable giving; and in AFFORD (*afærd*, connected with *forum*, market), personal sparing, or relative giving. A father *allows* his son a certain sum yearly; kings

grant pensions; gifts and honours are sometimes *bestowed* upon the unworthy; relief is *afforded* to the poor or the sick.

"If it (my offence) be weighed By itself, with aggravations not surcharg'd, Or else with just *allowance* counterpoised, I may, if possible, thy pardon find."

Milton.

"This mutual convenience introduced commercial traffic and the reciprocal transfer of property by sale, *grant*, or conveyance."—*Blackstone*.

"Almighty God, though He really doth, and cannot otherwise do, yet will not seem to *bestow* His favours altogether gratis, but to expect some competent return, some small use and income from them."—*Barrow*.

"Great Dryden next, whose tuneful muse *affords*

The sweetest numbers and the fittest words." *Addison*.

ALLUDE. REFER.

These words are often used indiscriminately, but they are by no means identical in meaning. To *ALLUDE* (Lat. *alludere*) is indirect; *REFER* (*referre*) is positive and direct. If I quote an author, for instance, not by name, but by description, style, subject, or period of writing, I allude to him; but if I attribute anything to another, specifically and plainly, I do not allude, but refer to him. Allusion is often so vague that confusion arises from ignorance of the person or point alluded to. The fault of reference is not obscurity, but inexactness. A wrong reference, an obscure allusion.

"The people of the country, *alluding* to its foam (Buttermere Lake), call it Sour Milk Force."—*Gilpin's Tour*.

"But to do good is not only our greatest duty, but our greatest interest and advantage, which is that that Solomon chiefly *refers* to in the text."—*Sharp*.

ALLURE. See ENTICE.

ALLY. See CONFEDERATE.

ALMOST. NEARLY.

NEARLY is more strictly applied to matters of quantity, time, and space, ALMOST to questions of progression or degree. So if we said, he is nearly ten years old, we should mean that his

age was separated from ten by a small interval; almost ten, would mean that in a little he would reach it. It may be observed that while nearly is used grammatically with a negative, almost is not so used.

ALSO. TOO. LIKEWISE. BESIDES.

Too is a slighter and more familiar word than also, which is more formal. BESIDES expresses an addition, commonly by way of afterthought. Between ALSO and LIKEWISE there is this difference: also cannot be used as a synonym for likewise, if there be only a similarity of position grammatically, and no community of nature. So, he is a prince and also a musician, may be said, because it is only a logical or grammatical unity which is expressed, the same person being a subject of two propositions; but, he is a prince and likewise a musician, we could not say, by reason of the absence of any natural or essential unity of the two.

ALTER. See CHANGE.

ALTERCATION. See QUARREL.

ALWAYS. See EVER.

AMALGAMATE. See COALESCE.

AMASS. See HEAP.

AMAZEMENT. See WONDER.

AMBASSADOR. ENVOY. PLENI-POTENTIARY. DEPUTY. MINISTER.

AMBASSADOR is from the Low Latin *ambasciator*, borrowed from the ancient German. He is a minister of the highest rank, resident in a foreign country even in times of peace, and keeps up, by the style of his living, the dignity of the country which he represents; while an ENVOY (Fr. *envoi*, a sending of persons or things) is commonly not resident, but sent on a particular occasion. The term applies especially to the ministers of monarchs, MINISTER (Lat. *minister*) being the generic term for foreign political representatives. The envoy, too, like the ambassador, exercises his functions in a sumptuous manner.

The **PLENIPOTENTIARY**, as his name implies, is one vested with full powers to treat with a foreign government, especially where its relations are precarious. Personal influence, diplomatic talent, and loyalty are needed in the plenipotentiary. The **DEPUTY** (Fr. *député*) has much less power, is sent upon a specific mission, which he is bound to execute with dignity, strictness, and despatch. Ambassadors and envoys speak and treat in the name of their sovereigns; but the first are invested with a representative quality; the second are authorized ministers, but not representative in the full sense of the term. No such high rank and power is ever enjoyed by deputies, who appear and speak on behalf of some subordinate society or private body. The title of minister comprises the functions of ambassador and envoy; that of deputy assimilates itself to those of an agent. Magnificence of living belongs characteristically to the ambassador; cleverness in negotiation constitutes the merit of an envoy; natural talent and aptitude for business are desired in a deputy.

"The commerce of the Turkey Company first occasioned the establishment of an ordinary ambassador at Constantinople."—*Adam Smith*.

"As when some faithful *envoy*, who at large
Receives commission for a weighty charge,
Chides his neglect, recalling to his thought
Some valued purpose midst his zeal forgot,
And, ere he sees his lord, with eager care
Bends every power the omission to repair."
Hoole, Orlando Furioso.

"The British plenipotentiaries were directed to give the same assurances to the Dutch ministers at Utrecht, and withal to let them know that the queen was determined by their late conduct to make peace either with or without, but would much rather choose the former."—*Swift*.

"When I was at Apamea, some of the principal inhabitants of several different cities complained to me of the excessive appointments that were decreed to their deputies."
—*Melmoth, Cicero.*

AMBIGUOUS. EQUIVOCAL.

AMBIGUOUS (Lat. *ambiguus*, from *ambo*, both, as if telling both ways)

is a form of expression which leaves the sense doubtful. EQUIVOCAL (*æquus* and *vox*) is the character which belongs to a term as having two meanings. So, ambiguous is negative, equivocal is positive. In an ambiguous sentence I do not see the grammatical force; in an equivocal, I do not know the intention or mind of the speaker. Ambiguity is thus less often the result of design than equivocation, which is sometimes used as a synonym for prevarication; so that the speaker desires his hearers to accept a term in one sense, while he is ready to fall back upon another if it suit his purpose.

"Taking advantage of a sentence or word that might be ambiguous or doubtful."—*Sir T. Elyot*.

"The equivocal title of the apostolical, given to the Roman creed."—*Waterland*.

AMBITION. See COMPETITION.

AMENABLE. See ACCOUNTABLE and DOCILE.

AMEND. CORRECT. REFORM. EMEND. RECTIFY.

Of these, AMEND and EMEND are really the same word—*emendare*, to which, in the French *amender*, another form has been loosely prefixed. The root is *menda*, a fault. In common usage, amend means positively to better, and emend negatively to remove faults. Emend is used of literary subjects, amend more commonly of moral. To CORRECT (*corrigere*) is to bring to a conformity with moral or artificial rule, by authoritatively removing faults, and, by an extension of meaning, by punishing them. To REFORM (*reformare*) is to correct in a more continuous and lasting manner, and has reference to the time to come, as well as to what is past. In reference to persons, it has the sense of reclaim from wrongness of life; and to institutions, from inherent defects. Correction designates that kind of action by which one sets to work to destroy or redress deficiencies of any sort, for the purpose of bringing back the matter to a standard which has been deviated from. Amendment denotes a change

brought about in something which to some extent has been well done. Reform denotes the state of a thing re-established in its right order or condition. A correction of faults will constitute an amendment of character, which, if carried out and completed, may result in an entire reform. To RECTIFY (*rectum facere*, to make right or straight) refers, on the other hand, only to the past, in the sense of adjusting what is wrong or false in fact, and has no application to continuity of habit. It applies to *intellectual* as well as moral subject-matter, as to rectify the errors or exaggerations of a statement.

"Graunt me, good Lord, grace of *amendment*."—*Piers Ploughman*.

"Under what manner therefore should I now submit this book to be *corrected and amended* of them which can suffer nothing to be well?"—*Tyndall*.

"The practical definition of what the popular branch of our legislature was at this day he took to be precisely this: an assembly freely elected, between whom and the mass of the people there was the closest union and most perfect sympathy. Such a House of Commons it was the purpose of the constitution originally to erect, and such a House of Commons it was the wish of every reformer now to establish."—*Pitt, Speech on Parliamentary Reform*.

"I hardly left a single line in it without giving it what I thought an *emendation*."—*Mason*.

"I must beg leave to assure certain modern *rectifiers* of prejudices, that the fathers are not commonly led away by a vain superstition, as they affect to represent them."—*Warburton*.

Amendment and reformation apply to things or persons in their totality. Correction, emendation, and rectification are of specific parts or points.

AMENDS. See COMPENSATION.

AMERCEMENT. See FINE.

AMICABLE. FRIENDLY.

These words are etymologically equivalent—*amicus*, in Latin, being equivalent to the English friend. But AMICABLE is the more formal word of the two, and so indicates less

warmth of feeling personally. FRIENDLY is positive in its force, while amicable often means no more than negatively the absence of quarrel. So it often refers to the externals of conduct, or to a conventional friendship; as the "amicable adjustment of former disputes." We are bound, in Christian duty, to live amicably with all; but it would be, perhaps, impossible to feel friendly towards all, in equal degree. Friendly, is *with the feelings* of friends. Amicable, *after the manner* of friends.

"Even those that break the peace cannot but praise it; how much more should they bid for it that are true friends to it, and to that *amicableness* that attends it?"—*Bishop Taylor*.

"There are several texts in the New Testament which interpret the love of our neighbour to mean universal benevolence or *friendliness* towards the whole kind as opportunities may offer."—*Waterland*.

AMPLE. SPACIOUS. CAPACIOUS.

These words convey in common the idea of extent or largeness. But AMPLE (Latin *amplus*) is always relative to some standard of want or necessity. Anything which is more than barely sufficient is ample, whether in quantity, number, space, or degree of any sort. SPACIOUS (*spatium*) expresses what is of superficial largeness, and CAPACIOUS (Latin *capax*) largeness in measures of internal extent. In the ample one has satisfaction; in the spacious, freedom; in the capacious, roominess. Ample is equally applicable to things moral and physical—ample powers, ample quantity. Spacious is applicable only to physical extent, except by metaphor; while capacious is applicable to the physical and the intellectual. That is ample which more than meets requirement. That is spacious which gives no idea of circumscription. That is capacious which, containing much, is not easily over-filled, nor checks the process of depositing or storing.

"How may I
Adore Thee, Author of this universe,
And all this good to man, for whose well-
being
So *ample*, and with hands so liberal,
Thou hast provided?" *Milton*.

"In that *spacious* place, ships of the greatest burthen may ride afloat."—*Dampier's Voyages*.

"No figure is so *capacious* as this (the sphere), and consequently whose parts are so well compacted and united, and be so near one to another for mutual strength."—*Ray on Creation*.

AMUSEMENT. DIVERSION. ENTERTAINMENT. SPORT. RECREATION. PASTIME.

An AMUSEMENT (Fr. *amuser*, to detain or amuse) is any continuous employment which gives pleasure and ease to the mind, whether purposely sought or not. It is employment without the sense of labour, and with no special object beyond itself. It is a lull of the mind, and a release from mental efforts and serious reflections. DIVERSION (Latin *divertere*, to turn aside) is an amusement, viewed relatively to the more serious business of life, from which it is a deviation. Hence it is more strongly counteractive than amusement, and may imply a higher degree of excitement, such, for instance, as amounts to positive merriment. When one is amused, the time passes unmarked; when one is diverted, it passes marked only by lively and agreeable sensations. We are amused by a tale, diverted by a comedy. One does not say that the tragedy diverts, because it is too serious, nor amuses, because it is too earnest. He must be well-nigh weary of life whom nothing can amuse; he must be deep in melancholy whom nothing can divert. One may amuse oneself in solitude; one is diverted in company. It is not well to give way to a fondness for diversions, for it is likely to create a habit of incapacity for amusement, as draughts too strong destroy the relish for those which are weaker, and exciting pleasures make common pleasures tame. An ENTERTAINMENT (Fr. *entretenir*) is the keeping up in the mind of the feeling of amusement by means which are social, and more or less of a refined character, as a play, or even a banquet. SPORT (an abbreviation of disport, and that from *disportare*, to

carry about) is more purely physical and constitutional, and denotes those active forms of amusement which belong naturally to the young and the robust, as the "sports of the field." RECREATION (Lat. *recreare*, to recreate) is, like diversion, counteractive, but not necessarily so energetic, comprising all degrees of relaxation, from active amusement to a seasonable abstinence from all employment. It belongs to the studious and industrious, with whom recreation is a relief from past labours and a preparation for resuming them. The PASTIME is, as its name implies, a means of pleasantly passing the time. It is the active amusement which beguiles the leisure hour, which otherwise might hang tediously. It is a happy relief to the industrious to enjoy recreation; it is better that the indolent should be found a pastime than that he should be left to his own idleness.

"High above our heads, at the summit of the cliff, sat a group of mountaineer children *amusing* themselves with pushing stones from the top, and watching as they plunged into the lake."—*Gilpin's Tour*.

"They must act as their equals act; they must, like others, dress, keep a table, an equipage, and resort to public *diversions*. It is necessary according to their ideas."—*Knox, Essays*.

"But the kind hosts their *entertainment* gave,
With hearty welcome and an open face.

In all they did you might discern with ease

A willing mind, and a desire to please."
Dryden.

"In areas varied with mosaic art,
Some whirl the dirk, and some the javelin dart;

Aside, sequestered from the vast resort,
Antinous sate, spectator of the *sport*."

Pope.

"So that of necessity they must either apply their accustomed labours, or else *recreate* themselves with honest and laudable *pastimes*."—*More's Utopia*.

ANALOGY. RESEMBLANCE.

ANALOGY (Gr. *ἀναλογία*) is often used familiarly, as if it meant mere moral resemblance or similarity. Strictly speaking, however, analogy implies a third term, or four terms, as

follows:—As A is to B, so is C; or as A is to B, so is C to D. Analogy, therefore, is similarity of relations. When we argue from example, we argue from the likeness of things; when from analogy, we argue from the likeness of their relations. If I argue that, because the seed dies in the earth before it springs up anew, therefore it is probable that the human body will rise again after death; this is, as to the character of the idea, a resemblance, as to the argument, an analogy; the principle being that, as the same God is the author of a natural and a spiritual world, He may be expected to act toward each upon similar and common laws.

“The schoolmen tell us there is an *analogy* between intellect and sight, forasmuch as intellect is to the mind what sight is to the body, and that he who governs the State is *analogous* to him who steers a ship. Hence a prince is *analogically* styled a pilot, being to the State what a pilot is to the vessel.”—*Bishop Berkeley*.

“To do good is to become most like God. It is that, which of all other qualities, gives us the *resemblance* of His nature and perfection.”—*Sharp*.

ANATHEMA. *See* CURSE.

ANCESTOR. *See* FOREFATHER.

ANCIENT. *See* OLD.

ANECDOTE. STORY.

An ANECDOTE is literally (Gr. *ἀνέκδοτος*) an incident which has never been given out or published, and so in private keeping. It is the relation of a characteristic matter of fact relating to individuals, and, therefore, stands to STORY (a shorter form of history) as species to genus. (*See* ACCOUNT.)

“Antiquity has preserved a beautiful instance, in an *anecdote* of Alexander, the tyrant of Pheres, who, though he had so industriously hardened his heart as to seem to take delight in cruelty, inasmuch as to murder many of his subjects every day, without cause and without pity, yet at the bare representation of a tragedy which related the misfortunes of Hercules and Andromache, he was so touched with the fictitious distress which the poet had wrought up in it, that he burst out into a flood of tears.”—*Sterne*.

“Intuit he hears Penelope disclose
A mournful *story* of domestic woes.”
Pope.

ANGER. *See* WRATH.

ANGLE. *See* CORNER.

ANGRY. *See* PASSIONATE.

ANGUISH. *See* PAIN.

ANIMADVERT. *See* BLAME.

ANIMAL. BRUTE. BEAST.

ANIMAL (Fr. *animal*, from *anima*, the life) comprehends every creature endowed with that life which is superior to the merely vegetative life of plants, and, therefore, includes man. It is, however, sometimes made to express other animals than man, a further distinction being drawn between the rational and the irrational animal life.

“Animate bodies are either such as are endued with a vegetative soul, as plants, or a sensitive soul, as the bodies of *animals*—birds, beasts, fishes, or insects—or a rational soul, as the body of man, and the vehicles of angels, if any such there be.”—*Ray on Creation*.

BRUTE (Lat. *brutum*) and BEAST (Lat. *bestia*) stand related each in its own character to man.

“We cannot teach *brute* animals to use their eyes in any other way than that in which nature hath taught them.”—*Reid*.

“Inspiring dumb
And helpless victims with a sense so keen
Of injury, with such knowledge of their strength,
And such sagacity to take revenge,
That oft the *beast* has seemed to judge the man.”
Cowper.

Brute is the animal regarded in reference to the absence of that intelligence which man possesses, beast (except where the word is used in the sense of cattle) in reference to that savage nature of which man is, or ought to be, devoid. So we say, the indolent or senseless brute, the cruel or savage beast. Hence, while the term animal is applicable to the insects, neither brute nor beast is so, as not coming into moral comparison with man. Applying the terms figuratively to the moral characters and dispositions of men, the term animal

denotes one who follows the instincts of his lower nature, to the neglect of his moral and intellectual nature. Beast is applied to one who grovels in sensuality; brute, to one whose nature seems deadened to fine feeling, as the selfish or cruel brute.

ANIMATE. INSPIRE.

To ANIMATE is literally to put life or soul into a thing (*anima*, life, or soul). To INSPIRE is to impart an influence to the nature of another, as if by a breath (*inspirare*). The difference lies in what is supposed to be communicated. The lower influence is expressed by the word animate, so that the term is applied to the mere imparting of life, or the appearance of life. The soul animates the body; the marble of the sculptor appears animated. The higher, more energetic and finer faculties of life are said to be imparted by inspiration, as to be inspired with a sublime courage or devotion. Animation quickens the physical and inferior, inspiration the mental, moral, and spiritual impulses of human nature. So animate lends itself the more easily to express evil influences, as to be animated by a spirit of revenge.

"Wherever we are formed by Nature to any active purpose, the passion which *animates* us to it is attended with delight or a pleasure of some kind."—*Burke*.

"Her hearty words so deep into the mind
Of the young damsel sunk, that great
desire
Of warlike arms in her forthwith they
ty'nd,
And generous stout courage did *inspire*."
Spenser.

ANIMATION. LIFE. VIVACITY. SPIRIT.

ANIMATION and LIFE are employed alike to express the appearance of one actuated by the lively impulses of nature. VIVACITY differs from animation (*vivax*, *vivus*, alive) in expressing itself rather by the manner, speech, and movements; while animation may be confined to the countenance. SPIRIT stands to action as vivacity stands to movement, and animation to aspect. It is that

vivacity which sustains itself in difficulty or danger, and is accompanied by self-assertion when needed. Animation is in the soul, vivacity in the temperament, spirit in the heart.

"Heroes in *animated* marble frown,
And legislators seem to think in stone."
Pope.

"They have no notion of life and fire in fancy and words."—*Felton*.

"Their attitudes, their *vivacity*, their leaps out of the water, their frolics in it, which I have noticed a thousand times with equal attention and amusement, all conduce to show their excess of spirits, and are simply the effects of that excess."—*Paley*.

"With all the warmth of a zealot in the cause of virtue, he (Juvenal) pours his majestic verse, and amid the most *spirited* invective and the finest morality emits many a luminous irradiation of poetry beautifully descriptive."—*Knox, Essays*.

ANIMOSITY. See ACRIMONY.

ANNALS. See HISTORY.

ANNEX. See ADD.

ANNOTATION. See NOTE.

ANNOUNCE. PROCLAIM. PUBLISH. DECLARE.

Things which are of the nature of intelligence are ANNOUNCED. As the term is applied to tidings as well as to persons, it often bears reference to something already expected. It implies some degree of formality. A marriage, for instance, is announced in the newspapers; an invited guest is announced. Announcement may be to many, to few, or to one (Lat. *annuntiare*, *nuntius*, a messenger). PROCLAIM (Lat. *proclamare*) applies to everything which is or may become matter of public interest, and is made in the hearing of many, as tidings, opinions, edicts, and the like. Things are proclaimed by the voice, announced in writing or other ways. As announce refers sometimes to what has been anticipated, so also it may refer to something which is to take place after an interval of time, as to announce an *intended* departure; while proclaim and PUBLISH refer usually to things present, or which

have lately past. In such phrases as to proclaim or publish an intention, the subject is in fact present. In DECLARE there is implied not so much the purpose of publicity, as of clearness, as distinct from reserve. We declare what we desire shall be well known, understood, or believed; so that we may declare a thing to no more than one other person. There is a close alliance between publish and proclaim; but publish implies any means for putting a matter in the possession of the public; proclaim implies rather a formal, personal, and sometimes official and authoritative mode of doing it. We proclaim our own acts or intentions. We publish what interests or concerns others. We announce in order to apprise; we declare in order to remove doubt.

"Her" (Queen Elizabeth's) "arrival was announced through the country by a peal of cannon from the ramparts, and a display of fireworks at night."—*Gilpin's Tour*.

"Now had the great Proclaimer, with a voice
More awful than the sound of trumpet,
cried

Repentance, and Heaven's kingdom nigh at
hand

To all baptiz'd."

Milton.

"For the instruction, therefore, of all sorts of men to eternal life, it is necessary that the sacred and saving truth of God be openly published unto them, which open publication of heavenly mysteries is by an excellency termed preaching."—*Hooker*.

"But the attorney answered them that he is not the declarer of his intentions; he must be judged by the book, by his words, above all, by the effect."—*State Trials*.

ANNOY. MOLEST. TEASE.

ANNOY is from the French *ennuyer*, a compound verb, of which *odium* (and not *nocere*, as commonly given) is the root. MOLEST is from *molestia*, inconvenience, and thence from *moles*, a mass or weight. TEASE is the Saxon *tesan*, to pluck. We are annoyed by anything painful, provided the pain be not excessive; and annoyance may be either physical or mental. We may be annoyed by an excessive glare of light, or by the conduct of a friend towards us, when it has been reported to us.

"Common nuisances are such inconvenient

and troublesome offences as *annoy* the whole community in general, and not merely some particular person."—*Blackstone*.

Molest, on the other hand, is *always physical*, and commonly implies the repetition of physical annoyances, as to be molested by insults, or begging applications, or the visits of a fly or wasp. We are never molested by circumstances or facts in the abstract.

"Save where from yonder ivy-mantled tower,

The moping owl doth to the moon complain
Of such as, wandering near her secret bower,

Molest her ancient solitary reign."—*Gray*.

Tease is very like molest. We are teased by the repetition of unpleasant trifles, which by their recurrence cause personal irritation.

"But as a whelp starts up with fear
When a bee's humming at his ear;
With upper lip elate he grins
Whilst round the little teazer spins."

Fenton

ANNOYANCE. See DISPLEASURE.

ANNUL. See ABOLISH.

ANSWER. REPLY. REJOINDER. RESPONSE.

Words given in return for words is the idea common to all these terms. An ANSWER (Saxon *andswaren*) is given as being required or expected. So an answer to a question or a speech is made in answer to another, such being the preconcerted arrangement. REPLY (Fr. *replique*, Lat. *replicare*, to fold or bend back) is a formal answer to an argumentative assertion, and commonly implies what is not implied in answer, namely, a contrary statement to the preceding. An answer is commensurate with the terms of a question or interrogation; a reply is not so restricted, and does not necessarily presuppose interrogation at all.

"When a man asks me a question, I have it in my power to answer or be silent, to answer softly or roughly, in terms of respect or in terms of contempt."—*Beattie*.

"The plaintiff may plead again, and reply to the defendant's plea. The plaintiff in his replication may totally traverse the plea."—*Blackstone*.

A REJOINDER (Fr. *rejoindre*, to rejoin) expresses not, as reply, a formal and lengthened counter-statement, but one within a short compass and of a pointed character. RESPONSE (Lat. *respondere*, *responsus*) denotes not an antagonistic, but an *accordant* answer, as on hearing one's name called out, or as in the case of the harmonious responses of the Liturgy.

"*Rejoinder* to the churl the king disdained,
But shook his head and rising wrath restrained."
Pope.

"Tertullian takes notice that the *responses* in baptism were then somewhat larger than the model laid down by Christ, meaning than the form of baptism, and he refers the enlargement of the responses to immemorial custom or tradition."—*Waterland*.

ANSWERABLE. See ACCOUNTABLE.

ANTAGONIST. See ENEMY.

ANTECEDENT. See PRECEDENT.

ANTERIOR. See PRECEDING.

ANTICIPATE. See PREVENT.

ANTIPATHY. See HATRED.

ANTIQUATED. See OLD.

ANTIQUE. See OLD.

ANXIETY. See CARE.

APATHY. See INDIFFERENCE.

APE. See MOCK.

APERTURE. See OPENING.

APHORISM. See PROVERB.

APOLOGY. DEFENCE. JUSTIFICATION. EXCULPATION. EXCUSE. PLEA.

An APOLOGY (Greek *ἀπολογία*) had originally the simple meaning of defence, as Jewel's "Apology for the Church of England." As at present employed, the term implies the nature of something said by way of amends. In this way it would differ materially from both DEFENCE and JUSTIFICATION, as *implying wrong committed*, which *they*, of course, *deny*. Again, we apologize for what has been done *to another*, we defend or justify what we have done *ourselves*. Again, between a defence and a justification

there is this radical difference, that we defend ourselves, and we justify our conduct; the defence may therefore possibly consist in the *denial* of the charge; whereas justification necessarily *admits* it, but gives it a new character. Where the defence admits the allegation, it does not extend beyond a palliation of the charge, or at most a demonstration of its allowableness (Lat. *defendere*). A justification may go no farther; on the other hand, it may prove positively a high degree of truth and right (*justus* and *facere*, to make just or right). EXCULPATION (*ex* and *culpa*, a fault) is the act of an inferior before one who has a right to censure or punish. Its object is to show that no blame attaches to him for what he has done or left undone. The recognition of this is also sometimes called exculpation. EXCUSE, on the other hand (*excusare*), never amounts to this. It admits the fact charged, but endeavours to show that it ought to be leniently dealt with, on the ground of extenuating circumstances, and is often the line adopted by pleaders when defence, justification, or exculpation seems impossible. An excuse may be against an obligation as well as a charge. A PLEA (Lat. *placitum*) is a specific point of self-defence. It is, as it were, an *item* in the general sum of any of the former. So that we may put in successively first one plea and then another. Technically speaking, the allegation of the plaintiff is answered by the plea of the defendant.

"For in the book that is called mine *Apology*, it is not required by the nature of that name that it be any answer or defence for mine own self at all; but it sufficeth that it be of mine own making an answer or defence for some other."—*Sir T. More*.

"*Defence* in its true legal sense signifies not a justification, protection, or guard, which is now its popular signification, but merely an opposing or denial (from the French verb, *défendre*) of the truth or validity of the complaint."—*Blackstone*.

"And pettish Jonas, after he had been cooled in the belly of the whale and the sea, yet will be bearing God down in an argument to the *justifying* of his idle choler. 'I do well to be angry to the death.'"—*Bishop Hall*.

"So that if I chose to make a defence of myself on the little principle of a culprit pleading in his *exculpation*, I might not only secure my acquittal, but make merit with the opposers of the Bill."—*Burke*.

When the invited guests in the parable "began with one consent to make excuse," this was a plea against an obligation, and so not directly, but only indirectly, a justification of conduct.

"And there are few actions so ill (unless they are of a very deep and black tincture indeed) but will admit of some extenuation, at least from these common topics of human frailty, such as are ignorance or inadvertency, passion or surprise, company or solicitation, with many other such things, which may go a great way towards an *excusing* of the agent, though they cannot absolutely *justify* the action."—*South*.

"They towards the throne supreme Accountable, made haste to make appear With righteous *plea* their utmost vigilance, And easily approved." *Milton*.

APOPHTHEGM. See PROVERB.

APPAL. See DISMAY.

APPAREL. See DRESS.

APPARENT. CLEAR. VISIBLE.

MANIFEST. PLAIN. OBVIOUS. EVIDENT. CONSPICUOUS.

APPARENT (Lat. *apparere*) is used in two senses; either clear, visible, in opposition to concealed or dubious, or, secondly, seeming, as opposed to real. It is in the former of these senses in which it is a synonym with the above. It is the most inexpressive of all. That is apparent which the bodily eye or the understanding discerns. VISIBLE (*visibilis*, from *videre*, to see) is used purely in a physical sense, and admits of every degree, from the barely discernible to the *conspicuous*. That is visible which is not invisible. The CONSPICUOUS (Lat. *conspicuus*) is also applied only to the physical, and means the *prominently* visible. The cause of this prominence, however, may be moral, as a person may be conspicuous by reason of taste in dress, not because he is more distinctly discernible, but because he draws attention. CLEAR (*clarus*) is both physical and moral,

and denotes the absence of indistinctness, obscurity, or confusedness as regards sight, sense, or sound. *Apparent* is applicable not only to the objects themselves, but their properties. The star is visible, perhaps also conspicuous, but its size and brightness are apparent. PLAIN (*planus*) is applied both to the objects of sight and sound, and to the subjects of the understanding. As that is clear which is lucid in itself, so that is plain of which ordinary perception may take cognizance, so as to require no effort to discern it. A thing may be stated so clearly as to be plain to the meanest understanding. MANIFEST (Lat. *manifestus*, *manus* and *fendo*, struck with the hand) is that which is palpably plain, and, as it were, exhibits itself without question. A man taken off his guard will often manifest his true character, though he may habitually conceal or keep it in check. A manifest contradiction is one which needs no criticism, but which spontaneously or by its own inherent force makes itself apparent. OBVIOUS (Lat. *obviā*, on the road) retains the force of its etymology. It is applied to what we cannot help understanding, and is not used of merely physical subjects. An obvious remark partakes commonly of the nature of a truism. EVIDENT (Lat. *evidens*) is more commonly used in a moral or intellectual acceptation, and denotes what is easily recognizable as a fact or truth. The apparent is opposed to the undiscerned or unperceived; the clear is opposite to the indistinct; the visible is opposite to the invisible; the manifest is opposite to the disguised or suppressed; the plain is opposite to the obscure and difficult; the obvious to the questionable; the conspicuous to the unobservable; the evident to the doubtful.

"When there is no *apparent* cause in the sky, the water will sometimes appear dappled with large spots of shade."—*Gilpin's Tour*.

"Others are furnished by criticism with a telescope. They see with great *clearness* whatever is too remote to be discovered by the rest of mankind, but are totally blind to all that lies immediately before them."—*Rambler*.

"Maker of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible."—*Nicene Creed*.

"You heard not he was false,
Your eyes beheld the traitor manifest."
Dryden.

"So that being filled with the Holy Ghost, as we read in Acts ii. and the 4th verse, they forthwith spoke with other tongues, and so clearly, *plainly*, and intelligibly, as both to convince and astonish all who heard them."—*South*.

"The hero's bones with careful view select,
Apart and easy to be known they be,
Amidst the heap, and *obvious* to the eye."
Pope.

"They affect singularity for want of anything else that is singular, and finding in themselves strong desires of *conspicuousness*, with small abilities to attain it, they are resolved, with Erostratus, that fired Diana's temple, to be talked of for having done so, to acquire that considerableness by their sacrilege which they must despair of from their own parts."—*Boyle*.

"No idea, therefore, can be undistinguishable from another, from which it ought to be different, unless you would have it different from itself, for from all other it is *evidently* different."—*Locke*.

APPARITION. See GHOST.

APPEAR. See SEEM.

APPEARANCE. ASPECT.

APPEARANCE (*apparere*, to appear) is used for the fact, the character, and the semblance of appearing. It is in the two latter points that it is a synonym with ASPECT (*aspicere*, *aspectus*). The appearance of a thing is total, its aspect is partial. The whole of a subject, or an object with all its properties or attendant circumstances, is its appearance. Its aspect is some one characteristic side or face, which it presents to us as a point of view. The appearance of a thing is *what it looks like*, the aspect is *what it seems to mean* or to indicate. The heavens have a clear or cloudy appearance, but they have a serene or stormy aspect. The appearance is a conclusion in itself, the aspect suggests further conclusions.

"Marcus, I know thy generous temper well;
Fling but th' *appearance* of dishonour on it,

It straight takes fire and mounts into a blaze."
Addison.

"The true *aspect* of a world lying in its rubbish."—*Burnet*.

APPEASE. ALLAY. ALLEVIATE.
RELIEVE. PACIFY. MITIGATE.
SOOTHE. ASSUAGE.

These express different modifications of the idea of making quiet, calm, or still. To APPEASE (Fr. *apaiser*, *paix*, peace) is etymologically the same word as the English *pacify*. It denotes the bringing to a calm or quiet state when the previous cause of the disturbance was intrinsic. It applies accordingly to moral cases, and not physical. The sea or the storm calms or abates, but is not appeased. The wrath or the cravings of men and beasts are appeased. In order to appease, something is exacted or paid.

"We, like unskilful or unruly patients, fondly imagine that the only way to *appease* our desires is to grant them the objects they so passionately tend to."—*Boyle*.

PACIFY (*pacem*, *facere*) has the same sense as appease, but is employed of lesser disturbances; while violent anger or craving wants are appeased, importunity, discontent, or restlessness is pacified.

"Not one diverting syllable now, at a pinch, to *pacify* our mistress."—*L'Estrange*.

Pacify applies to the *feelings* of men, and not to the force of things. Of *alleviate*, *mitigate*, and *relieve*, the two first express a more limited action than the third. Pain or grief is said to be RELIEVED (*relevare*, *levis*, light) when it is either partially or entirely removed. When it is ALLEVIATED (*ad* and *levis*, light), or MITIGATED (*mitis*, bland, lenient), it is only partially removed.

"The calamity of the want of the sense of hearing is much *alleviated*—comparatively speaking, it is removed by giving the use of letters and of speech, by which they (the deaf) are admitted to the pleasure of social conversation."—*Horsley*.

"By the practices of holy men he also showed that the reign of that ceremonious law was *mitigable*, that in some cases its obligation might be relaxed, and its observance dispensed with."—*Barrow*.

"The inferior ranks of people no longer looked upon that order as they had done be-

fore, as the comforters of their distress and the *relievers* of their indigence.”—*Adam Smith*.

Mitigate is used only of things, relieve both of things and persons. Alleviate is applied to suffering and distress regarded as a pressing burden, mitigate to the emotions of anger, and severity of action or treatment. To ALLAY is to lay a thing, or set it at rest. It stands to the fervid and vehement as appease to the violent and boisterous, in other words, to the feelings rather than the passions. Thirst, or what is analogous to it, as, for instance, curiosity or ambition, is allayed. On the other hand, ASSUAGE (*suavis*, soft) applies to both feelings and passions. We assuage grief, pain, and wrath. We relieve and mitigate, but do not appease, grief and pain. SOOTHE (*A. S. gesôðhian*) is said of pain or passion. It indicates a reduction of it without removal, and is commonly temporary as well as partial.

“Gentle stroking with a smooth hand allays violent pains and cramps, and relaxes the suffering parts from their unnatural tension.”—*Burke*.

“But to assuage

Th’ impatient fervour which it first conceives

Within its reeking bosom, threatening death
To his young hopes, requires discreet delay.”

Cowper.

“Sacred history has acquainted us with the power of music over the passions; and there is little doubt but the verse, as well as the lyre of David, was able to soothe the troubled spirits to repose.”—*Knôx, Essays*.

APPELLATION. See NAME.

APPEND. See ADD.

APPLAUD. See PRAISE.

APPLICATION. ATTENTION.
STUDY.

STUDY (Lat. *studium*, from *studere*, to desire) is the close mental observation of anything for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, APPLICATION and ATTENTION (*applicare* and *attendere*) are faculties or habits of mind which belong to study. Attention denotes the use, exercise, and devotion of the mind to the subjects of study,

to the exclusion of regard for other matters. Application includes attention, and expresses the entire surrender of the student in *sustained attention* to the employments of study, to which his time as well as his attention must be given. Study must be systematic, application diligent, attention close. Young persons and many others are capable in some degree of attention, but their levity prevents them oftentimes from giving application, and their inexperience does not show them its necessity. Habits of study are formed in their earlier stages by converting the attention of the young into application, by indirect methods, such as by making the subjects of learning attractive and interesting in themselves, or by the adventitious enhancement of them by prizes for competition.

“Had his *application* been equal to his talents, his progress might have been greater.”—*Jay*.

The word does not occur in Old English literature in this sense.

“That very philosophy which had been adopted to invent and explain articles of faith, was now *studied* only to instruct us in the history of the human mind, and to assist us in developing its faculties and regulating its operations.”—*Warburton*.

APPOINT. See ALLOT, NOMINATE, PRESCRIBE, CONSTITUTE, and ORDAIN.

APPORTION. See ALLOT.

APPRAISE. APPRECIATE. ESTIMATE. ESTEEM. VALUE.

To APPRAISE and to APPRECIATE are different forms of the same word, of which *pretium*, price, is the root. Material goods are appraised for the purpose of ascertaining their market value. Things are appreciated at their moral value, as character, conduct, acts of persons. To ESTIMATE (*æstimare*) is to get at the intrinsic value of things by calculation, and accordingly often means a rough valuing. Unlike the rest, it is applicable to what does not yet exist, as to estimate a *future* cost. As estimate applies to both material and moral things, so ESTEEM only to moral.

VALUE is the most general and simple of all these synonyms, and means to set a value (*valere*, to be worth), which may be variable. The word is sometimes used to signify to set a high value, as to appreciate is taken to mean not only to affix a price or value, but its just and due amount. Esteem and value, when employed without qualification, imply a favourable estimate. The same is also implied in appreciate, but not in appraise and estimate. One appreciates persons or things for their social value and utility; one esteems persons or characters for their moral value or merit. How often are the good *esteemed*! It would seem strange that they should not be so; they do not excite the provocations of human nature, they are inoffensive and kind. Yet how seldom are they *appreciated* for those hidden virtues or self-denials into which the world does not care to inquire! Appreciate is often used where there is danger of overlooking.

"The statute, therefore, granted this writ, by which the defendant's goods and chattels are not sold, but only *appraised*, and all of them (except oxen and beasts of the plough) are delivered to the plaintiff at such reasonable *appraisement* and price in part satisfaction of the debt."—*Blackstone*.

It is seldom employed of faults or errors, as in the following from Gibbon:

"A sin, a vice, a crime, are the objects of theology, ethics, jurisprudence. Whenever their judgments agree, they corroborate each other, but as often as they differ, a prudent legislator *appreciates* the guilt and punishment according to the measure of social injury."

In contrast with this Bishop Hall uses the term as follows: he says that the golden vials of incense of the angels in the apocalypse represent "both their acceptable thanksgivings, and their general *appreciations* of peace and welfare to the Church of God upon earth."

"Their wisdom, which to present power consents,

Live dogs before dead lions *estimates*."

Daniel.

"*Esteem* is the value we place upon some degree of worth. It is higher than simple

approbation, which is a decision of judgment. Esteem is the commencement of affection."—*Cogan*.

"Authors, like coins, grow dear as they grow old;

It is the rust we *value*, not the gold."

Pope.

APPREHEND. CONCEIVE. SUPPOSE. IMAGINE. PRESUME. ASSUME.

To APPREHEND (*apprehendere*), literally, to lay hold of in the mind, is employed to express what does not profess to be the result of accurate knowledge, or a judgment maturely formed, but such a belief as we are inclined to entertain upon our present state and stock of information. It is the expression of a strong apparent probability, and relates to facts, not principles or generalizations. To CONCEIVE (*concipere*) denotes a maturer act of judgment, yet one short of actual determination or absolute conviction. It relates to principles or truths, and needs the help of imagination. In SUPPOSE (*supponere*), IMAGINE (Fr. *imaginer*, *imago*, an image), and PRESUME (*presumere*, to take beforehand), the uncertainty of mind is *voluntarily stated*. If I say, I imagine, I am prepared to have it shown that the matter has no existence but in my imagination. If I say, I suppose, I mean that what I say is not to my knowledge based upon authority or evidence, but a sort of rational guess. If I say, I presume, I mean that I suppose it based upon something, the evidence of which I have forestalled, by which it might be shown to be true. If I say, I ASSUME (*assumere*), I mean that I take something for proved or granted which has not in fact been so, and the force of which I have simply appropriated, on the ground of its being true, though I do not, and perhaps could not, prove it. We may observe that a presumption is an antecedent probability final in itself; an assumption is no more than the arbitrary adoption of what is required to complete an argument. One does not apprehend what seems unlikely in reason or fact. One cannot conceive what is contrary to experience and

established order. One cannot suppose what neither argument nor observation is likely to verify. One cannot imagine that what has no existence in the common course and nature of things will occur or has occurred. One cannot presume what is contrary to analogy. It is worse than waste of time to assume in argument what your adversary would never concede. Imagine is a term of peculiarly varied applicability. It bears at different times the meanings of think, conceive, create, combine, conjecture, estimate, presume, believe with ground, and believe groundlessly, or, as it were, dream. It follows all the senses of imagination, as presume all the senses of presumption. Presumption, though always founded upon reason, being a reasonable forestalling of proof, nevertheless varies widely in degree of force or truth. Some presumptions are mere conjectures, others amount, especially where several combine, to the establishment of a moral certainty. A presumption which has force is an instalment of the proof, being in course of transformation from probability into certainty.

"It was once proposed to discriminate the slaves by a particular habit, but it was justly apprehended that there might be some danger in acquainting them with their own numbers."—*Gibbon*.

"It was amongst the ruins of the capital that I first conceived the idea of a work which has amused and exercised near twenty years of my life."—*Ibid*.

"Upon supposal that such and such things continue in their being, and that God withal affords them His ordinary concurrence, such and such effects will certainly follow."—*Smith*.

"Many men who now are conscious and willing to acknowledge that they act contrary to all the reasonable evidence and conviction of religion, are nevertheless very apt to imagine within themselves that if the great truths of religion were proved to them by stronger evidence, they should, by that means, be worked upon to act otherwise than they do."—*Clark*.

"When the fact itself cannot be demonstratively evinced, that which comes nearest to the proof of the fact is the proof of such circumstances which either necessarily or usually attended such facts, and these are called *presumptions*."—*Blackstone*.

"The consequences of assumed principles."
—*Wherevell*.

APPREHENSION. See ALARM and FEAR.

APPRIZE. See INFORM.

APPROACH. See ACCESS.

APPROACH. APPROXIMATE.

These verbs are both formed from the Latin *prope*, *proximus*, the former mediately through the French *proche*, near. They differ in the degree of nearness expressed. When two things APPROACH, the interval between them is materially lessened, or small. But they may be said to APPROXIMATE if the interval is in any degree lessened, though it may after all be so great as to be enormous. An approximate calculation, for instance, is so distant as hardly to be a calculation at all, but only the best that can be made of it.

"Let matter be divided into the subtlest parts imaginable, and these be moved as swiftly as you will, it is but a senseless and stupid being still, and makes no nearer approach to sense, perception, or vital energy than it had before."—*Ray on Creation*.

"The largest capacity and the most noble dispositions are but an approximation to the proper standard and true symmetry of human nature."—*J. Taylor*.

APPROBATION. See PRAISE.

APPROPRIATE. SUITABLE. PARTICULAR.

APPROPRIATE is to *suitable* as the subjective to the objective, the appropriate being the suitable in conception, and never employed of physical or mechanical fitting. So SUITABLE (*suite*, sequence, Lat. *sequi*, *secutus*) is the wider and simpler term; that is suitable which is in any way adapted to a thing, that is appropriate which accords with the conceptions formed of it (*proprius*, proper). Suitable is a purely practical term. Appropriate is a term of taste. Suitable may be between two physical or two moral terms. Appropriate always implies at least one moral. The terms might often be used interchangeably. An apposite remark might be styled suitable or appropriate; but appropriate is never affirmed directly of persons. So we should say of some

one elected to a public office, he is a fit or suitable, not appropriate, person for the appointment.

"In its strict and *appropriate* meaning, especially as applied to our Saviour's parables, it (parable) signifies a short narrative of some event or fact, real or fictitious, in which a continued comparison is carried on between sensible and spiritual objects; and under this similitude some important doctrine, moral or religious, is conveyed and enforced."—*Bishop Porteus*.

PECULIAR and PARTICULAR (*peculiaris* and *particularis*) both express what is the property of something else in a marked and characteristic way; but peculiar relates to the person or object *restrictively*, particular does not. For instance, the peculiar privileges of man are those which are proper to his nature, or belong to him as man. The particular privileges of man would mean those which might be specifically enumerated whether peculiar to him or not.

"Raphael, amidst his tenderness and friendship for men, shows such a dignity and condescension in all his speech and behaviour as are *suitable* to a superior nature."—*Addison*.

"Beauty, which either waking or asleep,
Shot forth *peculiar* graces." *Milton*.

"Young clerks that ben likerous
To reden artes that ben curious,
Seken in every halke and every herne,
Particular sciences for to lerne."

Chaucer.

APPROPRIATE. USURP. ARROGATE. ASSUME.

Of these, the widest in signification and most varied in force is the last. ASSUME (*assumere*) is, literally, to take to oneself; this may be done with or without right, and in any degree, from a temporary and external, to a more permanent assumption. We assume truth, probability, right, or the use of things, but not physical objects themselves, unless they have some force or significance beyond themselves. For instance, I take, not assume, my hat; but if I placed in it a feather as a badge of leadership or of party, I should be said to assume it. In this to assume is to take formally and demonstratively. I assume a thing when I simply take it to or

upon myself. I APPROPRIATE it (*proprius*, one's own) when, in so doing, I impart to it the character of being peculiarly mine; as this may be to the exclusion of others having an equal right to it, the word is tinged with an idea of injustice. The radical idea of appropriate is to make properly to belong. This may be either in regard to persons, or to objects, as to appropriate justly a sum of money to a particular purpose, or to appropriate it dishonestly to one's own use.

"But these (glebe, tithes, &c.) are sometimes *appropriated*, that is, the benefice is perpetually annexed to some spiritual corporation."—*Blackstone*.

"An *usurper* can never have right on his side."—*Locke*.

"The half-lettered are forward, and *arrogate* to themselves what a modest studious man dares not, though he knows more."—*Woolston*.

"Pompey, Crassus, and Cæsar had found the sweets of arbitrary power, and each being a check to the others' growth, struck up a false friendship among themselves, and divided the government betwixt them, which none of them was able to *assume* alone."—*Dryden*.

Right and wrong seem blended in ARROGATE (Lat. *arrogare*), which proceeds upon the *plea* of lawful title or *claim*, although that plea may be excessive or unsound, which indeed is most commonly implied. USURP (*usurare*) is to encroach upon that which is in the use or enjoyment of another, or to alienate it altogether in one's own favour; hence the term is employed of power, titles, rights, possessions, authority, privileges, and the like.

APPROXIMATE. See APPROACH.

APT. READY. PROMPT. CLEVER.

These terms all denote the possession of mental activity, with, however, some shades of difference. The APT man (*aptus*, fit) is he who can with comparative ease qualify himself for the exercise of any function of body or mind. Aptness is specific capacity rapidly developed; a man may be apt to learn, or apt to teach.

"It is true that if the affection or *aptness*

of the children be extraordinary, then it is good not to cross it."—*Barrow*.

The **READY** man is he who can meet the requirements of a particular case without much forecasting, who, from the armoury of his own resources, can draw at short notice what is wanted for immediate use. The apt man is so by natural power and fitness; the ready man by natural quickness and versatility of mind. The former in time learns much, the latter in a moment speaks or acts effectively. Readiness and aptness are also qualities of things, promptitude only of persons. The **PROMPT** (*promptus*, part. of *promo*, to bring out) is he who can meet the requirements of a case readily. He is the man who is ready for practical purposes, as the ready man is prompt for purposes less exigent, as in reply or rejoinder. The prompt man is so by virtue of an energetic will. The **CLEVER** man (*see* **ABILITY**) is he who can readily invent or adapt means to an end, with an instinctive faculty of contrivance and rapidity of execution.

"Ready in devising expedients."—*Macaulay*.

"To the stern sanction of the offended sky
My prompt obedience bows." *Pope*.

"Though there were many *clever* men in England during the latter half of the seventeenth century, there were only two great creative minds."—*Macaulay*.

ARBITER. *See* **JUDGE**.

ARBITRARY. *See* **ABSOLUTE**.

ARBITRATOR. *See* **JUDGE**.

ARCHITECT. *See* **BUILDER**.

ARCHIVE. *See* **RECORD**.

ARDENT. *See* **BURNING**.

ARDOUR. *See* **FERVOUR**.

ARDUOUS. **DIFFICULT.** **HARD.**

HARD (Old Saxon *hard*) expresses in a blunter and more general way what **DIFFICULT** (*difficilis*) and **ARDUOUS** (*arduis*) represent in a more particular and refined way. Any tough business of the hand or the mind may be called hard. It is simply a strong analogous term.

Difficulty is a kind of hardness, namely, that which requires some *mental exertion* besides mere work and perseverance to overcome. The making of roads is not difficult work; it is simply hard work; but it becomes difficult for the engineer when the country does not furnish the requisite material, and he has to substitute other material, which, perhaps, has to be brought from a distance, while the means of transit and transport are not at hand. Hardness is simple. Difficulty is complex. Arduous denotes that which requires the *sustained* exertion of mind or body. It will probably be made up of many hardnesses and many difficulties, which have to be successively encountered, endured, and overcome before the end, which from the first was seen, as it were, at a distance, and upon an eminence, shall have been attained. In hardness there is no disproportion between the means and the end, the faculties and the work. The opposite is implied in the term. To accomplish a hard task needs time, patience, and perseverance. In difficulty such a disproportion *does* exist, and it has to be supplied out of the mental resources of the agent. A difficult operation in surgery does not involve great bodily effort, but is constituted by the delicacy of the matter operated upon, and the need of constant care to avoid the serious consequences of slight deviations, or disastrous results from casual ignorance or oversight. In things which are arduous the difficulty comes rather from within, the danger of a lack of energy and effort. An arduous undertaking is commonly a demand rather upon a man's moral strength than upon his sagacity or skill.

"Hear how learn'd Greece her useful rules
indites,
When to repress, and when indulge our
flights,
High on Parnassus' top her sons she
show'd,
And pointed out those *arduous* paths they
trod." *Pope*.

"Was ever anything *difficult* or glorious
achieved by a sudden cast of a thought?"—*South*.

"Have you been evil spoken of, and your character injured when you know yourself innocent? this is *hard* to bear on worldly principles."—*Gilpin's Sermons*.

ARGUE. See DEBATE and SHOW.

ARISE. See ASCEND and SPRING.

ARMS. WEAPONS.

ARMS (*arma*) seems to be used in a general, and also a specific sense. In the general sense it means all that a man carries when armed, that is, of defensive and offensive. In this general sense it is distinguished from WEAPON (*A. Saxon wapen*), which always means the implements of active or offensive warfare. But usage has introduced yet another distinction. Weapon is employed of such implements as are extemporaneously assumed; or of such things as are converted into implements of defence, while arms is used of those which are uniformly made, and recognised as such. According as it is regarded in its fixed character, or in its occasional use, things may be called arms or weapons. The sword is one of the soldier's arms, and a necessary weapon it is. The tongue may be used as a poisoned weapon. A spade is in itself an implement of husbandry. It may be a formidable weapon in the hands of an angry rustic.

"He lays down
His arms, but not his wiles." Milton.

"The weapons of our warfare, are not carnal."—*Bible*.

ARMY. See HOST.

AROUSE. See EXCITE.

ARRAIGN. See CHARGE.

ARRANGE. See ADJUST.

ARRAY. See DRESS.

ARREST. See HOLD.

ARRIVE. COME.

TO COME (*Saxon cuman*) is *vague*, and independent of time, manner, or circumstances. To ARRIVE (*ad* and *ripa*, a bank, literally, to come to the bank) denotes an *anticipated* or *appointed coming*. It is used of things,

persons, events, and time, or points of time. Things come by chance or nature; they arrive by order or appointment. The train comes when it approaches. It arrives at a certain place and a certain hour.

"In the epistles of St. Paul, St. Peter, and St. James, we find frequent mention of the *coming* of our Lord, in terms which, like those of the text, may at first seem to imply an expectation in those writers of His speedy arrival."—*Harley*.

ARROGANCE. PRESUMPTION.
SELF-CONCEIT. PRIDE. VANITY.
HAUGHTINESS.

ARROGANCE (*Latin arrogantia*, from *arrogare*, to arrogate) is exactly what the word is formed to express, a habit of arrogating to oneself the deference of others; or, as it has been defined, "exclusive self-deference." It is the extreme of self-assertion. Go where he will, the arrogant man carries his claims with him—claims to be considered superior, as in social position, the expression of opinion, or what not. It is often a partial fault of character, and persons are found arrogant on some matters who are not so upon others.

"*Arrogance* is always offensive, because in demanding more than its due (for this meaning appears in the etymology of the word) it manifests a petulant and injurious disposition, that disdains to be controlled by good breeding or any other restraint."—*Beattie*.

Where exhibited it is more overbearing than SELF-CONCEIT, which is merely the entertaining an overweening opinion of oneself, and may be far less obtrusive than the former. It is commonly more ridiculous and less troublesome. Like arrogance, it may be confined to particular matters, and these may be personal trivialities.

"Nothing so haughty and assuming as ignorance, where *self-conceit* bids it set up for infallible."—*South*.

From these PRIDE (*A. S. pryta*) differs in lying essentially in *excess*. It is an exaggerated estimate of the deference due to something *which really exists* in us, or belongs to us, and by consequence involves a disposition to

disdain others, converting superiors into equals, and equals into inferiors.

"*Pride* is that exalted idea of our state, qualifications, or attainments which exceeds the boundaries of justice, and induces us to look down upon supposed inferiors with some degree of unmerited contempt."—*Cogan*.

HAUGHTINESS seems often constitutional. The haughty person breathes a superior atmosphere to other people, or imagines it (French *haut*, *hauteur*, height). It proceeds from pride, of which it is to a great degree the external manifestation, showing itself in the manners and deportment.

"As many more can discover that a man is richer than that he is wiser than themselves, superiority of understanding is not so readily acknowledged as that of fortune; nor is that *haughtiness* which the consciousness of great abilities incites borne with the same submission as the tyranny of affluence."—*Johnson*.

VANITY may exist with pride or self-conceit, but is not implied by either. It is literally emptiness (*vanitas*, from *vanus*, hollow); thence it came to mean something unreal, fictitious, or false, and so, bad. At length, as applied to the personal character, it came to mean an excessive desire of applause, approbation, or admiration for qualities we possess, as well as those we do not. It differs from pride in being of matters closely connected with oneself personally. One is not vain, for instance, of titles and estates, but proud. The subjects of vanity are good looks, talent, personal influence, or success, and the like.

"*Vanity* is that species of pride which, while it presumes upon a degree of superiority in some particular articles, fondly courts the applause of every one within its sphere of action, seeking every occasion to display some talent or some supposed excellency."—*Cogan*.

PRESUMPTION (a modern sense given to the Latin *presumere*) is especially the fault of the little. It is wholly unlike pride, as pride possesses, but over-estimates, presumption possesses not, but claims to possess, and that over the heads of others. The presumptuous man strives to be on a level with those above him, and shows his character in obtrusiveness of con-

duct, or he arraigns the acts and opinions of those who are far better able to judge and act than himself.

"And through *presumption* of his matchless might,
All other powers and knighthood he did scorn." *Spenser*.

ARROGATE. See APPROPRIATE.

ART. See KNOWLEDGE and PROFESSION.

ARTFUL. CUNNING. DECEITFUL. DESIGNING. CRAFTY.

ARTFUL is, as the term literally expresses, full of art, in the sense of contrivance; and, except as employed of the lower animals or in self-defence, is tinged with an unfavourable complexion. The artful character tends to exercise for its own purposes means which baffle the interpretation or escape the observation of others.

"Another vice of age, by which the rising generation may be alienated from it, is severity and censoriousness that gives no allowance to the failings of early life, that expects *artfulness* from childhood and constancy from youth, that is peremptory in every command and inexorable to every failure."—*Johnson*.

Artfulness is cunning indirectness of dealing. It is the trained use of the quality of CUNNING (Sax. *cunnan*, to know). CUNNING is the faculty of acting with concealment and disguise, as applied to the lowest order of wants or designs. It is the more simple and animal aspect of artfulness, which is sustained cunning brought to bear upon matters of design, with more versatility and knowledge than is implied in mere cunning. This is, however, quite a recent force of the word. In the time of the translation of the Bible and later the word cunning meant skill, especially in the arts.

"If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her *cunning*." "*Cunning* artificers."—*Bible*.

"Clerks *cunning* in schole."—*Piers Ploughman*.

It expresses now the characteristic quality of the fox.

"The fox, in deeper *cunning* vers'd,
The beauties of her mind rehears'd."
More's Fables.

DECEITFUL (*decipere*) denotes a more direct purpose of leading others astray. The artful and cunning are *indirectly* deceitful, but the deceitful is ready, if necessary, to falsify truth and honour to gain his end, and directly to mislead the mind of another. In the full sense of the term, it is only the intellect of *man* which can be deceitful. Yet deceitful is a term of the moral disposition rather than the mental nature. Artful and cunning imply some degree of success or aptitude; but a person may be in character deceitful, that is, he may have the desire to deceive others, without being artful or cunning, that is, he may not have the faculty. The deceitful betray truth, the artful exhibit or conceal it to suit their own purposes.

"But sin, by that *deceitfulness* which the apostle speaks of in the text, hides its deformed appearances from the eyes of foolish men, and sets before them nothing but pleasures and profit, joy and vanity, present security, and very distant, very uncertain, very remote fears."—*South.*

DESIGNING denotes artful conduct exercised with a specific purpose of effecting desired objects, even to the extent of misleading or injuring others. Indeed, the injury of another may constitute the *design*. DESIGN (*Fr. dessein, Lat. designare*) is strictly a marked or delineated scheme. The artful and cunning think of themselves; the efforts of the designing are directed against others. The sense of *designing*, as meaning artful, is of recent origin in English literature, though the word *designement* was used in that of craft or evil design.

"And, therefore, whatsoever wicked *designement* shall be conspired and plotted against her majesty hereafter, shall be thought to be conspired, plotted, and intended as against the Almighty Himself."—*Hackluyt.*

"This *designment* appears both iniquitous and absurd."—*Warburton.*

ARTICULATE. *See* PRONOUNCE.

ARTIFICE. *See* TRICK.

ARTIFICIAL. FICTITIOUS.

ARTIFICIAL (*ars, art, and facere, to make*) and FICTITIOUS (*fingere, to feign*) are nearly allied. As artful means done with art as opposed to simplicity, so artificial means done by art as opposed to Nature. The artificial is the dexterous production of imitative art. The fictitious is the creation of what has no natural existence. An artificial tale of distress, for instance, would be one of which the circumstances well imitated what was natural or probable. A fictitious tale would mean one of which the incidents had no existence but in the deceitful ingenuity of the narrator. In the idea of the artificial there are two elements, either of which may appear with special prominence,—1, that of art, as distinguished from Nature, and 2, that of exhibiting a considerable *degree* of art, as distinguished from simple. Dryden uses it in the former sense, when he says—

"In the unity of time you find them so scrupulous, that it yet remains a dispute among their poets whether the *artificial* day of twelve hours, more or less, be not meant by Aristotle rather than the natural one of twenty-four."

In the second by Tillotson:

"These, and such as these, are the hopes of hypocrites, which Job elegantly compares to the spider's web, finely and *artificially* wrought, but miserably thin and weak."

ARTIST. ARTISAN. ARTIFICER.
MECHANIC.

All these bear reference to art. The man who applies the resources of art to constructive manufacture is the ARTIFICER. It is thus that the Creator has been styled the great Artificer of the universe. There seems to be little difference between the ARTIST and the ARTISAN, as regards their profession, beyond the dignity of their employments. He who exercises any *fine art well* is called an artist. He who exercises any *mechanical art well* is called an artisan. It is in the superior skill of labour that an artisan differs from a MECHANIC (*μηχανή*, *Lat. machina, a machine*), the mechanic being one who employs instruments other than

agricultural in his work. Thus a gunmaker would be an artisan, a shoemaker a mechanic. The artist may be unprofessional, as an amateur artist.

"Art can never give the rules that make an art. This is, I believe, the reason why artists in general, and poets principally, have been confined in so narrow a circle."—*Burke*.

"If workmen become scarce, the manufacturer gives higher wages, but at first requires an increase of labour; and this is willingly submitted to by the *artisan*, who can now eat and drink better to compensate his additional toil and fatigue."—*Hume*.

"Another lean unwash'd *artificer*

Cuts off his tale, and talks of Arthur's death." *Shakespeare*.

"An art quite lost with our *mechanics*; a work not to be made out, but like the walls of Thebes, and such an *artificer* as Amphion."—*Brown's Vulgar Errors*.

The professor of the principles of mechanics, as distinguished from the workman, is called a *mechanician*.

AS. See CONSEQUENTLY.

ASCEND. MOUNT. ARISE. RISE. CLIMB.

ASCEND (*ascendere*) and MOUNT (*monter*, from the Latin *mons*) are employed as both transitive and intransitive verbs, while RISE and ARISE (Sax. *risan*, *arisan*) are used only as intransitive. It is in the intransitive sense that the two former are synonyms with the latter. The simplest of all is rise, of which the rest may be considered as modifications. To rise is irrelative, to arise is relative to something out of which a thing rises. This appears in the secondary use of the term, to spring from a certain cause. To arise is also definite and limited, while rise is indefinite and progressive. A person arises from his bed, and the point of rising is gained when he stands upright. A bird rises in the air, that is, goes higher and higher indefinitely. Rise, like arise, is used in a figurative as well as physical sense. It then expresses a gradual increase or enhancement.

"It is not their nominal price only, but

their real price, which *rises* in the progress of improvement. The *rise* of their nominal price is the effect, not of any degradation of the value of silver, but of the *rise* in their real price."—*Adam Smith*.

"No grateful dews descend from evening skies,

Nor morning odours from the flowers arise." *Pope*.

"He *ascended* into heaven."—*Apostles' Creed*.

"The idlest and the paltriest mime that ever mounted upon bank."—*Milton*.

"Its hooked form is of great use to the rapacious kind in catching and holding their prey, and in the commination thereof by tearing. To others, it (the mouth) is no less serviceable to their *climbing* as well as neat and nice commination of their food."—*Derham*.

Mount, like *rise*, is progressive, but it expresses only the process after its commencement; while *rise* expresses also the commencement. We might say, the birds rose, meaning that they took wing; but we could not use *mount* in this sense. In *mount* will be always found to underlie some implied *degree* of rising which is *not considerable*, as in *ascend*. It is graduated rising above the lower, while *ascend* is ungraduated, and towards the higher. The balloon ascends, rises, or mounts; the tide rises or mounts, but is not said to ascend. This appears yet more plainly in the transitive use of *mount* and *ascend*. We ascend a mountain, but not a horse, because the latter action has a definite stop and limit. To ascend the hill is merely to go higher and higher up it; to mount it, is to get to the top of it. *Ascend* conveys the idea of some *considerable* degree of altitude. To CLIMB (A. S. *climban*) is to ascend step by step in a series of personal efforts.

ASCENDANCY. See INFLUENCE.

ASCRIBE. IMPUTE. ATTRIBUTE.

These words belong to the process of assigning cause, and apparently are used in accordance with the nature of the cause assigned. Causation may be regarded as physical, moral, or mixed. Mixed causation, or human production, is expressed by ASCRIBE,

as I ascribe such a book to such an author; moral causation, or human motive, by *IMPUTE*, as I impute such conduct to his generosity, or his cruelty, or his ignorance, as the case may be; physical and moral causation, by *ATTRIBUTE*, as I attribute the loss of the ship to the violence of the storm; or I attribute his behaviour to his ignorance. *Ascribe* is also used in the simple sense of refer, *without* any idea of causation, but property, as to ascribe glory to God; that is, to express as an attribute of His nature.

* Behold Sir Balaam, now a man of spirit,
Ascribes his gettings to his parts and merit;
What late he called a blessing now was wit,
And God's good providence a lucky hit."

Pope.

"Nor you, ye proud, *impute* to those the fault,
If memory o'er their tomb no trophies raise,
Where, through the long-drawn aisle and
fretted vault,
The pealing anthem swells the note of
praise."

Gray.

"It is a practice much too common in inquiries of this nature to *attribute* the cause of feelings which merely arise from the mechanical structure of our bodies, or from the natural frame and constitution of our minds, to certain conclusions of the reasoning faculty."—Burke.

ASK. REQUEST. BEG. BE-
SEECH. SUPPLICATE. ENTREAT.
IMPLORE. SOLICIT. ADJURE.
CRAVE.

To *ASK* (*A. S. ascian, acsian*), not taking the word in the sense of interrogate, is the simplest term for making a request.

"And I beseech you come again to-morrow.
What shall you *ask* of me that I'll deny,
That honour sav'd may upon *asking* give?"

Shakespeare.

REQUEST, being Latin (*requirere, questus*), is a more polite word for the same thing. Nevertheless, the latter is sometimes used with an implied sense of authority amounting virtually to a command. Request is not a strong term, implying neither urgency of want nor vehemence of word.

"*Requesting* him to accept the same in good part, as a testimony and witness of their

good hearts, zeal, and tenderness towards him and his country."—Hackluyt.

To *BEG* (which is best derived from *bag*, as if to ask for the wallet, "beggars with bagges," *P. Ploughman*) is more earnest and, except when used in a kind of irony, is the act of an equal or an inferior, as request may be of an equal or a superior. To *beg* is not a term of marked character: we may beg boldly or timidly.

"In *begging* other inferior things, it may become us to be reserved, indifferent, and modest; but about these matters wherein all our felicity is extremely concerned, it were a folly to be slack or timorous."—Barrow.

To *BESEECH* (*beseek*) and to *ENTREAT* (a form of treat, and this the French *traiter*, Latin *tractare*, to handle or draw, in the same sense as treaty) are much the same, but beseech belongs more to feeling, entreat to argument. We entreat an equal by what he knows or feels; we beseech a superior by his goodness or his greatness. We may even entreat an inferior, as a father may entreat a son to be more diligent for his own sake. This is to urge on grounds of affection.

"The servant, therefore, fell down and worshipped him; prostrated himself at his master's feet, and in the most moving terms besought him, saying, 'Have patience with me, and I will pay thee all.'"—Bishop Porteus.

"So well he woo'd her, and so well he wrought her,

With fair entreaty and sweet blandishment."

Spenser.

To *SUPPLICATE* (*supplicare, supplex, sub and plico*, to ask with bended knees) and *IMPLORE* (*implorare*) both imply extreme distress and earnestness; but we may implore equals: we supplicate only superiors, for supplication denotes abject humility, as in a slave or an offender supplicating for pardon. To *SOLICIT* (*solicitare*) is to ask with a feeling of anxiety or strong interest in what we ask, and implies what a superior only can grant, or what we can only receive from the favour of another. It relates to reception only. *ADJURE* (*adjurare*) is to entreat in a solemn manner, as if upon oath, and there-

fore is employed to imply that the person addressed is under a strong moral obligation to take heed to the matter of the asking. To *CRAVE* (A. S. *cræfian*) is to ask with all eagerness to gratify a desire, or satisfy a natural want.

"Whose mercy the most opulent of us all must one day *supplicate* with all the earnestness of abject mendicacy."—*Knox*.

"With piercing words and pitiful *implore*." *Spenser*.

"To *solicit* by labour what might be ravished by arms was esteemed unworthy of the German spirit."—*Gibbon*.

"I *adjure* thee by the living God."—*Bible*.

"And none so bold beggar to bydden and *crave*."—*Piers Ploughman*.

ASPECT. See APPEARANCE and CHARACTER.

ASPERITY. See ACRIMONY.

ASPERSION. See CALUMNY.

ASSAIL. See ATTACK.

ASSASSINATE. See KILL.

ASSAULT. See ATTACK.

ASSEMBLE. See COLLECT.

ASSEMBLY. ASSEMBLAGE. GROUP. COLLECTION. COMPANY. MEETING.

ASSEMBLY and ASSEMBLAGE are from the Latin *assimulure*, from *simul*, together. Assembly and assemblage both refer to persons, but assemblage refers also to things, which assembly does not. Where they refer to persons, assembly is a number of persons voluntarily, assemblage a number of persons involuntarily, brought together, or at least not regarded as united under any common object or employment. We speak of an assembly of common persons; an assemblage of illustrious persons.

"He scarce had finish'd, when such murmurs filled

Th' *assembly*, as when hollow rocks retain
The sound of blustering winds, which all
night long

Have roused the sea." *Milton*.

"In sweet *assemblage*, every blooming grace
Fix love's bright throne in Teraminta's
face." *Fenton*.

GROUP (Fr. *groupe*) is applied to objects animate and inanimate, and

denotes an assemblage regarded with an eye to its configuration, or such relations of the parts as might be noticed for their artistic effect.

"Du Fresnoy tells us that 'the figures of the *groups* must not be all on a side,' that is, with their faces and bodies all turned the same way, but must contrast each other by their several positions."—*Dryden*.

COLLECTION (*colligere*) denotes a number of persons or things brought together by some force external to themselves, which has made them one either for unity of nature or by identity of place; while assembly denotes an internal purpose of meeting. So we speak of various refuse substances collected at the mouth of a river. Collection, unlike the rest, is capable of passing out of the category of number into that of quantity, so as to become synonymous with heap or mass, in which the items are merged.

"And Thomas Sternhold, one of the king's servants, set forth his Psalms, being a *collection* of some of David's Psalms."—*Strype*.

COMPANY (*compagnie, con and panis*, bread, a companion, being literally a messmate) is applied only to persons of whom it expresses a limited number united for a private and peculiar purpose, as assembly may be for a public purpose, and must be in a public way.

"As I am insignificant to the *company* in public places, and as it is visible that I do not come thither, as most do, to show myself, I gratify the vanity of all who pretend to make an appearance."—*Steele*.

MEETING, a body met together, is of many things or persons, though in its abstract sense of coming together it may refer to two only. It conveys the idea of involuntary union, or of persons who *find themselves together*. It also conveys more strongly than the other the idea of relation to a point or locality at which the meeting occurs.

"Understand this, Stethva, to be the *meeting* of the British poets and minstrels for trial of their poems and music sufficiencies, where the best had his reward—a silver harp."—*Drayton*.

ASSENT. See ACCEDE.

ASSERT. AFFIRM. ASSEVERATE.
AVER. PROTEST.

To ASSERT (Latin *asserere*, *assertus*, to lay hold by the hand, so as to assert a claim) and AFFIRM (*affirmare*, *firmus*, firm) both denote the making of a statement. But assert, true to its origin, is rather subjective, affirm rather objective in its character; or, in other words, I assert a thing as a truth or conviction; I affirm it as a fact or proposition. Assert has therefore a metaphysical, affirm a logical force. I assert boldly; I affirm positively. The opposite to assert would be to imply or to suppose; the opposite to affirm would be to deny: or again, we confute an assertion, and deny an affirmation. A man may affirm a thing because he would rather do so than deny it; or he may affirm it for the sake of discussion upon it. But when he asserts it he takes upon himself the consequences of his statement. Hence bold assertions commonly indicate a combination of ignorance and rashness. In deliberative assemblies a resolution of fact is said to be affirmed, not asserted, by the meeting, because the moral responsibility of individuals is not the idea of it, but a *proposition* unanimously framed and assented to. To ASSEVERATE (*asseverare*, from *severus*) is to speak in no way of joke, but in a peculiarly earnest manner, for the purpose of removing doubt from the minds of hearers by the very force of manner. To AVER (*verus*, true) is formally to declare as true; it belongs only to matters of fact and positive knowledge. We do not aver opinions; hence he exceeds his province who avers that a thing is so, unless he have had positive demonstration of it. To PROTEST (*pro* and *testis*) is to do the same, but in a more public manner, and indicating not only the truth of the thing, but one's own earnestness and sincerity in making the statement. Protestation, when it is relative, becomes antagonistic, and so the noun protest has come to convey the idea of a declaration *against* some other person or thing; but this is accidental, not essential to its meaning, which is open and solemn

declaration, with the energy of sincerity.

"I can hardly believe that any one will assert that a parcel of mere matter left altogether to itself could ever of itself begin to move. If there is any such bold *asserter*, let him fix his eyes upon some lump of matter, for instance, a stone, piece of timber, or a clod cleared of all animals, and peruse it well."—*Woolaston*.

"If one writer shall *affirm* that virtue added to faith is sufficient to make a Christian, and another shall zealously deny this proposition, they seem to differ widely in words, and yet, perhaps, they may both really agree in sentiment, if by the word virtue the affirmer intends our whole duty to God and man, and the denier by the word virtue means only courage, or, at most, our duty toward our neighbour, without including in the idea of it the duty which we owe to God."—*Watt's Logic*.

"'I will come, and some of you shall see me coming.' Can it be supposed that in such an *asseveration* the word to come may bear two different senses?"—*Harley*.

"I shall only *aver* what myself have sometimes observed of a duck when closely pursued by a water-dog. She not only dives to save herself, but when she comes up again, brings not her whole body above water, but only her bill and part of her head, holding the rest underneath, that so the dog, who, in the meantime, turns round and looks about him, may not spy her till she have recovered breath."—*Ray*.

"I *protest* by your rejoicing which I have in Christ Jesus our Lord, I die daily."—*Bible*.

ASSESSMENT. See TAX.

ASSEVERATE. See ASSERT.

ASSIDUOUS. See DILIGENT.

ASSIGN. See ADDUCE.

ASSIST. See HELP.

ASSISTANT. COADJUTOR.

ASSISTANT (*assistere*, to stand by) and COADJUTOR (*con* and *adjuvare*, to aid) differ only in quality. The menial servant, or one much younger, may be an assistant; but the coadjutor is on a level with him whom he aids, and with whom he is associated in some honourable office.

"In one respect I'll thy *assistant* be,"
Shakespeare.

"The plebeian ædiles were chosen out of the commons, and were in some respects a sort of *coadjutors* to the tribunes."—*Melmoth*.

ASSOCIATE. See COMPANION.

ASSOCIATION. PARTNERSHIP.

ALLIANCE. COMBINATION.

In itself, ASSOCIATION (*ad* and *socius*, a companion) is of a lighter and less lasting character than the others. It may be such an union as is kept alive merely by the spirit of union brought to bear upon a temporary object, as an association for investigating the geology, botany, or archæology of a district. If it be more than this it arises out of the peculiar circumstances of the case, and becomes a society, of which the organization is more strict. PARTNERSHIP is that association of two or more persons which is based upon a community of personal interests, and which must be secured by more or less formal sanctions. ALLIANCE (Lat. *alligantia*) is a voluntary association of a close character between individuals or states. When between the latter, it is for offensive or defensive purposes; when the former, it is for purposes of friendship, mutual protection, or assistance, and social or domestic relationship.

"Associations of mysterious sense,
Against, but seeming for the king's de-
fence." *Dryden*.

"In this *partnership* all men have equal rights, but not to equal things. He that has but five shillings in the *partnership* has as good a right to it as he that has five hundred pounds has to his larger proportion."—*Burke*.

"By this extraordinary and unexpected success of his ally (Gustavus), Charles failed of the purpose for which he framed the *alliance*."—*Hume*.

COMBINATION (*con* and *binus*, two each, or two) is commonly of many persons in private for the purpose of some object desired in common. As lawful purposes can commonly be compassed by ordinary means, combination conveys the idea of conspiracy or union against some existing power, not altogether honourable or peaceful. This, however, is by no means universally the case. Never-

theless, a union for a good purpose, as in the cause of humanity or science, is never called a combination, though persons may combine in it. As the other terms apply only to persons, or the union of conscious efforts, combination is applicable also to forces, circumstances, powers, or substances.

"Can I doubt that he who had the courage to withstand a *combination* of the most powerful men in Rome, who had conspired my ruin, will not be able to beat down the envious and malignant efforts of a little contemptible party that may endeavour to oppose my honours?"—*Melmoth, Cicero*.

ASSORTMENT. See CHARACTER.

ASSUAGE. See APPEASE.

ASSUME. See AFFECT, APPREHEND, and APPROPRIATE.

ASSURANCE. See BOLDNESS and HOPE.

ASTONISH. See SURPRISE.

ASYLUM. REFUGE. SHELTER. RETREAT.

ASYLUM (Gr. *ἀ*, not, and *συλάω*, to plunder) signified originally a place whose sanctity protected it from lawlessness and war. As a synonym with the others given above, it is more permanent. The refuge, the shelter, or the retreat may be hastily and temporarily sought; but the asylum is a quiet home of a fixed kind, in which to abide, and in which all wants shall be satisfied, and danger or violence escaped. The rest, on the other hand, point to some particular need. The REFUGE (*refugium*, *fugio*, to fly) is when specific danger or persecution presses, as the proscribed foreigner may take refuge in England. The SHELTER (connected with shield) affords some specific protection against violence or hostile force, as the storm-tost ship seeks shelter from the storm, or men and women in old times sought shelter in monasteries from the violence and lawlessness of the times. A RETREAT (Fr. *retraite*) is simply a place where we may find the desired rest, quiet, or retirement; as an escape from responsibilities and toils, as the man of active and public life loves some rural retreat in his old age,

or in the intervals of labour. The term asylum is not used but in an honourable sense, which is not the case with refuge. The contemplative find an asylum in solitude. Robbers and wild beasts have their places of refuge. The haunts of idlers, gamblers, or thieves and vagabonds are never termed asylums. Certain sacred places, as churches or religious institutions, had, and in some countries have, the right of asylum, that is, the criminal or accused who could fly to them might claim not to be taken away by the civil power. Of this kind were the Mosaic "cities of refuge."

"Earth has no other *asylum* for them than its own cold bosom."—*Southey*.

"The hapless unbeliever, while disordered Nature is sounding in his ears, hath nowhere to fly for *refuge* from his terrors."—*Warburton*.

"That pleasing shade they sought a soft *retreat*

From sudden April showers, a *shelter* from the heat."—*Dryden*.

ATONEMENT. See EXPIATION.

ATROCIOUS. See HEINOUS.

ATTACH. See AFFIX and CONNECT.

ATTACHMENT. AFFECTION.

For the latter see AFFECTION. The feeling of love may be expressed by ATTACHMENT (Fr. *attacher*, to attach) or AFFECTION (Lat. *affectio*). Affection may spring from natural relationship, as the affection of a child to its parent. Attachment is the result of circumstances, such as association, congeniality of disposition, kindness. In affection the leading idea is warmth and tenderness, in attachment it is that of union by strong and lasting ties. Affection is more of feeling, attachment of principle. A strong affection, a lasting or faithful attachment. So strongly does the element of habituation belong to attachment, that the term is applicable to many things to which affection is inapplicable, as the memory of another, one's own principles, profession, country, or even the locality in which one resides; or to certain favourite places of resort.

"Conjugal affection

Prevailing over fear and timorous doubt."—*Milton*.

"There is no man but is more *attached* to one particular set or scheme of opinions in philosophy, politics, and religion, than he is to another. I mean if he hath employed his thoughts at all about them. The question we should examine then is, how came we by those *attachments*?"—*Mason*.

ATTACK. ASSAIL. ASSAULT. ENCOUNTER.

Of these, to ATTACK (Fr. *attaquer*) may be considered the generic form, implying every degree of activity, the others denoting modes of approach for purposes of violence. What seems uppermost in the idea of attack is not violence but premeditation and effort, for the purpose of injury.

"Henry V. drew up his army on a narrow ground between two woods, which guarded each flank, and he patiently expected in that posture the *attack* of the enemy."—*Hume*.

To ASSAIL (Lat. *assilire*) is to attack in an energetic, sudden, and vehement manner, and by repeated minor efforts of attack. In ASSAULT the idea is rather of a hand-to-hand approach; in assail, we rather imply the use of missile weapons. Moral attack is expressed by assail, physical by assault. This appears in the metaphorical use of the terms. We attack a man's character when we speak evil of it; but we assail him with abuse, invective, and the like, as if words were like missiles thrown at him. ENCOUNTER (Fr. *en* and *contre*, against) is a prepared and measured attack, though the occasion of the meeting may have been accidental. It is the measuring of strength between the parties. While attack and assail may be against inanimate things, encounter implies properly a struggle with a person or living party.

"A thousand battles have *assailed* thy banks."—*Byron*.

Or in the moral sense:

"The papal authority was steadily though gradually *assailed*."—*Hallam*.

The assailing of authority would have implied an unlawful or insulting violence, which was not meant.

"Ensnared, assaulted, overcome, led bound."

Milton.

"Full jolly knight he seemed, and fair did sit,

As one for knightly guests and fierce encounters fit."

Spenser.

ATTAIN. See ACQUIRE.

ATTEMPT. See EFFORT and TRY.

ATTEND. See ACCOMPANY and HEARKEN.

ATTENTION. See APPLICATION and HEED.

ATTIRE. See DRESS.

ATTITUDE. ACTION. GESTURE. POSTURE. GESTICULATION.

ATTITUDE (from *agere*, *actus*, as in the Spanish *actitud*) refers to the body in a state of rest, as does the *posture*, while the others refer to its movement. There is therefore a likeness in the main between attitude and posture. But posture is generally natural; attitude is studied either for the general purpose of looking graceful, or as illustrative of a subject or of words. A placement of the body for the purpose of ridicule would be an absurd posture, as having not the *dignity* which belongs to attitude. An *unintentional* display of grace in a figure, as when casually thrown upon the ground, would be expressed by POSTURE (*ponere*, *positus*, to place); the contrary would be an ungraceful posture. As regards the human body in movement, ACTION is not general in its relation to the person, but refers to the hand and arms, as being the parts most moved. On the other hand, the action of a horse is his way of movement generally. In this sense the term is also mechanical, as the action of a steam-engine. A GESTURE (*gestura*, *gerere*, *gestus*, to carry) is specific and significant or illustrative action, as when in sarcastic speech, for instance, one shrugs the shoulders. When gesture is frequent and vehement, it is called GESTICULATION. The posture is the way in which the body is placed more or less removed from its ordinary state. Attitude is a way of holding the body more or less in relation to the present circumstances, otherwise the attitude

becomes a mere posture. It is evident that the same placement of the body might, in some cases, be viewed either as an attitude or a posture. The posture of the suppliant is an attitude of supplication. But the term attitude is more honourable than posture. Positions of the body which are forced, odd, ungainly, are called postures. Those which are noble, agreeable, and expressive, in which the expression of the countenance aids the pose of the limbs and body, are called attitudes. Postures are to the body what grimaces are to the countenance. Attitudes are to the body what expression is to the face. The clown and harlequin deal in ridiculous postures, the tragic actor in noble and dignified attitudes. Yet that which is an attitude fit for certain occasions would become a ridiculous posture if exhibited on others. The term posture commonly embraces the whole body; attitude is applicable to parts of it, as a head in a reclining attitude.

"A particular advantage of this attitude, so judiciously assigned to virtue by ancient masters, is that it expresses as well her aspiring effort or ascent towards the stars of heaven, as her victory and superiority over fortune and the world."—*Shafesbury*.

"Suit the action to the word."

Shakespeare.

"For in view

Stood rank'd of seraphim another row

In posture to displode their second tire

of thunder."

Milton.

"Morpheus of all his numerous train expressed

The shape of man, and imitated best

The walk, the words, the gesture could supply,

The habit mimic, and the mien holy."

Dryden.

"Indeed that standing is not so simple a business as we imagine it to be, is evident from the gesticulations of a drunken man who has lost the government of the centre of gravity."—*Paley*.

ATTRACTIVE. ALLURING. INVITING. ENGAGING.

That is ATTRACTIVE (*attrahere*, *attractus*, to draw) which draws attention, interest, observation, and the like in a moderate degree. That is ALLURING (Fr. *leurre*, a lure) which attracts the fancy, the interest, or the

desires so strongly as to draw away from other matters, and to create a wish for more and more enjoyment, as, for instance, the pleasures of society, which often lead on to a craving for more and more excitement. As attract is a milder term than allure, so it does not convey in so marked a way the idea of insidiousness in the influence. One may be attracted by what strikes the eye, the imagination, the ear, or the understanding. One is allured by what gives, or is believed to give, enjoyment or pleasure.

“Cato’s soul

Shines out in everything she acts and speaks,
While winning mildness and attractive
smiles

Dwell on her looks, and with becoming grace
Softens the rigor of her father’s virtues.”

Addison.

“Though caution’d oft her slippery path to
shun,

Hope still with promis’d joys allur’d them
on ;

And while they listened to her winning lore,
The softer scenes of peace could please no
more.”

Falconer.

That is INVITING (*invitare*) which draws us by a natural force of persuasion over our movements or actions, as fine weather is inviting. ENGAGING (Fr. *engager*) is applied to the manners of persons, as having an unstudied force of winning the esteem or affection.

“If he can but dress up a temptation to look *invitingly*, the business is done.”—*Sharp’s Sermons*.

The use of engaging in this sense is modern. It is of course equivalent to engaging or fixing the attention or interest. The whole phrase is thus given by Blair:

“The present, whatever it be, seldom *engages* our attention so much as what is to come.”

ATTRIBUTE. See ASCRIBE.

ATTRIBUTE. See PROPERTY.

AVAIL. See USE.

AVARICE. CUPIDITY. COVETOUSNESS.

AVARICE (*avaritia*, *avarus*) is employed of the specific passion for

money; while CUPIDITY (*cupere*, to desire) and COVETOUSNESS (Fr. *convoiter*, a form of *concupiscere*) are used, the former of valuable possessions, the latter of goods in the abstract. Hence one may be said to be covetous of rank and celebrity, to which both avarice and cupidity would be wholly inapplicable. The avaricious man is inordinately desirous of gain; he heaps up and cannot bear to part with his wealth. The covetous man desires property, wealth, or possessions, especially when he sees them in the hands of others. The covetous, though eager to obtain money, are not so desirous of retaining it, and are sometimes spendthrifts also. The avaricious are never free spenders. Cupidity is the eager love of gain. Covetousness the unjust love of it.

“To desire money for its own sake and to hoard it up is *avarice*, an unnatural passion that disgraces and entirely debases the soul.”—*Beattie*.

“For that tyrant, blinded and gluttled with the *cupidity* of ruling and sovereignty, commanded Edward my brother and me to be slain and despatched out of this mortal life.”—*Hall, Henry VII.*

“The word in Greek is *πλεονεξία*, which properly signifies *covetousness*, or an intemperate, ungoverned love of riches.”—*Locke*.

AVARICIOUS. See NIGGARDLY.

AUDACITY. See BOLDNESS.

AVENGE. REVENGE. VINDICATE.

These are all derivatives of the Latin *vindicare*, which, in the case of the two former, has come through the French. The idea common to all is that of taking up some one’s cause. Grammatically, there is a difference in the way in which the words are employed. I *avenge* myself upon another, or I *avenge* another, or I *avenge* a wrong. I *revenge* only myself, and that upon another. I *vindicate*, not persons, but rights, claims, and the like. To *AVENGE* is to inflict pain for the sake of retaliation. This may be an act of justice. To *REVENGE* is simply to inflict pain for pain, or wrong for wrong, to satisfy the vindictive desire. To

VINDICATE is always an act of generosity and justice; the infliction of pain may come of it, but this is not the object sought, which is to re-instate what has been oppressed, slighted, or injured, in claims, rights, causes, or persons. We avenge others, we revenge ourselves. To avenge is an act of retributive justice, to revenge is an act of passion in retaliation.

"How little reason this king had to impute the death of Hotham to God's *avengement* of his repulse at Hull may easily be seen."—*Milton*.

"*Revenge* is an insatiable desire to sacrifice every consideration of pity and humanity to the principle of vindictive justice."—*Cogan*.

"Yea, and we shall by daily experience see in the world that if one proud man injure or oppress a humble man, it is a thousand to one another undertakes his patronage, defence, and *vindication*, and very oftentimes is a means of his protection and deliverance."—*Hale*.

AVER. See ASSERT.

AVERSE. See RELUCTANT.

AVERSION. See DISGUST and HATRED.

AUGMENT. See INCREASE.

AUGUR. PRESAGE. FOREBODE.

BETOKEN. PROGNOSTICATE. PORTEND.

Although such a use seems forced in the case of presage, all these terms are employed both of persons and things. To AUGUR (Lat. *augurium*), when employed of persons, seems to denote a free use of the understanding, even to the extent of conjecture as to the probability of an occurrence. It is a calculation of some future event, commonly but not necessarily based upon another thing specifically present, the nature of which event may be either favourable or unfavourable. PRESAGE (in French *présage*, *præ*, before, and *sagire*, to trace) implies inference specifically from some sign or signs appearing beforehand, and an act of the judgment. FOREBODE is vague, dim, and imaginative. Evils of no definite character, number, or precise time of coming are the subjects of forebod-

ing. It is confined to the evil, while both augur and presage may refer both to good and evil.

"I shall do well.

The people love me, and the sea is mine,
My powers are crescent, and my *auguring*
hope

Says it will come to the full."

Shakespeare.

It may be observed that in Old English writers, as Shakespeare, the accent is placed upon the last syllable of the verb, presäge.

"Plotinus observes in his third Ennead that the art of *presaging* is in some sort the reading of natural letters denoting order, and that so far forth as analogy obtains in the universe there may be vaticination."—*Stewart*.

BETOKEN (A. S. *tæcan*, to teach) and PORTEND (Lat. *protendere*) relate to tendencies of events, and do not belong to any personal prediction. They differ in being, the former suggestive of ordinary, the latter of extraordinary sequences, whether supernatural or not. The aspect of the sky betokens rain, and portends a storm. To PROGNOSTICATE (Gr. *πρὸ* and *γῶσις*, knowledge beforehand) is exclusively personal. It applies to great and small forthcomings, which are, as it were, heralded by certain characteristic symptoms or indications, which observation has shown to precede them. There is more of chance in augury, more of reasoning and sentiment in foreboding. It is founded upon induction, augury upon external appearances.

"We are agreed upon this, that the words we speak be *tokens*. But a *token*, unless it betoken something, is no token."—*Bishop Jewel*.

"It was the opinion of the Gentiles that if one victim proved faulty, or *portended* evil, another victim might have a more propitious aspect and be accepted."—*Jortin*.

"The causes of this inundation cannot indeed be regular, and therefore their effects not *prognosticable* like eclipses."—*Brown's Vulgar Errors*.

AUGUST. See GRAND.

AVIDITY. See EAGERNESS.

AVOCATION. See EMPLOYMENT and OCCUPATION.

AVOID. See ESCAPE.

AVOW. See ACKNOWLEDGE.

AUSPICIOUS. PROPITIOUS. FAVOURABLE.

The AUSPICIOUS (*auspiciu*m, for *avispicium*, an augury) and PROPITIOUS (Lat. *propitius*, favourably inclined) are both forms of the FAVOURABLE (*favere*, to favour). The term favourable is applied to anything which tends to further our designs, as the goodwill of men, or the forces of nature, as a favourable wind. That is *propitious* which is *favourably inclined*. That is *auspicious* which *looks favourable*, and seems an indication of coming good or success. Auspicious cannot therefore be applied, like propitious and favourable, to persons, but is used of events and appearances. That is auspicious which looks as if success were at hand. That is propitious which causes or grants success.

"Thus were their loves *auspiciously* begun,
And thus with secret care were carried on."

Dryden.

"And now to assuage the force of this new flame,

And make thee more *propitious* in my need,

I mean to sing the praises of thy name,
And thy victorious conquest to areed."

Spenser.

"The *favourableness* of the present times
to all exertions in the cause of liberty."—
Burke.

AUSTERITY. SEVERITY. RIGOUR.
STERNNESS. STRICTNESS.

AUSTERITY (Lat. *austerus*) and STRICTNESS (*stringere*, *strictus*, to strain) are the only ones of these terms that apply to the mode of life personally. *Strictness* is *rigour* in reference to rule, and is an abridger of liberty in favour of method. It is commonly taken in a good sense, as severity in the contrary. *Austerity* is the result of a stern view of life. When austere is applied to looks, manners, and the like, what is meant is that they are the looks, manners, and the like of an austere person, of one who takes a slighting view of the enjoyments and relaxations, and dwells habitually upon the duties of life.

The austere man is accordingly exacting upon himself as well as upon others. RIGOUR is an unbending adherence to rule or principle (*rigor*, stiffness), an inflexibility which renders inaccessible to allurements, entreaty, or any force employed to induce one to relax the strictness of that adherence. SEVERITY (*severus*) is the constitutional tendency to enforce the rigour of justice or discipline, without being deterred by pity from the execution of punishment, or insisting upon such things as might be difficult or painful to others. STERNNESS (A. S. *sterne*) is more applicable to look, demeanour, and manners, so that, oftentimes, sternness is a disguise for great tenderness of disposition. The commander may sternly order a punishment, while he is much moved inwardly, and would gladly have been spared the occasion. The severe man has not this compunction. The primary meaning of the Latin *austerus* (Gr. *ἀστυρπός*) is harsh, like the flavour of unripe or inferior fruit, and in this sense English writers have sometimes directly used it, as Bishop Horsley—

"The sweetness of the ripened fruit is not the less delicious for the *austerity* of its cruder state."

"Such was the life the frugal Sabines led,
So Remus and his brother god were bred,
From whom th' *austere* Etrurian virtue
rose,

And this rude life our homely fathers
chose."

Dryden.

Strictness, severity, and rigour are applied to acts and proceedings as well as persons and disposition.

"I am very apt to think that great *severity* of punishment does but very little good, nay great harm in education."—Locke.

"We greatly deceive ourselves if we imagine that God requires greater *strictness* of life at one time than at another."—Gilpin's Sermons.

"Capitation taxes are levied at little expense, and where they are *rigorously* exacted afford a very sure revenue to the state."—Adam Smith.

"The public father, who the private quelled,
As on the dread tribunal *sternly* said."

Thomson.

AUTHOR. See WRITER.

AUTHORITATIVE. IMPERATIVE.
IMPERIOUS. COMMANDING.

AUTHORITATIVE denotes a manner of authority (*auctoritas*) which may or may not be suitably or justly assumed. It differs from COMMANDING in that it merely proceeds upon the possession of a right to be obeyed. The most insignificant person in real power may be authoritative, or speak authoritatively; but to be commanding implies a personal fitness for commanding others, a personal influence which makes itself felt upon the object; so we speak of a commanding presence or voice.

"A layman should not intrude himself to administer the sacred functions of *authoritative* teaching."—*Barrow*.

"Oh that my tongue had every grace of speech,
Great and commanding as the breath of kings."
Rore.

Of IMPERIOUS and IMPERATIVE (*imperare*, to command), the former is the more personal. Imperious denotes the disposition to command, which may show itself in an exacting and haughty manner; while imperative applies rather to the thing commanded, or the feeling of the person commanding. An imperious person is selfish and overbearing; but we may be imperative from a sense of necessity, and even circumstances may be said to have an imperative force.

"The suits of kings are *imperative*."—*Bishop Hall*.

"His bold, contemptuous, and *imperious* spirit soon made him conspicuous."—*Macaulay*.

AUTHENTIC. GENUINE.

Bishop Watson thus distinguishes between the AUTHENTIC (Gr. *ἀνρός* and *ἔντεα*, arms, the authentic person being literally the veritable committer of a deed, especially of murder, a force now lost) and GENUINE (*genuinus*, *genus*, the race):—

"A genuine book is that which was written by the person whose name it bears as the author of it; an authentic book is that which relates matters of fact as they really happened.

A book may be genuine without being authentic; and a book may be authentic without being genuine. The books written by Richardson and Fielding are genuine books, though the histories of *Clarissa* and *Tom Jones* are fables. The history of the Island of *Formosa* is a genuine book. It was written by *Psalmazar*; but it is not an authentic book, though it was long esteemed as such, and translated into different languages; for the author, in the latter part of his life, took shame to himself for having imposed upon the world, and confessed that it was a mere romance. *Anson's Voyages* may be considered as an authentic book; it probably contains a true narrative of the principal events recorded in it; but it is not a genuine book, having not been written by *Walter*, to whom it is ascribed, but by *Robins*."

AUTHORITY. JURISDICTION. DOMINION.

AUTHORITY (Lat. *auctoritas*) is the right of exercising power, no matter what the character of the power may be. It must be based upon some grounds, natural, moral, political, and the like. Authority may come from superior knowledge or information, or from natural as well as social or professional relationship. Authority is always based upon either law or natural right; if not, it is usurpation. As political authority is limited by right, so parental authority is limited by age.

"For that which obtaineth universally must either have some force in itself to command acceptance, or else must be imposed by some overruling authority."—*Bishop Hall*.

JURISDICTION (*jurisdictio*) is the exercise of political authority within limits legally defined.

"But at present, by the long uniform usage of many ages, our kings have delegated their whole judicial power to the judges of their several courts, which are the grand depositories of the fundamental laws of the kingdom, and have gained a known and stated *jurisdiction* regulated by certain and established rules, which the crown itself cannot now alter but by Act of Parliament."—*Blackstone*.

DOMINION (*dominus*) is the state of lordship, without reference to its rightfulness, as man exercises dominion over the inferior animals. It is sometimes a merciful, sometimes a merciless dominion. Dominion is as vague as jurisdiction is definite and exact, and therefore, unlike jurisdiction, is used in a great variety of analogous cases.

"Though for a while the pleasure of sin may captivate, and unlawful gain may bring its present advantage, yet we may depend upon it a time will come when sin will assert his *dominion*."—*Gilpin's Sermons*.

AUTHORIZE. COMMISSION. EMPOWER.

The idea common to these terms is delegated or transmitted power. **COMMISSION** (Lat. *committere, commissio*) is the most familiar and ordinary. I commission an equal or an inferior to do for me what it would be less convenient that I should do myself. I **AUTHORIZE** when I convey active rights, and **EMPOWER** when I convey passive qualifications. So I authorize my agent to ask for money, and empower him to receive it. Empower has rather a legal, authorize rather a moral, force. Hence persons authorize, and the State empowers. Again, empower often relates to enabling another to act in a case in which the right is transmitted to him personally, and he is more than an agent or representative only. The law authorizes a magistrate to impose such and such a penalty; that is to say, would bear him out if any question as to his right were to arise. But it also empowers him to do it; that is, he is free to act for himself in the matter, his power being *given* as well as recognized by the law. We also empower by giving faculties or abilities; we authorize when we permit another to use those which he already possesses.

"Since God evidently designed the regular course of nature for the support and comfort of man, we seem *authorized* to conclude that He will apply its irregularities and disorders to his punishment, correction, and admonition."—*Bishop Porteus*.

"From Christ and those *commissioned* by

Him we learn what the wisest men and even angels had desired to look into."—*Hurd*.

"For let a vicious person be in never so high a command, yet still he will be looked upon but as one great vice *empowered* to correct and chastise others."—*South*.

AWAIT. See **EXPECT.**

AWAKEN. See **EXCITE.**

AWARE. CONSCIOUS. SENSIBLE.

AWARE (Saxon *gewaere*) denotes the knowledge which is needful to have for one's own sake in the regulation of our conduct or the consideration of our interests. It refers to matters of ordinary, common, and practical information, or to any facts as bearing upon ourselves.

"Fastidious, or else listless, or perhaps *Aware* of nothing arduous in a task They never undertook, they little note His dangers or escapes, and haply find There least amusement where he found the most." *Cowper*.

CONSCIOUS (Lat. *consciens*) refers to reflective, as **SENSIBLE** (*sentire*, to feel) to perceptive, knowledge; or, in other words, I am conscious of mental, and sensible of physical, perceptions or sensations; aware of facts external to myself. I am aware of a fact or a circumstance; I am sensible of a toothache, or of some change of bodily condition, for better or for worse. The sick man is sensible of a change for the better when he feels it; he is conscious of it when he reflects on it.

"*Consciousness* is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind."—*Locke*.

"It is the good acceptance, the *sensibleness* of and acquiescence in the benefactor's goodness, that constitutes the gratitude."—*Barrow*.

AWE. DREAD.

AWE (A. S. *oga, ege, aige*, dread) is an undefined sense of the dreadful and the sublime, not mixed with fear in the sense of apprehension of personal danger; as the presence not only of powerful or venerable persons, but of certain scenes of nature, as the solitude of the desert, or the loftiness of the mountain, may fill the mind with awe—the sense of our own littleness in some greater presence or power.

"And, to consummate all,
Greatness of mind and nobleness their seat
Build in her loveliest, and create an *awe*
About her as a guard angelic placed."
Milton.

DREAD (Sax. *dræd*) contains more of personal fear, as in the presence of a latent power which takes effect upon one's imagination, and which by anticipation one fears.

"Dread is a degree of permanent fear, an habitual and painful apprehension of some tremendous event."—*Cogin.*

AWFUL. See DREADFUL.

AWKWARD. CLUMSY. UNGAINLY. UNCOUTH.

AWKWARD, which is formed of *awk*, and the termination of direction, *ward*, *awk* being probably equivalent to *left*, denotes untowardness of movement, which is also expressed by CLUMSY, allied to *clump*, in the sense of unshapen mass. But clumsiness comes of natural and general heaviness and thickness of limb; awkwardness is specific, and expresses no more than the want of ease, grace, or effectiveness in movement. This may be the result simply of want of experience, as the novice in the use of an implement is necessarily awkward till he has become familiar with it.

"*Awkwardness* is a more real disadvantage than it is generally thought to be. It often occasions ridicule. It always lessens dignity."
—*Chesterfield.*

"The manufacture would be tedious, and at best but *clumsily* performed."—*Spectator.*

UNGAINLINESS is more general and absolute, and exists independently of any particular use of the body or limbs. It is a chronic clumsiness which comes of size and disproportion and want of self-management. It is the misuse of manner, so as to *gain* nothing, or to miss the object of it; a waste of demeanour which, though in the idea negative, is demonstratively objectionable.

"Flora had a little beauty and a great deal of wit, but then she was so *ungainly* in her behaviour and such a laughing hoyden."
—*Tatler.*

In the moral sense. Hammond speaks of "misusing knowledge to

ungainly," that is, vain, unprofitable "ends."

The UNCOUTH (A. S. *uncūdh*, unknown) is in matters of demeanour what the awkward or clumsy is in matters of action or movement. Strange, odd things are said by the uncouth, and unconventional things done, from want of knowledge and familiarity with the ways of the trained society in which he finds himself. It is applicable to style of language and thought, as well as manner and dress.

"The dress of a New Zealander is certainly to a stranger at first sight the most *uncouth* that can be imagined."—*Cook.*

"The *uncouthness* of his language and the quaintness of his thoughts will not, it is hoped, disgust the delicacy of readers unaccustomed to the writings of our old divines."
—*Knox.*

Awkward has an active, clumsy a passive, or at least less active force. Action brings out awkwardness. Clumsiness betrays itself. An awkward affair is one that has gone wrong, and is difficult to adjust. We do not use clumsy in this sense. A clumsy excuse is one that is ill-contrived, without aptitude, forced, constrained, and unconvincing.

AWRY. See CROOKED.

AXIOM. See PROVERB.

B.

BABBLE. PRATTLE. CHATTER. CHAT. PRATE.

To BABBLE (Fr. *babiller*) is to talk small talk in an easy but monotonous flow. It is a fluency which takes no note of the relative importance of matters of conversation. As the object of the babbler is rather to relieve himself than to instruct others, he is apt to become indistinct and unintelligible in his speech, and speak in a murmurous flow. Babbling excludes reflectiveness and restraint in speech, so that a babbler sometimes means an indiscriminate talker, hence a talebearer or gossip. Poetically, the term has been applied to the

perpetual bubbling sound of running water, as "babbling brooks."

"When St. Paul was speaking of Christ and His resurrection, the great Athenian philosophers looked upon all he said to be mere babbling."—*Beveridge*.

CHATTER and CHAT are the French *caqueter*. It is the love of talk for the sake of hearing the sound of one's own voice. The babble is often an infirmity, and proceeds from weakness of mind, as in the aged. The chatter comes from over-activity of mind in little matters. When nervous activity and quick perception is combined with want of mental power, they produce that sort of eloquence which is called *chatter*. The term *chatter* is employed of the inarticulate sounds of some animals, as of birds; hence talk which consists of the rapid repetition of sounds without much sense. An old form of the word was *clitter*.

"Birds of the air perceiving their young ones taken from their nest *chitter* for awhile in trees thereabout, and straight after they fly abroad, and make no more ado."—*Wilson's Arte of Rhetorike*.

"The mimic ape began his *chatter*,
How evil tongues his life bespatter,
Much of the censuring world complained,
Who said his gravity was feigned."

Swift.

Chat is the social talk of elders, as PRATTLING and PRATING (Dutch *praten*), the former being a modification of the latter, are applied to children. *Prattling* is the innocent talk of very young children, while *prating* is talking much and to little purpose. As this implies forwardness in the young, the term *prate* is used of elders in the sense of talking about what they do not understand.

"She found, as on a spray she sat,
The little friends were deep in *chat*."

Cotton's Fables.

"This is the reason why we are so much charmed with the pretty *prattle* of children, and even the expressions of pleasure or uneasiness in some part of the brute creation."
—*Sidney's Arcadia*.

"These *proters* affect to carry back the clergy to that primitive evangelic poverty which in the spirit ought always to exist in them (and in us, too, however we may like it), but in the thing must be varied."—*Burke*.

BACK. BACKWARD. BEHIND.

The two former are used as adverbs, the latter as a preposition also. BACK denotes the relative position or movement in regard to external objects, as to stand back, or to go back. BACKWARD denotes the mode of movement in the person or object moving, as to go backwards is to go without turning the back. BEHIND is relative to one external object in particular, as to go behind another person.

BACKWARD. See BACK.

BAD. EVIL. WICKED. NAUGHTY. CORRUPT. VICIOUS. SINFUL.

Of these, BAD is the broadest and simplest term. It denotes that which is wanting in good qualities in any sense, moral or physical, and this in any degree, hurtful, unfavourable, or only defective. A bad man, a bad air, a bad principle, a bad pear. A thing is presumed to have, when in its true and normal state, a distinctive nature, character, and force, by which it manifests itself aright and answers its peculiar idea or purpose. When this is so, it may be pronounced good; when the contrary, it is bad.

"Every one must see and feel that *bad* thoughts quickly ripen into *bad* actions, and that if the latter only are forbidden, and the former left free, all morality will soon be at an end."—*Bishop Porteus*.

"That which hath in it a fitness to promote this end (its own preservation and well-being) is called good, and, on the contrary, that which is apt to hinder it is called *evil*."—*Wilkins's Natural Religion*.

"Self-preservation requires all men not only barely to defend themselves against aggressors, but many times also to persecute such and only such as are *wicked* and dangerous."—*Woolaston*.

"Play by yourself, I dare not venture thither;
You and your *naughty* pipe go hang together."
Dryden's Theocritus.

"They knew them to be the main *corrupters* at the king's elbow. They knew the king to have been always their most attentive scholar and imitator, and of a child to have sucked from them and their closet work all the impotent principles of tyranny and superstition."—*Milton*.

"On the other hand, what does a *vicious* man gain? Only such enjoyments as a virtuous man leaves."—*Locke*.

"Supernal grace, contending
With *sinfulness* of men." *Milton*.

EVIL (A. S. *efel*) is now only employed in a moral sense as the potentially bad; that is, having a nature or properties which tend to badness of any kind. It is applied to persons and properties, words and deeds, but not to material substances. Theologically, it stands to SIN as the motive principle to the act, evil being that which is contrary to the nature and will of God, and sin being the *fruit* of evil, or evil developed into thought or deed. So, a sinful deed is one regarded as primarily an act against God, or a transgression of the divine law. Yet the best have in them, to some extent, what is evil and sinful; but they are not therefore to be called WICKED (probably connected with the Saxon *wiccian*, to bewitch, as if possessed with an evil spirit). The term is used of things as well as persons, in which case it is simply used reflexively, a wicked act or word being such as belongs to a wicked person. The wicked person is so in his *whole* nature, and systematically. He lives in sin and wrong. He contradicts, whenever he desires it, any law, human or divine; hence wickedness includes immorality and sin, or offences human and divine. Evil is malignant and internal. Wickedness is mischievous and active. NAUGHTY (*naught*, nothing, good for nothing) had, of old, the same extensive application with bad, and was applicable to anything which was not what it ought to be, as "naughty figs," in the book of Jeremiah. It now denotes the minor offences which are the result of waywardness and rebelliousness, and expresses characteristically the faults of children. *Vicious* and *corrupt* are radically much alike. CORRUPT (Lat. *corrumpere*, *corruptus*) expresses that character which is analogous to the bad and unsound in bodies undergoing decomposition; and VICIOUS (*vitium*, vice, or unsoundness, as in the antiquated phrase, "vicious apples")

points to the same sort of corruption; but corrupt is now used rather of the principles, feelings, and motives which influence human conduct, while vicious applies to the conduct itself; we should say, a man of corrupt principles and vicious life. Corrupt has consequently a more direct application to principles of integrity. A man might be a corrupt judge without being vicious, in that more generally extensive sense of immoral habits in which the word vicious is now employed as the opposite to virtuous. As sin is an offence against the commands of God, so vice is an offence against morality. It is plain that the same act or habit may be sinful or vicious according to the relation under which it is regarded.

BADGE. COGNIZANCE.

The BADGE (connected with the French *bague*, a ring, and the Saxon *beag*, a bracelet or collar) is a personal mark of distinction used, except where the contrary is expressly stated, in an honourable sense. Where it is a party distinction, this would of course depend on the estimate formed of the character of the party. COGNIZANCE (Old Fr. *cognizance*) has a more heraldic sense. A servant might bear the cognizance of his master with his livery, but he could have no right to wear his badge. Nevertheless, the cognizance might be spoken of in reference to the servant who wore it as the badge of his retainership, taking the term badge in a secondary sense.

"Charity, which Christ has made the very *badge* and discriminating mark of His religion."—*Bishop Porteus*.

"For which cause men imagined that he gave the sun in his full brightness for his *cognizance* or badge."—*Hall, Henry VI.*

BADLY. ILL.

BADLY always refers to the act of doing, and the thing done. ILL may refer also to attendant circumstances, and to matters of thought rather than execution. If we wished to disapprove a matter both in purpose and performance, we might say that it was *ill-conceived* and *badly executed*.

BAFFLE. DEFEAT. DISCONCERT.
CONFOUND. FRUSTRATE. DISCOM-
POSE. FOIL.

BAFFLE, from the Old French *befler*, had originally the sense of mocking or disgracing, and was accordingly used only of persons. It is now, like all the rest of these synonyms, used both of the schemer and the scheme. He who baffles does so by skill, forethought, and address. The baffled finds that the baffler has been before him, and has taken just so much out of his plan as to make it ineffectual. Hence baffling commonly implies versatility in the baffler, and repeated little counteractions.

"Experience, that great baffler of speculation."—*Gov. of the Tongue*.

The chess-player who plays a losing game is baffled by the skill of his adversary. But he is not of necessity thereby DEFEATED (Fr. *défait*, *déficere*). Defeat is final, while baffling may be progressive, unless it be used of some one design, said to be baffled. Baffling is then a kind of defeat, not, as defeat may be, by superior force or skill, or both, but by skill only. So that one may be baffled, yet still strive; but when one is defeated the strife is over.

"Too well I see and rue the dire event,
That with sad overthrow and foul defeat
Hath lost us heaven." *Milton*.

DISCONCERT (Old Fr. *desconcerter*, probably from *conserere*), whether applied to persons or their plans, is to throw into temporary confusion, which may or may not terminate the strife.

"Far from being overcome, never once disconcerted, never once embarrassed, but calmly superior to every artifice, to every temptation, to every difficulty."—*Bishop Porteus*.

The man is *disconcerted* whose mind and purpose for a time suffers disorder; he is DISCOMPOSED (*dis*, *componere*, to put together) whose feelings are disturbed.

"Every opposition of our espoused opinions discomposeth the mind's serenity."—*Glanvill*.

He is CONFOUNDED whose ideas and feelings (*confundere*, to pour together) are thrown into such disorder that he can no more think, speak, or

act for himself. Plans and purposes, as well as persons, are said to be confounded.

"It was upon this very account that Christians took the pains to translate and publish them (the Scriptures), not to *confound* religion, but to confirm it."—*Bentley*.

FRUSTRATE (Lat. *frustra*, in vain) is to make the purpose miss its end. In common parlance, schemes and movements are baffled, efforts are defeated, arrangements are disconcerted, designs are confounded, purposes or hopes are frustrated, and feelings are discomposed. Attempts are foiled, or a person is foiled in his attempts. The term FOIL, which most resembles baffle (Fr. *foiler*, to tread), seems to imply an undertaking already begun, but defeated in the course of execution. One may be baffled by *anticipation*, but one is *foiled by counteraction*. Baffle, defeat, and foil, imply relation to external powers or persons. The rest are applicable to undertakings made solely on our own account.

"Is it to be supposed that He should disappoint His creatures and *frustrate* their very desire (of immortality) which He has Himself implanted?"—*Beattie*.

"I have endeavoured to find out, if possible, the amount of the whole of these demands, in order to see how much, supposing the country in a condition to furnish the fund, may remain to satisfy the public debt and the necessary establishments, but I have been *foiled* in my attempts."—*Burke*.

BALANCE. POISE.

BALANCE (*bis*, two or twice, and *lanx*, the scale of a balance) and POISE (Fr. *poids*, *pondus*, from *pendere*, a weight) both denote the establishment of an equilibrium; but balance is *consistent with movement*, and poise is *not*. A man may balance himself along a rope; but if he poises himself, it is at one point of it. Hence balance rather denotes an equilibrium of one thing against another, poise an equilibrium of the different parts of the same thing.

"Him science taught by mystic lore to trace
The planets wheeling in eternal race,
To mark the ship, in floating balance held,
By earth attracted, and by seas repelled."
Falconer.

"Earth, upon
Her centre *pois'd*." Milton.

BALK. See DISAPPOINT.

BALL. GLOBE. SPHERE. ORB.
ORBIT. CIRCUIT. CIRCLE.

BALL (Fr. *balle*) is any body which is round, or approximates to rotundity, a ball of cotton, a snowball, the ball of the toe. It is of necessity solid, unless the contrary is stated. It is used of artificial compositions, or refers to the combination of parts into rotundity, as a force-meat-ball.

"Why was the sight
To such a tender *ball* as th' eye confin'd?" Milton.

GLOBE (*globus*), on the other hand, is regarded entirely in reference to form, and not to composition. It is presumed to be perfectly, or very nearly perfectly, round, and may be solid or hollow.

"Mercator, in some of his great *globes*, hath continued the West Indies land even to the North Pole, and consequently cut off all passage by sea that way."—Huckluyt.

SPHERE (Gr. *σφαῖρα*) is in Greek what globe is in Latin. Like globe, sphere bears reference only to form, and not to composition. It is more strictly a geometrical term than globe, and is defined, "a body contained under a single surface, which in every part is equally distant from a point within it, called its centre."

"Suppose a man born blind and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a *sphere*."—Locke.

In its secondary sense, sphere denotes a limited extent of operation or proper action and influence.

"There is but little variety of other vegetable productions, though doubtless several had not yet sprung up at the early season when we visited the place, and many more might be hid from the narrow *sphere* of our observation."—Cook's *Voyages*.

ORB (Lat. *orbis*) is rather a rhetorical term of the present day, and is commonly associated with brilliancy or luminousness, as the orbs of the firmament, or of the eye, as luminous and spherical. The ORBIT is the path described by the orb or heavenly

sphere. It may be spherical or eccentric.

"And her bright eyes, the *orbs* which beauty moves,
As Phœbus dazzles in his glorious race." Drummond.

"Only there is this difference, that the bodies of the great system were projected at great distances from each other and in such a manner that the planets revolve in *orbits* almost circular, so as not to come too near to the sun, or to be carried too far from him in their revolutions."—Machlaurin.

The CIRCLE (*circulus*) is a mathematical term, and expresses, therefore, properly, no more than a mathematical figure, and is insubstantial. It is used analogously in such phrases as "the family circle." It is a plane figure bound by a curved line at all points equidistant from the centre.

"It is in the nature of things that they who are in the centre of a *circle* should appear directly opposed to those who viewed them from any part of the circumference."—Burke.

CIRCUIT (Lat. *circuitus*, *circum*, around, and *ire*, to go) is a regular or periodic movement within a certain sphere (not necessarily strictly spherical). It is applied to the act, the space, and the outline of the revolution, as a planet's circuit, to complete the circuit, and the like. To make a circuit, of a district is analogous to the drawing of a circle, not in geometrical exactitude, but in the fact of returning finally to the starting-point.

"So the *circuit* or compass of Ireland is 1800 miles, which is 200 less than Cæsar doth reckon or account."—Stow.

BAND. COMPANY. CREW. GANG.
SOCIETY. ASSOCIATION.

BAND (Fr. *bande*) is a number, not large, of persons bound together, having a work or design in common. They may be bound by consent, as a band of robbers, or as an organized body, as a band of soldiers. A COMPANY (Fr. *compagnie*) is more general, and may refer to any association, temporary or transient, as a company of priests. If the design be one of common interests, as for more effectively carrying out some commercial purpose in common, the term company

is used, as a mercantile company; if it be of a literary, scientific, moral, or philanthropic character, upon a large and public scale, the term SOCIETY is employed, as the Zoological Society, the Humane Society, the Society of Antiquarians. If the object be not prominently put forward, ASSOCIATION is employed, which is generic. (See ASSOCIATION.)

CREW (Old English *crue*) is from the French *croître*, to grow, and so signifies a complement, or full number. The word crew, in law, is accordingly commonly used to designate the entire "ship's company," including the officers. It was originally used in both a noble and ignoble sense; the former has been dropped, and it is now a term of disparagement, except of the "ship's crew." GANG (Saxon *gang*, a going) is a number of persons going in company, as a gang of thieves, also a gang of workmen, which is a company of workmen seeking labour in common, though the term is kept up after the work has been found. It is used in honourable and dishonourable senses.

"Ye see how all around them wait

The ministers of human fate,
And black misfortune's baleful train.

Ah, show them where in ambush stand,
To seize their prey, the murderous band.
Ah, tell them they are men." Gray.

"The blessed angels to and fro descend
From highest heaven in gladsome company." Spenser.

"Being sufficiently weary of this mad crew, we were willing to give them the slip at any place from whence we might hope to get a passage to an English factory."—*Dampier's Voyages*.

"In order to furnish at the expense of your honour an excuse to your apologists here, for several enormities of yours, you would not have been content to be represented as a gang of Maroon slaves, suddenly broke loose from the house of bondage, and therefore to be pardoned for your abuse of the liberty to which you were not accustomed and were ill fitted."—*Burke*.

"There entertain him all the saints above
In solemn troops and sweet societies."

Milton.

BANE. PEST. RUIN.

The BANE of anything (Saxon *bana*, destruction) is that which, as it were,

wounds or poisons it, inflicting serious injury upon what would be otherwise sound or pleasurable, but, though spoiling, not destroying it. PEST (Lat. *pestis*, plague) is that which interferes in a vexatious, noxious, or irritating manner. The RUIN (*ruina*) of a thing is that which destroys it utterly.

"A monster and a bane to human society."
—*Blackwood*.

"She spake, and at the words
The hellish pest forbore." Milton.

"The ruin of the clock trade."—*Dickens*.

BANISH. EXILE. EXPEL. TRANSPORT.

To BANISH (Fr. *bannir*) is literally to eject by a ban. To EXPEL (*expellere*) is to drive out. To EXILE is to drive into exile (Lat. *exilium*). The idea common to the three is, therefore, that of coercive removal of persons, for it is only by a figure of speech that hopes are said to be banished, or thoughts expelled. He is banished who is interdicted from any place to which he has been accustomed, or to which he may desire to resort. The nature of the banishment will depend simply upon the nature of the interdiction. *Exile* is that specific sort of banishment which relates to one's native country or home. It may be voluntary or involuntary. To *expel* is to drive out with disgrace, and relates to society in general, or some particular community. TRANSPORT (*transportare*), as a synonym of the above, is to carry beyond seas to a penal colony as a penalty, the expenses of which are borne by the State. Banishment may be from circles of society, and denotes more forcible and authoritative, as well as more disgraceful, removal than exile. We may occasionally speak of honourable exile; hardly of honourable banishment, save in exceptional cases, where the banishment was unjust, and with no fault of the banished, or where the right was on his side. In that state his sympathizers might call it honourable. Banishment is moral, social, and political, exile only political. Banishment involves a formal public or

judicial decree. On the other hand, one goes spontaneously into exile.

"Haste thee, and from the Paradise of God
Without remorse drive out the sinful pair:
From hallow'd ground th' unholy; and
denounce

To them, and to their progeny, from thence
Perpetual banishment." *Milton.*

"Brutus in the book which he writ on virtue, related that he had seen Marcellus in *exile* at Mitylene, living in all the happiness that human nature is capable of, and cultivating with as much assiduity as ever all kinds of laudable knowledge."—*Bolingbroke.*

"One great object is pursued throughout the Scriptures from the *expulsion* of our first parents out of Eden, to the last of the prophets of Israel, namely, the coming of a great person under various titles, the deliverer from death and destruction, the promised seed that was to come of the woman, not of man, and therefore of a virgin."—*Sharpe.*

The term transport is equally applicable to persons and commodities.

"All these different commodities are collected at Manilla, thence to be *transported* annually in one or more ships to the port of Acapulco, in the kingdom of Mexico."—*Anson's Voyages.*

BANKRUPTCY. INSOLVENCY. FAILURE.

These, which are terms of the mercantile world, follow practically in the following order: insolvency, failure, bankruptcy. The *INSOLVENT* (*in*, not, and *solvere*, to pay) is simply a person who is unable to pay his debts, or meet pecuniary liabilities and obligations generally. These may be merely of a personal nature; that is, he may not be in business, or he may be in too low a way of dealing to be a bankrupt at all. The *FAILURE* is an act and a state consequent upon the actual or presumed insolvency, being a cessation of business, proclaimed or known, from want of means to carry it on, and so conveying no reproach. *BANKRUPTCY* (*Fr. banqueroute*) is the condition of insolvency when it has passed under the recognition of the law.

"Truman was better acquainted with his master's affairs than his daughter, and secretly lamented that each day brought him by many miscarriages nearer *bankruptcy* than the former."—*Tutler.*

"Whether the *insolvency* of the father be by his fault or his misfortune, still the son is not obliged."—*Bishop Taylor.*

"The greater the whole quantity of trade, the greater of course must be the positive number of *failures*, while the aggregate success is still in the same proportion."—*Burke.*

BANQUET. FEAST. CAROUSAL. ENTERTAINMENT. TREAT.

Of these, *FEAST* (*dies festus*, *Fr. fête*) is the most general, extending in some of its senses to more than the idea of eating, and meaning festival or holiday. As referring to the former, the word feast refers merely to the abundance and excellency of the viands, and the pleasure derived therefrom. *BANQUET* (*Fr. banquet, banque*, a bench, literally a feast at which persons sit) conveys the idea of a sumptuous and magnificent feast, such as are given on occasions of state. *ENTERTAINMENT* (*Fr. entretenir*) refers to other pleasures than those of the palate. An evening's entertainment may pass off with little or no eating and drinking. Its characteristics seem to be that it should be given by some one, and so implies something of hospitality, and that where it is a feast in the ordinary sense of the term, it should display taste and furnish pleasure socially. A *CAROUSAL* (*Fr. carrousse*) is a feast in which the obligation to strict sobriety is disregarded. *TREAT* conveys the idea of hospitality, or giving such social entertainment of any kind as is peculiarly consonant with the circumstances of the giver and receiver. Superiors give treats to their inferiors, and elders to children. It denotes innocence and simplicity of enjoyment (*Fr. traiter*).

"Christianity allows us to use the world, provided we do not abuse it. It does not spread before us a delicious *banquet* and then come with a 'touch not, taste not, handle not.'"—*Porteus.*

"There my retreat the best companions
grace,
Chiefs out of war and statesmen out of
place;
There St. John mingles with my friendly
bowl,
The feast of reason and the flow of soul."
Pope.

"The sun was set, they had done their work. The nymphs had tied up their hair afresh, and the swains were preparing for a *carousal*. My mule made a dead pause."—*Sterne*.

"His office was to give *entertainment*
And lodging unto all that came and went."
Spenser.

"Carriion is a *treat* to dogs, ravens, vultures, fish."—*Pope*.

BANTER. RALLY.

We BANTER (probably derived from the French *badiner*) when we play upon another with words in kindness and good-humour. We RALLY (Fr. *railler*) when we slightly rail; that is, speak with slight contempt or sarcasm of some specific fault, offence, or weakness. It seems that the two words rally, the one, *railler*, to rail, and the other *raillier*, *re-allier*, Lat. *re-alligare*, to bind together anew, as in the recalling of dispersed troops, have been blended as to signification. So banter has always a somewhat mischievous force; but rally often means such sarcasm as may induce another to act more energetically or less despondingly.

"Where wit hath any mixture of raillery, it is but calling it *banter*, and the work is done. This polite word of theirs was first borrowed from the bullies in Whitefriars, then fell among the footmen, and at last retired to the pedants, by whom it is applied as properly to the production of wit as if I should apply it to Sir Isaac Newton's mathematics."—*Swift*.

"The only piece of pleasantry in Paradise Lost, is where the evil spirits are described as *rallying* the angels upon the success of their new-invented artillery."—*Addison*.

BARBAROUS. INHUMAN. CRUEL. BRUTAL. SAVAGE.

These words indicate pretty much the same thing, as contemplated under different points of view. CRUEL (Lat. *crudelis*) indicates that sort of disposition which derives pleasure from inflicting pain on other creatures, as the child or the tyrant. Such cruelty is an animal propensity. It must be observed, however, that acts are called cruel when they are represented as being like what *would* be produced by the propensity to

cruelty, though they have not been in fact so produced. To desert wife and child is a cruel act, by reason of its consequences; yet it may proceed from an excessive selfishness, and not at all from any pleasure derived from subjecting them to privation. It is by no happy analogy that we speak of cruel disappointments and the like, meaning severe. INHUMAN denotes that character of person or act which is not checked or guided by the principles and feelings of humanity or human nature in its worthier aspect. It is premeditated and conscious cruelty; and so we speak not of the inhumanity, though we speak of the cruelty, of children, but of grown persons, as having that mature appreciation of the evil they commit which is needful to the idea of inhumanity. The barbarous, the brutal, and the savage, are epithets which liken the conduct or the disposition to those of BARBARIANS (Lat. *barbarus*), BRUTES (*brutum*), or SAVAGES (Fr. *sauvage*, from the Latin *sylvaticus*, having grown up wild in the woods). These terms, therefore, are only analogous expressions, and might be taken—as indeed they are—to express other things besides cruelty; as barbarous rudeness, savage manners, and brutal ignorance. Barbarous and savage are epithets of manners primarily, and of disposition secondarily, brutal and cruel of disposition primarily, and are hardly applicable to manners of a community, though they might be predicated of habits and customs. As the barbarous bears relation to the civilized, we cannot speak of the inferior animals as barbarous; yet we may speak of them as savage or cruel. In this aspect the savage is a wild and violent form of cruelty.

"Pyrrhus, seeing the Romans marshal their army with some art and skill, said, with surprise, these *barbarians* have nothing barbarous in their discipline."—*Hume*.

"When Alexander had in his fury *inhumanly* butchered one of his best friends and bravest captains, on the return of reason he began to conceive a horror suitable to the guilt of such a murder."—*Burke*.

"This man (Jefferies), who wanted in *cruelty*, had already given a specimen of his character in many trials where he presided;

and he now set out with a savage joy as to a full harvest of death and destruction.”—*Hume*.

“So much was he altered by a long succession of hardships that he passed entirely without notice, and in the evening when he was going up to the prætor’s chair he was brutally repulsed by the attending lictors.”—*Goldsmith*.

“Your castle is surprised. Your wife and babes *savagely* slaughtered.”—*Shakespeare*.

BARE. See NAKED and SCANTY.

BARE. MERE.

BARE (Saxon *bar*) is sometimes used in the sense of only, and as a synonym of MERE (Lat. *merus*), as we might say, the bare necessities, or the mere necessities of life. But *mere* has in some cases a negative, privative, or restrictive force, while the force of bare is positive; so that mere is more suitably followed grammatically by some term expressive of negation; while bare is best construed as the subject of an affirmative sentence—as, the bare recital of such a tale would move to tears; the mere shedding of tears is an *imperfect* compassion.

“The study of morality I have above mentioned as that that becomes a gentleman, not *barely* as a man, but in order to his business as a gentleman.”—*Locke*.

“As for the rest of the planets, their uses are to us unknown or *merely* conjectural.”—*Ray*.

BARGAIN. See AGREEMENT.

BARTER. CHANGE. EXCHANGE. SUBSTITUTE. TRUCK. COMMUTE. INTERCHANGE.

Of these, CHANGE (Fr. *changer*) may be taken as the simplest and the generic term. Of itself it expresses no more than to take one person or thing for another, unless it is employed in the sense of to alter the condition. Some persons change their friends as they change their clothes. The term change, however, always refers to things of the same class or nature; as to change one’s opinions, though the new opinions may be very unlike the old.

“We all know how often those masters who sought after colouring *changed* their

manner, whilst others, merely from not seeing various modes, acquiesced all their lives in that which they set out with.”—*Sir J. Reynolds*.

TO EXCHANGE is to change one thing for another. The subjects of exchange may be of the same or of different natures; as to exchange one book for another, or a house for a piece of land.

“What shall a man give in *exchange* for his soul?”—*Bible*.

“To *truck*, the Latin for any other vulgar language, is but an ill *barter*. It is as bad as that which Glaucus made with Diomedes when he parted with his golden arms for brazen ones.”—*Howell*.

“Vitellescus vows to fast upon the last of February, but, changing his mind, believes he may *commute* his fasting for alms, he resolves to break his fast and give a duck to the poor. But when he had new dined he discourses the question again, and thinks it unlawful to *commute*, and that he is bound to pay his vow in kind, but the fast is broker, and yet if he refuses upon this new inquest to pay his *commutation* he is a deceiver of his own soul.”—*Bishop Taylor*.

“But search his mouth, and if a swarthy tongue

Is underneath his humid palate hung,
Reject him, lest he darken all the flock,
And *substitute* another from thy stock.”

Dryden’s Virgil.

BARTER (Old Fr. *barater*) refers, strictly speaking, to commercial exchange of some commodities for others of the same, or most commonly of different kinds. It is used metaphorically, and in such cases in an unfavourable sense, as to barter conscience for gold. To SUBSTITUTE (*substituere*) is to put one thing in the place of another, in order that the same purpose may be served. It may be observed that, though this purpose be not actually served, the term substitute is still employed in reference to the *intention*, as to substitute assertion for proof. To COMMUTE (Lat. *commutare*) is to exchange, either for an equivalent or for something of just value relatively. The payment of tithe in kind is commuted for payments in money; or capital punishment is commuted for transportation for life. TRUCK (Fr. *troquer*) is a familiar term applied to the private bartering of articles of no great intrinsic value.

INTERCHANGE is distinguished from exchange, as denoting not a single act, but a system, and repetition of such acts.

"Interchanges of cold frosts and piercing winds."—*Bp. Hall.*

BASE. VILE. MEAN. LOW.

BASE (Fr. *bas*, low). VILE (Lat. *vilis*, cheap, worthless). MEAN (Old Fr. *moien*, Low Lat. *medianus*, from *medius*, middle). Base is stronger than vile, and vile is stronger than mean. Base expresses the morally degraded; vile the morally despicable; mean the morally paltry, Low being expressive rather of such petty dishonesties or meannesses as are unworthy of persons who have a moderate degree of self-respect. What is base excites our abhorrence, as contradicting all loftiness and generosity of nature, as treachery and ingratitude. What is vile excites disgust, as, for instance, the gaining a living by the trade of the sycophant or the informer. What is mean excites pure contempt, as prevarication, petty dishonesties, flattery, and the like.

"Si ingratum dixeris, omnia dixeris, says the Latin maxim. If you call a man ungrateful, you have called him everything that is base. You need say nothing more."—*Beattie.*

"Though we caress dogs, we borrow from them an appellation of the most despicable kind, when we employ terms of reproach, and this appellation is the common mark of the last *vileness* and contempt in every language."—*Burke.*

The term mean has passed through the following stages:—1. Middle, or midway; then common, or ordinary, without excellence or deficiency; then with an unfavourable tendency toward the latter, scanty, and, as applied to persons, ungenerous or illiberal. The "mean man" in the book of Isaiah is contrasted with the "great man." Meanness is associated with dishonourable regard to self-preservation and self-interest, baseness with the treatment of others.

"There is hardly a spirit upon earth so mean and contracted as to centre all regards on its own interest exclusive of the rest of mankind."—*Burkeley.*

The epithet low, as applied to persons, indicates a kind of hopeless meanness, depravity, or dishonourableness, the result of an essential incapacity of what is lofty.

"Yet sometimes nations will decline so low From virtue." *Milton.*

BASIS. FOUNDATION. GROUND. BASE.

BASIS (Greek *βάσις*, from *βαίνω*, to go) that on which a thing stands, and BASE (Fr. *bas*, Low Lat. *bassus*) are used interchangeably; but while basis always means the part on which a structure rests, base means anything which approximates to this, as the lower part generally. The basis of a column is that on which it rests. This, strictly speaking, is hidden from view. Its base is an architectural feature of it. Base is not generally used in a recognized figurative sense, which is the case with basis, as to set matters upon a surer basis.

"Every plague that can infest Society, and that saps and worms the base Of th' edifice that policy has raised."

Cooper.

"This university had in the conclusion of the last century the honour of giving birth to a stupendous system of philosophy, erected by its disciple Newton on the immovable basis of experiment and demonstration."—*Porteus.*

FOUNDATION (Lat. *fundare*, to found) and GROUND (Sax. *grund*). Ground speaks for itself. Foundation is employed in architecture of some large and complex structure. Figuratively, we use basis as that on which rest the proceedings of thought, argument, or transactions of men, as their principles, as the basis of a conception, the basis of a conviction, the basis of reasoning, of traffic, of diplomacy, and so on. Ground is figuratively used as the warrant or substantial cause; as the ground of belief, feeling, or action; as groundless suspicions, jealousies, tears, grounds for legal proceedings, and so on. Foundation is rather restricted to matters of belief, feeling, hopes, and the like, than used of matters of practice, in reference to which we use the term ground, or basis. In many cases the epithets

groundless and unfounded may be used interchangeably, as groundless or unfounded clamours.

"From thence I draw the most comfortable assurances of the future vigour and the ample resources of this great misrepresented country, and can never prevail on myself to make complaints which have no cause, in order to raise hopes which have no foundation."—*Burke*.

"Philosophers, such as *grounded* their judgment of things upon notions agreeable to common sense and experience."—*Barrow*.

BASHFUL. MODEST. DIFFIDENT.

Bashfulness is a constitutional feeling. Modesty is a virtue. Diffidence is an infirmity. BASHFULNESS (Fr. *esbahir*, like abash) is excessive or extreme modesty. It is not unbecoming in females, and in very young persons in the presence of their superiors. It betrays itself in a look and air of timidity.

"Our orators, with the most faulty *bashfulness*, seem impressed rather with an awe of their audience than with a just respect for the truths they are about to deliver. They of all professions seem the most *bashful* who have the greatest right to glory in their commission."—*Goldsmith*.

"*Modesty* is a kind of shame or bashfulness proceeding from the sense a man has of his own defects compared with the perfections of him whom he comes before."—*South*.

"There is a degree of pain in *modest diffidence*; but it is amply recompensed by the glow of satisfaction derived from the favourable opinions of others, and by the encouragement thus inspired that the deficiency is not so great as was apprehended, or too great to be surmounted."—*Cogan*.

MODESTY (*modestia*) is the absence of all tendency to over-estimate ourselves; while DIFFIDENCE (*diffidere*, to distrust) is the positive distrust of ourselves. Modesty has in it the elements of something wholly unlike diffidence, for, though inclined to claim less than one's due, and to accord more than their due to others, the modest man is not deterred from such efforts in the struggle of life as are needful to do justice to himself; while diffidence, if it be a habit of the disposition, leads to positive injustice to oneself and one's own powers. In the

following passage the word *diffident* is employed in its less common use of distrustful of the power of others.

"But I remember too that you disapproved of the manner in which the civil war was conducted, and that, far from being satisfied either with the strength or nature of Pompey's forces, you were always extremely *diffident* of their success."—*Melmoth, Cicero*.

It may be observed that modest denotes a permanent quality of disposition; *diffident* may express distrust occasioned by special circumstances.

BATTLE. COMBAT. ENGAGEMENT. ACTION.

BATTLE (Fr. *bataille*) is a generic term. As an act of fighting, it is applied to individuals, small parties, armies. It commonly, however, conveys the idea of a premeditated fight between organised armies.

"The Scipios *battled*, and the Gracchi spoke."—*Dyer*.

COMBAT is derived from the same root (*combattre*, to fight, or beat together). It is used with a more direct reference to the reciprocal act of fighting, and is commonly employed of fights between individuals or small parties engaged in the same cause, as the combat of the Horatii and Curiatii. The verb *combat* is used directly of the object of the combat, when it is employed in a secondary sense, as to combat an opponent's arguments, opinions, or reasons. As in Milton—

"What had I
T' oppose against such powerful arguments?"

Only my love of thee held long debate,
And *combated* in silence all these reasons
With hard contest."

ENGAGEMENT (Fr. *engager*) and ACTION (*actio, agere*) stand to battle and combat as the process of the thing to the thing itself, as to accompany the troops to battle, and take part in the engagement. Engagement is that part of action which refers directly to the struggle with the enemy. The troops behaved well in the engagement, would be taken to mean that they showed courage in struggling with the enemy. To say that they behaved well in action, would

comprise other military qualifications, as that they manœuvred well under command. The action is decisive or otherwise; the engagement is protracted, or soon terminated.

"A decisive action."—*Macaulay*.

"The battle proved decisive in favour of the house of York, and in consequence of it Edward was, in June, 1461, crowned King of England. There were killed in this engagement 36,776 men."—*Fawkes*.

BAWL. See CLAMOUR.

BE. See EXIST.

BEAM. GLEAM. GLIMMER.

RAY. GLITTER. SPARKLE. SHINE.

These words, not excepting ray, may be used both as nouns and verbs. Their use as the latter will be sufficiently indicated by noticing their differences in the former capacity. They all express the steadier or less violent emissions of light, as distinguished from the fitful and violent, as in flame, flash, glare, and the like. BEAM meant, in Saxon, tree, post, ray, and so is analogous to the Latin *radius*, whence RAY, which meant a wand, spoke of a wheel. Beam is more nearly allied with ray in the above list, and GLEAM (A. S. *gleam*) with GLIMMER (Germ. *glimmer*) and GLITTER (Sax. *glitan*, to sparkle). The beam is larger and more powerful than the ray, commonly speaking, though not invariably. So we should say, the beams of the sun or moon, and the rays of smaller luminous bodies. Again, ray expresses more directly than beam the notion of one among a number of lines of light diverging from a luminous centre. Again, beam is never applied *but* to light, while ray is also applied to any substance analogous to ray, as, for instance, forming a starlike pattern; as the rays of the flowers called *compositæ* in botany; or as an order of chivalry might consist of a star with diamond rays, meaning points. Gleam, glimmer, and glitter have much in common; but gleam is commonly used of light not very brilliant, but undeveloped, yet steady, and beginning, as it were, to make itself visible through surrounding darkness, as

the first gleams of the sun at dawn. Glimmer is an unsteady gleam of light making itself visible in a tremulous way, or at intervals. Glitter and SPARKLE are, again, much alike, with this important difference, that sparkle is properly applied to luminous bodies, and glitter not so. The fire sparkles, that is, rapidly emits minute fragments of light; but diamonds, properly speaking, do not sparkle, but glitter, as they emit light only in the sense of reflecting it. When we say of the jewel, as we sometimes do, that it sparkles, we lend our imagination to it, and think of it as what it is not, as a tiny source of light, or as emitting what, in fact, it only reflects. SHINE denotes the steady reflection or emission of light. Shining talents are uniformly conspicuous, though they will exhibit themselves occasionally in brilliant efforts and successes.

"I saw a beauty from the sea to rise

That all earth looked on, and that earth
all eyes.

It cast a beam as when the cheerful sun
Is fair got up and day some hours begun."

Ben Jonson.

"Those uncertain *glimmerings* of the light of nature would have prepared the minds of the learned for the reception of the full illustration of this subject by the Gospel, had not the resurrection been a part of the doctrine therein advanced."—*Watson*.

"Though fainter raptures my cold heart
inspire,

Yet let me oft frequent this solemn scene,
Oft to the abbey's shattered walls retire
What time the moonshine dimly gleams
between."

Mickle.

"Bodies in respect of light may be divided into three sorts, first those that emit rays of light, as the sun and fixed stars; secondly, those that transmit the rays of light, as the air; thirdly, those that reflect the rays of light, as iron, earth, &c. The first are called luminous, the second pellucid, and the third opaque."—*Locke*.

"A reliance on genius, as it is called, without application, gives a boldness of utterance and assertion which often sets off base metal with the glitter of gold."—*Knox*.

"She affirmed to me that she had divers times observed the like alterations in some diamonds of hers, which sometimes would look more sparklingly than they were wont, and sometimes more dull than ordinary."—*Boyle*.

"Of gold shone his coronne."—*R. Branne*.

BEAR. See AFFORD, CARRY, SUFFER.

BEAST. See ANIMAL.

BEAT. STRIKE. HIT.

To BEAT (Fr. *battre*) is frequent, meaning to continue to give blows. It is the result of repeated aims and efforts with such implements as are retained in the hand, or the hand itself. To STRIKE (A. S. *strican*) is single, and may be by a missile, as to strike the target. To HIT (A. S. *hettan, hetian*) is to strike as the result of aim, and in consideration of the chances of missing it, as a lucky or good hit.

"Thrice was I *beaten* with rods."—*Bible*.

"They *struck* Him with the palms of their hands."—*Ibid*.

"Just as we experience it in the flint and steel. You may move them apart as long as you please, to very little purpose; but it is the *hitting* and collision of them that must make them strike fire."—*Bentley*.

BEAT. DEFEAT.

These words are used synonymously. BEAT, however, is of more extended application than DEFEAT. It is a competitor or an antagonist that is beaten. It is only an antagonist or his plan that is defeated. Runners in a race are not defeated.

"He *beat* them in a bloody battle."—*Prescott*.

"Yet Almighty God Himself often complains how in a manner His designs were *defeated*, His desires thwarted, His offers refused, His counsels rejected, His expectations deceived."—*Barrow*.

BEATIFICATION. CANONIZATION.

The former (*beatum, facere*) is a privilege more privately granted by the Pope to the memory of certain persons, to be regarded after death as saints, whose lives have been illustrious for piety and miracles. The latter (canon, the rule or order of the church) is a more formal and public trial of the merits of the deceased previous to his admission to the calendar. This distinction may serve partly to explain the crowd of names of saints which connect

themselves with the Roman Catholic Church.

BEATITUDE. See HAPPINESS.

BEAUTIFUL. HANDSOME. PRETTY. LOVELY. FINE.

Of these terms, handsome is applicable only to persons and to acts in a moral sense; the rest both to persons and other objects of sight, whether natural or artificial. BEAUTIFUL (Fr. *beauté*, Lat. *bellus*) is the strongest of these, except, perhaps, lovely. But neither beautiful, pretty, nor lovely are ever applied (except sarcastically) to men, who are never permitted to be more than handsome or fine. The beautiful is a thing of rule. It comprises form, colour, proportion, and the like, and these must exist in detail in sufficient number. The beautiful woman, like the beautiful landscape, is an assemblage of admirable objects. Yet with all this she may not be *lovely*. This implies the superaddition to external beauty of an exquisite delicacy, and the stamp of those moral graces without which physical beauty, however striking, falls short of being lovely.

"In like manner, I have heard it observed by thoughtless people that there are a few women possessed of *beauty* in comparison of those who want it. Not considering that we bestow the epithet of *beautiful* only on such persons as profess a degree of beauty that is common to them with a few."—*Hume*.

"Beauty is an over-weening self-sufficient thing, careless of providing itself any more substantial ornaments; nay, so little does it consult its own interests, that it too often defeats itself by betraying that innocence which renders it *lovely* and desirable."—*Spectator*.

HANDSOME (connected with hand, and the termination some, indicative of character, as gladsome) is a term of the second class of admiration. It meant, at first, dexterous, and reflexively handy, and then comely, as expressing more than pretty, and less than beautiful. There are certain associations connected with the handsome which seem a little arbitrary and hard to account for. It is easier to note them. For instance, men, women, horses, dogs, trees, dresses

are handsome, but not views or prospects, except in American phraseology. It always relates to persons.

"The Romans were so fully convinced of the power of beauty, that the word *fortis*, strong or valiant, signified likewise fair or handsome."—*Fawkes*.

The term, when applied morally to actions, retains that second-rate quality which belongs to it as an epithet of what is admirable physically. The handsome act is not of the highest description, not one of self-devotion, or heroic generosity, but of liberality, and of something more than fairness; nor, again, is handsome applied physically to objects of small size. The handsome implies a certain scale beyond the PRETTY (Germ. *prächtigt*), which belongs to the little in form, nor is the beauty which it denotes of a high order.

"If tall, the name of proper slays,
If fair, she's pleasant as the light,
If low, her *prettiness* does please."

Cowley.

FINE (Fr. *fin*) seems to have taken to itself by usage a force not originally belonging to it; the fine, being the slender or highly finished, has come to mean, emphatically, that which is not little, but implies a certain scale of size and expressiveness. In short, it is opposed to coarse, and so comes to mean no ordinary thing of its kind, and therefore implies size and excludes littleness.

"The *fine* original of Thomas Howard, Duke of Norfolk, with the staves of Earl Marshal and Lord Treasurer, from whence the print is taken, is at Leicester House."—*Walpole*.

BECAUSE. See CONSEQUENTLY.

BECOME. See GROW.

BECOMING. DECENT. PROPER.
FIT. SEEMLY. SUITABLE. JUST.
RIGHT.

BECOMING expresses that which is harmoniously graceful, or attractive from fitness. The becoming in dress is that which accords with the appearance, age, condition, &c., of the wearer. But though the becoming

has constantly the tendency to manifest itself under graceful forms, the term is often applied simply in the sense of morally fit, as modesty is becoming in a youth, gravity in a judge. It always relates to persons.

"For nothing is more certain than that He expecteth that we should do everything after the *becomingness* of human nature and in conformity to the relation we have unto mankind, and unto Himself."—*Greco*.

The DECENT, like the becoming, is external or internal (Lat. *decere*, to become). It seems commonly to have a restrictive or negative force rather than an active and positive one. It is that species of the becoming which results from the absence of all tendency to excess or fault, and so has no meaning of the positively graceful, like becoming. A person decently clad has clothing appropriate and sufficient, but perhaps this is all. A person becomingly dressed is graceful. Decent indicates a due attention to moral and social requirements.

"As beauty of body with an agreeable carriage pleases the eye, and that pleasure consists in that we observe all the parts with a certain elegance are proportioned to each other, so does *decency* of behaviour, which appears in our lives, obtain the approbation of all with whom we converse, from the order, constancy, and moderation of our words and actions."—*Spectator*.

PROPER (Lat. *proprius*) denotes in this connection an adaptation to an end or purpose—the ends, for instance, of order, taste, morality, or the circumstances of persons or cases. The proper is in its fundamental idea that which strictly belongs to the nature or use of things. In this sense it is employed by Milton, when he says—

"What dies but what had life
And sin? the body *properly* hath neither."

FIT denotes also the same, but it denotes more; as proper indicates natural fitness, so fit comprehends artificial adaptation or qualification. Fitness is distinct from moral propriety or decency, and is a term restricted to matters of form, purpose, and design.

"He who studies them (the works of Nature) is continually delighted with new and

wonderful discoveries, and yet is never perplexed by their multiplicity, because order, proportion, and *fitness* prevail throughout the whole system."—*Beattie*.

SEEMLY occupies a middle place between decent and becoming, being more than the first and less than the second.

"I cannot understand that any man's bare perception of the natural *seemliness* of one action and unseemliness of another, should bring him under an obligation on all occasions to do the one and avoid the other, at the hazard of his life, to the detriment of his fortune, or even to the diminution of his own ease."—*Bishop Horsley*.

SUITABLE. See APPROPRIATE.

JUST (Fr. *juste*) is used in the sense of well-suited, and, in this sense, only morally, as a just remark, which means, not one of justice, but of fitness.

"Many of the poets, to describe the execution which is done by this passion, represent the fair sex as basilisks which destroy with their eyes; but I think Mr. Cowley has, with greater *justness* of thought, compared a beautiful woman to a porcupine, that sends an arrow from every part."—*Spectator*.

RIGHT (*rectus*) is used in the same way, but is also used of physical adaptation, as the box is *rightly* packed; a *right* remark, that is, a true one; *rightly* dressed, that is, suitably to an original intention. That is right which goes straight to the point without deviation, error, or impropriety.

"It necessarily comes to pass that what promotes the public happiness, or happiness upon the whole, is agreeable to the fitness of things to nature, to reason, and to truth; and such is the Divine character that what promotes the general happiness is required by the will of God; and what has all the above properties must needs be *right*, for *right* means no more than conformity to the rule we go by, whatever that rule may be."—*Paley*.

BEG. See ASK.

BEGIN. COMMENCE.

BEGIN (Germ. *beginnan*) and COMMENCE (Fr. *commencer*) are employed with slight differences. Thus, *begin* sometimes refers only to time or order, while *commence* implies action. The alphabet *begins*, but could not

be said to *commence*, with the letter a. So, to enter upon a new state may be expressed by *begin*, but not by *commence*; as, after walking twenty miles I *began* to feel tired. The same applies to an alteration of mind, thought, or opinion. I *begin* to think that, after all, you are mistaken. *Commence* commonly applies as a verb directly to its object, which is some work or thing to be done; and if the subject be anything else, the term *commence* should be dispensed with. It is an absurdity, for instance, to say, "at this period of the performance the audience commenced to show signs of weariness." The opposite to *begin* is to end; the opposite to *commence* is to complete. To *begin* is used also in the peculiar sense of being the first to do a thing, as distinguished from the act of prosecution or joint action on the part of another. "James is most to blame, for it was he that *began* the quarrel."

"But to *begin* that which never was, whereof there was no example, whereto there was no inclination, wherein there was no possibility of that which it should be, is proper only to such power as Thine, the infinite power of an infinite Creator."—*Bishop Hall*.

Like all words of Latin origin (for the Latin *initium* is at the root of the French *commencer*), *commence* has a more emphatic and dignified force than *begin*. Formal and public transactions, ceremonies, and the like are said to *commence*; common and familiar things to *begin*.

"On the 29th, the Queen removed to St. James's, passing through the park, and took her barge at Whitehall, and so to Richmond, in order to her progress, which was chiefly *commenced* to meet her beloved, the Prince of Spain."—*Strype*.

BEGINNING. COMMENCEMENT.
ORIGIN. ORIGINAL. RISE. SOURCE.

See BEGIN and COMMENCE, above. Both ORIGIN and ORIGINAL come from the Latin *origo* and *orior*, to arise; RISE from the Saxon *risan*; and SOURCE from the French *source*, and the Latin *surgere*, to rise. *Origin* is used both for the first cause of a thing, and also for the first beginning of it. *Original* was once used in the

same way, and is still used scientifically; as some believe the wolf to be the original of the dog. It is now used of that which is the source *artificially*, as origin of that from which a thing is naturally *derived*, and is opposed to copy or translation. Origin is a more abstract term than rise, which is more familiar. It is a profound speculation in what evil had its origin. Among quarrelsome persons, a very trivial matter will give rise to dispute. Rise sometimes means that early portion of a thing's existence, in which the origin having taken place, the thing is still in a state of progressive development, as the historic "Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire." Source conveys the additional idea of that which can be referred to as the origin, whether in the mind only, by way of account, or actually for the purpose of drawing results, as to trace an evil to its source, to exhaust every source of pleasure; the term source involving a *continuous* supply.

"In the *beginning* was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God."—*Bible*.

"In the last lecture the nature and origin of the Hebrew elegy was explained, the form and *commencement* of that species of poetry was traced into the solemn dirges which are chanted at funerals by the professed mourners."—*Lowth*.

BEGUILE. See DECEIVE.

BEHAVIOUR. DEMEANOUR. CONDUCT.

BEHAVIOUR is from be and have, to have oneself, as in Latin *se gerere*. It refers to all those actions which are open to the observation of others as well as those which are specifically directed to others. As behaviour refers more directly to *actions*, so DEMEANOUR (Fr. *demener*, to lead or conduct) refers more directly to *manner*. He behaved himself insultingly, would mean that he was guilty of insulting *actions*; he demeaned himself insultingly, that his *manner* was such. Behaviour is a more positive and energetic term than demeanour. When Queen Elizabeth boxed the ears of the Earl of Essex, her be-

haviour was undignified and insulting; but the proceeding was too demonstrative to be a question of demeanour only.

"We are not perhaps at liberty to take for granted that the lives of the preachers of Christianity were as perfect as their lessons; but we are entitled to contend that the observable part of their *behaviour* must have agreed in a great measure with the duties which they taught."—*Paley*.

CONDUCT (*conducere, conductus*) relates to the general line of moral proceedings and the spirit of them.

BEHIND. See BACK.

BEHOLD. SEE. LOOK. VIEW. EYE. CONTEMPLATE. REGARD. OBSERVE. PERCEIVE. SCAN.

BEHOLD, compounded of be and *healdan*, Saxon, to hold, is to look at with fixed observation, as worthy on some account of being so viewed. It may indicate the lowest degree of such observation, and may be the result of accident: "As I was passing, I beheld such an one so engaged," and so means little more than I saw. On the other hand, "I beheld him with gladness," implies more of interest. But such interest is independent, arising from the fact of meeting.

"Then came Jesus forth, wearing the crown of thorns and the purple robe, and Pilate saith unto them, *Behold* the man."—*Bible*.

A much more exact and scrutinising observation or interest is expressed by CONTEMPLATE (Lat. *contemplor, contemplatus*), which indicates such a minute and sustained observation as extends to the very actions and movements. It is sometimes used of the purely ideal, as to contemplate a possibility, in which case it has a prospective force, and means nearly the same as to purpose or intend.

"Some few others sought after Him (God); but, as Aristotle saith, the Geometer doth after a right line only, *ὡς θεάτης τοῦ ἀληθοῦς* as a *Contemplator* of truth, but not as the knowledge of it is any way useful or conducive to the ordering or bettering of their lives."—*Hammond*.

To LOOK (A. S. *locian*) is the action

precedent to seeing. It is to direct the eye to the object for the purpose of seeing it. Nor is this object simply attained by the looking. "I am looking," it might be said, "in the direction which you indicate, but I cannot see it."

"The emotions produced by tragedy are upon this supposition somewhat analogous to the dread we feel when we look down from the battlement of a tower."—*Stewart*.

TO SEE (A. S. *seon*) is the result of voluntary or involuntary looking, and is simply physical, except when used metaphorically, as "to see fit," "to see a thing in such a light."

"The organ of seeing is the eye, consisting of a variety of parts wonderfully contrived for the admitting and refracting the rays of light, so that those that come from the same point of the object, and fall upon different parts of the pupil, are brought to meet again at the bottom of the eye, whereby the whole object is painted on the retina that is spread there."—*Locke*.

In regard to the faculty of sight, as employed in its secondary sense, Reid has the following remark:—

"It is not without reason that the faculty of seeing is looked upon not only as more noble than the other senses, but as having something in it of a nature superior to sensation. The evidence of reason is called seeing, not feeling, smelling, or tasting. Yea, we are wont to express the manner of the Divine knowledge by seeing, as that kind of knowledge which is most perfect in us."

TO EYE is to regard indirectly, but earnestly, as gratifying some passion or feeling, of which we desire to give no manifestation. It is used morally in an analogous sense, as to eye a prosperous rival with jealousy.

"What but faith eyeing the prize will quicken us to run patiently the race that is set before us?"—*Barrow*.

As we contemplate to get a minute, so we view or scan to get a general impression. To SCAN (Lat. *scandere*, to climb) is to get a rapid, as to VIEW (Fr. *vue*, Lat. *videre*) is to take a more leisurely observation. We scan by rapidly noting one point after another; we view by taking in the whole at once.

"Viewing things on every side, observing how far consequences reach, and proceeding

to collect and hear evidence, till reason saith, there needs no more, is grievous labour to indolence and impatience, and by no means answers the ends of conceit and affectation."—*Secker*.

"Who, finite, will attempt to scan
The works of Him that's infinitely wise?"
Pomfret.

TO REGARD (Fr. *regarder*) is of a moral force, and implies certain feelings as accompanying the observation, as to regard with pleasure, or with aversion; while OBSERVE (*observere*) implies no more than to look at for the purpose of noticing facts connected with the object or its properties.

"He valued his religion beyond his own safety, and regarded not all the calumnies and reproaches of his enemies, as long as he made this his constant exercise, to keep a conscience void of offence towards God and towards men."—*Stillington*.

"But pardon, too, if zealous for the right,
A strict observer of each noble flight;
From the fine gold I separate the alloy,
And show how hasty writers sometimes stray."
Dryden.

PERCEIVE (Lat. *percipere*) commonly implies sight as the result of the exercise of a faculty within ourselves. "Some stars are too remote to be perceived by the eye."

"Jupiter made all things, and all things whatsoever exist are the works of Jupiter, rivers and earth and sea and heaven, and what are between these and gods and men, and all animals, whatsoever is perceivable either by sense or by the mind."—*Cudworth*.

BEHOLDER. See SPECTATOR.

BELIEF. CREDIT. TRUST. FAITH.

BELIEF (A. S. *lefan*, *lyfan*, to allow) is the acceptance of a fact or statement as true without immediate knowledge, and admits of all degrees, from suspicion to assurance. It depends upon ourselves and our own judgment, and does not necessarily derive force from other persons. CREDIT (Lat. *credere*) and TRUST (Germ. *trost*, consolation, hope), on the other hand, owe their force to something more than mere external evidence. I give credit to a statement because of some apparent worthiness of belief, either in the thing itself or in the person who

communicates it. Trust represents not only the purely personal element in credit, but also a conviction of the worthiness of *things* to be relied upon; for instance, I trust the physician, I trust his word, and I trust his medicine. Trust, in short, is a practical reliance upon any object, grounded on a belief that it is worthy of it. FAITH (Fr. for Lat. *fides*) is very like trust, and, in some cases, might be used for it, but it is less practical and more speculative. For instance, I have trust in God; that is, I feel myself safe in His hands, I believe He will deal with me mercifully. I have faith in God, would imply this, but it would imply more, namely, that I believe what He tells me, simply because it is Himself who says it. Hence, it appears that belief and credit are commonly specific or occasional acts of the mind. Faith and trust may be mental and even moral habits.

"That there is satisfactory evidence that many professing to be original witnesses of the Christian miracles passed their lives in labours, dangers, and sufferings, voluntarily undergone in attestation of the accounts which they delivered, and solely in consequence of their *belief* of those accounts; and that they also submitted from the same motives to new rules of conduct."—*Paley*.

"Albeit, the name of faith being properly and strictly taken, it must needs have reference unto some uttered word as the object of belief. Nevertheless, sith the ground of *credit* is the credibility of things credited, and things are made credible either by the known condition of the utterer or by the manifest likelihood of truth which they have in themselves, hereupon it riseth that whatsoever we are persuaded of, the same we are generally said to believe."—*Hooker*.

"In a word, every man implicitly *trusts* his bodily senses concerning external objects, placed at a convenient distance, and every man may, with as good a reason, put even a greater *trust* in the perceptions of which he is conscious in his own mind."—*Bishop Horsley*.

A full definition of faith in the theological sense is thus given by Clarke:

"*Faith* is that firm belief of things at present not seen, that conviction upon the mind of the truth of the promises and threatenings of God made known in the Gospel, of the certain reality of the rewards and

punishments of the life to come, which enables a man, in opposition to all the temptations of a corrupt world, to obey God, in expectation of an invisible reward hereafter."

BELIEVE. See THINK.

BELOW. See UNDER.

BEMOAN. BEWAIL. LAMENT.

These are strong words expressive of the external manifestation of sorrow, and follow in degrees of force the order given above. BEMOAN, compounded of be and moan, takes its complexion from its etymology, and denotes rather a deep and almost silent grief, as if too deep for words; BEWAIL, of be and wail, denotes the frequent reference in words to the subject of grief, sorrow, or disappointment. LAMENT (*lamentari*) applies to lighter causes of trouble, as to lament another's weakness of character. Bemoan is more often used of causes of permanent sorrow, as to bemoan one's lot or hard fate; bewail, of specific events, as to bewail the loss of a friend. Lament involves regret that circumstances should have been as they are when they might have been otherwise: you will have cause to lament your present conduct.

"When a poor-spirited creature, that died at the same time for his crimes, *bemoaned* himself unmanfully, he rebuked him with this question: 'Is it no consolation to such a man as thou art to die with Phocion?'"—*Spectator*.

"And if I must *bewail* the blessing lost
For which our Hampdens and our Sydneys
bled,
I would at least *bewail* it under skies
Milder, among a people less austere,
In scenes which, having never known me
free,
Would not reproach me with the loss I
felt." *Corper*.

"Thammuz came next behind,
Whose annual wound in Lebanon allured
The Syrian damsels to *lament* his fate
In amorous ditties all a summer's day."
Milton.

BEND. See INCLINE.

BENEATH. See UNDER.

BENEFACTION. DONATION.

BENEFACTION (Lat. *benefacere*, to benefit) and **DONATION** (Lat. *donare*, to give) both express the act of giving or the thing given for some liberal or charitable purpose; but a donation may be small or large; a benefaction is large enough to have a material effect upon and to be of lasting benefit to the object. Hence it is frequently employed of the gift of money and lands to institutions by way of endowment or *permanent* source of income.

"Here idle and useless (and therefore necessitous) persons are taught the best lesson, labour, inured to it, and made acquainted with it, and then sent out with such a stock of industry as will do them more real service than any other kind of *benefaction*."—*Atterbury*.

"They had an opportunity of distinguishing themselves from the lower classes by voluntary *donations* to the charity-box."—*Anecdotes of Bishop Watson*.

BENEFICENT. BOUNTIFUL. MUNIFICENT. GENEROUS. LIBERAL. BENEVOLENT.

BENEFICENT (*beneficere*, to benefit) is a very high term. It denotes largeness of bounty springing from the highest purity and goodness of nature, and in its highest form appertains to the Creator, and is not confined to any one kind of gifts.

"Whose work is without labour, whose designs

No flaw deforms, no difficulty thwarts,
And whose *beneficence* no charge exhausts."

Cowper.

BOUNTIFUL (full of bounty, Fr. *bonté*, Lat. *bonus*, goodness) comes next in order. It appertains to the nature which, when it gives, gives largely.

"It is true, indeed, the direction of the public weal is in the hands of a single person, who, for the general good, takes upon himself to ease us of the whole weight and care of government; but still that *bountiful* source of power permits, by a very generous dispensation, some streams to flow down to us."—*Melmoth, Pliny*.

MUNIFICENT (*munus*, a gift, and *facere*, to make) stands to costliness as bountiful to amplitude. It is fre-

quently applied to the thing given, as a munificent gift or present. It is rather external than moral, and does not at all imply necessarily the goodness of beneficence or the liberality of bounty. It may be the natural manifestation of a noble or princely liberality, or it may be the product of ostentation or selfishness.

"The institution of a school of statuary in the house of a young nobleman (the Duke of Richmond) of the first rank, rivals the boasted *munificence* of foreign princes."—*Walpole*.

GENEROUS (*generosus*, properly, of good birth) differs from the foregoing as not being restricted to matters of external giving. Generosity is that nobleness of nature which is ready to benefit others even at a cost to oneself. Hence it applies to forgiving as well as giving. It comes of a disposition which despises meannesses of all kinds, as niggardliness, spitefulness, and the like.

"All men affect to seem *generous*, and will say they scorn to be base; but generosity is in nothing more seen than in a candid estimation of other men's virtues and good qualities. To this generosity of nature, generosity of education, generosity of principles and judgment do all conspiringly dispose."—*Barrow*.

LIBERAL (Lat. *liberalis*), like bountiful, denotes a character which, when it gives, gives largely; but it applies to more than matters of giving. It is the tendency to avoid exact circumscriptions, and to allow margins. To take a liberal view of a case is to give the greatest width to its facts and interpretations, admitting favourable rather than forcing unfavourable constructions. To give liberally is to avoid calculating what is precisely sufficient or exactly just, and not to fear the risk of exceeding the line of rigid dealing in such cases.

"The decency, then, that is to be observed in *liberality* seems to consist in its being performed with such cheerfulness as may express the godlike pleasure that is to be met with in obliging one's fellow-creatures."—*Spectator*.

BENEVOLENT (*bene volens*, well-wishing) differs from all the preceding in referring directly to the

character, and only indirectly to the acts of a person. The benevolent person may want the means of being liberal in matters of money or gifts, but he will naturally give when he can, and according to his means, from a disposition to wish well to others. The benevolent will spare to injure as well as be glad to benefit.

"When our love or desire of good goes forth to others, it is termed good-will, or *benevolence*. *Benevolence* embraces all beings capable of enjoying any portion of good, and thus it becomes universal benevolence, which manifests itself by being pleased with the share of good every creature enjoys, in a disposition to increase it, in feeling an uneasiness at their sufferings, and in the abhorrence of cruelty under every disguise or pretext. When these dispositions are acting powerfully towards every being capable of enjoyment, they are called the *benevolent* affections; and as they become in those who indulge them operative rules of conduct or principles of action, we speak of the *benevolent* principle."—*Cogan on the Passions*.

BENEFIT. *See* ADVANTAGE.

BENEVOLENT. *See* BENEFICENT.

BENIGNITY. HUMANITY. KINDNESS. TENDERNESS.

BENIGNITY (Lat. *benignus*) is a less active quality than benevolence. Indeed, benignity is but a part or aspect of benevolence. Benignity is, as it were, dormant benevolence. It is a matter of disposition, and not of positive will. It is a tendency to benevolence, but so far short of it that it is sometimes applied metaphorically to other influences than the human will, as the benign, that is, propitious influences of the seasons. Nevertheless, when employed of persons, benign usually denotes some degree of superiority in the person. We should be more likely to speak of the benignity of a rich or powerful man than of a poor man.

"In a thermometer, 'tis only the purest and most sublimated spirit that is either contracted or dilated by the *benignity* or inclemency of the season."—*Spectator*.

HUMANITY (*humanus*, human) is rather used to express an impulse than a quality. It is that manifest-

ation of active kindness which man, as such, is, or ought to be, prompted to exhibit to his fellow-man, or to any creatures with which he is brought into contact. Being an impulse, it appears in special cases, on special occasions, and has special objects. It stands over against cases which stand in need of it and evoke it. The act of the Good Samaritan was emphatically an act of humanity. Yet humanity is not so much a positive virtue as something the absence of which is positively evil.

"It is a rule of equity and *humanity*, built upon plain reason, that rather a nocent person should be permitted to escape than an innocent should be constrained to suffer."—*Barrow*.

KINDNESS (literally, the feeling of one of the same kind or nature) is very like benevolence, but is rather a social than a moral virtue. It accordingly applies to minor acts of courtesy and goodwill, for which benevolence would be too serious a term. "Have the kindness to do so and so," is a phrase of social courtesy. To say that the Good Samaritan performed an act of kindness would be not untrue, but very inadequate, and an under-statement.

"If Achitophel signify the brother of a fool, the author of that poem will pass with his readers for the next of *kin*. And perhaps it is the relation that makes the *kindness*."—*Dryden*.

TENDERNESS (Lat. *tener*) is that gentleness and kindness of disposition which leads to a gentle and sympathising dealing with cases of trouble or distress. It is a promptitude of compassion flowing from the sensibility of nature.

BENT. *See* CROOKED.

BENT. BIAS. INCLINATION. TURN. PROPENSITY. TENDENCY. PRONENESS.

All these terms denote a preponderating influence of mind. BENT (participle of bend) applies to the will, the intellect, the affections, or the entire nature. As the force of bent is internal, so the force of BIAS (Fr. *biais*, a slope or slant) is external.

Moreover, bias is applied to matters of judgment. It is that which (like a weight introduced into a ball) prevents it from pursuing an undeviating course.

"It is the legislator's policy to comply with the common *bent* of mankind, and give it all the improvements of which it is susceptible."—*Hume*.

The term *bias* is used in its primary sense in the following :—

"If you suppose a die to have any *bias*, however small, to a particular side, this *bias*, though perhaps it may not appear in a few throws, will certainly prevail in a great number, and will cast the balance entirely to that side."—*Hume*.

"I am of opinion there has not for these many years appeared anything more finished of the kind, if, indeed, my great affection for him, and the praises he bestowed upon me, do not *bias* my judgment."—*Melmoth, Pliny*.

INCLINATION (*inclinare*) is a tendency of the will to exercise certain preferences rather than others, and thus differs from PROPENSITY (Lat. *propendere*, to hang forward), which is an unreflecting, constitutional, or animal proneness to an object, which may be natural or simply the result of habit.

"Shall I venture to say, my lord, that in our late conversation you were *inclined* to the party which you adopted rather by the feelings of your good-nature than by the conviction of your judgment?"—*Burke*.

The term propensity is mostly used in an unfavourable sense. We do not speak directly of a propensity to virtue, but to vice.

"For as this strong natural *propensity* to vice and impiety cannot possibly consist with the hypothesis of the soul's coming just out of God's hands pure and immaculate, so doth it most aptly suit with the doctrine of its pre-existence."—*Glanvill*.

TURN is a colloquial word, and commonly expresses an innocent preference for a thing as suiting the taste, especially such habitual occupation voluntarily assumed as implies a natural capacity for it, as "to have a turn for drawing." TENDENCY (Lat. *tendere*, to reach or tend) is perhaps the most general of all, and, on that account, the least speci-

fically expressive. It denotes a force uniformly operating in a particular direction, whether it be of a physical or moral kind, and may be the result of nature or habit.

"In every experimental science there is a *tendency* toward perfection."—*Macaulay*.

PRONENESS (*pronus*, with the face downwards, opposed to *supinus*, lying on the back) denotes a moral proclivity or constitutional tendency, and is almost universally restricted to an unfavourable sense. We say prone to self-indulgence, not prone to self-denial. Yet this rule is not absolute. Pope says—

"Malice, *prone* the virtuous to defame."

On the other hand—

"An honest, hearty simplicity and *prone*ness to do all that a man knows of God's will is the ready, certain, and infallible way to know more of it."—*South*.

BENUMBED. See TORPID.

BEQUEATH. DEVISE. DEMISE.

TO BEQUEATH is formed of the prefix *be* and the verb *queath* (which survives in the antiquated word *quoeth*), meaning to speak or say. It points to times anterior to written testaments, when property was devised by word of mouth in the presence of witnesses. Bequeath is properly applied to a gift by will or legacy, *i.e.*, of personal property, and he who receives it is called a legatee. It is popularly extended, and even construed by the law courts to embrace what ought to be expressed by *devise*. To DEVISE (Old Fr. *devise*) is properly used for the gift by will of *real* property. DEMISE (Fr. *démise*, from *démètre*, to lay down) properly denotes the leaving of property at death to one who has already a claim to it, as the heir. Hence the term demise of the Crown, which is the transfer, at the death of the sovereign, of the kingdom to the lawful successor. The idea of expectancy belongs to the last, not to the two former.

"I have often read with a great deal of pleasure a legacy of the famous Lord Bacon, one of the greatest geniuses that our own or

any country has produced. After having bequeathed his soul, body, and estate in the usual form, he adds, 'My name and memory I leave to foreign nations, and to my countrymen after some time be passed over.'—*Tatler*.

The term bequeath is used in so general a manner as to be untechnical; the others are purely technical.

BEREAVE. DEPRIVE. STRIP.

BEREAVE (A. S. *beræfian*, *reafian*, to steal or rob) is to take away so as to leave a feeling of privation or destitution. DEPRIVE (*deprivare*) is to take away so as to leave a feeling of loss or disappointment. STRIP (A. S. *strypan*) denotes a sudden, violent, or arbitrary taking away so as to leave a feeling of spoliation. We are bereaved only of actual and substantial sources of comfort or happiness; but we may be deprived of what is only speculative, as to be deprived of all ground of hope, or source of consolation. Strip commonly applies to matters of possession, privileges, powers, or worldly goods.

"Me have ye bereaved of my children."—*Bible*.

"Mr. Pym, in a long-form'd discourse, lamented the miserable state and condition of the kingdom, aggravated all the particulars which had been done amiss in the government, as done and contrived maliciously and upon deliberation, to change the whole frame and deprive the nation of all the liberty and property which was their birthright by the laws of the land."—*Clarendon*.

As bereave and deprive bear a moral or an analogous, so strip combines with this a purely physical application. The two are combined in the following:—

"Opinions which, at the time of the accession of James, no clergyman could have avowed without imminent risk of being stripped of his gown, were now the best title to preferment."—*Macaulay*.

BESEECH. See ASK.

BESIDES. See ALSO, EXCEPT, and MOREOVER.

BESTOW. See GIVE.

BETIMES. See EARLY.

BETOKEN. See AUGUR.

BETTER. See IMPROVE.

BEWAIL. See BEMOAN.

BEYOND. See OVER.

BIAS. See BENT.

BID. CALL. INVITE. SUMMON. CITE.

Of these, CALL expresses the generic sense (Lat. *calare*, Gr. *καλεῖν*). It means little more than raising the voice to attract attention, even in inarticulate sounds. It implies no particular relation of superiority and inferiority between two parties.

'How often have I stood
A rebel to the skies,
The calls, the tenders of a God,
And mercy's loudest cries!'

Watts.

To INVITE (*invitare*) is to call in such a way as to leave the answer to the will and pleasure of the other; but it may be without words at all, as by inarticulate sounds, or by signs inaudible, as by writing. It implies some sort of equality between the parties, and is an act of persuasion or courtesy.

"Ask of no angel to reveal thy fate.
Look in thy heart, the mirror of thy state.
He that invites will not the invited mock,
Opening to all that do in earnest knock."

Waller.

To BID and to SUMMON (Saxon *biddan*, and the Latin *summonere*, from *moneo*) both imply the use of words in an authoritative manner; but the former extends to the subject-matter of all commands; the latter to the particular command to appear at a particular place. To summon is always authoritative and formal, and may also be legal and compulsory.

"Sir Roger, who is very well acquainted with my humour, lets me rise and go to bed when I please, dine at his own table or in my chamber as I think fit, sit still and say nothing without bidding me be merry."—*Spectator*.

"All men, both small and great, dead and living, shall be summoned to appear before a dreadful and impartial tribunal, and give an account of all their actions."—*Sharp*.

CITE is *citere*, from *ciere*, and has

the general sense of to call by name, in which it is a synonym with *quote* (see *QUOTE*); but, as compared with *summon*, it expresses more vividly the authority of a personal act. A person is summoned to appear before a court; he is cited to appear before a judge or a superior.

"A synod was called by the Bishop of Winchester, the Pope's legate, to right the bishop, where the King was *cited* to appear, who, sending to know the cause, answer was made, that it was to answer for his imprisoning of bishops, and depriving them of their goods, which, being a Christian King, he ought not to do."—*Baker, Stephen*.

Summon applies also to such calls as are imperative, without being strictly authoritative or personal; as to be summoned to the country by important business.

BIG. GREAT. LARGE.

BIG (Welsh *baig*, burden) expresses that size which gives the impression of burdensomeness or bulk, as a big box, a big mountain. It also expresses the simple idea of size in the abstract, when used relatively or comparatively, as an animal no bigger than a flea. **Great** has not so much of this abstract force, but implies some degree of size. When used positively, **GREAT** (A. S. *great*) refers rather to extent, and **LARGE** (Fr. *large*, Lat. *largus*) to capacity. A building is great which is lofty and extensive; a room is large which would hold a considerable number of persons. It deserves to be remarked that big is not commonly or easily applied to nouns expressive of number, quantity, extent, and the like, but directly to the subjects of these qualities, as a big house, but not a big size, or a big number, or a big space. This function is better exercised by great and large, as a great or large number, a great or large extent, a great or large amount, a great or large size. But great is used of degree in a way in which large cannot be, as, I was greatly disappointed; and large of quantity, in a way in which great cannot be, as, he was largely rewarded. Big is always purely physical; great is also

moral, and applicable directly to persons, as a great general. Large is purely physical when employed directly of persons, but may be used of qualities, as a man of large mind, or large benevolence.

"*Big-boned*, and large of limbs, with sinews strong."—*Dryden*.

"*Greatness* of soul is more necessary to make a great man than the favour of the monarch and the blazoury of a herald, and *greatness* of soul is to be acquired by converse with the heroes of antiquity—not the fighting heroes only, but the moral heroes."—*Knox, Letters*.

"Such as made Sheba's curious queen
resort
To the large-hearted Hebrew's famous
court."—*Waller*.

BIGOT. See **ENTHUSIAST**.

BILL. See **ACCOUNT**.

BILLOW. See **WAVE**.

BIND. TIE.

To **BIND** is the Saxon *bindan*. To **TIE** is the Saxon *tegean*, or *tygan*. They express different modes of fastening by any long and flexible material. In the first place, tie is applicable to involutions and knots of the material itself, as, the string was tied in a knot. To bind indicates the circumvolution of the binding material around what is bound. The horse in the stable is tied up, but not bound up. When two things are tied together, that which unites them is in some measure intermediate; when they are bound, it is not intermediate. When things are tied, the whole is in restraint as regards what is external to it; when they are bound, the parts are in restraint as regards one another. The insane patient is bound in a strait-waistcoat; the martyr is tied to the stake. When used metaphorically, that is, morally, the same distinction of force appears. The moral tie is an external restraint, as the ties of kindred. The bond is internal, as to be bound in conscience.

BIND. OBLIGE. COMPEL. CONSTRAIN. COERCE.

To **BIND** implies a condition of subjection to an *already existing* obli-

gation. Such obligation may be moral or legal, or prudential. The obligation arises out of the circumstances of the individual, and not from the exercise upon him of the pure will of another. I am *bound* to assist my friend in his trouble, if I can. I am bound in honour to speak the truth, and in conscience to make just restitution, if I have taken unjustly or dishonestly. To be bound legally, as, for instance, by a bond, is of course technical.

"Even in those actions whereby an offence may be occasioned, though not given, charity binds us to clear both our own name and the conscience of others."—*Bishop Hall*.

OBLIGE (Lat. *obligare*, to bind) denotes the operation of an external force, as of another's will, but more commonly the force of circumstances. It is commonly employed of those men or cases in which no strong opposition of the will of the person obliged is supposed; as, "the road was blocked up, so I was obliged to come another way." It is not so strong as bind; but though not so strong, it is more practical; for a man may be bound to do something which, in fact, he neglects or omits to do. But what he is obliged to do, he does. Neither bind nor oblige exclude necessarily the consent of the will.

"A man is said to be *obliged* when he is urged by a violent motive, resulting from the command of another. And from this account of obligation, it follows that we can be *obliged* to do nothing but what we ourselves are to gain or lose something by, for nothing else can be a 'violent motive' to us."—*Paley*.

To COMPEL (Lat. *compellere*) denotes that the will of the person was powerless, or was taken no account of. Compulsion may proceed from persons or from circumstances.

"Before the sun has gilt the skies
Returning labour bids me rise.
Obedient to the hunter's horn,
He quits his couch at early morn.
By want *compelled*, I dig the soil,
His is a voluntary toil."

Cotton's Fables.

To CONSTRAIN (*constringere*) differs from compel in not implying the

same absolute annulling, or at least disregard of the individual's will. To compel denotes a purely external force; but to constrain may be internal. I exercise force over myself when I constrain myself; and I lend myself to moral influences when I allow myself to be constrained, from motives of compassion, for instance, to act in such and such a way. In short, the principle of compulsion is simply *force*, and of constraint, *motive*.

"The love of Christ *constraineth* me."—*Bible*.

COERCE (*coercere*), like compel, denotes not the action in any degree of internal motives, but only of external force. But the external force of compulsion is direct, of coercion, indirect. In coercion, some means are employed, as the fulcrum to the lever of compulsion. Coercion is compulsion under a moral guise, and is often the resource of persons who would shrink from the responsibility of employing the overt force of compulsion. "Vote for what candidate you please; but if you vote for such an one, you know the consequences:" this is coercion. In short, coercion is the exercise of any powerful interference with the free exercise of the individual will. Yet it has a social character, and bears more especially upon such acts as men perform not merely as individuals, but as brought into contact with society and their fellow-men. It may be added that, unlike the other terms, which have only a positive, coerce has also a negative force, in which it is nearly allied to restrain.

"Therefore the debtor is *coerced* his liberty until he makes payment."—*Burke*.

BLAME. CENSURE. CONDEMN.
REPROVE. REPROACH. UPBRAID.
REPRIMAND. REBUKE. CHIDE.
ANIMADVERT.

To BLAME (Fr. *blamer*, from the Gr. *βλασφῆμειν*) is simply to ascribe a fault to a person. It does not extend to crimes. So we should not blame a person for committing a foul murder. And so persons are blamed for accidents and untoward circum-

stances, when their occurrence may be ascribed to neglect, disobedience, and the like. The idea of imputing fault constitutes blame. Hence the term is applicable, among others, to such faults as consist in defect or excess of what is in itself right and good, as to blame a person for over-indulgence toward others. It is exercised by any one man towards any other, without distinction of rank or right, and may extend to motives as well as acts. We may often blame our friends, whom, nevertheless, we should desire to shield from the public censure of others. Blame may be indirect, as by adopting one policy or party we, by consequence, blame the policy of the opposite party.

"A wise man may frequently neglect praise, even when he has best deserved it, but in all matters of serious consequence, he will most carefully endeavour so to regulate his conduct as to avoid not only *blameworthiness*, but as much as possible every imputation of *blame*."—*Smith, Moral Sentiments*.

TO CENSURE (Lat. *censura*) is the formal and open expression of fault by a superior, or by one who assumes to be so for the occasion. To censure is more an act of personal authority than to blame, and is supposed to take place in the face of the person censured, whereas we may blame the absent or the dead. The consequences of conduct, and the conduct itself may be blamed, but it is only the person who is censured. A certain gravity of offence is implied in censure, which lies midway between light faults and heavy crimes. We might say, I blame such an one for being over-indulgent, but we could hardly censure him for it. The censure is supposed to carry with it some degree of punishment in its own severity, or in the character of him who expresses it. Blame is no more than the result of an opinion contrary to the conduct of another, and need not be publicly expressed, but may be secretly entertained. Censure expresses a kind of civil right to express blame publicly, as the Censors of ancient Rome might erase from the lists of citizens those whom they thought unworthy of the name.

"Of this delicacy Horace is the best master. He appears in good-humour while he *censures*; and therefore his *censure* has the more weight, as supposed to proceed from judgment, not from passion."—*Young*.

TO CONDEMN (condemnare) applies to grave offences or to those who commit them. It is the solemn pronouncement of an adverse judgment, either formally and openly, or in one's own mind.

"When Christ asked the woman, 'Hath no man *condemned* thee?' He certainly spoke, and was understood by the woman to speak of a legal and judicial condemnation. Otherwise her answer, 'No man, Lord,' was not true. In every other sense of *condemnation*, as blame, censure, reproof, private judgment, and the like, many had *condemned* her; all those, in short, who brought her to Jesus."—*Paley*.

TO REPROVE (*reprobare*) is personally to express one's disapprobation to another, commonly one's junior or inferior. It may be no more than the simple expression of it in a very few words, or even by a sign, and so differs from censure, which always enters upon the nature of the offence or supposed offence.

"*Reproce, rebuke, exhort, with all long-suffering and doctrine.*"—*Bible*.

REBUKE (of which the origin is very doubtful as to its root idea, though the word appears in the Norman French *rebuquer*) indicates a certain manner in reproving, such as straightforwardness, outspokenness, and moral courage, especially where an inferior goes out of his way to rebuke a superior, as not being afraid to do so. REPROACH (Fr. *reprocher, proche*, Lat. *proprie*, near) differs from the foregoing in its whole tone and spirit. Its etymological force is to bring near or home. It is between persons related to each other by some kind of tie, and the subject of the reproach is commonly an assumed violation of moral obligation which has redounded to the shame or injury of the reproacher or the reproached, as a son reproaches his father with his own want of education, or to some moral harm which has redounded elsewhere, as I reproach a person with his neglect of his duties. In reproach there is a feeling of in-

dignation and protest commonly roused in the mind against the object of the reproach.

"The Chevalier Bayard, distinguished among his contemporaries by the designation of the knight without fear and without reproach."—*Robertson*.

To REPRIMAND (Fr. *reprimander*) is the official censure of a superior in rank, an admonition which commonly carries with it the character of a minor penalty. Reprimand is based upon natural or social rights, as that of a father over his children. The magistrate censures those who are wanting in respect to him. The preceptor reprimands his inattentive pupil. Reprimand is a kind of home censure. As censure implies a right of punishing, so reprimand a right of stopping or repressing, according to its derivation from the Latin *reprimere*, to repress. We blame motives; we commonly censure and reprimand only conduct and external actions.

"And every now and then he (Sir Roger) inquires how such an one's wife, or mother, or son, or father, do, whom he does not see at church; which is understood as a secret reprimand to the person that is absent."—*Spectator*.

To UPBRAID and to *chide* have much in common. The former (A. S. *upgebredan*) denotes the casting back of his offence upon the accused without the earnestness of reproach, but with fluency and pungency of speech, as if the object were to make the person *feel* his offence.

"He discourages the weak and weakens the hands of the strong, and by *upbraiding* their weariness tempts them to turn it into rashness or despair."—*Bishop Taylor*.

To CHIDE (A. S. *cidan*, *chidan*) is a minor upbraiding, a finding fault in a clamorous and angry manner. An appeal to the imperfect reason and the childish fears of the young seems to be manifested in the chiding of their children by impatient mothers.

"As children should be very seldom corrected by blows, so I think frequent, and especially passionate *chiding*, of almost as ill consequence. It lessens the authority of the parents and the respect of the child."—*Locke*.

ANIMADVERT (Lat. *animus advertare*, to turn the attention), though it might, with equal etymological propriety, have been used as a favourable, is restricted to an unfavourable sense. It is to notice unfavourably, and so of necessity applies not to grave offences of morals but to matters of taste, manners, criticisms, or measures generally. It involves, together with the censure, an unfolding of the grounds of it in detail.

"If the two Houses of Parliament, or either of them, had assuredly a right to *animadvert* on the King or each other, or if the King had a right to *animadvert* on either of the Houses, that branch of the legislature so subject to *animadversion* would instantly cease to be part of the supreme power."—*Blackstone*.

BLAMELESS. See IRREPROACHABLE.

BLAND. See GENTLE.

BLAST. See WIND.

BLAZE. See FIRE.

BLEMISH. DEFECT. FLAW. FAULT.

BLEMISH (Old Fr. *blemir*, *blesmir*, connected with *bleme*, *blesme*, pale, wan) is a partial or local defect, injury, or contrariety, which affects the completeness of the external aspect of a thing, as a spot of white on a horse otherwise entirely black. So, metaphorically, a blemish in character refers to reputation, or the view taken of it by others. The term blemish, as it is directly expressive of fault or defect, so is indirectly expressive of the contrary. The blemish is small and slight in itself, and is unsightly by reason of the much which is otherwise.

"They have possessed other beauties, which were conformable to just criticism; and the force of these beauties has been able to overpower censure, and give the mind a satisfaction superior to the disgust arising from the blemishes."—*Hume*.

DEFECT (Lat. *deficere*, to fail) is an actual absence of what is required to constitute completeness of any kind, whether of appearance, substance, or quality; as a defect in the organization of an animal, a defect of vision,

a defect in a work of art. A **FAULT** (Fr. *faute*, Lat. *falsus*, from *fallere*, to deceive or fail) is such a defect as is referred to human agency, as a fault of perspective in a painting; while the fading of a colour would be a blemish; and anything which deteriorated it, whether as a work of art or an article of ornamental furniture, would be a defect. Faults, however, are of commission as well as of omission. What is wanting is defective, what is ill-done is faulty; the one is negative, the other positive. Fault includes in its idea a relation to the doer or maker; defect expresses something imperfect in the thing, without relation to the maker. Human imperfections occasion defects. Human weaknesses, temptations, errors cause faults. That is faulty which has what it ought not to have; that is defective which has not what it ought to have. The former requires correction, the latter supply.

"And, after all, the rules of religion and virtue which were drawn up by these philosophers have been very imperfect and defective in many instances."—*Watts*.

"He who is gratified with that which is faulty in works of art is a man of bad taste; and he who is pleased or displeased according to the degree of excellence or faultiness is a man of good taste."—*Beattie*.

The term **FLAW** (of which the derivation is uncertain, but is connected with the A. S. *flöh*, a fragment or piece, and the Swedish *flaga*, a crack) is usually applied to such a defect as affects the substance or body of a thing. So we should not say a flaw in a picture, but a blemish, for the picture has little or no material value, but a flaw in an emerald, because the gem owes its value to the quality of its substance. A flaw in a document is metaphorical, and denotes what is analogous to the disruption of substantial completeness or continuity. The term flaw is used in the sense of imperfection or fault in such phrases as "a flaw in the indictment," and in the following:—

"No! the decree was just, and without flaw;
And He that made had right to make the law."
Cooper.

BLEND. See **CONFOUND**.

BLESSEDNESS. See **HAPPINESS**.

BLESSING. See **HAPPINESS**.

BLIND. See **CLOAK**.

BLISS. See **HAPPINESS**.

BLOODY. SANGUINARY. BLOOD-THIRSTY.

BLOODY is primarily purely physical, and means having blood in great quantities, and unduly, or, more commonly, covered or stained with blood. A bloody coat is a coat stained with blood; bloody deeds involve shedding of blood.

"When this great revolution was attempted in a more regular mode by government, it was opposed by plots and seditious of the people; when by popular efforts, it was repressed as rebellion by the hand of power; and bloody executions (often bloodily returned) marked the whole of its progress through all its stages."—*Burke*.

SANGUINARY (Lat. *sanguis*, blood) is moral, and relates to such characters or acts as tend to produce the shedding of blood, as a sanguinary disposition, a sanguinary tyrant, a sanguinary war.

"Well! one at least is safe. One sheltered here

Has never heard the sanguinary yell
Of cruel man exulting in her woes."

Cooper.

BLOODTHIRSTY is specifically desiring or compassing the effusion of blood, as an animal passion, whether from natural appetite, as in the tiger, or from cruelty or vindictiveness, as the tyrant. The tyrant might be called sanguinary, or, by a coarser and stronger term, bloodthirsty; but the tiger could only be called bloodthirsty, and not sanguinary.

"The Peruvians fought not, like the Mexicans, to glut bloodthirsty divinities with human sacrifices."—*Robertson*.

BLOW. STROKE.

BLOW (Germ. *bleuen*, *bläuen*, to strike) denotes the violent and sudden application of one substance to another; where it is to a sentient being or animal, it expresses a blunt and heavy kind of concussion, as with the hand, the fist, or a club.

If we heard of a blow from a sword, we should take it to mean the back, the pommel, or the flat side, otherwise it would be a stroke or cut. A **STROKE** (verb, to strike, Germ. *streich*, Dutch, *streke*, so connected with streak) is a finer and lighter kind of blow, almost requiring an instrument on purpose. Hence it follows that we very commonly speak of *accidental* blows, hardly ever of accidental strokes, for stroke involves a continuous relative line of movement or force, exercised, even though it be not, as it commonly is, one regulated, by design.

"Nor can it be meant that if a man should actually *strike* us on one cheek we should immediately turn to him the other, and desire the *blow* to be repeated."—*Bishop Porteus*.

BLUNDER. See **ERROR**.

BLUNT. See **COARSE**.

BOAST. **VAUNT.** **GLORY.**

To **BOAST** (Old Eng. *boſt*) is to speak in ostentatious language, with a view to self-praise or self-exaltation. A man vain and mendacious will boast of his valorous deeds; a man of vulgarity besides, will boast of his wealth. Nevertheless, mendacity is not essentially implied in boasting; only the habit of drawing things one way, that is, in the direction of self, is injurious to strict truth-speaking. To boast indicates more of vanity, and vaunt more of pride. To vaunt a thing is simply to bring it (perhaps frequently) before others, as a matter of admiration in oneself. To boast implies mere talking about it, with that tendency to a manifestation of personal pomposity and exaggeration which does not belong, or not in so marked a manner, to vaunt. It may be observed that there is less of falsehood compatible with vaunting than with boasting. It is possible to boast of having done what one never did. We vaunt that which is true in itself, but on which we place an exaggerated value. It is derived from the French *avant*, and that from the Latin *ab* and *ante*, before. To vaunt a thing is to bring it forward to show it off.

"The right honourable gentleman has chosen to come forward with an uncalled-for

declaration; he *boastingly* tells you that he has seen, read, digested, compared everything; and that if he has sinned, he has sinned with his eyes broad open."—*Burke*.

"All others may *vaunt* merely that they have vanquished men, but Sergius may *boast* that he hath conquered and overcome even Fortune herself."—*Holland, Pliny*.

To **GLORY** in a thing commonly denotes an antagonistic view of the admirable in oneself, as if one were determined to vaunt it, whatever estimate others might set upon it, by reason of the high value we set upon it ourselves. It is used of anything which bears characteristically a relation to ourselves, as possessions, reputation, acts.

BOATMAN. **WATERMAN.**

A **BOATMAN** is a general term for one whose trade is connected with the navigation of boats. A **WATERMAN** plies his boat for hire, and is paid for his labour in so doing.

BODILY. See **CORPOREAL**.

BODY. **CORPSE.** **CARCASE.**

BODY (A. S. *bodig*), as taken in the sense of dead body, and **CORPSE** (Lat. *corpus*, a body) are applied to human beings; **CARCASE** (Mod. Gr. *καρκασι*) only to brutes, except in disparagement. Body is used of the organization before as well as after death, and is applicable to brutes as well as men, corpse only to men. Wedgewood identifies the Saxon *bodig* with the German *bottish*, a cask, of which the root is *bot*, a lump, protuberance, the thick part of anything; so that the primary sense of body is the thick part of the living frame, as distinguished from the limbs or lesser divisions, then the whole material frame, as distinguished from the sentient principle by which it is animated. Derivatives of the Modern Greek form of the word for carcase appear in different languages, with the common meaning of a husk, shell, or case, as in the Italian *carcasso*, the core of fruits, *carquois*, a quiver, as well as *carquasse*, a carcase.

"The resurrection of the *body*."—*Apostles' Creed*.

Corpse was further written corps and corse. So Dryden has in the plural—

“The hall was heaped with *corps*.”

“For where the *carcase* is, there will the eagles be gathered together.”—*Bible*.

BOISTEROUS. TURBULENT. TUMULTUOUS.

These terms are applied to human behaviour, with certain differences. The behaviour of an individual may be BOISTEROUS (Old Eng. *boistous*, used by Chaucer of rude words, Icelandic, *bistr*, stormy), or the term may be employed of a number of persons. As such, it denotes violence and rudeness of noise in words and movements. It refers to the external manner, and not to the mind, and may proceed from mental conditions of opposite kinds, as boisterous from indignation, or boisterous in merriment. The boisterous is the result of conflicting, contrariant, and irregular forces, exerted without uniformity or self-control. In boisterous weather the elements show signs of variable commotion.

“On the contrary, he took the fact for granted, and so joined in with the cry, and halloo’d it as *boisterously* as the rest.”—*Sterne*.

TURBULENT (Lat. *turbulentus*, *turba*, tumult, crowd) denotes a disposition not only to disorder, but to insubordination.

“As this innocent way of passing a leisure hour is not only consistent with a great character, but very graceful in it, so there are two sorts of people to whom I would most earnestly recommend it. The first are those who are uneasy out of want of thought, the second are those who are so out of a *turbulence* of spirit.”—*Tatler*.

TUMULTUOUS (*tumultus*) is inclined to make a noise in turbulence or in merriment; but the effect is direct, while that of boisterous is unintended. A boisterous meeting is led into being noisy; a tumultuous meeting is noisy on purpose, and, when difficult to regulate, is turbulent. It is the combination of voices with other sounds in confusion and disorder that constitutes tumult. Turbulent denotes the resistance of the will or passions, tumultuous that they are

confused and conflicting. A solitary person may be turbulent; a crowd is tumultuous.

“The workmen accordingly very seldom derive any advantage from the violence of those *tumultuous* combinations, which generally end in nothing but the punishment and ruin of the ringleaders.”—*Adam Smith*.

BOLD. FEARLESS. BRAVE. COURAGEOUS. INTREPID. UNDAUNTED. VALIANT. GALLANT. HEROIC. DARING.

BOLD (A. S. *bald*, *beald*, *bold*) refers rather to the readiness to meet danger, than to the conduct under its immediate circumstances. So a man’s conduct in the lists may be not in unison with the boldness with which he entered them. FEARLESS denotes a negative state of mind—the absence of fear. This may be either from courage in the presence of danger, or from boldness in being ready to encounter it, or from a belief that no ground exists for apprehension. Boldness expresses a *quality*, fearlessness a *mode* of conduct under specific circumstances.

“Ask an Englishman, however, whether he is afraid of death; and he *boldly* answers in the negative; but observe his behaviour in circumstances of approaching sickness, and you will find his actions give his assertions the lie.”—*Goldsmith*.

“This *fearlessness* of temper depends upon natural constitution as much as any quality we can possess; for where the animal system is strong and robust it is easily acquired, but when the nerves are weak and extremely sensible, they fall presently into tremors that throw the mind off the hinges, and cast a confusion over her.”—*Search, Light of Nature*.

BRAVE (Fr. *brave*) applies to such dangers as come from living and active opponents, whose power is to be dreaded, implying a sustained energy of soul. The man who plunges into the sea off a high rock is bold, but not brave. The man who takes a noxious animal in his hand is fearless. The true knight, the good soldier, the spirited lion-hunter, are brave—Pope would add, he who meets death as he ought—

“Who combats *bravely* is not therefore *brave*,
He dreads a death-bed like the meanest
slave.”

To the COURAGEOUS man (Fr. *courage*) belongs that active fortitude which is shown against every sort of danger. When courage is sustained, and has borne the test of repeated trials, it may be termed INTREPIDITY (Lat. *in*, not, and *trepidus*, trepid). As the courage which is constant is intrepidity, so that which is spirited and adventurous is GALLANTRY (Fr. *galant*).

"*Courage*," says Hobbes, "in a large signification, is the absence of fear in the presence of any evil whatsoever; but in a strict and more common meaning, it is contempt of wounds and death, when they oppose a man on his way to his end."

"That quality (valour), which signifies no more than an *intrepid* courage, may be separated from many others which are good, and accompanied with many which are ill."
—Dryden.

"As a friend to the House of Brunswick, I cannot but rejoice in the personal safety, and in the personal *gallantry* too, of so distinguished a branch of it (the Duke of York)."
—*Anecdotes of Bishop Watson*.

VALIANT (Fr. *vaillant*) is restricted to the courage of a soldier in war or combat, and is not so well applicable to persons collectively, now that soldiers act commonly under strict orders, except on extraordinary occasions, when they may act singly. The terms brave and gallant have almost supplanted the term valiant, which rather reminds us of the knights of old.

"Who would not fight *valiantly* when he fights in the eye of his prince?"—*Bishop Hall*.

UNDAUNTED (*un*, not, and the Fr. *dompter*, Lat. *domitare*, to tame or subdue) is both applicable to persons directly, as expressive of a quality, and is used of acts, or as an epithet of courage and bravery. Undaunted courage is that which sustained itself in spite of many successive terrors and perils, and so is equivalent to intrepidity.

"He proceeded on in the performance of all his duty, and prosecution of his great designs, with *undaunted* courage, with unwearied industry, with undisturbed tranquillity and satisfaction of mind."—*Barrow*.

The DARING court that which the bold are ready to meet.

"Courage may be virtue where the *daring* is extreme, if the cause be good."—*Hobbes*.

HEROIC (Lat. and Greek *heros*), in conformity with its derivation, leads the mind to the days of the heroes, or the heroic age, and so is tinged with the notion of personal power or prowess, as well as courage. Magnanimity, too, finds its way in, and the heroic character is one who does deeds of valour, not only for himself, or as a soldier in service, but as a representative man, the champion of another or of a race. It is not only in reference to his boldness or bravery as an individual that we speak of Cœsars or of Wallace as a hero.

"No time for lamentation now;

Nor much more cause. Samson hath quit himself

Like Samson, and *heroically* hath finished

A life *heroic*, on his enemies

Fully revenged." *Milton*.

BOLDNESS. ASSURANCE. AUDACITY. HARDIHOOD. EFFRONTERY. IMPUDENCE. SHAMELESSNESS.

In addition to the force of bold as a synonym of courageous, bold and boldness have a less pronounced meaning, as referring to manner and character under ordinary circumstances. In this way, BOLDNESS is used to denote the absence of shyness and the absence of timidity. According as the term expresses one or the other of these in a becoming or unbecoming degree, boldness is, or is not, a commendable quality. Such boldness as seems to disregard what others regard is not good. Hence, a bold manner in women and young persons is unbecoming. On the other hand, it is a good thing to speak the truth with boldness, as if not to be frightened out of it, or to show boldness in the presence of superiors, if it be with modesty, or in the presence of the proud, as not to be daunted out of one's self-respect.

"In every state of life we may, with an humble *boldness*, address ourselves to Him as to our Father which is in heaven."—*Beveridge*.

ASSURANCE (*sur*, *securus*, sure) is that kind of boldness which betokens confidence in oneself, one's powers, or one's cause. When rightly exercised,

and in right degree, it is self-possession.

"On informing him of our difficulties, and asking whether we might venture across the plain, he bid us, like Caesar, with an air of assurance, follow him and fear nothing."—*Gilpin's Tour*.

When otherwise, it is IMPUDENCE, or SHAMELESSNESS. These last are, in fact, correspondent words in different forms—*impudentia* (*in*, not, and *prudens*, modest) being the same as the Saxon word shamelessness. But impudence is commonly used to denote a jaunty disrespect, which, however far removed from a virtue, is yet compatible with innocence. *Shamelessness*, on the other hand, commonly denotes an absence of shame where a feeling of shame is due. A high-spirited boy may be occasionally impudent; a profligate woman is often shameless. AUDACITY (*audax*, bold) and HARDIHOOD, which means much the same (hardy being an old Saxon word for bold), denote, the one the excessive tendency to venture, the other the undue capacity to endure. It is a proof of audacity to venture to an entertainment uninvited, and of hardihood to endure with apparent unconsciousness the astonished looks of the host and hostess. EFFRONTERY (*ex*, forth, and *frons*, the forehead) is very like impudence, but it is a step beyond it. It is the exhibition of self under circumstances peculiarly calling for the contrary, as, for instance, the asking a favour of a person whom you have maligned or injured, or behaving to a superior with the manner of an equal. In effrontery there is implied some degree of insult, which, however, arises not merely from the demeanour, but from the circumstances of the case and the relation of the parties.

"Audacity and confidence doth in civil business so great effects, as a man may reasonably doubt that besides the very daring and earnestness, and persisting and importunity, there should be some secret binding and stooping of other men's spirits to such persons."—*Bacon*.

"Nor should it be forgotten that he was the first who, in this dialogue, had the hardihood to displace Jonson from the

eminence to which, by the unanimous voice of Dryden's contemporaries, he had most unjustly been elevated, and to set Shakespeare far above him."—*Malone, Life of Dryden*.

"Can any one reflect for a moment on all those claims of debt, which the minister exhausts himself in contrivances to augment with new usuries, without lifting up his hands and eyes with astonishment at the *impudence* both of the claim and of the adjudication?"—*Burke*.

"And, how much that love might move us, so much and more that faultiness of her mind removed us; her beauty being balanced by her *shamelessness*."—*Sidney's Arcadia*.

"Vice is never so *shameless* as when it pretends to public spirit. Yet this *effrontery* is so common that it scandalizes nobody."—*Bishop Hurd*.

BOMBASTIC. See TURGID.

BONDAGE. See CAPTIVITY.

BOOTY. See PILLAGE.

BORDER. BOUNDARY. BOUND. FRONTIER. CONFINE. PRECINCT. LIMIT. PURLIEU.

BORDER (in French *bord* and *bordure*) is the outer edge of land which runs along that part of a territory which lies adjacent to another. It is applied to tracts of size and importance, as the "Border wars" of England and Scotland. Rhetorically, "Borders," in the plural, is used for the land itself.

"It is most advisable, when we are on the borders of death, to provide for that state which lieth just beyond it."—*Barrow*.

BOUNDARY (Old Fr. *bunde*, borne) is the object on any one side which indicates the BOUND or extreme extent in circuit. We speak of the bounds of smaller districts, as of parishes or estates; but we use the verb bound instead of border in speaking of large tracts of country and their geographical position, as France is bounded, not bordered on the east. Bound has a more restrictive force than boundary, which is more purely topographical.

"As in geometry, of all lines or surfaces contained within the same bounds the straight line and the plane surface are the shortest, so it is also in morality, by the right line of justice, from the plain ground of virtue, a man soonest will arrive to any well-chosen end."—*Barrow*.

"The world was ne'er designed for thee;
You're like a passenger below,
That stays perhaps a night or so,
But still his native country lies
Beyond the bound'ries of the skies."

Cotton.

The **FRONTIER** is a bound or boundary line of one side only, which is regarded as a front opposed to another front. It must be observed, however, that, while boundary may be an imaginary or geographical line, frontier is a slip of actual country, as in the phrase "towns on the frontier." It is a term of military significance. It may be remarked that, in speaking of entering a country at a given point, the term is often incorrectly used in the plural: "we crossed the frontiers," instead of the frontier.

"Frontier experience."—W. Irving.

CONFINES (Lat. *con*, together, and *finis*, an end or limit) is most commonly used of a point upon a line separating two territories, as, "the two kings met upon the confines of the two kingdoms." Confines are confining or comprising lines.

"The miraculous birth, life, death, resurrection, and ascension of our Lord Jesus Christ were all events which came to pass within the confines of Judæa."—Locke.

PRECINCT (*præ*, and *cingere*, to gird) is used even more loosely than confines; for, as confines is sometimes used to denote any enclosed space, so **PRECINCTS** has well-nigh lost the force of exact circumscription, and denotes little more than vicinity, the mind not resting upon any precise boundary, nor, perhaps, knowing it. "He lived within the precincts of the cathedral," that is, near it, on ground belonging to it, and in some way known as such.

"The common vice of these castle-builders is to draw everything within its *precincts* which they fancy may contribute to its defence or embellishment."—Warburton.

The vagueness of precincts becomes yet more vague in **PURLIEUS** (Fr. *pourlieu*), originally the outer parts of forest land, which, being separated from it, were made free of forest laws; hence, the outer parts and undefined environs of any place of importance.

"If deer come out of the forest into the *purlieu*, the purlieu man may hunt and kill him, provided he does it fairly and without forestalling."—Blackstone.

LIMIT (Lat. *limes*, *limitis*) has a restrictive force. The limits are those which part it off, so that you may not pass them without transgression or transgression.

"Nature now, as fertile as of old, hath in her effects determinate *limits* of quantity."—Drayton.

BORE. See **PENETRATE**.

BOUND. See **BORDER** and **CIRCUMSCRIBE**.

BOUNDARY. See **BORDER**.

BOUNDLESS. UNBOUNDED. UNLIMITED. INFINITE.

The second and third stand in analogy to the first and last. The **UNBOUNDED** and the **UNLIMITED** are those things which have no bounds or limits *in fact*; the **BOUNDLESS** and the **INFINITE** (Lat. *infinitus*, *in*, not, and *finis*, an end) are those which have none in nature or possibility or our conception or vision. Nevertheless, that which is boundless in nature may be regarded as unbounded in fact, and the infinite in nature as unlimited in fact (*in*, not, and *limes*, a limit).

"Is there a temple of the Deity
Except earth, sea, and air, yon azure
pole;
And chief his holiest shrine the virtuous
soul?
Where'er the eye can pierce, the feet can
move,
This wide, this boundless universe is Jove."
Lyttelton, *Cato's Speech*.

"To thee, immortal maid, from this blessed
hour,
O'er time and fame I give unbounded
power.
Thou from oblivion shalt the hero save,
Shalt raise, reverse, immortalize the brave."
Congreve.

"Some of them told us that the power of the king is *unlimited*, and that the life and property of the subject is at his disposal."—Cook's *Voyages*.

"Infinite knowledge is the foundation of all,
Infinite goodness is the author and mover
 of all,
Infinite wisdom is the contriver and
 director of all,
 And *infinite* power executes all."

Sharp.

BOUNTEOUS. BOUNTIFUL. *See*
 BENEFICENT.

BRACE. COUPLE.

TO BRACE (Fr. *bras*, an arm, Lat. *brachium*) is to bind for the purpose of giving additional strength. TO COUPLE (Lat. *copulare*) is to bind or tie in any way for the purpose of union.

"And ever at hand a drum is ready *braced*."
 —Shakespeare.

"Some independent ideas, of no alliance to one another, are by education, custom, and the constant din of their party, so *coupled* in their minds that they always appear there together."—Locke.

BRACE. COUPLE. PAIR.

A PAIR (Lat. *par*, equal) must have some similarity of nature, which is the cause of its being so naturally, or the occasion of its being made so. A COUPLE requires the same, but is more promiscuous; *any two* of such things constituting a couple, if they are brought into union; while pair often denotes two which are such that the one is the complement of the other: a couple of eggs, but a pair of gloves. BRACE (*see verb*) is used of those things in which it is requisite to their completeness that they should be two in number. It is never applied seriously to persons. It is a technical term among sportsmen.

"The king, who was then at Newmarket, heard of it, and was pleased merrily and graciously to say he could not be there himself, but would send them a *brace* of bricks."
 —Spectator.

"Scarce any *couple* come together but their nuptials are declared in the newspaper with encomiums on each party."—Johnson.

The term pair was in Old English not restricted to two things, but was applicable to many of equal or like sort; the term pair being of the same meaning as the present peer, but ap-

plicable to things as well as persons. So a "paire of cards" for a pack.

"There Baucis and Philemon liv'd, and there
 Had liv'd long married, and a happy
pair."
 Dryden, Ovid.

BRAVE. *See* BOLD.

BRAVE, *v.* *See* CHALLENGE.

BRAWNY. *See* STOUT.

BREACH. BREAK. GAP. CHASM.

BREACH and BREAK are connected. Break is used for any cessation of continuity, breach only when it is a disruption caused by violence. In deciphering imperfect manuscripts we frequently come upon breaks. The artillery may make a breach in the fortifications; or, figuratively, an untoward circumstance producing misunderstanding may make a breach in an old friendship.

"For he that openeth the waters but a little, knoweth not how great a *breach* they will make at length."—Spelman.

"Considering probably how much Homer had been disfigured by the arbitrary compilers of his works, Virgil, by his will, obliged Tucca and Varrus to add nothing, nor so much as fill up the *breaks* he had left in his poem."
 Walsh.

GAP (connected with gape) is the effect of discontinuity regarded simply in itself, and without reference to its nature or its cause, which may have been violence or not. I see a gap in a hedge. The gardener neglected to plant young slips in that part. I see another. It has been caused by the inroads of cattle.

"Then follows an immense *gap*, in which undoubtedly some changes were made by time; and we hear little more of them (the Germans) until we find them Christians, and makers of written laws."—Burke.

A CHASM (Gr. *χαλω*) is a yawning void not easily filled, and leaving a sense of this. A chasm in our enjoyments is a large deduction which leaves a sense of hopeless privation.

"The whole *chasm* in nature from a plant to a man is filled up with diverse kinds of creatures."—Addison.

BREAK. *See* BREACH.

BREAK. REND. TEAR. BURST.
CRACK. SPLIT.

These words all express a greater or less disruption of continuity; the difference depends upon the force employed, and the substance it is employed upon.

To BREAK (Sax. *brecan*) implies the entire separation of parts formerly continuous; the degree of force may be great or very slight, as in the cases of a thick stick or a piece of glass.

"He *break* my darts or hurt my power!"
Prior.

The particles need to be hard and brittle. When they are soft, tough, and lentous, they can only be RENT (Sax. *hrendan*, to rend), as the beast of prey rends the flesh of his victim. From the nature of the case, that force which in breaking is momentary, in rending is continuous.

"Lest they turn again and *rend* you."—
Bible.

When the particles are lentous and pliant without being tough, no such force is needed, and the substance is TORN (Sax. *teran*), as a piece of paper is torn. TEAR has a peculiar sense of its own, in which it signifies merely violently to separate.

"They are always careful to join the small pieces lengthwise, which makes it impossible to *tear* the cloth in any direction but one."—
Cook's *Voyages*.

To BURST (Sax. *beorstan*, *berstan*, *byrstan*) is to break suddenly, violently, and with more or less of explosion, as the result of a force operating outwards; as when the steam bursts the caldron, or the giant bursts his bonds. Bursting is the final point of excessive tension, the force proceeding from an internal point.

"Atoms and systems into ruin hurl'd,
And now a bubble *bursts* and now a world."
Pope.

To CRACK (Fr. *craker*) and to SPLIT (Danish *splitten*) denote longitudinal or transverse forms of partial breakage, where a discontinuity is produced, not extending through the whole substance, or not

so complete as to produce separation of parts. Anything more than this is *breaking open*; the difference between cracking and splitting being that the operation of splitting follows some natural or pre-existent cleavage of the material, and cracking not. To crack a nut is not to break it sufficiently to take out the kernel; if the nut is broken into two or more pieces in the act, this is over and above the cracking.

"Well, let all pass and trust Him who nor
cracks
The bruised reed nor quencheth smoking
flax."
Donne.

"With sounding axes to the grove they go,
Fell, *split*, and lay the fuel in a row."
Dryden.

BREAKER. See WAVE.

BREED. ENGENDER. PROCREATE.
PROPAGATE.

BREED (A. S. *bredan*, to nourish or cherish) is employed in a general way of anything which tends to bring animals into life, and so is employed not only directly of the procreation of the parents, but of any influence which tends to develop animal life, and even of the keeping of animals for the purpose of their progeny. To ENGENDER (Fr. *engendrer*, Lat. *gignere*, to beget) is to beget; to PROCREATE (*procreare*) is to produce offspring after the manner of *either* parent. The term is not a familiar one. To PROPAGATE (Lat. *propagare*, *propago*, a layer) is used of plants as well as of animals, and means to treat for the purpose of extending or multiplying the kind. Breed and engender are often employed metaphorically, the latter almost exclusively so, in the sense of producing, as to breed ill-feeling, to engender strife, and the like; where the result is seldom or never favourable or desirable. Propagate is, in like manner, employed in the sense of giving currency, as to propagate doctrines, a belief, a rumour, and the like. In their secondary applications we use the term breed to express the gradual development of effects by causes, and engender to express the simple relation of the one to the other, without

reference to immediate or deferred production. In this sense the terms are purely moral, not physical or mechanical.

"In brief, must it not follow necessarily, that the earth, which is the mother and breeder of men, of living creatures and of all plants, shall perish and be wholly extinct?"—*Holland, Plutarch.*

"True it is that we have seen better days,
And have with holy bell been knoll'd to church,
And sat at good men's feasts, and wip'd our eyes
Of drops that sacred pity had engendered."
Shakespeare.

"Poor and low-pitched desires, if they do but mix with those other heavenly intentions that draw a man to this study, it is justly expected that they should bring forth a base-born issue of divinity; like that of those imperfect and putrid creatures that receive a crawling life from two most unlike *procreants*, the sun and mud."—*Milton.*

"He (Pythagoras) was the chief propagator of that doctrine amongst the Greeks concerning three hypostases in the Deity."—*Cudworth.*

BREEDING. See EDUCATION.

BREEZE. See WIND.

BRIBE. See SUBORN.

BRIEF. See SHORT.

BRIGHT. CLEAR. LUCID. LUMINOUS. VIVID. SPLENDID. BRILLIANT. LUSTROUS.

Of these, BRIGHT (*Sax. bryht*, with many other forms) is used in the greatest variety of meanings, signifying shedding light, transmitting light, reflecting light; and so metaphorically expresses many ideas analogous to the several properties or effects of light, as vivid, lucid, clever, happy, and so on. But, as is usual, the most widely generic synonym is the least forcible. So brightness may exist in a low degree. Almost any object which is not dull is more or less bright.

"However, this was only a transient cloud; they were hid but a moment, and their constellation blazed out with greater brightness and a far more vigorous influence, some time after it was blown over."—*Burke.*

CLEAR (*Lat. clarus*) denotes unobstructed brightness, as when the stars shine clearly, that is, without clouds or haze. A clear style of speaking is one in which the meaning is not obscured by anything which may have that tendency. Clear water is that through which the rays of light pass freely and unobstructedly. This appears in the use of the term in the sense of without obstruction, as to stand clear of anything, that is, to keep away from it.

"Then shalt thou see clearly to take out the mote that is in thy brother's eye."—*Bible.*

LUCID (*lucidus, lux, light*) is not used in a physical sense, except in poetry or poetical expressions, but of speech and exposition, which are said to be lucid, that is, clear, distinct, intelligible, and in the phrase, lucid interval, that is, serene and undisturbed by insanity.

"Full to the margin flowed the lucid wave."
—*Fawkes' Theocritus.*

LUMINOUS (*Lat. lumen*) is employed of those bodies which emit light, as distinguished from those which merely transmit or reflect it. As used of style, luminous is an advance upon lucid. A lucid speech is one of clearness in diction; a luminous speech is one which is, as it were, lighted up by graces and illustrations calculated to give it especial clearness and effect besides.

"Notwithstanding the numerous objections which have been made to the validity of his reasonings, none of his critics has refused him the praise of the most luminous perspicuity."—*Stewart.*

VIVID (*Lat. vividus, from vivere, to live*) is shining with a special, and, as it were, living brightness, and indicates the profound harmony which subsists between life and light, no less than between darkness and death. Metaphorically, a vivid imagination is one which invests readily with reality and life. As illustrating the force of vivid, we may observe that unpolished metals, as not reflecting light, are said to be "dead." Vivid is a term of relation or degree. It denotes energetic conspicuousness in objects

which, under other circumstances, are less distinctly visible or bright. A vivid light is contrasted with an obscure glimmer.

"A variety of ideas afford us no notion of succession, unless we perceive one come before the other; nor can it be imagined that their degrees of *vividness* or faintness will do the job."—*Search, Light of Nature.*

SPLENDID (Lat. *splendere, splendidus*) denotes the combination of grandeur with brightness, as a splendid sun or sunset, a splendid ceremony, a splendid orator.

"We see through all this *splendid* obscurity that something grand is approaching. The several shades of darkness by degrees give way. Day comes on more and more, till at length the sun rises in all its glory, and opening into its fullest *splendour*, surrounds the earth from one end of it to the other."—*Gilpin.*

BRILLIANT (Fr. *briller*, to shine) is shining with a sparkling brightness. In brilliancy there is not only great inherent or reflected light, but the light shines with a changeful and varied play. So, metaphorically, brilliant wit.

"There is an appearance of *brilliancy* in the pleasures of high life which naturally dazzles the young."—*Craig.*

LUSTROUS (*lustrare*, from *lux*, light) is a forcible word conveying the notion of mingled light and brightness. The term is not the less forcible for being somewhat antiquated, and might well be revived.

"For the more *lustrous* the imagination is, it filleth and fixeth the better."—*Bacon.*

BRILLIANT. See **BRIGHT.**

BRIM. BORDER. EDGE. MARGIN. BRINK. VERGE. RIM.

BRIM (A. S. *brymme, bremme*) is the uppermost edge of any vessel or hollow space, containing, or fitted to contain, fluid, as the brim of a cup or a river, and so differs from **BRINK** (Dan. and Sco. *brink*, declivity), which may or may not imply a space filled with fluid, as the brink of the goblet and the brink of the grave or a precipice. A brink is, for this reason, not necessarily of a circular form, or approaching to it, which is ordinarily the case with brim, for where we

speak of the brim of a river, it is rather of its *brink*, regarded analogously to the brim of a vessel, and so relatively to its capacity of holding water. It would seem that we use the word brink of hollow vessels in relation to their *structure*, brim to their *use*. The brink of the tankard is decorated with flowers. The goblet is filled to the brim.

"How often has public calamity been arrested on the very *brink* of ruin by the energy of a single man!"—*Burke.*

So characteristic is the use of brim, as associated with the idea of fulness, that Dryden employs the verb to brim, meaning to fill:—

"This said, a double wreath Evander twin'd,
And poplars black and white his temples bind,
Then *brims* his ample bowl."

BORDER (Fr. *bord* and *bordure*), where the word is used to mean more than simply edge, is a finished and extended edge, so constituting a strip or stripe. It is, however, extended inwards, and may be *occupied*, so differing from **MARGIN** (Lat. *margo*), which is an edge extended outwards and unoccupied. The work commonly finishes *with* the border and *before* the margin. The **EDGE** (A. S. *ecg*) is the sharp termination of any substance superficially, as the edge of a sword. The **RIM** (A. S. *rima, reoma*, edge, lip) is an unextended brim, as the brim is an extended rim. So we speak of the rim of a cup, or the brim, when we regard it as extended by the thickness of the material of which it is composed; of the brim of a hat, as being more than an edge or rim; and of the brim, not rim, of a river, as being extended into the fields adjacent. **VERGE** (Lat. *vergere*, to tend) is the extreme border of anything, regarded in the light of a *termination* to an extended surface, and a line of arrival to one who has traversed it. The idea of border in English varies, as it represents the sense of the French *bord* or *bordure*; in the former it is an edge or confine, in the latter it is an *edging*, an expanded or artificial edge, as the borders of an ornamental garden, or a piece of tapestry.

"They make broad their phylacteries, and enlarge the borders of their garments."—*Bible.*

"I should have thought it superfluous, had it been easier to me than it was, to have interrupted my text, or crowded my *margin* with reference to every author whose sentiments I have made use of."—*Paley.*

"Who escaped the *edge* of the sword."—*Bible.*

"Struck through the belly's *rim*, the warrior lies
Supine, and shades eternal veil his eyes."
Pope.

This is what anatomists call the peritonæum.

"The *verge* of the king in this respect extends for twelve miles round the king's palace of residence."—*Blackstone.*

Verge and margin are, in some sense, opposed. The verge is the boundary which limits movement; the margin is the space whither movement, action, or work does not extend. This appears especially in the secondary uses of the words. We speak of the verge of possibility, and of leaving a margin of discretion.

BRING. FETCH. CARRY. BEAR.
CONVEY. TRANSPORT.

BRING is the Saxon *bringan*, FETCH, the Saxon *fetian*, and CARRY is the Old French *carier*, and connected with a large tribe of words, as car, chariot, cargo, charge, &c.

The idea common to these three words is transportation from one place to another. They differ in some points of mode and direction of such transportation. First, as to the mode; bring is used in more than a physical sense. I bring a basket, and I bring good or bad news. Again, fetch does not necessitate literal transportation. I fetch a loaf from the baker's, but I also fetch a boy who will run an errand for my friend. Nor, again, would carry, which, like bring, is applicable to what is not material, as to carry tidings, be employed physically of any small and very *light* object. I carry a heavy bag, and even an umbrella, but I should not carry a pin to some one who wanted it upstairs, but simply take

it. Secondly, as to direction. Bring denotes motion towards, carry motion from, and fetch motion, first from and then towards, while CONVEY (*convehere*) and TRANSPORT (*transportare*), refer to *any* two points. To BEAR (Sax. *beran*) is simply to have the weight of something upon oneself, whether voluntarily or involuntarily placed. It does not necessarily imply motion, which is always implied in carry. So, Atlas bore, but did not carry, the world on his shoulders. Convey and transport both imply, more or less distinctly, some route or destination for the carriage, and differ, in that convey applies to lighter objects, even to things not substantial, as to convey a message. While transport denotes matters of some substantial weight, as artillery, merchandise, and the like. The notion of an intermediate space between two points is expressed in the word transport, the notion of a point of destination in convey.

"What appeared to me wonderful was that none of the ants came home without *bringing* something."—*Addison.*

"Those early wise men who *fetched* their philosophy from Egypt."—*Warburton.*

"No one neglective was
Of Hector's safety; all their shields they
couched about him close,
Rais'd him from earth, and giving him in
their kind arms repose
From off the labour, *carried* him to his
rich chariot,
And bore him mourning towards Troy."
Chapman's Homer.

"His lines are a description of the sun in eclipse, which I know nothing more like than a brave man in sorrow; who *bears* it as he should do, without imploring the pity of his friends, or being dejected with the contempt of his enemies."—*Tatler.*

"Had it been so, we should naturally have betaken ourselves to prayer, and breathed out our desires in that form wherein they are most properly *conveyed*."—*Bishop Atterbury.*

"Their canoe, which was a small double one, just large enough to *transport* the whole family from place to place, lay in a small creek near the huts."—*Cook's Voyages.*

BRINK. See BRIM.

BRISK. See ALERTNESS.

BRITTLE. FRAGILE. FRAIL.

BRITTLE (Sax. *bryttan*, *breatan*, to break) is easily broken from the nature of the texture, as glass. FRAGILE, though etymologically correspondent (being the Lat. *fragilis*, easily broken, from *frango*, to break) is more widely employed of things which are susceptible of injury or destruction, though this be brought about in other ways than literal breakage. Anything which is little calculated to bear the lapse of time, or the rough touch, is fragile. So the body of man may well be called fragile, though not brittle. FRAIL, which is only another form of fragile, is nevertheless differently applied. It is employed of the susceptibility to deterioration of beauty or moral purity. The flower, fresh and beautiful, is yet frail; and man's virtue at the best is beset with frailties.

"For no man takes or keeps a vow
But just as he sees others do.
Nor are they obliged to be so brittle
As not to yield and bow a little."

Hudibras.

"Of bodies some are *fragile*, and some are tough and not *fragile*, and in the breaking some *fragile* bodies break out where the force is, some shatter and fly in many pieces. Of *fragility* the cause is an impotency to be extended, and therefore stone is more *fragile* than metal."—*Bacon.*

"How much more is it necessary that God, who has the tenderest concern for all His creatures, and who is infinitely far from being subject to such passions and variableness as *frail* men are, should desire to be imitated by His creatures in those perfections which are the foundation of His own unchangeable happiness!"—*Clarke.*

BROAD. WIDE. LARGE. THICK.

BROAD (A. S. *brád*), though used often of extension laterally, in which case it is identical with wide, is also used of that which is extensive every way, as the "broad daylight," "broad acres," or, metaphorically, a broad and liberal view, a broad conversation, meaning such as assumes too much license.

"Whenever she (the mole) comes up into broad day, she might be in danger of being taken, unless she were thus affected by a

light striking upon her eye, and immediately warning her to bury herself in her proper element."—*Spectator.*

WIDE (A. S. *wid*) denotes either lateral space, or extension generally; a wide road is an illustration of the latter, a wide doorway of the former. Metaphorically, it means beside the right line or aim, as "wide of the mark."

"We passed Selinus and the palmy land,
And *widely* shun the Libyan strand,
Unsafe for secret rocks and moving sand."
Dryden's Virgil.

LARGE (Fr. *large*) is broad with a stricter reference to limits, capacity, and proportion, and is therefore less vague a word than broad. Broad and wide describe merely superficial extent or capacity, large includes also that of solidity and capacity, as a large man, a large room.

"Under the shelter of a cavern'd rock,
The *largest* and the best, the pirate band
Seized and prepared a banquet on the strand."
Wilkie.

THICKNESS (A. S. *thicce*) expresses solidity irrespective of the ideas of length and breadth. A short man, a small cheese, a narrow plank, may be all of them *thick*.

"Nor can a thought be conceived to be of such a length, breadth, and *thickness*, as to be hewed and sliced out into many pieces, all which laid together, as so many small chips thereof, would make up again the entireness of that whole thought."—*Cudworth.*

BROIL. See QUARREL.

BROKER. See FACTOR.

BRUISE. SQUEEZE. POUND.
CRUSH.

TO BRUISE (Old Fr. *bruiser*, Mod. Fr. *briser*) is to injure by collision, so as to destroy the *superficial* continuity or integrity of parts.

"This place was therefore called the Lovers' Leap; and whether or no the fright they had been in, or the resolution that could push them to so dreadful a remedy, or the *bruises* which they often received in their fall, banished all the tender sentiments of love, and gave their spirits another turn, those who had taken this leap were observed never to relapse into that passion."—*Spectator.*

TO POUND (A. S. *punian*, to bruise) is to bruise repeatedly till separation of the parts takes place; which, when carried to the extreme, is pulverisation or trituration.

"Thou art a sweet drug, and the more thou art *pounded* the more precious."—*Midleton*.

TO SQUEEZE (A. S. *cvisan*) is to compress a body so that it is acted upon by two or more forces from without.

"Which similitude of them notwithstanding, they would not have to be *squeezed* or pressed hard."—*Cudworth*.

TO CRUSH (Fr. *écraser*) is to squeeze in a violent and abrupt manner, so that the integrity of the parts is destroyed. Injurious violence is not necessarily implied in squeeze, as to squeeze the hand of a friend.

"Scaliger (Exercit. 186) relates that in Gascony, his country, there are spiders of that virulency that if a man treads upon them to *crush* them, the poison will pass through the very soles of his shoes."—*Boyle*.

BRUTAL. See BARBAROUS.

BRUTE. See ANIMAL.

BUD. SPROUT. SHOOT. GERMINATE.

TO BUD (Dan. *bot*) implies the previous existence of a developed plant or tree. It is to put forth the first young protuberance, which is composed of an aggregate of leaves or petals, with the rudiments of flowers.

"Let him (the teacher) with a discreet and gentle hand nip or prune the irregular *shoots*, let him guard and encourage the tender *buddings* of the understanding till they be raised to a blossom, and let him kindly cherish the younger fruits."—*Watts*.

TO SPROUT (A. S. *spreotan*, *sprytan*, *spryttan*) is to come forth in growth generally, and does not presuppose a developed plant, inasmuch as the term is applicable to the first bursting and growth of the seed. As bud represents the ordinary pushing forth of the nascent leaves or flowers, so sprout is commonly used of their unexpected growth, as in parts where they were not looked for, or after certain apparently unfavourable cir-

cumstances, as when the plant having become sickly or apparently dead, sprouts forth afresh, or after the operation of pruning.

"Thus the heartiest gratitude, as I have shown in the proper place concerning the purest love, though bearing the fragrantest flowers, *sprouts* originally from the earthy principle of self-interest."—*Search, Light of Nature*.

TO SHOOT (A. S. *sceotan*, *scotian*) is to make marked and rapid progress in growth, and is applicable to the whole plant, or to any part of it which is above ground.

"In a third sort, the seed of the word takes deeper hold, and makes very strong and promising *shoots*; but thorns and bad weeds, the earlier possessors of the field, rise up and choke it."—*Secker*.

TO GERMINATE (Lat. *germen*) is applied to the commencement of the growth, the first sprouting of the young plant from the seed.

"And for the security of such species as are produced only by seed, it hath endued all seed with a lasting vitality, that so if by reason of excessive cold or drought, or any other accident, it happen not to *germinate* the first year, it will continue its fecundity, I do not say two or three, nor six or seven, but even twenty or thirty years."—*Ray*.

BUFFOON. WIT.

THE WIT (A. S. *witt*, *wit*, *gewitt*, knowledge), as the name is at present employed, denotes not a person of talent and learning, as the "Wits of Queen Anne's time," but one who, in social conversation, shows a combination of ingenuity and humour. In the **BUFFOON** (Fr. *bouffon*, It. *buffare*, to puff, sport) there is little ingenuity, and may be no humour. He amuses by means which are external, antics, grimaces (as puffing out of his cheeks, according to his etymology), postures, and mimicry. He is an artificial fool; and while the wit is essentially a master of common sense, the buffoon produces his effects by violating it. Men laugh *with* the wit and *at* the buffoon.

"The first are those *buffoons* that have a talent of mimicking the speech and behaviour of other persons, and turning all their patrons, friends, and acquaintance into ridicule."—*Tutler*.

The wit, in the full sense of the term, is the possessor of wit, for remarks on which see BURLESQUE.

BUILD. CONSTRUCT. ERECT. FABRICATE.

Of these to BUILD (A. S. *byldan*) is the most comprehensive. In the Old Swedish *byli* is a habitation; the Old English form is *bylle*. It implies both CONSTRUCTION (*construere*, to lay together) and ERECTION (*erigere*, to raise vertically). To build is to put together after the manner of a house, hence it implies careful collocation of parts, a raising of the work upwards, and some degree at least of size. The violin is constructed, the organ is built. Construction may be no more than a careful putting together with skill and care, with a view to a permanent shape, and may be a horizontal work. To ERECT is no more than to set up on end, as the most elaborate cathedral and the simplest flagstaff. To FABRICATE (*faber*, an artificer) more nearly resembles construct, but differs from it as follows. Construct implies an organization or intercollocation of parts, while fabricate allows of their being uncollocated, as to fabricate woollen stuffs. It also admits more largely the idea of invention or design. A man constructs a bridge if he only puts it together as a stonemason. To fabricate it would imply that he was his own architect as well. Hence, the inventive element in the word having gained prominence, to fabricate is sometimes used for to forge, that is, to put together fictitiously, yet with a pretence of authenticity. The term fabricate involves the idea of skill, art, manufacture, and labour.

"Hence it is that the *building* of our Zion rises no faster because our tongues are divided. Happy were the Church of God if we all spake but one language. Whiles we differ we can build nothing but Babel. Difference of tongues caused their Babel to cease, it builds ours."—*Bishop Hall*.

"The necessity of doing something, and the fear of doing something, and the fear of undertaking much, sinks the historian to a genealogist, the philosopher to a journalist of the

weather, and the mathematician to a constructor of dials."—*Rambler*.

"Now there is no building of pillars, no erecting of arches, no blazing of arms that doth more set forth a man's name than doth the increase of children."—*Wilson's Art of Rhetoric*.

"The very idea of the *fabrication* of a new government is enough to fill us with disgust and horror."—*Burke*.

BUILDER. ARCHITECT. MASON.

A BUILDER (see BUILD), as these terms are now employed, is a person who in any way causes the building of houses, whether by manual labour, or the investment or expenditure of capital. It is therefore possible that he may not be such by profession. Commonly the builder holds an intermediate rank between the ARCHITECT (Gr. *ἀρχιτέκτων*, chief artificer), who has to do only with the designs, and the MASON (Fr. *maçon*), who has to do only with the labour.

BUILDING. See EDIFICE.

BULK. SIZE. MAGNITUDE. GREATNESS.

BULK (Iceland. *bulka*, to swell) denotes material magnitude, or the substance of a mass, irrespective of proportion, symmetry, or anything else.

"That which is devoid of *bulk* and *magnitude* is likewise devoid of local motion."—*Cudworth*.

SIZE is abbreviated from *assize* (Old Fr. *assise*, an assembly of judges and their decree). In addition to its abstract sense of magnitude, as the size of a tree, it has a relative and conventional force, by which it denotes classification of magnitudes, as an anchor of the first, second, or third size. I want a pair of gloves a size larger.

"He found here some cockles of so enormous a size that one of them was more than two men could eat; and a great variety of other shell-fish."—*Cook's Voyages*.

MAGNITUDE is the Latin equivalent of the English GREATNESS. Magnitude, however, differs from size in presupposing *some amount* of greatness. So we might speak of the size but not of the magnitude of a minute insect. Magnitude and greatness are

applicable to superficial extent, as bulk is not, and to number, as size is not. So we might say, "Ten is a greater number, or a number of greater magnitude, than two," "a star of the first or second magnitude." Magnitude is to number what size is to quantity, and is capable of relative or conventional application; as a number of small or less magnitude, but we could not say of small greatness.

"We commonly find in the ambitious man a superiority of parts in some measure proportioned to the *magnitude* of his designs."—*Bishop Horsley*.

For greatness is a positive term, denoting the presence of size, number, power, nobility, and the like in a *considerable degree*.

"Our greatness will appear

Then most conspicuous, when *great* things
of small,
Useful of hurtful, prosperous of adverse,
We can create." *Milton*.

BULKY. MASSIVE.

The BULKY (*see* BULK) exhibits size without proportion. The MASSIVE (*Fr. masse*) exhibits size combined with compactness of material, *not* excluding proportion. A big port-manteau is simply bulky; the columns of a Norman cathedral are massive. Some inherent value of the material, either natural or artistic, is implied in massive, none in bulky. The former is depreciative. The latter a term of praise.

"Money is the best measure of the altered value of things in a few years, because its vent is the same, and its quantity alters slowly. But wheat or any other grain cannot serve instead of money, because of its *bulkiness* and too quick change of its quality."—*Locke*.

"The common military sword is a heavy *massive* weapon."—*Bishop Horsley*.

BURDEN. LOAD. WEIGHT.

BURDEN (*A. S. byrhdan*, from the root *beran*, to bear) is something to be borne, and always in a certain manner, and for a certain purpose. It is to be transported to some destination, and is imposed upon living creatures. The LOAD (*A. S. hlād*) is

a certain quantity of material imposed upon man, beast, or carriage. We speak of the load, not the burden, of a waggon, the load or burden of a beast, but more commonly the burden of a man; yet the same thing in the case of a man may be called a load or a burden; the former when regarded as something which he is charged with to transport with responsibility, the latter as something laid heavily upon his shoulders. WEIGHT (*A. S. wíht, gewíht*) refers simply to the pressure of gravitation. It is used in the concrete, as a certain weight, and in the abstract, the weight of a thing, or a thing of great weight. In this way it is used relatively to a standard or degree of weight; and we might speak of the weight of a burden or a load as being great or even slight.

"He had built at his own expense, to prosecute them, a strong handsome ship which was named the *Bark Raleigh*, of two hundred tons *burden*."—*Oldy's Life of Raleigh*.

BURDENSOME. HEAVY. WEIGHTY. PONDEROUS.

BURDENSOME (*see* BURDEN) denotes that which is difficult, and also that which is irksome to carry. A thing of slight specific gravity may be burdensome if we wish to be rid of it. The term burdensome is as often, if not oftener, employed in a secondary or metaphorical, as in the primary and literal sense.

"As exercise becomes tedious and painful when we make use of it only as the means of health; so reading is apt to grow uneasy and *burdensome* when we apply ourselves to it only for our improvement in virtue."—*Tatler*.

HEAVY (connected with *heave*) is that which is relatively or personally weighty (*see* WEIGHT under BURDEN), as weighty is that which is in itself hard to lift. So a thing may be heavy for a child to carry which may not be weighty in itself. The term *heavy* is used in the abstract sense of possessing weight, irrespectively of the amount of it, which appears in expressions involving comparison or degree, as this is not so heavy as the

other; how heavy is it? where none of the others could be used.

"Though philosophy teaches that no element is *heavy* in its own place, yet experience shows that out of its own place it proves exceedingly *burdensome*."—*South*.

PONDEROUS (Lat. *pondus*, a weight) denotes rather what manifests or gives the appearance of being heavy to carry, whether we have anything to do with carrying it or not. The ponderous volume almost deters us by its very appearance from taking it up. When we watch the movements of the elephant we remark upon his ponderous bulk. Like burdensome, weighty is more commonly used in the secondary than in the literal sense. As the burdensome is annoying to bear, so weighty is a term expressive of combined importance and difficulty, as "weighty cares of office," "weighty considerations." Ponderous, on the other hand, is not used but in a material and generally in a somewhat unfavourable sense.

"The cares of empire are great, and the burden which lies upon the shoulders of princes very *weighty*."—*Bishop Atterbury*.

"Vanbrugh, with his *ponderous* and unmeaning masses, overwhelmed architecture in mere masonry."—*Walpole*.

BURIAL. INTERMENT. SEPULTURE. INTOMBMENT.

BURIAL (A. S. *byrigan*, *byrgean*, *byrigean*, to bury) is simply to cover one thing over with others, so as to conceal it from view, as to bury one's face in one's hands. As used in the above connection, the burial of a body is the laying it sufficiently deep in the earth to conceal it from view. We even speak of burial at sea. The two applications occur in the following:—

"I observed, indeed, that the present war had filled the church with many of these uninhabited monuments, which had been erected to the memory of persons whose bodies were perhaps *buried* in the plains of Blenheim, or in the bosom of the ocean."—*Spectator*.

INTERMENT (*in* and *terra*, the earth) is a somewhat politer word for the same thing, meaning any formal ceremonial or decent placing of the body underground. We might say, "buried like a dog," but we should

be more likely to say, "reverently and even sumptuously interred."

"Cromwell's hearse was magnificent, the idol crowned, and (not to mention all other ceremonies which are practised at royal *interments*, and therefore by no means could be omitted here) the vast multitude of spectators made up, as it uses to do, no small part of the spectacle itself."—*Cowley*.

Interment involves the earth or soil, not so burial.

SEPULTURE (Lat. *sepultura*, from *sepelire*, to bury) points rather to the mode of burial, and to the rites connected with it, as to have the "privilege of sepulture," a place of "royal sepulture," and the like.

"The common rites of *sepulture* bestow,
To soothe a father's and a mother's woe.
Let these large gifts procure an urn at least,
And Hector's ashes in his country rest."
Pope.

INTOMBMENT, as its name expresses, is the burying or interring in a tomb (Fr. *tombe*, Late Lat. *tumba*). In its secondary sense it is a metaphor for placing or lying in oblivion.

BURLESQUE. PARODY. SATIRE. TRAVESTY. CARICATURE. SARCASM. COMEDY. IRONY. HUMOUR. WIT.

These are only remotely synonymous. Nevertheless they are here given as such, inasmuch as there is no one which has not the qualities of some one or more of the rest.

BURLESQUE (Fr. *burlesque*, It. *bur-lare*, to ridicule) is a sort of humour. It draws its amusements from incongruous representation of character, and placing persons in situations not proper to their actual positions and circumstances in society. Addison has said that "*Burlesque* is of two kinds. The first represents mean persons in the accoutrements of heroes, the other describes great persons acting and speaking like the basest among the people." **PARODY** (Gr. *παρῳδία* from *παρὰ*, besides, and *ὥδή*, a song), unlike burlesque, is a matter of words only, and does not extend to acts or representations dramatical. It is the humorous adaptation, by alterations here and there of

an author's words, to a subject very different from the original.

"From some fragments of the *Silli*, written by *Timon*, we may find that they were satiric poems full of *parodies*, that is, of verses patched up from great poets, and turned into another sense than their author intended them."—*Dryden's Juvenal*.

TRAVESTY (Fr. *travestir*, Lat. *transvestire*) is analogous to such disguise by dress as shall render absurd. Travesty differs from parody in that parody speaks the meaning put upon the words by the parodist. Travesty makes a thing distort and misrepresent *itself*.

"Old naturalism, thus *travestied* in the garb of new religion, his lordship bestows as his last and most precious legacy on his own dear country."—*Warburton*.

It is the *caricature* of literature; for **CARICATURE** (It. *caricatura*) is an overcharged representation, in which, while the general likeness is preserved sufficiently to bespeak the original, certain peculiarities are developed and drawn in an exaggerated manner.

"From all these hands we have such drafts of mankind as are represented in those burlesque pictures which the Italians call *caricaturas*, where the art consists in preserving, amidst distorted proportions, and aggravated features, some distinguishing likeness of the person, but in such a manner as to transform the most agreeable beauty into the most odious monster."—*Spectator*.

COMEDY (Gr. *κῶμῳδία*) is a kind of dramatic composition and representation of the light and amusing incidents or accidents of common life.

"Whenever Aristotle speaks of *comedy*, we must remember that he speaks of the old or middle *comedy*; which was no other than what we should call farce; and to which his definition of comedy was adapted, *μίμησις φαυλοτέρων*, that is, as he explains himself, an imitation of ridiculous characters."—*Twining's Aristotle, Poetics*.

IRONY (Gr. *ἐρωνεία*) is a mode of censuring by contraries. It ridicules by pretending to admire, and condemns by feigned approval. The modern term irony has widely departed from the original Greek *ἐρωνεία*, which was a term of the Socratic philosophy, and meant an

understatement of truth. The original force, however, is still perceptible in the following:—

"There are mixed in his talk so many pleasant *ironies*, that things which deserve the severest language are made ridiculous instead of odious; and you see everything in the most good-natured aspect it can bear."—*Guardian*.

SATIRE (Lat. *satira*), on the other hand, sets to work in no indirect fashion, but is a clever, lively, and sustained description of the character and acts of persons. It falsifies its character and transgresses its proper limits when it is anything more than subservient to the exposure of what is defective, blameworthy, or vicious in public administration and conduct, or in personal morals.

"Libel and *satire* are promiscuously joined together in the notions of the vulgar; though the satirist and libeller differ as much as the libeller and murderer. In the consideration of human life, the satirist never falls upon persons who are not glaringly faulty, and the libeller upon none but who are conspicuously commendable."—*Tatler*.

SARCASM (Gr. *σαρκασμός*, *σάρξ*, flesh, a biting of the flesh) is that kind of personal allusion which is vented by indignation or spite. It represents the more virulent aspect of satire, and is barely justifiable when grounded on moral indignation; not at all when it issues from personal bitterness or ill-will.

"And when they heard of the resurrection of the dead, some mocked, &c., i.e., disputed *sarcastically* and contumeliously against it, that certainly there was no such matter."—*Hammond*.

Sarcasm is the contemptuous and derisive expression of uncongeniality with the character, conduct, belief, principles, or statements of another.

HUMOUR is, as its name denotes, that species of wit—if it be allowed to be wit at all, which is a vexed question—which proceeds from the humour of a person, and may, to some extent, as wit does not, display itself in *actions* as well as words. **WIT** (Sax. *wit*, *gewitt*) may consist in a single brilliant thought; but humour is continuous and runs in a vein. It is an equable and pleasing flow of wit, en-

livening and amusing without being of necessity brilliant. The essence of wit, in the modern acceptation of the term, consists in the ready and telling appreciation and expression of the agreement and disagreement of things. It comes by nature, as wisdom comes by reflection and experience, and learning by study and labour. Swift drew attention to the distinction between wit and humour, when he said that humour was "a talent not confined to men of wit or learning, for we observe it sometimes among common servants, and the meanest of the people." It may be that wit excites a lively feeling of surprise and gratification, but not a smile or a laugh; this is *always* implied in humour.

"Wit," says Locke, "lies most in the assemblage of ideas, and in putting those together with quickness and variety wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy."

In short, humour seems to lie rather in the presentation to the mind of amusing incongruity or contrast, wit in that of brilliant association and comparison, which, however, will often include contrast. Goldsmith has expressed himself very strongly on the difference. He says—

"Wit raises human nature above its level, humour acts a contrary part, and equally depresses it. To expect exalted humour is a contradiction in terms."

BURNING. ARDENT. FIERY.
HOT. SCORCHING.

HOT (A. S. *hāt*) denotes simply having heat in the physical or any analogous sense of the term heat.

"Moderation may become a fault. To be hot but warm when God commands us to be hot is sinful."—*Feltham*.

BURNING (A. S. *beornan*, with many other kindred forms) denotes exhibiting heat, or in any way or degree affecting by heat. When used morally, hot is applied to the passions, burning to the more active desires; the idea of burning being the continuous feeling or transmission of heat in a lively manner. Fire is hot, but the flame burns. So, "a burning

sense of shame," "a burning indignation," but, "hot anger."

"Cowley, observing the cold regard of his mistress's eyes, and at the same time their power of producing love in him, considers them as burning-glasses made of ice."—*Spectator*.

ARDENT (Lat. *ardere*, to burn) is the Latin equivalent to the English burning, but is not so strong a term, and is applied to inclinations as well as desires, as an ardent hope or ambition, ardent zeal. Ardent is, unlike the others, not used except poetically in any primary or physical sense.

"There was one Felton, of a good family, but of an ardent melancholy temper, who had served under the Duke of Buckingham in the station of lieutenant."—*Hume*.

FIERY is showing itself like fire, that is, tending to project itself upon others. Fiery wrath is that which would consume or injure others if it could. "Fiery indignation" is that which would "devour the adversaries." It is not steady and consuming so much as fitful and flashing.

"Legions of loves with little wings did fly,
Darting their deadly arrows fiery bright."
Spenser.

SCORCHING (Fr. *écorcer*, Lat. *cortex*, the bark) denotes a heat which affects the surface injuriously or painfully. Scorching passions would denote not so much their mere heat, as the way in which they redounded to the remorse of those subject to them.

"Some of the pieces which were then brought from its repositories appeared to have been scorched with the fire which happened in the town house soon after the bank was established."—*Adam Smith*.

BURST. See BREAK.

BUSINESS. See AFFAIR, EMPLOYMENT, and PROFESSION.

BUSTLE. See HURRY.

BUSY. ACTIVE. OFFICIOUS.

BUSY (A. S. *bysig*) means no more than actively employed, except in the unfavourable sense of fond of unduly employing oneself with the concerns of others from curiosity or inquisitiveness. A person of inactive habits may occasionally be suffi-

ciently interested in anything to be busy. To be busy, whether habitually or not, is to be carefully, sedulously, and absorbingly engaged in a work.

“Despair

Tended the sick, *busiest* from couch to couch.” *Milton.*

ACTIVE (Fr. *actif*, Lat. *agere*, *actus*, to do) is having a tendency to employment and a dislike of remaining idle. Such a disposition, if not well employed, is pretty sure to fall into mischief. To be active implies more energy, to be busy more attention. The active man distributes his thoughts, the busy man concentrates them. The former is ready for any employment, the latter dedicates himself to one in particular.

“The soul, being an *active* nature, is always propending to the exercise of one faculty or another.”—*Glanvill.*

OFFICIOUS (Lat. *officium*, office, duty) is that aspect of the quality of the busy man in the affairs of others which leads him to the superfluous taking upon himself to advise or to assist them.

“The miserable Rachel now too late discovered the fatal consequences of interfering between husband and wife, and heartily reproached herself for her *officiousness* in aggravating his jealousy.”—*Observer.*

BUT. See **HOWEVER.**

BUTCHERY. See **MASSACRE.**

BUTT. **MARK.**

The man who is a **BUTT** (Fr. *but*, butt, aim) is a **MARK** (Fr. *marque*), but the man who is a mark is not necessarily a butt. The word butt is a metaphor, indicating a mark for the shafts of *satire* or ridicule of the most contemptuous nature. A man may be a mark of envy, but he is only a butt for ridicule.

“I mean those honest gentlemen that are pelted by men, women, and children, by friends and foes, and, in a word, stand as *butts* in conversation.”—*Addison.*

Both terms are taken from archery, the butt being the barrel, whose bung served for the central mark for aim.

“*Ben.* I aimed so near when I supposed you loved.

Rom. A right good *mark*-man! and she’s fair I love.” *Romeo and Juliet.*

BUY. PURCHASE.

To **BUY** (A. S. *byegan*, *bygan*) and to **PURCHASE** (Fr. *pourchasser*, to desire and seek to obtain) are much the same, except that buy, being the simple Saxon term, is applied to all kinds of objects; purchase has a somewhat more polite air, and, with buy, is applicable to articles of taste and value. We buy vegetables and purchase jewelry. Again, to buy is specifically to give money; to purchase being used more often than buy in a metaphorical sense, extends to the giving or parting with anything to procure something else, as to “purchase money at the cost of reputation.” The term buy wears an unfavourable air when it is employed of the procuring by money what might better be the reward of merit.

“The law presumes that he who *buys* an office will by bribery, extortion, or other unlawful means, make his *purchase* good, to the manifest detriment of the public.”—*Blackstone.*

BYEWORD. See **PROVERB.**

C.

CABAL. **CONSPIRACY.** **COMBINATION.** **PLOT.** **FACTION.**

CABAL (Fr. *cabale*) is from the Hebrew *kabala*, a mystic tradition which it was pretended had come down from Moses along with the Jewish law; hence the term was applied to any association which had a pretended secret. The idea of a cabal is that of a party or faction confined to a few, and plotting in secret for their own interests. The object of a cabal is to affect public opinion on behalf of the intriguing party, and so, although the plan is secret, the means employed may be sometimes secret, sometimes open, as clamour. It carries a political or quasi-political air, true to its origin—

the ministry of Charles II., Clifford, Ashley, Buckingham, Arlington, and Lauderdale, the initials of whose names comprise the word, and to whom it was first applied.

"Base rivals, who true wit and merit hate,
Caballing still against it with the great,
Maliciously aspire to gain renown
By standing up and pulling others down."
Dryden.

A CONSPIRACY (Lat. *conspiratio*, which, unlike conspiracy, denoted good as well as evil accord) is a secret combination against some person, power, authority, or legitimate interest. In its common occurrence conspiracy denotes a treasonable attempt for the purpose of subverting a dynasty, or re-establishing one, or generally for altering the political face of affairs. It tends to multiply its numbers, thus differing from cabal, which is restricted.

"Catiline's conspiracy."—*Rose's Sallust.*

COMBINATION (*con* and *binus*, two, two each) need not be for a bad purpose, though it is commonly so used. It is an association of persons united for the purpose of acting or resisting in a matter of their own interests. It differs from cabal in being more active than deliberative, and from conspiracy in being open and not secret. Social or professional interests are commonly the basis of union and action in combinations, and its work lies in pushing its own demands and resisting those of others. It is evident that the term admits of such a generic sense as would include the others.

"A combination of the most powerful men in Rome who had conspired my ruin."—*Melmoth's Cicero.*

A PLOT (abbreviated from complot, Fr. *comploter*, Lat. *complicatum* and *complicare*) is a complicated plan for the accomplishment of a purpose always evil or mischievous. As it expresses the plan as well as the planner, a plot may lie with a single person, though it commonly involves more than one.

"The tempter may cease urging, and yet continue plotting."—*South.*

FACTION (Lat. *factio*) meant an-

ciently one of the troops in the games of the circus, which, assuming a political character, the term came to mean a political party. It is now used more commonly of a minority than of a majority, but in either case denotes a party acting unscrupulously for the promotion of their own interests in the community.

"The members of the court *faction* are fully indemnified for not holding places on the slippery heights of the kingdom not only by the lead in all affairs, but also by the perfect security in which they enjoy less conspicuous, but very advantageous situations."
—*Burke.*

Unquiet, turbulent, jealous, ambitious, vain spirits form cabals. Mischievous, malignant, wicked, and designing spirits form plots. Discontented spirits, indocile subjects, and bad citizens form conspiracies. Social and professional grievances, undue preponderance of power or wealth bring about combinations. Restlessness, combined with views of self-interest, raises up factions. A seditious party in a community or a state while it is as yet weak and undeveloped is a faction. It is a party when it has established its claim to be recognised as one of the powers of that community or state.

CAJOLE. COAX. WHEEDLE.

The idea common to these words is that of using petty arts of demeanour to persuade into something connected with a selfish purpose. To CAJOLE (Fr. *cajoler*, to allure into a cage like a bird) denotes the use of such winning arts, whether of words, as flattery, or more than words, as leads the person under such influence to accede to the wishes of another, even to some little loss or detriment to himself. To COAX (perhaps the Old Eng. *cokes*, a fool) expresses the same thing, but with more of persuasiveness and less of art. It is a more simple-minded process. The father may coax his child into doing some unpleasant thing for its own good, and the child may coax the father into making him some little present. WHEEDLE (possibly from the Saxon *wüdlan*, to be poor or beg) denotes

the reiterated use of clever importunities and little cheats, and, like cajole, often has the sense of luring against the interest of the person lured. The designing person cajoles, the impudent one coaxes, the artful and dishonest one wheedles.

"After a *cajoling* dream to wake in the aggravation of disappointment."—*Smollett*.

The following gives the word *coax* in its old form:—

"Princes may give a good poet such convenient countenance and also benefit as are due to an excellent artificer, though they neither kiss nor *cokes* them."—*Pultenham*.

"I have already a deed of settlement of the best part of her estate, which I have *wheeled* out of her."—*Congreve*.

CALAMITY. DISASTER. VISITATION. MISFORTUNE. MISCHANCE. MISHAP. MISADVENTURE.

CALAMITY (Lat. *calamitas*, according to Bacon, derived from *calamus*, a stalk, as if destruction of crops) is commonly applied to events which produce *extensive* evil, whether public or private, as a bad harvest, a civil war, the death or ruin of the head of a family, are calamities. The calamity generally befalls from without, and is not a miscarriage of plans, but an independent visitation. Hence a person may be closely connected with a calamity without directly suffering from it. A plague upon a city is a calamity, and is called so even by those who may escape from it.

"Even when they are in prosperity they ever and anon feel many inward stings and lashes; but when any great affliction or *calamity* overtakes them, they are the most poor-spirited creatures in the whole world."—*Tillotson*.

A DISASTER (*désastre*, Lat. *astrum*, a star, a word of astrological character) is an untoward event of great importance coming in to mar or ruin a particular plan, course, or condition of things as incidental to it. Thus, losses in trade, the overthrowing of a carriage on the road, are disasters.

"This was a real *disaster* to us, as by retarding us half a day it broke the chain of our stages, and laid us under the disagreeable

necessity of stopping each ensuing night at a very bad inn."—*Swinburne's Spain*.

MISFORTUNE is the widest, though not specifically the strongest in meaning. Anything which is an untoward event is a misfortune. Calamities and disasters are misfortunes, only they are more than ordinary misfortunes. That is a misfortune which in any way deprives of an actual or contingent good against one's will. But the term is by no means so serious as calamity or disaster.

"She daily exercises her benevolence by pitying every *misfortune* that happens to every family within her circle of notice."—*Johnson*.

VISITATION (Lat. *visitare*) is a term used to denote providential infliction or retribution, and is applied to public and private afflictions, as the sudden death of an individual, or the plague in a country.

"There shall not be left in thee one stone upon another, because thou knewest not the time of thy *visitation*."—*Bible*.

MISCHANCE and MISHAP differ from misfortune in being lighter. Misfortunes to individuals are failures in business, the loss of health, the being born of cruel or over-indulgent parents. Miscanches and mishaps are such as interrupt employments or undertakings untowardly. A slight difference too exists between mischance and mishap; the mischance is external to the actual employment, and befalls a person while engaged in it; a mishap occurs in the midst of the employment itself. So mischance is less personal than mishap, which often wears a ludicrous air. A sudden frost on a hunting day is a mischance; a fall while hunting is a mishap.

"'For charity,' replied the matron, 'tell What sad *mischance* those pretty birds befel.'

'Nay, no *mischance*,' the savage dame replied,

'But want of wit in their unerring guide,
And eager haste, and gaudy hopes, and
giddy pride.' " *Dryden*.

"Ah me! what perils do environ
The man that meddles with cold iron!
What plaguy mischiefs and *mishaps*
Do dog him still with after-claps!"

Hudibras.

MISADVENTURE is the more serious form of mishap. It is a calamity occurring in the course of some deed or transaction; as if in fencing one accidentally wounded one's adversary. It combines more strongly than mishap the idea of the unfortunate with the doings and proceedings of men.

"We seldom or never find that any nation hath endured so many *misadventures* and miseries as the Spaniards have done in their Indian discoveries."—*Raleigh's History of the World*.

CALCULATE. RECKON. COMPUTE. COUNT. ESTIMATE. ENUMERATE. RATE.

To CALCULATE (Lat. *calculus*, a pebble, of old used in counting) is to arrive at a result by an arithmetical operation of any kind; hence of various kinds; hence also, *remotely*, a calculation may be formed by using one or more arithmetical processes in succession for the purpose of a common result or product. Calculation goes beyond the actual and present, and may deal with the future and probable. Hence the result of calculation may be approximate only, not exact.

"I fear this learned man may have been somewhat misinformed by the navigators he relies in, or else that the way of allowing for refractions is not yet reduced to a sufficient certainty; for I do not find by those who have purposely gone to the top of it (Teneriffe) that the mountain is so high as his *calculation* makes it."—*Boyle*.

To RECKON (A. S. *reccnan*, *reccnian*) is to tell one by one, and deals only with matters of addition and subtraction. It is a process of units only. It is to count into a number, rank, or series; hence, analogously, to place as an item in a moral or social account, as, "I reckon him among the aristocracy." Hence the process of reckoning is more straightforward, and the result of reckoning more exact and certain than calculation, while it is less comprehensive and varied.

"Retrospects with bad *reckoners* are troublesome things."—*Warburton*.

But reckon involves in some cases the use of the logical as well as the arithmetical faculty to determine

what is to be reckoned, as in the instance given under count.

To COMPUTE (Lat. *compute*) bears reference to a sum or value already given. The rising and setting of the heavenly bodies are calculated; but the number of comets that have been visible during the last thousand years could only be computed, all that is likely to increase or diminish the number being taken into account; hence compute is more than an arithmetical term, and involves the factors as well as the amount of numbers and sums. To compute is to form a numerical estimate, though it is applicable to magnitude.

"Of time on all occasions, he (Swift) was an excellent *computer*, and knew the minutes required to every common operation."—*Johnson*.

Experience and analogy are great aids in computation.

COUNT is etymologically another form of compute, but its signification is nearer to that of reckon. It is to reckon one by one; but as to reckon is to enlist in a number, so to count is simply to register as units. So we might say, "I have counted the bottles; there are ninety without reckoning ten which are broken."

"I would not be that guilty man,

With all his golden store;

Nor change my lot with any wretch

That counts his thousands o'er."

Logan.

In the secondary use of the terms, count stands to reckon as a proposition to a conclusion. I count him faithful that endures, that is, I bring the two ideas or terms into unity. "I reckon that the present sufferings are not to be compared to the glory that shall be revealed hereafter;" that is, I draw this deduction (Gr. *λογίζομαι*).

ESTIMATE (Lat. *æstimare*) is to compute more generally, as to estimate the average or probable market value of goods, distance, and the like, in a rough manner. It is not so numerical as compute. Estimate has to do not with facts, figures, or dimensions in themselves, but in so far as they relate to ourselves and our interest in them. We may compute

the number of acres in a tract of country; we estimate their saleable price, and, so doing, set what is valuable over against what is comparatively or completely worthless.

"Live dogs before dead lions *estimates*."—*Daniel*.

ENUMERATE (*enumerare*) is to tell the number by expressing the items, and is a process of speech rather than arithmetic. It is to mention as an item in a sum. To RATE (Old Fr. *rate*) is to compute or estimate according to a standard of *proportion*, whether scientific or conventional.

"But I collect out of the Abbey Book of Burton that twenty-one were *ratable* to two marks of silver."—*Camden*.

CALL. See BID.

CALLOUS. See OBDURATE.

CALM (Fr. *calme*) is used for the quiet of the elements, and analogously for the quiet of the mind, emotions, passions, and the like. These two applications therefore belong to the following lists of synonyms.

CALM. STILL. QUIET. SERENE. TRANQUIL. PEACEFUL. PLACID. SETTLED.

These terms are all applicable to the elements of nature. CALM is applied to the air and the sea. It is a relative term, denoting the absence of perturbation; a calm air is one which is not stormy; a calm sea one which is not rough. In its secondary sense, calm, as applied to the feelings, mind, or conduct, denotes the absence of excitement under circumstances calculated to produce it, and is commonly a praiseworthy feature of character. Yet not invariably so, for it is not good to endure or witness calmly what is cruel or painful or miserable to others.

"The Seventh Book (of *Paradise Lost*) affects the imagination like the ocean in a *calm*, and fills the mind of the reader without producing in it anything like tumult or agitation."—*Spectator*.

STILL (A. S. *stille*) denotes the absence of movement and of the sound

which accompanies it. The night is still when no sounds are heard. It expresses not merely the absence of sound and motion, but a state which is as it were poised between past and future activity. That which is still may be regarded as having settled into quiet, and as having the capability to be exercised at any moment, of being again aroused. It is as it were a fixed and established state of the silent or the motionless.

"The subtle spoiler of the beaver kind,
Far off, perhaps, where ancient alders shade
The deep *still* pool, within some hollow
trunk
Contrives his wicker couch."

Somerville Chase.

QUIET (Lat. *quietus*, from *quies*) is as if we should say at rest, and therefore is employed only metaphorically of the condition of nature, and has a more direct force in the sense which will be noticed subsequently.

"The tide of business, like the running
stream,
Is sometimes high, and sometimes low,
A *quiet* ebb, or a tempestuous flow."
Dryden's Horace.

SERENE (Lat. *serenus*) is only used of the atmosphere, and denotes the union of calmness and clearness. A dark night, however still, would not be called serene. TRANQUIL (Lat. *tranquillus*) denotes free from commotion or agitation of any kind. It means more than still and quiet, for these denote the external condition only, while tranquil implies also the effect produced on the senses and mind of the observer, which are correspondingly affected with a sense of quiet.

"The celebrated *tranquillity* of the Pacific Ocean."—*Anson*.

PEACEFUL, as the word denotes, is full of peace, that is, not entirely free from sounds, but free from loud and jarring sounds. Nature is not the less but the more peaceful when certain soothing sights and sounds, such as the smoke of the cottage hearth, or the tinklings of sheep-bells, meet the eye and ear. The epithet is better applied to the *scenes* than to the *elements* of Nature.

"Still as the *peaceful* walks of ancient night,
Silent as are the lamps that burn in tombs."
Shakespeare.

PLACID (Lat. *placidus*) denotes an unruffled calmness which has a pleasing and cheering effect. The night may be still and tranquil, but not placid if it is dark. Tranquil and gloomy are compatible epithets, not gloomy and placid. The surface of the lake in the still summer night is placid. It is a term more directly applicable to human beings and their characteristics of disposition, countenance, demeanour, and the like, and only analogously to objects in Nature. See below. SETTLED (A. S. *settan*, to set) is a term which bears reference to past commotion, and denotes the return to a state of calm which is likely to continue. When used of persons, it refers to the judgment, determination, and plans of life.

"It is true that a weighty *settled* sorrow is of that force that besides the contraction of the spirits, it will work upon the radical moisture, and dry it up so that the hair can have no moisture at the root."—*Howell.*

CALM. QUIET. SERENE. TRANQUIL. PEACEFUL. PLACID. COMPOSED. COLLECTED.

As referred to the state of the mind, these epithets have each its peculiar character. CALM denotes simply the absence of perturbation, and may be highly laudable, or entirely the reverse. It may refer to the thoughts or the feelings, or both. It denotes a state rather than a habit. The captain through all the time of the storm gave his orders calmly. The tyrant looked on calmly at the execution.

"For I cannot but think all controversies in matters of religion are the best handled, and with the greatest probability of success, when they are managed *calmly*, without all particular resentments, and with all the tenderness that is possible towards those persons whom we are endeavouring to reclaim into the way of truth."—*Nelson, Life of Bishop Bull.*

QUIET, as applied to the mind, denotes rather an habitual than a pass-

ing state; yet, according to present usage, it is more applicable generally to the external circumstances of life than to temper or manners; when employed of these it would rather imply a silent and retiring disposition. "I long to lead a quiet life," would mean a life of retirement from the busy occupations and cares of life. A quiet mind is an unharassed mind; yet quiet does not of necessity involve happiness, for there is a quiet of compulsion, of a swoon, of death.

"Thus leave
Thee, native soil, these happy walks and shades,
Fit haunt of gods? where I had hope to spend
Quiet, though sad, the respite of that day
That must be mortal to us both."
Milton.

SERENE, when employed in a moral sense, denotes that quiet which comes from within, as the result of such causes as a bright religious hope, the absence of disturbing passions, and the peace of conscience. It expresses the highest and holiest calm of the soul.

"Wherefore the preferableness of virtue does not arise so much from the transports she occasions, as from the calm *serenity* and steady complacency of mind she ensures."—*Search, Light of Nature.*

TRANQUIL is far less strong, and denotes little more than the absence of solicitude and apprehension, or more generally of any source of discomposure or disturbance. In this way it is applied to the condition of communities or collections of persons with more force and propriety than any other of these epithets, which belong more naturally to individuals. A tranquil state of society. The tranquillity of the country. It was a very tranquil meeting.

"Oh now for ever
Farewell the *tranquil* mind, farewell content!"
Shakespeare.

PEACEFUL, as applied to the life, may be understood by a reference to the epithet as explained from an external point of view. As applied to the person and disposition, it denotes not only a state but an habitual tendency. A peaceful disposition is one

which loves peace in relation to others, and dislikes and avoids occasions of quarrel. A peaceful atmosphere in the natural and the moral world is one in which there is no strife of warring elements. The difference between peaceful and peaceable is noticed under peaceable.

"Our loved earth, where peacefully we slept,
And far from heaven quiet possession kept."
Dryden.

PLACID denotes more than peaceful. One may be peaceful on principle, but persons are placid by nature. Accordingly it often comes of comparative insensibility, and of a nature constitutionally wanting in fervour. It is very often employed of the face, as a placid countenance, a placid smile. It is the serene of commonplace.

"Placid and soothing is the remembrance of a life passed with quiet, innocence, and elegance."—*Steele.*

COMPOSED (*componere*) and COLLECTED (*colligere*) are not used of the life or character, and seldom of the countenance, but almost always of the air or manner. Composure bears reference to the thoughts and feelings, collectedness to action. The person who is composed retains or has recovered his self-possession after some period of, or in spite of, some inducement to over-excitement; he who is collected has, as the term denotes, gathered up his feelings and thoughts, and recovered them from a state of distraction, and is prepared to act with deliberation.

"Collected in his strength, and like a rock
Poised on his base, Mezentius stood the shock."
Dryden.

"In this hurry, one running one way, another running another way, a man was seen walking before the door very composedly without a hat; whereupon, one crying out, 'Here is the fellow that killed the Duke!' upon which others ran thither, everybody asking which is he? to which the man without the hat very composedly answered, 'I am he.'"—*Clarendon.*

CALUMNY. ASPERSION. DETRACTION. DEFAMATION. SLANDER. LIBEL. REVILING. VILIFICATION.

CALUMNY (Lat. *calumnia*) is that

evil-speaking which is based in any degree on what the speaker knows to be false, whether it be a crime or an offence. The calumniator is both a forger and a propagator of evil report against another, and aims at doing him an injury.

"For calumny will sear
Virtue itself."
Shakespeare.

ASPERSION (*aspersio*, a sprinkling, from *aspergere*) is like the bespattering a person with foul water. It brings no definite charge, but seeks by any means to convey an unfavourable impression morally of the character and conduct of another. The etymological force is preserved by Dryden:

"I will not leave thee liable to scorn,
But vindicate thy honour from that wretch
Who would by base *aspersions* blot thy virtue."

DETRACTION (*detrahere*, to draw away) is that mode of cheapening another in public or private estimation which consists in granting facts as to his character, but interpreting them so as to diminish or contradict favourable inferences; as when we attribute his acts of giving to motives of ostentation. It comes of cynical views and estimates of human life and motives, or from specific jealousy and envy. It is of wider application than moral or personal character. It consists in lowering the moral and sometimes even the material value or pretensions of anything; as to detract from personal merit, from the excellence of an act, or the value or merit of a work of art.

"If any shall detract from a lady's character, unless she be absent, the said *detractress* shall be forthwith ordered to the lowest place of the room."—*Addison.*

DEFAMATION (*de*, down, or away, and *fama*, fame) is essentially public; it is the spreading far and wide what is injurious to the reputation of persons.

"Their aim is only men's *defamation*, not their reformation, since they proclaim men's vices unto others, not lay them open to themselves."—*Prynne.*

SLANDER (Old Fr. *csclandre*, con-

nected with *scandalum*) differs from defamation in being not only public but also secret and underhanded. The slanderer is not so inventive as the calumniator.

"Whether we speak evil of a man to his face or behind his back; the former way indeed seems to be the most generous, but yet is a great fault, and that which we call *reviling*. The latter is more mean and base, and that which we call *slander* or backbiting."
—*Tillotson*.

REVILING (*vilis*, cheap, worthless) is eloquent defamation or slander, the copious use of opprobrious or contemptuous language. VILIFICATION is from the same root, but reviling is direct, vilification indirect. We revile a person to his face; we vilify him or his character generally in the eyes of the world. To vilify is simply to cheapen down to vileness, and therefore is applicable to anything, and not restricted to persons which have a character of goodness or a reputation for excellence.

"Believe it that can, while he is labouring to destroy the best, the only complete system of morality that ever yet appeared, and to *vilify* that Book which so truly places the whole of religion in doing good."—*Waterland*.

LIBEL is *written* slander or defamation (*libellus*, a little book).

CANCEL. See **ABOLISH** and **EF-FACE**.

CANDID. See **HEARTY**.

CANONIZATION. See **BEATIFICATION**.

CAPABILITY. See **ABILITY**.

CAPACIOUS. See **AMPLE**.

CAPACITY. See **ABILITY**.

CAPITAL. See **CHIEF**.

CAPRICE. **HUMOUR.** **WHIM.**

FREAK. **FANCY.** **FICKLENESS.** **VARIABLENESS.** **CHANGEABLENESS.**

CAPRICE (Fr. *caprice*, Lat. *caper*, a goat, as it were, a fantastical goat-leap) is employed both of the quality and of what manifests the quality, that is, an act of caprice. Caprice is the acting on the slightest preference of the moment, and from one moment to another without such choice as is

founded on deliberation. It manifests itself in abrupt changes of feeling, opinion, or action. **HUMOUR** (Lat. *humor*, moisture) is the indulgence of one's temper or mood at any time, and making that the principle of action. Humour may differ at different times, but caprice is ever variable. Caprice may be a matter of imagination and fancy, but humour is an actual sensation. Humour allows feeling to usurp the place of will, while caprice substitutes fancy. The three terms, humour, fancy, and caprice, denote generally a passing lively feeling; but caprice and humour belong more to the character, fancy to passing circumstances. Humour is quite as compatible with sadness as with its contrary. The coquette has her caprices; the hypochondriac, the tyrant, the imperious man his humours; the child, or the childish, his fancies.

"Upon his right hand was Industry, with a lamp burning before her, and on his left *Caprice*, with a monkey sitting on her shoulder."
—*Spectator*.

"You'll ask me why I rather choose to have A weight of carrion flesh than to receive Three thousand ducats. I'll not answer that, But say, it is my *humour*."

Shakespeare.

WHIM (Welsh *chwim*, a brisk motion) differs from caprice and humour, as not expressing any quality or temper of mind, but something external. We call that a whim which seems to have no better account than personal eccentricity.

"Let every man enjoy his *whim*."

What's he to me, or I to him?"

Churchill.

A **FREAK** (compare Scotch *frak*, *freak*, to move quickly) is a humorous, or, at least, lively display of personal eccentricity, a merry whim.

"For many of their actions and opinions were very wild *freaks* of fancy and humour, and would gain men in these days (as foolish and bad as they are) no better name than of lunatics and bedlams."—*Glanvill*.

A **FANTASY** (Fr. *fantasie*) or **FANCY** is the product of an eccentric or unregulated imagination. It has to do, in this sense, with matters of pos-

session and enjoyment or pleasure or their opposites, and not with the treatment of others, like humour, and caprice, though others may be affected by our fancies. It invests objects, without exact attention or inquiry, with supposed charms or otherwise.

"I dare not force affection, or presume
To censure her discretion, that looks on me
As a weak man, and not her *fancy's* idol."
Massinger.

Fickleness, variableness, and changeableness apply to human disposition, with these differences: FICKLENESS (A. S. *ficol*) belongs rather to the disposition, the others to the temper and mood. As VARIABleness and CHANGEABLENESS are used of weather, so they are used analogously of that which belongs to manner and behaviour; variableness of mood, and changeableness of humour. But fickleness is more deeply seated. It is that inconstancy of mind and taste which shows itself in inconstant preferences and attachments.

"When he (Lucas) came to the English, he painted a naked man with cloth of different sorts lying by him, and a pair of shears, as a satire on our *fickleness* in fashions."—*Walpole.*

"An eternal and *unchangeable* cause producing a changeable and temporary effect."—*Raleigh.*

"But, alas! though the just grounds of my joy be steady, yet my weak disposition is subject to *variableness*."—*Bishop Hall.*

CAPTIOUS. CAVILLING. CENSORIOUS. CARPING.

CAPTIOUS (Fr. *captieux*) is apt to catch at faults. Another meaning has flowed out of this—difficult to suit, and so peevish. It is an epithet of the disposition. It comes of a mind trained in exact habits of thought combined with an impatience of error. It is applied to matters of taste and exact learning. It is therefore sometimes a fault of the disposition purely, sometimes of the mind and disposition combined. In the latter sense it is thus employed by Stillingfleet:—

"What design can the wit of man pitch upon in a *captious* and suspicious age that will not meet with objections from those that have a mind to cavil?"

Captiousness, as defined by Locke, is of the former kind, although the excessive tendency to find fault is common to both; in the latter, faults in themselves, in the former, faults by which we are personally affected.

"*Captiousness*," says he, "is another fault opposite to civility, not only because it often produces misbecoming and provoking expressions and carriage, but because it is a tacit accusation and reproach of some incivility taken notice of in those we are angry with."

CENSORIOUS (*ensor*, from *censeo*, a controller of morals) has a graver meaning, and expresses a disposition which tends to find serious fault, and to administer reproof, whether on such matters as the captious, or on the subject of morals and conduct, more especially the latter. It comes of an austere and dogmatical spirit.

"They are both very requisite in a virtuous mind, to keep out melancholy for the many serious thoughts it is engaged in, and to hinder its natural hatred of vice from souring into severity and *censoriousness*."—*Spectator.*

"But Colotes, like a sycophant, *cavilling* at him and catching at his words without regard of the matter, not arguing against his reasons, indeed, but in words only, affirmeth flatly that Parmenides overthroweth all things in one word by supposing that all is one."—*Holland, Plutarch.*

"Lay aside, therefore, a *carping* spirit, and read even an adversary with attention and diligence, with an honest design to find out his true meaning. Do not snatch at little lapses and appearances of mistake in opposition to his declared and avowed meaning."—*Watts.*

Cavilling is the carping of argument, carping the cavilling of ill-temper.

CAVILLING (from *cavillari*, to banter) implies a tendency to captious argument, to start frivolous objections, and find fault without good reason. CARPING (from *carpere*, to pick or pluck) springs from ill-nature, and so vents itself upon the most welcome objects to such a nature, namely, the words and actions of other persons, as well as their statements.

CAPTIVATE. ENCHANT. CHARM. FASCINATE. ENRAPTURE. ENSLAVE.

To CAPTIVATE (Lat. *captivare*, from

captivus and *capio*) and to FASCINATE (Lat. *fascinare*, Gr. *βαρκαίνω*) express something more strong than "to attract." They denote such a power of attraction as exerts itself over the will of the person affected, and draws it away from other objects. A captivating person, or a captivating pursuit, is that which draws one from other persons and other pursuits by a strong influence, leading the person, as it were, captive. A captivating landscape is one which arrests our progress to stop and admire it, so charming us as to induce a feeling of regret at turning our backs upon it. Captivation may or may not, therefore, be the result of design; or it may be, as exercised by a woman of the world, the combined result of nature and art. There is always a more or less unfavourable air about the term *captivate*, inasmuch as it denotes some degree of influence exercised to the diminution of perfect liberty of thought or action. The understanding as well as the taste may be captivated.

"No small part of our servitude lies in the *captivation* of our understanding, such as that we cannot see ourselves *captive*."—*Bishop Hall*.

Fascination is the extreme of captivation, when the person lies, as it were, spell-bound under some influence of attraction. This may be external or personal beauty or manners, or an extreme feeling of interest, as a fascinating employment, which so absorbs the attention as to leave no room for interest in anything else. The fascinating acts through the faculty of sight, and exerts a power upon individuals, owing to their peculiar susceptibilities, which is out of proportion to the intrinsic claims of the object to admiration and regard. It quickens the vision morbidly in some directions, and bandages the eyes also.

"Some, to the *fascination* of a name
Surrender judgment hood-winked."

Corper.

Another aspect of *captivate* is developed by the word ENSLAVE, literally to make a slave of. As to *captivate*, in one sense, is to bring into

captivity, so to enslave is to bring into slavery. There is the same difference, therefore, as between those two. The captive is simply in his captor's power. The slave does his owner's bidding, and has surrendered or been deprived of the independent exercise of his own will to do another's bidding.

"Sensual pleasure is a great abuse to the spirit of a man, being a kind of fascination or witchcraft, blinding the understanding and enslaving the will."—*Bishop Taylor*.

ENCHANT (Fr. *enchanter*, Lat. *incantare*) and CHARM (Fr. *charmer*, from *charme*, Lat. *carmen*, an incantation) have a close resemblance both in derivation and application. To enchant is a livelier word than to charm. We are charmed with what engages the senses and gratifies the taste, as beautiful scenery, sweet music, engaging conversation and manners. The term is even used for the same as delight, as, "I was charmed to hear such news." We are enchanted by what so charms the senses as to affect the imagination, to carry us out of common thoughts and common life, and perhaps place us as in a fairy land of thought. ENRAPTURE (Lat. *raptura*, a seizing, from *rapere*, to seize) denotes a delight beyond measure, when we are beside ourselves, and transported by enjoyment. When we are enchanted we are taken out of ourselves; when charmed it is by some object which, insinuating itself into the mind, acts like those magical charms, those love philters, and the like, which are supposed to produce in us effects which we imagine to be natural, and which make us feel their power without being aware of their presence. Custom, which familiarises all things, destroys enchantment. Reflection may even dissipate it at once. But both familiarity and reflection may seem to prolong charms which will bear the test of the judgment and of criticism. There is always a little of surprise mixed with enchantment. Affection comes in and takes part with sentiment in the case of the object which charms us. In rapture, on the other hand, there is unrest; and, so far from bearing

the test of reflection, the very use of reflection shows that it is passing away.

"We all promise ourselves great pleasure in our journey homewards, and we have great reason to believe it will be *enchantingly* pleasant."—*Sir W. Jones*.

"Such a lovely image and representation of the true virtue, as Plato said, could not but *charm* men with the strongest degree of love and admiration possible."—*Clarke*.

"Explore thy heart, that, roused by glory's name,

Pants, all enraptured, with the mighty charm." *Beattie*.

CAPTIVITY. CONFINEMENT. IMPRISONMENT. INCARCERATION. BONDAGE. SLAVERY. IMMURING. SERVITUDE.

CAPTIVITY is the state of a captive (*captivus*, from *capere* to take or catch), that is, of one who has been deprived of his liberty by another, however honourable, liberal, or wide the restrictions of such captivity may be. The captive monarch is not the less a captive because he is placed by his courteous captor at his right hand on horseback or at table. The bird is not the less a captive for the size of the cage. The term is restricted to such command over the persons of others as results from successful war. So every captive is a prisoner, but every prisoner (those, for instance, in the gaols) is not called a captive. A distinction is made in the English Litany, which prays for "all prisoners and captives."

"Myself my sepulchre, a moving grave,
Buried, yet not exempt
By privilege of death and burial
From worst of other evils, pains, and wrongs,
But made hereby obnoxious more
To all the miseries of life.
Life in *captivity*
Among inhuman foes." *Milton*.

CONFINEMENT (*con* and *finis*, a limit) is a wider term than captivity, as it denotes other kinds of restriction than that of the captive. A person may be confined to the house by sickness. It is the abridgment of personal liberty for any cause or by any sort of force. As applied to persons, it may be partial, as his hands

were confined, the rest of his body was free.

"I thank the Almighty I am now all collected in myself; and though my person is in *confinement*, my mind can expatiate on ample and useful subjects with all the freedom imaginable."—*Johnson, Life of Savage*.

IMPRISONMENT (Fr. *prison*, *prendre*, *pris*, to take) is confinement within walls, which is the literal meaning of IMMURE (*in* and *murus*, a wall); but immure is a narrower imprisonment, in which the stony captivity presses closely on all sides. Imprison most commonly denotes the involuntary confinement of one by another, immure the mere fact of close confinement, irrespective of any coercion which has produced it; as to live immured in the walls of a convent may be a voluntary act. Imprisonment is a narrowing of the state of captivity. The bird which is taken captive in the hand is afterwards imprisoned in the cage. Captivity and imprisonment both deprive of some degree of personal liberty, but not of civil rights, which takes place in bondage and slavery. The fair one does not take her lover prisoner, but captive, and yet sometimes succeeds in making him her slave. The term "prisoner of war" does not necessarily imply confinement in a prison. He is generally a captive rather than a prisoner.

"It is but six or seven years since a clergyman of the name of Malony, a man of morals, neither guilty, nor accused of anything noxious to the State, was condemned to perpetual imprisonment for exercising the functions of his religion."—*Burke*.

"For six long years *immured*, the captive knight
Had dragged his chains and scarcely seen the light." *Dryden*.

INCARCERATION (Lat. *carcer*, a prison) is an equivalent of Latin form for the more directly French form *imprison*, but denotes an ignominious imprisonment, such as that of prisoners in a gaol, with as little as possible of personal liberty. So *imprison* admits more possible freedom than *incarcerate*, and *incarcerate* than *immure*.

"It (the doctrine of pre-existence) supposeth the descent into these bodies to be a culpable lapse from an higher and better state of life, and this to be a state of *incarceration* for former delinquencies."—*Glanvill*.

BONDAGE (a state of being bound), **SLAVERY** (Fr. *esclave*), and **SERVITUDE** (Lat. *servitudo*, from *servire*, to serve as a slave), all denote the subjection of the person to superior restrictive power. The terms increase in force in the following order: servitude, slavery, bondage. Servitude is simply compulsory service to a master. So the term is even sometimes employed of free and honourable service, in reference to any compulsory terms connected with it. British naval officers will speak of their period of servitude, by which they mean their service as regards a certain term which they are bound to complete.

"A hundred were Spaniards, every one well mounted upon his horse, the rest were Indians running as dogs at their heels, and in the most miserable *bondage*."—*Sir Francis Drake*.

"Beauty of every kind is formed to allure, and there is this peculiar advantage in contemplating the beauties of vegetable nature, that we may permit our hearts to be captivated by them without apprehension of any dangerous or dishonourable *servitude*."—*Knox*.

Slavery begins where servitude ends. It is that sort of compulsory life of labour which depends upon the will of another, the master owning the servant as a chattel. But even slavery has its degrees; and the ancient Romans had learned slaves who were honourably treated as literary companions of their masters. Bondage is the extreme aspect of slavery, when the slave has become, as it were, a beast of burden, and works, it may be under the lash, as the captive Israelites did in the land of Egypt.

CAPTURE. SEIZURE. PRIZE.

CAPTURE (*captura*, from *capere*, to take) and **SEIZURE** (Fr. *saisir*) are used both of the process and the object. The process of capture involves art as well as force, while seizure is effected by force alone.

A strong town may be captured after a prolonged siege by a powerful army, or a little bird may be captured in a bird-trap. The highwayman seizes the person or the property of the traveller. **PRIZE** relates only to the object taken and its value to the taker. It is the result of competitive effort, as in the galleon laden with gold, the slave-ship, or the award of the school-boy, or student. The term prize is, however, sometimes used to express merely a thing of value, however obtained—as a prize in a lottery, or "I was walking along the road, and I picked up an unexpected prize." The idea is something taken which is of value.

"This was very happy for him; for in a very few years, being concerned in several *captures*, he brought home with him an estate of about twelve thousand pounds."—*Guardian*.

"The Indians, having perceived by our seizure of the bark the night before that we were enemies, immediately fled into the woody parts of the island."—*Anson*.

"Our inheritances are become a prize for disputation."—*Burke*.

The capture is commonly either an object having life, or something taken in spite of voluntary efforts of resistance. The seizure is commonly of lifeless objects, as contraband goods. The prize is commonly, also, an inanimate object, except where the person who constitutes the prize is regarded simply for the ransom or other indirect advantage, and value.

CARCASE. See **BODY**.

CARDINAL. See **CHIEF**.

CARE.

CARE (Lat. *cura*) has the following significations, which may be referred to separately:—**HEED, SOLICITUDE, CONCERN.**

CAREFUL. See **CAUTIOUS**.

CARELESS. See **INATTENTIVE** and **LISTLESS**.

CARESS. **FONDLE.**

CARESS (Fr. *caresse*, Lat. *carus*, dear) is the expression of tender feeling by words and actions. **FONDLE**,

from fond, is the expression of weak or childish tenderness, and is confined to actions.

"The King of France used him (the Duke of Buckingham) in so particular a manner, knowing his vanity, and *caressed* him to such a degree, that he went without reserve into the interests of France."—*Burnet*.

"Each time enjoined her penance mild,
And *fondled* on her like a child."—*Gay*.

CARICATURE. See BURLESQUE.

CARGO. FREIGHT. LADING. BURDEN.

CARGO (Spanish *cargo* and *carga*) is a ship-load, and in English law means all that is carried by a vessel, except live persons and animals.

"To different lands, for different sins, we roam,
And, richly *freighted*, bring our *cargo* home." *Churchill*.

FREIGHT is a later form of *fraught*, that with which a vessel is *fraught* for transportation. As regards floating vessels, the cargo and the freight are the same thing, viewed differently, the freight being the cargo as viewed for transportation. But freight is also used of material of land carriage. Again, the LADING (connected with load) is the freight regarded in its weight and quantity, of which consideration is taken by formal record and registration.

"Some were made prize, while others, burnt
and rent,
With their rich *lading* to the bottom went." *Waller*.

BURDEN (see BURDEN), in nautical matters, is the capacity of a ship, which is ascertained by measurement, and determined by the builder, as a vessel of so many tons burden.

CARNAGE. See MASSACRE.

CAROUSAL. See BANQUET.

CARP. See CAPTIOUS.

CARRIAGE. GAIT. WALK. DEPORTMENT.

CARRIAGE is seldom used now in any other than the physical sense, the metaphorical one of conduct being almost obsolete. It denotes the habitual mode of carrying the

body, mainly, but not exclusively, while in motion. A graceful or ungraceful carriage may be shown while sitting at table. It would sound antiquated to use the word as Clarendon did :

"He advised the new governour to have so much discretion in his *carriage*, that there might be no notice taken of the exercise of his religion."

The word is one of formality, and is best employed of the bearing of persons on public occasions, where some degree of personal dignity is demanded.

"His gallant *carriage*."—*Stirling*.

Perhaps modern use would be best satisfied by the term *bearing*.

GAIT (A. S. *geat*, *gat*, gate, or place for going) is the manner of the walk as to the movements of the legs and feet alone, as a shambling gait.

"He had very narrow shoulders, and no calf; and his *gait* might be more properly called hopping than walking."—*Fielding*.

The term is one wanting in dignity. We should say an awkward, not a majestic gait.

WALK (SAX. *wealcan*, to roll) is the manner of progress, taking the movements of the whole body into account. This use is conversational and modern.

"In length of train descends her sweeping gown,
And by her graceful *walk* the Queen of Love is known." *Dryden*.

DEPORTMENT (Fr. *deportement*, which originally had this meaning, though the modern word signifies misdemeanour) refers to the whole use and movement of the body, as graceful or ungraceful, suitable or unsuitable. It is the carriage of the body as regards social requirements and regulations. Yet we should speak of a person's carriage in public, of his deportment in private life.

"The coldness of his temper and the gravity of his *deportment* carried him safe through many difficulties."—*Swift*.

CARRY. See BRING.

CASE. CAUSE.

The CASE (Fr. *cas*, from Lat. *casus*, *cadere*, to fall out) is a matter of fact,

and the CAUSE (*causa*) is matter of question. This distinction is not the less sound because the case may be differently stated. The case is learnt, the cause is decided. We state the case, and defend the cause. In the process of a cause, cases are often cited as precedents.

"Yet on his way (no signs of grace,
For folks in fear are apt to pray)
To Phœbus he preferred his *case*,
And begged his aid that dreadful day."

Gray.

"Plead Thou my *cause*."—*Book of Psalms*.

CASE. See EXAMPLE.

CASH. MONEY. SPECIE.

MONEY (*Juno Moneta*, at whose temple money was coined at Rome, whence mint) is employed for anything which is used as a circulating medium. In some parts of Africa, for instance, shells are used as money.

"To prevent such abuses, to facilitate exchanges, and thereby to encourage all sorts of industry and commerce, it has been found necessary in all countries that have made any considerable advances towards improvement, to affix a certain stamp upon certain quantities of such particular metals as were in those countries commonly made use of to purchase goods. Hence the origin of coined money, and of those public offices called mints."
—*Adam Smith*.

CASH (Fr. *caisse*) is ready money, that is, coin, in distinction to anything the value of which depends on credit. The following quotation will show that there was a time when the English cash, like the French *caisse*, was employed of the bank or place where the cash was stored.

"So, as this bank is properly a general *cash*, where every man lodges his money because he esteems it safer and easier paid in and out than if it were in his coffers at home."
—*Sir W. Temple*.

The word, however, is used in our own sense by Shakespeare and Milton.

"Or as a thief, bent to unhoard the *cash*
Of some rich burgher, whose substantial
doors,
Cross-barred and bolted fast, fear no
assault,
In at the window climbs, or o'er the tiles."
Paradise Lost.

SPECIE, the same word as species, is money of stamped coin, but is not necessarily ready money, as it may consist in the coinage of a foreign country.

"There was in the splendour of the Roman Empire a less quantity of current *species* in Europe than there is now."—*Gibbon*.

CAST. See THROW.

CAST. See CHARACTER.

CASUAL. ACCIDENTAL. INCIDENTAL. CONTINGENT. OCCASIONAL. FORTUITOUS.

CASUAL (*casus*, from *cadere*, to befall) is applied to such occurrences as, coming by chance, have no immediate consequences beyond themselves. The casual is the accidental combined with the unimportant. A casual observer is simply a man who happens to look on; a casual remark is one which happens to be made. The casual is, as it were, a solitary link, and not a concatenation of cause and effect. In short, the trivial is an element in the casual, although it often happens that seeming trifles are followed by important consequences.

"*Casual* breaks in the general system."
—*W. Irving*.

It is hardly stronger than OCCASIONAL, which it much resembles in meaning, as occasional is derived from the same root (*occasio*, *cadere*, to fall out); but occasional excludes to a greater extent the idea of chance. Moreover, the casual may occur once, the occasional more than once. However trivial may be the casual circumstance, it was unexpected; whereas the occasional is often expected, and is generally known; thus differing from the recurrent or periodic, which are specifically known, as "he paid us occasional visits during his stay in the neighbourhood." That which is recurrent without being regular is occasional.

"This time I could not spend in idleness. I therefore very willingly set myself to translate my *occasional* meditations into Latin."
—*Bishop Hall*.

ACCIDENTAL (another form of

cadere, accidere) is a more serious word, and denotes an effect sufficiently important to lead the mind to speculate on the cause which produced it. A thing may be regarded as accidental which in any way happens by chance, as distinguished from design. (See CHANCE.)

"Civil society was instituted either with the purpose of obtaining all the good of every kind it was even *accidentally* capable of producing, or only of some certain good which the institutors, unconcerned with and unattentive to any other, had in view."—*Warburton*.

INCIDENTAL (another form of *cadere, incidere*) combines the idea of the casual with that of relation, appropriateness, or conformity. An incidental circumstance in a voyage is one which so befalls as to run up into the general count and story of it. Incidental expenses in an account are those which could not be exactly calculated beforehand, but, nevertheless, legitimately or necessarily connect themselves with it. Hence the term is sometimes used in the sense of naturally concomitant, as the anxieties incidental to high office.

"But there is a wide difference between supposing the violence offered to them to be the direct and proper purpose of the act and the *incidental* effect of it."—*Bishop Hurd*.

CONTINGENT (*contingere*, to touch on or belong to) denotes a union of certainty and uncertainty, or the certain effect of an uncertain or unknown cause; such as are logically expressed in a hypothetical proposition, as "if the skies fall, we shall catch larks." Our catching larks is, so far, contingent upon the skies falling.

"Perhaps the beauty of the world requireth (though we know it not) that some agents should work without deliberation (which his lordship calls necessary agents), and some agents with deliberation (and these both he and I call free agents), and that some agents should work and we not know how (and their effect we call *contingents*)."—*Hobbes*.

FORTUITOUS (Lat. *fortuitus, fors*, chance) is commonly employed when the subject is one of union, aggregation, or combination, as the "for-

tuitous concurrence of atoms;" a fortuitous union of causes produced such and such an effect, that is, two or more independent causes happened to produce an effect in common.

"The old stale pretence of the atheists, that things were first made *fortuitously*, and afterwards their usefulness was observed and discovered."—*Ray*.

CASUALTY. See ACCIDENT.

CATALOGUE. LIST. ROLL. REGISTER.

CATALOGUE (in Latin *catalogus*, from the Greek *κατάλογος*) is more than LIST (A. S. *list*, an edging of cloth), which is a narrow and long enumeration of only just such words or names as are necessary to specify the individuals or items. Catalogue gives some particulars connected with each. So a list of books would be no more than a bare enumeration of them or the names of their authors. A catalogue of books would give also such points as the number of volumes in each work, the binding, place of publication, and the like.

"Every man is ready to give in a long *catalogue* of those virtues and good qualities he expects to find in the person of a friend, but very few of us are careful to cultivate them in ourselves."—*Spectator*.

"Yes, 'tis the list

Of those that claim their offices this day

By the custom of the coronation."

Shakespeare.

A ROLL (Lat. *rotula*) is the same as list; but, as list is applicable to an enumeration of *articles*, roll is a list of names of *persons* only.

"These signs have marked me extraordinary,

And all the courses of my life do show

I am not in the *roll* of common men."

Shakespeare.

A REGISTER (Fr. *registre*, from Lat. *re* and *gerere*, to carry back) is a record of persons and transactions connected with them, given with some fulness of detail, and according to a prescribed form, as a parish register of births, deaths, or marriages. Milton uses the term *regist* :—

"Others of later time have sought to assert him (Arthur) by old legends and cathedral *regist*s."

"They seem to have registered his sayings with wonderful fidelity, but not always in the order in which they come from him."—*Bishop Horsley.*

CATCH. SEIZE. SNATCH. GRASP. GRIPE.

To CATCH (Old Fr. *cacher*, to hunt) is to use such effort as shall arrest the movement of an object and gain possession of it. The effort may be indirectly made, as when a bird is caught in a snare. It is an act of some force, but more skill and quickness. To SEIZE (Fr. *saisir*) is to lay hold of by force and retain possession. The thing seized may be stationary or in motion. To SNATCH (Old Eng. *snack*) is to seize by a rapid and sudden effort for the purpose of appropriation, as seize is for detention. To GRASP is to continue to hold with a strong hold or embrace, for the purpose of detaining, or from fear of losing. It is also employed of comprehension by the intellect. To GRIPE is to grasp with a squeeze or pinch; and, in its secondary sense, to keep tight out of avarice.

"So saying, he caught him up, and without wing

Of Hippogrif, bore through the air sublime
Over the wilderness and o'er the plain."

Milton.

Catch and seize have both a recognized secondary meaning; the former applying to mental deception or ensnarement, the latter to the influence of emotion, as—

"Admiration seized

All heaven, what this might mean or whither tend."

Milton.

"These are the agonies but of one single person whom death *snatches* away in the midst of his years, his pleasures, and his hopes."—*Stillingfleet.*

"Let the reading be pleasant and striking, and the memory will *grasp* and retain all that is sufficient for the purposes of valuable improvement."—*Knox.*

"The sacrilegious *gripe* of those execrable wretches."—*Burke.*

CAVIL. See CAPTIOUS.

CAVITY. HOLLOW. HOLE. CONCAVITY. PERFORATION. BORE. EXCAVATION. ORIFICE.

Every HOLE (A. S. *hol*) is a HOLLOW and a CAVITY, but every hollow or every cavity is not a hole. Hole is generic, a deep hollow, in which the cavity communicates externally by a comparatively narrow or small aperture, or a perforation through a solid body. Hollow is the interior part of a hollow body excavated by nature or by art, as the hollow of a nut. Where the cavity communicates externally by two apertures, it is a PERFORATION (*per*, through, and *foris*, a door). A CONCAVITY is a slight superficial cavity, as in the eye-glasses called concave. An EXCAVATION (*ex*, out, and *cavus*, hollow) is a hollow, more or less deep, which has been formed out of a solid mass by some living or mechanical agency. The term perforation is sometimes used for that which penetrates but does not pierce through a substance. This is better expressed by BORE, as the bore of a gun (A. S. *borian*, to bore, allied to *foris*). Bore is, however, used in the same way also, as to bore a tunnel through a mountain. A perforation is, however, in this case a lighter thing than a bore, which denotes the laborious piercing on a large scale of solid masses or materials. A thin sheet of paper might be perforated, not bored. We should not speak of the tunnel above mentioned as a perforation, though here and there the sea, we might say, has perforated the rocks. An ORIFICE (*orificium*, *os*, *oris*, the mouth, and *facere*, to make) is an opening which resembles the mouth in form and use, as the orifice of a tube or a flower, open outwardly and closed within.

"Jehoiada the priest took a chest, and bored a hole in the lid of it."—*Bible.*

"Upon weighing the heart in my hand I found it to be extremely light, and consequently very *hollow*, which I did not wonder at, when upon looking inside of it I saw multitudes of cells and *cavities* running one within another."—*Spectator.*

Cavity is more a term of descriptive science than hole, and is, of course,

also essentially distinct from hole in the sense of perforation.

"Look upon the outside of a dome, your eye half surrounds it; look up into the inside, and at one glance you have all the prospect of it. The entire *concavity* falls into your eye at once."—*Spectator*.

"Herein may be perceived slender *perforations*, at which may be expressed a black fœculent matter."—*Brown's Vulgar Errors*.

"The appearance, therefore, of the dry land was by the *excavation* of certain sinus and tracts of the earth, and exaggerating and lifting up other parts of the terrestrial matters, and by this means the water subsided into those caverns and valleys prepared for its reception."—*Hale*.

CAUSE. See CREATE.

CAUSE. See CASE.

CAUSE. See ORIGIN and REASON.

CAUTION. See ADMONISH.

CAUTIOUS. CAREFUL. WARY. CIRCUMSPECT. PRUDENT. DISCREET.

CAUTIOUS (Lat. *cautus*, from *cavere*, to take heed) expresses the character which realizes the constant possibility of danger whether in physical or moral things. It is prudence in regard to danger in particular. It is apt to become excessive, and is then over-timidity, and caution may be either wise or weak.

"And yet these same *cautious* and quick-sighted gentlemen can wink and swallow down this sottish opinion about percipient atoms which exceeds in credibility all the fictions of Æsop's fables."—*Bentley*.

PRUDENCE, on the other hand (*prudentia*, for *providentia*), is active and positive, while caution is negative, with a frequent tendency to inaction. While caution only deters from the dangerous, prudence prompts to the desirable, if it be safe.

"Prudence is goodly wisdom in knowing of things."—*Chaucer*.

DISCREET (Lat. *discretus*, from *discernere*) involves the natural aptitude to discern between good and evil, truth and falsehood, and, on a lower scale, the desirable and the undesirable. As prudence is the quality which enables us to pierce probabilities, and to act accordingly, so dis-

cretion has to do with facts and circumstances present and before us. The prudent man prepares for what is coming; the discreet man judges of present affairs. It is prudent to provide against bad weather; it is discreet not to allude to an offensive subject.

"He will guide his words with *discretion*."—*Bible*.

CAREFUL (having care) expresses what is expressed by cautious, and more besides. The careful person has before him a sense of danger, error, or failure, and, so far, he is cautious; but care proceeds also from interest, zeal, personal attachment toward others. The parent is cautious who tries to keep his child out of harm which is likely to beset him; but he is careful even when he is not thinking of danger, as in his training and education generally. Caution avoids doing the wrong thing; carefulness seeks also rightly to do the right.

"Jehoiada then occupied the priesthood, an honourable, wise, and religious man. To his *carefulness* it may be ascribed that the state of the church was in some slender sort upheld in those unhappy times."—*Ralegh, History of the World*.

"Then judge yourself, and prove your man
As *circumspectly* as you can;

And having made election,
Beware no negligence of yours,
Such as a friend but ill endures,
Enfeeble his affection." *Corper*.

WARY and CIRCUMSPECT are closely allied; but wary (A. S. *war*, *wär*, aware) is applicable to the vigilant cunning of mere animal self-preservation, while circumspect belongs to the higher matters of prudential conduct and morality (*circumspicere*, to look around). An animal might be said to be wary, that is, to have an instinctive sense of danger; but only a moral and reasoning being could be circumspect.

"The bear hunts them by scent till he come in sight, when he advances *warily*, keeping above them, and concealing himself among the rocks as he makes his approaches, till he gets immediately over them and nigh enough for the purpose."—*Cook's Voyages*.

CEASE. DISCONTINUE.

To CEASE (Lat. *cessare*), when used

as a transitive verb, is to put a stop to, or bring to an end simply; when as an intransitive verb, it means in the same way simply to come to an end. The sound ceased. It is more commonly used in the intransitive way. As a transitive verb, it implies a former course of operative action, which is voluntarily terminated by the agent. This notion belongs also to DISCONTINUE (Lat. *dis* and *continuus*). The wind ceases to blow, the man ceases talking, and discontinues his work. Between the transitive cease and discontinue there exist some shades of difference. One ceases by abandoning; one discontinues by interrupting; one ceases an operation of any kind, as to cease chattering; one discontinues a set process. To cease involves a more direct act than discontinue. I cease working when I feel wearied by it. In the other, a casual interruption may have compelled me to discontinue it.

"Cease to do evil, learn to do well."—*Bible*.

To TERMINATE (*terminus*, a boundary) is to discontinue at the ultimate point, and so often means to bring to an appointed end, when the thing ought not to be allowed to go farther. Hence the word is characteristically employed of discussion and dispute. It involves the interposition of power and authority, and stands opposed to prolongation. The verb terminate is used also intransitively, in which case it means to come to a stop, to meet with a boundary, or something which causes cessation.

"The thought that our existence terminates with this life doth naturally check the soul in any generous pursuit."—*Berkeley*.

"I wish that milder love or death,
That ends our miseries with our breath,
Would my affections terminate;
For to my soul, deprived of peace,
It is a torment worse than these
Thus wretchedly to love and hate."

Cotton.

CEDE. CONCEDE. YIELD. GRANT.

To CEDE (Lat. *cedere*) is to give up in a formal manner, and with reference to recognized rights and claims on either side, as a nation

cedes a territory under treaty to another nation. It is a tribute to the claims of justice, an act of dignity and right combined. To CONCEDE, which is a compound form of the above, is to give up with an implication of a power to withhold. It is more commonly used in matters of debate or claim. It is, therefore, an act of discretion or courtesy, or anything short of absolute compulsion. YIELD is to give up under some degree of pressure at least, if not absolute compulsion. To GRANT (Old Eng. *graunt*) is to give voluntarily, or in return to petition, but not coercion or compulsion. It denotes freedom and liberality in giving or giving up.

"The whole island (St. Christopher) was ceded in sovereignty to the crown of Great Britain by the Treaty of Utrecht."—*Grainger*.

"The first is *petitio principii*, which fallacy is committed where that is assumed as a principle to prove another thing which is not conceded as true in itself."—*Brown's Vulgar Errors*.

"The fourth disposition for peace—an *yieldableness* upon sight of clearer truths."—*Bishop Hall*.

"Both sides being desirers, and neither granters, they broke off the conference."—*Sidney's Arcadia*.

CELEBRATE. COMMEMORATE.

To CELEBRATE (Lat. *celebrare*) is to extol or honour in a solemn manner. It is used of persons, deeds, events, and days or seasons. COMMEMORATE (*commemorare*) is to recal in a solemn manner. Hence it follows that we celebrate what is marked, striking, illustrious. We commemorate what is dear and interesting to us. The same things, from different points of view, may often be said to be both celebrated and commemorated. We commemorate the battle of Waterloo when we mark the day on which it comes round in some special manner. We celebrate it when we treat it as an illustrious day with festivities, public demonstrations, panegyric speeches, and the like. The birthday of the member of a family is annually commemorated by some little observance of the day; but the event is not illustrious enough to be celebrated. Hence,

too, events of importance and interest, but of a melancholy character, such as the death of a great or beloved person, would be commemorated, not celebrated. It will be observed from this that celebrate refers to what is past and to what is present, commemorate only to what is past.

"It may happen in the various combinations of life that a good man may receive favours from one who notwithstanding his accidental beneficence cannot be justly proposed to the imitation of others, and whom therefore he must find some other way of rewarding than by public celebrations."—*Rambler*.

"You will pardon me, I hope, for speaking in this advantageous manner of my own conduct; but as you advise me to alleviate my present uneasiness by a retrospect of my past actions, I will confess that in thus commemorating them I find great consolation."—*Melmoth, Cicero*.

CELEBRATED. See FAMOUS.

CELERITY. See QUICKNESS.

CELESTIAL. See HEAVENLY.

CENSORIOUS. See CAPTIOUS.

CENSURE. See BLAME.

CEREMONIAL. See FORMAL.

CEREMONIOUS. See FORMAL.

CEREMONY. FORM. RITE. OBSERVANCE.

All these terms relate to the solemn, prescribed, and public acts of society. FORM (Lat. *forma*) is the most generic. Form means generally a definite and prescribed mode of doing a thing in all transactions of life, and applies to many matters which are not connected with social intercourse and manners, or have a character of publicity, as a form of returns for registration.

"Many that vehemently oppose forms are the greatest formalists."—*Glanvill*.

A CEREMONY (Lat. *ceremonia*) is such a form as regulates public transactions, or the demeanour of individuals in cases where any degree of respect has to be shown, whether in mutual civility and propriety, or religious devotion.

"Not to use ceremonies at all is to teach others not to use them again, and so diminish respect to himself, especially they are not to

be omitted to strangers and formal natures. But the dwelling upon them and exalting them above the moon is not only tedious, but doth diminish the faith and credit of him that speaks."—*Bacon*.

RITE (Lat. *ritus*) is a ceremony of a peculiarly solemn or sacredly important character, which is of a religious or gravely political nature.

"It is very plain that baptism, which is by all acknowledged to be the rite of initiating us into Christianity, is in Scripture declared to be the rite whereby we are entered and admitted into the Church."—*Sharp*.

OBSERVANCE (Lat. *observantia*, *observare*, to observe) is, like rite, of a religious character; but as rite is performed by public and responsible officers, observances may be kept by individuals, and even in private, as "some persons are strict in the observance of Lent." Hence the term relates more commonly to the customs and times of observance, as the observance of a sabbath, than to the objects of it. We should say, not the observance, but the commemoration of Christ's resurrection; on the other hand, Easter Day is observed. An observance is rather a way of acting than a formal, ceremonial, or definite act. Hence we speak of observing a strict silence.

"Since the obligation upon Christians to comply with the religious observance of Sunday arises from the public uses of the institution and the authority of the apostolic practice, the manner of observing it ought to be that which best fulfils these uses and conforms the nearest to this practice."—*Paley*.

CERTAIN. See ACTUAL and SURE.

CESSATION. See CEASE and INTERMISSION.

CHASE. HUNT. PURSUE.

TO HUNT (A. S. *huntian*) is to seek by close pursuit, by a search for objects not within sight. CHASE is a pursuit of objects which are within sight. The fox is hunted in the cover, and chased when he leaves it. This distinction is often lost sight of; and we speak of a boy hunting a butterfly, instead of chasing it. TO PURSUE (Fr. *poursuivre*), like hunt, includes the idea of following after what is not

within sight. A wild animal is pursued by the track which he leaves; when he catches sight of his pursuers, he probably flies, and is then chased. Thus chase involves more simply than pursue the notion of driving an object before one. Pursue, as it denotes primarily the following of a continuous course, is directly applicable to the course itself, as to pursue a line of conduct. One pursues when one follows after an object, in spite of danger, difficulties, and obstacles, with sustained effort and energy.

"Now therefore let not my blood fall to the earth before the face of the Lord; for the King of Israel is come out to seek a flea; as when one doth hunt a partridge upon the mountains."—*Bible*.

"The glare did not continue long before it rained again, and kept us from sight of each other; but if they had seen and *chased* us, we were resolved to run our bark and canoes ashore, and take ourselves to the mountains."—*Dampier's Voyages*.

"Impelled with steps unceasing to pursue
Some fleeting good that mocks me with the
view,
That, like the circle bounding earth and
skies,
Allures from far, yet, as I follow, flies."
Goldsmith.

CHAFE. FRET. GALL. RUB.

CHAFE (Fr. *chauffer*, Lat. *calefacere*), like fret and gall, is used metaphorically. It is to excite heat in the mind, as physical heat or irritation is excited by friction. It is commonly employed of the excitement of feelings of irritation, vexation, annoyance, or petty anger. To FRET (A. S. *fretan*, to eat, gnaw) is used of small irritations, which produce their effect by their continuance and repetition, and sadden the spirits. GALL (Fr. *galer*, to rub, scratch, *gale*, itch, scab) is used of such vexations as have a humiliating effect, or, as it were, wound the pride. RUB is no more than friction, which may be wholesome and needful, or galling and vexatious, according to circumstances. It is seldom used except in the literal sense, though the noun rub is sometimes employed of the rough contacts of society. It is employed, unlike the others, of the person suffering, as well

as the annoyance suffered, that is, the annoyance chafes, or the person chafes against the annoyance.

"The inward *chafings* and agitations of his struggling soul."—*South*.

"Fret not thyself because of the ungodly."—*Book of Psalms*.

"The necks of mortal men having been never before galled with the yoke of foreign dominion, nor having had experience of that most miserable and detested condition of living in slavery."—*Raleigh*.

"And these are wonderfully busy and active to throw *rubs* and stumbling-blocks in our way."—*Sharp*.

CHALLENGE. BRAVE. DEFY. DARE.

CHALLENGE (Old Fr. *chalenger*, Lat. *calumniari*) is to provoke or summon to answer for something, and therefore can only be properly used of personal adversaries. It is a call to combat, which must be appreciated by two persons. It is a rhetorical analogy to speak of challenging danger. BRAVE (Fr. *brave*) is to meet with courage an opposing danger or force, whether living or not, and whether initiated by words or not. It belongs to physical and moral courage. To defy and to dare, when used as active verbs, have this difference. To DEFY a person to do a thing (Fr. *défier*) implies the expression of your own cheap estimate of his efforts. To DARE him to do it (Saxon *dyrran*) is to put him on his own courage or resources, with an implied notion that he will think better than make the attempt. The original idea of reproach, as lying at the bottom of challenge, survives in the phrase, "to challenge the truth of a statement," that is, to call it out as untrue, with a view to combat it.

"Yet I am far from thinking this tenderness universally necessary; for he that writes may be considered as a general *challenger* whom every one has a right to attack."—*Rambler*.

"Face not me, thou hast *braved* many men: *brave* not me. I will neither be faced nor *braved*."—*Shakespeare*.

The radical meaning of defy is to reject alliance, *i.e.*, faith given;

hence to proclaim hostility, or to renounce. So Sir T. Wyatt's oration—

"What word gave I unto thee, Mason? What message? I *defy* all familiarity and friendship betwixt us. Say thy worst."

"What! is Brutus sick,
And will he steal out of his wholesome
bed

To *dare* the vile contagion of the night?"

Shakespeare.

CHAMPION. HERO. COMBATANT.

A CHAMPION (Fr. *champion*, Low Lat. *campio*, from *campus*, a man of the field) is one who is ready singly to contend on behalf of another or a cause.

"In a battle every man should fight as if he were the single *champion*; in preparations for war every man should think as if the last event depended on his own counsel."—*Idler*.

HERO (Lat. *heros*) expresses a man of distinguished valour or daring, whether as a champion, combatant, soldier, or man of adventure. The champion is ready to fight; the hero has fought, and has perhaps retired to live a life of peace.

"The most magnanimous *hero* of the field will earnestly solicit the aid of a physician on a bed of sickness."—*Cogan*.

A COMBATANT (Fr. *combattre*, to fight) is a hand-to-hand fighter in a personal engagement. The term is hardly applicable to regular and disciplined fighting of armies on the modern field of battle. Individual soldiers in action are not called combatants.

"To have the *combat* ended by parting the combatants."—*South*.

CHANCE. ACCIDENT. FORTUNE. HAZARD. PROBABILITY.

CHANCE (Fr. *chance*, Low Lat. *cadentia*) is a befalling. It is used, as was observed under accident, in two distinct though closely associated meanings; either, 1, to express the absence of assignable cause, or, 2, the absence of design. An instance of the former is, "By chance the tyrant that morning was in a good humour;" an instance of the latter would be, "I aimed at the red ball, and by chance

I struck the white one also." In the former case no cause can be specified, though of course some cause existed; in the latter the cause might be distinctly seen and observed, but the effect was not the result designed.

"It is not, I say, merely in a pious manner of expression that the Scripture thus ascribes every event to the providence of God, but it is strictly and philosophically true in nature and reason that there is no such thing as *chance* or accident; it being evident that these words do not signify anything really existing, anything that is truly an agent or the cause of any event, but they signify merely men's ignorance of the real and immediate cause."—*Clarke*.

ACCIDENT (Lat. *accidere*, another form of *cadere*, whence chance was derived) is relative, as chance is absolute. Accident is chance in some effect produced. In chance the abstract may not have become the concrete, as when we say, "Yes, but what if it should chance to turn out differently?" or, "There is a chance of its turning out differently;" but an accident is historical and actual. Hence it follows that accident is very often partial chance, in which chance and design are blended; yet the effect was not designed. Such would be the character of the remark, "He wounded him by accident in fencing." There is a complexion of the untoward in the word accident; if the contrary is meant, we add a word, as a lucky accident.

"Place, riches, favour—
Prizes of *accident* as oft as merit."

Shakespeare.

FORTUNE (Lat. *fortuna*) is chance or accident as they regard human life and its hopes, employments, and undertakings, for good or evil, success or failure. Chance has nothing in it either of order or design. One does not impersonate it, nor attribute to it knowledge or will. Fortune forms plans, but without choice. One attributes to it a will without discernment, and says that she has freaks, or acts blindfold.

"*Fortune* a goddess is to fools alone;
The wise are always masters of their own."
Dryden.

HAZARD (Fr. *hazard*) is the opera-

tion of chance so far as man voluntarily places himself within the range of it.

"I am always willing to run some hazard of being tedious, in order to be sure that I am perspicuous."—*Adam Smith*.

PROBABILITY (Lat. *probabilis, probare*, to prove) partakes of the mixed nature of certainty and chance. It is founded upon the doctrine that "like causes produce like effects." The chance or uncertainty is represented by the question, "Are the causes in the present case sufficiently like to past experience?" If so, the thing is probable.

"A demonstration is the showing the agreement or disagreement of two ideas by the intervention of one or more proofs which have a constant, immutable, and visible connection one with another; so *probability* is nothing but the appearance of such an agreement or disagreement, by the intervention of proofs whose connection is not constant or immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so, but is or appears for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition to be true or false rather than the contrary."—*Locke*.

CHANCE. See **HAPPEN**.

CHANGE. See **BARTER**.

CHANGE. **ALTER.** **VARY.**

CHANGE (Fr. *changer*) which is generic, as also the other two of these synonyms, is employed both as a transitive and an intransitive verb. As the former, to change a thing is to put another in its place. This loss of identity is not expressed by the intransitive form, as, he changes every day. To **ALTER** (Lat. *alter*, another) is to preserve the identity while we change some portion of it, or some property of it, as its shape or colour. To **VARY** (Lat. *variare*) is to cause a thing to differ at different times, or one portion of it to differ from another. A lady varies her appearance when she frequently changes her dress. Even where the same things are referred to, change is a stronger term than alter; the most trivial removal or substitution of detail alters a thing, yet the change may be almost imperceptible. In this case changes are alterations of a

considerable character. In some particular connections these distinctive forces are very perceptible. We alter our opinions when they become in some respects not what we used to hold; we change them when we abandon them altogether, and adopt others in their stead. We should be said to vary a statement if we made it in different forms at different times, to alter it if we made the change but once.

"I would not exclude *alteration* neither, but even when I *changed* it should be to preserve."—*Burke*.

"Whether shall we profess some trade or skill,
Or shall we vary our device at will?"
Spenser.

CHANGEABLE. See **INCONSTANT**.

CHANGEABLENESS. See **CAPRICE**.

CHARACTER is the Greek *χαρακτήρ*, a furrow or groove, cut or engraved, from which several meanings have flowed, as a distinctive mark, letter, or sign, a national mode of writing, the stamp or general nature of a thing, the stamp of an individual, and the estimate in which he is held socially. These it will be necessary to notice separately, each with its own synonyms.

CHARACTER. **LETTER.**

CHARACTER is to **LETTER** (Lat. *litera*) as genus to species. Every letter is a character, but every character is not a letter. Character embraces other distinctive signs stamped or engraved. We might speak of hieroglyphic characters, or the characters of short-hand, which nevertheless are not letters. A letter is a component part of the common alphabet of any language.

"Almost all the men had their names traced upon their arms in indelible characters of a black colour."—*Cook's Voyages*.

"The essence of *letters* doth consist in their power or proper sound, which may be naturally fixed and stated from the manner of forming them by the instruments of speech, and either is or should be the same in all languages."—*Wilkins*.

CHARACTER. REPUTATION. CREDIT.

In this connection CHARACTER is used of the whole complex constitution of a man's personal qualities. It therefore exists anterior to and independent of his reputation. A common character has no reputation at all. When used of the personal stamp as *regarded by others*, it still differs somewhat from reputation. It is moral, while reputation extends to other qualities. A man has a character for honesty or dishonesty; he has hardly a character for talent; in this case we should use REPUTATION (Lat. *reputare*, to repute), because the mental qualities of a person are not that aspect of his nature which passes commonly before the world for judgment. His moral qualities affect his friends and connections, his intellectual qualities affect himself. CREDIT is that trustworthiness which is based upon what is known of character (*credere*, to trust), and relates both to right conduct and the truth of propositions. Credit may be given on specific occasions only; character and reputation are permanent. Character is borne, reputation acquired, credit given. Reputation is more than ordinary, character and credit belong to ordinary deeds, conduct, and persons, unless some specific epithet is added.

"He will represent to him as often, with as much zeal as you or I should, the virtues of his ancestors, and what a glorious weight of illustrious *characters* he has to support."—*Melmoth, Cicero*.

"*Reputation* is the greatest engine by which those who are possessed of power must make that power serviceable to the ends and uses of government."—*Atterbury*.

"If the Gospel and the Apostles may be *credited*, no man can be a Christian without charity, and without that faith which works not by force but by love."—*Locke*.

CHARACTER. See DISPOSITION.

CHARACTER. STAMP. ASPECT.
NATURE. KIND. SORT. ASSORT-
MENT. SPECIES. GENUS. FORM.
CAST. ORDER. AIR. MOULD.
SHAPE.

CHARACTER in this sense is pur-

posely vague. It is that view of the nature which is external and strikes the natural eye or the eye of the mind as being of a certain order. A landscape of a barren character is one in which certain broad features of barrenness predominate, so as to affect the whole. This is character in the sense of outline or general configuration as it strikes the eye at a single glance.

"Let a man think what multitudes of those among whom he dwells are totally ignorant of his name and *character*."—*Blair*.

That is, generally, what manner of man he is. On the other hand, the verb *characterize* has rather the sense of affixing by words an appropriate mark upon a thing or person, as:

"You must know, sir, that I am one of that species of women whom you have *characterized* under the name of jilts."—*Spectator*.

STAMP (Germ. *stampfen*) is that general impression which a thing gives us of itself: it is in English what character is in Greek. It is used also in detail, as a stamp of nobility in personal appearance. The verb to stamp is in its secondary sense moral—to affix a moral character, or at least a distinctive one; to characterize is rather logical and definitive. Circumstances may stamp a man, words characterize him.

"A young maid truly of the finest *stamp* of beauty."—*Sydney, Arcadia*.

ASPECT (Lat. *aspicere*, to look towards) is that portion of the nature of a thing which for the present meets our observation. In the moral as in the natural world the eye cannot see an object in its entirety, but can only in series observe its different aspects; the same thing may present different aspects, which nevertheless belong to the series of manifestations under which it is known and recognized. A characteristic side of a thing is its aspect. As character and stamp are objective, so aspect is subjective, that is, aspect is character as seen by and impressed on ourselves. So that two things sometimes wear different aspects to two persons.

"Tydides stood in aspect lion-like,
And terrible in strength as forest boars."
Cowper, Iliad.

NATURE (Lat. *natura*) is a word of wider meaning, embracing all that makes a thing to be what it is, its essence or definition, its properties, form, tendencies, faculties, qualities, and the like.

"Nature, then, according to the opinion of Aristotle, is the beginning of motion and rest, in that thing wherein it is properly and principally, not by accident; for all things to be seen (which are done neither by fortune nor by necessity, and are not divine, nor have any such efficient cause) are called material, as having a proper and peculiar nature of their own."—*Holland, Plutarch.*

KIND (A. S. *cynd*) is the nature according to its place in creation, while **SORT** (Fr. *sorte*) denotes mere assemblage on vague principles of similarity without any natural affinity, as a certain kind of animal, a certain sort of coat. When things of a sort are collected for the purpose of being more conveniently dealt with as such, it is called an **ASSORTMENT**. It is, however, possible that any parcel of things may have a natural affinity, but it is not simply as having it that they are *sorted*.

"Some of you, on pure instinct of nature,
Are led by *kind* to admire your fellow-creature."
Dryden.

"Shell-fish have been by some of the ancients compared and *sorted* with insects."—*Bacon.*

"An adjective is by nature a general, and in some measure an abstract word, and necessarily presupposes the idea of a certain species or *assortment* of things to all of which it is equally applicable."—*Smith, Formation of Languages.*

SPECIES and **GENUS** are Latin scientific and correlative terms. The genus is the higher species in logic, that is, the species which approaches nearer to the abstract or supreme genus; while species is the lower genus, or that which approaches nearer to the individual. So the same may be genus or species according to its relative position in the scale.

"In the defining of words, which is nothing but declaring their signification, we make use of the *genus*, or next general word which comprehends it."—*Locke.*

Not that this is the whole process of logical definition, for to the genus has to be added the differentia or distinctive property.

FORM (Lat. *forma*) is a particular mode of manifestation in anything which is wont to manifest itself under several like or cognate manifestations, as the same or different form of hat, the same or different form of address, the same or different form of speech.

"Of bodies changed to various forms I sing."
Dryden, Ovid.

CAST (Dan. *kaste*, to throw) is used almost in the same way as **MOULD** (Fr. *moule*, Lat. *modulus*); but we commonly apply cast to what is personal in countenance, character, appearance, and mould when we entertain the idea not only of shape or impression on ourselves but of formative origin.

"The business men are chiefly conversant in does not only give a certain *cast* or turn to their minds, but is very often apparent in their outward behaviour and some of the most indifferent actions of their lives."—*Spectator.*

"My sonne, if thou of such a *mold*
Art made, now tell me pleine thy shrift."
Gower.

ORDER (Lat. *ordo*) denotes commonly not only the characteristic nature and kind, but a reference to a scale, as of a high or low order. The notion conveyed by such an expression as a thing of the same or a different order, is partly scientific and partly not. The word order in scientific classification commonly means a group of allied individuals more comprehensive than the genus. As employed conventionally, relative dignity, value, or worth is implied in the term.

"Men shulde it in the prestes find,
Their *order* is of so high a kynde."
Gower.

AIR signifies such a manifestation of character as is made involuntarily. It is applied both to persons and analogously to things, as such and such a theory wears an intelligible air, by which we mean to grant that there may be something in it accordant with truth and common sense, if it were worth while to examine it.

"It is certain that married persons who are possessed with a mutual esteem, not only catch the *air* and way of talk from one another, but fall into the same traces of thinking and liking."—*Spectator*.

SHAPE is simply such external form or configuration as belongs or may be conceived to belong to anything. It differs from form in this character of externality. The form of a thing results from the relative aggregation of its parts, both internal and external, that is, its solidity as well as its surface. Shape refers to the superficies, but not the substance. The form includes length, breadth, and thickness; the shape is only what meets the eye. This difference appears more strongly in the verbs than the nouns: to form a thing is as it were to create it. God formed, not merely shaped, man out of the dust of the ground. Nature forms the marble, man shapes the block. He may also be said to form the statue, because he actually makes it; as such it did not exist before. To form involves the use and preparation of materials; to shape may be no more than to give them a contour superficially.

"And eke his garment to be thereto meet,
He wilfully did cut, and *shape* anew."
Spenser.

CHARACTERIZE. See DESCRIBE.

CHARGE. ACCUSE. IMPEACH.
ARRAIGN. CRIMINATE. INDICT.

Of these CHARGE (Fr. *charger*) is the most generic. It is to lay upon a person a burden, hence specifically of imputed guilt, and this either formally or legally, or generally and morally. Hence it refers to many things which are not of the specific nature of crimes, as a dereliction of duty, or dishonesty, or a want of fidelity to oneself, may be the object of a charge. "I charge him with having indolently let slip many occasions of improving his condition."

"Men do not pick quarrels with their friends, and therefore when we find any *charging* the Scripture with obscurity and imperfection, we have reason to believe they have no comfort from it."—*Stillingfleet*.

ACCUSE (Lat. *accusare*) refers to failings, faults, or crimes by which *others* are injured. It also implies more than a mere mouth-to-mouth imputation; it is formal and public. I may charge a man with a crime between myself and him, but if I accuse him of it, I make the charge a matter of publicity. CRIMINATE (Lat. *crimen*, a crime) is yet stronger. It is to bring against another a charge in such a way that he finds himself compelled to deal with the matter as personal and imminent. Circumstances may criminate, while only persons charge or accuse. Criminate has a stronger relation to the state of the person. A man criminated feels himself placed in the position of a grave offender.

"Their thoughts the meanwhile *accusing* or else *excusing* one another."—*Bible*.

"To *criminate* with the heavy and ungrounded charge of disloyalty and disaffection an uncorrupt, independent, and reforming parliament."—*Burke*.

IMPEACH and ARRAIGN rather imply than express an accusation or charge. *Impeach* (Old Fr. *empescher*, Lat. *impingere*) is officially to charge with misbehaviour in office, and may relate to anything which is of the nature of an offence considering the office held. *Arraign* (Low Lat. *arractionare*) is to call to account, and is characteristically employed of the exercise of personal power of judgment. It is to call personally to account in a specific and summary manner, and may be directed against a course of conduct in an individual as well as specific matters of misdemeanour; but arraign more commonly relates to an act, impeach to a series of acts. *Impeach* is formal and official, *arraign* is informal and personal. *Arraign* involves a decisive act of power in a superior, of boldness in an equal or inferior.

"Censure, which *arraigns* the public actions and the private motives of princes, has ascribed to envy a conduct which might be attributed to the prudence and moderation of Hadrian."—*Gibbon*.

"Of these the representatives of the people, or House of Commons, cannot properly judge, because their constituents are the parties injured, and can therefore only *impeach*."

But before what court shall this impeachment be tried? Not before the ordinary tribunals, which would naturally be swayed by the authority of so powerful an accuser. Reason, therefore, will suggest that this branch of the legislature, which represents the people, must bring its charge against the other branch, which consists of the nobility, who have neither the same interests nor the same passions as popular assemblies."—*Blackstone*.

"An *indictment* is a written accusation of one or more persons of a crime or misdemeanour preferred to and presented upon oath by a grand jury."—*Ibid*.

INDICT (Lat. *indicare, indictus*) is a term regulated by the form of process and nature of the offence. In law it is the peculiar province of a grand jury to indict, as it is of a house of representatives to impeach.

CHARGE. CARE. MANAGEMENT. ADMINISTRATION. CONTROL. GOVERNMENT.

CHARGE in this sense denotes *delegated* care under circumstances of responsibility. **CARE** denotes no more than time bestowed upon an object with personal labour or attention. To take care of a child is to keep him out of harm's way. It is the work of solicitude and affection, as charge is of responsibility and duty. To take charge of him is to do everything in connection with him which another would require. For we take care of what is our own; we take charge of what is another's.

"I can never believe that the repugnance with which Tiberius took the *charge* of the government upon him was wholly feigned."—*Cumberland*.

MANAGEMENT (Old Fr. *menager*, from *manus*, the hand) is the concurrent control which regulates what has progression in itself, so that it may operate in the way in which it is designed, as a house, a garden, a steam-engine, a horse, a matter. It implies subjection where persons are concerned, as the management of a school. **ADMINISTRATION** (*administrare*) relates to offices of power and responsibility. Administration takes effect on men, management may belong only to machines; administra-

tion is executive, management may be manipulative. Administration, however, is always ministerial, that is, consists in putting the will or power of another in force; while **GOVERNMENT** (Lat. *gubernare*) involves every exercise of authority, political, civil, or domestic. The government of a country, when the term is not used of persons, is an abiding and perpetual power; the administration belongs to the persons who may be in office from time to time. **CONTROL** (Lat. *contra rotulus*) is, literally, to keep a check on a roll; hence to govern in movement and action where an independent will and power exists. Machines are managed; men, their acts, wills, desires, are controlled.

"I think myself indebted to you beyond all expression of gratitude for your *care* of my dear mother."—*Johnson*.

"Scripture gives something more than obscure intimations that the holy angels are employed upon extraordinary occasions in the affairs of men and the *management* of this sublunary world."—*Horsley*.

"He (the Earl of Clarendon) was a good chancellor, only a little too rough, but very impartial in the *administration* of justice."—*Burnet*.

"That which begins and actually constitutes any political society is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capable of a majority to unite and incorporate into such a society. And that is that, and that only, which did or could give any beginning to any lawful *government* in the world."—*Locke*.

"If the seeds of piety and virtue be but carefully sown at first, very much may be done by this means, even in the most depraved natures, towards the altering and changing of them, however to the checking and *controlling* of our vicious inclinations."—*Tillotson*.

CHARM. See CAPTIVATE.

CHARMING. See DELIGHTFUL.

CHASM. See BREACH.

CHASTEN. CHASTISE. PURIFY. PUNISH. CORRECT. DISCIPLINE.

Of these the two first are formed from the Latin *castus*, chaste, pure, and the last from *purus*, pure, and *facere*, to make. The term **PURIFY** is applicable to the removal of what

is noxious or impure in a moral, physical, or even ceremonial sense. To CHASTEN is to purify morally and spiritually by the providential visitation of distress and affliction, or generally to purify from errors or faults, as the effect of discipline. It implies imperfection, but not guilt.

"Oh, gently on thy suppliant's head,
Dread goddess, lay thy *chastening* hand;
Not in thy Gorgon terrors clad,
Nor circled with the vengeful band,
As by the impious thou art seen."

Gray, Hymn to Adversity.

"He *chastises* and *corrects* as to Him seems best in His deep unsearchable and secret judgment, and all for our good."—*Burton, Anatomy of Melancholy.*

"It was a received opinion in the ancient world that human nature had contracted a stain or pollution, and that not only particular *purifyings*, but also some general sanctification was necessary to put man in a capacity of being restored to the favour of the Deity."—*Warburton.*

"Yet these, receiving grafts of other kind,
Or thence transplanted, change their savage mind,
Their wildness lose, and quitting Nature's part,
Obey the rules and *discipline* of art."

Dryden, Virgil.

"O Lord, *correct* me, but with judgment; not in Thine anger, lest Thou bring me to nothing."—*Book of Common Prayer.*

CHASTISE, on the other hand, implies specific guilt or an offence. To PUNISH (Lat. *punire*) differs from chastise in the object aimed at. In the former it is to visit the offence upon the individual offender for his own good in correction and reformation; in the latter it is to satisfy public justice upon a member of a community. It is to be observed that punishment is often used of the consequences of wrong, irrespectively of any personal authority exercised. To CORRECT (*corrigere*) is, literally, to set right. As used of punishment, correction looks no further than to the individual fault. DISCIPLINE (Lat. *disciplina*) has for its object the amelioration of the whole character and the *prevention* of offences, nor does it imply necessarily that any have been committed. The purest and best natures recognize the need

of discipline in themselves. Discipline aims at the removal of bad habits, and the substitution of good ones, especially those of order, regularity, and obedience.

CHASTITY. CONTINENCE.

CHASTITY (Latin *castitas*, *castus*, chaste) is the regulation of the sexual desires, as by marriage, and all practical rules or modes of life which tend to it. CONTINENCE (Lat. *continentia*) is the absolute refraining from all such indulgences under interdiction. Chastity is enjoined upon all Christians. Continence is enjoined, for instance, on the Romish clergy.

"It was then that some gallant spirits, struck with a generous indignation at the tyranny of these miscreants, blessed solemnly by the bishop, and followed by the praises and vows of the people, sallied forth to vindicate the *chastity* of women, and to redress the wrongs of travellers and peaceable men."

—*Burke, Abridgment of English History.*

"As then the church had also a great number of persons of both sexes who consecrated themselves to God by a perfect *continence*, nothing was more reasonable than to choose its principal ministers out of this upper part of the flock."—*Tortia.*

CHASTISE. *See* CHASTEN.

CHAT. *See* BABBLE.

CHATELS. *See* GOODS.

CHATTER. *See* BABBLE.

CHEAT. DEFRAUD. TRICK.

CHEAT (probably an abbreviation of *escheat*, but compare also A. S. *ceat*) respects primarily the gain to *yourself* resulting from fraudulent practice upon another. DEFRAUD (Lat. *fraus*, fraud) respects the *loss to him*. Cheat is only applied to appropriations of minor value; defraud to those of the largest amount. Defraud hence regards matters of value generally, as rights and privileges. Cheat usually regards possessions. Cheating implies knavery; defrauding a settled plan or plot against another's interests.

"But since it is not so much worth our labour to know how deep the pit is into which we are fallen as how to come out of it, hear rather, I beseech you, for a conclusion, how

we may avoid the deceit of heart; even just so as we would prevent the nimble feats of some *cheating* juggler—search him, watch him, trust him not.”—*Bishop Hall*.

A man may be cheated out of that which he is aiming at obtaining; he is only defrauded of what he can claim as actually his. In games of chance or competition men often cheat; they do not defraud.

“The statute mentions only fraudulent gifts to third persons, and procuring them to be seized by sham process, in order to *defraud* creditors.”—*Blackstone*.

TO TRICK (Fr. *tricher*) is adroitly to deceive another, and implies more ingenuity than cheating. It does not of necessity involve any appropriation to oneself, or any loss to another, but may be dictated by mischievous as well as dishonest motives.

CHECK. See RESTRAIN.

CHEER. ANIMATE. ENCOURAGE.
ENLIVEN. EXHILARATE. COMFORT.
CONSOLE. SOLACE.

TO CHEER (from the noun cheer, and that from the Old Fr. *chere*, countenance, mien) is to put into good or better spirits. It respects a previous state of mental depression or despondency, and a change to a sober and quiet satisfaction at an improved state of circumstances.

“The Christian is justly *cheered* by the assurance he has that there will come a time when oppressed and disfigured innocency shall shine forth and triumph, and his good name, as well as his body, shall have a glorious resurrection even in the sight of his accusers and enemies, and all those whom their slanders did either prevail with or startle.”—*Boyle*.

TO ANIMATE (*anima*, life) is to put life, vitality, or vivacity into, and respects a previous state of dullness, slowness, indifference, or inertness. It has an influence on the looks, words, and movements, as when an orator in the course of his oration becomes more animated. Reflection cheers, passion animates.

“Wherever we are formed by Nature to any active purpose, the passion which *animates* us to it is attended with delight or a pleasure of some kind.”—*Burke*.

ENCOURAGE (Fr. *encourager*) is to give heart, and so respects a previous state of comparative diffidence or irresolution. It implies something proposed as an aim of action, either by the words of another, or by the mind reflecting on some external event.

“Plato would have women follow the camp, to be spectators and *encouragers* of noble actions.”—*Burton*.

ENLIVEN (Eng. life) is the English equivalent of animate; but it is not so grave a word, and relates to the minor matters of feeling and manner. It has also the meaning of to quicken what was previously less lively, and may be employed of purely physical energies, as to enliven a fire, that is, to make it burn more brightly. It is also directly applicable to works of art and descriptions or narratives.

“By this means I was enabled to *enliven* the poems by various touches of partial description.”—*Mason*.

EXHILARATE (Lat. *hilaris*, lively) denotes such cheering as has a combined effect on the spirits and the bodily frame. It may come of a primary influence on either, as to be exhilarated by good wine or good news. It denotes an effect upon the nervous system, and is thus exclusively applicable to persons.

“The truth is that this remedy, like strong drink to a nervous body, elivens for a while by an unnatural *exhilaration*.”—*Knox*.

COMFORT (Lat. *con*, and *fortis*, strong) and CONSOLE (Lat. *consolari*) both relate to relief brought from previous trouble of mind through the aid of admonition or reflection; but to comfort denotes the actual substitution of *happy* thoughts; while console denotes only the removal or diminution of the unhappy. Comfort and consolation address themselves to the intellectual nature.

“*Consolation* or *comfort* are words which in their proper acceptation signify some alleviation to that pain to which it is not in our power to afford the proper and adequate remedy. They imply rather an augmentation of the power of bearing than a diminution of the burden. To that grief which arises from a great loss he only brings the true remedy who makes his friend's con-

dition the same as before; but he may be properly termed a *comforter* who, by persuasion, extenuates the pain of poverty, and shows, in the style of Hesiod, that half is more than the whole."—*Rambler*.

SOLACE (Lat. *solatium*) differs from comfort and console in being never applied absolutely to human agents. A solace is a continuous consolation accruing from *something impersonal*, as certain modes or means of occupation, such as reflections, employments, books, or a person regarded as a blessing or possession.

"The ingenious biographer of the poet Gray has informed us that the most approved productions of his friend were brought forth soon after the death of one whom the poet loved. Sorrow led him to seek for *solace* of the muse."—*Knox, Essays*.

CHEERFUL. MERRY. SPRIGHTLY. GAY. MIRTHFUL. JOVIAL. LIVELY. VIVACIOUS. SPORTIVE.

CHEERFUL (*see* **CHEER**) is used both of that which possesses, and that which promotes good spirits, as a cheerful disposition, cheerful tidings. As applied to persons, cheerful denotes an habitual state of mind, the natural happiness of an even and contented disposition (*see* **CHEER**). **MERRY** points to an occasional and transient elevation of spirits. Mirth, which is the cognate noun to merry, is less tranquil than cheerfulness; it requires the companionship of others to feed upon—social excitement and the noise of jests and laughter are needful for mirth.

"Whoever has passed an evening with serious, melancholy people, and has observed how suddenly the conversation was animated, and what sprightliness diffused itself over the countenance, discourse, and behaviour of every one on the accession of a good-humoured, lively companion, such a one will easily allow that *cheerfulness* carries great weight with it, and naturally conciliates the good will of mankind."—*Hume*.

SPRIGHTLY (spright, a form of spirit) is purely a personal epithet. Sprightliness is a constitutional buoyancy and briskness of mind which shows itself in the bodily movements. It is in this extended sense only becoming in youth, and as

associated with beauty. A sprightly damsel, or a sprightly dame.

"Parents and schoolmasters may not be displeased at unlucky tricks played by their lads, as showing a sagacity and *sprightliness* they delight to behold. Yet they will not suffer them to pass with impunity, lest it should generate idleness and other mischiefs."—*Search*.

GAY (Fr. *gai*) is a term which denotes less of animal spirits, and expresses the brightness which appears outside, in the appearance or the aspect of things external, as a gay countenance, a gay dress, gay plumage, a gay scene. It combines the ideas of cheerfulness and showiness. As cheerfulness is unruffled, mirth tumultuous, sprightliness buoyant, so gaiety is characteristically self-indulgent. The lover of gaiety despises, dislikes, and avoids the responsibilities, duties, and sobrieties of existence, and would, if possible, ignore its troubles altogether.

"Profane men stick not, in the *gaiety* of their hearts, to say that a strict piety is good for nothing but to make the owners of it troublesome to themselves and useless to the rest of the world."—*Atterbury*.

MIRTHFUL is, as we have seen, only another form of merry; but it points more specifically to the laughter and the jest and the fun which are always *ready to appear* in the merry. Mirthful is more demonstrative than merry, and involves objects or subjects of it; while merry denotes no more than a condition of the spirits. The merry are gay, the mirthful are jocose also.

"If great crimes and great miseries be made the matter of our *mirth*, what can be the argument of our sorrow?"—*South*.

JOVIAL is a term expressive of a constitutional habit of mind and body. It meant, literally, born under the genial influence of the planet Jupiter, and was opposed to saturnine. It denotes a tendency to sensual merriment, and a contempt for the cares and anxieties of life.

"In pure good will I took this *joyal* spark
Of Oxford, he—a most egregious clerk."
Pope.

LIVELY is exhibiting life as contrary to dull or lifeless. It denotes an energetic action of the vital principle, whether of the sense or understanding, without of necessity implying merriment or gaiety. A lively child is the opposite to a dull child, brisk, bright, intelligent, observant. Lively conversation, lively movements, lively descriptions.

"Every person knows how faint the conception is which we form of anything with our eyes open in comparison of what we can form with our eyes shut, and that in proportion as we can suspend the exercise of our other senses, the *liveliness* of our conception increases."—*Stewart*.

VIVACIOUS (Lat. *vivax*) is matured liveliness, when those faculties which are developed by after years are seen to partake of the same liveliness of youth. It indicates a power as well as an activity of life, a capacity of keen appreciation of external things, which by no means implies perpetual merriment, but is as ready to express dissatisfaction as pleasure from the objects and experiences of life. The vivacious person lives, as it were, faster and more fully than his opposite, and experiences more and more varied sensations. Indeed, in Old English, the word meant long-lived, or having a tenacity to life.

"He had great *vivacity* in his fancy, as may appear by his inclination to poetry and the lively illustrations and many tender strains in his contemplations."—*Burnet, Life of Hale*.

SPORTIVE is tending to sport, which is practical merriment in this case; so that the word contains an element of something bordering on mockery or amusement at the expense of others, or in heedlessness. It carries with it an air of unregulated play of mind and speech, though less so than wanton; but is more innocent when applied, as it often is, to the natural playfulness of dumb and especially young animals.

"If a history so circumstantiated as that is shall be resolved into fable or parable, no history whatever can stand secure, but a wide door will be opened to the ravings of sportive wit or wanton fancy."—*Waterland*.

CHERISH. NOURISH. NURTURE.
FOSTER. FEED.

To CHERISH (Fr. *cherir*, from *cher*, dear) is to treat as dear, or to hold dear; hence, to keep faithfully or constantly. It is to treat with all the care and affection of which the nature of the thing cherished is capable. The cherished child receives from its parent all that it can need—food, warmth, shelter, clothing, education, advice, help. The cherished hope is kept, as it were, closely and faithfully, and guarded against all influences and considerations that might tend to weaken or destroy it. Alas, in this sense we cherish also prejudices, errors, and illusions. To cherish is to love with tenderness and predilection. The cherished object is precious to us. We feel it to be necessary to our happiness, perhaps our existence.

"He that comforts my wife is the *cherisher* of my flesh and blood."—*Shakespeare*.

To NOURISH (Fr. *nourrir*, Lat. *nutrire*) is to supply what is needful to the physical necessities of any growing body, as a child or a plant, thus differing from FEED (A. S. *fedan*), which is only strictly used of animals (though analogously also, as to feed a fire), and means no more than to give food, whether in sufficient or insufficient quantities. In feeding there is no idea beyond that of supplying with what is necessary to support life. In nourishing the idea is that of furnishing an organised and growing body with what is congenial to it, and with what it requires to be assimilated into its substance.

"The chyle being mixed herewith (the lymphia), partly for its better conversion into blood by a liquor of a middle nature between them both, and partly for its more ready adhesion to all the *nourishable* parts."—*Grew*.

"When, with the flocks, their *feeders* sought the shade."—*Philips*.

To NURTURE (from the same root as nourish) is to train up with fostering care, and so implies more than the giving what is needed for the mere development of the organi-

zation. To nurture, however, is, after all, only a physical act, while to cherish is moral, and involves the action of the affections. We nurture plants, but we do not cherish them, unless as associated with persons or scenes, which give them an analogous place to that of children in our affections. We nourish children by bodily food; we nurture them by mental food also.

"Understande, therefore, in thyn hert that as a man *nourtereth* his sonne, even so the Lord thy God *nourtereth* the."—*Bible*, 1551.

FOSTER (A. S. *fostrian*) is to supply with everything necessary for the life and growth. As in the case of the foster-parent, we foster things which are in some measure alien to ourselves, though we are interested in them; for instance, how marked the difference between fostering a hope and cherishing a hope. When we cherish it, we hold it as closely dear to us. We would not for the world perhaps part with it. We allow all weight to what strengthens, we turn a deaf ear to what would deprive us of it. To lose it would be to part with some portion of ourselves. But when we foster a hope, it is because we regard the good of the thing hoped for. We foster objects of pride and ambition, because we want to get them. We foster a feeling of anger when it suits our humour; we cherish it when we lie in wait for the time of revenge. We cherish, not only from self-love, but out of affection or interest. We foster for our own sake alone. We cherish in order to preserve. We foster in order to promote, increase, or strengthen. So foster is often used in an unfavourable way, as flattery fosters pride.

"Stage plays serve for nothing else but either to draw men on by degrees to idleness, or to *foster*, to foment them in it."—*Prynne*.

CHIDE. See BLAME.

CHIEF. MAIN. PRINCIPAL.
LEADING. CARDINAL. CAPITAL.

CHIEF (Fr. *chef*, *caput*, a head) retains its etymological force, and denotes priority in rank, order, or

consideration. The chief men of a city are the highest in rank and influence. The chief topics of a discourse are opposed to those which are of minor moment.

"What is man
If his *chief* good and market of his time
Be but to sleep and feed? a beast — no more."
Shakespeare.

MAIN (A. S. *māgen*, and other forms, force, from *magan*, to be strong) refers to that which is the more potent or extensive, and is thus applicable, as chief is not, to superior in quantity or size, as the main bulk of the army, the main pipes of an organ. Practically, the terms chief and main are often interchangeable; so we might speak of the chief inducements, or the main inducements to a certain line of conduct, only the chief would be those to which are assigned a foremost place in our consideration; the main would be those which exercised the greatest influence on us, or impressed us most with their power. Main is a less exact term than chief, not indicating so close a process of comparison or the result of our appreciation of strict and technical. The main points in a speech are roughly felt, and are estimated as such.

"There is scarce any instance of the history of the same person being written by four different contemporary historians, all perfectly agreeing in the *main* articles, and differing only in a few minute particulars of no moment."—*Porteus*.

PRINCIPAL (Lat. *principalis*) denotes the most prominent in any way, and that which would naturally strike the attention first on any account whatever. The principal cities of a country are the most prominent; such are London, Manchester, Oxford, Cambridge, Bristol, Brighton, and others, for very different reasons. Hence it does not follow that the chief cities of a country are the principal, for they may have a rank assigned them from various causes by no means proportioned to their present and actual influence or importance.

"Thanketh the maister of grace which of that good and al other is authour and *principal* doer."—*Chaucer*.

LEADING is simply taking the lead. The term, therefore, is only employed when the things to which it applies can by the mind be regarded as motive, operative, and influential, as the leading points of a case. We say, the leading men in a community, but not the leading cities of a country, as the mere notion of priority in series does not express the force of leading.

"He left his mother a countess by patent, which was a new *leading* example."—Wotton.

CARDINAL (Lat. *cardinalis*, from *cardo*, a hinge), literally denoting that on which a thing hinges, expresses the combined ideas of prominence and importance, but is a term technically restricted to certain subjects, as cardinal virtues, numbers, points of the compass, and signs of astronomy, or signs of the Zodiac. The term denotes primary importance in a class of similar things.

"Conscience and alle cristene and *cardinale* vertues."—Piers Ploughman.

CAPITAL (Lat. *capitalis*, from *caput*) is etymologically equivalent to chief, but, like cardinal, is technically restricted. It denotes what belongs to the head and life, and so is essential. The term is not now of frequent use in this sense, but common in the sense of excellent of its kind. An indication of the old sense of the term survives in the phrase "capital letter."

"*Cappitall* enemies unto his grace both in heart and in deed."—Barnes.

CHIEF. See HEAD.

CHIEFLY. PRINCIPALLY. ESPECIALLY. PARTICULARLY. PRIMARILY.

Of these, CHIEFLY and PRINCIPALLY are terms of relation in regard to a number, and therefore have a comparative force. ESPECIALLY, PARTICULARLY, and PRIMARILY are terms of relation in regard to individuals, and therefore have a superlative force. If I say, "Robberies happen chiefly by night," I mean that of the number which takes place, the majority are by night. If I say, "Such

a word is used principally in such a sense," I mean that of the number of cases in which it is used, the majority have this signification. If I say, "Men are but too ready to listen to adverse rumours, *especially* where they concern their enemies," I single out the foremost case. So is it in the following instances:—"Water is everywhere a blessing, *particularly* in hot climates;" "The building was intended *primarily* for a magazine."

CHIEF. See LEADER.

CHILDISH. PUERILE.

Both these terms are employed in an unfavourable sense, that is, in reference to cases where the weakness of the child or the character of the boy (Lat. *puer*, a boy) are out of place. No such disparagement belongs to the words childlike and boyish. CHILDISH is used of ideas, character, and conduct, as childish fancies, childish behaviour. PUERILE of modes of thought and judgment, as puerile objections in argument; the one indicates the trifling of the child, the other the immature weakness of the boy, as contrasted with the weight and wisdom of the man. As childish expresses the intellectual poverty, so childlike expresses the moral simplicity of a child.

"We cannot be so *childish* as to imagine that ambition is local, and that no other can be infected with it but those who rule within certain parallels of latitude and longitude."—Burke.

Piers Ploughman used the term in the sense of childlike:

"Charitie is a *childish* thing, as holi churche witnesseth."

As at present employed, that which is simply and absolutely weak or silly is called childish; that which, though such, aims at the character of the contrary, or is employed with gravity of purpose, is called puerile.

"The French have been notorious for generations for their *puerile* affectation of Roman forms, models, and historic precedents."—De Quincy.

CHOICE. OPTION. PREFERENCE. SELECTION. ELECTION.

CHOICE (Fr. *choix*) denotes the act and the power of choosing out of a number, with the sense, sometimes, of judgment in choice, as when we say to show choice. Every act of choice is determined by some motive or final purpose.

"This might have been avoided by anchoring more to the west, but I made *choice* of my situation for two reasons; first to be near the island we intended to land upon, and secondly, to be able to get to sea with any wind."—*Cook's Voyages*.

OPTION (Lat. *optio*, from *optare*) is the right or power of choice, or freedom from constraint in the act of choosing. It does not necessarily imply numbers, as it is at my option to act or not. The optional is opposed to the compulsory.

"The difference between the employment of language in such cases (in our speculations concerning individuals), and in our speculations concerning classes or genera, is, that in the former case the use of words is in a great measure *optional*, whereas in the latter it is essentially necessary."—*Dugald Stewart*.

PREFERENCE (Lat. *præ* and *ferre*) is the specific exercise of choice in reference to one or more objects of choice.

"I trust it will be allowed by all that in every act of will there is an act of choice; that in every volition there is a *preference*, or a prevailing inclination of the soul, whereby the soul at that instant is out of a state of perfect indifference with respect to the direct object of the volition."—*Edwards on the Will*.

SELECTION (Lat. *seligere*) means much the same as preference; but preference may express only a feeling, and always implies personal feeling. Selection is an act of taking one or more out of a number upon some principle of choice connected or not with personal feeling.

"And sure no little merit I may boast,
When such a man *selects* from such a host."
Dryden.

ELECTION (Lat. *eligere*) is selection with a view to privilege or office, and is, therefore, applicable only to persons, while both things and per-

sons may be selected. The object is practically so much more important than the source in elections, that the term elect is employed where only one person is concerned, and where, therefore, no choice was possible, as "only one candidate presented himself, and was unanimously elected."

"Experience overturns these airy fabrics, and teaches us that in a large society the *election* of a monarch can never devolve to the wisest or to the most numerous part of the people."—*Gibbon*.

CHOKE. SUFFOCATE. SMOTHER. STIFLE. STRANGLE.

CHOKE (A. S. *aceocjan*, from *ceac jani*) is a general term expressive of the stopping up of anything through which a free passage or current ought to exist, as a garden or a river may be choked with weeds, or the pipe of a drain may be choked. As used of the human body, it means to stop the passages of respiration by the introduction of foreign substances.

"Whose banks received the blood of many a thousand men,
On sad Palm Sunday slain; that Towton field we call,
Whose channel quite was *choked* with those that there did fall."

Drayton.

SUFFOCATE is from the Latin *suffocare*, from *sub*, under, and *faux*, the jaw. It is, therefore, only applicable, properly, to living beings. A fire may be *metaphorically* said to be suffocated, that is, deprived of free air, which it requires, after the likeness of living beings, but, at least, the river is not suffocated with weeds.

"Think of that, I that am as subject to heat as butter, a man of continual dissolution and thaw, it was a miracle to scape *suffocation*."—*Shakespeare*.

To STIFLE (diminutive of the old verb to stive, allied to the Latin *stipare*, to press) is commonly employed of the less gross substances, as smoke, dust, malaria, introduced into the respiratory organs, and interfering with their action in other ways than by mechanical obstruction. This is not, however, its exclusive use. In the following passage it is used in the sense of smother:—

"So he wrapped them, and entangled them, keeping down the feather-bed and pillows hard unto their mouths, that within a while, *smored and stifled*, their breath failing, they gave up to God their innocent souls, into the joys of heaven."—*Sir T. More*.

To STRANGLE (Lat. *strangulare*) is to stop the circulation of air in the respiratory organs by purely external and mechanical compression.

"First he (Tyndall) was with a halter *strangled* by the hangman, and afterwards consumed with fire."—*Fox, Life of Tyndall*.

SMOTHER (allied to *smoor*, A. S. *smorian*, to stew) is used of such stoppage of air as is produced by an overwhelming mass from without, being so far like strangled, and unlike choke and suffocate; but, from the nature of the case, there is no local application of force, as when a person is covered by an avalanche, and so smothered to death.

"She, *smothered* with so monstrous a weight, did sink down under it to the earth."—*Sidney's Arcadia*.

CHOLER. See WRATH.

CHOOSE. See CHOICE.

CHRONICLES. See HISTORY.

CIRCLE. See BALL.

CIRCUIT. See BALL and ROUND.

CIRCULATE. See PROPAGATE.

CIRCUMSCRIBE. INCLOSE. LIMIT. BOUND. RESTRICT. INCLUDE. ENVIRON. SURROUND. RESTRAIN. ENCIRCLE. ENCOMPASS. CONFINE.

To CIRCUMSCRIBE (Lat. *circum*, around, and *scribere*, to write or mark) is to inclose within a certain limit; but the term could only be very pedantically used of mere superficial extent. It denotes rather limitation of range, movement, action, play; as "his ambition was circumscribed by his poverty."

"Nor *circumscribed* alone
Their growing virtues, but their crimes con-
fined,
Forbade to wade through slaughter to a
throne,
And shut the gates of mercy on mankind."
Gray.

To INCLOSE (Lat. *includere*, *inclusus*) is, on the other hand, purely physical, as a town within walls, a letter in a cover, lands within a fence.

"Shall one, and he *inclosed* within your wall,
One rash imprisoned warrior, vanquish
all?"
Pitt's Virgil.

To LIMIT (Lat. *limes*, a limit) bears specific reference to movements or tendencies which are likely to pass beyond a certain number or extent.

"Nothing can be more evident than the necessity of *limiting* the field of our exertion if we are to benefit society by our labours."
—*Stewart*.

To BOUND denotes not restriction of action or by external influence, so much as the cessation of extension, as England is bounded on all sides by the ocean. The sphere of action is bounded; actions themselves are limited.

"Ye good distrest!
Ye noble few! who here unbending stand
Beneath life's pressure, yet bear up awhile,
And what your *bounded* view, which only saw
A little part, deemed evil, is no more."
Thomson.

On the other hand, RESTRICT (Lat. *restringere*) implies the confinement within certain limits or to a certain number or extent of what has a tendency to exceed them. But restrict differs both from limit and RESTRAIN (another form of restrict, Lat. *restringere*, *restrictus*). To restrict is relative, and restrain is absolute. We restrain a person from running when we compel him to walk, or hold him from doing anything he may be inclined to do; but we restrict him to a certain pace, or to certain limits which he must not pass.

"The common law of England indeed is said to abhor perpetuities, and they are accordingly more *restricted* there than in any other European monarchy; though even England is not altogether without them."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations*.

"Nor is the hand of the painter more *restrainable* than the pen of the poet."—*Brown, Vulgar Errors*.

For CONFINE, see CAPTIVITY. To ENCOMPASS (compass in, Fr. *compas*, Lat. *compassus*, a circle, from *passus*,

a pace) is to circumscribe a given space or locality, so as closely to surround it. While SURROUND itself (prefix sur and round) does not necessarily imply this closeness. A city may be encompassed with an army, so that all ingress and egress is prevented; this is not implied in saying that it is *surrounded*, as, for instance, by hills. A question may be encompassed with difficulty.

"Entirely encompassed the enemy's body of foot."—*Ludlow's Memoir*.

"But cloud instead, and ever-during dark,
Surrounds me, from the cheerful ways of men
Cut off." Milton.

INCLUDE (Lat. *includere*) is as invariably metaphysical as inclose is physical. "We will include you in our party," means, we will regard you as forming one of ourselves. A number, a designation, a definition, and the like, are the terms of inclusion.

"Our mayster Christ showeth that in fulfilling two of these commaundements bee all workes included."—*Barnes*.

To ENVIRON (Fr. *environner*) is a French word, which is as nearly as possible the equivalent of the English surround, but it presupposes some degree of magnitude, dignity, or importance in the surrounding things. We say the plain is environed by mountains, but we should hardly say, the table is environed by chairs. Of surround and environ, we may observe, that they do not denote of necessity any *restrictive* inclosure; for instance, a mere circular pattern or design might be said to surround, as the centre is surrounded by a flowing border.

"Into that forest far they thence him led,
Where was their dwelling in a pleasant glade,
With mountains round about environed,
And mighty woods, which did the valley shade."
Spenser.

To ENCIRCLE, as its name designates, implies a surrounding with something which is exactly or approximates to a mathematical circle, as "a diadem encircled her brow." It involves limitation or circumscription, but not coercion or restriction.

"Young Hermes next, a close-contriving god,
Her brows encircled with his serpent rod,
Then plots and fair excuses filled her brain."
Parnell, *Hesiod*.

CIRCUMSPECT. See CAUTIOUS.

CIRCUMSTANCE. SITUATION. INCIDENT. FACT. EVENT. OCCURRENCE.

CIRCUMSTANCE (Lat. *circumstare*, to stand around, Fr. *circonstance*) is literally the condition of things surrounding an event, from which it passed to mean one of the things themselves, and so generally a fact, particular, or incident. A circumstance is a distinctive accessory to the principal fact or event. The circumstance occasionally reacts with great force on the main fact or event, or, on the other hand, is so trivial as to be practically of no moment. An unforeseen circumstance in a campaign may lead to the loss of a battle.

"We are now at the close of our review of the three simple forms of artificial society, and we have shown them, however they may differ in name or in some slight *circumstances*, to be all alike in effect—in effect to be all tyrannies."—*Burke*.

It is in the plural, circumstances, that it has the character of a synonym with SITUATION (Lat. *situs*), many relative circumstances making a situation. (Circumstances, in modern English, has the peculiar meaning of *situation as to worldly goods*.) "He found himself in such circumstances," and "He found himself in such a situation," would be nearly equivalent expressions, for the situation or the case is the sum of the circumstances. But situation points to a fixed state, circumstances may accompany the varying condition of the thing or person. "He was in a situation of great danger," would be equivalent to "He was in circumstances of great danger;" but we could hardly say, "He pursued his journey in a situation of great danger;" in this case we should be compelled to say, "under circumstances of great danger."

"Nor did the shores and woods appear less destitute of wild fowl, so that we hoped to

enjoy with ease what in our *situation* might be called the luxuries of life."—*Cook's Voyages*.

Circumstance, incident, and fact are also related in meaning. So we might say, the circumstances, the incidents, or the facts of the case; but circumstance relates to what is accessory to fact, and forms a part or detail of it. A murder is a fact, the circumstances of it are the parts of the fact—the incidents of the deed, the details of its commission, or anything remotely connected with the fact as such. An INCIDENT (Lat. *incidere*) is no more than a befallment, something which happens upon another thing, and is not necessarily connected with the fact as such, but has merely occurred along with it. A circumstance of the murder is essentially connected with it; an incident of it may be such as to have no practical value in regard to it—no close relationship—as, for instance, that a bright rainbow seemed suddenly to break forth at the moment—a thing which might affect the imagination, but not the evidence.

"Thy *incidents* perhaps too thick are sown,
But too much plenty is thy fault alone."
Dryden.

A FACT (Lat. *factum, facere*, a thing done) is a thing which has truly taken place, and may be of a complicated nature as being conceived in the aggregate. So the fact of a murder is not a simple, but a very complicated thing, involving all the numerous particulars of the so-called fact, and the necessity of exact truth in all the particulars to form an exact conception of the fact.

"It would have been absurd to allege in preaching to unbelievers a *fact* which itself presupposed the truth of Christ's mission, and which could not have been proved without first taking for granted the truth of that very doctrine in proof of which this *fact* was to have been alleged."—*Clarke*.

The term fact has the different senses of—1, that which has been done or has taken place; 2, truth in the abstract, as in the phrase, "in fact;" and 3, the representation of a fact in the first sense, irrespectively of the

actual truth of it, as when a pleader is eloquent on his case, but wrong in his facts.

An EVENT (Lat. *eventus*, from *evenire*, to come forth) is a fact or occurrence regarded as a result or product of other things; hence we speak of watching the event, or waiting for the progress of events.

"Such kind of things or *events*, whether good or evil, as will certainly come to pass may fall under computation, and be estimated as to their several degrees, as well as things present."—*Wilkins*.

An OCCURRENCE, on the other hand (Lat. *occurrere*, to meet), has no reference to any antecedents, but simply denotes what meets us in the course of our lives by chance or Providence. It ought, however, to be added that these terms may be often used interchangeably, according to the point of view from which things are regarded. For instance, a shower of rain is an *event*, regarded simply as a meteorological result. It is a *fact*, as regards any question as to whether it actually fell or not. It would be an *incident* in the account of a day's sport. It is a *circumstance*, of perhaps vital importance, to a crop, and an untoward *occurrence* to any one who, having taken no precautions against it, was wetted through by it.

"When fear does not in sudden or hazardous *occurrences* discompose his mind, set his body a trembling, and make him unfit for action, or run away from it, he has then the courage of a rational creature."—*Locke*.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL. PARTICULAR. MINUTE.

These terms diminish in force in the above order. A CIRCUMSTANTIAL account would be one which gave the *leading* circumstances, PARTICULAR, all the circumstances, and MINUTE (*minutus*, from *minuere*, to lessen) the most *trivial* as well as the most important.

"I conceived myself obliged to set down somewhat *circumstantially* not only the events but the manner of my trials."—*Boyle*.

"Now will we speak *particularly* of all, and first of the first, which he calleth by the first month's name, January."—*Spenser*.

"Vandyck had a peculiar genius for portraits; his draperies are finished with a *minuteness* of truth not to be demanded in historic compositions."—*Walpole*.

CITE. See BID and QUOTE.

CIVIL. POLITE. OBLIGING.
ACCOMMODATING. COURTEOUS.
COMPLAISANT. CONSIDERATE.

The CIVIL man was originally the *civilis*, or who fulfilled the duties of a *civis* or citizen. It means now him who is observant of the slight external courtesies of intercourse between man and man.

"The people behaved very *civilly*, showing us everything that we expressed a desire to see."—*Cook's Voyages*.

The POLITE man (*politus*, from *polire*, to polish) is polished in such courtesies, and is of higher training. The courtier is polite, but even the rustic may be civil.

"What but custom could make those salutations *polite* in Muscovy which are ridiculous in France or England?"—*Watts*.

The OBLIGING man (*obligare*, to bind or oblige) is he who is ready with more than the mere courtesies of demeanour, and takes pleasure in doing some actual service.

"Gay, modest, artless, beautiful, and young, Slow to resolve, in resolution strong, To all *obliging*, yet reserved to all."

Walsh.

The ACCOMMODATING person (see ACCOMMODATE) is ready to be obliging, not in the way of granting favours generally, like the obliging, but in meeting the particular or specific requirements of the time and occasion in favour of others, even at the cost of a little personal inconvenience. Though the epithet is modern and conversational, the radical force of it may be seen in the following:—

"It is an old observation which has been made of politicians who would rather ingratiate themselves with their sovereign than promote his real service, that they *accommodate* their counsels to his inclinations."—*Adlison*.

(For COURTEOUS see AFFABLE.) COMPLAISANT (Fr. *complaisant*) occupies a position midway between polite

and courteous—which are merely external—and obliging—which implies actual kindness of nature. Complaisance is a deportment indicative of a desire to please, and therefore best befits those who have superiority or power on their side.

"As for our Saviour, He was a person so far from being morose or reserved in His carriage or a lover of singularity, so far from setting up a way of conversation of His own making, distinct from the way He found in the world, that He was the most free, obliging, and civil, and, if I durst use the word, I would say *complaisant* person that ever perhaps appeared in the world."—*Sharp*.

A more praiseworthy character is that of the CONSIDERATE (*considerare*), who meets the wants of others, or relieves them of trouble by placing himself thoughtfully in their place and circumstances. Of old, considerate meant thoughtful or deliberate.

"The wisest and most *considerate* men in the world."—*Sharp's Sermons*.

It bears now the usual meaning of having thought for others, what would please them or what is due to them. This general character is expressed in the following use of the noun consideration:—

"Moses, having his mind fixed upon Him who is invisible, acted more from the *consideration* of Him whom he could not see than of him whom he saw to be highly displeased with him, not fearing the wrath of the king, for he saw Him who is invisible."—*Stillingfleet*.

"Æneas is patient, *considerate*, and careful of his people."—*Dryden*.

CIVILIZATION. See CULTIVATION.

CLAIM. DEMAND. RIGHT. PRETENSION. PRIVILEGE. PREROGATIVE.

CLAIM (Lat. *clamare*, to call out) is an advance upon DEMAND (Fr. *demandar*, Lat. *demandare*), being the assertion of a right to demand. The highwayman demands the surrender of the traveller's purse, on which he has no claim. The poor man claims equal rights of liberty with the rich in a free state. Claim supposes an unacknowledged right, demand either a disputed right or the ab-

sence of all right, and a simple determination to have.

"They were told, in answer to their *claim* to the bread earned with their blood, that their services had not been rendered to the country which now exists."—*Burke*.

"If we seriously do weigh the case, we shall find that to require faith without reason is to demand an impossibility, for faith is an effect of persuasion, and persuasion is nothing else but the application of some reason to the mind apt to draw forth its assent."—*Barrow*.

RIGHT (Lat. *rectus*) is not, like claim and demand, developed, but lies, as it were, dormant. It is the latent power to claim or demand upon occasion.

"Although there be, according to the opinion of some very great and judicious men, a kind of natural *right* in the noble, wise, and virtuous to govern them which are of servile disposition, nevertheless for manifestation of this their *right* and men's more peaceable contentment on both sides, the assent of them who are to be governed seemeth necessary."—*Hooker*.

PRETENSION (Lat. *pretendere*) is the holding out the appearance of right or possession, without directly urging it. This indirectness is so much an attribute of pretension, that pretension sometimes speaks altogether for itself, as if we should say, "He has some pretensions to be considered one of the best writers of the day," the pretensions being, in this case, the actual merits.

"You see that an opinion of merit is discouraged even in those who had the best *pretensions*, if any pretensions were good."—*Paley*.

PRIVILEGE (Lat. *privilegium*) is a right, immunity, or advantage possessed by some, but not enjoyed by others.

"*Privilege* in Roman jurisprudence means the exemption of one individual from the operation of a law."—*Mackintosh*.

"As this liberty is not indulged in any other government, either republican or monarchical, in Holland and Venice more than in France or Spain, it may very naturally give occasion to the question how it happens that Great Britain enjoys this peculiar *privilege*."—*Hume*.

PREROGATIVE (Lat. *tribus prero-*

gativa) denotes a right of precedence, or of doing certain acts, or enjoying certain privileges, to the exclusion of others. In short, prerogative is political priority of privilege.

"The kings of these realms enjoy several powers wherein the laws have not interposed. So they can make war and peace without the consent of parliament, and this is a great *prerogative*."—*Swift*.

CLAMOROUS. See LOUD.

CLAMOUR. CRY. OUTCRY. UPROAR. EXCLAMATION. ACCLAMATION. VOCIFERATION. SHOUTING. BAWLING. TUMULT.

CLAMOUR (Lat. *clamare*, to call out) is a noisy use of the voice in continuous or reiterated pronunciation. In this sense, we might speak of the clamour of the streets; but it is commonly employed of the simultaneous use of the tongue by a collection of persons calling out each for himself, and trying to be heard on his own account, above the voices of others; as when the crew, on the eve of mutiny, clamorously state their grievances.

"We may much more easily think to *clamour* the sun and stars out of their courses than to word the great Creator of them out of the steady purposes of His own will by all the vehemence and loudness of our petitions."—*South*.

CRY (Fr. *crier*) is the sound of voices in articulate or inarticulate sounds, as the cry of a bird, the cry of the salesman, the cry of joy or of pain. It is to the inarticulate, especially, that the word cry belongs; while clamour consists necessarily of words.

"The voice of one *crying* in the wilderness."—*Bible*.

OUTCRY is an expressive and unanimous aggregate of cries in opposition or protest, as hoots and yells. It is confined to human beings, and is allowed to include words. Clamour often asserts, but outcry always protests.

"When they cannot out-reason the conscience they will *out-cry* it."—*South*.

UPROAR (up and roar, A. S. *rarian*)

denotes the mass of confused sound which proceeds from a number of persons giving vent to feelings of strong opposition.

"We are in danger to be called in question for this day's *uproar*, there being no cause whereby we may give an account of this concourse."—*Bible*.

EXCLAMATION (*exclamare*) is no more than the sudden expression of sound or words, and is indicative of joy, grief, surprise, or any such emotion, in one or more.

"These holy groves

Permit no *exclamation* 'gainst Heaven's will

To violate their echoes." *Mason*.

ACCLAMATION is loud and unanimous exclamation in favour, and is opposed to outcry in being expressive of approval, as outcry of protest.

"An amiable, accomplished prince ascends the throne under the happiest of all auspices, the *acclamations* and united affections of his subjects."—*Junius*.

VOCIFERATION (*Lat. vociferare*) is any vehement and strained use of the voice, and relates to continuous and articulate sounds, while **BAWL** (*Ice. baula*, to bellow) relates to inarticulate. When we say, "He bawled out his speech," we mean that it had the effect of an inarticulate bellowing.

"The judges of the Areopagus considered action and *vociferation* as a foolish appeal to the external senses, and unworthy to be practised before those who had no desire of idle amusement and whose only pleasure was to discover right."—*Idler*.

SHOUTING (connected with shoot) is to vociferate for the sake of the effect produced by the sound, as to shout for joy, or to shout in derision. It commonly refers to articulate sounds, which are not necessarily words, but are formed as sonorous media for the shouting, as hip, hurrah!

"The rest of the Grecians advanced with eager haste and fury, and in the beginning of their onset gave a general *shout*, to encourage and animate themselves and strike terror into their enemies."—*Potter's Antiquities*.

TUMULT (*Lat. tumultus*) is primarily commotion, then the noise and disturbance resulting from it. It involves numerous forces working

together to produce it, as the tumult of the elements, of a multitude, of the passions.

"Till in loud *tumult* all the Greeks arose."
Pope.

CLANDESTINE. See **SECRET**.

CLASS. ORDER. RANK. DEGREE.

CLASS (*Lat. classis*) is a group of individuals (both things and persons) associated as having common characteristics. No priority or posteriority of rank is denoted by the term class, though such difference of rank may coexist with it, as in the classes of a school. Such are "the labouring class," "the agricultural class," "the mercantile class."

"Now God Almighty, by the inexhaustible fecundity of His creative power, may have made innumerable *orders* and *classes* of rational minds, some in their natural perfection higher than human souls, others inferior."
—*Bentley*.

AN ORDER (*Lat. ordo*) differs from a class in having peculiar interrelated connections or interests. The term is applied both to persons, as the order of Knights Templars, to natural productions, and to architecture, as the Corinthian order. In botany the order is a group of allied individuals, more comprehensive than a genus. In zoology the order is a well-marked division of a class, including in itself families and genera. **RANK** (*Fr. rang*), when taken for more than a line of things or persons *arranged*, is the relative position of individuals or classes in regard to superiority and inferiority in social or any other distinction, as an officer of high rank, an author of high or low rank, a man of rank. **DEGREE** (*Fr. degré, Lat. gradus*) is one of a series of steps in a graduated scale, and is of as various application as the scale itself, as of social or literary rank, size, number, quantity, excellence, goodness, badness, and so on. It is an assignable point or line in any subject matter which admits of comparison of higher or lower, or of more or less within itself.

"These are all virtues of a meaner *rank*."
—*Addison*.

"Take but *degree* away, untwine that string,
And hark what discord follows; each thing meets
In mere oppugnancy." *Shakespeare.*

CLEAN. CLEANLY. PURE.

CLEAN (A. S. *clæne*) is free from what is foul. It sometimes means free from what is obstructive, dirt being always obstruction, as "to make a clean way for himself through a mob." It is used in a moral sense, as "to make a clean breast," and in old scriptural English, "pure hands" and "a clean heart."

"Every sin, every moral irregularity, does as really imprint an indelible stain upon the soul as a blot falling upon the *cleanest* paper."
—*South.*

CLEANLY expresses a disposition to the physically clean.

"And this hath so intoxicated some
That (to appear incorrigibly mad)
They *cleantiness* and company renounce
For lunacy beyond the cure of art,
With a long beard and ten long dirty nails
Pass current for Apollo's livery."
Roscommon, Horace.

PURE (Lat. *purus*) is used of the more refined substances in nature, and of things moral. As clean means unsoiled, so pure means uncontaminated, that is, free from heterogeneous matter, especially from what pollutes or vitiates, as pure metal, water, air; hence it has sometimes the meaning simply of uncompounded, as pure sand, that is, sand and nothing else, pure good-nature, pure mathematics, as distinguished from applied.

"To the *pure* all things are *pure*."—*Bible.*

CLEAR. See APPARENT and BRIGHT.

CLEAR, *v.* See ABSOLVE.

CLEARNESS. See PERSPICUITY.

CLEAVE. STICK. ADHERE.

CLEAVE (A. S. *clifan*) is to adhere at all parts of an extended surface. It was of more frequent use formerly than at present, when it is more commonly employed in a moral sense of

personal attachments, or to the persistent *entertainment* of hopes and opinions.

"As creeping ivy clings to wood or stone,
And hides the ruin that it feeds upon,
So Sophistry *cleaves* close to and protects
Sin's rotten trunk, concealing its defects."
Cooper.

ADHERE (Lat. *adhærere*) is used of a close and persistent *maintenance* of the same matters. In its physical sense it implies such superficial contact as tends naturally, or by the inherent properties of the substances themselves, to unite them, as wax adheres to the fingers.

"It would be difficult to prove that God may not in certain circumstances have greater reasons for varying from His stated rules of acting than for *adhering* to them."
Farmer.

STICK (A. S. *stician*) is the most familiar and comprehensive of the three, and is used in the senses of the others, that is, of both material and moral subjects. In their secondary meanings, as cleave expresses persistency of affection, and adhere persistency of principle, so stick belongs to mental application and resolve.

"I have *stuck* unto Thy testimonies."
Book of Psalms.

CLEMENCY. See MERCY.

CLEVER. See ABILITY, APT, and INGENIOUS.

CLIMB. See ASCEND.

CLOAK. MASK. BLIND. VEIL.

These are all figurative expressions for means employed to conceal something from the knowledge of others. A CLOAK (Low Lat. *cloca*), being a garment, indicates something continually worn as it were, so as to conceal what is of the nature of a habit or practice. So religion may be employed as a cloak for dishonesty.

"When the severity of manners is hypocritical, and assumed as a *cloak* to secret indulgence, it is one of the worst prostitutions of religion."
—*Blair.*

MASK (Fr. *masque*) is that which hides the feelings and motives, as the

cloak conceals the conduct; but a mask does more than conceal. It has an expression of its own. It is in this way that malignant feelings are sometimes masked under a courteous demeanour, treacherous words, and smiles.

"Thou art no ruffian, who beneath the *mask* Of social commerce com'st to rob their wealth." *Thomson.*

BLIND denotes that which shall so mislead others as to permit certain practices to be carried on unobserved, by presenting to their attention what is calculated to preclude the idea or suspicion of them.

"Those who are bountiful to crimes will be rigid to merit, and penurious to service. Their penury is even held out as a *blind* and cover to their prodigality."—*Burke.*

VEIL is oftener used of what deceives *oneself*, or obscures *one's own* vision, as the veil which hides futurity from view, the mists and veils which rise and are spread before the vision of the prejudiced.

"As soon as that mysterious *veil* which covers futurity should be lifted up all the gaiety of life would disappear."—*Bhair.*

CLOG.	ENCUMBER.	IMPEDE.
OBSTRUCT.	EMBARRASS.	FETTER.
RETARD.	PREVENT.	SHACKLE.
HINDER.		

To **CLOG**, an Old English word, is literally to fasten a clog on to the feet of animals, to prevent them from straying. Hence to impede movements generally, whether of the limbs or the mind. It denotes the presence of something heterogeneous, obstructive, or against freedom of action.

"It was said that the king was alienated from the Church of England, and weary of supporting Episopacy in Scotland, and so was resolved not to *clog* his government any longer with it."—*Burnet.*

ENCUMBER (Fr. *encombrer*, Lat. *cumulus*, a heap) denotes that which retards by being superfluous, and is more or less extraneous to the individual. An estate is encumbered by its own debts; and as a man's movements may be encumbered by any kind of useless weight, even that of

his own garments, so a mind may be encumbered by useless learning.

"Knowledge, a rude unprofitable mass,
The mere materials with which wisdom builds,
Till smoothed and squared and fitted to its place,
Does but *encumber* whom it seems t' enrich." *Cowper.*

IMPEDE (Lat. *impedire*, *pes*, a foot) refers not so much to mere movement as to continuous and systematic movement or progress, as to impede the advance of an army, the growth of a plant, the progress of education. It implies some end or goal which is thereby set farther off.

"Some error has been committed in not rightly computing and subducting the contrary or *impeding* force which arises from the resistance of fluids to bodies moving any way, and from the continual contrary action of gravitation upon bodies thrown upwards."—*Clarke.*

OBSTRUCT (Lat. *obstruere*, *obstrusus*) is purely external. It is not, therefore, employed directly of persons, but of their progress, or of roads, passages, and the like. The progress of a vessel is impeded by contrary winds; it is yet worse if the entrance into the harbour at the end of the voyage is obstructed by rocks.

"'Tis he th' *obstructed* paths of sound shall clear,
And bid new music charm th' unfolding ear." *Pope.*

EMBARRASS (Fr. *embarras*) is properly used only of *mental* impediments or obstructions, that is, of such doubts, perplexities, or difficulties in general as impede the exercise of thought, speech, or action.

"You will have the goodness to excuse me if my real unaffected *embarrassment* prevents me from expressing my gratitude to you as I ought."—*Burke.*

FETTER (literally a chain for the feet) has commonly the meaning of restrictive influence or power, which admits a certain freedom of movement, but limits it at certain points, as to be fettered by system. "He received permission fettered by certain conditions."

"And truly when they are balanced together this order seemeth more an infiran-

chising than a *fettering* of our nature, which without it seemeth rather bound than free in revenge; such is the dominion of our irritated passions."—*Montague, Essays.*

SHACKLE (A. S. *seacul, secacul*) denotes such fettering as redounds to the discomfort of the person, ungainliness of movement, and deprivation of grace in the thing itself. If we said, "The tenure of that fine estate is shackled by some antiquated conditions," we should mean that it was much deteriorated in value, and as it were deformed by them. Commonly speaking, persons are fettered by restrictions, and things are shackled by conditions.

"And it is great

To do that thing that ends all other deeds,
That *shackles* accidents, and bolts up
change." *Shakespeare.*

HINDER, from *hind*, is to cause to be behind.

"I shall distinguish such as I esteem to be *hinderers* of reformation into three sorts: 1, antiquitarians (for so I had rather call them than antiquaries, whose labours are useful and laudable); 2, libertines; 3, politicians."—*Milton.*

RETARD (Lat. *tardus*, slow) is to cause to be slow or slower.

"Metaphysics not only succeeded physics and mythology in the manner here observed, and became as great a fund of superstition, but they were carried still further, and corrupted all real knowledge, as well as *retarded* the progress of it."—*Bolingbroke.*

PREVENT (Lat. *prevenire*) is to go before, as if for the purpose of stopping. The difference between these three is, that to hinder is to stop entirely, but only temporarily; to retard is to stop, but not entirely; and to prevent is to stop entirely. Retard necessarily refers to a thing begun; that which is hindered or prevented may not have been yet begun. It will sometimes require the interpretation of after events to know whether a thing be a hindrance or a prevention. For instance, "I was hindered from going out of the house yesterday till the evening by torrents of rain." Had the rain lasted all day he would have had to say, "I was prevented yesterday by the rain from leaving the house." All three are

applicable both to personal and impersonal influences, and all these both directly to persons and their acts, as also to the progress of either.

"It is much easier to keep ourselves void of resentment than to restrain it from excess when it has gained admission. To use the illustration of an excellent author, we can *prevent* the beginnings of some things, whose progress afterwards we cannot *hinder*."—*Holland.*

CLOSE. CONCLUSION. TERMINATION. CESSATION. END. ENDING. EXTREMITY. EXTREME.

Of all these synonyms the simplest and most generic is *END* (A. S. *ende*), of which the rest may be regarded as modifications. End is applicable to the extreme point of a line, or anything which is regarded as linear, progressive, or continuous, as the end of a cord, of a book, of a story, of a life. No remoteness is implied in this beyond the intrinsic remoteness from the centre, as to tie two ends of a string together. It is also used to express the idea of result or of a final point, as produced by antecedent causes, as "the end of these things is death," or that which is the thing aimed at, or the purpose for which something else is done, in which sense it is equivalent to object or final cause, as "he did it for private ends." In short, end expresses both objective and subjective finality.

"The harvest is the *end* of the world."—*Bible.*

CLOSE (Fr. *clos*, Lat. *claudere, clausus*, to shut) is the kind of end to which a thing is regarded as naturally tending or bringing itself. The close of a book or a story seems brought about by the story or the book itself, hence such phrases as "coming to a close," "drawing to a close."

"We have it, it seems, in our power, by the exercise of one particular virtue, to secure a pardon to ourselves for neglecting all the rest, and can blot out the remembrance of an ill-spent life by a few acts of charity at the *close* of it."—*Atterbury.*

A CONCLUSION (Lat. *concludere*) is etymologically of the same origin. A conclusion is a superimposed close, anticipated or drawn as the result of

a previous course of action or argument. The conclusion of a contest are those efforts which bring it to an end; the conclusion of an argument is that which is necessarily drawn from its premises.

"I will *conclude* this part with the speech of a counsellor of state."—*Bacon*.

TERMINATION (Lat. *terminus*, a boundary) is that kind of end which presupposes a previous course, whether of view, of thought, of words, of action or movement, which proceeds till it is stopped by such a limit or boundary. It belongs both to space and time, and refers to any kind of intervention, as human agency or natural arrangements.

"I had a mind to know how each of these roads *terminated*."—*Addison*.

CESSATION refers to action as limited or stopped by some inherent will, power, or influence, so differing from termination, which depends on external causes, as "I listened till the sound *ceased*."

"A *cessation* of all hostilities was to begin within two months, and to continue till all was concluded by a complete treaty and ratified, provided the Spanish monarchy was then entirely restored."—*Burnet*.

ENDING is an imposed end, or the end of something artificial or variable. For instance, we speak of the ending of a sentence or a word; not of the ending, but the end of human life. A termination is a fixed ending, as an ending is a variable termination.

"A perfect kingdom and glorious, that shall never have *ending*."—*Bishop Taylor*.

EXTREMITY (Lat. *extremus*) is the remotest part of anything which has configuration, or is regarded mentally as having a definite area or extent. It differs from end in involving such remoteness. So we speak of the end of the street, but the extremity of the town, or the extremities of the human body. The extremity of distress is a supposed boundary line to the extent of such endurance.

"No less man than St. Augustine was doubtful whether the *extremity* of bodily pain were not the greatest evil that human nature was capable of suffering."—*Ray*.

EXTREME denotes a strained, exaggerated, undue, or unnecessary distance or departure from the mean or centre. It is remarkable that the word tends to this unfavourable force, though etymologically it is equally applicable to favourable applications. We speak often enough of "extreme folly," but not of "extreme wisdom." It conveys a sort of censure to say of any one that he holds "extreme opinions."

"For though innovations which appear very plausible may be found, when examined, very dangerous, and therefore love of change is by no means to be encouraged, yet aversion to it may be carried to an *extreme* also."—*Secker*.

CLOSE. See *FINISH and SHUT*.

CLOSE. See *NEAR*.

CLOTHES. See *DRESS*.

CLOTHING. See *DRESS*.

CLOWN. See *PEASANT*.

CLOY. See *GRATIFY*.

CLUMSY. See *AWKWARD*.

COADJUTOR. See *ASSISTANT*.

COALESCE. See *AMALGAMATE*.

UNITE. See *COHERE*. See *JOIN*.

COALESCE (Lat. *coalescere*, to grow up together) is hardly used except as a scientific term in its purely physical sense, which is to grow together, so that the particles of two organisations shall become compact and one. Coalition has now a political meaning, and denotes the combination of different persons, parties, or states, having different views or interests, for a temporary purpose.

"No *coalition*, which under the specious name of independency carries in its bosom the unreconciled principles of the original discord of parties, ever was or will be an healing coalition."—*Burke*.

AMALGAMATE (amalgam, a compound of mercury with some other metal) denotes the interpenetration of inorganic particles, as coalesce of organic. Amalgamation is the mixing of things in themselves foreign, but which are found to have in them sufficient properties in common to allow of their union into one mass.

"Ingratitude is indeed their four cardinal virtues compacted and *amalgamated* into one."
—Burke.

UNITE (Lat. *unus*, one) is said of two or more things which are so joined as to present the appearance of a sensible or visible whole; if the union is absolute, then the individuality of the parts or separate unities is lost, as the union of two regiments in the field.

"We were ignorant that the time drew near when the squadron would be separated never to *unite* again, and that this day of our passage was the last cheerful day that the greatest part of us would ever live to enjoy."
—Anson.

COHERE (*coherere*) denotes the internal adherence of parts reciprocally, as adherence is an external sticking together of whole bodies or substances. In its metaphysical sense cohere means consistently to hang together in subordination to one principle or purpose; as the several parts of a speech, or a theory, are said to cohere.

"Of all things there is the greatest difficulty in retaining numbers. They are like grains of sand which will not *cohere* in the order in which we place them."
—Priestley.

JOIN (Lat. *jungere*) denotes a union formed by external association or attachment, which in no way detracts from the separate individuality of the things joined. Such joining may be permanent or temporary.

"There were reports that the Emperor and the French King were in a treaty, and that in conclusion they would *join* to make war upon the King."
—Burnet.

COARSE is only another form of "course," as it was originally written, so meaning in course, or such as is commonly to be met with. According as it is used in the literal or the metaphysical sense, it associates itself with two distinct sets of synonyms, as follows:

COARSE. ROUGH. RUDE. GROSS.

That is COARSE which is composed of relatively large particles, whether naturally, as a coarse kind of stone, or artificially, as a coarse kind of linen. In this sense it is opposed to

fine, in which nature or art has produced a subtler texture.

"For habit it was anciently sackcloth and ashes: by the *coarseness* of the sackcloth they ranked themselves as it were amongst the meanest and lowest of men, by ashes and sometimes earth upon their heads they made themselves lower than the lowest of the creatures of God."
—Mede.

ROUGH (A. S. *hreôh*) is that of which the particles have sufficient inequality to be conspicuous to the eye or palpable to the touch: a rough sea, a rough plank. In this sense it is opposed to smooth.

"While yet the *roughness* of the stone remains,
Without the rising muscles and the veins."
Dryden, *Ovid*.

RUDE (Lat. *rudis*) denotes such a sort of roughness as belongs to unskilled implements or productions.

"Is it in destroying and pulling down that skill is displayed? The shallowest understanding, the *rudest* hand is more than equal to that task."
—Burke.

GROSS (Fr. *gros*, Low Lat. *grossus*, from *crassus*) differs from coarse in not relating to the particles of a substance, but to the effect produced by the whole of it. It has the meaning of coarsely bulky, or combines thickness of texture with unwieldiness in the cases to which it is commonly applied.

"The element immediately next the earth in *grossness* is water."
—Digby on Bodies.

COARSE. ROUGH. RUDE. GROSS. UNCOUTH. BLUNT.

As applied to the mind and the manners, COARSE denotes that natural savagery which comes of movements and expressions unchecked and unremoved by the training and restrictions of refined society. It comes of such selfishness of demeanour as civilization tends to suppress. In this sense it is opposed to refined.

"Already there appears a poverty of conception, a *coarseness* and vulgarity in all the proceedings of the assembly and of all their instructors."
—Burke.

ROUGH is applied only to the manners and the speech. As coarseness comes of the absence of mental re-

finement, so roughness comes of the want of polite training, except in the case of rough speech or words, which may come from the most polite on occasions of excitement. Hence roughness is compatible, as coarseness is not, with much mental refinement and purity of heart. Where, however, this latter is palpably the case, a better epithet is *blunt*.

"*Roughness in the grain
Of British natures.*" *Cooper.*

RUDE has the meaning of being personally offensive to others from roughness of manner. This may be unintentional, in which case it amounts to no more than omission of what polite intercourse requires; or intentional, in which case it is the disregard or violation of it in contempt or active insult.

"My censures of some reputed virtuosos that live in it are written with as harmless and friendly designs as was the seeming *rudeness* of the angel to St. Peter when he struck him on the side, and hastily roused him."—*Boyle.*

GROSS refers not to social but moral and mental subjects. The gross person is he in whom the sensual in any way predominates, as a gross eater. It is opposed to delicate, and denotes an unrestrained exhibition or expression of the animal part of human nature.

"Bleached and purified from the *grossness* and pollution of their ideas."—*Warburton.*

UNCOUTH (A. S. *uncūdh*, unknown). See AWKWARD.

COAX. See CAJOLE.

COERCE. See BIND.

COEVAL. CONTEMPORARY. SYNCHRONOUS. COMMENSURATE.

The difference of force between these terms is sufficiently indicated by their derivations. COEVAL being compounded of *ævum*, an age, and CONTEMPORARY of *tempus*, time. As the age is of long duration, the term coeval is employed when the sense is existing in the same age, especially if it be remote as well as long, as, "Silence coeval with eternity," "The building of such a pyramid was co-

eval with such a dynasty of Egyptian kings." But *tempus* not having this force of long duration, we employ the term contemporary for synchronous periods that are shorter. Such are the lives of men. "He was contemporary (it would be absurd to say coeval) with me at college."

"The history of redemption is *coeval* with that of the globe itself, has run through every stage of its existence, and will outlast its utmost duration."—*Bishop Hurd.*

"This king (Henry VIII.) was *contemporary* with the greatest monarchs of Europe, namely the Emperor, the kings of Spain and France."—*Strype.*

Although SYNCHRONOUS is only the Greek equivalent of the Latin contemporary (*σύν*, together, and *χρόνος*, time), it is a convenient term to use when nothing more is intended than the simultaneity of two occurrences as a matter of history.

"Sensations are impressed either at the same instant of time, or in contiguous successive instants. Hence it follows that the corresponding associations are either *synchronous* or successive."—*Belsham.*

The term COMMENSURATE (*con*) together, and *mensura*, a measure, may be analogously employed when the meaning is that two durations synchronize. (See ADEQUATE.)

"We can, I think, have no positive idea of any space or duration which is not made up and *commensurate* to repeated numbers of feet or yards, or days and years, which are the common measures, whereof we have the ideas in our minds, and whereby we judge of the greatness of these sorts of quantities."—*Locke.*

COGENT. See FORCIBLE.

COGNIZANCE. See BADGE.

COHERE. See COALESCE.

COINCIDE. See ACCEDE and AGREE.

COLD. FRIGID. GELID. COOL.

Of these, COLD (A. S. *cald*, *ceald*) simply expresses the absence of heat in any degree, whether physically, or in a metaphorical sense of the mental feelings or passions. FRIGID (Lat. *frigidus*, *frigus*, cold) denotes that which is by nature relatively cold, as

the Frigid Zone. COOL denotes the lesser degrees of cold, and GELID (Lat. *gelidus*, *gelu*, frost) is applicable only to conditions of natural substances, the earth and the atmosphere. A cold nature is wanting in zeal and warm-heartedness, reserved, unswayed by passion or ardour of sentiment. A frigid nature communicates its coldness by a distant, unsympathizing manner. A frigid style of speaking or writing is one which neither conveys nor excites warmth of feeling or brightness of thought. Cool is employed not so much of temperament (like cold and frigid), as of the state of mind under certain circumstances, and is associated with the praiseworthy, as cold with the contrary. So we say, "cold calculation," "cold indifference," but "cool determination or courage." When coolness has an unfavourable sense, it refers to specific demeanour towards others, as "cool impudence."

"It is in vain that we would coldly gaze
On such as smile upon us; the heart must
Leap kindly back to kindness."

Byron.

"Then, crushed by rules, and weakened as
refined,
For years the power of Tragedy declined.
From bard to bard the *frigid* caution crept,
Till Declamation roared while Passion
slept."

Johnson.

"To what cool cave shall I descend,
Or to what *gelid* fountain bend?"

Marvel.

"To say the truth, when the matter
comes to be considered impartially and *coolly*,
their faults, of whatever kind, will admit of
much alleviation."—Bishop Hurd.

COLLEAGUE. See COMPANION.

COLLECT. ASSEMBLE. MUSTER.
GATHER.

To COLLECT (Lat. *colligere*, *collectus*)
is to gather from different places into
one body or place.

"Some ritualists say the collects are
prayers made among the people *collected* or
gathered together."—Comber.

To ASSEMBLE (Lat. *ad*, to, and
simul, together) differs from collect
in being applicable only to persons,
and not to things.

"Thither he assembled all his train."
Milton.

The transitive use of the verb has
become uncommon.

To MUSTER (Old Eng. connected
with *monstrare*) is to bring by effort or
by authority to a certain place or occa-
sion. It differs from collect and
assemble in being applicable to one
as well as many, hence, metapho-
rically, "to muster courage," and
from assemble also, in being appli-
cable both to things and persons.

"Prone on the lowly grave of the dear man
She drops, whilst busy meddling memory
In barbarous successions *musters* up
The past endearments of their softer hours."
Blair.

GATHER (A. S. *gaderian*) has the
senses of collect and assemble, and
others of its own. As muster im-
plies the point to, so gather the
source from, which the taking is;
hence simply to gather a flower,
which expresses no collection at all.

"Not that fair field

Of Enna, where Proserpin, *gathering*
flowers,

Herself a fairer flower, by gloomy Dis
Was *gathered*, which cost Ceres all that
pain

To seek her through the world."

Milton.

The term, like collect, is used in the
sense of deduction or inference. "I
gather," that is, I infer, "so and so
from what you say." The expres-
sion of the English Liturgy, "when
two or three are gathered together,"
has been censured as tautology; it is
plainly not so. All gathering is not
collective, as we have seen.

COLLECTED. See CALM.

COLLECTION. See ASSEMBLY.

COLLOQUY. See CONVERSATION.

COLOUR. DYE. TINGE. STAIN.
PAINT.

To COLOUR (Lat. *color*) is simply to
impart a hue, whether superficially
or substantially, or both, as to colour
the outside of a house, Nature
colours the grass with green. It
may denote an artificial process, or a
process of nature.

"Vain is the hope by *colouring* to display
The bright effulgence of the noon-tide
ray,
Or paint the full-orbed ruler of the skies
With pencils dipt in dull terrestrial dyes."
Mason.

DYE denotes a purely artificial process, by which either the surface or the entire texture may be coloured, as an ivory ball, which may be dyed red, or a silken fabric.

"Weaving was the invention of the Egyptians, and *dyeing* wool of the Lydians."—*Holland, Pliny.*

To **TINGE** (Lat. *tingere*) is applied to both natural and artificial processes, but implies a subordinate degree of colouring, as a red colour may be tinged with blue, the maiden's cheek is tinged with red.

"There is constantly a cheerful grey sky just sufficient to screen the sun, and to mitigate the violence of its perpendicular rays, without obscuring the air or *tinging* the daylight with an unpleasant or melancholy hue."
—*Anson's Voyages.*

To **STAIN**, which is abbreviated from *distain*, and that from *dis* and *tingere*, is, properly, to colour with a heterogeneous colour, or to discolour, as "stain the pure white with accidental spots." From the application or involuntary contact of foreign colouring matter, the term *stain* has come to mean a certain kind of dyeing. In this way, as **PAINT** (Fr. *peindre*, Lat. *pingere*) denotes the covering of the surface with a pigment, so *stain* and *dye* indicate the colouring of the substance itself; and *stain* is said chiefly of solids, as ivory, wood, glass; and *dye* of fibrous substances and textile fabrics. *Stain* is sometimes used for the accidental marring of one colour by another.

"See what reward the grateful senate yield
For the lost blood which *stains* you
northern field."
Rowe's Lucan.

"True poetry the *painter's* power displays;
True *painting* emulates the poet's lays."
Mason.

COLOUR. See **TINT**.

COLOURABLE. See **OSTENSIBLE**.

COLUMN. See **PILLAR**.

COMBAT. See **BATTLE**.

COMBATANT. See **CHAMPION**.

COMBINATION. See **ASSOCIATION**
and **CABAL**.

COMBINE. See **CONNECT**.

COMBUSTION. See **FIRE**.

COME. **ARRIVE**.

To **COME** expresses no more than to reach up to some point, state, or condition.

"If the good man of the house had known at what hour the thief would *come*, he would have watched."—*Bible.*

To **ARRIVE** (*ad* and *ripa*, a bank) is to come to a *given* destination. Periods of time, tidings, and events, as well as moving persons or bodies, are said to arrive.

"In the Epistles of St. Paul, St. Peter, and St. James we find frequent mention of the *coming* of our Lord in terms which, like those of the text, may at first seem to imply an expectation in those writers of His speedy arrival."—*Horsley.*

COMELY. **GRACEFUL.** **ELEGANT.**

COMELY (which is come-like) means, literally, coming or appearing as we would have it, *in itself*, and not in relation to any other person, as becoming. It expresses more than becoming. A very cheap thing may, on account of colour, shape, and the like, be becoming; but *comely* denotes some degree of intrinsic value. *Comely* is either applied directly to the personal appearance, as a *comely* face or figure, or to something closely connected with it by way of dress, of personal decoration.

"A *comely* creature."—*Piers Ploughman.*

GRACEFUL, on the other hand, is independent both of personal relationship and of intrinsic value. It denotes simply an elegance of outline or movement. The pendent flower, the statue of the Apollo Belvedere, the action of the accomplished orator, are graceful.

"*Gracefulness* is an idea not very different from beauty. It consists in much the same things. *Gracefulness* is an idea belonging to posture and motion."—*Burke.*

ELEGANT (Lat. *elegans*) denotes acquired grace, or such grace as indi-

cates the touch of artificial refinement. The peasant girl may be comely and graceful by nature, but not elegant, save so far as nature gives to some what it requires art to develop in others. It is only reflexively that we speak of "elegant furniture," or an "elegant classic."

"The natural progress of the works of men is from rudeness to convenience, from convenience to *elegance*, and from *elegance* to nicety."—*Johnson*.

COMFORT. See CHEER and PLEASURE.

COMEDY. See BURLESQUE.

COMICAL. See DROLL.

COMMAND. ORDER. INJUNCTION. PRECEPT.

COMMAND (Fr. *commander*, Lat. *con*, and *mandare*, to order) is the most general of these terms. It generally indicates a person of higher station. We speak of the Divine commands, and commandments of the Divine law. The noun commandment has now this restricted application.

"How commandatory the apostolical authority was is best discernible by the apostle's mandates unto the churches upon several occasions, as to the Thessalonians, 'We command the brethren.'" — *Bishop Morton*.

ORDER (Fr. *ordre*) comes from a person less removed in rank. The general gives commands, the inferior officers order. The master orders, not commands, his servant. In command there is more of power and dignity; in order, more of specific energy or peremptoriness. A command may be held permanently, an order is given to be executed for the occasion.

"A step-dame, too, I have, a cursed she,
Who rules my henpecked sire, and orders me."
Dryden.

As command and order relate to specific acts, so INJUNCTION (Lat. *injungere*) relates rather to general conduct, as an injunction of secrecy, an injunction to be careful. It has more of the moral and less of the official about it. So that, as com-

mand and order are for one's own sake, so injunction may be entirely for the sake of the other, as the father enjoins his son to be diligent.

"Though all duties expressly enjoined are by virtue of such *injunction* equally necessary, yet it follows not that they are in themselves equally excellent."—*South*.

PRECEPT (Lat. *præceptum*) is commonly not addressed to individuals, but has a moral or didactic force, which flows not simply, or, perhaps, not at all, from the authority of the person, but from the inherent wisdom of the thing itself.

"Precepts are short—necessarily must be so—take up but little room, and for that reason do not always strike with the force or leave the impression which they ought to do."—*Paley*.

COMMANDING. See AUTHORITY.

COMMEMORATE. See CELEBRATE.

COMMENCE. See BEGIN.

COMMEND. See PRAISE.

COMMENDABLE. See LAUDABLE.

COMMENSURATE. See ADEQUATE and COEVAL.

COMMENT. See NOTE.

COMMENTARY. See NOTE.

COMMERCE. See TRADE.

COMMERCIAL. MERCANTILE.

COMMERCIAL (see COMMERCE) is the widest term, being sometimes made to embrace MERCANTILE (Lat. *mercari*, to traffic, *merz*, merchandize). In that sense it extends to the whole theory and practice of commerce, as a commercial speculation, a commercial education, a commercial people. Mercantile respects the actual transaction of business; and, as commercial relates strictly to the exchange of commodities, so mercantile relates to their sale when brought to market.

"Every man thus lives by exchanging, or becomes in some measure a merchant, and the society itself grows to be what is properly a commercial society."—*Adam Smith*.

"Such is the happiness, the hope of which

seduced me from the duties and pleasures of a mercantile life."—*Johnson*.

COMMISERATION. *See* MERCY.

COMMISSION. *See* ACCREDIT.

COMMIT (Lat. *committere*) has two main meanings—to intrust, and to do.

COMMIT. INTRUST. CONSIGN. CONFIDE.

These words have in common the idea of transferring from oneself to the care and custody of another. COMMIT is the widest term, and expresses no more than generally the delivery into another's charge, as to commit a case to an attorney, or a felon to prison.

"The Lord Chancellor, upon petition or information, grants a commission to inquire into the party's state of mind, and if he be found non compos, he usually commits the care of his person, with a suitable allowance for his maintenance, to some friend, who is then called his committee."—*Blackstone*.

TO INTRUST is to put in trust, and denotes a higher degree of confidence, as to intrust a child to the care of a friend, or the friend himself with the care of the child.

"The joy of our Lord and Master, which they only are admitted to who are careful to improve the talents they are intrusted withal."—*Wilkins*.

TO CONSIGN (Lat. *consignare*, to sign or seal) is a more formal act, implying abandonment at least of present responsibility, and a more complete merging in the keeping of another, as to consign goods into the hands of an agent; and, yet more strongly, though metaphorically, to consign a body to the grave. TO CONFIDE (Lat. *con* and *fides*, trust) combines the transfer of responsibility implied in consign with the assurance implied in intrust. In the phrase, "to confide a secret," the responsibility is rather shared than transferred.

"Congress may under the constitution confide to the Circuit Court jurisdiction of all offences against the United States."—*Story*.

COMMIT. PERPETRATE.

As it relates to the doing of deeds, COMMIT is only used in an unfavour-

able and bad sense, as to commit error, a fault, or a crime. Good deeds are never committed. PERPETRATE (Lat. *perpetrare*) is in the same way restricted, but has only reference to grosser errors or crimes. So we might say, "I committed a slight mistake;" but the terms slight and mistake would be incompatible with perpetrate. The term is, however, used of lighter matters, as to perpetrate a blunder, or a gross fault in manners, when we wish sarcastically to exaggerate.

"Lands and tenements commit no treason."
Dryden.

"What great advancement hast thou hereby won,

By being the instrument to perpetrate
So foul a deed?" *Daniel*.

COMMODIOUS. *See* CONVENIENT.

COMMODITY. *See* GOODS.

COMMON. *See* PUBLIC and USUAL.

COMMON. ORDINARY. VULGAR.

COMMON (A. S. *gemæn*; with the sense of the Latin *communis*), from its primary sense of general, frequent, has naturally come to signify that which is cheap from its frequent occurrence, and of no high or refined kind. The term expresses rather a negative idea than any positive defect or objectionableness. A common-looking person is one who has nothing to distinguish him from the mass of people about him.

"The commonness and general long reception of a doctrine is not a sufficient argument of the truth of it."—*South*.

As that is common in which many persons partake, so that is ORDINARY (Fr. *ordinaire*, Lat. *ordo*) which is apt to meet us in the common order or succession of things, as "an ordinary face." Hence it takes its character for praise or blame, according to the subject with which it is associated. No such character belongs to the phrase, "the ordinary forms of law." "Men of ordinary judgment," would mean whose judgment would make them fit judges, as being of an average goodness. On

the other hand, to say of a book that it was an ordinary performance, would express disparagement.

"Nature bestowed upon Pythagoras a form and person more than *ordinarily* comely."—*Observer*.

VULGAR (*vulgaris, vulgus*, the common people), though it had not originally this decidedly unfavourable sense, as in the old phrase "vulgar," that is, common, "tongue," is always now employed with some tinge of depreciation, if not of actual dispraise. Vulgar reports are such as are circulated among common people, and such as may be supposed to interest them in particular. In a stronger sense, vulgar indicates depravation of taste and manners.

"Verses which a few years past were thought worthy the attention of children only, or of the lowest and rudest orders, are now admired for that artless simplicity which once obtained the name of coarseness and *vulgarity*."—*Knox*.

COMMONLY. See FREQUENTLY.

COMMONWEALTH. See STATE.

COMMOTION. See DISTURBANCE.

COMMUNICATE. See IMPART.

COMMUNICATION. See INTERCOURSE.

COMMUNION. See INTERCOURSE.

COMMUNITY. SOCIETY.

COMMUNITY (Lat. *communis*) is a section of society. **SOCIETY** (Lat. *socius*, a companion) is as wide as the human race. A common interest or nature constitutes community. It is evident, then, that society may be used in an abstract and universal sense; but community (except in the sense of a sharing, which is not to the present purpose) has a particular sense. Moreover, there is a difference between a society and a community. A community is a society having reciprocal rights, privileges, or interests. A society is not held together by such strictly organized constitutions. A number of persons associated for a common object would be a society, as "The Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge,"

which is not of the nature of a community, as the members are not of the nature of a polity, nor have any relation to each other, except as related to their purpose in common.

"And thus the *community* perpetually retains a supreme power of saving themselves from the attempts and designs of anybody, even of their legislators, whenever they shall be so foolish or so wicked as to lay and carry on designs against the liberties and properties of the subject."—*Locke*.

"God having designed man for a sociable creature, made him not only with an inclination and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind, but furnished him also with language, which was to be the greater instrument and common tie of *society*."—*Ibid*.

COMMUTE. See BARTER.

COMPACT. See AGREEMENT.

COMPANION. ASSOCIATE. COMRADE. COLLEAGUE. MATE. PARTNER.

COMPANION (Lat. *con*, together, and *panis*, bread, as if it originally meant a messmate) is a term which may be applied to any person who keeps company with another for a longer or shorter time without such connection being habitual, or even of necessity an equality between the two. "All through my travels my dog was my faithful companion."

"Alas! my soul, thou pleasing *companion* of this body, thou fleeting thing that art now deserting it, whither art thou flying?"—*Tatler*.

ASSOCIATE (Lat. *socius*) denotes habitual and voluntary companionship on the ground of personal community of feeling. **COMRADE** (Lat. *camara, camera*, a chamber) is used of companionship in certain of the lighter relations of society, dependent upon and subordinate to a common rule of life. So a comrade is an associate who is not so purely by personal choice. Playfellows at school, or soldiers of the same regiment, are comrades.

"In the meantime the other two squadrons were calm spectators of the rout of their comrades."—*Anson's Voyages*.

MATE (Icel. *máti*, equal, companion) is to the graver relations of life what comrade is to the lighter, and denotes a common employment in which each takes a part. It is applicable to the relation between two persons, while comrade always implies a number.

"I

Will way me to some withered bough, and there

My mate, that's never to be found again,
Lament till I am lost." *Shakespeare.*

COLLEAGUE (Fr. *collègue*) is one who is united with another in the tenure of an office, or the discharge of an official duty.

"Being yet very young, says Plutarch, I was joined in commission with another in an embassy to the proconsul, and my *colleague*, falling sick, was forced to stay behind, so that the whole business was transacted by me alone."—*Dryden.*

PARTNER is commonly one who takes part in a social community of interest, whether grave or gay, as a partner in business, a partner in the dance, a partner for life.

"No faith, no trust, no friendship, shall be known

Among the jealous *partners* of a throne;
But he who reigns shall strive to reign alone." *Rowe's Lucan.*

COMPANY. See **ASSEMBLY**, **BAND**, and **TROOP**.

COMPARISON. See **SIMILITUDE**.

COMPASSION. See **MERCY**.

COMPATIBLE. See **CONSISTENT**.

COMPEL. See **BIND**.

COMPENDIUM. See **ABRIDGMENT**.

COMPENSATION. **REMUNERATION.**

RECOMPENSE. **AMENDS.** **SATISFACTION.** **REQUITAL.** **REWARD.** **MEED.** **GUERDON.**

To **COMPENSATE** is to furnish an equivalent for anything lost or parted with by another (Lat. *compensare*, from *pendere*, to weigh or pay). It commonly supposes that the loss has been in favour, or, in some way, in the cause of the person making the compensation; but this is not essential. So one might, as an act of charity, give to a poor person as a

compensation for a loss which he had unfortunately sustained.

"Not having any certain knowledge of a future state of reward (though the wisest of them did indeed hope for it, and think it highly probable), they were forced, that they might be consistent with their own principles, to suppose the practice of virtue a sufficient reward to itself in all cases, and a full compensation for all the sufferings of the world."—*Clarke.*

REMUNERATION (Lat. *re* and *munus*, a gift) is commonly taken in the specific sense of compensation for personal services done to the remunerator.

"Human legislators have for the most part chosen to make the sanction of their laws rather vindictory than *remuneratory*, or to consist rather in punishments than in actual particular rewards."—*Blackstone.*

RECOMPENSE and **REWARD** stand to each other in this relation, that recompense (Fr. *récompense*) is a reward equivalent to the thing done. Reward is, literally, that which regards or is related to the thing (*regarder*). An industrious boy at school is rewarded, not recompensed, by a prize. On the other hand, if the boy were to set his reward against the efforts and self-denial he had made and exercised in order to gain his prize, he might say, "I am well recompensed for all I have done."

"Thou who hast taught me to forgive the ill,
And *recompense* as friends the good misled,

If mercy be a precept of Thy will,
Return that mercy on Thy servant's head."

Dryden.

"Which good and evil, pleasure or pain, attending an observance or breach of the law by the decree of the law-maker, is what we call *reward* and punishment."—*Locke.*

MEED is not a term of familiar use. It is a reward which we fairly earn by our own exertions; something bestowed or rendered in consideration of merit, and which does not, like reward, imply any substantial value, as the "meed of praise," but rather something which derives its value from its honourable character.

"As he pronounces lastly on each deed,
Of so much fame in heaven expect thy meed."

Milton.

GUERDON is a French word, and combines the two notions of a voluntary gift and a reward. It is that which is received and recognized as a recompense from one who was not absolutely bound to recognize the thing done, and may or may not be of intrinsic value.

"Verse, like the laurel, its immortal meed,
Should be the *guerdon* of a noble deed."
Cowper.

AMENDS and SATISFACTION both belong to cases in which the person *complains* of loss. *Amends* (Fr. *amende*) relates rather to the thing, *satisfaction* (Lat. *satis* and *facere*, to do enough) to the person. Amends restores the balance of deprivation, satisfaction the balance of discontent. So we may make amends not only to persons, but abstractedly, as to make amends for idleness by increased efforts afterwards; but satisfaction is purely personal.

"Then let us seek
Some safer resolution, which, methinks,
I have in view, calling to mind with heed
Part of our sentence—that thy seed shall
bruise
The Serpent's head—piteous *amends*."
Milton.

"For the transgressions of man, man
ought to make *satisfaction*, but he could not."
—*Sheridan, Sermons.*

REQUITAL (*requite*), which, like quit and acquit, is from *quies*, rest (something given to set the mind of the debtor at rest), is simply the giving of something in return for something done towards ourselves. This may be anything but a reward or a recompense. It is dictated simply by gratitude, and is not conferred. The requital is of the fullest possible value in the case of the truly grateful. It is mean or even injurious in the absolutely ungrateful. It is a matter of evil for evil in the vindictive. It is simple punishment in cases where it consists of deserved suffering coming from those who have a right to inflict it.

"Every receiver is debtor to his benefactor; he owes him all the good he receives from him, and is always obliged to a thankful acknowledgment, and, whenever he hath

opportunity, to an equivalent *requital*."—*Scott, Christian Life.*

COMPETENT. See ADEQUATE and QUALIFIED.

COMPETITION. EMULATION. RIVALRY. AMBITION.

COMPETITION (Lat. *con* and *petere*, to seek) is not a matter of feeling, but of action. It is the attempt to gain something desirable with or against others who are aiming at the same thing.

"But they ought to consider that when these two parts of religion come in *competition*, devotion is to give way to charity, mercy being better than sacrifice."—*Tillotson.*

EMULATION (Lat. *emulatio*) is a matter of feeling, which often prompts to competition. It is a desire of excelling, and a natural tendency to make efforts in that direction. It is always relative to others, whom the emulous person desires to equal, imitate, or excel. And in this way it differs from AMBITION, which is not relative directly to others (*ambitio*, from *ambire*, to go about canvassing for office). The emulous person is thinking of others who are running the same course; the ambitious person thinks only of the goal and the prize, or only indirectly of others who have to be passed in the course.

"A noble *emulation* prevailed among the companions to obtain the first place in the esteem of their chiefs, among the chiefs to acquire the greatest number of valiant companions."—*Gibbon.*

RIVALRY (*rivalis*, from *rivus*, a river, hostile tribes being often thus separated) has always a selfish object. It consists in trying to get something for oneself which is of the nature of a possession against one or more others who are trying for the same thing.

"Keen contentions and eager *rivalries*."—*Jeffrey.*

COMPLAIN. MURMUR. REPINE. LAMENT. DEPLORE. EXPOSTULATE. REGRET. REMONSTRATE.

COMPLAIN (Fr. *complaindre*, Lat. *plangere*, to beat, strike the breast) is to find fault sadly. It is plain

that this may be either with the course of things themselves, or with the conduct of other persons. A complaint in either case is expressed openly, and implies that what has befallen one has been undeserved or unjust, from whatever quarter it may have come. When it relates to the conduct of another, it comes from a superior, or from one who is sufficiently on an equality to have a right to complain to some superior.

"Save where from yonder ivy-mantled tower
The moping owl doth to the moon com-
plain
Of such as, wandering near her secret
bower,
Molest her ancient solitary reign."

Gray.

MURMUR (Lat. *murmurare*) is the suppressed expression of discontent against a superior power or the irresistible force of circumstances.

"What if God, willing to show the riches of His mercy, calls and accepts of some at the very last hour of the day, and rewards them equally with those that came in at first; have we anything to reply against such a proceeding, or to carp at His justice, or *murmur* at our brother's felicity?"—*South.*

REPINE. Unlike complain and murmur, repine (*re* and *pine*, to continue pining) implies no outward expression, but an inward discontent which preys on the spirits, and relates to the general lot or condition.

"*Repining* is sorrow united with a degree of resentment against some superior agent, where the mind dares not to break forth into strong expressions of anger."—*Cogan.*

LAMENT (Lat. *lamentari*), like complain, is necessarily expressed. It denotes sorrow for something which is regarded simply as a misfortune. In regard to the conduct of others, it is used in cases where the circumstances of the case or the speaker are not considered sufficient to entitle him to complain.

"Thammuz came next behind,
Whose annual wound in Lebanon allured
The Syrian damsels to lament his fate,
In amorous ditties all a summer's day."

Milton.

REGRET (Fr. *regretter*) regards

matters of fact, and denotes sorrow that something should have happened as it has, and a wish that it should have been otherwise. It is used, like lament, to express a modified complaint of another, but it is equally applicable to oneself. One may regret one's own conduct, as well as that of another. The essential idea of regret is that of looking back with dissatisfaction. If it be on what has occurred without ourselves, then regret is sorrow; if it be connected with our own acts, then regret is repentance.

"Alike regretted in the dust he lies,
Who yields ignobly or who bravely dies."
Pope's *Homer.*

DEPLORE (Lat. *deplorare*) is as extensive in its meaning as regret, and stronger specifically. It is to express deep and poignant grief for anything as an event or matter of fact, as to deplore a loss, to deplore another's conduct, or one's own. It is an expression not only of dissatisfaction, but of despondency. As compared with lament, it may be observed that, as lament is the more earnest expression, deplore is the deeper and more prolonged. A man laments a comparatively slight mistake; he deplores what threatens to involve him in ruin.

"To find her, or for ever to deplore
Her loss."
Milton.

Though the force of lament is demonstrative, yet usage would tolerate such a phrase as to lament in secret. We could hardly say to deplore in secret. The lighter force of lament, as compared with deplore, appears in the adjectives lamentable and deplorable. A deplorable thing is a real evil, a lamentable mistake is pitiable, and pity is akin to laughter and ridicule.

REMONSTRATE (Lat. *remonstrare*, to show again) and EXPOSTULATE (Lat. *ex* and *postulare*, to require) much resemble each other, inasmuch as they denote the complaint of another's conduct, which is expanded into reasoning with him; but remonstrate is the milder term of the two. The person who remonstrates with another is more on an equality with

nim than the expostulator, who is in a superior position, reasons less, and dictates more. Remonstrances and expostulations may be made either before the act by way of dissuasion, or after it. In the latter case the object is to produce an impression of dissatisfaction or repentance. There seems to be a further difference in nature of the force employed in each case. Expostulation is a more direct appeal to the person himself, and therefore includes the employment of any means which may influence him. Remonstrance is rather an appeal to the case, and indirectly to the person's sense of its injustice, impropriety, or the like. They refer exclusively to matters of right and wrong, not to matters of truth and falsehood, except so far as they are associated with or flow out of moral causes. We do not expostulate or remonstrate against ignorance or false opinions, though we might do so against persons for neglecting opportunities of fuller or exacter knowledge, and the results of this.

"We must use *expostulation* kindly."—*Shakespeare*.

"It is the proper business of a divine to state cases of conscience, and to *remonstrate* against any growing corruptions in practice and especially in principles."—*Waterland*.

COMPLAINT. *See* DISEASE.

COMPLAISANT. *See* CIVIL and AFFABLE.

COMPLETE. *See* ENTIRE.

COMPLETE. *See* FINISH.

COMPLETION. *See* CONSUMMATION.

COMPLEXITY. COMPLICATION. INTRICACY. COMPOUNDING.

COMPLEXITY and COMPLICATION are both derived from the Latin *con*, together, and *plicare*, to fold. INTRICACY is from *trix*, small entanglements, as the feathers on the legs of birds. Complexity is the effect produced by complication, whether on the bodily eye or the eye of the understanding. Complication is a

confused involution of things. Intricacy represents the difficulty of finding a definite line of thought or movement on account of the complexity or complication of things. In a wood, in consequence of the complication of the foliage, the task is one of complexity, and it is an intricate matter, to find the right path. Complication is oftener used of words and circumstances, as "complicated sentences," "his affairs are in a complicated state;" complexity, of ideas, as a complex proposition; intricate, of matters which have to be investigated, mastered, or understood, as "an intricate point of law." Complexity is a more abstract term than complication, which is more specific. So complexity is employed of the inherent tendency of things to become complicated, as by Burke:

"Men are every now and then put by *complexity* of human affairs into strange situations."

"A *complication* of diseases."—*Macaulay*.

"Many who toil through the *intricacy* of complicated systems are insuperably embarrassed with the least perplexity in common affairs."—*Rambler*.

COMPOUNDING (Lat. *componere*) denotes the physical amalgamation of homogeneous substances, and is not a moral term; except as compound has also the sense of the Latin *componere*, to allay (strife), to compound a difference (*componere litem*).

COMPLIMENT. *See* FLATTERY.

COMPOSE. *See* SETTLE and FORM.

COMPOSED. *See* CALM.

COMPOUND, *adj.* COMPLEX. (*See* COMPLEXITY.)

As compared with each other, these two adjectives differ in that while COMPLEX denotes involution, COMPOUND only denotes a more external kind of amalgamation or combination. A grammatical form may be compound (the word compound is an instance of it), but it is not complex. This is reserved for metaphorical use, as in the subjoined employment of it by Locke.

"But the opinion of Buchanan is more probable, that the town now called Dundee is a compound word of Down and Tay."—*Spotswood*.

"As these simple ideas are observed to exist in several combinations united together, so the mind has a power to consider several of them united together as one idea, and that not only as they are united in external objects, but as itself has joined them. Ideas thus made up of several simple ones put together I call *complex*, such as are beauty, gratitude, a man, an army, the universe."—*Locke*.

COMPOUND. COMPOSE.

These two words, formed from the same root (Lat. *componere*), serve to represent, the first the physical, the second the metaphysical process. The words are often used interchangeably, yet this distinction holds good. "Of what is this pudding composed?" is a question which would carry the mind to the receipt for it, and the intention of the person who made it; "Of what is it compounded?" to the actual ingredients only. So an artist composes his subject, and compounds his colours.

"In like manner, if by knowing that colours are nothing else but various mixtures of light and of darkness in bodies, our discourse assures us that by several *compoundings* of these extremes, reds, blues, yellows, greens, and all other intermediate colours may be generated."—*Digby*.

COMPREHEND. See COMPRISE and UNDERSTAND.

COMPRISE. CONTAIN. COMPREHEND. INCLUDE. EMBRACE. INVOLVE. IMPLY.

COMPRISE (Fr. *compris*, Lat. *comprehendere*) is always used metaphysically, that is, expresses comprehensiveness or inclusiveness as appreciated by the mind. It is a term commonly applicable to the individual objects included under an abstract or collective noun, that is to say, to comprise is to include by the metaphysical force of a term. For instance, we could not say, "Six trees are comprised in that field," but we might say, "Those six trees comprise all the timber on my estate." If we

meant to say that Walter Scott's works were part of the library of an acquaintance, we might say, "The library contains or comprises Scott's works;" but we should not mean quite the same thing. In the former case we simply state that in this particular whole is contained something as a part. In the latter we predicate of the library an extensiveness, which in this case has proved *adequate* to include those particular works. The term comprise adds to the idea of inclusion that of adequate or commensurate including.

"Whatever was by them decreed either in the declaration of Christian belief or refutation of heresy, may all be *comprised*, as judicious Hooker well noteth, in four words, 'truly, perfectly, indivisibly, distinctly,' truly God, perfectly man, indivisibly one person, distinctly two natures."—*Bishop Horne*.

If we meant to enumerate all that was involved in the term library, we might say a library comprises bookshelves as well as books, or, singly, that book is comprised in the list. CONTAIN (Lat. *continere*) denotes what is within another thing as a simple matter of fact, and not of inference or implication, as the vessel contains oil, that man's writings contain many original ideas. There is, however, commonly a specific relationship or community between the thing contained and that which contains it. This appears in the term contents, which is not the case with comprise or include, which may relate to things which in use and nature are entirely foreign among themselves. Yet contain is generic, and may be taken as the universal term, of which the rest are modifications.

"And when he (Cranmer) came to the last part of his task, he boldly owned his books, avowing the truths in them *contained*, and disclaimed the Roman doctrine."—*Strype*.

COMPREHEND (Lat. *comprehendere*), like comprise, and unlike contain, can only be used metaphysically; but it denotes the extent of an imposed term, not an inherent or spontaneous force. Comprehension is the result of purpose; while comprisal flows from the nature of the thing compri-

sing. Rules comprehend particular instances, laws comprehend certain cases, a word comprehends several meanings. The character of contain is physical, of comprise metaphysical, of comprehend geometrical.

"The virtues required in the heroic poem, and, indeed, in all writings published, are comprehended all in this one word, discretion."
—Hobbes.

INCLUDE (Lat. *includere*) is metaphysical, while the physical meaning is expressed by another form of the same word, *inclose*. It is to contain in the relation of the logical whole to the parts, that is, of the universal to the particular.

"Our Master Christ sheweth that in fulfilling two of these commandments be all works included."—Barnes.

EMBRACE (Fr. *bras*, the arm) is a metaphorical term, meaning to inclose as if in the arms. It is a livelier term than include, and commonly denotes a distant, indirect, or unexpected including.

"Not that my song, in such a scanty space,
So large a subject fully can embrace."
Dryden.

INVOLVE and IMPLY are commonly used of one particular only. INVOLVE (Lat. *in* and *volvere*, to roll) denotes that which exercises such a force upon another thing as to draw it after itself of necessity. "Such a scheme involves the necessity of a large expenditure of money." IMPLY (Lat. *implicare*) relates only to the force of words or the virtue of ideas, as involve to the necessities of things. IMPLY is opposed to express. An implied promise is one fairly to be understood or inferred from the words used, though not reducible to a distinct statement. An involved promise is one which is necessitated by what has been said or done. Generally speaking, words imply, and circumstances involve. If one thing involves another, it so contains it that the two must go together by an indissoluble connection. War involves the expenditure of blood and treasure. The premises of a syllogism involve the conclusion, which, on the other hand, is evolved from them.

"We cannot demonstrate these things so as to show that the contrary necessarily involves a contradiction."—Tillotson.

"Where a malicious act is proved, a malicious intention is implied."—Sherlock.

COMPEL. See BIND.

COMPLIANT. See OBEDIENT.

COMPOSED. See CALM.

COMPUNCTION. See REPENTANCE.

COMPUTE. See CALCULATE.

COMRADE. See COMPANION.

CONCAVITY. See CAVITY.

CONCEAL. See HIDE.

CONCEALMENT. See SECRECY.

CONCEDE. See CEDE.

CONCEIT, SELF-. See ARROGANCE.

CONCEIVE. See APPREHEND.

CONCEPTION. See FANCY and IDEA.

CONCERN. See SOLICITUDE.

CONCERN. See AFFAIR, AFFECT, and INTEREST.

CONCERT, *n.* See CONCORD.

CONCERT. See CONTRIVE.

CONCILIATE. RECONCILE.

To CONCILIATE (Lat. *concilio*, from *concilium*, a union) is to gain the affections or goodwill of another for oneself. To RECONCILE (from the same root) is to restore others to goodwill. Reconcile has also the peculiar sense of bringing a person into acquiescence with that which is distasteful. Reconcile is used only of persons, while conciliate may be applied to qualities, as to conciliate regard and esteem. To conciliate amounts, in some cases, to reconciling to oneself, for to conciliate is to gain over, and this may be one who was previously either indifferent or an enemy.

"The rapacity of his father's administration had excited such universal discontent, that it was found expedient to conciliate the nation."—Hallam.

"First be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift."—Bible.

CONCISE. SUCCINCT. CONDENSED.

CONCISE (Lat. *concisus*, cut off short, from *concidere*) is used of style in speaking or writing, and means expressing much in a few words.

"To tell you the truth, I was once inclined to be somewhat angry at the shortness of your letters; but I am now so well reconciled to your *concise* manner, that I condemn my own as downright loquacity, and shall make your epistles the models of mine."—*Melmoth, Cicero*.

SUCCINCT (Lat. *succingere*, *succinctus*, to gird or tuck up) has the same signification, but is applied more frequently to the subject matter, while concise belongs to the style; so we should say, a concise style and a succinct narrative.

"A strict and *succinct* style is that where you can take away nothing without losse, and that losse to be manifest."—*B. Jonson*.

CONDENSED (Lat. *condensare*, from *densus*, close) relates rather to the mode of treatment by which a matter is brought, and, as it were, compressed into a smaller space than it *might* have occupied.

"The secret course pursued at Brussels and at Madrid may be *condensed* into the usual formula—dissimulation, procrastination, and again dissimulation."—*Motley*.

CONCLUDE. See FINISH.

CONCLUSION. See CLOSE and INFERENCE.

CONCLUSIVE. FINAL. DECISIVE. ULTIMATE.

These terms agree in expressing that character of what is said or done which leaves no room for subsequent modification or procedure. CONCLUSIVE (Lat. *concludere*) is commonly used of that which terminates argument or debate by its overwhelming or irresistible force, as a conclusive proof, conclusive evidence.

"But this objection, when thoroughly examined, will not be found by any means so pressing or *conclusive* as at first sight it seems."—*Hobbes*.

FINAL (Lat. *finis*) to that which brings with it an *intentional* end. The term final is most commonly

found associated with the end or purpose of intelligent beings, or as recognised by them, the final being generally that on which the mind dwells as the end. Hence, especially, words, decisions, resolves, and the like, are final, as shutting up further thought, speech, or action. A conclusive answer leaves no room for question. A final answer is followed by a determined silence.

"Neither with us in England hath there been till very lately any *final* determination upon the right of authors at the common law."—*Blackstone*.

DECISIVE (Lat. *decidere*) is that which has the power of prompt and summary determination, as a decisive proof, a decisive victory. The decisive terminates action, as the conclusive terminates argument.

"A *decisive*, irrevocable doom."—*Bate's Sermons*.

ULTIMATE (Lat. *ultimus*, last) denotes that beyond which all attempts to go are stopped, as an ultimate concession is one which there is no probability of seeing extended; ultimate truths, that is, truths which must be taken as axioms, being incapable of further analysis.

"Whence comes it (the mind) by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer in one word, from experience; on that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it *ultimately* derives itself."—*Locke*.

CONCOMITANT. See ACCOMPANIMENT.

CONCORD. HARMONY. UNISON. CONCERT.

CONCORD (from *con*, together, and *cor*, *cordis*, the heart) denotes the union of wills and affections.

"Love quarrels oft in pleasing *concord* end."—*Milton*.

HARMONY (Gr. *ἀρμονία*) is a continuous concord or state of such agreement manifesting itself externally. A united family, by the concord which subsists among its members, lives a life of domestic harmony.

"In us both one soul,
Harmony to behold in wedded pair,
More grateful than harmonious sounds to
the ear." *Milton.*

CONCERT (*con* and *serere*, to grasp) applies also to designs and actions, which is the carrying out of such designs;

"It was concerted to begin the siege in March."—*Burnet.*

While UNISON (Lat. *unus*, one, and *sonus*, sound) relates to such congeniality as may exist in the less grave matters of feeling and taste.

"A work which warms our passions, and hurries us on with the rapid vehemence of its style, may be read once or twice with pleasure; but it is the more tranquil style which is most frequently in *unison* with our minds."—*Knox, Essays.*

These are all secondary applications, with the exception of the last, of which the primary meaning is union of design or action, and its musical meaning the secondary one. It came afterwards to be confounded with consort. So Spenser—

"For all that pleasing is to living ear
Was there *consorted* in one harmony."

CONCUR. *See* AGREE.

COINCIDE. *See* AGREE.

CONCURRENCE. *See* ACCEDE.

CONCUSSION. *See* SHOCK.

CONDEMN. *See* BLAME.

CONDENSED. *See* CONCISE.

CONDESCENDING. *See* AFFABLE.

CONDITION. *See* CIRCUMSTANCE, STATE, and STIPULATION.

CONDOLENCE. *See* MERCY.

CONDUCE. CONTRIBUTE. TEND.

Of these, TEND (Lat. *tendere*) is used of anything the nature of which is such as to be likely to bring about something else by a junction with that thing. Hence it is used of a single cause, as idleness tends to poverty. It denotes a relation between cause and effect, not invariable, but variable and probable, or such as partially, if not completely, effects a certain end.

"The laws of our religion *tend* to the universal happiness of mankind."—*Tillotson.*

CONDUCE (Lat. *conducere*) expresses more distinctly than tend the separate existence of cause and effect. We say a thing is apt to tend to something else, but we do not say, apt to conduce. It either does conduce or not.

"All agree that Moses' main end was the abolition of idolatry and preservation of the unity. The institution of the Sabbath is shown by Spenser and others to be, of all the ceremonials, the very rite most *conducive* to this end."—*Warburton.*

The term conduce is employed of that which leads to a favourable or desirable end, not to the contrary. We speak of things as conducive to happiness, not to misery.

CONTRIBUTE (Lat. *contribuere*) denotes partial causation, which is shared with other things of like tendency, while one thing alone may conduce to bring about a result.

"Quoth she, I grant it is in vain
For one that's basted to feel pain;
Because the pangs his bones endure
Contribute nothing to the cure."

Hudibras.

CONDUCT. *See* BEHAVIOUR.

CONDUCT. *See* LEAD and DIRECT.

CONFEDERACY. *See* ALLIANCE.

CONFEDERATE. ALLY.

CONFEDERATE (*con* and *fœdus*, a treaty) is used of individuals in a bad sense.

"He is the freeman whom the truth makes free,
And all are slaves besides. There's not a chain
That hellish foes *confederate* for his harm
Can wind around him, but he casts it off
With as much ease as Samson his green withes."
Cooper.

As an adjective a confederate state or power differs from an ALLY (Fr. *allier*, Lat. *alligare*, to bind), in that confederation may be permanent, while alliance is temporary. We speak of the "German Confederation," and of the alliance between the English and French in the Crimean

war. An ally is not used of individuals except in a jocose way, or on a great scale, as one monarch may be an ally of another.

"By this extraordinary and unexpected success of his *ally* (Gustavus), Charles failed of the purpose for which he framed the *alliance*."—*Hume*.

CONFER. See GIVE.

CONFERENCE. See CONVERSATION.

CONFESS. See ACKNOWLEDGE.

CONFIDE. See COMMIT.

CONFIDENCE. See HOPE.

CONFINE. See BORDER and CIRCUMSCRIBE.

CONFINED. See NARROW.

CONFINEMENT. See CAPTIVITY.

CONFIRM. CORROBORATE.

The idea of giving additional strength is common to both these terms, and that in other than the physical sense, but they differ in their mode of application. CONFIRM (Lat. *con* and *firmitas*, strong) is used both of the minds of persons and of the subjects; corroborate, only of the subjects themselves. My statement has been confirmed, or I am confirmed in my belief. Facts, opinions, statements are CORROBORATED (Lat. *con* and *robustus* strength). Generally speaking, to confirm is to make more sure, to corroborate is to make more strong. When a statement is doubtful, it may be confirmed; when testimony is weak, it may be corroborated. I am confirmed in what is internal or relative to myself, as an opinion, a conviction, a resolution, or even a suspicion. That is corroborated which I put forth before others, and advance as liable to doubt or gainsaying.

CONFLAGRATION. See FIRE.

CONFLICT. CONTEST.

CONFLICT (Lat. *configere*, *conflictus*) is used of any two opposing forces in sustained collision, as the "conflict of the elements," "conflicting hosts." CONTEST (*contestari*) is an open and premeditated struggle on the part of

man for some proposed prize or victory. It may be intellectual, while a conflict is physical, except when it is used in a metaphorical sense, as a conflict of opposite emotions or opinions. A contest is a strife for a common object. A conflict is a violent meeting of two forces or individuals. A contest may be, and often has been, decided by a conflict. In the Wars of the Roses the houses of York and Lancaster were the contending parties, and the battles in which they engaged were conflicts. A man may be defeated in a contest, but he may perish in a conflict.

"And whenever the patrons of liberty shall give this advantage to the enemies of it, as much of that popularity which the first lose the others will gain, and so, the *contest* becoming more equal, force alone must decide."—*Warburton*.

"The starry cope
Of heaven, perhaps, or all the elements
At least had gone to rack, disturbed and
torn
With violence of this *conflict*."—*Milton*.

CONFORM. See ACCEDE and COMPLY.

CONFORMATION. See FORM.

CONFOUND. See ABASH and BAFFLE.

CONFOUND. MIX. CONFUSE. BLEND. MINGLE.

These two, CONFOUND and CONFUSE, may be regarded as modes of the third to mix. To MIX (Lat. *miscere*) is to produce or exhibit an entire interpenetration of many parts or particles, whether homogeneous or not. In the mixture the parts may absolutely lose their individuality, as in liquid substances, or not absolutely, as in mixing different kinds of seeds. The term mix is hardly employed in any other than a purely physical sense. MINGLE is a variation of mix, and denotes that kind of mixture in which the individuals or parts retain their individuality, or are still recognisable, as when persons mingle in the dance or the crowd. BLEND (Germ. *blenden*, to blind, or dazzle) is to mix imper-

fectly yet harmoniously, so that the individuality, as in colours, is discernible, but under a modified form. But, except in the case of colours and sounds and flavours, blend is used of abstract qualities and ideas. Confound (*confundere, confusus*) and confuse are derived from different parts of the same Latin verb, but used the former of more things than one, the latter of one thing. They apply to the mind and ideas as well as to objects of vision. A person confuses an account when he gives inverted, vague, or contradictory relations, so making it obscure. He confounds one account or circumstance with another when he mixes into one details belonging to both. When we confuse we throw into indistinctness; when we confound we falsely identify. In the former we wrongly put one or more things among others; in the latter we substitute them wrongly for others. Things may mix or be mixed in almost any proportion; but things mingled with others are comparatively few, or a minority.

"Our critic *confounds* the nature and order of things."—*Warburton*.

"But as he wrote at second-hand and from hearsay only of things which he himself had not seen, he is observed to have jumbled his facts together more *confusedly*, and to describe them more inaccurately, than the rest, who related them from their own knowledge."—*Middleton*.

The following from Bishop Horsley may show that the term mix is not happily employed but of material compounds:—

"Who is he that shall determine in what proportions the attributes of justice and mercy, forbearance and severity, ought to be *mixed* up in the character of the Supreme Governor of the universe?"

"Curiosity *blends* itself more or less with all our passions."—*Burke*.

"Fire *mingled* with the hail."—*Bible*.

CONFRONT. FACE.

To CONFRONT (*con*, together, and *frons*, the forehead or face) is usually personal, implying two persons at least, as to confront one witness with another, or he was confronted by several witnesses, or the witnesses

confronted one another. To FACE (Lat. *facies*) denotes one person or one party which is ready to encounter some specific difficulty, danger, or object of fear, not necessarily personal, as to face the enemy or the storm. Confront is also a more energetic and positive term than face. He who faces danger is ready to meet its consequences. He who confronts it has shown signs of opposition, and, in some sense, begun the attack.

"We four, indeed, *confronted* here with four
In Russian habit." *Shakespeare*.

It may be observed that confront has a sense which does not belong to face, namely, to *bring* face to face.

"A lie *faces* God and shrinks from men."—*Bacon*.

CONFUSE. See ABASH and CONFOUND.

CONFUSED. See INDISTINCT.

CONFUSION. DISORDER. DISTURBANCE. COMMOTION.

CONFUSION (Lat. *confundere, confusus*) denotes that abnormal state in which things which ought to be separate or distinct are tumultuously, irregularly, or obscurely mixed together. It can only apply, therefore, to matters in which the individuals, parts, or particles ought to be distinctly separate, as the confusion of voices in a mob, a man's affairs are in confusion, confusion of thought, confusion of papers. DISORDER (Fr. *désordre*) is the violation of order or arrangement, and so takes place in matters where position, location, or adjustment are needed, as in the tumultuous march of armies, a disorderly crowd, a disordered dress. Confusion necessarily involves disorder; but there may be disorder without confusion. Confusion is of the whole. Disorder may be of the whole or only some of the parts. Confusion stands to distinctness as disorder to arrangement. So a thing may be disordered in the sense of disarranged, without any such wrong intermixture of separate parts as belongs to confusion. The hair of

the head may be in disorder, not in confusion. An army in disorder has lost its ranks. When confusion reigns in it the soldiers cannot hear the voice of their commanders, which, if heard and obeyed, might put an end to the disorder. Disorder is more external than confusion, so that oftentimes the former is the result and manifestation of the latter. In the councils of a government confusion may reign for some time before public disorder (which must sooner or later be the case) manifests itself as the consequence. The term confusion is utterly opposed to every principle, moral, mental, or artistic. We never could bring the term into contact with anything otherwise than faulty. On the other hand, disorder may be regulated and designed for the purpose of effect.

"If we unbroke

Sustain their onset, little skilled in war,
To wheel, to rally, and renew the charge,
Confusion, havoc, and dismay will seize
The astonished rout." *Smollett*.

"When you behold a man's affairs through negligence and misconduct involved in *disorder*, you naturally conclude that his ruin approaches."—*Blair*.

"We have seen that inordinate passions are the great *disturbers* of life."—*Ibid*.

DISTURBANCE (*turba*, a crowd) is the violation of peace or quiet, physical or otherwise; as the sea is often disturbed violently, but can never be thrown into confusion or disorder, having no distinctness or sequence of parts. Disturbance is of those things which, presumably or desirably, are in tranquillity. **COMMOTION** (Lat. *commovere*, *commotus*) differs from disturbance in denoting the action of a multitude of individuals or parts; while disturbance may be of one, as, "My occupation was disturbed," "By a violent commotion of the elements the stillness of the night was disturbed." Commotion adds the influence of excitement to the force of disturbance.

CONFUTE. REFUTE. OPPUGN. IMPUGN. DISPROVE.

To **CONFUTE** (Lat. *confutari*) applies both to the arguer and the

argument. It is to *overwhelm* by decisive argument. **REFUTE** is to *repel* by the same kind of argument, and so applies to what is personally alleged against one, as charges, calumnies, and the like, to which confute is not applied in the same sense. When a thing is confuted, it is reduced to an absurdity, neutralised, and, as it were, annihilated. When it is refuted, it remains where it was, but its *application* is invalidated. Confutation deprives of force and of truth. Refutation does not weaken or destroy, but repels effectually. Opinions, statements, arguments, paradoxes, fallacies are confuted by being, as it were, melted down to nothing. Charges, accusations, insinuations, slander are refuted by proving their *relative* untruth. **DISPROVE** is now never used of persons, but only of statements, suppositions, and the like. An argument is confuted by showing its fallacy. Calumny is refuted by proving the innocence of the calumniated person. A fact or the assertion of it is disproved by showing it to be untrue. **OPPUGN** and **IMPUGN**, from *oppugnare* and *impugnare*, both denote a hostile attitude in argument. They both fall short of the rest, in that they denote only reasoning, not *conclusive* reasoning. To oppugn is to exercise hostile reasoning against a person or his statements; while impugn is rather to call in question the truth of what he states. So we might perhaps better say, "He was publicly oppugned in the senate," and, "The truth of his statements was impugned." To oppugn is a term of stronger force than impugn, and denotes a determined and total opposition, while impugn is applicable to questions of detail and lesser moment. "I have no desire to oppugn the statements you have just made, but pardon me if I impugn the accuracy of one observation in particular."

"They only read the gazettes of their own writers, so that everything which is called an answer is with them a *confutation*."—*Dryden*.

"Some of his blunders seem rather to deserve a flogging than a *refutation*."—*Macaulay*.

"They said the manner of their impeachment they could not but conceive did *oppugn* the rights of Parliament."—*Clarendon*.

"Unless you grant some fundamental and eternal truths, I see not how it is possible for us to confute divers theological errors of Pagans and other infidels, whose rejection of the authority of the Scriptures does not allow us without indiscretion to *impugn* them with arguments from them."—*Boyle*.

"That false supposition I advanced in order to *disprove* it."—*Atterbury*.

CONGRATULATE. FELICITATE.

FELICITATE (Lat. *felix*) had, of old, the sense of to *make* happy, as well as to consider or call happy. The former force it has since lost. It differs from CONGRATULATE (*congratulari*) mainly in the degree of force and sincerity. Congratulate is, therefore, rapidly taking the place of felicitate, inasmuch as we naturally tend to give ourselves credit for genuineness of motive. Felicitate is a word of formal politeness. Congratulate implies a sharing of the joy produced by another's good fortune. Good manners felicitate, a good heart or true friendship congratulates. We do not demand the same warmth in felicitations. On the other hand, a cold congratulation must be forced.

"That fawning villain's forced *congratulations*."—*Johnson*.

As felicitations are manifestations of politeness, they may be offered where congratulations might seem to presume an equality of condition.

"I sincerely rejoiced to hear of your advancement to the purple; yet on these occasions I did not think myself warranted to break in upon you either with my acknowledgments or *felicitations*."—*Anecdotes of Bishop Watson*.

CONJECTURE. See GUESS.

CONJUNCTURE. See CRISIS.

CONNECT. COMBINE. ATTACH. UNITE.

CONNECT (Lat. *connectere*) commonly implies a third thing as a medium whereby two others are joined; as two houses are connected by a covered way, leading from one to the other, so we speak of things

as closely or distantly, directly or indirectly connected. In this respect it differs from UNITE (Lat. *unus, unire, unitus*), where, if the individuality of the united objects is not, as it sometimes is, lost, there is at least a disregard of the connecting medium. ATTACH (Fr. *attacher*), except when used of affection, commonly implies the fastening of the smaller, lighter, more movable, or less important, to the fixed and immovable, or at least the heavier, less movable, and more important. So the seal is attached to the watch, not the watch to the seal. COMBINE (Lat. *con* and *binus*, two, two each) is not used in a physical sense. It denotes the union or comprehension of two or more things in some common principle, or under some common object or purpose, as to combine exercise with recreation in a country walk.

"A right opinion is that which *connects* distant truths by the shortest train of intermediate propositions."—*Johnson*.

"Few painters have obliged us with finer scenes, or have possessed the art of *combining* woods, lakes, and rocks into more agreeable pictures than G. Poussin."—*Hurd on Horace*.

"As our nature is at present constituted, *attached* by so many strong connections to the world of sense, and enjoying a communication so feeble and distant with the world of spirits, we need fear no danger from cultivating intercourse with the latter as much as possible."—*Blair*.

"This was the cause of men's *uniting* themselves at the first in politic societies, which societies could not be without government, nor government without a distinct kind of law from that which hath been already declared."—*Hooker*.

CONNECTION. See INTERCOURSE.

CONQUER. SUBDUE. VANQUISH. OVERCOME. SURMOUNT. SUBJUGATE.

CONQUER (Fr. *conquérir*, to acquire by power) is applied to persons, countries, and any terms expressive of difficulty or opposition, or to subjects in which such difficulty or opposition is implied; as David conquered Goliath, William I. conquered Eng-

land, to conquer resistance, to conquer evil passions. It denotes the placing under one's own power or control after a series of efforts or systematic resistance. SUBDUCE (Lat. *subducere*) is much the same, but points not so much to the struggles of the victor as to the state of the conquered in a final and surer reduction. It applies also to the inner spirit. To conquer is sometimes employed in the simple sense of getting the better of, as to conquer one's own prejudices or passions, aversion, and the like.

"It has been observed of Greece, that when it was subdued by the Romans, itself subdued its conquerors, softened their savage temper, and refined their manners; and afterwards, of the Romans themselves, that wherever they conquered they in some degree civilized the world."—*Law, Theory of Religion*.

VANQUISH (Fr. *vaincre*, Lat. *vincere*, to conquer) is used of combats commonly with a *personal* enemy.

"Shall a stripling David gloriously triumph over giants, while I basely am vanquished by dwarfs?"—*Barrow*.

SUBJUGATE (Lat. *sub* and *jugum*) is to bring under the yoke, that is, to conquer and retain under continued pressure. Poland is subjugated by Russia, while its spirit remains unsubdued. OVERCOME and SURMOUNT (Fr. *surmonter*) are employed of continued resistance from impersonal adversaries, though overcome is used of personal as well. Overcome is applied, not only directly to difficulties and obstacles, but to things which have the nature of difficulties and obstacles, as scruples, prejudices; surmount, directly to the difficulties and obstacles themselves. It is possible to overcome by stratagem as by force.

"To work in close design by fraud or guile
What force effected not; that he no less
At length from us may find, who over-
comes
By force hath overcome but half his foe."
Milton.

"Finding difficulties which his reason cannot surmount, he becomes contemptuous and sceptical."—*Gilpin's Sermons*.

CONQUEROR. VICTOR.

Every CONQUEROR is a VICTOR (Lat. *victor*, *vincere*, to conquer), but every victor is not a conqueror, inasmuch as the term victor is employed of other struggles than those of war or personal antagonism, as, for instance, of competition. The victors in the Olympic games were not conquerors, for they did not make themselves masters of the persons or territories of men. An old form of conqueror was *conquereur*, which meant much the same as the present term *annexer*, as appears from the following from Blackstone:—

"What we call purchase, *perquisitio*, the feudists called conquest, *conquestus* or *conquisitio*; both denoting any means of acquiring an estate out of the common course of inheritance; and this is still the proper phrase in the law of Scotland, as it was among the Norman jurists, who styled the first purchaser (that is, he who brought the estate into the family who at present owns it) the conqueror or *conquereur*, which seems to be all that was meant by the appellation which was given to William the Norman."—*Blackstone*.

It may be well to warn the reader, in case Blackstone should have meant to derive purchase from *perquisitio*—which seems only too probable—that there is no etymological connection between these words, purchase being the French *pourchasser*, to chase or seek after, afterwards, specifically to procure by money. In addition to the difference observed above, it may be remarked, that a victor vanquishes in a single strife or contest, a conqueror gains a complete success and subdues his opponent. Alexander was victor at Arbela, and the conqueror of Asia and Darius.

"In love the victors from the vanquished fly;

They fly that wound, and they pursue that die."
Walker.

CONSANGUINITY. See AFFINITY.

CONSCIENTIOUS. SCRUPULOUS.

SCRUPULOUS (Lat. *scrupulus*, a grit, or little stone, which gives pain in walking, or makes the path sharp) is in one way more comprehensive

than CONSCIENTIOUS (Lat. *conscire sibi*, to be conscious, *conscientia*, conscience), and in another less so. If a person were found scrupulous in all things, it might then be said, that conscientiousness is one form or aspect of scrupulousness; but the fact is, that scrupulousness is often of a different character from conscientiousness. It leads men sometimes to be exact in one direction, and to attend to minute matters, omitting weightier, as the Pharisees, according to the representations of the Gospel, must have been exceedingly scrupulous, and unconscientious also. The scrupulous man may be nice from other motives than conscience, as, for instance, from politeness.

"Let us consider the world therefore as God's great family, and ourselves as servants in that family, as acting immediately, whatever our situations are, under our great Master, and of discharging the several offices which He hath assigned with a *conscientious* regard to our duty."—*Gilpin*.

"The *scrupulousness* of the parents or friends of the deceased persons deprives us oftentimes of the opportunities of anatomizing the bodies of men."—*Boyle*.

CONSCIOUS. See AWARE.

CONSCIOUSNESS. See FEELING.

CONSECRATE. DEDICATE. DEVOTE. HALLOW.

Of these, the three former relate to a specific object or purpose; the last is general or abstract. To HALLOW is to regard as holy, or to keep as holy; as the name of God is hallowed, and certain days are hallowed. An object of sacred recollection in the mind is hallowed, as "hallowed memories" of the dead. Of old, the term hallow was used in the sense of the modern consecrate by formal rite.

"To dedicate and *halowe* the monastery of Seynt Denys."—*Fabyan*.

It denotes now the consecration by the mind of the individual.

"*Hallowed* be Thy name."—*Lord's Prayer*.

To CONSECRATE (Lat. *con* and *sacer*, holy) is to hallow in a formal manner and with a purpose, being sometimes

followed by the preposition *to*. It commonly denotes a religious act and ceremony, but, by analogy, is extended to the force of circumstances, as, "The spot is consecrated to me by the memory of a deceased friend," or to reverential appropriation.

"Think with yourselves whether it is not really a great mercy and kindness to all of us, that one day in the week is by a public law *consecrated* to a holy rest."—*Sharp*.

DEDICATE (Lat. *dedicare*) is to offer for specific acceptance, or, in a specific manner, for a certain use or to a certain person. It is a less sacred term than consecrate, as to dedicate a book to an illustrious person, to dedicate one's life to literature.

"The feast of the *dedication* of churches was to be held every year on the first Sunday in October; but the feast of the patron of the Church was to be no more observed."—*Burnet*.

To DEVOTE (Lat. *devovere*) is earnestly or exclusively to give for a certain use or purpose, and so implies a *continuous* dedication. It implies also a final surrender away from oneself. This sense sometimes rises prominently to the surface, so that we say, to devote to destruction, or the flames.

"Gilbert West settled himself in a very pleasant house at Wickham, in Kent, where he *devoted* himself to piety."—*Johnson*.

In dedicating, the uppermost idea is that of the person to whose honour or use the thing is dedicated; in devoting, the surrender of the thing or person devoted.

CONSENT. See ACCEDE.

CONSEQUENCE. See RESULT, IMPORTANCE, and INFERENCE.

CONSEQUENTLY. ACCORDINGLY. THEREFORE. WHEREFORE. THEN. HENCE. THENCE. SINCE. BECAUSE. AS. SO.

These words all mark the drawing of a conclusion from something which has been said as premises. They are called in grammar *illative* particles, as marking an inference, which they do in different ways. THERE-

FORE and WHEREFORE, equivalent to for that, and for which, cause, are nearly alike; their difference flows simply from their grammatical formation. *Therefore* points farther back than *wherefore*, which, being relative, tends to mean relative to what has just been said, rather than to anything more remote. We might say, "I find the proposal attended by this difficulty, and that and the other. I cannot therefore accede to it." Again, "I feared his intentions, wherefore I refused to accompany him." THEN is a less emphatic word for *therefore*, and AS or SO, a less emphatic word for BECAUSE, and express the relation of cause and effect in a less marked manner. *Therefore* and *because* are more emphatically expressions of reasoning, and would, of necessity, occur in syllogisms and mathematical propositions; as and *then* are more colloquial. HENCE and THENCE resemble *then*, the one indicating an antecedent reason more remotely expressed, the other one more remote. *Therefore* and ACCORDINGLY differ, in that the former is applicable both to inference and proof, or, in other words, both to physical causation and to the conclusions of argument. So we might say, "It rained last night, therefore the ground is wet;" or "The ground is wet, therefore it rained last night." Accordingly could not well be used in this latter way. Accordingly is often used to express a congruity of action or proceeding, while *hence* and *thence* belong to the rigorous necessities of nature and logic; as, "I found a letter at home urging me to write at once to Paris. I wrote accordingly." CONSEQUENTLY expresses a definite conclusion, but is seldom used of logical inferences. It rather relates to practical proceedings or decisions; as, "My pocket has been picked, consequently I have no money." *Because* (by cause) had originally a stricter reference to physical causation. It now represents the correlative of the question why; and in the senses of physical sequence, logical sequence, and final causation or purpose. For instance, "Why are the shadows of the after-

noon longer than those of mid-day?" "Why is this line equal to that?" "Why did you leave the house?" SINCE is less formal than *because*, and in its grammatical position at the beginning of the sentence, anticipates the statement of the premise or premises of the argument.

CONSIDER. See MEDITATE.

CONSIDERATE. See CIVIL and THOUGHTFUL.

CONSIGN. See COMMIT.

CONSISTENT. COMPATIBLE. CONSONANT. ACCORDANT.

CONSISTENT (Lat. *consistere*) denotes one or more of the following points:—1, harmony, internal, of the several parts of a thing, which accordingly cohere well; as a consistent course of conduct: 2, harmony of a thing with another thing; as tranquillity is consistent with happiness: and, 3, harmony with itself at different times; as a consistent adherence to principles.

"Show me one that has it in his power
To act *consistent* with himself one hour."
Pope.

COMPATIBLE (Lat. *com* and *patior* to suffer) denotes an extraneous relation of one thing to another, or of two to each other. That thing is compatible with another which may exist under similar conditions, and, therefore, may share with it probability as a matter of supposition.

"Our poets have joined together such qualities as are by nature the most *compatible*."—Broom.

CONSONANT (*consonare*) denotes a harmony of general character, independent of any minute analysis or exact comparison. It is accordingly used not of things sharply defined, but of the drift of statements, sentiments, expressions, general representations, states of feeling, views, and the like; as, "Such an expression is consonant with all that I have heard of his character and behaviour."

"They all plead Scripture for what they say, and each one pretends that his opinion . . . is *consonant* to the words there used."
—Beveridge.

ACCORDANT (*ad* and *cor*, *cordis*, the heart) is commonly used of consistency in specific matters of statement, evidence, or testimony; as, "His evidence entirely accords with that of the other witness."

"The difference of good and evil in actions is not founded on arbitrary opinions or institutions, but in the nature of things and the nature of man. It *accords* with the universal sense of the human mind."—*Blair*.

CONSOLE. See CHEER.

CONSONANT. See CONSISTENT.

CONSPICUOUS. See APPARENT.

CONSPIRACY. See CABAL.

CONSTANCY. STEADINESS. FIRMNESS. FIDELITY. STABILITY. PERMANENCE. STEADFASTNESS.

CONSTANCY (Lat. *constare*) is that character which is opposed to changeableness. It is not employed of mere immobility, but of moving or acting bodies on natures which are controlled by some fixed principle amid such movements. Mechanical regularity and uniformity of will both come under the idea of constancy. We do not speak of the constancy of the rock or the mountain, but of the movements of the heavenly bodies, and the affections of men. It is opposed to variableness in the one case, and to fickleness in the other.

"Whilst thou livest, dear Kate, take a fellow of plain, uncoined *constancy*; for he perforce must do thee right."—*Shakespeare*.

STEADINESS (A. S. *stede*, a place or station), unlike constancy, admits the idea of fixedness of station as well as fixedness of motion. In the one case it is opposed to tottering, in the other to deviating; as, "to stand steady," "the ship kept a steady course," "to keep steadily to work or business," "a man of steady character." Steadiness, unlike constancy, is not related to recurrence, but to continuity. The constant may suffer occasional eclipse; the steady is continuously seen or felt.

"*Steadiness* is a point of prudence as well as of courage."—*L'Estrange*.

FIRMNESS (Lat. *firmus*) is a more active form of steadiness. The

steady man resists temptations to wander from the line of his duties and avocations, for his character is opposed to that of levity, as constancy is opposed to fickleness; but the firm man can be steady under opposition, and in cases where strength of will is specifically needed. Firmness is the resolute abiding by principles of action. Without firmness a man has no character. "Without constancy," says Addison, "there is neither love, friendship, nor virtue in the world." FIDELITY (Lat. *fidelis*, *fides*, faithful) is the steadfastness to persons, causes, or principles which flows either from a sense of honour or personal attachment, or both.

"The best security for the *fidelity* of men is to make interest coincide with duty."—*Hamilton*.

STABILITY (Lat. *stabilis*, from *stare*, to stand) is that local or moral fixedness which resists efforts to shake or move the object. Stability prevents variableness, and resists temptations to levity or curiosity consequent upon the variety of objects or influences.

"The king-becoming graces,
As justice, verity, temperance, *stability*,
Bounty, perseverance, mercy, lowliness,
Devotion, courage, patience, fortitude,
I have no relish for them."—*Shakespeare*.

PERMANENCE (*permanere*, to endure) is not a moral quality at all. It denotes no more than the quality of exemption from removal or alteration, in spite of external influences of every kind. Operations, as well as states, which endure, may be called permanent, as "the permanent laws of nature." It is opposed to alterable and transient. STEADFASTNESS, another form of steadiness, is applied particularly to the human will, and is opposed to the abandonment of or deviation from the objects and purposes of life, as "to adhere steadfastly to a resolution."

"But when strong passion or weak fleshiness

Would from the right way seek to draw him wide,

He would, through temperance and *steadfastness*,

Teach him the weak to strengthen, and the strong suppress."—*Spenser*.

CONSTANT. *See* CONSTANCY.

CONSTERNATION. *See* ALARM.

CONSTITUTE. APPOINT.

The exercise of authority in relation to the tenure of office, or the bestowal of a certain formal character, is common to these terms; but APPOINT is a less forcible term. Appoint is commonly the act of an individual, CONSTITUTE involves the convergence of several authorities and powers. Appoint has an external, constitute a virtual or inherent force. Almost all bishops in Roman Catholic countries are appointed by the Pope, who is constituted the supreme earthly head of that Church.

"That which constitutes the nature of man, and doth formally difference and distinguish him from all other animals, is not so much the power of reason as the capacity of being religious."—*Sharp*.

"God desires that in His Church, knowledge and piety, peace and charity and good order, should grow and flourish; to which purposes He hath appointed teachers to instruct, and governors to watch over His people."—*Barrow*.

CONSTITUTE. *See* CREATE.

CONSTITUTION. *See* FRAME and TEMPERAMENT.

CONSTRAIN. *See* BIND.

CONSTRUCT. *See* BUILD.

CONSTRUCTION. *See* EDIFICE.

CONSULT. DELIBERATE.

These terms denote the same process differently carried on. We CONSULT (Lat. *consulere*, *consultus*) with others; we DELIBERATE (Lat. *deliberare*, *libra*, a scale) within our own minds.

"That the law hath been fined (defined) by grave and learned men, meaning professors of the law, is manifestly untrue; for all the laws of England have been made by the kings of England, consulting with the nobility and commons in Parliament, of which not one in twenty was a learned lawyer."—*Hobbes*.

"I would not indeed refer a prince for maxims of equity and government to Puffendorf and Grotius, the dull and unfeeling

deliberators of questions on which a good heart and understanding can intuitively decide."—*Knox, Essays*.

CONSUME. DESTROY.

To CONSUME (Lat. *consumere*) is to destroy by absorption, and as a natural process, whether such absorption be regular or violent. To consume is by no means always to waste, as, for instance, an army of such a number will consume, on an average, so much food. The same idea is kept up when we say the fire consumed the stubble. To DESTROY (Lat. *destruere*) is a process always of violence, and contradiction of the purpose of the thing destroyed, and, generally speaking, a reversion of natural processes, or an abnormal exhibition of them. The philosophical idea of destruction never amounts to annihilation, but the violent discription of the forms and proportions under which bodies exist.

"It is as if the dead could feel
The icy worm around them steal,
And shudder as the reptiles creep
To revel on their rotting sleep,
Without the power to scare away
The cold consumers of their clay."

Byron.

"Whatsoever is in the world is but *ὅλη πῶς ἔχουσα*, matter so and so modified or qualified, all which modifications and qualifications of matter are in their own nature destroyable, and the matter itself (as the basis of them is not necessarily determined to this or that accident) is the only *ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον*, the only necessary existent."—*Cudworth*.

CONSUMMATION. COMPLETION.

COMPLETION (Lat. *completo*, to fill) is the filling up of a design or purpose. A work is completed when the plan of it is realized. CONSUMMATION (*summa*, a sum) is applied to matters which must reach a certain degree or extent to make them complete. In completion an outline is filled up; in consummation a point is reached. Hence consummation may be the point at which many antecedent things converge, and is so a plural result; while complete is a single result; as the consummation of

all our hopes, desires, and efforts. Completion is more external, consummation more internal. It is the completion of the idea or definition. It is also used in the sense of a gathering up in one of many things; as the event of to-day is the consummation of the hopes of many years.

"It is not to be doubted but it was a constant practice of all that is praiseworthy which made her capable of beholding death, not as the dissolution, but as the consummation of life."—*Steele*.

"He makes it the completion of an ill character, to bear a malevolence to the best of men."—*Pope*.

In this last example consummation might have been employed instead of completion, but the idea would have been different. The completion of an ill character would have been that which gave, as it were, the finishing touch to it. The consummation of an ill character would have been that which, being once supposed or known, the character would be regarded as necessarily involving all requirements and so summing it up.

CONSUMPTION. *See* CONSUME.

CONTACT. *See* TOUCH.

CONTAGION. INFECTION.

CONTAGION (Lat. *con* and *tangere*, to touch) operates by mutual contact, INFECTION (Lat. *inficere*) by an influence common to its subjects, or by other media than contact. This is adhered to in the moral use of the terms, as "the contagion of bad example," and "the infection of error." In the term infection the uppermost idea is the evil nature of the influence; in contagion, its communicative and spreading character. We dread infection, and we shun contagion.

"Their propensity to recount the wonderful exceeds all imagination. Neither their learning, judgment, nor integrity could secure them against the general contagion."—*Warburton*.

"It is necessary for the polishing of manners to have breathed that air (of the court); but it is infectious even to the best morals to live always in it."—*Dryden*.

CONTAGIOUS. *See* CONTAGION.

CONTAIN. *See* COMPRISE.

CONTAIN. HOLD.

Although these words are respectively Latin and Saxon equivalents (Lat. *continere*, and Saxon *healdan*, to hold), they are differently employed. Setting aside other meanings of hold, as to retain in the grasp, to possess, and the like, in speaking of mere capacity there are differences. To HOLD is in this sense purely physical, as a vessel holds water, or a certain quantity of it; but contain is used of abstract quantity, as that field contains (*i. e.*, consists of) so many acres. Again, contain does not imply, as is implied by hold, the extreme limit of physical contents. When we say a coach holds six persons, we mean that it is capable of holding so many, and not more. If we said it contains six, we should mean that there happen to be six inside it. It might have contained three. That cask holds water, might mean that it is water-tight, or, at least, retains it. That cask contains water, could only mean water is inside it, and nothing else.

"Among artificial substances the ship (*navis*) is feminine, as being so eminently a receiver and container of various things, of men, arms, provisions, goods, &c."—*Harris*.

"Death only this mysterious truth unfolds,
The mighty soul how small a body holds."
Dryden.

CONTAMINATE. DEFILE. POLLUTE. TAIN. CORRUPT.

To CONTAMINATE (Lat. *contaminare*, probably connected with *tungo*) is a stronger term than TAIN (which comes from *tingere*, Fr. *teindre*, to dye), but not so strong as DEFILE (connected with foul, Fr. *fouler*, to press under the feet) and POLLUTE (Lat. *polluere*, *pollutus*). They all indicate a partial, while CORRUPT (Lat. *corrumpere*, *corruptus*) marks a deeper and more permanent spoiling. Some of these synonyms tend more strongly than others to a purely moral application. To contaminate is to soil by defiling contact. Con-

tamination, therefore, may be best employed in cases where such external communication with what is bad may be supposed; as improper conversation, impure literature, vicious society, or bad example. Defile denotes such contamination as passes permanently into the inner nature, so as to render unclean. Pollute, like defile, has a ceremonial and moral bearing. It denotes the defilement of the springs of thought and action, the befouling of the character and very soul, as the sources of a stream are poisoned, and the waters which flow therefrom are infected thereby. Yet some affection of the senses is the means by which this is done. Taint denotes a partial colouring of evil, which has not yet spoilt the character or the judgment. It applies to what is false as well as to what is foul; as his mind is tainted with prejudice, he is tainted with the opinions of such and such a school. It is a milder form of contaminate. Corrupt is an analogous term, conveying the idea of an effect upon the mind similar to that of the breaking up of organized bodies. It is of very general application, and denotes the extreme of unsoundness, as a corrupt taste, a corrupt life, a corrupt judge. In all the other synonyms the character or principles are regarded as spoilt by external communication. Corrupt regards the case at the point when the evil has taken root in the system. Persons themselves are said to be contaminated, defiled, and polluted. Their purity tainted, their morals, principles, honesty, and integrity to be corrupted. The hands may be defiled, but the mind only is polluted.

"Even when the nobility, which represented the more permanent landed interest, united themselves by marriage, which was sometimes the case, with the other description, the wealth which saved the family from ruin was supposed to *contaminate* and degrade it."—*Burke*.

"Poltroons that fling dirt
Do but *defile*, and cannot hurt."

Huilibras.

"And can any then behold or act these gross abominations with delight, the very relation of which is sufficient to *pollute* the

ears that hear them, the common air that receives them, yea, the breath that utters them, and yet be innocent, be *untainted* by them?"—*Prynne*.

"That epidemical taint wherewith King James infected the minds of men continued upon us."—*Bolingbroke*.

"He (Cato the Elder) procured in the senate that Carneades, the Academic, and Diogenes, the Stoic, ambassadors from Athens, should immediately be dismissed, that they might not *corrupt* the youth."—*Bentley*.

CONTEMN. *See* DESPISE and SCORN.

CONTEMPLATE. *See* BEHOLD and MEDITATE.

CONTEMPTIBLE. *See* DESPICABLE.

CONTEMPTUOUS. *See* DISDAINFUL.

CONTEND. *See* STRIVE and DEBATE.

CONTENTION. *See* STRIFE.

CONTENTMENT. SATISFACTION.

CONTENTMENT (Fr. *content*) is less strong than SATISFACTION (Lat. *satis*, enough, *facere*, to make). Satisfaction is a full measure coming from without. Contentment is from within, implying such a measure as we are willing to regard as full. But contentment, from this internal character, tends to become a habit, which satisfaction, relating to things external, does not become. Where one man is not satisfied, another under the same circumstances is contented. It deserves to be remarked that in matters which are independent of our own efforts and actions, contentment is higher than satisfaction, as implying a better moral state. In matters which depend upon our own efforts and actions, it is better to endeavour to satisfy ourselves, and not be contented with a little. Both contentment and satisfaction denote tranquillity of mind in regard to the object of one's desires. Contentment is more in the heart, satisfaction in the passions. The first is a feeling which always

renders the mind quiet; the latter is an issue which sometimes throws it into trouble, although it is no longer disquieted as to the object of its desire. A restless or timid man is never content; an avaricious or ambitious man is never satisfied. One is content when one wishes for nothing more, though one is not always satisfied when one has procured what one wished. Satisfaction has in it an element of uncertainty. It is no surety for its own continuance. The fullest satisfaction is not necessarily accompanied by a proportionate contentment.

"*Contentment* expresses the acquiescence of the mind in the portion of good which we possess."—*Cogan*.

"The word *satisfaction* is frequently employed to express the full accomplishment of some particular desire, which always communicates a temporary pleasure, whatever may be the nature of that desire."—*Ibid*.

CONTEST. *See* CONFLICT.

CONTIGUOUS. ADJACENT. ADJOINING.

What is CONTIGUOUS (Lat. *contiguus*, from *con* and *tangere*, to touch) lies with some extent of one side or the whole of it touching. What is ADJOINING (Fr. *adjoindre*, Lat. *ad* and *jungere*, to join) need touch only at a single point. What is ADJACENT (Lat. *ad* and *jacere*, to lie) may be near without touching at all. It is remarkable that these words adhere to the physical or primary, and have not lent themselves to a secondary or moral meaning, though they may be used analogously, as in the following:

"To me there appear to be only three principles of connection among ideas, namely, resemblance, *contiguity* in time or place, and cause or effect."—*Hume*.

"Now, touching that proportion of ground that the Christians have on the habitable earth, I find that all Europe, with her *adjacent* isles, is peopled with Christians, except that ruthless country of Lapland, where idolaters yet inhabit."—*Howell, Letters*.

"Every man's land is, in the eye of the law, enclosed and set apart from his neighbour's; and that either by a visible and material fence, as one field is divided from another by

a hedge, or by an ideal invisible boundary, existing only in the contemplation of law, as when one man's land *adjoins* to another's in the same field."—*Blackstone*.

CONTINENCE. *See* CHASTITY.

CONTINGENCY. *See* ACCIDENT and CHANCE.

CONTINGENT. *See* CASUAL.

CONTINUAL. CONTINUOUS. PERPETUAL. INCESSANT.

What is CONTINUAL admits of no interruption in time, though it admits of intervals, as continual showers through the month. What is CONTINUOUS admits of no interruption in space, or what is analogously conceived as having extent, as continuous employment. What is PERPETUAL (Lat. *perpetuus*) admits of no termination, being in its very nature lasting. INCESSANT (Lat. *in*, not, and *cessare*, to cease) denotes what does not cease as a matter of fact. The nouns continuance and continuity follow the same distinction.

"After this He sends prophets in a *continual* succession for several ages, who do more clearly discover God's will to them."—*Sharp*.

"Continuatives, on the contrary, by a more intimate connection, consolidate sentences into one *continuous* whole."—*Harris*.

"Amusements and diversions succeed in a *perpetual* round."—*Blair*.

"The frosty north wind blows a thick cold sleet,

That dazzles eyes, flakes after flakes incessantly descending."

Chapman, Homer.

CONTINUATION. CONTINUANCE. DURATION.

CONTINUATION is an artificial or contrived continuance, as the continuation of a history to a particular period. CONTINUANCE and DURATION (Lat. *durare*, to last) are both employed of time; but continuance is active, duration is passive, and not inherent in the thing itself, but refers simply to the accident of time. Continuance is inherent extension, of which duration is the external measure.

"The great wisdom of the Divine Creator appears in that there is pleasure annexed to those actions that are necessary for the support and preservation of the individuum, and the *continuation* and propagation of the species; and not only so, but pain to the neglect or forbearance of them."—*Ray*.

"But, alas, the honeymoon of a new ministry is always of short *continuance* in England."—*Hoadly*.

"That we have our notion of succession and *duration* from this original, namely, from the reflection on the train of ideas, which we find to appear one after another in our own minds, seems plain to me, in that we have no perception of *duration* but by considering the train of ideas that take their turns in our understandings."—*Locke*.

CONTINUE. *See* CONTINUAL, CONTINUATION, LAST, and PERSEVERE.

CONTINUITY. *See* CONTINUAL.

CONTRACT, *n.* *See* AGREEMENT.

CONTRACT, *v.* *See* ABRIDGE and SHRINK.

CONTRACTED. *See* NARROW.

CONTRADICT. DENY.

CONTRADICT (Lat. *contradicere*, *contradictus*, to speak against) denotes an opposing force of statement, but not necessarily an intention of the speaker. The force may lie either in the purpose of the speaker, or in the inherent nature of the terms employed, as in propositions called "contradictory" by the logicians. To DENY (Fr. *denier*, Lat. *negare*) is purely a personal act. Moreover, contradiction is positive, denial only negative. I contradict a statement by stating something else in its stead; I deny it simply by refusing to admit the truth of it. Hence, to deny is employed of charges, imputations, and the like, in which we are concerned, not with making any statements of our own, but simply invalidating those of others; and of requests, in which sense it is synonymous with *refuse*. Deny is not used in this sense directly of persons, like contradict, but only of their statements, or the truth and force of them.

"The pulpit is a sacred place, Where none dare *contradict* you to your face." *Dodsley*.

As contradict is opposite to countenance or corroborate, so deny is opposed to allow or admit.

"That the variation may be found with a share of accuracy more than sufficient to determine the ship's course is allowed; but that it can be found so exactly as to fix the longitude within a degree of sixty miles, I absolutely *deny*."—*Cook's Voyages*.

CONTRARIETY. *See* DIFFERENCE.

CONTRARY. *See* ADVERSE.

CONTRAST. *See* DIFFERENCE.

CONTRIBUTE. *See* CONDUCE.

CONTRIBUTION. *See* TRIBUTE.

CONTRITION. *See* REPENTANCE.

CONTRIVE. DEVISE. INVENT.

CONCERT. MANAGE.

To CONTRIVE (Fr. *trouver*, to find) denotes an effort, or a series of efforts, of inventiveness. It is to form, find, or adapt means to an end by the exercise of practical ingenuity.

"The machine which we are inspecting demonstrates by its construction *contrivance* and design. *Contrivance* must have had a *contriver*."—*Paley*.

DEVISE (Fr. *deviser*) expresses the more theoretical aspect of contrive, and implies not so much the finding ways of using means, as finding the means themselves. We contrive ways of doing things when to some extent the materials are at hand. We devise schemes and plans, and bring them into existence by the device.

"He (God) hath not prevented all exceptions or cavils *devisable* by curious and captious wits against it."—*Barrow*.

INVENT (Lat. *invenire*, *inventus*, to find) represents the practical aspect of contrive; the invention being the more perfect in proportion to the lasting character of the contrivance, and its enabling us to contrive at will, as in the case of the invention of gunpowder, or the steam-engine. Invention, in its fullest sense, is the discovery of a mode in which the laws of nature may be made serviceable, or facts treated as natural, as in the invention of a romance. In its lowest

sense it is the finding out of a sufficient mode of doing a thing. Imagination and fecundity of genius give rise to inventors.

"The mind of man discovers every day some craving want in a body which really wants but very little. It every day *invents* some artificial rule to guide that nature which, if left to itself, were the best and surest guide."—*Burke*.

CONCERT (Lat. *con*, and *serere*, to bind or weave), unlike the former, commonly implies the joint assistance of others. It implies conference or consultation, and is almost exclusively employed of matters of action, not of pure invention in the scientific sense, as to concert a plan or scheme. Yet Burke uses it of a single person in the following:—

"Furious in their adversity, tyrannical in their successes, a commander had more trouble to *concert* his defence before the people than to plan the operations of the campaign."

MANAGE (Fr. *ménager*) denotes rather a judicious or ready employment of means extemporized on the occasion; such contrivance as gives to the course of things the kind of turn which we desire for compassing our end.

"Ofttimes nothing profits more
Than self-esteem grounded on just right
Well *managed*."—*Milton*.

CONTRIVANCE. See EXPEDIENT.

CONTROL. See CHARGE and RESTRAIN.

CONTROVERT. DISPUTE. GAIN-SAY.

Of these, GAIN-SAY (A. S. *gean*, against, and *say*) denotes no more than contradict, or call in question, whether by simple denial and opposition, or by more or less of reasoning accompanying it.

"To convince any froward *gainsayer*."—*Barrow*.

CONTROVERT is to make matter of controversy; that is, lengthened argument in opposition, entering point by point into the dispute.

"This was the great proposition that was then *controverted* concerning Jesus of Naza-

reth, whether He was the Messiah or no, and the assent to that was that which distinguished believers from unbelievers."—*Locke*.

DISPUTE (Lat. *disputare*) is against a personal competitor, as controvert refers directly to the matter, and only indirectly to the person; hence dispute may apply to more than argument as such, and to anything brought forward by another against oneself; that is, to such things as claims, possessions, titles, rights, and the like.

"Therefore *disputed* He in the synagogue with the Jews."—*Bible*.

In controversy there is more of opposition, in dispute more of doubt. In order to controvert, exact knowledge is wanted; but we often dispute where we have a general and undefined persuasion that what we dispute is not sound or true.

CONTUMACIOUS. See OBDURATE.

CONTUMELIOUS. See OBSTINATE.

CONTUMELY. See OBLOQUY.

CONVENE. CONVOKE.

The idea of collecting persons to one place is common to these two terms; but CONVENE (Lat. *con*, together, and *venire*, to come) is commonly applied to such assemblies as are got together for some public purpose in a special manner; as to convene a meeting of shareholders in consequence of special news. To CONVOKE (Lat. *convocare*, to call together) is an act of authority on the part of one whose official relation to the body enables or requires him to call it together. Hence, where the power is lodged equally in the hands of many, convene seems the more suitable term, and convoke when peculiar power of summoning is lodged in the hands of a single person. Convoke and convocation have acquired an ecclesiastical, as convene a political and generally deliberative force.

"The Parliament of Scotland now *convened*."—*Baker*.

"At this time the Cardinal, by his power legative, dissolved his *convocation* at Paul's, convoked by the Archbishop of Canterbury,

calling him and all the clergy to the *convocation* at Canterbury.”—*Baker*.

CONVENIENT. COMMODIOUS. SUITABLE. HANDY.

CONVENIENT (Lat. *convenire*) has lost its old meaning of decent or becoming, and has come to mean little more than *handy*. We use the term HANDY (when not employed of the person in the sense of dexterous, but of the thing) in the senses of manageable and close at hand. The former is the old meaning, the latter is modern. A weapon is handy which may be used easily and effectively; a house is handy which is close by and easily reached. Convenient denotes what suits the requirements of persons. SUITABLE (suit, Fr. *suite*, Lat. *sequi*, to follow) points to inherent qualities in things. A convenient season suits the individual; a suitable season suits the character and object of the purpose in hand. COMMODIOUS (Lat. *commodum*) joins the two, and denotes what is convenient, inasmuch as it is suitable. It is peculiarly applicable to localities intended for the carrying on of common business or private matters. A house, a chair, a room, are commodious. It thus naturally conveys the notion of sufficiency of space, which, however, is a meaning which has flowed out of the other. Handy has a more external character than convenient, which is also applied to more general ideas. A specific thing or object is handy; arrangements, times, and seasons are convenient.

“For he that strains too far a vow,
Will break it like an o’er-bent bow;
And he that made and forced it broke it,
Not he that for convenience took it.”

Hudibras.

Camden uses the word commodious in its primary meaning, when he says that “Britain is walled and guarded with the ocean most commodious for traffick to all parts of the world.”

“Pleasure in general is the consequent apprehension of a *suitable* object *suitably* applied to a rightly-disposed faculty.”—*South*.

“Each is *handy* in her way.”—*Dryden*.

CONVENT. ABBEY. CLOISTER. NUNNERY. MONASTERY. PRIORY.

Of these, ABBEY and PRIORY are no more than religious houses or monasteries, so called as being governed by an abbot or a prior. They would differ, not in their religious character, but in their state and privileges. The NUNNERY is a CONVENT (*conventus*, *convenire*, to meet) of females, and in modern parlance is identical with convent, which is a religious house of nuns, as a MONASTERY (Lat. *monasterium*, of which the root is the Greek *μόνος*, a line) is a religious house of monks. The CLOISTER (Lat. *claustrum*, *claudere*, to shut) is, strictly, that part of the religious house which was enclosed as a place of exercise and conversation. It is in their general use that the difference between the terms cloister, convent, and monastery deserves notice. The distinctive idea of cloister is seclusion, or inviolable retirement; that of convent community of living; that of a monastery solitude. One is shut up in the cloister; one goes into a convent; one retires to a monastery. In the cloister liberty is sacrificed; in the convent ancient habits are renounced, and those of a certain society adopted; in the monastery one has vowed a kind of exile, and men live only for their souls’ sake. In the ancient and true monasteries the religious divided their time between contemplation and work. They were pioneers in the work of settlement, and in the civilization of new and wild countries. The term convent is less imposing than that of monastery. The continental towns abound in convents within the walls; while here and there are seen the ruins of ancient monasteries standing alone in the fields, yet manifesting even in their decay their former grandeur, influence, and importance.

CONVERSANT. FAMILIAR.

CONVERSANT (Lat. *con*, and *versari*, to be versed) relates only to persons; FAMILIAR (Lat. *familiaris*, belonging to the *familia* or household), both to persons and to objects. As regards

persons, to be familiar with anything is simply to have seen a thing so often as to know it well. In its simplest sense, therefore, it applies to no more than ocular recognition. *Conversant* denotes, in addition, the knowledge of skill necessarily. This may sometimes also be expressed by familiar. In such cases, to be conversant implies more markedly the knowledge of principles; and familiar the knowledge of facts and processes. So we may better say, "It is one thing to be *conversant* with the principles of the British constitution; it is another to be *familiar* with the facts of English history."

"He uses the different dialects as one who had been *conversant* with them all."—*Pope*.

It must be observed that conversant is a peculiar epithet of persons, while familiar is applicable both to persons and objects. The thing is familiar to me, or, I am familiar with it.

"That war or peace may be
As things acquainted and *familiar* to us."
Shakespeare.

CONVERSATION. COLLOQUY. CONFERENCE. DIALOGUE. DISCOURSE.

CONVERSATION (*see* CONVERSANT) is verbal intercourse of an unpremeditated kind, in which any number of persons may take a part. It is indefinite as to the subject, which may be one or many. It may be more or less desultory, and spring altogether from accident. It naturally supposes some equality of social position in those engaged in it.

"The influence exercised by his (Johnson) conversation directly upon those with whom he lived, and indirectly upon the whole literary world, was altogether without a parallel."—*Macaulay*.

COLLOQUY (Lat. *colloquium*, *con*, together, and *loqui*, to speak) is a species of dialogue indefinite as to number, but restricted as to subject, in which each person present contributes remarks pertinent to the matter in hand, without the rigidity of a public meeting. It commonly supposes authorised deputation for the purpose of discussion and coming to agreement.

"In 1540 he (Simon Gryne) was joined as an assistant to Ph. Melancthon, Martin Bucer, John Calvin, &c., when they went to Wormes to the *colloquy* there about religion."
—*Wood, Athenæ Oxon*.

CONFERENCE (Lat. *con* and *ferre*, to bring) has more of form, being a colloquy on urgent or public and national affairs, where some line of action has to be taken or some expression of opinion published authoritatively.

"The Hampton Court Conference."—*English History*.

DIALOGUE (Gr. *διάλογος*) is commonly, though not necessarily, restricted to two speakers. It is a sort of literary conversation, in which the things said are made subservient by art to certain main topics. It is therefore commonly recorded, and so framed as to be worth reading.

"Aurungzebe is written in rhyme, and has the appearance of being the most elaborate of all Dryden's plays. The personages are imperial, but the *dialogue* is often domestic, and therefore susceptible of sentiments accommodated to familiar incidents."
—*Johnson*.

DISCOURSE (Lat. *discursus*) is consecutive speech, whether of one or more persons, upon a given line of thought. It differs from the others in the particular that it may have been primarily written, while they imply speaking without writing, and in being applicable to the continuous exposition of a single person.

"The word *discourse* is derived from a Latin verb, which signifies to run about, and by the motion of our legs and the agitation of our whole body to traverse many different grounds, or the same ground many different ways. Now the application of this corporeal image to what passes in the mind, or to the action of the mind when we meditate on various subjects, or on many distinct parts of the same subject, and when we communicate these thoughts to one another, sometimes with greater, and sometimes with less agitation and rapidity, is obvious."—*Bolingbroke*.

CONVERT. PROSELYTE. NEO-PHYTE. PERVERT.

CONVERT (Lat. *convertere*, to change) is one who turns from one set of

opinions to another, not necessarily, though commonly supposed to be, of a religious character.

"A believer may be excused by the most hardened atheist for endeavouring to make him a *convert*, because he does it with an eye to both their interests."—*Addison*.

PROSELYTE (Gr. *προσίλυτος*, *pros to*, and *ἔρχομαι*, to come) is one who has come or been brought over from one religion to another. The term has been metaphorically extended to embrace other creeds than those of religion. The difference between the terms seem to be that convert regards the internal aspect of the change, proselyte the external; or, in other words, the proselyte is simply one who has been brought over by external persuasion to another set of opinions; the convert is one who has essentially changed his views, perhaps as much through the exercise of his own reflection and reason as from any power or influence from without.

"False teachers commonly make use of base, and low, and temporal considerations, of little tricks and devices, to make disciples and gain *proselytes*."—*Tillotson*.

NEOPHYTE (Gr. *νεόφυτος*) expresses no more than one who has recently entered upon a profession, whether this has involved any change of previous views or not. **PERVERT** (Lat. *pervertere*) is a term of recent invention to express a mistaken conversion.

CONVEY. See **BRING**.

CONVICT. **DETECT.** **CONVINCE.** **PERSUADE.**

These terms all denote the bringing home of something to another. To **CONVICT** (Lat. *convincere*, *convictus*) is to bring his guilt or error home to another by evidence. It is never used in any but an unfavourable sense. Such conviction may be more or less formal and public. **DETECT** (Lat. *detegere*, *detectus*) relates to acts only, not, as convict, both to acts and their motives. It resembles convict in applying only to falsehood and wrong. To **CONVINCE** is another form of the word convict, but relates to the inner belief of the individual,

and not to the external result of acquainting others. So I may be convinced in my own mind of the innocence of a convicted person. To **PERSUADE** (*persuadere*) has much in common with convince; but conviction is the result of the understanding, persuasion of the will. Conviction is a necessity of the mind. Persuasion an acquiescence of the inclination. Logic convinces. Rhetoric persuades. In action or matter of practice they are often combined. The man who is persuaded feels convinced that he is rightly so; the man who is convinced has not set himself against the process of persuasion. Conviction, being mental, is the less active; persuasion, being moral, is the more active. We are convinced of truths and facts. We are persuaded to acts and conduct. So strong is this difference, that the two may be in opposition, and we may (from by-motives and considerations of self-interest and the like) be persuaded to act *against* our conviction.

"Wise men desire to see the several parts of it so far cleared up and made consistent with each other, and upon the whole to discover such evident marks of a superior wisdom, power, and goodness in the frame and texture of it, as may *convince* them that it is truly divine and worthy of the Supreme Mind to whom we ascribe it."—*Bishop Hurd*.

"But if the jury find him, the prisoner, guilty, he is then said to be *convicted* of the crime whereof he is indicted; which *conviction* may accrue two ways, either by his confessing the offence, and pleading guilty, or by his being found so by the verdict of his country."—*Blackstone*.

"For were not such miracles and oracles at last generally believed? or if several impostures were *detected*, does the author imagine that such *detection* would utterly sink the credit of all future miracles?"—*Bishop Hurd*.

"He that *persuades* a man to rob a house is guilty of the sin he *persuades* him to, but not in the same manner that he is who committed the robbery, for it was in his power, after all other *persuasions*, to have forborne the fact, and to have maintained his innocence."—*South*.

CONVICT, n. See **CRIMINAL**.

CONVIVIAL. See **SOCIAL**.

CONVOKE. See CONVENE.

COOL. See COLD.

COPIOUS. ABUNDANT. AMPLE.
PLENTIFUL. PLENTEOUS.

COPIOUS (in Lat. *copiosus*, from *copia*, plenty) denotes the abundant giving forth as from a fund, store, or resources, as a copious supply, a copious stream, a copious language. It relates to the richness of the source.

"The sense of the laws, I am sure, is on my side; which are by no means sparing of the orator's time. It is not brevity, but *copiousness*, a full representation of every circumstance, that they recommend."—*Melmoth*, *Pliny*.

ABUNDANT (Lat. *abundare*, *unda*, a wave) relates, not to the source, but the supply, which is large of its kind, as an abundance of grain, of words, of wit.

"He goes lightly that wants a load. If there be more pleasure in *abundance*, there is more security in a mean estate."—*Bishop Hall*.

AMPLE (Lat. *amplus*) refers especially to what is variable in limit or quantity, and, in the instance under consideration, extends beyond the limits of what is sufficient or requisite.

"Now let us leave this earth, and lift our eye
To the large convex of yon azure sky,
Behold it like an *ample* curtain spread,"
Prior.

PLENTIFUL and PLENTEOUS (Lat. *plenitas*, *plenus*, full) differ but little, but plenteous is more closely connected with the character of the giver, plentiful with the abundance of the gift. Plenteous belongs also to a higher and more rhetorical style. But plentiful belongs more strictly than abundant to purely physical things. We might say a plenteous, plentiful, or abundant harvest, but we could only say abundant, not plentiful or plenteous, cause of gratitude for it.

"The very word *satura* signifies a dish plentifully stored with all variety of fruit and grains."—*Dryden*, *Juvenil*.

COPIOUS. See DIFFUSE.

COPY. See EXAMPLE, IMITATE, and TRANSCRIBE.

CORDIAL. See HEARTY.

CORNER. ANGLE.

CORNER (Fr. *coin*, Lat. *cuneus*) is formed by the meeting of solid bodies, ANGLE (Lat. *angulus*) by the meeting of mathematical lines. Corner refers only to the point of meeting, angle to the whole space included between the lines. Hence, corner has a metaphorical force, of which angle does not partake, as a quiet or remote corner of the world.

"A master cook! why he's the man of men
For a professor. He designs, he draws,
Makes citadels of curious fowl and fish,
Mounts marrow-bones; cuts fifty-angled
custards." *B. Jonson*.

"We learn from hence what is the true use and end of miracles. They are not private but public proofs, not things to be done in a *corner* for the sake of single persons, but before multitudes and in the face of the sun."—*Bishop Atterbury*.

CORPORAL. BODILY. CORPOREAL. MATERIAL.

CORPORAL and CORPOREAL (Lat. *corpus*, the body) both mean relating to the body, but under different aspects of it; corporal relating to the *substance*, corporeal to the *nature* of the body; while BODILY denotes, more generally, connected with the body or with a body; hence corporal punishment, corporeal existence, bodily vigour, pains, or shape. MATERIAL (Lat. *materies*) respects all bodies, inanimate as well as animate, as the material system, material substances.

"For truth, the greatest of intellectual goods, is the produce of undisturbed reason; and health, the greatest of the *corporeal*, is the blooming fruit of temperance; and yet we can be content to be deprived of both for the sordid pleasure of a riotous, unmeaning jollity."—*Warburton*.

"All corporal damages that chance to mortal men are by medicines healed, or by reason remedied, or by length of time cured, or else by death ended."—*Golden Book*.

"But in reality it arose from very different causes, sometimes from *bodily* pain, which he often felt when he did not own it."
—*Porteus*, *Life of Secker*.

CORPOREAL. *See* CORPORAL.

CORPSE. *See* BODY.

CORPULENT. *See* STOUT.

CORRECT. *See* AMEND and CHASTEN.

CORRECT. *See* EXACT.

CORRESPOND. *See* TALLY.

CORROBORATE. *See* CONFIRM.

CORRUPT. *See* CONTAMINATE.

CORRUPTION. *See* DEPRAVITY.

COST. EXPENSE. PRICE. VALUE. WORTH.

The COST of a thing (Germ. *kost*), in its extended sense, is all that has been laid out, or is to be laid out upon producing it. The EXPENSE (Lat. *expendere*, to pay out) relates rather to the person than the article; hence expense often means continued cost, as whatever a carriage may cost there will be expense in keeping it up. The PRICE of a thing is that which represents its value to the owner (*price*, Lat. *pretium*), and must be paid to procure it. The WORTH is what it will fetch, and the VALUE is what it ought to fetch.

"The real *price* of everything, what everything really *costs* to the man who wants to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it."—*Adam Smith*.

"Already I am worn with cares and age,
And just abandoning the ungrateful stage.
Unprofitably kept at Heaven's *expense*,
I live, a rent-charge on her Providence."
Dryden.

"Besides the ornaments that are thrust through the holes of the ears, many others are suspended to them by strings; such as chisels or bodkins made of green talc, upon which they set a high *value*. The nails and teeth of their deceased relations, the teeth of dogs, and everything else that they can get which they think either curious or *valuable*."
—*Cook's Voyages*.

"But he, his wonted pride
Soon recollecting, with high words that bore
Semblance of *worth*, not substance, gently raised
Their fainting courage, and dispelled their fears."
Milton.

COSTLY. *See* PRECIOUS.

COSTUME. *See* DRESS.

COTEMPORARY. *See* COEVAL.

COVENANT. *See* AGREEMENT.

COVER. *See* HIDE.

COVETOUSNESS. *See* AVARICE.

COUNSEL. *See* ADVISE.

COUNT. *See* CALCULATE and NUMBER.

COUNTENANCE. *See* FACE and SANCTION.

COUNTERFEIT. SPURIOUS. SUPPOSITIOUS. FICTITIOUS. ADULTERATED. SOPHISTICATED.

COUNTERFEIT (Lat. *contra*, *factus*) relates to such deception as consists in matters of exterior, the making a false thing wear the look of the true.

"Think freely on all the various pretences to revelation; compare the *counterfeit* Scriptures with the true."—*Bentley*.

SPURIOUS (Lat. *spurius*) denotes not issuing from the true source, or the source pretended.

"I never could be imposed on to receive for yours what is written by any others, or to mistake your genuine poetry for their *spurious* productions."—*Dryden*.

SUPPOSITIOUS denotes that which is founded upon supposition instead of fact. This admits of varying degrees of falsehood or deception. The worst form is when that which is known to be not the true is *substituted* in its place. On the other hand, no intention to deceive is implied in a supposititious history, if the materials are the most authentic that could be procured. In such a case their necessarily supposititious character ought to be declared.

"We shall premise this observation, or rather suspicion of our own, that there seem to be some Orphick verses *supposititious* as well as there were Sibylline, they being counterfeited either by Christians or Jews."—*Cudworth*.

FICTITIOUS (Lat. *fingere*, to form or feign) applies to anything which is put forth as having independent truth and reality, while it is the product of imagination or invention.

"Thus, some make comedy a representation of mean, and others of bad men. Some think that its essence consists in the unimportance, others, in the *fictitiousness*, of the transaction."—*Rambler*.

The two last epithets are applied to such substances as are not of pure composition and manufacture. That is **ADULTERATED** (*adulterium*) in which the article is made to contain less of the genuine by the substitution of other cheaper substances, with a view to obtaining the full price of it at less cost. That is **SOPHISTICATED** (*σοφος*, wise) of which the genuine simplicity is destroyed. It is a less mercantile term than adulterate, and applies to matters of the mind, belief, argument, judgment, as to sophisticate the understanding—subjects to which adulterate is also applied analogously; but we speak of persons as sophisticated, and systems as adulterated.

"We have well proved that Leucippus and Democritus were not the first inventors, but only the depravers and *adulterators* of the atomic philosophy."—*Cudworth*.

"He is rattling over the streets of London, and pursuing all the *sophisticated* joys which succeed to supply the place where nature is relinquished."—*Knox, Essays*.

COUNTRY. *See* LAND.

COUNTRYMAN. *See* PEASANT.

COUPLE. *See* BRACE.

COURAGE. COURAGEOUS. *See* BOLD.

COURSE. *See* PASSAGE.

COURT. *See* HOMAGE.

COURTEOUS. *See* AFFABLE and CIVIL.

COVER. *See* HIDE.

COVETOUS. *See* NIGGARDLY.

COXCOMBICAL. *See* FOPPISH.

CRACK. *See* BREAK.

CRAFTY. CUNNING. SLY. WILY. SUTLE.

CRAFTY (craft, a manual trade) has come from the idea of skill to drop into that of cunning. Craft is the cunning of practice. It is always

alive, and not only on occasions. It designs as well as conceals. It misleads as well as eludes. He may be said to be crafty who makes a cunning use of his knowledge, and is at once active and wary.

"To prudence, if you add the use of unjust or dishonest means, such as usually are prompted to men by fear or want, you have that crooked wisdom which is called *craft*, which is a sign of pusillanimity."—*Hobbes*.

CUNNING (literally knowledge, connected with ken) is a low animal instinct, which shows itself in matters connected with the animal nature.

"This deplorable estate could not be more feelingly expressed than it is here, by making sin, which still remained in man under the law, a person, who, implacably aiming at his ruin, *cunningly* took the opportunity of exciting concupiscence in those to whom the law had made it mortal."—*Locke on Romans*.

Crafty belongs to the development of human character. The child may be cunning; the old man is crafty when he compasses his ends by means which are likely to pass unobserved, or to deceive as to their true character. **SLYNESS** is a combination of cunning and vigilance. It belongs to actions of an ordinary kind, and an underhanded way of performing them.

"They tempted me to attack your highness,
And then, with wonted *wile* and *slyness*,
They left me in the lurch." *Swift*.

WILINESS, or being full of wile (which is another form of guile), shows itself in matters of self-interest and self-preservation. A wily adversary quietly waits his opportunity of wounding, and can make opportunities for himself. He is mischievously artful in attack, defence, and escape. **SUTLE** (Lat. *subtilis*, *sub*, and *tela*, a web, being another form of subtle) is, as the word indicates, of fine texture, analysing motives, seeing minute differences, and handling opportunities with keen observation. It is the most comprehensive of all, including every faculty, from the low animal craft to the highest penetration of man's nature. It not only finds means for executing the pur-

pose, but weighs and dissects the purpose itself.

"Now the serpent was more *subtle* than any beast of the field which the Lord God had made."—*Bible*.

CRAVE. See ASK.

CREATE. CAUSE. OCCASION.
MAKE. FORM. PRODUCE. CON-
STITUTE.

It is hardly necessary to observe that CREATE (Lat. *creare*) is used in the metaphysical sense of producing out of nothing, as "the creation of the world." With this, which represents only an effort of the human mind to express the inconceivable, we have nothing to do in a work of this kind, which deals only with the ordinary use of language. The term create is often used in a kindred sense with CAUSE (Lat. *causa*, a cause), but it involves personal agency. It is to effect by the agency and under the laws of causation. This human agency, if not directly expressed, is indirectly implied, as busybodies create mischief, or jealousies are created by unnecessary reserve. On the other hand, when the natural force and sequence of things is contemplated, we use cause, as the circumstance caused great surprise.

"The bad treatment of those who are suffered still to live in a society is the *creating* of so many malcontents, who at some time or other may make those who treat them ill feel their revenge."—*Burnet*.

"And the Lord God *caused* a deep sleep to fall upon Adam."—*Bible*.

To OCCASION (Lat. *occasio*, *occidere*, to befall) denotes the more indirect and less active kinds of causation; the occasion is the circumstance or set of circumstances which allow the cause to operate. Accordingly the verb occasion is often employed of something connected with the cause, or the cause viewed generally and indirectly. In travelling, we might say, the delay was occasioned by an accident, but it was caused by the breaking of an axle-tree. Generally speaking, the cause is more remote than the occasion, the occasion

more specifically active than the cause. Thus, in the case of some crime committed, the temptation, the convenient circumstances, the solicitation, or the hope of gain, and the like, might be spoken of as the cause; but to a moralist these would rather constitute the occasion, while the cause would be deeper, namely, in the depravity of the man's nature. The following of Spenser shows how easily the two may be interchanged:

"Madman, said then the palmer, that does seek

Occasion to wrath and cause of strife."

MAKE (A. S. *macian*) is the most generic of all. It has the sense of to bring about by any means or by any process, and is applicable both to physical and metaphysical results, in which latter sense it is synonymous with form and constitute, as two and two *make* four, implying logical causation, but not agency.

"When the cause is extrinsical, and the effect produced by a sensible separation, or juxtaposition, of discernible parts, we call it *making*; and such are all artificial things."—*Locke*.

To FORM (Lat. *formare*) is used in three main senses: 1, to give physical form or shape, as to form an image out of clay; 2, to produce in substantial shape, as the action of cold on water forms ice; 3, to give metaphysical shape, as to form an idea or notion. This does not imply distinct agency, as six will form a majority, that is, will complete the *notion* as well as the *fact* of a majority. 4. To give moral shape, that is, to mould, as to form a habit of reflection; circumstances form the character.

"We are so wonderfully *formed*, that whilst we are creatures vehemently desirous of novelty, we are as strongly attached to habit and custom."—*Burke*.

PRODUCE (Lat. *producere*) is to bring about as the result of a lengthened effort or process, analogous to the bringing forth of plants from seeds, and the young of animals from the parent. It may or may not imply distinct purpose, as to produce a work of literature or art

on the one hand, or kindness produces love on the other.

"Trade, then, is necessary to the *producing* of riches, and money necessary to the carrying on of trade."—*Locke*.

CONSTITUTE (Lat. *constituere*) is purely mental, though the conception may be based upon a physical process. To constitute means to contribute all that is needed to make up a whole, whether physical or metaphysical. If many things are needed the term applies to all; if one thing is sufficient, that alone constitutes, as, "That field constitutes, or those fields, trees, and hedges constitute all my landed property."

"It is not more necessary to the *constituting* of a man that a human soul inhabit in a human body, than it is to the being a true Christian that the Holy Spirit of God inhabit in the soul and body of the man."—*Sharp*.

CREDIT. See BELIEF, CHARACTER, and REPUTATION.

CREW. See BAND.

CRIME. VICE. SIN. GUILT. MISDEMEANOUR. OFFENCE. TRESPASS. TRANSGRESSION. MISDEED. WRONG. INIQUITY. WICKEDNESS. INJUSTICE. INJURY.

CRIME (Lat. *crimen*) is always a deed, never a state. It is, strictly speaking, a deed violating a law, human or divine. Hence, we may speak of crimes against God, and crimes against society; but, according to present usage, a crime is understood to be against the state. Crime can only be used of moral and spiritual offences when religion wears a political aspect, and God is recognized as a Supreme Ruler and Judge, whose laws have been infringed. In this way Spenser speaks of the "*crime* of our first father's fall." So Blackstone says—

"A *crime* or misdemeanour is an act committed or omitted, in violation of a public law either forbidding or commanding it."

And, again, that the discussion and admeasurement of the nature of crimes and punishments, "forms in

every country the code of *criminal law*."

VICE (Lat. *vitium*) is a state, not a deed, a moral fault or failing, a departure from moral purity or integrity, implying more or less of defect, corruption, or wrong in the character itself.

"That this is the common measure of virtue and *vice*, will appear to any one who considers that though that passes for *vice* in one country which is counted a virtue, or at least not a *vice*, in another, yet everywhere virtue and praise, *vice* and blame, go together."—*Locke*.

SIN (A. S. *syngian*) is a departure from a divine law, or any law regarded as of a divine or sacred character. Sin comprehends both crime and vice, by reason of the perfection of the Divine law; but there are many specific sins or acts of sin which are not vices, inasmuch as they consist *only* of acts, and are not habits or propensities; and there are many sins which are not crimes either, as being not acts, as sins of thought, or not violations of the law of the land, as lying. The following is the view of Hobbes:—

"All crimes are indeed *sins*, but not all *sins* crimes. A *sin* may be in the thought or secret purpose of a man, of which neither a judge, nor a witness, nor any man, can take notice; but a crime is such a *sin* as consists in an action against the law, of which action he can be accused and tried by a judge, and be convinced or cleared by witnesses. Farther, that which is no *sin* in itself, but indifferent, may be made *sin* by a positive law."—*Hobbes on the Common Law of England*.

GUILT (A. S. *gylt*) is a state, the state of one who has infringed or violated any moral or political law, or, in the mildest sense, one to whom anything wrong, even as a matter of taste or judgment, may be attributed, as to be guilty of error, to be guilty of a piece of bad taste. Guilt is the impress of evil upon the individual, and is opposed to merit, as the impress of good in action.

"An involuntary act," says Blackstone, "as it has no claim to merit, so neither can it induce any *guilt*."

MISDEMEANOUR is a minor crime, under the purely social aspect of

crime. Any crime less than a felony, or any for which the law has not furnished a name, would be a misdemeanour. In common parlance it is used in the sense of misconduct.

"The consideration of this, that God takes a particular notice of our *misdemeanours*, should engage us to set about a particular amendment."—*South*.

OFFENCE (Lat. *offendere*, to stumble against) is indefinite. It implies a contradiction of will or a violation of law, without saying anything of the nature of the will or the law, which may be political or personal. Offence may be even against customs, where customs have the force of social laws or regulations, as to offend against good taste and good manners.

"To *offend* originally signifies to impinge, that is, to stumble or hit dangerously upon something lying cross our way, so as thereby to be cast down, or at least to be disordered in our posture and stopped in our progress, whence it is well transferred to denote our being, through an incident temptation, brought into sin, whereby a man is thrown down, or is bowed from his upright state, and interrupted from prosecuting a steady course of piety and virtue."—*Barrow*.

TRESPASS (Fr. *trépasser*, Lat. *trans* and *passus*, a step) is an offence of which the essence consists in going beyond certain allowable or right limits. I trespass upon my neighbour's land, or, metaphorically, upon his patience. **TRANSGRESSION** (Lat. *transgressus*, *transgredior*, to step beyond) differs from trespass in referring solely to law, moral or civil, while trespass is in reference to the rights or character of another. A trespass is a *personal* transgression against another. It is evident that a trespass may be of the nature of a transgression.

"This action of *trespass* or *transgression* on the case is our universal remedy given for all personal wrongs and injuries without fine."—*Blackstone*.

MISDEED is a deed of wrong, and therefore of a private character. It stands to misconduct as a part to the whole. A misdeed is very often of the nature of a minor crime and misdemeanour, or an offence against the

law, but this is accidental, not essential to the term.

"Like caitiff vile, that for *misdeed*
Kides with his face to rump of steed."
Hudibras.

INIQUITY (Lat. *iniquus*, unequal, unfair), like vice, is used both of the habit and the act. It commonly denotes a gross violation of the rights of others by fraud and circumvention. It is used also, however, of cases of open violence, as "iniquitous war."

"All governments must frequently infringe the rules of justice to support themselves. Truth must give way to dissimulation, honesty to convenience, and humanity itself to the raging interest. The whole of this mystery of *iniquity* is called the reason of state."—*Burke*.

INJUSTICE (Lat. *in*, not, and *justitia*, justice) and **INJURY** (Lat. *injuria*, wrong) differ, in that the former relates to the actor, the latter to the object. Every injustice, therefore, is not an injury. For instance, if we speak ill or disparagingly of another without his deserving it, we do him an injustice; but unless what we say has sufficient influence to affect his interests it will be no injury. It deserves to be remarked, that injury is used in two very different ways, though the notion of wrong lies at the bottom of both. We may act with violence or wrong upon insensible as well as sensible objects. Strictly speaking, it is only in reference to the latter that the term injury can be directly employed; but it is often used in respect to the former, in which case it is simply tantamount to damage, as, for instance, injuries done to trees by a storm.

"The great, it seems, are privileged alone
To punish all *injustice* but their own."
Dryden.

"The former (private wrongs) are an infringement or privation of the private or civil rights belonging to individuals, considered as individuals, and are thereupon frequently termed civil *injuries*."—*Blackstone*.

WRONG (connected with wrung) is a distortion of right, either in reference to ourselves or to others. In the former case, it is a crime or a misdeed, according to its character

and extent; in the latter, it partakes both of injustice and injury, being such a violation of justice on the part of the agent as redounds to the detriment of the person acted upon.

"The distinction of public *wrongs* from private, of crimes and misdemeanours from civil injuries, seems principally to consist in this, that private *wrongs* or civil injuries are an infringement or privation of the civil rights which belong to individuals, considered merely as individuals; public *wrongs*, or crimes and misdemeanours, are a breach and violation of the public rights and duties due to the whole community, considered as a community in its social aggregate capacity."

—*Blackstone.*

WICKEDNESS (Old English *wicke*, wicked, connected probably with *witch*) is the disposition towards and practice of evil generally. It is a generic term, referring more directly to transgressions of the Divine law, and morality as included under it.

"Our manifold sins and *wickedness*,"—*English Book of Common Prayer.*

CRIMINAL. GUILTY.

CRIMINAL respects the character of the deed, **GUILTY** the simple fact of its commission. The criminality of an offence is a question of degree, to be determined by circumstances. Guilt is a question of fact, to be determined by evidence. It must be observed that criminal is an epithet only of things, guilty both of things and persons.

"The ends of drink are digestion of our meat, cheerfulness and refreshment of our spirits, or any end of health; besides which, if we go at any time beyond it, it is inordinate and *criminal*; it is the vice of drunkenness."—*Bishop Taylor.*

"One cannot but be astonished at the folly and impiety of pronouncing a man *guilty* unless he was cleared by a miracle, and of expecting that all the powers of Nature should be suspended by an immediate interposition of Providence to save the innocent whenever it was presumptuously required."—*Blackstone.*

CRIMINAL. CULPRIT. FELON. MALEFACTOR. CONVICT.

These are terms denoting persons who have offended against the laws

of the country. A **CRIMINAL** is one who stands indicted for a crime, or against whom a crime has been proved.

"Suppose a civil magistrate should have a *criminal* brought before him, accused, for instance, of murder, burglary, or the like, and the fact is proved, would you not have him in that case to pronounce the sentence that the law has awarded to all such malefactors?"

—*Sharp.*

CULPRIT (for culped, from the Old Fr. verb *culper*, Lat. *culpa*, blame) is used in the same twofold force, but is a milder term, admitting of less grave applications—as among boys in a school who have offended against morals or regulations.

"Like other *culprit* youths, he wanted grace, But could have no self-interest in the case."

Whitehead.

MALEFACTOR (Lat. *male facere*, to do wrong or badly) expresses a criminal, who, though seized or condemned by the state, is regarded in reference to the moral instead of the political character of his offence.

"From every species of punishment that has hitherto been devised, from imprisonment and exile, from pain and infamy, *malefactors* return more hardened in their crimes and more instructed."—*Paley.*

FELON (Low Lat. *felo*) denotes a criminal in regard to the grade of his offence; that is, as having committed a crime which amounts to a felony. Originally, a felony was such a crime as included the forfeiture of goods for its penalty, but subsequent Acts of Parliament have declared several specific crimes to be felonies.

"Yes, Leila sleeps beneath the wave,
But his shall be a redder grave;
Her spirit pointed well the steel
Which taught the *felon* heart to feel."

Byron.

The **CONVICT** (*convincere*, *convictus*) is the criminal or felon regarded as sentenced and undergoing the punishment to which he has been sentenced, more especially that of forced labour.

"Its garrison being in great measure unarmed, it was impossible that it could have opposed our force, or that its half-starved inhabitants, most of whom are *convicts*, banished thither from other parts, could have had any other thoughts than that of submitting."—*Anson's Voyages.*

CRIMINATE. *See* CHARGE.

CRISIS. CONJUNCTURE. EMERGENCY. EXIGENCY.

CRISIS (Gr. *κρίσις*, from *κρίνω*, a decision) denotes literally what decides or turns the scale. It is commonly used of a turning point in affairs, before it is known whether the issue will be for better or worse; and generally of a precarious or high-wrought state of affairs. The difference seems to be that CONJUNCTURE (Lat. *con* and *junctura*, a joining) denotes a compound crisis, or a state which results from the meeting of several external circumstances to form it; while crisis is applicable to the internal state alone, as the crisis of a disease. EMERGENCY (Lat. *emergere*, to emerge) is an unforeseen occurrence or combination, which calls for immediate action. EXIGENCY (Lat. *exigere*, to exact) is a minor emergency.

"It is observed in all those actions or passages which cause any great or notable change either in the mind or life of man, that they do not constantly operate at the same rate of efficacy, but that there is a certain *crisis* or particular season which strangely provokes and draws forth the activity and force of every agent, raising it to effects much greater and higher than the common measure of its actings is observed to carry it to."—*South*.

"But I will rather ostentatiously display my own endeavours to assist you in this *conjunction*, nor dwell upon the unworthy treatment you have received from others."—*Melmoth, Cicero*.

"On whom she might her doubts repose,
In all *emergencies* that rose." *Swift*.

"The total collective *exigencies* of the state."—*Burke*.

CRITERION. *See* STANDARD.

CRITICISM. STRICTURE.

CRITICISM is a minute examination of any compound subject, as human conduct, dress, personal appearance, a literary production or work of art (but not a purely natural object, as, for instance, a landscape), with a view to ascertaining and manifesting merits and faults. STRICTURE (Lat. *strictura*, from *stringere*, to touch

lightly) is only employed of adverse criticism, and consists in the effort to expose defects, faults, or wrong in series. It is commonly employed in reference to works of art and literature and the conduct of public men.

"*Criticism*, though dignified from the earliest ages by the labours of men eminent for knowledge and sagacity, and, since the revival of polite literature, the favourite study of European scholars, has not yet attained the certainty and stability of science."—*Rambler*.

"To the end of most of the plays I have added short *strictures*, containing a general censure of faults or praise of excellence."—*Johnson*.

CROOKED. BENT. CURVED.
AWRY.

CROOKED (Swedish *krok*, a crook) denotes that which might have been conceived as straight but is not; one deviation from the straight line, or more than one, may belong to a crooked object. It is a term of abruptness, and tends, in its secondary sense, to express that which is morally wrong or perverted, as contrasted with what is straight or right, as crooked ways or thoughts.

"And in one of the Snowdon lakes is found a variety of trout, which is naturally deformed, having a strange *crookedness* near the tail, resembling that of the perch before described."—*Pennant*.

BENT (the passive participle of bend, A. S. *bendan*) denotes the exercise of some power, which has caused the deviation from straightness, whether exercised on purpose, or purely mechanical or involuntary; as bent by art, or bent by the storm. It expresses such deviation as occurs only once in the subject. If it occurred oftener, we should use some term expressive of *frequent* bending, as "bent about." The word belongs to substantial matter, and not to mere lines. We say "crooked paths," not "bent paths."

"And yet these bows, being somewhat like the long bows in use amongst us, were *bent* only by a man's immediate strength."—*Wilkins, Mechanical Powers*.

CURVED (Lat. *curvus*) denotes

equable and proportionate flexure, which is almost always the result of design, and may have grace for its object.

"They have no furniture except a few little blocks of wood, the upper side of which is hollowed into a *curve*, and which serve them for pillows."—*Cook's Voyages*.

AWRY (connected with *writhe*) is a kind of adverbial adjective, and not directly applied, like the rest, to the subject, but grammatically placed after it. It denotes wrong or defective deviation or flexure. As the crooked is that which *might* be straight, and is not, so that which is awry *ought* to be straight, and is not.

"He may in some points be in error, he may in many points pursue the way which we may not think best; yet if he be a pious and good man, his path cannot possibly be much *awry*."—*Gilpin's Sermons*.

CROSS. See **FRETFUL**.

CROWD. **MULTITUDE.** **THRONG.**

SWARM. **MOB.** **POPULACE.**

CROWD (A. S. *croda*, *cread*, *crudh*) denotes such a collection of persons as gives the impression of multitude without order; rarely used of *things*.

"Like his own Christian in the cage, Bunyan found protectors even among the *crowd* of Vanity Fair."—*Macaulay*.

MULTITUDE (*multitudo*, *multus*, many), that which gives the impression of numerousness, and nothing else, and is not, like *crowd*, restricted to human beings.

"It is a fault in a *multitude* of preachers that they utterly neglect method in their harangues."—*Watts*.

THRONG applies to human beings exclusively. It expresses a voluntary pressure of the individuals composing the collection; while *crowd* rather expresses such as is inconvenient and involuntary. *Crowd* merely denotes a fact, *throng* supposes some common object of curiosity or interest.

"Not to know me argues yourself unknown, The lowest of your *throng*."—*Milton*.

SWARM (A. S. *swearm*) is employed only of animate objects, whether human or otherwise, but of human

beings only disparagingly. The specific idea of *swarm* is that of multitudinous life and action, whether with or without a common purpose uniting them, as a swarm of busy bees, or a swarm of idle children.

"Every place *swarms* with soldiers."—*Spenser*.

MOB (Lat. *mobile vulgus*, the fickle crowd) and **POPULACE** (Lat. *populus*) stand closely related. As *populace* is a word formed to include the masses of a country which have no distinction of rank, education, office, or profession; so *mob* indicates a specific reunion of such persons exhibiting a characteristic coarseness or violence, more especially on such occasions of social or political interest as may have brought them together. A *mob* may be gathered and dispersed in an hour. The *populace* is a permanent portion of society.

"Kings are ambitious, the nobility haughty, and the *populace* tumultuous and ungovernable."—*Burke*.

"He shrunk from the dangers which threatened him, and sacrificed his conscience and his duty to the menaces of a *mob*."—*Bishop Porteus*.

CRUEL. See **BARBAROUS**.

CRUSH. See **BRUISE**.

CRY. See **CLAMOUR**.

CULPABLE. **FAULTY.**

Although these terms are very nearly related, **CULPABLE** being derived from the Latin *culpa*, a fault (Fr. *faute*, from Lat. *fallere*, to fail), yet culpable is always specific, while faulty is general. **FAULTY** means generally defective, whether morally or otherwise, as a faulty character, a faulty composition. *Culpable* means guilty of a specific act or course of conduct which deserves blame. The term is also used of negative acts, as a culpable ignorance, a culpable negligence. *Faulty* is an epithet of things intellectual and artistic. *Culpable* is only of things moral.

"Every man in doubtful cases is left to his own discretion, and if he acts according to the best reason he hath, he is not *cul-*

pable, though he be mistaken in his measures."—*Sharp*.

"Created once
So goodly and erect, though *faulty* since."
Milton.

CULPRIT. See CRIMINAL.

CULTIVATION. CULTURE. TILLAGE. HUSBANDRY. CIVILIZATION. REFINEMENT.

CULTIVATION (Lat. *colere*, *cultus*, to cultivate) is used in a physical and a metaphorical sense. It denotes the use of art and labour and all things needful to the production of such things as grow out of the soil. The term, it may be observed, is employed both of the soil and of that which grows out of it. We cultivate fields, and we cultivate flax. The same force belongs to the metaphorical or moral use of the term, as in the cultivation of the mind, or of special habits, or of literature, or the arts.

"The mind of man hath need to be prepared for piety and virtue. It must be *cultivated* to that end, and ordered with great care and pains. But the vices are weeds that grow wild and spring up of themselves."—*Tillotson*.

CULTURE (Lat. *cultura*) is commonly employed to denote the specific cultivation of some particular kind of production for the sake of its amelioration. In this sense the term is used of the culture of the human race or human mind (but not of moral habits), to indicate such civilization and training as results in the raising of the condition of the race.

"The mind that lies fallow but a single day sprouts up in follies that are only to be killed by a constant and assiduous *culture*."
—*Spectator*.

CIVILIZATION (*civilis*, *civis*, a citizen), unlike cultivation, is employed only of races of mankind or, by a licence, of the countries which they inhabit. *Civilization* and REFINEMENT are respectively the first and the final stage of cultivation as regards the condition of men in their social capacity; the first meaning the mere redeeming from a state of barbarism; the second a high con-

dition of intellectual culture in the liberal arts and social manners. TILLAGE and HUSBANDRY, except by special design, convey no metaphorical meaning. Tillage (A. S. *tilian*, *teotian*) applies directly and solely to the soil in reference to its preparation for seed, and its preservation for the sake of the crops which it is to produce, and not to the crops themselves. Husbandry is of much wider meaning, comprising all the branches of agriculture, and even the theoretical science of it, while tillage is purely manual.

"Nothing is more certain than that our manners, our *civilization*, and all the good things which are connected with manners and with *civilization*, have in this European world of ours depended for ages upon two principles, and were indeed the result of both combined. I mean the spirit of a gentleman and the spirit of religion."—*Burke*.

"This refined taste is the consequence of education and habit. We are born only with a capacity of entertaining this *refinement*, as we are born with a disposition to receive and obey all the rules and regulations of society; and so far it may be said to be natural to us, and no farther."—*Reynolds*.

"The very ground you cultivate affords much instruction. Without proper *tillage* you know it will bear nothing; and the more it is cultivated the more it will produce."—*Gilpin's Sermons*.

"*Husbandry* supplieth all things necessary for food."—*Spenser*.

CULTURE. See CULTIVATION.

CUNNING. See ARTFUL and CRAFTY.

CUPIDITY. See AVARICE.

CURB. See RESTRAIN.

CURE. HEAL. REMEDY.

CURE (Lat. *curare*, *cura*, care, to take care of) is employed of such deep-seated or internal ailments as need the indirect treatment of science; HEAL (A. S. *hælan*, to make hale or sound) of such external and tangible wounds, diseases, or injuries, as need the direct application of manual skill. Wounds and ulcers are healed. Diseases generally are cured. In their moral bearings, cure is used of what is bad or unsound in

the mental or moral nature; as to cure prejudices, to cure vices, or vicious habits, or evil propensities; to heal of external breaches and separations, as to heal animosities, hatreds, rivalries, or anything which, like the lips of a social wound, needs bringing together. **REMEDY** (in Latin *remedium*) is more comprehensive, and denotes the specific counteractive setting right of anything that has gone wrong, as diseases, nuisances, evils, social injuries and wrongs, or even deficiencies and omissions. To remedy, however, has commonly more to do with the result or fact, while cure relates to the principles and origin of things requiring remedy. To remedy a disease is simply to remove it, to cure it is to remove the cause. The nouns *cure* and *remedy* follow the same distinction.

"The child was *cured* from that very hour."
—*Bible*.

"But Vane opposed this with much zeal. He said, Would they *heal* the wound that they had given themselves which weakened them so much? The setting them at quiet could have no other effect but to *heal* and unite them in their opposition to authority."—*Burnet*.

"Now since all wrong may be considered as merely a privation of right, the plain natural *remedy* for every species of wrong is the being put in possession of that right whereof the party injured is deprived."—*Blackstone*.

It may be observed that the verbs *cure* and *heal* are employed both of the malady or evil, and of the subject in which it resides, while *remedy* is used only directly of the evil itself.

CURIOUS. See **ABSTRUSE** and **INQUISITIVE**.

CURRENT. See **STREAM**.

CURSE. **MALEDICTION.** **IMPRECATION.** **EXECRATION.** **ANATHEMA.**

CURSE (A. S. *cursian*, possibly connected with *cross*) is a solemn or violent pronouncement or invocation of evil upon another. It is used in the independent sense of a uniform cause of harm. *Curse* commonly implies the personal desire of evil accompanying its declaration.

"When men in common conversation use *curses* and *imprecations* against their brethren, as passionate and profane men are frequently apt to do, it is either with an intention and desire that mischief might befall them, which is both malicious towards man, and also irreligiously thinking light of the *curse* of God; or else it is without any such desire or intention, and then it is profanely supposing God to have no regard to their behaviour."—*Clarke*.

MALEDICTION (Lat. *male dicere*) is a more formal term, and expresses generally the declaration of a curse. This may be personal, or it may be purely official, as the maledictions of the Jewish law, that is, the solemn declaration of curse as attached to certain acts, whoever they may be that commit them.

"*Imprecations* and *maledictions* were made, according to the custom of the Jews, against those who should presume to add or alter anything therein."—*Greco*.

IMPRECATION (Lat. *imprecari*) is a weaker form of cursing, which prays for evil upon another, and has in it more the wish than the feeling or belief of power. **EXECRATION** (Lat. *execratio*) is a curse dictated by violent personal feeling of hatred. So distinctive is this element, that the word sometimes means simply such hatred, without any idea of cursing, as to hold certain deeds in execration.

"I mean the Epicureans, who though in other respects they were persons of many excellent and sublime speculations, yet, because of their gross error in this kind, they have been in all ages looked upon with a kind of *execration*."—*Wilkins*.

ANATHEMA (Gr. *ἀνάθεμα*, anything devoted) was a term taken from the New Testament, and meant a ban or curse pronounced on religious grounds by ecclesiastical authority, and was accompanied by excommunication, so that the person was held up as an object of offence.

"*Anathema* signifies persons or things devoted to destruction and extermination. The Jewish nation were an *anathema*—destined to destruction. St. Paul, to express his affection to them, says he could wish, to save them from it, to become an *anathema*, and be destroyed himself."—*Locke*.

CURSORY. DESULTORY. SUMMARY.

CURSORY (Lat. *currere*, *cursum*, to run) denotes such haste as implies of necessity the impossibility of more than momentary and superficial observation or comprehension of particulars. **DESULTORY** (Lat. *desultor*, a horse-vaulter) is that which wants continuity and method, and indicates an impatience of applied thought. **SUMMARY** (Lat. *summa*, a sum) denotes that which is rapidly gathered up into completion, and so saves time at the expense of attention to detail. We speak commonly of cursory glances, views, and observation; desultory studies, argument, remarks; and summary proceedings.

"It is an advantage to all narrow wisdom and narrow morals that their maxims have a plausible air, and on a *cursory* view appear equal to false principles."—*Burke*.

"This makes my reading wild and *desultory*, and I seek refuge from the uneasiness of thought from any book, let it be what it will, that can engage my attention."—*Warburton*.

"Nor spend their time to show their reading, She'd have a *summary* proceeding."—*Swift*.

CURTAIL. See **ABRIDGE**.

CURVED. See **CROOKED**.

CUSTODY. See **KEEPING**.

CUSTOM. **FASHION.** **MANNER.**
METHOD. **PRACTICE.** **HABIT.**
USAGE. **PRESCRIPTION.**

CUSTOM (Fr. *coutume*, Lat. *consuetudo*) is an habitual practice, whether of individuals or communities. It differs from **HABIT** (Lat. *habere*), in that habit is exclusively applicable to individuals, and denotes that the stage is reached when the custom is no longer purely involuntary, by a repetition of acts. In law, custom has the meaning of long-established practice or usage, having the force of unwritten law. Ordinarily speaking, custom respects things that are done by the majority, habit those which are done by individuals. We speak of national cus-

toms, and a man of active or indolent habits. In this way, it is a custom in England to repair to the seaside in the autumn months. To smoke tobacco or take snuff are habits. There will often be a close connection between a habit and a custom; either may lead to the other. The custom of going to church may lead to a habit of devotion; or the personal habit of devotion may lead a person to the custom of attending public worship. Those natural customs are the best which lead to good habits among the people.

"A custom

More honoured in the breach than the observance."
Shakespeare.

Habit is the effect of custom, as custom is the effect of inclination. It is a good custom to rise early, as this will produce a habit of doing so.

"How use doth breed a habit in a man."
Shakespeare.

FASHION (Fr. *façon*, Lat. *facere*), besides its primary meaning of shape or manner, has the secondary meaning of *prevailing manner*. A fashion is a custom temporarily established, and refers commonly to matters of social usage, as style of dress.

"The innocent diversions in *fashion*."—*Locke*.

MANNER and **METHOD** are closely allied, the former, however (Fr. *manière*, Lat. *manus*, the hand), denotes no more than the way of doing a thing, while in its more extended meaning, as expressed by the plural manners, it means the peculiar and characteristic mode of living and behaving. **Method** (Gr. *μέθοδος*) is scientific manner, as manner is natural method. When manner is scientifically regarded as a process capable of rules for its right and effective conducting, it becomes method.

"All *method* is a rational progress; a progress toward an end."—*Sir W. Hamilton*.

"The temptations of prosperity insinuate themselves after a gentle but very powerful manner."—*Atterbury*.

PRACTICE (Fr. *pratique*, Gr. *πράσσειν*, to do) has the two senses of a regular

doing, and the thing regularly done. It is closely allied to both habit and custom. Practice is customary action; if it be the result of repeated acts, it is so far a habit, but, unlike custom, it refers necessarily to the acts of individuals, either separately or in the aggregate, and not to communities as such. It often occurs that the same thing may be regarded as either a custom or a practice, that is, as a regular thing or a regular act in a person. Custom and practice must be based upon reason, but habit may be the result of instinct or training in irrational animals. Practice embodies more of the moral than is necessarily implied in custom, or even in habit. It denotes a distinct determination of purpose. A practice must be good or bad, wholesome or unwholesome, and can hardly be purely indifferent or formal. Indeed, practice is such conduct as manifests the disposition of the person. So gaming is a custom in those countries which are particularly addicted to it. It is a habit in those individuals who cannot resist it. It is a practice in those who deliberately indulge in it.

"He thought to have that by *practice* which he could not by prayer."—*Sidney*.

USAGE (Fr. *usage*) and PRESCRIPTION (Lat. *prescriptio*, a preamble, hence, figuratively, a pretext) are terms of a legal character. Custom is prolonged by usage till it confers rights of prescription. In its ordinary sense, as, for instance, "usage determines the senses of words," usage is of many, while custom may be of one. Usage implies longer establishment than custom; hence we may speak of a new custom, but not a new usage. In the case of wishing to express a common mode lately adopted, we ought to say a new use—a new use of the word in that sense, or a new employment. *Technically*, custom differs from prescription in being *local*, while prescription is *personal*.

"Of things once received and confirmed by use, long *usage* is a law sufficient."—*Hooker*.

"The speeches on both sides indicated that profound reverence for law and *prescription* which has long been characteristic of Englishmen."—*Macaulay*.

D.

DAILY. DIURNAL.

These adjectives, which are both formed from the Latin *dies*, a day (*diurnus*, belonging to a day), are the same in meaning, and only differ as a colloquial term differs from a more scientific one. So we speak of DAILY occurrences or daily newspapers, and of the DIURNAL motion of the earth upon its axis.

"Give us this day our *daily* bread."—*Lord's Prayer*.

"Half yet remains unsung but narrow bound,
Within the visible *diurnal* sphere."
Milton.

DAINTY. DELICACY.

As applied to matters of the palate, DAINY (Old Fr. *dain*, connected with the Lat. *dignus*, worthy) may be considered to be a species of DELICACY (Fr. *délicat*, Lat. *delicie*, delicate). For delicacy applies to anything which is exquisite, whether naturally so, as a fruit, or artificially, as a choice dish. A dainty is that which is uncommon and choice at the same time. Delicacy points to the niceness of the quality, dainty to the rarity of the supply.

"The *delicacies*,
I mean, of taste, sight, smell, herbs, fruits,
and flowers,
Walks, and the melody of birds."
Milton.

"A table furnished plenteously with bread
And *dainties*, remnants of the last regale."
Cowper.

DAMAGE. See HURT.

DAMP. MOIST. HUMID.

All these terms are employed to express the smallest degree of infusion or suffusion of liquid. Anything which is not dry must be in some degree damp, moist, or humid. But we use the term DAMP of that which has contracted a state of wet foreign to itself, as a damp house, damp clothes. When we say of a thing that it is damp, we almost always

imply that it might better have been otherwise, unless we have damped it expressly (Germ. *dampf*, fog, steam, vapour). **MOIST** (Old Fr. *moiste*) means normally and naturally damp, and therefore has not the unfavourable sense attached to damp. If we said the ground was moist, we should probably mean in a favourable condition for vegetation; if we said it was damp, we should probably mean that we ought to be careful about walking upon it. **HUMID** (Lat. *humidus*) means both damp and moist, and is of more scientific application, as "the atmosphere of islands is more or less humid." The peculiar character of the adjective damp is developed in the verb to damp, which means to stifle or repress. As:

"Usury dulls and *damps* all industries, improvements, and new inventions."—*Bacon*.

"Set such plants as require much *moisture* on sandy dry grounds."—*Ibid*.

"Evening cloud or *humid* bow." *Milton*.

DANDYISH. See **FOPPISH**.

DANGER. PERIL. HAZARD. RISK. JEOPARDY. VENTURE.

DANGER (Fr. *danger*) is the liability or exposure to evil of any kind. Danger is general and contingent, and may be remote. It is the generic term.

"Such men as he be never at heart's ease
Whilst they behold a greater than themselves,
And therefore are they very *dangerous*."
Shakespeare.

PERIL (Lat. *periculum*) is always immediate and personal. A man is in danger of his property and in peril of his life.

"O sacred source of ever-living light,
Conduct the weary wand'rer in her flight,
Direct her onward to that peaceful shore
Where *peril*, pain, and death prevail no more."
Fulconer.

HAZARD (Fr. *hazard*) is the condition of any good possessed and exposed to danger of destruction or loss. It is the risk of entire deprivation of the thing hazarded, and applies only to things, not persons. Hence people hazard their lives, their

property, their reputation; but they do not hazard, but endanger or imperil themselves. Hence passionate and unreasonable men call it courage to *hazard* their lives in their own private quarrels, where contempt of danger is, on the contrary, neither reasonable nor just; because, neither is the danger at all needful to be run into, nor is the benefit proposed to be obtained by it in any manner equal to the evil hazarded. The essence of hazard is its fortuitous character, so that sometimes this predominates to the exclusion of all others, and we speak of the "hazard of the die," as implying the chance of gain as well as loss. This is not the case with either peril or danger. **RISK** (Fr. *risque*) is hazard of loss only. We run the risk of losing, but we never speak of the risk, but of the chance of winning.

"How often, whether wrong or right,
Must he in jest or earnest fight,
Risking for those both life and limb,
Who would not *risk* one groat for him."
Churchill.

JEOPARDY (Fr. *jeu parti*, drawn game) may exclude all voluntary agency, which is implied in hazard and risk, and, unlike peril, is applicable to things of value as well as to persons. A man's property, or life, or himself, may be in jeopardy.

"But by the way there is a great quicksand
And a whirlpool of hidden *jeopardice*;
Therefore, Sir Palmer, keep an even hand,
For twixt them both the narrow way doth lie."
Spenser.

VENTURE (for adventure) is *purely voluntary*, and denotes a meeting of hazard, peril, jeopardy, or risk, with the hope that chance may be in one's favour.

"Wise *venturing* is the most commendable part of human providence."—*Halifax*.

DARE. See **CHALLENGE**.

DARING. See **BOLD**.

DARK. OBSCURE. DIM. GLOOMY. OPAQUE.

Of these, the most comprehensive is **DARK** (A. S. *dearc*, *deorc*), which

denotes any degree of absence of light or colouring, with metaphorical meanings in addition, as unintelligible, mysterious, difficult, unhopeful, degraded or ignorant, iniquitous, and the like.

"For as that which sees does not cease to exist when in the *dark* all objects are removed, so that which perceives does not necessarily cease to exist when by death all objects of perception are removed."—*Clarke*.

OBSCURE (Lat. *obscurus*) denotes any degree or kind of darkness which interferes with the distinct perception of objects. It is opposed to what is *clear*, as dark is opposed to what is *light*. In its secondary sense, as darkness stands for ignorance, so obscurity for uncertain knowledge.

"When all the instruments of knowledge are forbid to do their office, ignorance and *obscurity* must needs be upon the whole soul."—*South*.

DIM (A. S. *dim*) denotes lack of brightness in something capable or supposed capable of it, and is opposed to bright. Dim, unlike dark, is not applicable to locality, but, on the other hand, is applicable as an epithet to light itself. Dimness stands to obscurity as the cause to the effect.

"Shedding a *dim* religious light." *Milton*.

GLOOMY (Old Eng. *glome*) is a purely subjective term, denoting what has no existence but in ourselves. Any *oppressive* kind or degree of darkness is gloom.

"His Holy Spirit doth in our religious intercourse with Him insinuate a lightsome serenity of mind, doth kindle sweet and kindly affections, and doth scatter the *gloomy* clouds of sadness."—*Barrow*.

OPAQUE is a scientific term, denoting that kind of substance which resists the transmission of rays of light, and is opposed to translucent and transparent.

"Through this *opaque* of Nature and of soul,

This double night, transmit one pitying ray,

To lighten and to cheer." *Young*.

DATE. PERIOD. ERA. EPOCH. TIME. AGE. GENERATION.

Of these, the most general is **TIME**

(Lat. *tempus*), which means unmeasured duration, or any specific measure or point of it.

"This consideration of duration, as set out by certain periods, and marked by certain measures or epochs, is that I think which most properly we call *time*."—*Locke*.

DATE (Fr. *date*, Lat. *datum*, from *dare*, to give, a point given) is a point, and not a duration of time, bearing reference to the whole historic course of time within which it occurs.

"Any writer, therefore, who mentions the rising or setting of any star, at any particular *time* of the year with respect to the sun, furnishes us with *data* sufficient to determine the time in which he wrote."—*Priestley*.

PERIOD (Gr. *περίοδος*) is, properly, a recurrent portion of time, or such a portion as is measured by some recurrent phenomenon, as a revolution of one of the heavenly bodies. Hence, more generally, an interval, definite or indefinite, and sometimes the end or limit of such an interval. A period is, as it were, an expanded point of time, or a stage in history, which may itself be included among other stages.

"The particular *periods* into which the whole *period* should be divided, in my opinion, are these: 1. From the fifteenth to the end of the sixteenth century. 2. From thence to the Pyrenean treaty. 3. From thence down to the present time."—*Bolingbroke*.

ERA (It. and Spanish *era*) is used both for a fixed point of time, and for a succession of years dating from that point. It is conventional, and indicates a mode of computing time peculiar to some community or body of persons.

"I incline to this opinion, that from the evening ushering in the first day of the world to that midnight which began the first day of the Christian era there was 4003 years seventy days and six temporary hours, and that the true nativity of our Saviour was full five years before the beginning of the vulgar Christian *era*, as is demonstrable by the time of Herod's death."—*Usher*.

EPOCH (Gr. *επέχειν*, to check) is an era constituted by the inherent importance of an event, while an era may be arbitrary. Hence epoch is less formal than era. The capture of Constantinople is an epoch in the history of Mahometanism; but the Flight

of Mahomet is its era. It is obvious that an epoch might be constituted an era. AGE (Fr. *age*) and GENERATION (Lat. *generatio*, a birth or production) have nearly the same meaning; but age is taken broadly for such periods as coincide with the joint lives of human beings, and so is extended to mean a century, while generation rather refers to the average duration of individual life, and frequently means thirty years.

"In divers ages and nations divers epochs of time were used."—*Usher*.

"Ancient learning may be distinguished into three periods. Its commencement, or the age of poets; its maturity, or the age of philosophers; and its decline, or the age of critics."—*Goldsmith*.

"For behold from henceforth all generations shall call me blessed."—*Bible*.

DAUB. SMEAR.

DAUB (Irish *doib*, plaster) denotes the process of applying moist matter, or, in an unfavourable sense, unseemly colouring matter to several points of the surface *in succession*. SMEAR (A. S. *smeru*, fat, grease) is to cover *continuously* and over a considerable space with unctuous or other like matter. A badly-painted landscape or portrait is said to be daubed; a badly-painted door might be said to be smeared.

"Another *daubed* it with untempered mortar."—*Bible*.

"But if that honest license now you take,
If into rogues omnipotent you rake,
Death is your doom: impaled upon a
stake,
Smeared o'er with wax, and set on blaze, to
light
The streets, and make a dreadful fire by
night." *Dryden's Juvenal*.

DAUNT. See DISMAY.

DEAD. LIFELESS. INANIMATE.

Taking these words in reference solely to their physical application, their characteristic differences are as follows: DEAD (A. S. *dead*) denotes the absence of life from bodies, *both capable and incapable of it*, as a dead man, dead matter.

"Seek him with candle, bring him *dead* or living."—*Shakespeare*.

LIFELESS (or wanting life) from bodies *capable* of it, as a "lifeless corpse."

"Nor can his *lifeless* nostril please
With the once ravishing smell."

Cowley.

INANIMATE (Lat. *in*, not, and *anima*, life) from bodies *incapable* of it; as, "Trees and rocks, and other portions of the inanimate creation."

"We may in some sort be said to have a society even with the *inanimate* world."—*Burke*.

DEADLY. MORTAL. FATAL.

Using these terms, not in any metaphorical, but in their literal and physical meanings, the distinctions are as follow: DEADLY means capable of producing death.

"Gods! I behold a prodigy. My spear
Lies at my foot; and he at whom I cast
The weapon with such *deadly* force is
gone." *Cowper's Rind*.

MORTAL (Lat. *mortalis*, *mors*, death) is liable to produce or suffer death. Hence it is used as a strong epithet of feelings. A mortal hatred is literally one which would kill its object.

"Louis XIII. *mortally* hated the Cardinal de Richelieu; but his support of that minister against his rivals was the source of all the glory of his reign, and solid foundation of his throne itself."—*Burke*.

FATAL (Lat. *fatalis*, *fatum*, fate) actually productive of death. A poisoned arrow is a deadly weapon, even while it remains in its quiver. Men are mortal, or receive mortal wounds, as being or having what tends to death. A blow is fatal on which death follows inevitably.

"Where's the large comet now whose raging
flame
So *fatal* to our monarchy became,
Which o'er our heads in such proud horror
stood,
Insatiate with our ruin and our blood?"
Cowley.

DEALING. See INTERCOURSE and TRADE.

DEARTH. See SCARCITY.

DEATH. DEPARTURE. DECEASE. DEMISE.

DEATH signifies the act of dying or the state of the dead. DEPARTURE (Fr. *départ*, the quitting life). DECEASE (Lat. *decedere*, to depart) is etymologically the same. DEMISE (Lat. *demittere*, *demissus*) is the laying down or resigning of life and possessions. Death is the simplest and broadest, being applicable to the extinction of life both in animals and plants, to which the others are inapplicable. It may be calm or violent, natural, or self-inflicted. Departure is a term under which lies the idea of social life, and, in spirits of the highest faith, the hopes of reunion, as well as a point of arrival, or future state beyond the grave. The suicide and the aged, or the sick calmly awaiting their end, depart; not those who die on the scaffold or in battle. Decease is the term we use when we think of the death of another as an epoch of his existence, or our own, and in connection with personal events preceding, accompanying, or following it; yet a violent death is not called a decease. Demise is employed of the death of illustrious persons, as peculiarly of royalty, in reference to the bequeathing of titles or estates to successors and heirs.

"Happy to whom this glorious *death* arrives,
More to be valued than a thousand lives,
On such a theatre as this to *die*,
For such a cause, and such a witness by."
Waller.

"Although when the Divine Providence does itself offer us a just occasion of leaving this world (as when a man chooses to suffer death rather than commit wickedness), a wise man will then indeed *depart* joyfully, as out of a place of sorrow and darkness into light; yet he will not be in such haste as to break his prison contrary to law, but will go when God calls him, as a prisoner when dismissed by the magistrate or lawful power."
—Clarke.

"The Romans had the custom to deify and adore their emperors, most of them after their *decease*, and some of them during their lives, even though they were the vilest of mankind."
—Jortin.

"So tender is the law of supposing even a possibility of his (the king's) death, that his

natural dissolution is generally called his *demise*, *demissio regis vel coronæ*, an expression which signifies merely a transfer of property."
—Blackstone.

DEBAR. DEPRIVE. HINDER. PROHIBIT. DISQUALIFY. EXCLUDE. PRECLUDE. FORBID.

DEBAR (bar or barrier) is to shut out. It applies only to persons in reference to things rightful, desirable, or desired, as to be debarred from privileges, possessions, rights, or an attempt to procure them. To debar indicates merely an act of preventive power in reference to those things which may be exercised upon us by ourselves, by others, or by circumstances.

"Hereby the apostle not only *debarred* women from prophesying, but from any public function in the ecclesiastical jurisdiction."
—Strype.

DEPRIVE (Lat. *deprivare*) denotes the coercive taking away of what one possesses either in fact or in prospect, while debar relates to what one does not as a fact possess or attain to.

"Thus a punishment of this kind was inflicted on the rebellious Israelites. They were *deprived* of the extraordinary Providence, and were yet held subject to the Theocracy."
—Warburton.

To HINDER (literally, to keep behind) is to debar either temporarily or entirely from some act or occupation to which one was seeking to devote oneself.

"Sore let and *hindered* in running the race that is set before us."
—Book of Common Prayer.

PROHIBIT (Lat. *prohibere*) and FORBID (for having the force of negation, and bid, to tell) have the force of interdiction by authority, or debarring by the use of words of command. Forbid is less formal than prohibit, is used in the commoner matters of life, and is more direct. A father forbids his child to go out of the house. We are prohibited from promiscuous revenge not only by the Divine law, but by many considerations besides. Prohibit and forbid almost universally relate to

some kind of action which is kept in check.

"To this day in France the exportation of corn is almost always *prohibited*; in order, as they say, to prevent famines; though it is evident that nothing contributes more to the frequent famines which so much distress that fertile country."—*Hume*.

"Heaven is high,

High and remote to see from thence distinct
Each thing on earth; and other care per-
haps

May have diverted from continual watch
Our great forbidding." *Milton*.

DISQUALIFY (Lat. *dis* and *qualis*, such, and *facere*, to make) is to debar by attaching personal and *inherent* prohibition from some privilege, office, or dignity.

"Men are not *disqualified* by their engagements in trade from being received in high society."—*Southey*.

EXCLUDE (Lat. *excludere*) is formally to shut out, and may be an act of law and regulation by arbitrary power or inherent conditions. It relates to the participation of things desired or desirable, and is the generic term under which disqualification is contained as a species of exclusion.

"None but such from mercy I *exclude*." *Milton*.

PRECLUDE (Lat. *præcludere*) is to exclude by indirect means. It is to shut out by anticipation, or to prevent by necessary consequence. It is applicable not only to persons, but to such things also as are merely conceivable or possible.

"The valves *preclude* the blood from entering the veins."—*Darwin*.

INTERDICT (*inter* and *dicere*, to speak) is opposed to positive, being negative, command, and is commonly employed of formal or public kinds of prohibition. Interdict closely resembles prohibit, but points to the stopping or debarring of what was already in course of being done or enjoyed. I prohibit where I see, perhaps, no more than a probable cause for the prohibition; interdict what if I were silent would certainly be done or assumed, or what is

actually in performance or enjoyment.

"The *interdicted* tree."

Milton.

DEBASE. See ABASE.

DEBATE. ARGUE. DISPUTE.
DELIBERATE. DISCUSS. CONTEND.

DEBATE (Fr. *débattre*) is formally to sift by argument for and against. It supposes a number of opinions in every way related to the question in hand, including every shade, from the strongest affirmation to absolute denial, being brought into comparison and collision. The legitimate *object* of debate is to bring together the expression of various opinions for the purpose of accepting, rejecting, or modifying the matter in hand. The *subject* of debate may be purely theoretical, as the abstract truth of a proposition, or purely practical, as how best to compass an object, or both. There is, or ought to be, no personal antagonism in debate, truth and right being things of common interest; nor is there any reason why debate should not be among friends, and carried on in harmony and unanimity of purpose. And the process of debate is, according to its etymology, to strive to conquer or refute (literally beat down) the' wrong and false, for the purpose of setting up the truth and right.

"As I am only giving an opinion on this point, and not at all *debating* it in an adverse line, I hope I may be excused in another observation."—*Burke*.

To **ARGUE** (Lat. *arguere*) is to say all that can be said for or against a proposition or a case. It may be the process of one or of more persons.

"When we peruse those authors who defend our own settled sentiments, we should not take all their *arguings* for just and solid."—*Watts*.

To **DISPUTE** (Lat. *disputare*) is always antagonistic. It is to argue against something as held or maintained by another, and extends, not only to his statements, but to anything claimed or upheld by him in any way, as his claims, rights, or pretensions. **CONTEND** (Lat. *con-*

tendere) is the opposite to dispute; for, as dispute is to attack and endeavour to shake what is held or advanced by another, so contend is to argue urgently in favour and support of something held by oneself.

"It is very strange that those who *contend* so much for the Scriptures being a perfect rule of all things pertaining to worship and discipline, should be able to produce nothing in so necessary a point."—*Stillingfleet*.

DELIBERATE (Lat. *libra*, a balance) has reference never to questions of abstract truth, but always to a course of action to be adopted or pursued.

"If there be a real surprise, that is, that the person is not aware, or hath not time to consider what he is to do, he that hath a mind well resolved may be betrayed into what he would never have done, if he had time to *deliberate* about it."—*Stillingfleet*.

To DISCUSS (Lat. *discutere*, to shake about) very closely resembles to debate, but differs in the two following points:—1, discuss is more commonly applied to matters of opinion, while debate belongs rather to action or proceedings; but, 2, discuss is used of cases in which the process of consideration is argumentative, but the object or subject is not a matter of argument at all, but only amounts to a varied expression of feeling or opinion. To discuss a point of theology, for instance, does not of necessity imply either contending or disputing. It may be no more than a collation of what is said and argued upon that point, without giving in an adhesion to any conclusion or view whatever.

"Pride and humility are two opposite habits or dispositions of the mind; and therefore the *discussion* and examination of the latter will of itself give us a discovery of the former."—*Hale*.

DEBILITY. See ENERVATE.

DECAY. DECLINE. DIE. PERISH.

To DECAY (Lat. *decidere*, to fall down) is to depart from a state of soundness, and denotes a tendency to the state of disorganization and dissolution; as the decay of the body in old age, the decay of the mind by the same cause, the decay of states and constitutions political.

"Throughout the whole vegetable, sensible, and rational world, whatever makes progress towards maturity, as soon as it has passed that point begins to verge towards decay."—*Blair*.

DECLINE (Lat. *declinare*) is downward tendency or movement, without any such disruption or disorganization, as "the declining years of life," "the declining sun."

"The strength of the frontiers, which had always consisted in arms rather than fortifications, was insensibly undermined, and the fairest provinces were left exposed to the rapaciousness or ambition of the barbarians, who soon discovered the *decline* of the Roman empire."—*Gibbon*.

Decline is often preparatory to decay. The prop declines when it bends, and decays when it rots. The progressive debility of the Roman empire was its decline. The actual dissolution of the fabric commenced with its decay.

DIE (Iceland. *deya*, *deyja*) is simply to cease to live.

"Wise men *die*, as well as the ignorant and foolish."—*Bible*.

PERISH (Lat. *perire*) is used when something connected with the extinction of life is meant to be emphatically dwelt upon, as its completeness, or the unhappy or violent circumstances of it. So men often die happily, but they never perish happily. We say "perish miserably," "perish utterly," and the like.

"Yet one doubt
Pursues me still, least all I cannot die.
Least that pure breath of life, the spirit of
man,
Which God inspired, cannot together *perish*
With this corporeal clod."

Milton.

DECEASE. See DEATH.

DECEIT. See DECEPTION.

DECEIVE. DELUDE. MISLEAD.
BEGUILE.

DECEIVE (Lat. *decipere*) is generally to lead into error by causing to believe what is false, or disbelieve what is true. The plausible, the specious, the *apparent* right, true, or desirable, is that which exercises over us the power of deception, which being one thing, looks, or is made to

look, like another by misrepresentation in objects or in words.

"But what account shall a man give of himself for living perpetually in disguise; for *deceiving* all about him, and using the speech which God gave him for better purposes, to impose on the weakness and folly of mankind?"—*Sherlock*.

To **DELUDE** (Lat. *deludere*) is to deceive in the particular matters of the desirable or good. Delusion combines disappointment with deceit. I deceive my neighbour if I simply tell him a falsehood, which he believes. I delude him by any kind of misrepresentation in matters connected with his feelings, hopes, or interests, as by holding out to him a hope of his gaining what I know to be impossible for him ever to attain.

"This pure metal

So innocent is, and faithful to the mistress
Or master that possesses it, that rather
Than hold one drop that's venomous, of itself

It flies in pieces, and *deludes* the traitor."

Massinger.

I **MISLEAD** him when I draw him off from the line of right judgment or action. To delude, when used of persons, implies *an intention* to deceive; but mislead may be *unintentional*, as when I give my neighbour what I believed at the time to be true information, but which I have since discovered to be erroneous. We are deceived in our judgment, deluded in our desires, misled in our actions. **BEGUILE** (be and guile, the same as wile) is to place another in a false position, to induce him to believe something to be true, and to leave him to the consequences of his error, especially by seductive arts. It is intentionally and maliciously to mislead another to his privation or detriment.

"And the woman said, The serpent *beguiled* me, and I did eat."—*Bible*.

DECEIVER. See **IMPOSTOR**.

DECENT. See **BECOMING**.

DECENCY. See **DECORUM**.

DECEPTION. DECEIT. ILLUSION. DELUSION.

DECEPTION (Lat. *decipere*, to de-

ceive) is used of individual instances or acts of one who deceives; **DECEIT**, rather of the acts as appertaining to habit or quality of mind; as "a course of deceit," "an act of deception." Hence deception is more external, and is applicable to cases in which the guilt of deceit has no part, as an optical deception. **ILLUSION** and **DELUSION** (*illudere* and *deludere*) express, the former, something which is presented before our mental or bodily view, but which has no substantial and independent existence, while the latter implies a false view of something which really exists, but not under the conditions which we attribute to it. The same distinction prevails in regard to matters purely intellectual. In history, for example, to believe that any great personage, as Thomas à Becket or Henry VIII., acted uniformly from pure and disinterested motives, would be a delusion. To believe in the historical existence of Don Quixote would be an illusion.

"A fanatic, either religious or political, is the object of strong *delusions*; while the term *illusion* is applied solely to the visions of an uncontrolled imagination, the chimerical ideas of one blinded by hope, passion, or credulity, or, lastly, to spectral and other optical deceptions, to which the word *delusion* is never applied."—*Whately*.

DECIDE. DETERMINE. RESOLVE.

To **DECIDE** (Lat. *decidere*) expresses an intellectual result, **DETERMINE** (Lat. *determinare*) and **RESOLVE** (Lat. *resolvere*) moral results. I decide according to my judgment. I determine according to my purpose. I resolve as combining the two, and implying a sort of pledge given to myself to carry out with determination what I have decided upon. Resolution betokens a choice made between action and inaction, and is opposed to doubt, reluctance, or inaction. Determination betokens a choice made between motives, and is opposed to vacillation, uncertainty. Decision is a final and irrevocable act of the will or judgment, and is opposed to indecision or hesitation.

"And it is indeed but fit there should be some *dernier ressort*, the absolute *decider* of all controversies."—*Spectator*.

"By *determining* the will, if the phrase be used with any meaning, must be intended causing that the act of the will or choice should be thus and not otherwise; and the will is said to be *determined* when in consequence of some action or influence its choice is directed to, or fixed upon a particular object."—*Edwards, Freedom of the Will.*

"I am *resolved* what to do, that when I am put out of the stewardship they may receive me into their houses."—*Bible.*

DECISION. *See* RESOLUTION.

DECISIVE. *See* CONCLUSIVE.

DECLAIM. INVEIGH.

Of these, DECLAIM (Lat. *declamare*) does not of necessity imply antagonism of speech. We may declaim *upon* as well as *against*. It is in the latter use in which the term is synonymous with INVEIGH (Lat. *in* and *vehere*, to carry). To declaim is to speak. Declamation is speech in which the rhetorical is more considered than the logical. It sacrifices accuracy, refinement, and consecutiveness to effect. To inveigh is specific declamation against character, conduct, manners, customs, and morals. Invective may be written, declamation is always spoken. In declamation against a thing or person, the uppermost idea is fluency in adverse expression of opinion; in invective, the personal dislike and opposition of the speaker. Hence we are more commonly said to declaim against wrongs and injuries, and to inveigh against vices and abuses. Eloquent declamation, bitter invectives.

"Grenville seized the opportunity to *declaim* on the repeal of the Stamp Act."—*Bancroft.*

"All men *inveighed* against him, all men except court vassals opposed him."—*Milton.*

DECLARE. *See* ANNOUNCE, PROFESS, and PRONOUNCE.

DECLINE. *See* DECAY and REFUSE.

DECORATE. *See* ADORN.

DECORUM. DECENCY.

These, though both derived from the same word (*decere*, to become) are

employed, the former in reference to social behaviour, the latter to moral conduct. Indecorous behaviour offends against order, good manners, and good taste. Indecent behaviour indicates a corrupt state of morals.

"Negligent of the duties and decorums of his station."—*Hallam.*

"Those thousand *decencies* that daily flow
From all our words and actions."
Milton.

DECOY. *See* ENTICE.

DECREASE. *See* ABATE.

DECREE. EDICT. PROCLAMATION. LAW. STATUTE. REGULATION. RULE.

DECREE (Fr. *décret*, Lat. *decernere*, *decretus*, to decide) may come from one or more, from a sovereign, or a court of justice. It is commonly an authoritative order addressed to subordinates, being in its nature specific and occasional, not permanent or of continuous operation. An EDICT (Lat. *edicere*, *edictus*) is not applicable to numbers. It is the public expression of a will of an individual in political power. In decree the leading idea is absolute obligation; in edict absolute authority. Hence decree is used largely of any binding power, as the decrees of fate.

"Therefore I make a *decree* that every people, nation, and language which speak anything amiss against the God of Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego shall be cut in pieces, and their houses shall be made a dunghill, because there is no other God that can deliver after this sort."—*Bible.*

"The silence or ambiguity of the laws was supplied by the occasional *edicts* of those magistrates who were invested with the honours of the State."—*Gibbon.*

PROCLAMATION (Lat. *proclamatio*, a proclaiming) is a published order emanating from the sovereign or supreme magistrate, and bears reference to specific occasions, as determined upon in council, and not provided for by the law of the land.

"These *proclamations* have then a binding force when (as Sir Edward Coke observes) they are grounded upon and enforce the laws of the realm."—*Blackstone.*

LAW (Fr. *loi*, Lat. *lex*), in its widest sense, is the authoritative expression of will on the part of any rightful governing power, and, in its political sense, permanently controls every department of the State.

"That which doth assign unto each thing the kind, that which doth moderate the force and power, that which doth appoint the form and measure of working, the same we term a law."—*Hooker*.

STATUTE (Lat. *statuere statutum*, to appoint) is commonly applied to the acts of a legislative body composed of representatives of the people, and stands with ourselves distinguished from civil law, canon law, and common law.

"The oldest of these now extant and printed in our statute books is the famous Magna Charta, as confirmed in Parliament 9 Henry III."—*Blackstone*.

REGULATION (*regula, rego*, a rule) is a governing direction of a State, department, institution, or an association for a specific purpose, and may be only of a temporary character. Such, for instance, are the arrangements for preserving order on great occasions of public interest, and the rules by which voluntary societies are managed. We often find "rules and regulations" combined. In such cases the difference is slight. Rule, however, points rather to authoritative enactments as such; regulation to the place of such rules in the working of the system or institution. In a school a refractory boy might be reprimanded for breaking the rules. It would be a regulation that the school should open and close every day at certain hours. One submits to a rule; one conforms to a regulation.

"Tis against the rule of nature."

Shakespeare.

"It never was the work of philosophy to assemble multitudes, but to regulate only and govern them when they were assembled."—*Cowley*.

DECRY. DEPRECIATE. DISPARAGE.

The idea of lowering by words the current value is common to all these terms. DECRY (Fr. *décrier*) relates

primarily to the inherent value of the thing itself, DEPRECIATE (Lat. *de*, down, and *pretium*, price) to the estimate of it as formed or expressed by oneself, DISPARAGE (Low Latin *paragium*, equality of condition or birth) to the estimate of it as formed by others.

"What an insufferable impudence then are they guilty of who nowadays decry all reading, study, and learning, and rely only on enthusiasm and immediate inspiration!"—*Bishop Bull*.

"Others are so unhappily attentive to party considerations or personal prejudices, that if a design ever so valuable comes from a wrong quarter, instead of being ambitious to share the merit and the honour of it, they set themselves immediately to depreciate it and suggest mischievous intentions in it."—*Secker*.

"Nothing hath wrought more prejudice to religion, or has brought more disparagement upon truth, than boisterous and unseasonable zeal."—*Burrow*.

I decry a thing or person when I wish to bring it down in the actual or possible regard of others. This may be from the purest motives, as to decry the architecture of a public building, as believing it to be radically defective, inconsistent with its purpose, or in itself bad. I depreciate it when I have some personal motive connected with myself (as lowering its abstract estimation). I disparage it to or before others, in order that certain persons whom I desire to think less highly of it may be led to do so. To decry expresses a more sustained process than the others, and a fuller entering on the demerits of the object.

DEDICATE. See CONSECRATE.

DEDUCE. See DERIVE and INFER.

DEDUCTION. See INFERENCE.

DEDUCTION. SUBTRACTION. ABATEMENT.

These terms all express diminution of some quantity, and differ as follows: SUBTRACTION (Lat. *subtrahere*, to draw away from under) applies to number and quantity, and is general and abstract. It simply denotes the

removal of a part from the whole. DEDUCTION (Lat. *deducere*) is such subtraction as is performed with the purpose of lowering the aggregate or capital sum or quantity. A tradesman subtracts a certain sum from the total of his account, in consequence of my representations to him that he ought, in fairness, to make certain deductions. So subtraction may be theoretical; deduction has always a practical purpose. ABATEMENT (Fr. *abattre*, to beat down) refers not, like deduction and subtraction, to the parts, but to the whole, of which the amount is in any way diminished, as to make an abatement of a claim.

"The late king had also agreed that two and a half per cent. should be *deducted* out of the pay of the foreign troops, which amounted to fifteen thousand pounds."—*Burnet*.

"That universals are nothing else but names or words by which singular bodies are called, and consequently that in all axioms and propositions, sententious affirmations and negations (in which the predicate, at least, is universal), we do but add or *subtract*, affirm or deny names of singular bodies."—*Cudworth*.

Old writers, as Shakespeare, used the form *substract*.

"They are scoundrels and *substractors* that say so of him."—*Shakespeare*.

"A great *abatement* of kindness."—*Ibid*.

DEED. See ACT.

DEEM. See REGARD.

DEFACE. DISFIGURE. DEFORM.

The formations of these words explain themselves—to injure the face, the figure, the form. DEFACE is always a purposed act, denoting a superficial injury to the extent of spoiling or destroying. It may be done by the injury of the substance, or by the application of some other substance externally, so as to smear, erase, or obliterate. DISFIGURE and DEFORM do not necessarily imply the desire to injure or deteriorate. Disfigure denotes the marring of the general appearance by some defect or injury which is sufficient to interfere with the effect produced by the whole. Deform implies something which is detrimental to the character, shape, or organization of the

entire thing. For instance, a building may be defaced by scrawling upon its walls, disfigured by a roof, of which the colour is out of harmony with the walls, deformed by an unsightly cupola surmounting it. Deface is never used of living animals, which can only be disfigured or deformed. Of human beings, deformity is predicated as to the body and limbs, disfigurement of the face. The face of the veteran soldier might be disfigured, not defaced, by wounds. The face might be said to be deformed in the sense of being monstrously out of shape as to its features, or disfigured by some one blemish.

"With these honourable qualifications, and the decisive advantage of situation, low craft and falsehood are all the abilities that are wanting to destroy the wisdom of ages and to *deface* the noblest monument that human policy has erected. I know such a man."—*Junius*.

"Nor would his slaughtered army now have lain

On Afric's sands *disfigured* with their wounds."—*Addison*.

"Monsters, on the contrary, or what is perfectly *deformed*, are always most singular and odd, and have the least resemblance to the generality of that species to which they belong."—*Smith, Moral Sentiments*.

DEFAMATION. See CALUMNY.

DEFEAT. See BAFFLE.

DEFECT. See BLEMISH.

DEFECTIVE. DEFICIENT. IMPERFECT.

These words both imply failing (Lat. *deficere*, to fail); but defective relates to incompleteness of quantity or quality, deficient to incompleteness of action or power in reference to some purpose. DEFECTIVE is specific. It presupposes some standard of sufficiency, or some definite aggregate of parts constituting a whole, which in the present case is not reached or forthcoming. DEFICIENT is general and indefinite, supposing an undefined standard of sufficiency in force or operation. A book is defective as to its substance, when out of its complement of pages one or more, or even a portion of a page, is wanting. It is defective as

to its matter when it is inadequately planned, or omits what is needful or important. It is deficient when it fails of its character and use, either by the defectiveness of its parts, or any weakness of style, or want of knowledge in the writer. So defective belongs rather to the nature of things, deficient to the requirements of persons. A speaker is deficient who is defective in his speech. A difference is to be noted between defective and imperfect. Defective marks a specific case and positive degree of imperfection. That is defective which falls short of the *ordinary* or *average* standard. That is IMPERFECT which does not come up to perfection. So man and his every faculty is imperfect in regard to an ideal standard of perfection, by reason of the infirmity of his nature; but he is only defective in any such faculty when he does not possess it as the bulk of mankind do.

"All of them (philosophers), as has been before shown, were very *imperfect and deficient*."—*Clarke*.

"And after all, the rules of religion and virtue which were drawn up by these philosophers have been very *imperfect and defective*."—*Watts*.

DEFENCE. See APOLOGY.

DEFEND. PROTECT. GUARD.

TO DEFEND (Lat. *defendere*) implies an active repelling of some adverse influence or power, PROTECT (Lat. *protegere*, to cover over) a passive placing of something between the object and the power. A fortress is defended by its guns, and protected by its walls. A defence is successful or unsuccessful. A protection is adequate or inadequate. In some cases, but they are of a somewhat metaphorical character, we use the words interchangeably. So we say, to defend or protect plants from frost; but in the one case we look upon the power we have to resist; in the other, upon the objects which we have to guard. GUARD (Fr. *garder*) partakes of the nature of both. It is the exercise of vigilant care of the object protected, with a readiness to defend it if necessary.

"God *defend* the right." *Shakespeare*.

"The stately-sailing swan
Gives out his snowy plumage to the gale,
And arching proud his neck, with oary
feet

Bears forward fierce, and *guards* his osier
isle,

Protective of his young." *Thomson*.

"For heaven still *guards* the right."
Shakespeare.

DEFENDER. See PLEADER.

DEFER. DELAY. POSTPONE. PROCRASTINATE. PROLONG. PROTRACT.

TO DELAY (Old Fr. *délayer*) is simply to place an indefinite term between the present and the commencement of the thing delayed. This may be either a voluntary act or the result of circumstances. In this point DEFER (Lat. *deferre*) differs from delay, expressing always a voluntary act. Defer is more specific; delay more indefinite. I may delay to do that which I have no will to do, and would fain see left undone. I defer that which I desire to be done, but not at the present moment. Hence defer is often followed by some term specifying a point of time, such as "till" or "to."

"Defer the spoil of the city till night."
Shakespeare.

"My lord *delayeth* his coming."—*Bible*.

POSTPONE (Lat. *post*, after, and *ponere*, to place) implies more strongly what defer implies less strongly, and delay hardly implies at all, namely, a definite intention to resume what for the present is put off. Hence it is more formal, and applies better to official meetings for business. "The meeting, we might say, was *postponed* for a month, and, when it met, the consideration of that question was *deferred*. Some regarded this as an unseemly and unnecessary *delay*."

"These *postponers* never enter upon religion at all in earnest or effectually."—*Paley*.

The idea of postpone includes that of something to which the thing postponed is rendered subordinate, whether an event, a circumstance, or a period. Hence the word bears sometimes the meaning of to regard as of inferior moment, as in the following:

"Nor can that rationally be said to be despised by any, or *postponed* to any other thing, which never was proposed to them as their option, and which it never was in their power to choose or to embrace."—*Whitby*.

PROCRASTINATE (Lat. *pro* and *cras*, to-morrow) is, literally, to put off till to-morrow what might better have been done to-day. It is to delay, defer, or postpone through indolence or general unwillingness to commence action.

"*Procrastination* is the thief of time.

Year after year it steals till all are fled,
And to the mercies of a moment leaves
The vast concerns of an eternal scene."

Young.

PROLONG and **PROTRACT** (Lat. *protrahere*, *protractus*) differ from the former in implying something actually commenced, as a period or a transaction. There is very little difference between them; but we commonly use *protract* in the sense of *contriving* to lengthen. So to *prolong* a speech is simply to extend it; to *protract* it would be to talk against time. *Prolong* applies better to what is begun, but not concluded; *protract* better to what is not yet begun, as I *prolong* my stay, I *protract* my departure.

"To what purpose should I take pains for a livelihood, or so much as be at the trouble of putting meat to my mouth for the *prolongation* of my life?"—*Sharp*.

"The other manager very complaisantly received it again, and had recourse to the old mystery of *protraction*, which he exercised with such success that the season was almost consumed before he could afford it a reading."—*Smollett*.

DEFERENCE. REVERENCE. RESPECT. REGARD.

DEFERENCE to another (Fr. *déférence*) marks a readiness to yield to him in matters of choice or judgment, rather than to enforce one's own wishes or opinions. It is grounded upon age, rank, dignity, or personal merit.

"*Deference* to the authority of thoughtful and sagacious men."—*Whevell*.

RESPECT (Lat. *respicere*, *respectus*, to regard) is to hold in high estimation for moral or intellectual quali-

ties, or both. It is due peculiarly to the wise and good.

"We pass by common objects or persons without noticing them, whereas we turn back to look again at those which deserve our admiration, our regard, our *respect*. This was the original meaning of *respect* and *respectable*."—*M. Müller*.

REVERENCE (Lat. *reverentia*) is a profounder respect, not unmingled with fear.

"Great *reverencers* of crowned heads."—*Swift*.

REGARD (Fr. *regard*) differs from the former in being the feeling of an equal or a superior, not an inferior. It is the feeling of all right-minded persons toward those whose qualities are estimable.

"He should advanced be to high *regard*,
And have our lady's love for his reward."
Spenser.

DEFILE. See **CONTAMINATE**.

DEFICIENT. See **DEFECTIVE**.

DEFINITE. POSITIVE.

In the cases in which these terms have the character of synonyms, **DEFINITE** (Lat. *definire*, *definitus*) relates to the thing, **POSITIVE** (*positivus*, from *ponere*, to place or lay down) to the mind of the person. A definite account of a thing would be one that was clear and sufficient; a positive account one which was given with plainness of speech, and with an air of conviction and assurance by the speaker.

"To be *definitely* in a place is to be in it so as to be there and nowhere else."—*Bishop Taylor*.

"*Positively* to foretell is to profess to foreknow, or to declare positive foreknowledge."—*Edwards on the Will*.

DEFINITION. EXPLANATION.

DEFINITION (Lat. *definire*) in its strict sense is that which gives the logical essence of a thing, as its genus and specific difference, or, less scientifically, enumerates its accidents and properties. **EXPLANATION** (*explanare*, to make smooth) is a more popular process, consisting in bringing home something to the

understanding of a nature difficult to comprehend, by the media of other things with which the mind of the person is more familiar. Definition rather belongs to words and ideas, explanation to facts and statements.

"Definition being nothing but making another understand by words what idea the term defined stands for, a *definition* is best made by enumerating those simple ideas that are combined in the signification of the term defined."—*Locke*.

"Explanations of the doctrine of the Trinity."—*Burnet*.

DEFORM. See DEFACE.

DEFRAUD. See CHEAT.

DEFY. See CHALLENGE.

DEGRADE. See ABASE.

DEGREE. See CLASS.

DEJECTED. See SAD.

DEJECTION. DEPRESSION. DESPONDENCY. MELANCHOLY.

DEJECTION (Lat. *dejecere*, *dejectus*, to cast down) and DEPRESSION (Lat. *deprimere*, to depress) both refer to the spirits. Dejection is such a state of sadness or sorrow as affects the countenance and demeanour, giving a downcast look. Depression is simply a lowness of spirits, and is more purely constitutional. Dejection implies some *source* of sorrow, privation, or disappointment; but depression may be produced by atmospheric causes. DESPONDENCY (Lat. *despondere*) points to a state of mind, the result of sad or disheartening reflections, as upon a loss which cannot be recovered, or a failure which cannot be retrieved, or a hope which is likely to be frustrated, or an unfavourable aspect of personal affairs. MELANCHOLY (Greek *μελαγχολία*, literally black bile) denotes such dejection or depression as is either constitutional or chronic in the individual, and often results from a number of impressions which cannot be resolved into any one direct cause of grief or sadness.

"I have had no dignities; thou hast withheld them, and I have not thought them even

worthy of a wish. Didst thou see me sad and *dejected* on these accounts?"—*Jortin*.

"Lambert, in great *depression* of spirit, twice prayed to let him escape."—*Baker*, *Charles II.*

"This (sincerity and integrity of heart) enables a man to look back without horror, to look about him without shame, to look within without confusion, and to look forward without *despondency*."—*Stillington*.

"When the mind is very deeply impressed with a sense of calamity for a continuance, and the attention cannot by any means be diverted from it, the subject is in a state of *melancholy*. This affection manifests itself by dejection of spirits, debility of mind and body, obstinate and insuperable love of solitude, universal apathy, and a confirmed listlessness, which emaciate the corporeal system, and not unfrequently trouble the brain."—*Cogan*.

DELAY. See DEFER.

DELEGATE. See ACCREDIT and REPRESENTATIVE.

DELETERIOUS. See NOXIOUS.

DELIBERATE. See CONSULT and DEBATE.

DELICACY. See DAINTY.

DELICATE. FINE. NICE.

These terms are all employed both of the character of objects and of the faculties which perceive and treat them. As to the quality of objects, that is DELICATE (Fr. *délicat*) which is refinedly agreeable, or likely to please a highly-cultivated taste, though it might have no gratification for minds or tastes not trained to perceive the beauty of what is not conspicuous, or the agreeableness of what does not force itself strongly upon the senses. When used of persons in a moral sense, the term expresses an appreciation of what is *extrinsically* delicate, a shrinking from harshness and coarseness, a considerateness for others, and an appreciation of the less prominent beauties and graces of things. As in delicacy there is a natural susceptibility of injury, the term is sometimes used purely in this sense, as a delicate constitution, delicate health.

"An air of robustness and strength is very prejudicial to beauty. An appearance of

delicacy, and even of fragility, is almost essential to it."—Burke.

FINE (Fr. *fin*) has, singularly enough, taken to itself a meaning quite opposed to the weakness of delicacy, though it is nearly identical with it in its other sense of requiring minuteness of discrimination, or exhibiting discriminative power, as a "fine distinction." There would appear at first sight to be almost a contradiction between such uses of the term, as "fine cambric" and a "fine child;" the former pointing to delicacy of texture, the latter to robustness of constitution; but fine, as opposed to coarse (which is the same as course, ordinary), and so meaning *choice of its kind*, will admit of such seemingly contrariant applications. A fine child is a child of *no common* form and growth; fine cambric is of *no common* texture; a fine taste is a taste of *no common* power of discrimination. The fine is that which combines delicacy and power or grandeur, as a fine speech, a fine landscape.

"The character of his Majesty's bluff haughtiness (Henry VIII. by Holbein) is well represented, and all the heads are *finely* executed."—Walpole.

NICE (said to be from *nescius*, ignorant, as if it indicated, as it did in Old English, uninformed, and afterwards came to mean seeking information, and so exact), when applied to objects, is not a word of high meaning. It indicates such a degree of excellence or agreeableness as people in general would approve or enjoy. When used of persons and their powers of discrimination, it seems to combine exactness of knowledge with a certain fastidiousness of requirement. A distinction is said to be nice which tends to over-refinement. A person with a nice taste in music is not easily pleased with what he hears. The old meaning of *nice*—silly, ignorant—appears in the following:

"For he was *nyce* and knowthe no wisdom."
—R. Gloucester.

"By his own *nicety* of observation he had already formed such a system of metrical harmony as he never afterwards much needed

or much endeavoured to improve."—Johnson, *Life of Waller*.

DELICIOUS. See DELIGHTFUL.

DELIGHTED. See GLAD.

DELIGHTFUL. DELICIOUS.
CHARMING.

Of these, DELIGHTFUL relates to the state of mind, DELICIOUS to the specific gratification of the senses, and CHARMING to the gratification of the mind through the senses. Anything is delightful which produces gladness of mind. Hence delight is not caused simply by external objects of sense. Good news, for instance, may be delightful. A delightful country, delightful music, and so on, are such as to produce pleasurable excitement of the mind. The term ill accords with purely physical enjoyment, as a delightful dish. Delicious is well-nigh confined to matters of taste, touch, and smell. It expresses that which very sensibly excites pleasure in these matters. Charming is used in a wider sense of that which delights and engages the whole nature, and commonly denotes that state of mental enjoyment which is produced through the senses. A charming landscape is one which we linger to enjoy. A charming person is one in whose society and conversation we feel continual delight. It generally implies an aggregate of attractions, while delightful and delicious refer to some one point of attractiveness or enjoyment.

"The situation was *delightful*. In front was the sea and the ships at anchor, behind and on each side were plantations, in which were some of the richest productions of nature."—Cook's *Voyages*.

"They are like Dives, whose portion was in this life, who went in fine linen, and fared *deliciously* every day."—Bishop Taylor.

"This is a most majestic vision and
Harmonious *charmingly*."

Shakespeare.

DELINEATE. See SKETCH.

DELINQUENT. See OFFENDER.

DELIVER. RESCUE. LIBERATE.
RELEASE.

DELIVER (Fr. *délivrer*, Low Latin

deliberare, from *liber*, to set free) has various senses, according to the various applications of the main idea; as to set free, and so release; to set free from oneself, and so surrender; to cause to go forth; free, to disburden. In the sense of setting free, deliver means to rid of any kind of coercive power, which in any sense or any way interferes with the freedom of the person, as to deliver one person from another, or from the power of another. It is even extended to what is oppressive, painful, or irksome, as to deliver from the fear of death, or from a painful necessity.

"Deliver us from evil."—*Lord's Prayer*.

RESCUE (Old Fr. *rescoudre*, from *re excutere*, to shake off and away) denotes that kind of removal both of persons and things from the power and possession of another, which is the result of energetic interference and personal effort. It is possible to deliver and to rescue from danger, that is, from *impending*, not actual evil. Liberate, on the other hand, involves an *actual* restraint, confinement, or coercion.

"Nineveh was rescued from the brink of destruction."—*Stillingfleet*.

LIBERATE and **RELEASE** (the former of the same root as deliver, the latter from the Old Fr. *relaisser*, to set loose) are very closely related in meaning; so that in many cases they might be used indifferently, as to release or to liberate a prisoner from confinement; but liberate refers only to *restraint* in the most direct sense of the term, though the metaphorical use of it is common, as to liberate the mind from prejudices, where prejudices are regarded as restraining influences interfering with the mind's free action. Release is more widely applied to any kind of *force*, as, for instance, that which oppresses, pains, or compels. So we speak not only of releasing from prison, but from an obligation, debt, or bond, from torture or sickness, and, in death, from sorrow, pain, and evil.

"That the public revenue of Great Britain can never be completely *liberated*, or even

that any considerable progress can ever be made towards that *liberation*, while the surplus of that revenue, or what is over and above defraying the annual expense of the peace establishment, is so very small, it seems altogether in vain to expect."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations*.

"So I may say I am but a prisoner still, notwithstanding the *releasement* of so many."—*Howell*.

DELIVER. SURRENDER. TRANSFER.

I DELIVER (*see above*) a thing to another when I place it in his hands, so as to part with my own personal responsibility and control. It is a formal act, performed either on my own or some one else's account, as when I sign, seal, and deliver a bond, or when I deliver to its intended owner or keeper a parcel with which I have been entrusted. The act is at least voluntary, if not willing. The difference in meaning between this force of the verb deliver and that last noticed corresponds with the difference between the nouns *deliverance* and *delivery*.

"The investitures of bishops and abbots, which had been originally given by the *delivery* of the pastoral ring and staff."—*Burnet*.

SURRENDER (Fr. *surrendre*, *sub* and *reddere*, to render) is applied to matters of right or possession, with which we part in favour of another under coercion or compulsion, as to surrender a fortress, or an expressed opinion in argument, or a claim, or oneself to any influence or power, as to vice, grief, despair, idleness, sleep.

"If we do not *surrender* our wills to the overtures of His goodness, we must submit our backs to the strokes of His anger."—*Barrow*.

TRANSFER (Lat. *transferre*) is simply to convey from one person or place to another, with or without personal interest, property, or control on our own part, and is applicable to moral things, as well as to material substances, as to transfer one's affection.

"*Transferring* the honour which was due to God alone unto saints and to feigned miracles."—*Udal*.

DELIVER. PRONOUNCE. UTTER.

Of these, UTTER (to put forth or out) is the simplest. To utter a speech is simply to sound it with the voice, as so many words. So the word utterance is applied to mere inarticulate sound, as to utter a sigh or a moan. PRONOUNCE (Lat. *pronuntiare*) is syllabically, distinctly, and in some cases with formality and solemnity, to utter, as to pronounce judgment. To DELIVER (*see above*) denotes a careful and sustained pronouncing of what requires to be conveyed in many words. To deliver a speech would imply not only the words, but the manner of it. So we might say, "The substance was eloquent, but the words were indistinctly pronounced;" or, "The speech was good in itself, but badly delivered."

"He (Vertue) was simple, modest, and scrupulous, so scrupulous that it gave a peculiar slowness to his *delivery*. He never uttered his opinion hastily, nor hastily assented to others."—*Walpole*.

"In order to be fully and easily understood, the four chief requisites are, a due degree of loudness of voice, distinctness, slowness, and propriety of *pronunciation*."—*Blair, Lectures*.

DELIVERY. DELIVERANCE.

These two forms of the same word (*see above*) differ in mainly regarding, the former, the point whither, the latter, the point whence the action proceeds. Delivery means a delivering *to*, deliverance a delivering *from*. So "The holiday was concluded by the delivery of prizes to the successful competitors;" "A Te Deum was celebrated for the nation's deliverance."

DELUDE. *See* DECEIVE.

DELUGE. INUNDATE. OVERFLOW. SUBMERGE.

To DELUGE (Lat. *diluvium*) implies the pouring of a vast body of water coming from above, as a deluge of rain.

"And as, when stormy winds encountering loud,
Burst with rude violence the bellowing cloud,

Precipitate to earth the tempest pours,
The vexing hailstones thick in sounding showers,
The deluged plains then every ploughman flies,
And every hind and traveller sheltered lies." *Hamilton's Virgil*.

INUNDATE (Lat. *in* and *unda*, a wave) implies an horizontal movement of the same body spreading itself laterally. An inundation may result from a deluge. As deluge primarily regards the water which pours or covers, so inundation primarily regards the land which is covered or submerged.

"Nonnus reports in the history of his embassy, that during the period when the Nile *inundates* Egypt there are very violent storms in the different parts of Ethiopia."—*Belue, Herodotus*.

OVERFLOW is an inundation caused by excess of fluid in some specific place or channel. So, "a deluge of rain fell, the river overflowed its banks, and the country far and wide was inundated, so that it remained for some weeks submerged."

"Poets that lasting marble seek
Must carve in Latin or in Greek.
We write in sand, our language grows,
And like the tide our work o'erflows." *Waller*.

SUBMERGE (Lat. *submergere*, to drown) denotes that the inundation has entirely drowned the land. It deserves, however, to be remarked that, while the others indicate the specific action of water, submerge is also applied to cases in which the primary action is not on the part of the water, as, when in a quantity of water a large body is purposely placed so as to be entirely covered, it is said to be submerged. The element overflows and inundates. Man may deluge and submerge.

"Some of our own countrymen have given credit to the *submersion* of swallows."—*Pennant*.

DELUSION. *See* DECEPTION.DEMAND. *See* ASK and RE-QUIRE.DEMEANOUR. *See* AIR.

DEMISE. See BEQUEATH and DEATH.

DEMOLISH. DESTROY.

To DESTROY (Lat. *destruere*) is violently to put an end to anything that existed in life or shape, or even to the life itself. Hence destroy is the generic word. DEMOLISH (Fr. *démolir*, moles, a mass) is the specific destruction of an organized body or a structural mass. To this latter it is most commonly applied, as to demolish the walls of a castle. Demolition is opposed to construction. Destroy may or may not involve violence, as a noxious vapour or a violent blow might destroy life; demolish involves violence. Destruction may be sudden or gradual; demolition is commonly rapid and decisive. Destroy is equally applicable to things moral and physical, as to destroy hope, beauty, effect. Demolish could not be so employed, except in the way of formal metaphor.

"O come hither, and behold the works of the Lord, what *destructions* He hath brought upon the earth."—*Bible*, 1551.

"On their coming into administration, they found the *demolition* of Dunkirk entirely at a stand. Instead of *demolition* they found construction; for the French were then at work on the repairs of the jetties."—*Burke*.

DEMONSTRATE. See SHOW.

DEMUR. HESITATE. SCRUPLE. WAVER. FLUCTUATE.

To HESITATE (Lat. *hesitare*, from *hære*, to stick) is literally to stick at doing something, whether mentally or practically. It may proceed from a variety of causes, as prudence, fear, doubt, generosity, cowardice.

"In an age of darkness he (Gregory VII.) had not all the knowledge that was requisite to regulate his zeal; and taking false appearances for solid truths, he without *hesitation* deduced from them the most dangerous consequences."—*Jortin*.

To DEMUR (Old Fr. *demourer*, Lat. *mora*, delay) is a specific kind of hesitation. It is to suspend action or judgment in view of a doubt or difficulty. When we say, "I demur to that statement of yours," we mean to

arrest the argument of the speaker on a point to which we are prepared to make objection.

"A *demurrer* denies that by the law arising upon these facts, any injury is done to the plaintiff, or that the defendant has made out a legitimate excuse, according to the party which first *demurs* (demoratur), rests or abides upon the point in question."—*Blackstone*.

SCRUPLE (Lat. *scrupulus*, a grit or sharp stone in the path) is a kind of internal demur, that is, when the process of thought or action arrested is not that of another but our own, and this in consequence of a doubt or difficulty suggested either by some other, or by our own minds or feelings. A scruple is dictated by a sense of impropriety, intellectual or moral.

"I *scruple* not to rest it on reason rather than on passion."—*Gilpin's Sermons*.

WAVER (A. S. *wafian*, connected with wave, as it were, to fluctuate) refers to an antecedent opinion or resolution of our own, which we have *actually formed* and distrust. As *actually* formed and scruple are applicable to that which is proposed to be said or done, so waver applies to what *has* been said or done. FLUCTUATE (Lat. *fluctus*, a wave) resembles waver in expressing motion and change of mind, but differs from it in implying more than one point. We waver upon one consideration. We fluctuate between two or more, which we are inclined to adopt successively. Waver is only applied to matters of intellectual decision, but fluctuate to states of feeling. We fluctuate not only between one opinion and another, but between joy and sorrow, gladness and depression, hope and despair, and the like.

"Liberty of will is like the motion of a magnetic needle toward the north: full of trembling and uncertainty till it were fixed in the beloved point. It *wavers* as long as it is free, and is at rest when it can choose no more."—*Bishop Taylor*.

"Teach me how I came by such an opinion of worth and virtue; what it is which at one time raises it so high, and at another time reduces it to nothing; how these disturbances and *fluctuations* happen."—*Shaftesbury*.

DENOMINATE. *See* NAME.

DENOMINATION. *See* NAME.

DENOTE. *See* SIGNIFY.

DENSE. *See* THICK.

DENIAL. ABNEGATION.

DENIAL (Fr. *dénier*, Lat. *denegare*) is logical and practical. ABNEGATION is not logical, but only practical. Denial may stand opposed either to affirmation or to indulgence, Abnegation only to the latter, in the sense of renunciation of self, or of anything else.

"You ought to converse with so much sincerity that your bare affirmation or *denial* may be sufficient."—*Stillingfleet*.

"*Denying* ungodliness and worldly lusts."—*Bible*.

"*Abnegation* of God, of His honour, of His religion."—*Knox*.

DENY. *See* CONTRADICT, REFUSE, and DISAVOW.

DEPARTURE. *See* DEATH and EXIT.

DEPENDENCE. RELIANCE.

DEPENDENCE (Lat. *dependere*, to hang from) expresses a fact, RELIANCE (re and lie, to rest one's weight upon) expresses our consciousness or feeling of that fact. Dependence is conditioned existence, a result contingent upon a cause. Reliance is trust upon a living will. The child depends upon his parent for all that he requires; but it is not till he has grown to be conscious of his own dependence in this way that he can rely upon his parent's willingness to grant him what he needs.

"The absolute stoical *depend*er upon fate may starve for want of industry, die for want of physic, and be damned for want of repentance."—*Hammond*.

"The Saviour effecting everything by His power is represented under the image of a great champion in the field, who is prompted by his own courage, and a *reliance* on his own strength and skill, to attempt what might seem impracticable."—*Bishop Horsley*.

DEPICT. *See* DESCRIBE.

DEPLORE. *See* COMPLAIN.

DEPONENT. *See* WITNESS.

DEPORTMENT. *See* CARRIAGE.

DEPOSIT. *See* PLEDGE.

DEPRAVITY. DEPRAVATION. CORRUPTION.

DEPRAVITY and DEPRAVATION (Lat. *pravus*, crooked) stand to each other as the process and the result; depravity is the state of being depraved, depravation the action of making depraved, or the state of having been made so. There is in human nature, we believe, an inborn depravity. This is made far worse where defective education and evil company have tended to the worse depravation of the individual. The same twofold meaning belongs to CORRUPTION, which expresses both the state of being, and the process of making corrupt (Lat. *corrumpere*, *corruptus*, to break up, as an organized body in dissolution). Differences must be noted between depravity and corruption. These may be illustrated by the difference between a depraved person and a corrupt person. The depraved man has been brought to a certain condition of evil practice; the corrupt man to a certain condition of evil principle. Corruption relates to the source of action, depravity to the actions themselves. A corrupt judge need not be a person of depravity of character necessarily in any other way than that of the principle of integrity, which is wanting or has been destroyed in him. Or, again, a person may have a corrupt taste in art or literature without being a person of corrupt life. This shows corruption to be a *specific* badness or depravity of principle, while depravity is *general*, and affects the entire character. When we speak of a person of depraved taste, we, of course, confine the assertion to the matter of taste, without saying anything of the moral character. A corrupt taste and a depraved taste would be practically the same; but in the former case we take account of the want of true principle to decide, in the latter of the influence of bad training to pervert. Corrupt taste would rather

belong to the artist, depraved taste to the spectator.

"If refinement does not lead directly to purity of manners, it obviates at least their greatest *depravation*."—*Reynolds*.

"A mad and desperate *depravity*."—*Shaftesbury*.

"As though all the false religion that ever was among the heathen was not a *corrupting* and *depravation* of the true religion of God."—*Calvin*.

DEPRECIATE. See DECRY.

DEPREDACTION. See ROBBERY.

DEPRESSION. See DEJECTION.

DEPRIVE. See BEREAVE and DEBAR.

DEPTH. PROFUNDITY.

These words supply a good illustration of a large class of synonyms, and of the general difference of character between words of Saxon and words of classic formation to express the same thing. DEPTH expresses no more than the physical property of perpendicular measurement downward from a surface; or, metaphorically, what is like this, as depth of mind, or thought, or meaning, which is such as has the properties of natural depth; not lying on the surface; more or less difficult to reach; more or less dark when reached; not meeting the eye of those who regard only the surface of things, and the like; but PROFUNDITY (Lat. *profundus*, deep) expresses the abstract idea of depth, or the scientific measurement of it. It is the same thing under a more refined, abstract, and scientific view. The former class of words are physical and metaphorical, the latter scientific and metaphysical.

"A dreadful *depth*, how *deep* no man can tell." *Spenser*.

"In one (Ben Jonson) we may respect the *profundity* of learning, in the other (Shakespeare) we must admire the sublimity of genius."—*Observer*.

DEPUTE. See ACCREDIT.

DEPUTY. See AMBASSADOR.

DERANGE. DISORDER.

DERANGE (Fr. *déranger*, rang, rank

or order) and DISORDER (Fr. *dés-ordre*, Lat. *ordo*, rank, order) are so much alike that they may often be used interchangeably, as a mass of papers may be disordered or deranged. But from other illustrations it would be seen that derange is commonly applied to matters of mental or internal, disorder to matters of physical or external, arrangement. It is only an extension of this to say that disorder bears reference to the fact, derangement to the intention, of order. A defeat of a general will, at the same time that it throws his army into disorder, derange more or less his own plans. This distinction is not destroyed by the fact that things of the mind are often viewed metaphorically, that is, after the analogy of things of sense. Thus, "a disordered imagination" is one in which the faculties, as in a machine, have lost their just disposition, after the analogy of such disturbance of the bodily functions as accompanies or creates disease.

"Whether this folly (expensiveness of dress) may not produce many other follies, an entire *derangement* of domestic life, absurd manners, neglect of duties, bad mothers, a general corruption of both sexes."—*Berkeley*.

"In wildest numbers and *disordered* verse."
Lyttelton.

DERANGEMENT. See MADNESS.

DERIDE. See RIDICULE.

DERIVE. TRACE. DEDUCE.

Of these, TRACE (Fr. *tracer*) is generic, meaning to draw a line, or to prosecute a given line, whether materially or mentally, as to trace a river from its source to its mouth, or from its mouth to its source, to trace a line of march, DERIVE (*derivare*), and DEDUCE (*deducere*) indicate a tracing in one direction, that is, from the source or origin downwards. To derive is to trace, and so to refer to the physical cause; to deduce is to trace, and so refer to the logical cause or reason. A river derives its waters from a certain source; a word is derived from a certain grammatical root; a nation derives its origin from one or more historic causes, as a

victory, a migration, and the like. We deduce inferences from statements, and conclusions from premises.

"But this kind of writing which seems to be reformed, which is that writing should be consonant to speaking, is a branch of unprofitable subtleties; for pronunciation itself every day increases and alters the fashion, and the derivation of words, especially from foreign languages, are utterly defaced and extinguished."—*Bacon*.

"From the words of Moses cited by our Saviour, the doctrine of a future state may as clearly be deduced as from any single text which can be produced out of any one of the prophets."—*Jortin*.

"In this chart I have laid down no land nor traced out any shore but what I saw myself."—*Cook's Voyages*.

DEROGATE. DETRACT.

These words are in meaning very closely allied, and may in many cases be used indifferently; but DEROGATION refers to *intrinsic* goodness, DETRACTION to the *estimation* in which a thing is held. Derogation takes place when a thing that is estimable suffers deterioration; detraction when a thing that is esteemed, or is capable of being esteemed, is lessened or cheapened in the estimation of others. Hence derogate belongs to the influence of circumstances, while detraction is exclusively the act of persons. For instance, we might say, "His warmth of temper derogates much from a character otherwise worthy of high respect;" or, again, "The speaker, in speaking of such an one, detracted much from his reputation by ascribing to him ill-temper, and other such derogatory qualities."

"I hope it is no *derogation* to the Christian religion to say that the fundamentals of it, that is, all that is necessary to be believed in it by all men, is easy to be understood by all men."—*Locke*.

"I know it has been the fashion to *detract* both from the moral and literary character of Cicero; and indeed neither his life nor his writings are without the characteristics of humanity."—*Knox*.

DESCRIBE. DEPICT. CHARACTERIZE.

DESCRIBE (Lat. *describere*) is to

write down an account, hence to give an account, whether in writing or spoken words. True description is the giving in words of an account analogous to that of ocular representation; only describe goes further, and gives a representation of complex objects or moral events, as well as visible forms or transactions, as to describe the circumstances under which such an event took place. Description belongs to the external manifestations of things, and ought to be full and clear, that is, it should enumerate all particulars, and represent them accurately and vividly.

"How shall frail pen describe her heavenly face,

For fear, through want of skill, her beauty to disgrace!"

Spenser.

DEPICT (Lat. *depingere, depictus*) refers to the vivid description of anything which may be brought with more or less distinctness before the mind's eye. Both describe and depict involve the representation of every detail connected with the subject described or depicted.

"An idea of figure depicted on the choroides or retina of the eye."—*Anecdotes of Bishop Watson*.

CHARACTERIZE (Gr. *χαρακτήρ*, an impression) is employed in moral description of what represents the subject by its leading feature or features. Hence a whole course of conduct, or a whole class of character in men, may be said to be characterized by some one strong and distinctive epithet, for instance, which, without delineating in detail, sets a peculiar mark and stamp upon it.

"Richard Martin was worthily characterized by the virtuous and learned men of his time to be princeps amorum."—*Wood, Athenæ Oxon*.

DESCRIPTION. See ACCOUNT and NAME.

DESCRY. ESPY. DISCOVER. DETECT. DISCERN.

To DESCRY (Norm. Fr. *descrier*) is to discover by the eye objects difficult of discernment by reason of distance or dimness. When the difficulty

arises from other causes, as confusion among a number of similar objects, partial concealment, or the like, we employ *ESPY* (Fr. *espier*). As *descry* denotes discriminative penetration of the bodily vision, so *espy* implies acuteness of vision or observation. *DISCOVER* (Fr. *découvrir*, Lat. *discoperire*) points to the bringing to light of what was concealed or unknown. This may be either accidental or the result of specific research. To *DETECT* (Lat. *detegere*, *detectus*, to uncover) is to remove what concealed from view, having been in most cases purposely so placed, as to detect a criminal or a crime. Such a purpose of concealment, however, is not essential to the term, as to detect an error in a calculation, or a fallacy in an argument; only what is detected is never a matter of merit, but always an error, fault, or crime. *DISCERN* (Lat. *discernere*) is to perceive with the inherent power of the faculty of bodily or mental identification, while *descry* is always physical. From this power of exact vision comes the faculty of seeing differences in objects; and this identification of an object by setting aside its differences, or other objects which differ from it, is discernment, whether in the physical or intellectual sense.

"The first *describing* of the enemy's approach."—*Holinshed*.

"Secure, unnoted Conrad's prow passed by,
And anchored where his ambush meant to lie,

Screened from *espial* by the jutting cape
That rears on high its rude fantastic shape." *Byron*.

"The distinction of a first *discoverer* made us cheerfully encounter every danger, and submit to every inconvenience."—*Cook's Voyages*.

"The Romans were plagued with a set of public officers belonging to the emperor's court called *Curiosi* and *Imperatoris oculi*, part of whose employment was to go about as *detectors* of frauds and misdemeanours."—*Jortin*.

"A *discerner* of the thoughts and intents of the heart."—*Bible*.

DESERT. See ABANDON and MERIT.

DESERT. See DESOLATE.

DESIGN. PURPOSE. INTEND.
MEAN.

These terms all refer to the condition of the mind antecedent to action, and relative to it. *MEAN* (A. S. *mænan*, to recite, intend), being of Saxon origin, is the most comprehensive and colloquial, and is employed of matters of any degree of importance, signifying simply to have a mind to do a thing or to say it, as, "What do you mean by saying that?" or, "What do you mean to do this morning?" It is used also of the significance of circumstances, events, or actions in the sense of denote, as, "What does that shouting in the streets mean?" Meaning relates to purpose in speech and in action.

"Thei wondred what she wolde mene."—*Gower*.

To *DESIGN* (Lat. *designare*) denotes an object of attainment placed before the mind, with a calculation of the steps necessary for it. It is a *complicated intention* carried into action, or proposed for it. I had no design to hurt you, means it was not a part of my aim or plan to do so.

"Ask of politicians the end for which laws were originally *designed*, and they will answer that the laws were *designed* as a protection for the poor and weak against the oppression of the rich and powerful."—*Burke*.

To *INTEND* (Lat. *intendere*, to stretch towards) points to no more than the general setting of the mind upon doing a thing. I did not intend to hurt you, means that it was accidental; and intention is commonly opposed to accident. It denotes no more than the presence or action of the will as distinguished from its absence.

"They that do me good, and know not of it, are causes of my benefit, though I do not owe them my thanks, and I will rather bless them as instruments, than condemn them as not *intenders*."—*Feltham*.

To *PURPOSE* (Old. Fr. *pourpos*, Lat. *propositum*) is stronger than to intend, indicating a permanent resolution, to be carried out in such a way that circumstances must be made subser-

vient to it. I purposed to hurt you, would imply that I had been watching my opportunity, and managed matters accordingly. The difference between intention and purpose is that between incipient and decisive volition. Intentions may be remote, purposes are immediate. The intention is weaker than the purpose.

"Steadfastly *purposing* to lead a new life."
—*Church Catechism.*

DESIGN. *See* PLAN.

DESIGNATION. *See* NAME.

DESIRABLE. *See* ELIGIBLE.

DESIRE. *See* WISH.

DESOLATE. DESERT. SOLITARY.

These terms express under modifications the idea of local solitude. A place is DESOLATE (*de* and *solus*, alone) in reference to human occupation and use. A desolate country is one which gives the impression of no inhabitants to till or inhabit it. A desolate house or room, one which shows no signs of occupation, or seems, as it were, half occupied. It will be observed that, like gloomy, desolate is a subjective rather than an objective term, that is, it expresses not so much facts or appearances of nature as their impressions upon our own minds. Hence it is sometimes employed exclusively of the state of the person.

"Have mercy on me, for I am *desolate*."—*Psalms.*

"How is Babylon become a *desolation* among the nations!"—*Bible.*

DESERT (Lat. *deserere*, *desertus*, to abandon) denotes natural unfitness for occupation, and applies only to natural localities. A desert island is without inhabitants, because it is without the natural means of supporting them. A desolate place may or may not have been at one time occupied, and may be partly occupied at present.

"Full many a flower is born to blush unseen,

And waste its sweetness on the *desert* air."
Gray.

SOLITARY (*solus*, alone) denotes no

more than removed from the haunts and occupation of human beings. The depth of a South American forest, though peopled with animals of another kind, would be terribly solitary to a man. Solitary is applicable to persons as well as localities, in the sense of removed from others of the kind.

"It hath been disputed which is a state of greater perfection, the social or the *solitary*."
—*Atterbury.*

DESOLATION. *See* DESOLATE and RAVAGE.

DESPAIR. DESPONDENCY. DESPERATION.

DESPONDENCY (*despondere*, to give up) is the least violent, but often the more lasting of the three. It is a low state of the feelings which leads to an unhopeful view of things.

"He found his Indian friend leaning his head against a post, in an attitude of the utmost languor and *despondency*."—*Cook's Voyages.*

Between DESPAIR and DESPERATION (Fr. *désespoir*, Lat. *de*, down, and *spes*, hope) there is a practical difference, in that one is a passive, the other an energetic hopelessness. This is expressed in common language. Men fall into despair, and are worked up to desperation. Desperation seizes the weapon. Despair sits with folded hands.

"*Despair* is the thought of the unattainableness of any good, which works differently in men's minds, sometimes producing uneasiness or pain, sometimes rest and indolency."
—*Locke.*

Despair is, however, more comprehensive than this. "It is," says Cogan, "a permanent fear of losing some valuable good, of suffering some dreadful evil, or remaining in a state of actual misery, without any mixture of hope."

"Daughters of Eve, whom *desperation*, the effect of their first false step, hath driven to the lowest walks of vulgar prostitution."—*Bishop Horsley.*

DESPERATION. *See* DESPAIR.

DESPICABLE. *See* PITIFUL.

DESPISE. *See* SCORN.

DESPONDENCY. See DEJECTION and DESPAIR.

DESPOTIC. See ABSOLUTE.

DESTINATION. DESTINY.

These two words (formed from the Latin *destinare*) differ as the human and controllable from the super-human and uncontrollable or providential. DESTINY is used of individuals and the final point of their personal history. DESTINATION of things as well as persons, and denotes no more than the end at which a person or thing is intended to arrive, or the purpose to which a thing is put.

"Which of us in setting out upon a visit, a diversion, or an affair of business, apprehends a possibility of not arriving at his place of *destination*, yet at the same time does not apprehend himself at liberty to alter his course in any part of his progress?"—*Search, Light of Nature*.

"Thus the Pagans had the same notion with that which is mentioned in Scripture of a double *destiny* depending upon human choice."—*Jortin*.

DESTINE. See ALLOT.

DESTINY. FATE. LOT. DOOM.

DESTINY (see above) is used both of the end to which a person or thing is fore-appointed, and of the course of things which brings them to it.

"But who can turn the stream of *destiny*,
Or break the chain of strong necessity,
Which fast is tied to Jove's eternal seat?"
Spenser.

FATE stands to destiny as an item to a sum (Lat. *fatum*, fate), and is employed, as destiny never is, of the *details* of life. It is seldom used in a favourable sense, as, "In travelling it is almost always my fate to meet with delays." So far as a man's condition has resulted from unconscious causes, as the laws of the material world, we speak of his fate. So far as we attribute it to the ordainment of more powerful beings, we speak of his destiny. Fate is blind; destiny has foresight. The theist speaks of destiny, the atheist of fate.

"I would not have that *fate* light upon you which useth to befall some, who from

golden students become silver bachelors and leaden masters."—*Hovell*.

LOT (Fr. *lot*, share) commonly refers to something connected with the whole course of life, which gives it a distinctive character for good or for ill, as "Trouble is the common lot of men."

"To labour is the *lot* of man below;

And when Jove gave us life he gave us
woe."
Pope.

DOOM (deem, to judge) is the final close of life, regarded as a matter foreordained, and is never used in a happy sense. It is sometimes used, like lot, of the details of life itself, when it is at once unhappy and continuous, as "I was doomed to spend many years of my early life in exile from my home."

"Ere Hector meets his *doom*."
Pope.

DESTITUTE. DEVOID. VOID.

Of these, VOID (Lat. *viduus*) has a physical application, although the word empty is at present a more common substitute for it, as—

"The *void* helmet."—*Cowper's Iliad*.

DEVOID is reserved for the *morally* empty. There is very little difference of meaning between it and DESTITUTE (Lat. *destituere*, *destitutus*); but devoid partakes rather of the nature of a purely negative, destitute of a privative epithet; or, in other words, to be destitute is to be devoid of what might naturally be expected to belong, or where it might be requisite; as beasts are devoid of speech, which nature has simply denied them. A man is destitute of learning when we think of his capability of acquiring it, devoid of it when we think of the simple fact that he does not possess it. Destitute is, therefore, commonly employed of the absence of the common requirements or necessities of life, as destitute of daily food or of clothing, where we should not employ devoid. Devoid thus seems to have a more abstract usage, as we might still say, devoid of all means of subsistence. We are devoid of faculties, and destitute of means or possessions. But a yet stronger difference lies in the fact

that destitute involves the non-possession of what is in some way necessary or *desirable* to possess; while devoid is more neutral, and may be used of the absence of faulty or culpable qualities.

"Devoid of pride certaine she was."

Chaucer.

"This faire lady on this wise destitute
Of all comfort and consolation."

Ibid.

DESTROY. See CONSUME and DEMOLISH.

DESTRUCTIVE. RUINOUS. PERNICIOUS.

We use the term DESTRUCTIVE (Lat. *destruere*) when we simply think of the tendency to effect permanent termination to what had form, life, beauty, power, and the like.

"Loaded with gold, he sent his darling far
From noise and tumults and destructive war."

Dryden.

We use the term RUINOUS (Lat. *ruina*, from *ruere*, to fall) when we think of the *value* of that which is so destroyed, for ruin is destruction visible. Ruined reputation, blighted hopes, and the like, are terms recalling the fairness of what is lost, and not the mere loss or destruction. A destructive agency simply takes away, and may be so far good if the thing that is destroyed be noxious; but ruinous implies the taking away in a sad and fatal way of what we should desire to live and last.

"Of all these expensive and uncertain projects, however, which bring bankruptcy upon the greater part of the people who engage in them, there is none perhaps more perfectly *ruinous* than the search after new silver and gold mines."—Smith, *Wealth of Nations*.

PERNICIOUS (Lat. *perniciēs*) is employed of what harms man's inner powers, as of life, health, morals, interfering, as the word etymologically implies, with the vital force of things (*per* and *necare*, to kill), and obstructive of wholesome energies, physical or moral.

"He who has vented a *pernicious* doctrine or published an ill book must know that his guilt and his life determine not together."—South.

DESULTORY. See CURSORY.

DETACH. See DISENGAGE.

DETAIN. See HOLD.

DETER. DISCOURAGE. DIS-
HEARTEN.

DETER (Lat. *detertere*) is to prevent from action by fear of consequences, or the difficulty, imprudence, or risk of the attempt. To DISCOURAGE (Fr. *courage*) is to prevent from action, or to lessen energy in action by such representations as affect the spirit of the person contemplating or making the attempt. Hence discourage admits of degrees, but deter is absolute. Circumstances, as well as the representations of individuals, may deter, discourage, or dishearten. Persons are discouraged in their undertakings, and deterred from them.

"So that, upon consideration of the whole matter, there is no reason why any man should be *deterred* from a holy and virtuous life for fear of the labour and pains of it. Because every one that is wicked takes more pains in another way and is more industrious, only to a worse purpose."—Tillotson.

"A slight perusal of the innumerable letters by which the wits of France have signalized their names, will prove that other nations need not be *discouraged* from the like attempts by the consciousness of inability."—Rambler.

DISHEARTEN is in English what discourage is as a word of French and Latin formation (*cœur*, *cor*, the heart); but discourage may apply to the case in which the action is intended only. Disheartened implies that it is actually undertaken. One is deterred from beginning; discouraged in beginning or in proceeding; disheartened in proceeding. Disheartened applies only to persons, discourage both to persons and their efforts.

"His astonished and *disheartened* colleagues."—Bancroft.

Deter and discourage denote generally the action of the judgment, dishearten an influence upon the spirits. One is deterred by formidable difficulty or opposition, discouraged by the representations of advisers, or a

calm estimate of the nature of the case; disheartened by anything that robs us of spirit, energy, or hope.

DETERMINE. *See* DECIDE.

DETERMINATION. *See* RESOLUTION.

DETEST. *See* ABHOR.

DETESTABLE. *See* EXECRABLE.

DETRACT. *See* DEROGATE.

DETRACTION. *See* CALUMNY.

DETRIMENT. *See* HURT and DISADVANTAGE.

DETRIMENTAL. *See* NOXIOUS.

DEVASTATION. *See* RAVAGE.

DEVELOP. UNFOLD. UNRAVEL.

To DEVELOP is to open out what was contained in another thing, or the thing itself (Fr. *développer*). In develop these *two* ideas are inherent, the gradual opening of the whole containing, and the gradual exhibition of the particular contained. So we might say, "Time developed his character," or "Circumstances developed the cruelty which was latent in his character." Unlike UNFOLD, develop is not used of purely physical processes. We speak of the development of plans, plots, ideas, the mind; and also of the development of one species from another, of the development of the body in growth; but these are scientific terms involving other ideas, as of the vital functions in growth. We should never speak of the development of a flag or a tablecloth. In other words, it is not used of manual or mechanical unfolding. On the other hand, in the sense of the mechanical process of gradually opening, unfold is used as well as in the other; but in this latter develop expresses far more than unfold, and relates to the laws of expansion by which a thing unfolds in definite sequence of expansion, and in conformity with principles which conserve the type developed. Hence we speak of a true and a vicious development. To UNRAVEL (Old Germ. *reffen*, to pluck) is purely a mechanical effort of separating what is

complicated, whether naturally or accidentally, and expresses simple disentanglement, not growth or expansion. As the former indicate ordinary processes of nature or art, so the latter indicates extraordinary and counteractive processes, and commonly implies the abnormal state of that which needs to be unravelled.

"Then take him to *develop* if you can,
And hew the block off and get out the man."
Pope.

"Several pieces of cloth, the largest we had seen being fifty yards long, which they unfolded and displayed so as to make the greatest show possible."—*Cook's Voyages.*

"What riddle's this? *Unfold* yourself, dear Robin."—*Ben Jonson.*

"That great chain of causes which, linking one to another, even to the throne of God Himself, can never be *unravelled* by any industry of ours."—*Burke.*

DEVIATE. *See* WANDER.

DEVICE. *See* EMBLEM.

DEVISE. *See* BEQUEATH and CONTRIVE.

DEVOID. *See* DESTITUTE.

DEVOTE. *See* CONSECRATE.

DEVOUT. PIOUS. RELIGIOUS. HOLY.

Of these the two former are applicable only to persons, the last in the general sense of connected with or relating to religion, to things, as religious edifices, meetings, books, &c., holy places, and the like. The DEVOUT man (Fr. *dévo*t) is he whose mind is given to religious feeling, and is apt in the exercise of prayer, divine praise, and spiritual meditation. The PIOUS man (Lat. *p*ius) has reverence and love toward the Supreme Being. As devout points to the external observances of religion, so *pious* points to its moral sentiments. RELIGIOUS is a wider term, and denotes one who, in a general sense, is under the influence of religion, and is opposed to irreligious or worldly, as the pious man is opposed to the impious or profane, and the devout to the indifferent or irreverent. HOLY (A. S. *halig*, with other forms), when used of persons,

is employed to denote men of especial saintliness or purity and integrity of life, the result of the continued influence of religion upon their nature.

"Thus we see the *devoutness* of His mind in His frequent retirement to solitary prayer, in His habitual giving of thanks, in His reference of the beauties and operations of nature to the bounty of Providence, in His earnest addresses to His Father, more particularly that short but solemn one before raising Lazarus from the dead, and in the deep piety of His behaviour in the garden on the last evening of His life."—*Paley*.

"Our whole duty is made up but of three things, that a man live soberly with respect to himself, righteously with respect to his neighbours, and *piously* with respect to God."—*Sharp*.

"The first requisite in religion is seriousness; no impression can be made without it. An orderly life so far as others are able to observe us is now and then produced by prudential motives or by dint of habit; but without seriousness there can be no *religious* principle at the bottom, no course of conduct from *religious* motives; in a word, there can be no religion."—*Paley*.

"Ye distant spires, ye antique towers
That crown the watery glade
Where grateful science still adores
Her Henry's *holy* shade." *Gray*.

DEXTERITY. ADDRESS. ADROITNESS.

These terms are employed in a physical and moral sense, that is, are applied analogously to moral things. ADDRESS (Fr. *adresse*) is more mental than physical in any case. It denotes skill practically applied, so as entirely to meet a certain end, especially one proposed on short notice. It is more comprehensive than DEXTERITY (Lat. *dexter*, the right hand) or ADROITNESS (Fr. *droit*, right or straight). Dexterity is that kind of cleverness which comes of being a perfect master by practice or experience of the means or instrument employed. Address may be shown in improving advantages; dexterity and adroitness, which is a sharp and sudden exhibition of dexterity, rather denote the skilful avoidance of danger, or escape from difficulty. Address is a species of

manners, that is, manners as specifically exhibited towards certain persons. Lounging, inattention, whistling in company indicate bad manners. Hesitation, shyness, stammering, a want of self-possession, or too much of it, show a bad address.

"Whatever good from clear understanding, deliberate advice, sagacious foresight, stable resolution, dexterous *address*, right intention, and orderly proceeding doth naturally result, wisdom confers."—*Barrow*.

"The *dexterity* of hand, indeed, even in common trades, cannot be acquired without much practice and experience."—*Smith*, *Wealth of Nations*.

"The stoic and the libertine, the sinner and the saint, are equally *adroit* in the application of the telescope and the quadrant."—*Horsley*.

DEXTEROUS. See ADROIT.

DIALECT. See LANGUAGE.

DIALOGUE. See CONVERSATION.

DICTATE. PRESCRIBE. SUGGEST.

To DICTATE (Lat. *dictare*, *dictatus*) is to issue a command in such a way as that it shall appear to be based upon the will of the commander; which deems nothing too minute to be the subject of such command, as when a powerful party, being offended, dictates the terms on which the apology shall be made. To dictate is more authoritative, arbitrary, and minute than PRESCRIBE (Lat. *prescribere*), and has to do with the words and terms and minutiae of things; while prescribe has to do rather with rules and general modes of dealing, as partaking less of the nature of command and more of direction or counsel. Prescribing is commonly the expression of superior wisdom, dictation of superior power only, or the assumption of it. SUGGEST is less authoritative than either, being a holding out of partial truth or the indirect exhibition of counsel or command, in faith that the object of it will himself supply what is practically needed to complete them. All three are used of internal as well as external promptings, as the dictates of nature, what is prescribed by reason and common sense, the sug-

gestions of prudence. Of the three, it may be said, that for their force, dictation depends on the power of the person dictating, prescription on the wisdom of the thing prescribed, and suggestion on the sense of the person to whom the suggestion is made.

"I hope God hath given to me to be master of my own passion, and endowed me with that reason that will *dictate* unto me what is for my own good and benefit."—*State Trials*.

"Prescribe not us our duties."

Shakespeare.

"Arthur, they say, is killed to-night,
On your *suggestion*." *Ibid.*

"Nothing certainly being so tyrannical as ignorance, where time and possession enable it to *prescribe*."—*South*.

DICTION. See PHRASEOLOGY.

DICTIONARY. VOCABULARY.
GLOSSARY. LEXICON. ENCYCLO-
PÆDIA.

DICTIONARY (Lat. *dictionarium*, a collection of words) is a list of words commonly arranged in alphabetical order, or which belong to a system, whether of language or any other, as a dictionary of botany, medicine, biography. It admits of every degree of copiousness in explanation of the terms from a line to an article. LEXICON is only the same word in Greek as *dictionarium* in Latin (λέξις, a word), and is applied to dictionaries of the learned languages of Latin, Greek, and Hebrew *especially*. A VOCABULARY (*vocabulum*, a vocable or word) is a list of terms, like dictionary, connected with some system, but not professing to be exhaustive, as a French vocabulary of words most commonly used in conversation. A GLOSSARY (Gr. γλῶσσα, a tongue) is an explanatory vocabulary, in which certain words are selected and arranged for consideration in detail. An ENCYCLOPÆDIA (ἐν κύκλῳ παιδεία) is literally instruction in the whole circle of the sciences, and therefore, unlike the preceding, is not restricted to any system or province, but embraces the whole sphere of human knowledge, and explains not merely

the meaning of words, but the branches of knowledge which they represent.

DIE. See DECAY and EXPIRE.

DIET. FOOD. REGIMEN.

As FOOD expresses generally anything on which a living animal *feeds*, so DIET (Gr. *diæta*) and REGIMEN (Lat. *regimen*, from *regere*, to rule) are employed only of human beings. Diet is ordinary and systematic food, whether prescribed for health's sake or in any other way. Black broth was part of the diet of the ancient Spartans. Regimen differs from diet, first in relating to quantity as well as quality of food prescribed, and secondly, in relating to other matters appertaining to the way of living, even to the abstinence from food or fasting.

"Their failure as remedies may be reasonably attributed to the alterations which the human frame is found to undergo in the revolution of ages by a general change of *dietetic regimen*."—*Knorr, Essays*.

DIFFERENCE. VARIETY. VARIATION. CONTRAST. DIVERSITY. DISTINCTION. CONTRARIETY. DIS-
AGREEMENT.

DIFFERENCE (Lat. *differentia*) denotes no more than the state of being unlike; and inasmuch as Nature never exactly repeats herself, the term is employed to denote the mere absence of identity, as, "It is a different person," which is equivalent to, "It is not the same person." The term different has to be distinguished from various on the one hand, and unlike on the other. Different shows the unlikeness as existing in general; various marks the dissimilarity of the species. We might say that things are infinitely various, but not infinitely different, for this latter word relates not to abstract but to specific unlikeness. The flowers of a rose-bush will be of various sizes and shades of colour, and, if the species be red, will be different from the white kinds. Different people think differently. Various is thus seen to be of less

intensity than different. On the other hand, different stands to unlike as the positive to the negative. Two things, in so far as they are merely two, may be different without being unlike. Between two things that are different we may still draw a comparison; but unlikeness tends to exclude comparison. Different belongs to the inherent nature of things, unlike to the effect which they produce upon us. Blue is different from green; a circle is unlike a square.

"Intellectual *differences* shall shortly cease, and then moral *differences* shall take place. One moment shall equal the learned and the unlearned. The knowing and ignorant person shall at last stand upon equal ground; but the good and bad men shall be differenced for ever."—*Bates*.

DISTINCTION (Lat. *distinguere, distinctus*) is sharply-defined or palpably-apparent difference. Such distinction may be natural, scientific, practical, or scientific and natural at the same time. "A binary constellation, which, under a telescope of low power, looks like a single star, under one of greater power, resolves itself into two *distinct* stars." This is a purely physical distinction. The distinction between contrary and contradictory propositions in logic is technical or scientific. The distinction between the animal and vegetable departments of nature is both scientific and natural. In the common phrase, "A distinction without a difference," the term is used in the sense of a mental or scientific distinction, which the phrase denotes as being sought to be made, while no corresponding difference exists in fact or nature. To murder all without distinction of sex or age, means without recognising these natural differences; the phrase without distinction being here equivalent to without making or observing a distinction. Distinction is applied to *delicate* variations, diversity to *glaring* differences, difference to *hostile* unlikeness.

"Men, women, maids without *distinction* fall."—*Shakespeare*.

As difference and distinction are absolute, so VARIETY, VARIATION,

and DIVERSITY are relative. They imply at least some common idea to which the objects are referred, if not some common nature to which they belong. Variety (Lat. *varius, varietas*) denotes difference of such a nature as strikes the observation in any aggregate of things, or in one thing as regards the aggregate or class to which it is referred, as a variety of objects in a landscape, a variety of the species. Variation expresses a process as variety a result, and therefore may mean a purposed inducing of variety as well as that which is without design. Variety can only be between two or more things or parts of the same thing; but variation may be of one entire thing. So we might say, "There is great variety of colour in this single flower," but we should mean in different parts of it. Or, again, the flower has undergone great variation from change of soil, that is, the whole of it. Diversity (Lat. *diversus*) is internal, essential, or natural difference. This may be between two only or many, while variety is of many. Yet diversity falls short of CONTRARIETY (*contra, contrarius*), which is repugnant diversity.

"And all *variety* or difference of existence must needs arise from some external cause, and be dependent upon it, and proportionable to the efficiency of that cause, whatsoever it be."—*Clarke*.

"The essences of things are conceived not capable of such *variation*."—*Locke*.

"They cannot be divided, but they will prove opposite, and not resting in a bare *diversity*, rise into a *contrariety*."—*South*.

CONTRAST (Fr. *contraste*) is strongly-marked opposition. This implies not necessarily similarity of nature in the things contrasted, but a capability at least of being viewed together, otherwise there would be no room for contrast. Any two or more things which in juxtaposition exhibit different properties, or excite different feelings or impressions in the mind, may form a contrast. DISAGREEMENT (dis and agree, see AGREE) is such contrariety as exists between things which ought to be at one, or between which an unity is sought to be es-

tablished. It is used not only of matters of the human will, but in the general sense of being unsuited or at variance, as the two narratives disagree.

"Contrasts and resemblances of the seasons."
—*Whewell*.

Contrast can only be employed of objects or subjects which have something in common in their nature or relations. There is no contrast between a man and a dog or a tree, but between a tall tree and a stunted shrub.

"The second act of the mind is putting together such single objects in order to our comparing of the agreement or *disagreement* between them, by which we make propositions, which we call judging."—*Wilkins*.

DIFFERENT. *See* DIVERS.

DIFFICULT. *See* ARDUOUS.

DIFFICULTY. OBSTACLE. IMPEDIMENT.

DIFFICULTIES (Lat. *difficilis*, *dis* and *facilis*, easy) are generally complicated, OBSTACLES (Lat. *obstare*, to stand in the way) and IMPEDIMENTS (*impedire*, to hinder) usually simple. Difficulties are not usually surmounted by vigour, energy, resolution, hardihood, and the like, but by patience, skill, and perseverance. The cutting of the Gordian knot was an escape from, not a solution of the difficulty. In marching through a foreign country the difficulties of the general lie in many incidental things, the badness of the roads, the nature of the climate, the disposition of the natives, the scarcity or remoteness of provisions. A precipitous valley suddenly yawning under the feet of the soldiers would be an obstacle, that is, a barrier, to their progress, to be surmounted as best it might. As an obstacle is always external, so impediment is commonly internal, and operates continually, having the effect of retarding progress, while an obstacle checks it altogether till it is removed. A river might be an obstacle, a heavy cloak an impediment to the traveller. In common parlance difficulties are met and solved, obstacles surmounted, impediments re-

moved. It is obvious that the same thing may be sometimes all three, according to the point of view from which it is regarded. The eloquence of Demosthenes was to Philip of Macedon a difficulty to be met with his best resources, an obstacle to his own ambition, and an impediment in his political career. Difficulties perplex, impediments embarrass, obstacles deter or retard.

"Was ever anything *difficult* or glorious achieved by a sudden cast of a thought, a flying stricture of the imagination?"—*South*.

"The want of this (a life conformable to the religion which we profess) hath been an *impediment* to the progress of Christianity, and a stumbling-block in the way of unbelievers."—*Jortin*.

"Because an *obstacle* by nature earthly and foul doth not receive the pure clearness of light."—*Raleigh*.

DIFFIDENCE. DISTRUST. MISTRUST. MISGIVING. SUSPICION.

Of these, the first, DIFFIDENCE (Lat. *diffidentia*, *dis*, and *fides*, faith, trust) is only used of ourselves. It is a distrust of our own powers, or a slowness to give ourselves credit for having any. It may be with or without sufficient grounds. DISTRUST is want of trust both as regards ourselves and others. It relates not only to the power but the will, and to schemes, efforts, and the like. MISTRUST relates not to the power but only the will, and hence can only be properly used of animate beings. To distrust is to *doubt the sufficiency*, *mistrust*, to *doubt the integrity*. If I send a messenger on a confidential errand, and then say I distrust him, I mean, or ought to mean, I distrust his powers, and fear that he will not carry out successfully what I have confided to him. If I say I mistrust him, I mean, I fear that he will intentionally play me false. To distrust is to feel *absence* of trust. To mistrust is to have a feeling of *wrong* trust. Distrust is more nearly related to diffidence, mistrust to suspicion. MISGIVING is entirely internal or reflective. It is the spontaneous suggestion of distrust, when the shadow of doubt is, as it were,

cast back upon a former conviction, resolution, or act. SUSPICION (Lat. *suspiciere*) relates to something external to ourselves, or, at least, something of which we have no direct cognisance. It is the tendency to believe without adequate proof in the existence of something which is, by usage, unfavourable, hurtful, or wrong. We do not suspect good.

"There were some essays made faintly, diffidently, and occasionally at first like those of men who, emerging out of darkness, were dazzled as well as enlightened."—*Bolingbroke*.

"It appears evidently that God's moving David, or Satan's provoking him, or his own distrustful heart tempting him, to number the people, are all phrases that have one and the same meaning."—*Clarke*.

"Next stood Mistrust, with frequent sigh,
Disordered look, and squinting eye,
While meagre Envy claimed a place,
And Jealousy, with jaundiced face,"
Cotton.

"No man should reckon every doubting or misgiving of his heart about the safety of his spiritual estate inconsistent with that confidence toward God which is here spoken of."—*South*.

"Suspicion may be excited by some kind of accusation not supported by evidence sufficient for conviction, but sufficient to trouble the repose of confidence."—*Cogan*.

DIFFIDENT. See BASHFUL and LOWLY.

DIFFUSE. DISCURSIVE. PROLIX. COPIOUS.

Of these, as epithets applied to styles of speaking or writing, DIFFUSE (Lat. *diffundere*, *diffusus*, to pour abroad) rather relates to the language, DISCURSIVE (*discurrere*, to run about) to the treatment of the subject, and PROLIX (*pro* and *laxus*, loose) to the effect of both in combination. A diffuse writer or speaker is not sparing of time or space. He employs sentences which might have been condensed into fewer words, and expands into imagery, illustration, and amplification of all sorts. Diffuseness is the extreme of which COPIOUSNESS (Lat. *copia*, plenty) is the mean, and may be the result either of wealth of thought or language, or simply of

the contrary, and an inability to compress. Discursive denotes the absence of unity, system, method, and sequence. It belongs to the mind, which does not estimate the relative bearings of different portions of the subject-matter upon the central point, and treats them in undigested series. Prolix denotes any sort of protraction of discourse which imparts the sense of weariness, and of superfluous minuteness or tedious length in the treatment of the subject.

"A sentiment which, expressed diffusely, will barely be admitted to be just, expressed concisely, will be admired as spirited."—*Blair*.

It is remarkable that the unfavourable sense of the term discursive is of recent growth. In the older English writers the word is employed as the adjective corresponding to discourse—the Latin *discursus*, reasoning—as in the following:—

"Rational and discursive methods are fit only to be made use of in philosophers, men of deep reason, and improved minds. The generality of mankind would be utterly insensible of their force."—*Atterbury*.

"But flie we now *prolixitie* best is."—*Chaucer*.

"The sense of the laws, I am sure, is on my side, which are by no means sparing of the orator's time. It is not brevity, but copiousness, a full representation of every circumstance, which they recommend."—*Melmoth*, *Pliny*.

DIGEST. See ABRIDGMENT.

DIGNITY. LOFTINESS. HAUGHTINESS.

DIGNITY (Lat. *dignitas*, *dignus*, worthy) is used in the different senses of excellence or importance, high station, and loftiness of demeanour. In this latter sense it is the honourable mean of which the others are vicious extremes. Dignity, in its best sense, is that elevation of soul without pride which shows itself in the manners and in demeanour toward others. It flows from a proper consciousness of what is due to oneself, combined with a recognition of the claims of others. LOFTINESS is such an air as seems to indicate a vague sense of personal

superiority, which, in ordinary persons, is pitiable and ridiculous, and graceful not even in the highest of rank. HAUGHTINESS (Fr. *haut*, high) is more offensive than loftiness, because it is the result of comparison of self with others, resulting in the persuasion that they ought to be treated as inferiors. Dignity, unlike the others, conveys the idea of grace of manner.

"Taller, indeed,

I may perceive than he, but with these eyes

Saw never yet such *dignity* and grace."

Cowper, Iliad.

It may be observed that loftiness is often used as a term of praise, when not applied to persons and demeanour, as in the following :—

"The *loftiness* of his fancy, the richness of his vein, and the elegance of his style."—*Barrow.*

"As many more can discover that a man is richer than that he is wiser than themselves, superiority of understanding is not so readily acknowledged as that of fortune; nor is that *haughtiness* which the consciousness of great abilities incites borne with the same submission as the tyranny of affluence."—*Johnson.*

DILATE. EXPAND. EXTEND.
ENLARGE. DISTEND.

To DILATE, to DISTEND, and to EXPAND differ from to EXTEND and to ENLARGE, in denoting an increase of bulk or space wrought on all sides, or, at least, on more than one; while the latter may be by increase only in one direction. Again, dilate (Lat. *dilatare*, *latus*, wide) and distend (Lat. *distendere*) only apply to hollow bodies or space inclosed within confines. Expand (Lat. *expandere*), Extend (Lat. *extendere*), and Enlarge (Fr. *large*, Lat. *largus*, wide) are applicable to superficial measure, and extend and enlarge also to number. A thing is dilated when the hollow of its centre is made wider. It is expanded when it is made to occupy more space. It is extended when its bulk or length is prolonged or increased in any one direction. It is enlarged when it is in any way, but especially by external addition, made larger. It is distended when it is dilated by the

elasticity of its parts. In dilating, expanding, and distending there is no addition of substance, which is the case in extending and enlarging.

"Here, by the by, we take notice of the wonderful *dilatability* or extensiveness of the throats and gullets of serpents. I myself have taken two entire adult mice out of the stomach of an adder whose neck was not bigger than my little finger."—*Ray.*

"Then with *expanded* wings he steers his flight,

Aloft incumbent on the dusky air

That felt unusual weight, till on dry land

He lights, if it were land that ever burned
With solid, as the lake with liquid fire."

Milton.

"The *extenders* of empire are admired and commended, howsoever they do it, although with cruel wars, or by any unjust means."—*Barrow.*

"He that is in such a condition as doth place him above contempt and below envy cannot by any *enlargement* of his fortune be made really more rich or more happy than he is."—*Wilkins.*

"It is not nature's abhorrency of a vacuum, but the *distension* of the water, that breaks glasses when the contained liquors come to be congealed."—*Boyle.*

DILATORY. PROCRASTINATING.

These words very closely resemble each other, and seem to express the same thing from different points of view. The PROCRASTINATING man (Lat. *pro*, and *cras*, to-morrow) is regarded in his habits as a man tending to postpone acting when he might or ought to have begun. The DILATORY man (Lat. *differre*, *dilatus*, to put off) is regarded in his acts, which he does tardily and after time, the result of previous procrastination. It may be observed, also, that procrastination refers to the whole of any act, while dilatoriness belongs to the details of it as well. In the execution of his work, the procrastinating man, when he has once begun, has ceased to procrastinate, but the dilatory man may be dilatory while he works. There are persons who are given to procrastination, but who are singularly undilatory when once they have begun to work.

"The king of Spain indeed delayed to comply with our proposals, and our armament

was made necessary by unsatisfactory answers and dilatory debates."—*Johnson*.

"The enemy of mankind hath furnished thee with an evasion. For that he may make smooth the way to perdition, he will tell the *procrastinator* that the thief upon the cross was heard by our Saviour at the last hour."—*Junius*.

Men only are procrastinating; both men and measures may be dilatory.

DILIGENT. ACTIVE. ASSIDUOUS. INDUSTRIOUS. LABORIOUS. SEDULOUS.

The DILIGENT man (Fr. *diligent*) is he who gives sustained attention to any matter which admits of perseverance and interest. This may be a matter of habit with things in general, or with some one occupation in particular, or it may be occasional without being habitual. It denotes a specific pursuit. In this respect it differs from INDUSTRIOUS (Lat. *industrius*), which denotes a nature which loves work for its own sake. Diligence signifies the attention we pay to any particular object out of preference to others. Industry is the habit of laying up for ourselves a store, whether of knowledge or worldly goods. Diligence often produces industry, which may be employed on many various objects. The man who gleans information from many different sources is industrious; he who studies a particular subject with attention is diligent. Hence the quality of diligence is not attributed to the inferior animals, while the bee and the ant are termed industrious. The ACTIVE man (Fr. *actif*) loves employment, and is uneasy when he has nothing to do. He has not necessarily the specific aim of the diligent, or the love of grave study or hard work which belongs to the industrious, but his constitution recoils from indolence or long repose. LABORIOUS is employed both of the agent and the work, and is a stronger form of industrious (Lat. *labor*) as applied to persons. The laborious man does not grudge hard effort where needed, especially in compensating for his own deficiencies. ASSIDUOUS (Lat. *assiduus*, *assidere*, to

sit to) and SEDULOUS (from the same root) both express steady and persevering attention to an occupation or pursuit; but sedulous denotes that it is natural or habitual, assiduous only denotes the fact, which may be casual without implying a habit. The assiduous person is constantly attentive, the sedulous constantly busy.

"Diligence and accuracy are the only merits which an historical writer may ascribe to himself, if any merit indeed can be assumed from the performance of an indispensable duty."—*Gibbon*.

"The soul, being an active nature, is always propending to the exercising of one faculty or other."—*Glanvill*.

"A scholar is industrious who doth assiduously bend his mind to study for getting knowledge."—*Barrow*.

"Whence labour or pain is commonly reckoned an ingredient of industry, and laboriousness is a name signifying it."—*Ibid*.

"Be sedulous to discharge thy trust. Be zealous for souls, and careless of money."—*Bishop Taylor*.

DIM. See DARK.

DIMINISH. See ABATE.

DIMINUTIVE. See LITTLE.

DIRECT. CONDUCT. REGULATE.

To DIRECT (Lat. *dirigere*, *directus*), as applied to the administration of affairs, is more authoritative than CONDUCT (Lat. *conducere*, *conductus*), while conduct is more active or operative. We direct by ordering others in the way to a certain end, as to direct the movements of an army. We conduct by actually taking a practical part, as to conduct an important or lucrative business. REGULATE (Lat. *regula*, a rule) stands midway between, with less of the command of direct, and less of the activity of conduct, as to regulate the proceedings of a public meeting.

"And, to prevent all dangers and all disorder, there should always be two of the scholars with them, as witnesses and directors of their actions."—*Cowley*.

"If the Jews under his conduct should endeavour to recover their liberties, and fail

in it, they knew that the nation would be severely punished by the Romans."—*Jortin*.

"Knowledge without its *regulator*, temperance."—*Warburton*.

DIRECT. RIGHT. STRAIGHT.

RIGHT (*rectus*) and **STRAIGHT** (Lat. *strictus*), as employed of lines or lines of movement, differ as the technical from the natural. A right line is a line mathematically straight. **DIRECT** has more than a physical meaning, and denotes that which goes to the point intended with as much straight-forwardness as possible. In this sense we speak of a direct answer to a question. A direct road to a town is one which conducts to it at once without leading elsewhere; this it may do without being straight, or represented by a right line upon paper. Straight has the purely physical meaning of not crooked, and may be employed of physical objects, as a straight stick, a mode in which neither right nor direct can be employed.

DIRECTION. ADDRESS.

Of these the former more strictly relates to things and places, the latter to persons; the **DIRECTION** of a letter is the place to which it is to be sent. The **ADDRESS** includes the person to whom it is to be sent.

DIRECTION. ORDER.

The former conveys more prominently the idea of instruction, the latter that of authority. A master may give **DIRECTIONS** to his servant, or a friend may give directions to another how he is to proceed in certain cases, as, for instance, how he is to find a certain locality in a large town; but **ORDER** is always authoritative.

DIRECTLY. IMMEDIATELY. INSTANTLY. INSTANTANEOUSLY.

DIRECTLY refers more especially to the actions of men, **IMMEDIATELY** (Lat. *in*, not, and *medium*, a middle or interval) to the course of time. **INSTANTLY** (Lat. *instans*, *instare*, instant) is formed to express an interval so small as to be inappreciable. **INSTANTANEOUSLY** is the same as in-

stantly, but with the specific reference to the interval between the cause and its effect. "I desired him to go, and he went directly." Immediately has a negative, instantly a positive force. I went immediately, would mean that I allowed nothing to intervene between the present moment and my going. It commonly follows something to which it refers, as to a sort of date or starting-point. Instantly commonly relates to the actions of intelligent agents, instantaneously to physical causation as appreciated by the senses, as "The explosion was instantaneous;" "Instantly upon seeing the accident I ran to the spot."

DISABILITY. INABILITY. DISQUALIFICATION.

DISABILITY (Fr. *habile*, Eng. able, Lat. *habilis*, from *habere*, to have) is privative; **INABILITY** is negative. Disability expresses the absence of power or fitness, physical, moral, intellectual, or social, in a subject capable of it. Inability expresses its absence in a subject incapable of it. In this way inability is irremediable, disability may be sometimes removed by giving, or giving back, the qualifications. **DISQUALIFICATION** (Lat. *dis*, *qualis*, such as, *facere*, to make) differs from disability in being more general, while disability is commonly used of specific social privileges.

"For they will be freed from that terrene concretion and remains of the carnal part bringing on the inconveniences, *disabilities*, pains, and mental disorders spoken of in the last section."—*Search*.

"It is not from *inability* to discover what they ought to do that men err in practice."—*Blair*.

"We often pretend, and sometimes really wish, to sympathise with the joys of others when by that disagreeable sentiment (envy) we are *disqualified* from doing so."—*Smith*, *Moral Sentiments*.

DISADVANTAGE. DETRIMENT.

The former relates to the possible, the latter to the actual. A **DISADVANTAGE** (see **ADVANTAGE**) is that which hinders from the amount of good which otherwise might have been attained. A **DETRIMENT** (Lat.

deterere, to rub away) diminishes the amount of good actually existing. Disadvantage commonly refers to the actions and well-being of intelligent agents, detriment to anything of the nature of a valuable possession, or which ought to be preserved in integrity.

"Besides, it plainly proveth the properness of their parts and tallness of their industry who thereby, and by God's blessing thereon, reached so high preferment, though *disadvantaged* by standing on so low ground of their extraction."—*Fuller*.

"Though every man hath a property in his goods, yet he must not use them in *detriment* of the commonwealth."—*State Trials, Hampden*.

DISAFFECTION. DISLOYALTY.

The former is a wider term than the latter. It denotes, generally, alienation or want of goodwill. DISLOYALTY (Fr. *loi*, law) does not necessarily imply disaffection, as in England, to a monarchical head, or form of government, but may be to any superior, and especially to the form of government under which one lives. All disloyalty is, of course, disaffection; but all disaffection is not disloyalty. If the disaffection be against an usurped government, it may spring from loyal attachment to that which is the rightful form.

"Cordelia at length arrives; an opiate is administered to the king to calm the agonies and agitations of his mind, and a most interesting interview ensues between this daughter that was so unjustly suspected of *disaffection* and the rash and mistaken father."—*Adventurer*.

"The devil and his ministers, wicked seedsmen, sowed in you darnel and cockle, treason and *disloyalty*. They have made you forget your duty to your natural prince and country."—*State Trials*.

DISAGREEMENT. *See* DISSENT.

DISAPPEAR. *See* VANISH.

DISAPPOINT. BALK. (*See* BAFFLE.)

These terms both imply the depriving another of something which he had anticipated; but DISAPPOINT (Fr. *désappointer*, Lat. *dis ad punctum*, to prevent from coming to the point) refers commonly to what is hoped,

desired, or expected, BALK (Old Eng. *balk*, meaning a beam, or piece of unploughed land, where the cultivation comes suddenly to a stop) to what is planned or devised. Hence balk is hardly used but of such things as are done on purpose, while disappoint is employed of any untoward influence. The farmer is disappointed by heavy rains in harvest time. The term balk is commonly used of the stopping of discreditable rather than of honourable designs.

"By the inward overpowering influences of His Spirit a man's desires shall become cold and dead to those things which before were so extremely apt to captivate and command them, than which there cannot be a greater *balk* to the tempter, nor a more effectual defeat to all his temptations."—*South*.

"Cut off even in the blossom of my sin,
Unhousled, *disappointed*, unaneled."

Shakespeare.

DISAPPROBATION. DISAPPROVAL.

Although these words have the same root—*approbare*, to approve—they are employed in a different way. DISAPPROBATION is the feeling, DISAPPROVAL is the expression of it. Hence disapproval is the more public and formal. To disapprove is therefore sometimes used in the sense of formally refusing a sanction, or annulling, in consequence of the feeling of disapprobation. As "The acts of the provincial governor were disapproved by the government at home;" or, "His acts met with the disapprobation of the senate."

"Now the chief gentlemen of all countries travelled to him to tender their service, which implied a *disapprobation* at least, if not a contempt of the two houses' carriage towards him."—*Clarendon*.

"I *disapprove* alike
The host whose assiduity extreme
Distresses, and whose negligence offends."
Cowper's Homer.

DISAPPROVAL. *See* DISAPPROBATION.

DISASTER. *See* CALAMITY.

DISAVOW. DENY. DISOWN.
REPUDIATE. DISCLAIM.

To DISAVOW (Fr. *désavouer*) is to

refuse to acknowledge in a strong manner, with some solemnity, and in general terms.

"A solemn promise made and *disavowed*."
—*Dryden's Virgil*.

TO DENY (Fr. *denier*, Lat. *denegare*) is to contradict specifically. A disavowal is commonly volunteered; a denial follows upon a specific imputation. We disavow facts or charges in which we are said to be personally implicated. We deny assertions and requests of others as well. Denial has the broadest possible application, being employed of anything which in any sense might be *affirmed*.

"And thus to rack the sacred writings, to force them, whether they will or no, to bring evidence to our opinions, is an affront to our authority which is next to the *denying* on't."
—*Glanvill*.

TO DISOWN is, as the term implies, to disavow or deny, as connected with oneself personally, to refuse to acknowledge personal interest, authorship, or relationship generally.

"But when you say it is impossible for you upon the sudden and without the advice of counsel to own or *disown* books, you seem very dark to me. I cannot dive into your meaning."
—*State Trials*.

REPUDIATE (Lat. *repudiare*, *re* and *pudere*, to be ashamed) is to force away from oneself what some other person or some external power would connect with us, either as a gift, claims, or responsibility. The term was of old employed in the technical sense of divorce, but with a difference, as follows:—

"There is this difference between a divorce and a *repudiation*, that a divorce is made by a mutual consent occasioned by a mutual antipathy, while a *repudiation* is made by the will and for the advantage of one of the two parties, independently of the will and advantage of the other."
—*Montesquieu*.

TO DISCLAIM is the opposite of claim (Lat. *clamare*, to call), to waive, as a claim, to deny ownership or responsibility, right, merit, or pretension.

"To tell you the truth, my dear sir, I think the honour of our nation to be somewhat concerned in the *disclaimer* of the proceedings of this society of the Old Jewry and the London Tavern."
—*Burke*.

DISBELIEF. UNBELIEF. INCRE-
DULITY. INFIDELITY.

DISBELIEF and UNBELIEF (Sax. *lefan*, *lyfan*, to allow or permit) are thus differenced: unbelief is negative, disbelief is positive. One may have unbelief from want of knowledge, but disbelief rejects as false. Unbelief is the absence, disbelief the refusal of credit.

"There have been doubtless in all ages such as have *disbelieved* the existence of anything but what was sensible."
—*Cudworth*.

"For the mind doth by every degree of affected *unbelief* contract more and more of a general indisposition towards believing."
—*Atterbury*.

INCREDULITY (Lat. *in*, not, and *credulus*, from *credere*, to believe) and INFIDELITY (*in*, not, and *fides*, faith) are used, the former to signify absence of belief where it is *possible*, the latter absence of belief where belief is *right*. Incredulity may be, therefore, right where it denotes a rightful reluctance of assent to what ought not to be easily believed, or not believed at all. Infidelity is by the force of the term wrong. It has the further sense of a breach of faith in matters not of belief, but practice—where those matters depend upon contract or promise.

"There is nothing so wild and extravagant to which men may not expose themselves by such a kind of nice and scrupulous *incredulity*."
—*Wilkins*.

"The uncertainty of princes, the caprices of fortune, the corruption of ministers, the violence of factions, the unsteadiness of counsels, and the *infidelity* of friends."
—*Sir W. Temple*.

DISCARD. DISMISS. DISCHARGE.

Of these, DISCHARGE (*dis* and Fr. *charge*, charge) has applications in which it is not synonymous with the other two, as of a load or cargo, an office, or duty, an obligation, in the sense not of disregarding, but performing it, to discharge substance, matter, fluid, or missile. It is here taken of removal from personal connection with oneself. TO DISCARD (*dis* and *carta*, a card) is, literally, to throw out of the hand as useless. It has,

therefore, the force of rejection of the person or thing so disposed of as useless or of comparatively little value; while discharge is capable both of an honourable and dishonourable sense. DISMISS (*dis* and *mittere*, to send) is simply to send away or get rid of, and takes its colouring from the character of the dismissal. A servant may be dismissed for bad conduct, an untenable charge dismissed by a magistrate, an officer, arraigned before a court-martial, dismissed without any stain upon his character, or, on the other hand, dismissed the service. It has, when applied to things of the mind, a meaning closely resembling discard, that is, to abandon as worthless or insignificant; as, you may dismiss that idea as fictitious, that fear as groundless, that hope as vain. In this sense, however, discard is used of habits, as to discard the follies and vices of youth, where we should not use dismiss. As applied to persons, dismiss has less than discharge the idea of inferiority in the person sent away; and, on the other hand, it has more of the force of *peremptory* sending away. A king might dismiss his refractory ministers; but he would not be said to discharge any but his menial servants.

"A man *discards* the follies of boyhood."
—*I. Taylor*.

"Before he came in sight the crafty god
His wings *dismissed*, but still retained his
rod."
Dryden's Ovid.

"Death is the *discharger* of all griefs and miseries."—*Sir T. Elyot*.

The last quotation illustrates the wide meaning of discharge. It is, in short, to relieve of a charge or burden, which may be of many kinds, as of a trust, an obligation, servitude, a criminal accusation, a responsibility, and the like.

DISCERN. See DESCRY.

DISCERNMENT. PENETRATION.
DISCRIMINATION. JUDGMENT. DISCRETION.

All these terms relate to the practical intellect. DISCERNMENT is combined keenness and accuracy of mental vision. It sees character,

deeds, actions, in their differences, their peculiar motives, their true nature. It is first penetrative, then discriminative. The discerning man is not easily misled, because he is not imposed upon by appearances, nor takes one thing for another.

"Syrena is for ever in extremes,
And with a vengeance she commends or blames.
Conscious of her *discernment* which is good,
She strains too much to make it understood."
Young.

PENETRATION (Lat. *penetrare*) is the power of seeing deeply into things, and is that faculty, which, when habitually exercised upon different objects, constitutes discernment; for discernment is general, penetration is in detail; and, while discernment is commonly spoken of character, penetration is used of specific acts, thoughts, intentions, or motives. As the man of discernment does not confound, so the man of penetration does not overlook, nor is easily misled.

"The drawing of Sir Thomas More at Kensington has a freedom, a boldness of thought, and acuteness of *penetration* that attest the sincerity of the resemblance."—*Walpole*.

DISCRIMINATION (Lat. *discrimen*, a difference) is a more directly practical term. It is discernment in minute particulars, and of such a kind as leads to the acting upon the differences observed. Discernment shows a man the nature of the end to be aimed at; discrimination will guide him in his selection of the means to attain it.

"The sculptors of the last age, from not attending sufficiently to this *discrimination* of the different styles of painting, have been led into many errors."—*Sir J. Reynolds*.

JUDGMENT (Fr. *jugement*, *juger*, to judge) is the faculty of deciding in practical matters with wisdom, truly, skilfully, or accurately. It has to do not so much with actualities, like discernment and penetration, but with possibilities. It is the faculty of weighing the issues of things, and of deciding aright in reference to them; and is that in the general of which prudence is the personal application. The twofold idea of judg-

ment, as expressing first a faculty of the mind, and, secondly, the good use of that faculty to practical purposes, may be realized by collating the two following passages from Stewart and Locke respectively :—

“For wit, lying most in the assemblage of ideas and putting those together with quickness and variety, wherever can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy; *judgment*, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side, in separating ideas one from another wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by similitude and by affinity to take one thing for another.”—*Locke*.

“When we give our assent to a mathematical axiom, or when after perusing the demonstration of a theorem we assent to the conclusion; or in general when we pronounce concerning the truth or falsity of any proposition, or the probability or improbability of any event, the power by which we are enabled to perceive what is true or false, probable or improbable, is called by logicians the faculty of *judgment*.”—*Stewart*.

DISCRETION (Lat. *discernere*, *discretus*) is, etymologically, another form of discernment. It is *cautious* discernment, and has for its result the avoidance of such errors as come from want of self-control or want of judgment. It is discernment referred back to the standard of propriety in matters of self-control.

“The second thing that naturally shows itself in paucity of words is *discretion*, and particularly that prime and eminent part of it that consists in a care of offending.”—*South*.

DISCHARGE. See **DISCARD** and **FULFIL**.

DISCIPLE. See **ADHERENT**.

DISCIPLINE. See **CHASTEN**.

DISCLAIM. See **DISAVOW**.

DISCLOSE. **DIVULGE.** **REVEAL.**

DISCOVER. **UNCOVER.** **TELL.**

DISCLOSE (*dis* and *claudere*, *clausus*) is to expose to view or knowledge anything which before was secret, hidden, or concealed. **DIVULGE** (*dis* and *vulgus*, the common people) is to communicate what had been before kept or confided as a secret, or known

to but one or a few. **REVEAL** (*revelare*, *re*, back, and *velum*, a veil) is to make known after having been unknown or concealed. It differs from disclose, as applying only to matters of knowledge, while disclose is applicable to physical objects of sight. The matter revealed is supposed to be of value or interest to him to whom it is revealed. It may be to one or a few, while divulge is to many. **DISCOVER** (*dis cooperire*) is employed of such manifestations as are not the result of specific design, the knowledge of which, therefore, was not antecedently in the possession of the discoverer. It is a sudden, unexpected bringing before the eyes, not of others, but one's own. **UNCOVER** is at present hardly ever used, except in the sense of removing a material substance which served as a covering, as to uncover the head in token of respect. When a mental or moral thing, as an opinion or feeling, is so exhibited, the term discover is used in the peculiar sense of manifesting without design, as “at an early age the youth discovered a taste for sculpture.” **TELL** (A. S. *telian*, *tellan*) denotes an intention to give information in successive detail, and expresses such only as is communicated by words, except when used metaphorically. To tell is to declare things purposely, with a design to inform the listener. Disclosure may be accidental. To reveal is to make known what is concealed by withdrawing what covered it. To divulge often follows upon revealing, being a spreading abroad of the knowledge of what is revealed. The term reveal conveys a favourable, as divulge an unfavourable, impression. We reveal under a sense of duty or for the benefit of another; we divulge to his injury in betrayal of a trust.

“When stormy winds disclose the dark profound.”—*Pope's Homer*.

“Secrets which perhaps the confidence of a friend has made known to the treacherous divulger of them.”—*Knox, Essays*.

“The doctrines thus delivered we call the revealed or Divine law, and they are to be found only in the Holy Scriptures.”—*Blackstone*.

"It is idle to say that a future state had been *discovered* already. It had been *discovered* as the Copernican system was; it was one guess among many. He alone *discovers* who proves."—*Paley*.

"None of the Eastern people use the compliment of *uncovering* their heads when they meet, as we do."—*Dampier*.

"Who can tell how oft he offendeth?"—*English Psalms*.

DISCOMPOSE. *See* BAFFLE.

DISCONCERT. *See* BAFFLE.

DISCONTINUE. *See* CEASE.

DISCORD. *See* STRIFE.

DISCOURAGE. *See* DETER.

DISCOURSE. *See* CONVERSATION.

DISCOVER. *See* DISCLOSE.

DISCREDIT. DISHONOUR. DIS-GRACE.

These words, which are the negations of certain opposites, are best understood by the opposites which they negative. DISCREDIT interferes with a man's credit or respectability. DISGRACE marks him as a conspicuous object of another's disapproval. DISHONOUR is the treatment with positive disrespect. A man may, therefore, discredit or disgrace himself, but he can only be dishonoured by others. This may be deserved or not, as a foolish young king may dishonour a venerable minister. He who falls in social estimation incurs discredit; he who loses favour of society or a personal superior is disgraced. He who is treated as unworthy in the sight of others is dishonoured.

"I think good to deliver it (learning) from the *discredits* and disgraces which it hath received, all from ignorance, but ignorance severally disguised, appearing sometimes in the zeal and jealousy of divines, sometimes in the severity and arrogancy of politicians, and sometimes in the errors and imperfections of learned men themselves."—*Bacon*.

"No vow the god, no hecatomb unpaid,
But the *dishonour* of his priest resents,
Whom Agamemnon menaced, and refused
His daughters freedom at the richest price."
Cowper's Homer.

"Till the proud king and the Achaian race
Shall heap with honours him they now
disgrace." *Pope's Homer*.

DISCRETION. *See* DISCERNMENT.

DISCRIMINATION. *See* DISCERNMENT.

DISCUSS. *See* DEBATE.

DISDAIN. *See* SCORN.

DISDAINFUL. SCORNFUL. CONTEMPTUOUS.

DISDAINFUL (exhibiting disdain, Fr. *dédain*, Lat. *dis* and *dignus*, worthy) denotes that kind of look or manner—for it is commonly confined to demeanour, and not to pure thought or judgment—which is the result of a depreciation or disregard of what is due to others, and a vague habit of regarding others as beneath oneself.

"Let not ambition mock their useful toil,
Their homely joys and destiny obscure;
Nor grandeur hear with a *disdainful* smile
The short and simple annals of the poor."
Gray.

SCORNFUL (*see* SCORN) is an energetic form of this, and a positive expression of the ill-desert or utter meanness of others; while disdainful expresses little more than the habitual sense of one's own superiority.

"All but themselves they looked on with a very *scornful* piety, and thought that God hated them because they did."—*Stillingsfleet*.

"This posture signifying a proud, *contemptuous* behaviour, whilst the Publican stood crouching humbly, tremblingly behind."—*Hammond*.

CONTEMPTUOUS (Lat. *contemnere*, *contemptus*) is more elaborately disdainful, and refers to words or actions; while disdainful hardly goes beyond the look, and is far less direct. A disdainful expression, air, smile; a scornful look; a contemptuous epithet or remark or behaviour towards another.

DISEASE. SICKNESS. MALADY. COMPLAINT. AILMENT. DISORDER. DISTEMPER.

DISEASE (dis and ease, Fr. *aise*) is the most strictly technical of these

terms, being applied in medical science to such morbid conditions of the body, or of parts of it, as admit of diagnostics, and is commonly of prolonged duration. It is specific, local, and organic, as a disease of the heart or the skin.

"Though all afflictions are evils in themselves, yet they are good for us because they discover to us our *disease* and tend to our cure."—*Tillotson*.

SICKNESS (A. S. *syc*, Old Eng. *seke*) is an unscientific term, to denote the deranged condition of the constitution generally, without specifying its character.

"Sorrow, need, *sickness*, or any other adversity."—*English Liturgy*.

A **MALADY** (*maladie*) is a lingering and deep-seated disorder, which debilitates without immediately jeopardizing the vital functions. Both sickness and malady are general; while disease is specific.

"O, wist a man how many *maladies*
Folwen of excess and of glotonies,
He wolde ben the more mesurable
Of his diete, sitting at his table."

Chaucer.

COMPLAINT (literally, that of which one complains) is commonly applied to the less violent though continuous kinds of disorder. Complaint is not in this sense a term of Old English literature, but bears the sense of an expression of pain or trouble. **DISORDER** (Fr. *désordre*) is a disturbance of the functions of the animal economy, and differs thus from disease, which is organic.

"The following lines upon delirious dreams may appear very extravagant to a reader who never experienced the *disorders* which sickness causes in the brain."—*Thompson on Sickness*.

AILMENT is the lightest form of complaint, and expresses its slight and passing character.

"For little *ailments* oft attend the fair."
Lansdowne, Cure for the Vapours.

DISTEMPER (dis and temper, in the sense of combination or proportion) is a morbid state of the animal system. It is used of the human race commonly in the sense of mental

ailment, and in its physical meaning purely is spoken of the lower animals. In a secondary sense, we speak of a diseased mind, a disordered intellect or imagination, mental maladies. Though the human subject is not said to labour under such and such a particular distemper, there is an abstract and general sense in which it is so applicable, as in the following:—

"Peradventure it will be replied, that there are many sinners who escape all these calamities, and neither labour under any shame or disrepute, any inquietness of condition, or more than ordinary *distemper* of body, but pass their days with as great a portion of honour, ease, and health as any other man whatsoever."—*South*.

DISEMBODIED. See **IMMATERIAL**.

DISENGAGE. DISENTANGLE. EXTRICATE. DETACH.

DISENGAGE (prefix *dis* and *engage*, Fr. *engager*) is the simple opposite to engage, and, therefore, relates to one detaining or engrossing force or influence at a time. **DISENTANGLE** (prefix *dis* and entangle, allied to the Gothic *tagl*, hair) is to release from a condition of being *intricately* involved. Disentangle differs from disengage in applying both to subject and object. We may disentangle the difficulty as well as the person involved in it. **EXTRICATE** (*ex* and Lat. *trica*, meshes, impediments) is to liberate from complicated detention or conditions of difficulty, and relates to persons, and not things, except in a few scientific terms, as the extrication of heat or moisture. **DETACH** (Fr. *détacher*) relates to such simple connections as unite one thing to another, or to several others. We may be disengaged from an oath or an occupation; disentangled from pecuniary difficulties, or embarrassing claims and connections; extricated from imminent peril, where it comes from multiplied difficulties of escape; and detached from a party to which we have hitherto adhered. It is in the purely physical sense that detach is commonly employed, as to detach a seal from the chain to which it was suspended.

"We should also beforehand *disengage* our mind from other things, that we may the more effectually attend to the new object which we wish to remember."—*Beattie*.

"In the *disentanglement* of this distressful tale (the 'Nut-browne Mayde') we are happy to find that all his cruelty was tenderness, and his inconstancy the most invariable truth; his levity an ingenious artifice, and his perversity the friendly disguise of the firmest affection."—*Warton*.

"His treasures were now exhausted, his subjects were highly irritated, the ministry were all frightened, being exposed to the anger and justice of the Parliament, so that he had brought himself into great distress, but had not the dexterity to *extricate* himself from it."—*Burnet*.

"They are, in short, instruments in the hands of our Maker to improve our minds, to rectify our failings, to *detach* us from the present scene, to fix our affections on things above."—*Porteus*.

DISENTANGLE. See *DISENGAGE*.

DISFIGURE. See *DEFORM*.

DISGRACE. See *ABASE* and *DISCREDIT*.

DISGUISE. *DISSEMBLE*.

DISGUISE (prefix *dis* and *Fr. guise*, manner, fashion) is to hide by a counterfeit appearance, or in any manner to cloak by what is fitted to mislead. *DISSEMBLE* (*dis* and *simulare*, to simulate) has much the same meaning; but the terms are a little differently employed. Disguise relates rather to the false or altered condition of the subject of the disguise; dissemble to the false impression produced upon other persons. Disguise is general, dissimulation specific. We may disguise negatively by preventing another from knowing what is in us; but we dissemble when we lead him to believe that we have something which we have not. An enemy may disguise his hatred of another by an air of indifference. He dissembles when he assumes an air of friendship. Disguise is a matter of appearance, dissimulation a matter of action. A prince might disguise himself as a beggar; but unless he held such communications with others as to practically deceive them, he would not be dissembling.

"When we are touched with some important ill,
How vainly silence would our grief conceal.
Sorrow nor joy can be *disguised* by arts,
Our foreheads blab the secrets of our hearts."—*Dryden, Juvenal*.

"With him, *Dissemblance* went, his paramour,
Whose painted face might hardly be detected;
Arms of offence he sold' or never wore,
Lest thence his close designs might be suspected;
But clasping close his foe, so loth to part,
He steals his dagger with false-smiling art,
And sheathes the traitorous steel in his own master's heart."—*Fletcher, Purple Island*.

DISGUST. DISLIKE. AVERSION.
DISTASTE. DISINCLINATION.

These terms not only differ in point of force, but are differently applied. *DISLIKE* (prefix *dis* and *like*) is to have a feeling of positive and usually permanent avoidance, though not necessarily strong in degree. We have a dislike to what is simply unpleasant to us from an inherent uncongeniality with our feelings or sentiments.

"To show any *dislike* to those who were the favourites of that infamous emperor (Domitian), was construed by him into an act of treason against himself."—*Melmoth, Pliny*.

DISGUST (*dis* and *gustus*, taste) is said primarily of what is offensive to the organs of taste; then analogously of anything repugnant to the moral taste or higher sensibilities of our nature. *DISTASTE*, though verbally equivalent to disgust, is far less strong. It expresses natural uncongeniality, which is often gradually superinduced by the alienating force of habit. Disgust is the strongest but most transient, being excited by something suddenly presented to the experience or observation.

"The king (Henry VIII.) loved to raise mean persons, and upon the least *distaste* to throw them down."—*Burnet*.

"For day by day themselves,
My parents, urge my nuptials, and my son
(Of age to note it) with *disgust* observes
His wealth consumed." *Corper, Homer.*

AVERSION (Fr. *averse*, Lat. *ad*, and *vertere*, to turn) denotes a fixed internal dislike or distaste, and is stronger than either, almost amounting to hatred. Aversion is founded less on feeling, and more on sentiment and judgment. The just and humane man has an aversion to committing, no less than witnessing, an act of cruelty. It is a stronger and more definable form of disinclination.

"Strictly speaking, *aversion* is no other than a modification of desire—a desire of being liberated from whatever appears to be injurious to well-being."—*Cogan.*

We are disgusted with occasional exhibitions, as with acts of cruelty. If disgust is not physical, it results from the actions of men. Dislike is felt of persons and things, which is also the case with aversion; while distaste is not often applied to persons, but most commonly to what is habitually associated with ourselves, as employments, pursuits, modes of life. **DISINCLINATION** (dis and incline) is an indisposition or dislike to the adoption of an act, a course of conduct, a policy, or mode of life, and may either be constitutional or the result of circumstances and considerations. It refers, unlike the rest, as much to our own will as to circumstances external to us.

"Whenever they found any person of quality inclined to the king, or but *disinclined* to them, they immediately seized upon his person, and sent him in great triumph to the Parliament, who committed him to prison with all circumstances of cruelty and inhumanity."—*Clarendon.*

DISHEARTEN. See **DETER.**

DISHONOUR. See **ABASE** and **DISCREDIT.**

DISHONEST. See **KNAVISH.**

DISINCLINATION. See **DISGUST.**

DISJOIN. See **SEPARATE.**

DISLIKE. See **DISGUST** and **HATE.**

DISLOYALTY. See **DISAFFECTION.**

DISMAL. **DULL.** **DREARY.**

DISMAL (supposed to be from *dies malus*, evil day) has at least a meaning in conformity with this. A dismal object not only produces an unenlivening, but a kind of foreboding effect. It carries on the mind to think of other matters over which that which is dismal casts a shade, being depressing to the feelings, and inducing gloom in the mind.

"I trow it was in the *dismall*."

Chaucer.

"An ugly fiend more foul than *dismal* day."

Spenser.

"A *dismal* description of our English November."—*Southey.*

DULL (A. S. *dol*) is simply not sharp, bright, or quick; hence furnishing little delight, or, subjectively, not feeling it, and is not so strong as dismal. In its secondary application dismal is commonly positive; dull may be little more than negative. A dismal description is one that impresses the mind with the sadness of actual occurrences; a dull description is no more than heavy and uninteresting. Dull, as an epithet of character, expresses such torpor of soul as is inconsistent with mental activity, and implies an innate deficiency of moral sensibility or mental power.

"In eldest time ere mortals writ or read,
Ere Pallas issued from the Thunderer's head,

Dulness o'er all possessed her ancient right,
Daughter of Chaos and Eternal Night.

Fate in their dotage this fair idiot gave,
Gross as her sire, and as her mother grave,
Laborious, heavy, busy, bold, and blind,
She ruled, in native anarchy, the mind."

Pope.

DREARY (A. S. *dreorig*, bloody, sorrowful, from *dreor*, blood) conveys the idea of tedious, monotonous, long-drawn-out dullness. It belongs to an extent of time or space unrelieved by glad some interval and change, as a dreary time, a dreary journey, a dreary waste of country.

"His heart was *drear*, his hope was crossed,
'Twas late, 'twas far—the path was lost
That reached the neighbour town."

Parnell.

DISMAY. DAUNT. APPAL.

DISMAY (connected with *magan*, to be able, like our English word may), true to its derivation, denotes the inspiring of a fear which interferes with action, destroying the spirit of energy and enterprise; as the traveller may be dismayed by what he hears of the perils incident to a particular route. It involves a state of gloomy apprehension. DAUNT (Lat. *domitare*, to tame) is stronger than dismay, commonly implying not only the feeling of terror, but the abandonment of the undertaking in consequence of the sudden manifestation of the difficult or dangerous. APPAL (Fr. *appalir*, to make pale) expresses a temporary check produced by the action of sudden fear strong enough to overwhelm the faculties. He who is dismayed suffers great mental perturbation. He who is daunted abandons his enterprise. He who is appalled is unable to act.

"So flies a herd of beeves, that hears, *dismayed*,
The lions roaring through the midnight shade."
Pope.

"No fear could *daunt*, nor earth nor hell control."
Ibid.

"Smiling ferocious, with impatient haste
Striding, and brandishing his massy spear,
Him (Ajax) viewed the Greeks exulting,
with *appal*
The Trojans, and with palpitating heart
Even Hector."
Couper, Iliad.

DISMISS. See DISCARD.

DISORDER. See DERANGE, CONFUSION, and DISEASE.

DISOWN. See DISAVOW.

DISPARAGE. See DECRY.

DISPARITY. INEQUALITY.

Of these, DISPARITY (Lat. *dispar*, unmatched) is a species of INEQUALITY (in, not, and *æqualis*, equal). Inequality is general or absolute; disparity is relative and specific. Disparity is inequality in reference to a common standard, while inequality does not of necessity imply this.

There is an inequality of age between an old man and a youth, but no disparity. But let some common measure be introduced, as, for instance, the running a race, and there would be, in reference to their common state or undertaking, a disparity. Thus inequality involves, as it were, two terms, disparity three.

"Notwithstanding which *inequality* of number, it was unanimously resolved, in a council of war, to fight the Dutch fleet."
Ludlow.

"But the *disparity* of years and strength
Between you and your son duly considered,
We would not so expose you."

Massinger.

DISPASSIONATE. UNIMPASSIONED.

The term DISPASSIONATE relates to the mind and the judgment, as not being warped, prejudiced, or in any way swerved or carried away by passion or feeling (Lat. *passio*, from *pati*, *passus*, to suffer). UNIMPASSIONED relates to the manner, gesture, voice, or speech, as not affected by or exhibiting strong feeling. A calm and dispassionate view of a personal question is needful to a right judgment upon it. An unimpassioned style of speaking in an orator can only be compensated for by great felicity of diction and closeness of reasoning.

"Whereas reason requires a calm and *dispassionate* situation of the mind to form her judgments aright, she wants the whole attention to look round upon every circumstance, and places her objects in all the lights wherein they are capable of standing."
Search.

"The day that by their consent the seat of regicide has its place among the thrones of Europe, there is no longer a motive for zeal in their favour. It will at best be cold, *unimpassioned*, dejected, melancholy duty."
Burke.

DISPATCH. See HASTE.

DISPEL. DISPERSE. (See SCATTER.)

DISPEL (Lat. *dispellere*) is to separate in such a way as to cause to vanish, or to drive away, at the same time. It denotes some point from which the objects dispelled are thrust away. Accordingly, things dispelled commonly cease to be visible, or to

exist. DISPERSE, on the other hand, means no more than to scatter abroad. By the providence of God the Jews, dispelled from their own land, are now dispersed among the nations. Dispel commonly relates to the involuntary, as to dispel illusions from the mind; disperse may be purely voluntary, in the sense of to scatter systematically, as in a garden flowers of a certain colour may be dispersed or interspersed, or religious tracts are dispersed among the poor. Dispel is, therefore, more intensive than disperse, or may be said to express what is expressed by disperse and something more. Dispel and disperse both imply many objects, for the cloud can only be dispelled by separation into fragments.

"And when the king of lightnings, Jove,
dispels

From some huge eminence a gloomy
cloud,

The groves, the mountain-tops, the head-
land heights,

Shine all illumined from the boundless
heaven." *Cooper, Iliad.*

"As when two lions in the still dark night
A herd of bees *disperse*, or numerous
flock,

Suddenly in the absence of their guard,
So fled the heartless Greeks."

Ibid.

DISPENSE. DISTRIBUTE.

Of these, the former (Lat. *dispensare*, freq. of *dispendere*) bears no reference to any rule of number or quantity, which is the case with the latter (*distribuere*), implying that in a certain number of shares the whole of a certain thing was given away. A number of *different* things would not be DISTRIBUTED. So we might read, "Every morning at the castle gate to all the poor of the neighbourhood who might present themselves for the purpose, bread, with other provisions and money, were dispensed;" but if a certain quantity of one article were given to a certain number of persons, we might read, "Bread to the amount of a hundred loaves was distributed among the persons present." The uppermost idea in DISPENSE is varied and liberal giving; that of distribute numerous

and apportioned giving. Nature is said to dispense, but not to distribute her bounties. A dispensary issues its medicines, but in no equalized portions among any set number.

"In every benefaction between man and man, man is only the *dispenser*, but God the benefactor."—*South.*

"He will pass sentence on the evil angels; He will raise up the dead, and will *distribute* rewards and punishments to all proportionably to their behaviour in the days of their mortality."—*Jortin.*

DISPERSE. *See* DISPEL.

DISPLAY. *See* SHOW.

DISPLEASE. *See* OFFEND.

DISPLEASURE. DISSATISFACTION
(*See* DISAPPROBATION). ANNOY-
ANCE.

DISPLEASURE (prefix *dis* and *pleasure*, Fr. *plaisir*) is a modified anger produced invariably by the actions or conduct of men, and not by any other cause, as opposing desire or command. It is commonly applied to superiors in position, as a father is displeased with his son, a master with his servant. DISSATISFACTION (Lat. *dis* and *satisfacere*, to satisfy) may spring from any source of disappointed wishes or expectations. We may be even dissatisfied with ourselves. Displeasure commonly implies too much done, dissatisfaction too little. To ANNOY (Lat. *in* and *odium*, hatred) is to inflict sustained personal vexation and irritation by influences reiterated.

"My youth's first hope, my manhood's treasure,

My prattling innocent, attend,

Nor fear rebuke, nor sour *displeasure*;

A father's loveliest name is friend."

Cooper.

"To be deprived of some good which by a proper conduct might have been secured and obtained, if it be attended with *dissatisfaction* or regret, is certainly a punishment, and if it always lasts, an eternal punishment."—*Jortin.*

"Common nuisances are such inconvenient and troublesome offences as *annoy* the whole community in general, and not merely some particular person."—*Blackstone.*

DISPOSE. *See* ORDER and ADJUST.

DISPOSITION. CHARACTER. TEMPER.

The DISPOSITION (Lat. *disponere*, to dispose) is the prevailing spirit of mind, resulting from constitution. It is the aptitude or tendency of character. CHARACTER (Gr. *χαρακτήρ*, an impress) is used in a variety of senses (*see* CHARACTER). As a synonym with disposition, it is the whole moral character, of which the disposition is a manifestation. Character is often used in the sense of the social estimate formed of a man, his reputation for good or ill. TEMPER (Fr. *tempérer*) commonly denotes the disposition or constitution of the mind in regard to the passions and affections, or the more purely emotional part of our nature. Both disposition and character are permanent. Temper is variable, unless we use the term in the sense of temperament or composition—according to the old supposition that the human individual was composed of an admixture of humours, and that his peculiar conformation lay in the predominance of one or more of these humours.

"There is not, there cannot be a stronger proof that pride was not designed for man than that the most excellent of the human race thought it not a proper *temper* and *disposition* of mind for Him to appear in."—*Farce, Sermons.*

"Remember with what mild
And gracious *temper* he both heard and
judged." *Milton.*

"A man of dull intellect and thoroughly subservient character."—*Motley.*

DISPROVE. *See* CONFUTE.

DISPUTE. *See* CONTROVERT, DEBATE, and QUARREL.

DISREGARD. *See* NEGLECT.

DISQUALIFICATION. *See* DISABILITY.

DISQUALIFY. *See* DEBAR.

DISSATISFACTION. *See* DISPLEASURE.

DISSEMBLE. *See* DISGUISE.

DISSEMINATE. *See* PROPAGATE.

DISSSENT. DISAGREEMENT. VARIANCE. DIFFERENCE.

As relating to the conflict of opinions these words have their distinctions. DIFFERENCE (Lat. *differre*) is the simplest, and admits of degrees from the smallest to the widest variation. DISSSENT (Lat. *dissentire*, to feel differently), unlike the rest, is employed only of persons, and not of their opinions. It commonly denotes the expression of non-agreement, without of necessity implying any opinion of one's own. I express dissent when I simply refuse to adopt something propounded by another; but a difference of opinion would imply that I held a distinct opinion of my own. DISAGREEMENT (*dés-agréer*) and VARIANCE (Lat. *variare*, *varius*) also imply the same thing, and commonly denote a difference on some practical, and not merely an abstract matter of opinion. Persons are said to disagree who might be expected to act together, and to be at variance where they might be expected to exhibit harmony; they are said to differ simply as a matter of fact. Disagreement, variance, and difference may be used generally of interrelated numbers of persons or opinions; dissent expresses the specific disagreement between a person or set of persons on the one hand, and an opinion or body of opinions on the other.

"He (St. Cyprian) disavoweth the practice of one bishop excluding another from communion for *dissent* in opinion about disputable points."—*Barrow.*

"United thus, we will hereafter use
Mutual concession, and the gods, induced
By our accord, shall *disagree* no more."
Couper, Iliad.

"Because that King Lucius was dead, and had left no issue to succeed him, the Britons, as before ye have heard, were at *variance* amongst themselves."—*Holinshed.*

"What was the *difference*?
It was a contention in public."
Shakespeare.

DISSERTATION. *See* ESSAY.

DISSIMULATE. *See* FEIGN.

DISSIMULATION. *See* DISGUISE.

DISSIPATE. *See* WASTE.

DISSOLUTE. LICENTIOUS. (*See* ABANDONED.)

There is much in common between these two terms. Yet the LICENTIOUS man (Lat. *licentia*, *licere*, to be allowed) is not necessarily DISSOLUTE (*dissolutus*, from *dissolvere*, to let loose), as one may take much licence of self-indulgence in one way without that universal laxity and reckless indifference to all self-restraint which is implied in the term dissolute. Licentious points rather to the indulgence of self-will or vicious pleasures, dissolute to the wanton disregard of everything that stands in the way of, or might restrain sensual enjoyment.

"Abstain from wanton and dissolute laughter."—*Bishop Taylor*.

As dissolute relates invariably to sensual indulgence, so licentious has the further meaning of exhibiting an abuse of freedom, or an excessive liberty, as in the following:

"Courtiers, my lord, are too polite to reprove one another; the only place where they can meet with any just reproof is a free though not a *licentious* stage."—*Chesterfield*.

DISTANT. FAR. REMOTE.

Of these the Saxon monosyllable FAR (*feor*, *feorr*, *fior*, *fyr*) is the simplest, denoting separation by a wide space of separation in any direction. Far is employed physically and metaphorically.

"If, therefore, there be any who, under colour of the blessed name of Christ, subvert His doctrine, annihilate His authority and our salvation, it is so far from being our duty to unite ourselves to them, that, on the contrary, we are obliged to part with them."—*Duillé, Apology for the Reformed Churches*.

DISTANT (Lat. *distare*, to be apart) is a more refined term, and is employed in scientific phraseology, as "The sun is ninety-five millions of miles distant from the earth." It is also used of difference in matters of conception, as a distant relation, a distant period of history. It may be observed that, grammatically, the part of a complete adjective can only be

performed by distant, not by far, which only occurs as the predicate of a subject. The star is far, or far off; a distant star—but not a far star. This adjectival force is attempted in a few cases only, as the far side of the river. As an adverb far is often employed in connection with distant—far distant. Thus far implies some amount of distance; while distance might be great or small, according to the following definition:

"This space, considered barely in length between any two beings, without considering anything else between them, is called *distance*."—*Locke*.

REMOTE (Lat. *remonere*, *remotus*) is distant in reference to a specific starting-point, standard, presence, or purpose. As distant is opposed to near, so remote is opposed to immediate; as, "The accident was the remote, not the immediate cause of his death." Things are remote not only physically, but as regards our need or use of them, or the relation they bear to us, or the impression they produce on us; as a remote notion, connection, cause, resemblance, effect. Thus remote superadds to distant another idea, that of the effect caused by such distance on the condition of the distant subject. A distant spot is simply one that is far off; a remote spot is solitary, inconvenient, difficult to reach, not likely to be well known, and the like.

"Whenever the mind places itself by any thought either amongst or *remote* from all bodies."—*Locke*.

DISTASTE. *See* DISGUST.

DISTEMPER. *See* DISEASE.

DISTEND. *See* DILATE.

DISTINCTION. *See* DIFFERENCE.

DISTINGUISH. DISCRIMINATE.

In the sense in which distinguish is a synonym with discriminate, it is used additionally in regard to physical objects, while discriminate is only used of moral things. We DISTINGUISH (Lat. *distinguere*) by the eye or the mental perception; we DISCRIMINATE (*discrimen*, a difference) by the judgment alone. We

distinguish broadly; we discriminate nicely. We distinguish best when we show *great* differences; we discriminate best when we show *slight* differences, or dissimilarities in detail under a general resemblance. The object of distinguishing is commonly practical, that of discriminating speculative. We distinguish in order to separate or keep things apart which might otherwise be confounded. We discriminate with the further view of showing wherein their differences consist. Hence discrimination must always be nice, particular, and exact, dissecting, as it were, the things discriminated. Distinction may be exact or not, minute or rough, broad or nice.

"He was in logic a great critic,
Profoundly skilled in analytic;
He could *distinguish* and divide
A hair twixt south and south-west side."
Hudibras.

"On the other side, there be a sort of men that place the greatest stress, and *discriminating* point of Christian religion, in opposing and decrying all instituted ceremonies, though innocent, decent, and without any the least touch of superstition in them."—*Hale.*

DISTINGUISHED. *See* EMINENT.

DISTORT. *See* TWIST.

DISTRACTED. *See* ABSENT.

DISTRESS. *See* AFFLICTION.

DISTRIBUTE. *See* DISPENSE.

DISTRICT. TRACT. REGION.
QUARTER.

DISTRICT (Lat. *distringere*, *districtus*) was originally a portion of country over which the lord of the manor had the right to distrain goods. It is so far true to its etymology that it now means a portion of land as included in some kind of administration, as a civil, municipal, ecclesiastical district.

"Even the decrees of general councils bind not but as they are accepted by the several churches in their respective *districts* and dioceses."—*Bishop Taylor.*

A TRACT (Lat. *trahere*, *tractus*) is literally something drawn out and extended. It commonly denotes such a space of country as can be taken in

by the eye, or such as is distinguished by some natural characteristic, as a tract of marsh land, or forest. It is used with perfect accuracy in the following:

"A high mountain joined to the mainland by a narrow *tract* of earth."—*Addison.*

REGION (Lat. *regio*) is a term of wider extent, and denotes a large tract lying about some specific centre or vicinity.

"If thence he scape into whatever land,
Or unknown *region*."
Milton.

QUARTER (Fr. *quartier*, Lat. *quartus*, *quatuor*, four), though not meaning necessarily a fourth part, or a part coincident with the quarter of the compass, carries with it, nevertheless, something of both these elements, and means a district in a particular direction as regards the whole of which it forms a part, but vague as to the *exact* direction or the *exact* extent. It is a term often manifesting either looseness of information, or an avowed generality and disregard of precision in specifying locality.

DISTRUST. *See* DIFFIDENCE.

DISTURBANCE. *See* CONFUSION.

DIVE. PLUNGE.

To DIVE (A. S. *dyfan*, *düfan*) is purposely to penetrate beneath the surface of water, and therefore may be done after the diver has entered it. PLUNGE (Fr. *plonger*) is to throw oneself into a body of water; hence we may plunge without diving, and dive (as ducks) without plunging. In the metaphorical application of these terms, this distinction is preserved. We dive into mysteries, curiosities, and the like; we plunge into debt, difficulties, embarrassments, danger. It is the effort of penetration which is expressed by diving, the hardihood or recklessness of action by plunging.

"*Divers* in the deep of Providence."

Montague.

"As he (Callius) had no great stock of argument, and but small forecast, anything at a *plunge* would be received which came to his relief."—*Warburton.*

DIVERS. DIFFERENT. SEVERAL.
SUNDRY. VARIOUS.

Of all these terms, DIFFERENT is the most indefinite. It is equally applicable to few and to many; and, inasmuch as its primary force is to designate *quality*, it is applicable to any number, even to as few as two; as "they are not the same, but two different persons, or things." SEVERAL (Old Fr. *several*, from *severer*, *severer*, to sever, Low Lat. *separalis*, from *separare*, to separate or sever) indicates more than two, but not very many, the exact number being unknown or not taken account of. SUNDRY (connected with *sunder*, to sever) is very like it, but indicates disconnectedness as well as plurality. If I say there were several persons present, I refer only to number; if I say, sundry persons were present, or persons of sundry professions, I draw attention to an absence of internal relation, or to diversity of character. DIVERS and VARIOUS are more strong still, indicating a diversity and variety of kind over and above plurality. Sundry implies, primarily, separation, which *may* be without of necessity implying an internal difference of nature, as, "at sundry times;" *divers* does imply this, as, "in divers manners." Various applies to time and to character, as "various dresses," "various periods," "various colours." There seems a very slight difference between divers (which is the French *divers*, diverse, though, by confusion, used in English as a plural) and various; but divers rather refers to a marked diversity of character or nature, various to such differences as the eye takes cognizance of, or as strike the observation without so strong a distinction between them. So we might say, "diverscolours," and, "various shades of the same colour."

"To Sisera a prey of *divers* colours, a prey of *divers* colours of needlework, of *divers* colours of needlework on both sides, meet for the necks of them that take the spoil."—*Bible*.

"Black and white, and every other colour, is caused by *different* motions made upon the eye by objects *differently* modified."—*Cudworth*.

"Like kings, we lose the conquests gained before,
By vain ambition still to make them more;
Each might his *several* province well command,
Would all but stoop to what they understand."
Pope.

"Here I had ended; but experience finds
That *sundry* women are of *sundry* minds;
With *various* crotchets filled, and hard to please,
They therefore must be caught by *various* ways."
Dryden, *Ovid*.

It deserves to be noted that there is a sense of various, namely, exhibiting variety of state or appearance, in which the term is applicable to a single object, as in the following:

"The principle (of religion) lies in a narrow compass, but the activity and energy of it is diffusive and *various*."—*Bishop Hall*.

DIVERSION. See AMUSEMENT.

DIVERSITY. See DIFFERENCE.

DIVERT. See DIVERSION.

DIVIDE. See SEPARATE.

DIVINE. See HEAVENLY and GUESS.

DIVISION. See DIVIDE and PART.

DIURNAL. See DAILY.

DIVULGE. See DISCLOSE.

DOCILE. TRACTABLE. AMEN-
ABLE.

DOCILE (literally, easy to teach, Lat. *docilis*, *docere*, to teach) implies more than TRACTABLE (*tractabilis*, *tractare*, to handle). Tractable denotes no more than the absence of refractoriness, docile the actual quality of meekness. A tractable animal may go in the right path when led; a docile animal is *easily* led; or, again, he may be made tractable by severe training, but if naturally docile he will not require this. AMENABLE (Fr. *amener*, to lead) is commonly used of human beings who are *willing* to be guided by persuasion, entreaty, and reason, without requiring coercion. It must be admitted that this is a modern and conversational use of the term. The older application appears in the ex-

ample. As docile means easy to teach, it is only by analogy that it can be applied to irrational animals. But the analogy is the more easy by reason of the fact that intellectual aptitude, as in the Old English word *docible*, so far as it ever belonged to the term, has entirely departed from it. The elephant is at once docible and docile.

"The Persians are not wholly void of martial spirit, and if they are not naturally brave, they are at least extremely *docile*, and might, with proper discipline, be made excellent soldiers."—*Sir W. Jones*.

"Indeed, the common men, I presume, were not less *tractable* for want of spirituous liquors."—*Anson's Voyages*.

"The sovereign of this country is not *amenable* to any form of trial known to the laws."—*Junius*.

The docile is easily taught or led, the tractable easily managed, the amenable easily governed and persuaded.

DOCTRINE. DOGMA. TENET.
PRINCIPLE.

DOCTRINE (Lat. *doctrina*, *docere*, to teach) means any speculative truth recommended by a teacher or a school of thinkers, whether in religion, science, or philosophy.

"It is by an evident abuse and perversion of Mr. Locke's *doctrine* that Dr. Reid pretends that it is favourable to Bishop Berkeley's notion of there being no material world, when in reality our author's own principles are much more favourable to that notion than Mr. Locke's."—*Priestley*.

DOGMA (Gr. *δοκῆν*, to seem) is at present employed of such doctrine as is put forth authoritatively under a rigid definition, and especially in theology.

"Diodorus Siculus affirms the Chaldeans likewise to have asserted this *dogma* of the world's eternity. The Chaldeans affirm the nature of the world to be that it was neither generated from the beginning, nor will ever admit corruption."—*Cudworth*.

TENET (Lat. *tenere*, to hold) is a matter of philosophy or religion which, as resting on its own intrinsic merits, is firmly held as true. The term expresses doctrine in its peculiarity and distinctiveness. There

is a milder force in *tenet* than in *doctrine*, which is graver and more important, and in *dogma*, which is more energetic and authoritative.

"In recommending the doctrine which this book particularly enforces, I know that I am justified by the Holy Scriptures, by the Church, by the *tenets* of the most learned and virtuous of the dissenters, and the greatest divines of this country, who have displayed their abilities either by the press or the pulpit."—*Knox, Christian Philosophy*.

A PRINCIPLE is a central or representative truth in philosophy, science, art, religion, or morals, which is fundamental and general, and out of which other matters of a speculative or practical character flow, and become its practical illustrations (Fr. *principe*, Lat. *principium*).

"He who fixes upon false *principles* treads upon infirm ground, and so sinks; and he who fails in his deductions from right *principles* stumbles upon firm ground, and so falls."—*South*.

DOGMA. See DOCTRINE.

DOLEFUL. RUEFUL. PITEOUS.
WOEFUL.

DOLEFUL (Old Fr. *dol*, New Fr. *deuil*) is exciting or expressing sadness, and is applicable to anything which has that effect, as a doleful sight or sound. RUEFUL (A. S. *hreowan*, to rue or lament) is at present more commonly used in the sense of expressing misery in the countenance. PITEOUS is expressing sorrow or misery in such a way as to excite pity. WOEFUL means not so much exciting or expressing woe or misery as accompanied by it. In the phrase, a woeful visage, it bears the former meaning, but in the phrase, a woeful day or woeful time, it signifies the latter, in which sense it is not accompanied by rueful. A doleful countenance, sound, sight, story. A rueful visage. A piteous tale, sight, cry. A woeful narrative or event.

"How *dolefully* this *dole* thou dost rehearse."
Spenser.

"*Ruefully* dismayed."
Dryden.

In Old English literature piteous had

almost universally the sense only of feeling, not exciting, pity, in which it is still sometimes employed, as in Thomson:—

“Him, *pitous* of his youth, and the short space

He has enjoyed the vital light of heaven,
Soft disengage, and back into the stream
The speckled captive throw.”

Though Spenser has—

“That *pitous* strained voice.”

DOMESTIC. SERVANT. MENIAL.

The first is one species of the second. **MENIAL** (Norm. Fr. *meynal*, and Old Fr. *mesnée*, a household) is one who performs inferior offices of service, which the term, however, does not define. A **DOMESTIC** (Lat. *domus*) is a servant actually employed in the house. A **SERVANT** (Fr. *servir*, Lat. *servire*, *serviens*) is a paid attendant of any kind. A farm servant or a gardener is not, strictly speaking, a domestic.

“A *servant* dwells remote from all knowledge of his lord's purposes; he lives as a kind of foreigner under the same roof, a *domestic*, and yet a stranger too.”—*South*.

“The women servants perform only the most *menial* offices.”—*Swift*.

DOMICILE. See **HABITATION**.

DOMINION. See **AUTHORITY**, **EMPIRE**, and **TERRITORY**.

DONATION. See **BENEFACTION**.

DOOM. See **DESTINY**.

DOUBLE-DEALING. See **DUPPLICITY**.

DOUBT. **HESITATION**.

DOUBT (Lat. *dubius*, *duo*, two) relates both to matters of belief and to matters of conduct, **HESITATION** (Lat. *hesitare*, from *hære*, to stick) only to matters of conduct. We doubt about entertaining opinions; we sometimes hesitate to express them. We doubt for want of scientific evidence. We hesitate for want of practical knowledge. We doubt through ignorance. We hesitate through fear, caution, misgiving. Doubt is uncertain about principles, hesitation about consequences.

“Modest *doubt* is called
The beacon of the wise.”

Shakespeare.

“But in an age of darkness he (Gregory VII.) had not all the knowledge that was requisite to regulate his zeal; and taking false appearances for solid truths, he, without *hesitation*, deduced from them the most dangerous consequences.”—*Jortin*.

DOUBTFUL. **DUBIOUS.** **UNCERTAIN.**

DOUBTFUL (see **DOUBT**) is used in all the senses of entertaining doubt, exhibiting doubt, admitting of doubt, characterized by doubt; but **dubious** is never used in the abstract, but only in the concrete. So we might say, “It is doubtful whether such is really the case.” We could not say, “It is dubious.” We speak of doubtful facts of history, not of dubious facts, except in the sense of facts about which persons are dubious; but we might say, “The most eminent historians are dubious as to the fact.” **UNCERTAIN** (prefix *un* and *certus*, certain) differs from doubtful and dubious, as not necessarily implying any tendency to discredit, but simply expressing lack of knowledge sufficient to decide; hence it may be used of matters of which the motive cause lies in ourselves, while doubt refers to matters beyond our control. “I doubt that it is so,” would mean, “I am inclined to think it is or may not be so.” “I am uncertain,” would mean only, “I am not sure whether it is so or not.” “Do you purpose to leave town to-morrow?” “I am uncertain.” Not, “I doubt.” “Doubt,” says Taylor, “has not studied, uncertainty has not judged. Doubt is the hesitation of ignorance, uncertainty of irresolution. Doubt is open to inquiry, uncertainty to conviction.” And so it may be said that doubtful expresses a positive, uncertain a negative state of mind. As uncertainty is opposed to conviction, so doubt is opposed to belief. We are in doubt how to act; we are uncertain whether we will act or not. Of the two, doubtful and dubious, doubtful is the more objective, dubious the more subjective. The former denotes what in its nature is inadequately

evidenced, the latter what tends to make *us* doubt. When Milton speaks of "dubious light," he means such as makes those halt who walk in it.

"The wisdom of a law-maker consisteth not only in a platform of justice, but in the application thereof, taking into consideration by what means laws may be made certain, and what are the causes and remedies of the doubtfulness and uncertainty of law."—*Bacon*.

"She (Minerva) speaks with the *dubiousness* of a man, not the certainty of a goddess."—*Pope*.

DOZE. See SLEEP.

DRAG. See DRAW.

DRAIN. EXHAUST.

TO DRAIN (A. S. *drehnigean*, from *dræhen*, *drén*, drop, tear) is to draw off so as to leave empty or dry. EXHAUST (Lat. *exhaustire*, *exhaustus*) is much the same; but there is a slight difference in their application. Drain is used in a physical and analogous sense, as to drain a field, or a country of its resources; but exhaust is used also in a more purely metaphysical way of abstract things, as to exhaust efforts, speculation, conjecture, strength, patience. To exhaust also points more strongly to an original limitation of the supply, and its subsequent coming to an end. Hence drain commonly refers to some involuntary expenditure, while exhaust may refer to what has all along been spent *purposely*. As, "The country was drained of its resources by a protracted and expensive war." "I brought with me twenty pounds from home, but I have exhausted my supply." The terms are used together in the following:

"He himself, through terror, permitted those of Rome to *exhaust* and *drain* the wealth of England."—*Camden*.

DRAW. PULL. DRAG. HAWL.
TUG. PLUCK.

TO DRAW (A. S. *dragan*, connected with the Lat. *trahere*) is to cause to move by force employed in the direction of oneself or in the line of one's own movements. It varies in degree from drawing a heavy load or a tight cork to a hair trigger. But,

light or heavy, it is commonly implied that some kind of aptitude or provision exists for drawing. In this respect, draw differs from DRAG, which implies a natural inaptitude for drawing, or positive resistance, as a heavy box without wheels, or a captive struggling with his captor. To PULL (A. S. *pullian*) is applied to such cases of drawing as do not admit of continuous draught, or indefinite change of place, but where the draught is checked and limited, as to pull a bell, a door, or the oar of a boat. HAWL, haul, or *hale* (Fr. *haler*) is to pull or draw with force and sustained effort, so as to transport from one place to another. TUG (A. S. *teóhan*, *teón*, to pull) is to pull with great effort, as in a boat to pull *with* the stream, and to tug *against* it. PLUCK (A. S. *pluccian*) is to pull with sudden force or effort, commonly resulting, but not necessarily, in the detaching of the thing plucked from that to which it was united, as feathers, fruits, flowers.

DREAD. See AWE.

DREADFUL. FEARFUL. FRIGHTFUL. TERRIBLE. TREMENDOUS. TERRIFIC. HORRIBLE. HORRID. FORMIDABLE. AWFUL.

DREADFUL (A. S. *dræd*), like awful, has lost its original sense of *feeling dread*, or *awe* (see AWE), and means now only *inspiring dread*; but dread is not exactly the same as fear, and so dreadful may mean inspiring a mixed feeling of fear and reverence, or of the dangerous and the sublime, as a dreadful thunderstorm. FEARFUL would denote no more than a sense of personal danger. Dreadful seems to convey more than fearful; for fearful is rather that which inspires fear by its impression upon the senses, dreadful by what we know or suspect as belonging to its nature or powers. So we may speak of "dreadful accounts of a foreign war," but not "fearful accounts." On the other hand, the news of a large army attacking our own country would be a fearful report.

"For this reason (that man may repent) it is that He hath annexed so many *dreadful*

threatenings against the breakers of His law, and so many gracious promises to them that keep it."—*Beveridge*.

FRIGHTFUL (A. S. *fyrhtu*, fear) is said of anything which causes vivid alarm by sudden impression upon the senses in sight or sound, but especially the former.

"One cannot conceive so *frightful* a state of a nation. A maritime country without a marine and without commerce, a continental country without a frontier, and for a thousand miles surrounded by powerful, warlike, and ambitious neighbours."—*Burke*.

TERRIBLE (Lat. *terribilis*, *terrere*, to frighten) denotes what is to be dreaded for its effects upon us, though there may be in it nothing frightful. Death by accident is a frightful thing to witness; but there are many to whom death, in its calmest aspects and happiest circumstances, is still terrible.

"How shall they be able to abide His presence at that day when the gloriousness and majesty and *terribleness* of His appearance will infinitely exceed all that the tongue of man can express or the heart of man conceive?"—*South*.

Terrible is a far graver word than frightful. The former never lends itself to a light meaning. Whereas frightful is sometimes employed in the sense of exciting a fantastic fear by ugliness of aspect.

TREMENDOUS (Lat. *tremendus*, to be dreaded, *tremere*, to tremble) denotes rather what is fitted by its nature or appearance to inspire a kind of fear, without implying that we ourselves have any cause to fear it, as "a tremendous cataract," "a tremendous wind," "a tremendous noise," "a tremendous size."

"If anything could raise his passion, it was the nonsensical discourses of deists and Christian infidels; and he thought he might be justly angry with such wretches that, like the giants of old, durst make war upon *tremendous* Omnipotence."—*Glouceville*.

TERRIFIC (Lat. *terrere* and *facere*, to make) is only a more learned or rhetorical form of terrible, used as a term of greater dignity.

"The serpent, subtlest beast of all the field, Of huge extent sometimes, with brazen eyes,
Terrific." *Milton*.

HORRIBLE and **HORRID** (Lat. *horere* to dread) differ as the possible from the actual: "a horrible supposition," "a horrible alternative," "horrid scenes," "horrid deeds;" but horrible is often used in the latter sense. The idea of horror is a recoiling of the whole nature, such as makes the countenance rigid, or expresses itself in the look or posture. The horrible is more in the imagination, the horrid in experience and observation.

"Swift in her walk, more swift her winged haste,
A monstrous phantom, *horrible* and vast,
As many plumes as raise her lofty flight,
So many piercing eyes enlarge her sight."
Dryden, Virgil.

"Thus, when black clouds draw down the neighbouring skies,
Ere yet abroad the winged thunder flies,
An *horrid* stillness first invades the ear,
And in that silence we the tempest fear."
Dryden.

FORMIDABLE (LAT. *formido*, fear) relates to contingent and not necessary fear. Things are formidable only when we are compelled or perhaps go out of our way to encounter them; as, "a formidable undertaking," "a formidable foe," or when we think of what *might* be if we did encounter them.

"Before the gates they sate
On either side, a *formidable* shape."
Milton.

AWFUL commonly excludes or hardly admits the idea of a sense of personal peril, though it implies fear or dread. It is closely linked with the exercise of the imagination and the belief in unseen presences and powers. An awful solitude is one in which the mind is left to its own fancies, when it feels itself alone, and is inclined to people the blank with vague creations of its own. The awful is to the imagination what the frightful is to the eye or the ear, and the fearful to the understanding.

"A subject bears a reverential fear to his prince from the sense of his majesty and grandeur, and thus much more the majesty and greatness of Almighty God excites reverence and *awfulness*, though there were no other ingredient in that fear."—*Hale*.

DREARY. See DISMAL.

DREAM. See REVERIE.

DREGS. DROSS. SEDIMENT.
SCUM. REFUSE.

The distinctive differences between such synonyms as these are only important as regulating their moral or metaphorical application. DREGS (Icelandic *dregg*, trash) was used formerly in the singular by Shakespeare and Spenser. It is corrupt matter precipitated or separated from a liquid especially in process of manufacture, and, for the immediate purpose, useless and valueless. With the exception of sediment, which is never employed in any secondary sense, we find all the rest so employed. The more usual applications of the term dregs are two: 1, "To drain in the dregs," that is, to exhaust in the endurance of labour, pain, punishment, and the like — an ancient Hebrew image; and, 2, "The dregs of society or the people," signifying the very lowest and vilest orders. The following is a little peculiar and original:

"This manner, however, of drawing off a subject or a peculiar mode of writing to the dregs, effectually precludes a revival of that subject or manner for some time for the future. The sated reader turns from it with a kind of literary nausea."—*Goldsmith*.

DROSS is the refuse matter which, as it were, falls (A. S. *dros*, from *dreosan*, to fall) from metals in smelting the ore; sometimes used of their oxydation or rust. It is a symbol of worthlessness.

"I know, O Lord, that Thy judgments are right," says the Psalmist, "and that Thou in faithfulness hast afflicted me;" the furnace of affliction being meant but to refine us from our earthly *drossiness*, and soften us for the impression of God's own stamp and image."—*Boyle*.

SEDIMENT (from *sedere*, to settle) is the matter in a liquid compound which subsides to the bottom, and which therefore, unless it be heterogeneous, is unlike the former in not being refuse, but the insoluble or undissolved portions of it. SCUM (Old Fr. *écume*, froth) is the extraneous impurities which rise to the surface of liquids in boiling or fer-

mentation. It is a symbol of contemptible worthlessness and impurity.

"The great and the innocent are insulted by the *scum* and *refuse* of the people."—*Addison*.

REFUSE (Fr. *refus*, combining the Latin *refutare* and *recusare*) means no more than waste or rejected matter, which, whether valuable or not, or available for other purposes or not, is not required for the purpose in hand. Refuse is often used also in an analogous sense of anything which has simply done its part, and has become superfluous, without involving any strong idea of worthlessness or impurity.

DRENCH. SOAK. STEEP.

TO DRENCH (A. S. *drencean*, *dren-can*, to give to drink, to drench) is to saturate with moisture or liquid by pouring it upon the object. TO SOAK (A. S. *sôcian*) is to cause to lie in a fluid till the substance has imbibed what it is capable of containing. TO STEEP (Germ. *steppen*, to dip) is to immerse, commonly for the purpose of causing some alteration in it, or applying it to a specific purpose after it has been so immersed, but not necessarily soaking it, of which the texture may possibly render it incapable.

"Mars driven from the dreadful field
That he had drenched with blood."

Cowper, Iliad.

"When they appear it is not unlikely but that they *soak* their vehicles in some vaporous or glutinous moisture or other, that they may become visible to us at a more easy rate."—*More, Immortality of the Soul.*

"The prudent sibyl had before prepared
A sop in honey steeped, to charm the
guard."
Dryden, Virgil.

DRESS. ATTIRE. APPAREL. AR-
RAY. COSTUME. HABIT. CLOTHES.
CLOTHING. GARMENT. VESTURE.
VESTMENT. RAIMENT.

DRESS (Fr. *dresser*, Lat. *dirigere*, to arrange) is used generically of what is employed to cover the body, regarded as a whole, though it be of more articles than one, and of a more or less careful arrangement and

elaborate character. Hence the term dress readily lends itself to a secondary meaning, that of aspect or character, as it impresses the sight or judgment.

"Christianity is that very religion itself (natural religion) in a better dress."—*Pearce, Sermons.*

CLOTHES (A. S. *clādþ*, cloth) are articles of dress. And yet they are restricted to those which are directly so.

"And Jacob rent his clothes."—*Bible.*

CLOTHING is dress divested of the idea of ornament, and regarded simply in its material, as a savage might be clothed in the skins of beasts, or a rich man in purple and fine linen. It is a broader term than clothes, and would include what were not in themselves clothes. A magazine of articles of clothing would contain laces, buttons, &c. It has a very generic and abstract meaning.

"With him the clothing is neither woollen, nor linen, nor silk, satin, or velvet. It is drapery. It is nothing more."—*Sir J. Reynolds.*

Nearly allied is RAIMENT (for arrayment), which is the representative name for dress when regarded as one of the necessities of life, as to be provided with shelter, food, and raiment.

"Having food and raiment, let us be therewith content."—*Bible.*

ATTIRE (Old Fr. *attirer*, to array) denotes highly ornamental or official dress, as "gorgeously attired," "meanly clad."

"Earth in her rich attire." *Milton.*

APPAREL (Fr. *appareil*, ad and *pariculus*, from *par*, equal) is clothing regarded as a luxury of life, as raiment is a necessary. So we might say, "Wealth in the East often consists in the possession of costly apparel and stuffs."

"Costly thy habit as thy purse can buy,
But not expressed in fancy, rich, not gaudy,
For the apparel oft proclaims the man."
Shakespeare.

ARRAY (Old Fr. *arrai*, *arroi*) gives the idea of various articles of dress

and ornament, not called so till ranged in order upon the person, and would include such ornaments as are not articles of apparel or clothing, as, for instance, rings on the fingers, or decorations for the head.

"Dry up your tears, and stick your rosemary
On this fair corse, and as the custom is,
And in her best array, bear her to church."
Shakespeare.

COSTUME (Fr. *coutume*, Lat. *consuetudo*) is a modification of the word custom, and is to national dress what HABIT (Fr. *habit*) is to the dress of sections or orders of men, as the costume of a period, the habit of an ecclesiastic.

"Sergius Paulus wears a crown of laurel. This is hardly reconcilable to strict propriety and the costume, of which Raffaele was in general a good observer."—*Sir J. Reynolds.*

HABIT is commonly of a plain and more or less flowing character. We do not speak of the habit of a soldier, but of a monk, or a lady's riding-habit.

"Habited like a juryman." *Churchill.*

VESTURE (Lat. *vestire*, to clothe) conveys the idea of a costly garment of a flowing character; while VESTMENT is an official vesture, especially of ministers of religion.

"Upon My vesture shall they cast lots."—*Bible.*

"Bring forth vestments for all the worshippers of Baal; and they brought them forth vestments."—*Ibid.*

GARMENT, which is an abbreviated form of garniment (Fr. *garnir*, to furnish) is any article of clothing of a main character, and connected with the trunk of the body. Hats, laces, boots, and the like, though articles of clothing, would hardly be called garments.

"All thy garments smell of myrrh, aloes, and cassia."—*English Psalms.*

DRIFT. TENDENCY.

DRIFT (connected with drive) is commonly employed of the argumentative meaning or purpose of connected words, as in a speech or

written composition, though not confined to this. TENDENCY (Lat. *tendere*) is applied to subjects, as the tendency of certain principles, and means not the mental aim, but the moral and practical issue or consequence. "I could hardly make out the drift of his speech, but it seemed to me to have a revolutionary tendency."

"But so strangely perverse is his commentator, that he will suppose him to mean anything rather than what the obvious *drift* of his argument requires."—Warburton.

"This truth, Philosophy, though eagle-eyed
In Nature's tendencies, oft overlooks."

Corper.

DROLL. LUDICROUS. RIDICULOUS. COMICAL. LAUGHABLE.

Of these, LAUGHABLE, exciting or worthy of laughter, may be regarded as the generic term, the others expressing different modifications of the laughable.

"Nature hath framed strange fellows in her time,

Some that will evermore peep through their eyes,

And laugh like parrots at a bagpiper;

And other of such vinegar aspect

That they'll not show their teeth in the way of smile,

Though Nestor swear the jest be laughable."

Shakespeare.

DROLL (Fr. *drôle*) denotes the combination of the laughable with the unfamiliar or odd. A droll person is an oddity; a droll story is not simply amusing, but amusing from a disconnectedness and unexpected combination of incidents.

"This never transported him to anything which looked like malignancy; yet in the little rubs and vexations of life 'twas apt to show itself in a drollish and witty kind of peevishness."—Sterne.

LUDICROUS (Lat. *ludus*, play) denotes that which is personally laughable, but without any necessary admixture of contempt or pity, in this differing from RIDICULOUS (*ridere*, to laugh), which conveys the idea of the contemptible in things and the humiliating in persons, or the petty and trifling, where some degree of gravity is claimed.

"He has therefore in his whole volume nothing burlesque, and seldom anything

ludicrous or familiar."—Johnson, *Life of Waller*.

COMICAL denotes what is demonstratively and, as it were, dramatically laughable, admitting of surrounding incidents or circumstances, as "to be in a comical position," "a book with comical illustrations."

"He (Daniel Whitby) was suspended, and at length made a pretended recantation, which cost him nothing but the pleasure of outwitting his governors by a part acted in a comical way."—Wood, *Athenæ Oxon*.

DROOP. LANGUISH. FLAG. PINE.

DROOP is allied to drop, and is applied to anything which occupies a less erect position than ordinary. The snowdrop, as its name implies, droops, that is, hangs down its head more than the generality of flowers. The flag droops when there is not sufficient force of wind to unfold it horizontally. The human head or form droops under sorrow or sickness. LANGUISH (Lat. *languere*) is only applicable to things possessing some kind of vital energy, which has become dull or weak under a softening, depressing, or sickly influence. To FLAG (Icelandic *flaka*, to droop) commonly bears reference to growth, movement, progress, or efforts; while PINE (A. S. *pinan*, *pinian*) is only used of sentient beings, and is to languish under certain causes, as distress, anxiety, disappointment, captivity, desire, longing, desertion, or solitude. The plant does not pine, though it may droop and languish.

"Upon her face there was the tint of grief,
The settled shadow of an inward strife,
And an unquiet drooping of the eye,
As if its lid were charged with unshed tears."

Byron.

"If this harmonical temperature of the whole body be distributed and put out of tune, weakness and languishing will immediately seize upon it."—Cudworth.

"The wounded bird, ere yet she breathed her last,

With flagging wings alighted on the mast,
A moment hung, and spread her pinions there,

Then sudden dropt, and left her life in air."

Pope, Rind.

"Loathing from racks of husky straw he turns,
And *pining* for the verdant pasture mourns."
Rowe, *Lucan*.

DROP. FALL. SINK. TUMBLE.

DROP (A. S. *dreopan*, *dropian*, *drupian*) has more than one sense, as to distil or fall in globules; or, again, to descend suddenly, abruptly, and, in some cases, on purpose. To FALL (A. S. *feallan*) is involuntary or mechanical, except in the phrase to fall down in worship, or at the feet of any one. It may be more or less rapid or sudden, as the apple falls from the tree, the river falls into the sea, the tide falls, or the mercury in the barometer. To SINK (A. S. *sin-can*) is to fall *gradually* and comparatively slowly. It is metaphorically used in the sense of to be overwhelmed or depressed, to decline, decay, and decrease in bulk. To TUMBLE is to fall awkwardly or without design, so losing the centre of gravity. Many are the analogous applications in which these distinctions are preserved, as, for instance: Words drop from the lips, or an observation is dropped accidentally; a subject is dropped. To fall from a high estate. Words sink into the heart, or great men sink in public estimation. To tumble from the seat of power; the cataract tumbles over the rocks.

DROSS. See DREGS.

DROWSY. SLEEPY. LETHARGIC.

DROWSY (Old Dutch *droosen*, to be sleepy) and SLEEPY, or inclined to sleep (*slæpan*, *släpan*, to sleep), are almost identical; but drowsiness is a heavy, and often abnormal sleepiness. Persons complain of drowsiness when they wish to keep awake, and say they feel sleepy when it is time to go to rest for the night. An artificial heaviness, produced, for instance, by drugs or an intoxicating draught, would be called drowsiness rather than sleepiness. LETHARGIC, from lethargy (Gr. *ληθαργία*, from *λήθη*, forgetfulness), is always abnormal, supposing some foreign influence, whether used physically of an involuntary and strong tendency to

sleep morbidly; or morally, in the sense of insensateness and invincible sluggishness, oblivion, indolence, or indifference.

"Above is perpetual gloom. The sun is not seen, nor the breeze felt. The air stagnates, and pestilential vapours diffuse *drowsiness*, lassitude, and anxiety."—*Adventurer*.

"I rather choose to endure the wounds of those darts which envy casteth at novelty, than to go on safely and *sleepily* in the easy ways of ancient undertakings."—*Rulegh*.

"Does Lear walk thus? speak thus? Either his notion weakens, or his discernings are *lethargied*."—*Shakespeare*.

DRUNKENNESS. INTOXICATION. INEBRIATION. INEBRIETY.

DRUNKENNESS is specifically the becoming intoxicated by strong drink, and is used to express both the casual state and the habit. INTOXICATION (Lat. *toxicum*, poison, from the Greek *τοξικόν φάρμακόν*, a poison in which arrows were dipped, from *τοξόν*, a bow or arrow) includes cases in which the same effect is produced by other causes than drinking, as, for instance, the fumes of tobacco. INEBRIATION (*ebrius*, intoxicated) differs from intoxication in being confined to the results of drinking, and from drunkenness, in denoting the process or the state, but not the habit. INEBRIETY expresses the state and the habit, but not the process. Intoxicate lends itself most easily of all to a secondary application; so that it is said to be intoxicated with success, pleasure, and the like.

"The dissolution and *drunkenness* of that night was so great and scandalous, in a nation which had not been acquainted with such disorders for many years past, that the King, who still stood in need of the Presbyterian party, which had betrayed all into his hands, for their satisfaction caused a proclamation to be published forbidding the *drinking* of healths."—*Ludlow, Memoirs*.

"King was a name too proud for man to bear
With modesty and meekness; and the crown,
So dazzling in their eyes who set it on,
Was sure to *intoxicate* the brows it bound."
Corper.

"That 'tis good to be drunk once a month,

is a common flattery of sensuality, supporting itself upon physick and the healthful effects of *inebriation*.”—*Brown, Vulgar Errors.*

DUBIOUS. *See* DOUBTFUL.

DULL. *See* DISMAL.

DUMB. MUTE. SPEECHLESS.

SILENT. VOICELESS. NOISELESS.

DUMB (A. S. *dumb*) commonly signifies *unable* to speak, whether from temporary or permanent and natural causes, as “dumb brutes,” “struck dumb with amazement.”

“In the first case the demoniac or madman was *dumb*; and his *dumbness* probably arose from the natural turn of his disorder, which was that species of madness called melancholy, of which taciturnity or *dumbness* is a very common effect.”—*Farmer.*

MUTE (Lat. *mutus*) is commonly employed of the human race, and refers to articulate speech, which for some peculiar reason is temporarily suspended, as, “Mute in astonishment,” “In spite of all interrogations he remained mute.” Many are mute by nature who are not, strictly speaking, dumb; that is, they have no imperfection of the vocal organs; but, being without the sense of hearing, they have no notion of the sounds which they ought to utter. Poetically, mute is used in the sense of dumb, as “mute fishes.”

“Hail native Language, that by sinews weak
Didst move my first endeavouring tongue
to speak,
And midst imperfect words with childish
trips
Half unpronounced, slide through my
infant lips,
Driving dumb silence from the portal
door
Where he had *mutely* sat two years before.”
Milton.

SPEECHLESS (A. S. *spræc, spæc*, speech) relates only to articulate sounds, and means destitute or deprived, whether permanently or for a time, of the faculty of speech.

“From his slack hand the garland wreath’d
for Eve
Down drop’d, and all the faded roses shed.
Speechless he stood and pale, till thus at
length,
First to himself, he inward silence broke.”
Milton.

SILENT (Lat. *silere*, to be silent) is very general, and relates to anything characterized by the absence, temporary or permanent, of speech or sound. It is applicable not only to living beings, but anything producing sound, as “a musical instrument,” or even localities, as “the silent woods.”

“But man is frail, and can but ill sustain
A long immunity from grief and pain.
And after all the joys that plenty leads
With tiptoe step vice *silently* succeeds.”
Corper.

“The VOICELESS woods,” would mean the absence of animal sounds (Lat. *vox, vocis*), “The NOISELESS woods” (Old Fr. *noise*, connected with *nocere*, to hurt), the absence of all sounds, whether vocal or otherwise.

“The Niobe of nations, there she stands,
Childless and crownless in her *voiceless*
woe,
An empty urn within her withered hands,
Whose holy dust was scattered long ago.”
Byron.

“Like some tall palm the *noiseless* fabric
grew.”
Heber, Palestine.

DUPLICITY. DOUBLE DEALING.
(*See* DECEPTION.)

The former relates to character (*duplex, duplicis*, double), the latter to action. DUPLICITY of character may lead to DOUBLE-DEALING in particular cases. Duplicity is that sustained form of deception which consists in entertaining one set of feelings, and acting as if influenced by another. Double-dealing is acting in such a way as to have a double line of conduct, and commonly to give the impression of consulting the wishes or interests of others, while one is really following one’s own.

“I find in you no false *duplicity*.”—*Chaucer.*

“Maskwell in the ‘Double-dealer,’ discloses by soliloquy that his motive for *double-dealing* was his passion for Cynthia.”—*Cumberland.*

DURABLE. LASTING. PERMANENT. ENDURING. PERSISTENT.

Of these, LASTING (A. S. *læstan*) is the most general—remaining longer in existence, and, by an extension of

meaning, remaining long unimpaired. Lasting and durable seem to share between them the moral and physical import of endurance. Durable stone. A lasting friendship.

"The ancients depicted friendship in the bearings and strength of a young man, bare-headed, rudely clothed, to signify its activity and *lastingness*, readiness of action and aptness to do service."—*Bishop Taylor*.

DURABLE (Lat. *durare*, to endure) is lasting, with specific reference to physical influences; as a "durable material" is one which will bear wear and tear, weather, and the like.

"A Gothic cathedral raises ideas of grandeur in our minds by its size, its height, its awful obscurity, its strength, its antiquity, and its *durability*."—*Blair*.

PERMANENT (Lat. *permanere*, to remain long) combines the two ideas of absence of internal and of external change. A permanent monument is not only durable, but it is established so as to remain unmoved. It lasts both *in time and place*.

"The earth, great mother of us all, That only seems unmoved and *permanent*." *Spenser*.

ENDURING (see **DURABLE**) is employed of what resists moral influences of deterioration or destruction, as "enduring happiness," "an enduring friendship." It involves such ideas as remaining firm under trial, suffering, perhaps, without resistance, but at least without yielding.

"Ye have in heaven a better and an *enduring* substance."—*Bible*.

PERSISTENT (Lat. *persistere*, to stand long) is lasting through native tenacity, and so continuing or lasting in spite of influences which might have been sufficient to destroy natures less changeable or tough. It has a physical character, as a botanical term, in the sense of remaining beyond the period when the same parts in other plants fall off. In the following it indicates a sustaining will or purpose, as reflected in the expression of the eye itself:—

"Modred's narrow foxy face,
Heart-hiding smile, and grey, *persistent* eye."
Tennyson.

DURATION. See **CONTINUATION**.

DUTIFUL. See **OBEDIENT**.

DUTY. **OBLIGATION.**

The distinction commonly made between these is that **DUTY** (literally, what is due) rises out of permanent relationships between persons, while **OBLIGATION** (Lat. *obligare*, to bind) flows from the application of moral principles to particular cases. Obligations in this way would often be duties, while duties would often be based upon obligations. An obligation in its broadest sense is anything which constrains us to act, as a vow, promise, oath, contract, but is hardly applicable to the coercive power of law, or to such matters as flow from natural piety, as the duty of parents and of children. Duty is a graver term than obligation. A duty hardly exists to perform *trivial* things; but there may be an obligation to do them. It is the duty of peers to attend the queen at the opening of parliament. We should hardly say that to attend in their robes was a duty, though they are obliged to do this. Law and conscience dictate to a man what is his duty, and the neglect of it is a violation of right or virtue. Obligation is more practical, and is dictated rather by usage and propriety. Obligation has also very often the sense of the power that binds, while duty is the thing enforced. A duty never can be against reason; an obligation may be even absurd, as depending upon custom. Obligation is defined by the extent of the power which obliges; duty by the ability of the subject who performs.

"As the will of God is our rule, to inquire what is our *duty*, or what we are obliged to do, in any instance is in effect to inquire what is the will of God in that instance, which constantly becomes the whole business of morality."—*Paley*.

"The various *duties* which have now been considered all agree with each other in one common quality, that of being *obligatory* upon rational and voluntary agents; and they are all enjoined by the same authority, the authority of conscience."—*Stewart, Outlines of Moral Philosophy*.

DWELL. See **ABIDE**.

DYE. See **COLOUR**.

E.

EACH. See ALL.

EAGER. EARNEST.

EAGER (connected with the Latin *acer*, sharp) denotes an excited desire or longing, and an intentness upon pursuit of some object, as hounds eager in the chase. He who is eager seeks to gain or enjoy with the least possible delay, and is proportionately stimulated to action. The term may relate to what is praiseworthy or the contrary.

"The insect youth are on the wing,
Eager to taste the honied spring,
And float amid the liquid noon."

Gray.

EARNEST (A. S. *eornost*) is always used in a good sense; and though earnestness may grow into specific eagerness, it by no means implies this. Eagerness relates to the object, earnest to the occupation, the state or habit. Earnestness is a combination of sincerity and energy. We should say equally of the hypocrite and of the sluggard that he was not in earnest in religion.

"And we may learn hence that the greatest gift of prayer, and *earnestness* and frequency in it, is no good mark of godliness, except it be attended with sincere, constant, and virtuous endeavours."—*Glanvill*.

EAGERNESS. AVIDITY. GREEDINESS.

EAGERNESS (see above) differs from AVIDITY (*avidus*, greedy), in that the latter implies more of appetite and desire of possession, and is not employed of anything besides matters of enjoyment and such possession; whereas eagerness is applicable to an excited desire to gain ends of other kinds, as, for instance, the young soldier may be eager for opportunities of distinguishing himself, or accept the post of danger with eagerness, where the term avidity would be wholly out of place. GREEDINESS (A. S. *grædig*, *grêdig*, from *grædan*, to cry or call like young birds for food) is a low, animal, or selfish form

of desire. Eagerness, as we have seen, may in certain cases be praiseworthy; but avidity and greediness are always used in an unfavourable sense.

"For him, ye gods, for Crastinus, whose
spear

With impious *eagerness* began the war,
Some more than common punishment
prepare." *Roote, Lucan.*

"In all which we may see an infinite *avidity*, and such as cannot be satisfied with any finite object."—*Fotherby, Athcomastic.*

"To work all uncleanness with *greediness*."
—*Bible.*

EARLY. SOON. BETIMES.

EARLY (Old Eng. *arliche*, *erliche*, *ereliche*, *eerly*, *erely*) is used as an adjective as well as an adverb. It is essentially relative, and implies some ordinary or fixed point of time, in advance of which something else takes place, as "to rise early," "an early spring." SOON (A. S. *sona*, *sunu*, *sones*) indicates always a short interval posterior to any given moment or the present moment, as "soon after sunrise," "I will go soon." BETIMES (be and time, *i.e.*, by time) denotes some space in the early part of which something else is done. It has a practical force, and commonly means in good time for all needful purposes, or for some specific object.

"Samuel began his acquaintance with God *early*, and continued it long. He began it in his long coats, and continued it to his grey hairs."—*Bishop Hall*.

"'Tis sooner past, 'tis sooner done,
Than summer's rain or winter's sun;
Most fleeting when it is most dear,
'Tis gone while we but say 'tis here."

Carew.

"When the first rays their cheering crimson shed,
We'll rise *betimes* to see the vineyard spread."
Parnell.

EARN. See ACQUIRE.

EARNEST. See EAGER.

EARNEST. PLEDGE.

EARNEST is probably connected with the French *arrhes*, a pledge, PLEDGE with the Old Fr. *plege*, *pleige*.

As used figuratively, there is some distinction of use. Earnest is less strong than pledge. After a pledge we expect by personal right; after an earnest we expect by natural sequence. A pledge is some kind of security actually given for the future. An earnest often involves no more security than that of a high probability. If I say, "I pledge my word that it shall be so," I leave, as it were, a deposit in honour that I will do what I say. If I say, "His early school successes were an earnest of his brilliant career in after life," I mean no more than that they raised expectations which were afterwards fulfilled.

"They (afflictions) may be testimonies or *earnests* of God's favour; for whom He loves He rebukes and chastens, even as a father a son in whom he delighteth."—*Wilkins*.

"If a pawnbroker receives plate or jewels as a *pledge* or security for the repayment of money lent thereon at a day certain, he has them upon the express contract or condition to restore them if the *pledger* performs his part by redeeming them in due time."—*Blackstone*.

EARTH. See LAND.

EASE. QUIET. REST. REPOSE.

EASE (Fr. *aise*) means the absence of any cause of trouble. This may be either internally as regards oneself, or externally as regards what one has to do. Hence the twofold meaning into which the word runs out, of *quiet* and *facility*. In the former application ease is freedom from trouble, pain, or restraint from without or from within. We speak of ease of body or ease of mind; in the latter freedom from difficulty or opposition. QUIET denotes the absence of a disturbing cause, as harassing thoughts or noises, and is inapplicable to the bodies of men. REST (Fr. *rester*) denotes primarily the cessation of motion, and, as a particular application of this, the cessation from active or laborious movement. As a synonym with REPOSE (Fr. *repos*, Lat. *reponere*), it may mean any cessation which is a relief from exertion. We may rest, for instance, in a standing posture; but repose implies the placing of *all parts* of the body in a posture of rest.

"What joy within these sunless groves,
Where lonely Contemplation roves,
To rest in fearless *ease*!" *Langhorne*.

"Secure the sacred *quiet* of thy mind."
Dryden, Ovid.

"So forth she rode, without *repose* or *rest*."
Spenser.

EASE. EASINESS. FACILITY.

In the sense in which it is a synonym with these, EASE commonly refers to specific action, EASINESS to inherent quality. "He lifted the heavy weight *with ease*, being apparently assured beforehand of the *easiness* of the task." FACILITY (Lat. *facilis*, easy) is less objective, and more subjective. We speak of ease in reference to the task, facility in reference to a person's power of performing it; so that by practice and natural strength a man may perform with comparative facility a task in itself by no means easy. Ease is also more applicable to purely physical undertakings, facility to mental. Ease is opposed to effort, facility to difficulty. The intelligent man solves a problem with facility; the strong man lifts a weight with ease.

"It must be likewise shown that these parts stand in such a relation to each other that the comparison between them may be *easily* made, and that the affection of the mind may result from it."—*Burke*.

"Refrain to-night,
And that shall lend a kind of *easiness*
To the next abstinence." *Shakespeare*.

"Some gentlemen are not terrified by the *facility* with which government has been overturned in France."—*Burke*.

EBULLITION. EFFERVESCENCE.
FERMENTATION. FERMENT.

EBULLITION (Lat. *ebullire*) is the process of boiling, or the agitation of a liquid owing to the escape of bubbles caused by the conversion of a part of the liquid into vapour. EFFERVESCENCE (Lat. *effervere*) is caused by the escape from a fluid of gas, as in the mixture of carbonated alkali and acid. FERMENT (Lat. *fervimentum*, *fermentum*, from the same *fervere*) is the *state*, FERMENTATION, the *process* of fermenting. This consists in the decomposition of the starch, sugar, gluten, and

the like, under the influence of water, air, and warmth. When used metaphorically, ebullition is employed of sudden bursts of anger or ill-temper. Effervescence is used less commonly, but employed of the natural exhibition of liveliness and good spirits. Fermentation and ferment, of a state of ill-suppressed discontent or impatience, and especially among a number of persons. But ferment is commonly appropriated to the emotional, and fermentation to the material.

"There are many young members in the House (such of late has been the rapid succession of public men) who never saw that prodigy Charles Townshend, nor of course know what a *ferment* he was able to excite in everything by the violent ebullition of his mixed virtues and failings."—*Burke*.

"The nation is in too high a *ferment* for me to expect either fair war or even fair quarter from a reader of the opposite party."—*Dryden*.

"It is not a *fermentative* process, for the solution begins at the surface and proceeds towards the centre, contrary to the order in which *fermentation* acts and spreads."—*Paley*.

ECCENTRIC. SINGULAR. STRANGE. ODD.

ECCENTRIC is only employed of persons, and, again, only of what meets the observation in reference to conduct, as the appearance, dress, and the behaviour. No peculiarity of countenance or form, however striking, would be called eccentric; for eccentric implies a will, nature, or habits, which, as it were, move in a different orbit from other people. SINGULAR (Lat. *singularis*), on the other hand, is applied to the whole person or to any aspect of his character, to his ideas, to his whole life, or to any particular act, as standing by itself out of the common course, and even to phenomena, circumstances, or occurrences. STRANGE (Old Fr. *estrange*, Lat. *extraneus*) is of equally comprehensive application, but bears reference to the experience of the witness, to which it is foreign and alien; so that what seems strange to one person may not be so to another, who can better interpret it, or has by a larger experience been made familiar with it. It is a graver word than singu-

lar. It is the difficulty of comprehension or interpretation which constitutes the strange, whence strange is often coupled with mysterious, and is usually associated with the undesirable. ODD (Swedish *udda*, odd, Welsh *od*) implies disharmony, incongruity, or unevenness. An odd thing or person is an exception to general rules of calculation and procedure, or expectation and common experience. Like singular and strange, it has a very wide application, and is not restricted to what is purely of a personal nature. It is less grave than strange, and denotes an impression not so much of surprise or bewilderment as of incongruity.

"Genius, a bustling lad of parts,
Who all things did by fits and starts;
Nothing above him or below him,
Who'd make a riot or a poem,
From *eccentricity* of thought
Not always do the thing he ought."

Lloyd.

"Though, according to the common course and practice of the world, it be somewhat *singular* for men thoroughly to live up to the principles of religion, yet *singularity* in this matter is so far from being a reflection upon any man's prudence, that it is a *singular* commendation of it."—*Tillotson*.

"Though the common experience, says he, and the ordinary course of things have justly a mighty influence on the minds of men to make them give or refuse credit to anything proposed to their belief, yet there is one case wherein the *strangeness* of the facts lessens not the assent to a fair testimony given to it."—*Warburton*.

"But oh, how *oddly* will it sound, that I
Must ask my child forgiveness."

Shakespeare.

ECONOMICAL. SAVING. FRUGAL. THRIFTY. PARSIMONIOUS. SPARING. PENURIOUS.

Of these, SAVING (Fr. *sauver*) means avoiding unnecessary expenses, whether it be with or against the natural inclination, whether as a habit or for a particular purpose, whether with or without sufficient reason. ECONOMICAL (Gr. *οικονομία* *oikos*, a house, and *νέμω*, to keep) implies a good deal more, as not only saving of waste and unnecessary expense, but careful and frugal manage-

ment and prudence in expenditure. FRUGAL (Lat. *frugalis*, *frugi*, fit for food) relates more specifically to matters of consumption. So that one may be frugal even of time. It is opposed to lavish, and belongs especially to matters of food and dress. It conveys the idea of not using *or spending superfluously, and when used of matters of consumption points to a simplicity of manners. THRIFTY (connected with thrive) connects the ideas of frugality and industry, or such careful expenditure as comes of a knowledge of the value of money, and results in the competent possession of it, and in prosperity in general. PARSIMONIOUS (Lat. *parsimonia*, *parcere*, to spare) is commonly employed in a bad sense of *excessive* economy, and a closeness bordering upon niggardliness, or, at least, of continuous effort at saving. SPARING (A. S. *sparian*, to spare) has, like parsimonious, a somewhat unfavourable sense, indicating a reluctance to spend where spending is necessary, or would be at least more graceful. It is more specific, as parsimonious is more general and habitual. It commonly implies ampler means than the possessor is inclined to make use of. The PENURIOUS (Lat. *penuria*, Gr. *πενία*, poverty) is one who suffers want in the extremity of his sparing.

"The charitable few are chiefly they
Whom Fortune places in the middle way,
Just rich enough, with *economic* care,
To save a pittance, and a pittance spare,
Just poor enough to feel the poor man's
moan,

Or share those sufferings which may
prove their own." *Harte.*

"He was not hitherto a saver."—*Swift.*

"The father was more given to *frugality*,
and the sonne to ryotousnesse."—*Goldyng.*

"Domestic industry and economy, or the qualities distinguished by the homely titles of *thriftness* and good housewifery, were always till the present century deemed honourable."
—*Knox, Essays.*

"*Parsimony*, and not industry, is the immediate cause of the increase of capital. Industry indeed provides the subject which *parsimony* accumulates; but whatever industry might acquire, if parsimony did not save and store up, the capital would never be the greater."
—*Smith, Wealth of Nations.*

"And taught at schools much mythologic
stuff,

But sound religion *sparingly* enough."

Cowper.

"I ever held a scanty and *penurious* justice
to partake of the nature of a wrong."—
Burke.

ECSTASY. RAPTURE. TRANSPORT. FRENZY.

ECSTASY (Gr. *ἔκστασις*) is, literally, a standing or being apart, as if the soul left the body for a time, according to the ancient notion, a state in which the mind is carried away beyond the reach of ordinary impressions. It is now commonly used only of excessive and overpowering *joy*. An ecstasy of delight. It is a passive state. RAPTURE (Lat. *raptura*, *rapio*, to seize), on the other hand, is energetic and active, when the thoughts and feelings are keenly alive and intensified. TRANSPORT (Lat. *transportare*, to transport) is not so strong a term, and is more variously applied. Ecstasy and rapture are states of delight. Transport relates to vehement emotion of any kind, as grief, joy, rage, astonishment. FRENZY (Gr. *φρην*, the mind, *φρενός*) is stronger than transport, and is applied to all that transport relates to, and to the higher spiritual emotions besides; as the frenzy of poetry, or of inspiration; the frenzy of genius, when a more than common or human influence enraptures the mind; and the frenzy of wrath. In all the rest the individual is master of his own acts. In frenzy he is supposed to be himself acted upon by some power, which makes him an instrument, and carries him into subjection.

"What! are you dreaming, son? with eyes
cast upwards

Like a mad prophet in an *ecstasie*."

Dryden.

"The latent Damon drew
Such maddening draughts of beauty to his
soul,
As for a while o'erwhelmed his *raptured*
thought

With luxury too daring." *Thomson.*

"With *transport* views the airy rule his
own,

And swells on an imaginary throne."

Pope.

"What *frenzy*, shepherd, has thy soul possessed ?

The vineyard lies half pruned and half undressed."
Dryden, Virgil.

EDGE. See BRIM.

EDICT. See DECREE.

EDIFICE. BUILDING. STRUCTURE. FABRIC. CONSTRUCTION.

AN EDIFICE (Lat. *œdificium*, *œdes*, a building, and *facere*, to make) is commonly applied to *inhabited* buildings of some size and pretension, or to such as are at least from time to time *occupied*, as a palace or a cathedral; not an obelisk.

"Should I go to church,
And see the holy *edifice* of stone,
And not bethink me straight of dangerous
rocks,
Which touching but my gentle vessel's
side,
Would scatter all her spices on the
stream,
Enrobe the roaring waters with my silks?"
Shakespeare.

BUILDING (A. S. *bylðm*, to build) is used in an indeterminate way, when no characteristic idea is attached; as a mass of building, public and private buildings. Buildings are raised or vertical.

"And Jesus answered and sayde unto hym,
Seyst thou these great *byldinges*?"—*Bible*,
1551.

STRUCTURE (*structura*, *struere*, to lay down) is used of almost anything which is regarded as made of parts or particles put together, whether natural or artificial, and has the sense of composition, or mode of putting together, or formation; as the structure of the globe, the structure of a natural rock, the structure of a poem or a discourse. When used in a sense more closely synonymous with building, it draws the attention to the internal putting together of the parts rather than to any purpose of it. A curious structure, a lofty structure, the structure is insecure. It would be incongruous to say, "The citizens needed some public structure in which to hold municipal meetings." Here edifice or building would be used; but it might be added, "The

plans of an eminent architect were adopted, and the result is a commodious and handsome structure."

"But this is yet a weak piece of *structure*, because the supporters are subject to much impulsion, especially if the line be long."—*Reliquie Wottonianæ.*

FABRIC (Fr. *fabrique*, Lat. *fabricare*) is used not only of structures in the sense just given, but also of textile substances. In the architectural sense, fabric denotes more art and design, structure more care and orderly arrangement.

"The baseless *fabric* of a vision."

Shakespeare.

CONSTRUCTION does not imply that unity of form or plan which is expressed by both fabric and structure. York Minster is a marvellous fabric or structure. A Roman mosaic pavement, or London Bridge, is an elaborate fabric. The Dutch dykes are other constructions on which the lives of thousands depend. The term construction is the abstract of which structure is the concrete. It is also the process of which structure is the result.

"From the raft or canoe which first served to carry a savage over the river, to the *construction* of a vessel capable of conveying a numerous crew in safety to a distant coast, the progress in improvement is immense."—*Robertson.*

EDUCATION. INSTRUCTION.
BREEDING. TRAINING.

INSTRUCTION (Lat. *instruere*, to furnish) and *education* are as parts to the whole. Instruction is mental, education is moral as well as mental. EDUCATION, however (Lat. *educare*, form of *educere*, to bring up) is more applicable to the younger portion of life, when the mind and the moral nature are unstocked and undeveloped; while instruction may be given or received on specific points or departments of knowledge at all periods. Instruction makes men wiser; education ought to make them wiser and better; and BREEDING (A. S. *bredan*, to nourish) will make them more polished and agreeable. TRAINING (Fr. *trainer*) is development by instruction, exercise, and discipline, and is applicable

to the whole nature of a man, or, specifically, to the faculties which he possesses. It denotes no more than a process of purposed habituation, and is equally applicable to the physical and mental powers, so that it may include both at the same time.

"If what I have said in the beginning of this discourse be true, as I do not doubt but it is, namely, that the difference to be found in the manner and abilities of men is owing more to their *education* than anything else, we have reason to conclude that great care is to be had of the forming children's minds, and giving them that seasoning early, which shall influence their minds always after."—*Locke*.

"The coldness of passion seems to be the natural ground of ability and honesty among men, as the government or moderation of them the great end of philosophical and moral *instructions*."—*Sir W. Temple*.

"I shall also be bold enough to affirm that among the ancients there was not much delicacy of *breeding*, or that polite deference and respect which civility obliges us either to express or counterfeit towards the persons with whom we converse."—*Burke*.

"So to his steed he gott, and gan to ride
As one unfit therefore, that all might see
He had not *trayned* been in chevalree."
Spenser.

EFFACE. OBLITERATE. EXPUNGE. ERASE. CANCEL.

All these terms apply to characters impressed or inscribed. **EFFACE** (Fr. *effacer*, Lat. *facies*, face) is to render illegible or indiscernible, as the letters from a monument, or the effigy and letters from a coin, or any representation upon a surface. It is also used metaphorically in the sense of removing traces, as "to efface recollections from the mind." But the term implies nothing of mode or purpose; so that things may be purposely effaced, or effaced by the lapse of time, corroding influences, and the like. Such effacing may come short of the entire removal of the thing. **OBLITERATE** (*obliterare*, *litera*, a letter) only applies to what conveys a symbolical meaning, as letters. A fresco painting, for instance, would be a direct representation, and so might be effaced, but not obliterated; but the term is used analogously to

the effacing of letters. So we might say, not indeed, "The painting itself," but "every trace of it was obliterated." **EXPUNGE** (Lat. *expungere*, to prick out) is to strike out with the point of the pen, and is always *designedly* done; while obliteration, like effacement, may be the result of undesigned influences. **ERASE** is to scratch out (*e* and *radere*, to scrape); while **CANCEL** (Lat. *cancelli*, lattice work) is to draw lines diagonally across writing, so as practically to remove it, without actually erasing, expunging, or obliterating it. Cancelled writing loses its force, but not its legibility. It is in their metaphorical applications that the distinctions of these words are more clearly prominent. Memories and impressions are effaced; traces, vestiges are obliterated; offences and injuries are expunged; gratitude, good and kindly thoughts, are erased; obligations, necessity, favours, debts, are cancelled.

"Thus the ideas, as well as children, of our youth often die before us, and our minds represent to us those tombs to which we are approaching, where, though brass and marble remain, yet the inscriptions are *effaced* by time, and the imagery moulders away."—*Locke*.

"The sin of Judah is said to be writ upon the table of their hearts, as if their memory of and affection to it could scarce be *obliterated*."—*Whitby*.

"Is every word in the declaration from Downing Street, concerning their conduct, and concerning ours and that of our allies, so obviously false, that it is necessary to give some new-invented proofs of our good faith, in order to *expunge* the memory of this perfidy?"—*Burke*.

"A king is ever surrounded by a crowd of infamous flatterers, who find their account by keeping him from the least light of reason, till all ideas of rectitude and justice are *erased* from his mind."—*Ibid*.

"The handwriting against him may be *cancelled* in the court of heaven, and yet the enditement run on in the court of conscience."—*South*.

EFFECT. See **ACCOMPLISH** and **RESULT**.

EFFECTIVE. See **EFFICIENT**.

EFFECTS. See **GOODS**.

EFFECTUAL. *See* EFFICIENT.

EFFEMINATE. *See* FEMALE.

EFFERVESCENCE. *See* EBULLITION.

EFFICACIOUS. *See* EFFICIENT.

EFFICIENT. EFFECTIVE. EFFECTUAL. EFFICACIOUS.

EFFICIENT (Lat. *efficere*, to effect) is actively operative, and is used of persons, of things, and of causes in a philosophical sense, as an efficient cause, an efficient officer. An efficient cause is the motive principle, as distinguished from the final cause or design, the material, and the formal cause. Efficient is peculiarly applicable to persons. EFFECTIVE is producing a decided effect, as an effective remedy, an effective picture, an effective speech. It is not a quality of persons. Effectual is *finally* effective, or producing not effect generally, but the desired effect in such a way as to leave nothing to be done. An effectual remedy is one which needs not to be repeated. It is not used of persons. EFFICACIOUS is possessing the *quality* of being effective, which is latent in the thing until it is put into operation. It is not employed of persons. An efficacious remedy is had recourse to, and proves effective if it does decided good, effectual if it does *all* the good desired.

"The Church was not impaired. Her estates, her majesty, her splendour, her orders and gradations continued the same. She was preserved in her full *efficiency*, and cleared only of a certain intolerance which was her weakness and disgrace."—*Burke*.

"The House of Commons will lose that independent character which, inseparably connecting the honour and reputation with the acts of this House, enables us to afford a real, substantial, and *effective* support to his Government."—*Ibid*.

"The extreme dishonour and even peril of this situation roused her old age at length to the resolution of taking some *effectual* measures."—*Bishop Hurd*.

"Rules themselves are indeed nothing else but an appeal to experience; conclusions drawn from wide and general observation of the aptness and *efficacy* of certain means to produce those impressions."—*Ibid*.

EFFIGY. *See* IMAGE.

EFFORT. ATTEMPT. ENDEAVOUR. ESSAY. TRIAL. EXERTION. EXPERIMENT.

EFFORT (Fr. *effort*, *e*, out, and *fortis*, strong) is a specific putting forth of strength, whether physical or mental, in performing an act, or aiming at an object. It implies external hardness or difficulty. Its opposite is ease. An ATTEMPT (Old Fr. *attempter*, Lat. *attentare*) is a trying to do something in particular. It may be a trial of skill or strength, as to attempt to scale a wall, or to untie a knot, or comprehend an expression. Efforts are strong or weak; attempts are successful or unsuccessful, and often need fortune as well as strength. ENDEAVOUR (Fr. *en devoir*, in duty, *se mettre en devoir*, to make it one's duty) is of wider meaning than both effort and attempt, and, indeed, comprehends both. It is to use all available means and resources in one's power to bring about an object. It is labour directed to some specific end. Effort is energetic or laborious endeavour. ESSAY (Fr. *essayer*, to try) is commonly connected with one's own natural powers, of which some trial is made, as to essay to write, to speak, to sing. When of matters wholly extraneous to oneself, it has the meaning of to test or try the strength, value, or purity; and in matters of effort implies some degree of the ineffectual. TRIAL (Old Fr. *trial*, *triel*) is the trying or testing in any manner, as by experiment, by experience, by examination, and is applicable to one's own strength or powers and qualities, or the qualities of things external to ourselves. EXERTION (*exsero*, to put forth) is the active exercise of any power or faculty of which we may be possessed, as to exert the mind, the limbs, or one's powers generally, as one's interest on behalf of another. It admits all degrees of effort, and even natural action without effort. EXPERIMENT is a process instituted for the sake of arriving at the knowledge of a general principle or truth. Experiment is to the general law what test is to the particular case.

"From whence it seems probable to me that the simple ideas we receive from sensation and reflection are the boundaries of our thoughts, beyond which the mind, whatever efforts it would make, is not able to advance one jot; nor can it make any discoveries when it would pry into the nature and hidden causes of those ideas."—*Locke*.

"I am afraid they have awaked.

And 'tis not done. The attempt and not the deed

Confounds us." *Shakespeare*.

"It ought to be the first endeavour of a writer to distinguish nature from custom, or that which is established because it is right from that which is right because it is established."—*Rambler*.

"Yet such a tongue alike in vain essays

To blot with censure or exalt with praise." *Hocle*.

"To bring it to the trial will you dare?

Our pipes, our skill, our voices to compare?" *Dryden*.

"Exertings of the senses of seeing and hearing."—*Hale*.

"These records of wars, intrigues, factions, and revolutions are so many collections of experiments, by which the politician or moral philosopher fixes the principles of his science, in the same manner as the physician or natural philosopher becomes acquainted with the nature of plants, minerals, and other external objects by the experiments which he forms concerning them."—*Hume*.

EFFRONTERY. See BOLDNESS.

EGOTISTICAL. OPINIONATED.

SELFISH. CONCEITED.

The EGOTISTICAL man (Lat. *ego*, I) is full of himself in talk, as the SELFISH man is full of self in plans, wishes, and desires. The egotistical man acts out self-conceit. He is a centre of interest and importance in his own estimation. The OPINIONATED man is self-conceited on the particular point of his own judgment, and obstinately tenacious of his own opinions. Both the egotistical and opinionated man are innocent in comparison with the selfish, who is ready not only to think of himself first on all occasions, but even to gratify his desires at the expense of others. The CONCEITED man, full of conceit or estimation of himself, overrates his own capacity or recommendations. This may be in some

things, and not in others, in which he may form a just or even too low an estimate.

"The gentlemen of Port Royal, who were more eminent for their learning and their humility than any other in France, banished the way of speaking in the first person out of all their works, as rising from vain-glory and self-conceit. To show their particular aversion to it they branded this form of writing with the name of an *egotism*, a figure not to be found among the ancient rhetoricians."—*Spectator*.

"People of clear heads are what the world calls *opinionated*."—*Shenstone*.

"But men are led into this mistake by laying too much stress upon etymology. For, *selfishness* being derived from self, they learnedly infer that whatever is done to please one's own inclination must fall under that appellation, not considering that derivatives do not always retain the full latitude of their roots."—*Search*.

The old force of the term conceit, that is, a conception or thought, and thence a forced thought, as a verbal conceit, or play on words, and afterwards a false or undue conception of one's own attractions or powers, appears in the following:—

"That groom that *conceited* himself an emperor thought all as irrational as disloyal that did not acknowledge him."—*Glanvill*.

ELDER. SENIOR. OLDER.

ELDER (A. S. *ildra*, *yldra*, masc. *ildre*, *yldre*, fem., the comparative degree of *ald*, *eald*, old) and SENIOR (Lat. *senior*, older) are used both as adjectives and substantives, older only as a comparative adjective, in the sense of older persons, or, as if older, as the Jewish elders. As adjectives, elder and senior relate only to persons, elder signifying more advanced age, and senior implying also that priority or precedence which such advancement confers or has brought with it. OLDER is applicable to any person or thing which has existed comparatively long; as this man, this house, this infant is older than the other.

"Hereof it came that the word (*elder*) was always used both for the magistrate and for those of age and gravity, the same bearing one signification almost in all languages."—*Boyle*.

"The names of lord, signior, seigneur, sennor, in the Italian, French, and Spanish languages, seem to have at first imported only *elder* men, who thereby were grown into authority among the several governments and nations which seated themselves into those countries upon the fall of the Roman Empire."—*Sir W. Temple*.

"The melancholy news that we grow *old*."
Young.

ELDERLY. *See* OLD.

ELECT. *See* CHOICE.

ELEGANT. *See* COMELY.

ELEVATE. *See* LIFT.

ELIGIBLE. DESIRABLE. PREFERABLE.

ELIGIBLE (Lat. *eligere*, to elect) means primarily worthy of being chosen, or qualified to be chosen. It denotes, therefore, an alternative—that of choosing something else, or not choosing this. DESIRABLE (Fr. *désir*, Lat. *desiderium*) is of wider application, and conveys no idea of comparison or selection. It relates to any kind of choice, not only, for instance, of possession, like eligible, but of conduct, as action, or abstaining from action, and, in short, of anything that is to be wished, as a desirable residence, a desirable measure, a desirable abstinence from food. PREFERABLE (Lat. *præ* and *ferre*, to bear or place) is that which is comparatively desirable or specifically eligible.

"A life of virtue and religion will, notwithstanding, to a considering man be far more easy and far more *eligible* than the contrary way of living."—*Sharp*.

"O, wherefore did God grant me my request,
And as a blessing with such pomp
adorned?

Why are His gifts *desirable*, to tempt
Our earnest prayers, then, given with
solemn hand

As graces, draw a scorpion's tail behind?"
Milton.

The older form, preferable, would seem to be the more correct, as in the analogous word referrible.

"Which hypothesis, if it appear but probable to an impartial inquiry, will even on that account be *preferable* to both the former,

which we have seen to be desperate."—*Glanvill*.

ELOCUTION. ELOQUENCE. ORATORY. RHETORIC.

ELOCUTION (*e* out, and *loqui*, to speak) turns more upon the accessory graces of speaking in public, as intonation, gesture, and delivery in general; ELOQUENCE, on the matter, and the natural gifts or attainments of the speaker. The actor must practise elocution; but, as his words are found him, he cannot be eloquent. The orator needs eloquence as a natural gift, which may be enhanced and rendered more effective by a studied elocution. ORATORY (Lat. *orator*, an orator) comprehends both the art and the practice of the orator, and, in an extended sense, the combined productions of orators, as the oratory of Greece and Rome. RHETORIC (Gr. *ρήτορική τέχνη*) is strictly the theory or science of which oratory is the practice. It is only by a kind of poetic license that eloquence is used in the sense of expressiveness; as the silent eloquence of a look, for instance. Rhetoric is commonly employed, like the adjective rhetorical, in the sense of a particular figure of rhetoric, or a phrase which illustrates it, and is intended to be rather effective than literally and exactly true.

"Soft *elocution* does thy style renown,
And the soft accents of the peaceful gown."
Dryden.

"If I mistake not, our modern *eloquence* is of the same style or species with that which ancient critics denominated Attic eloquence; that is, calm, elegant, and subtle, which instructed the reason more than affected the passions, and never raised its tone above argument or common discourse."—*Hume*.

"Their *orators* thou then extoll'st as those
The top of eloquence, statists indeed,
And lovers of their country, as may seem;
But herein to our prophets much beneath,
As men divinely taught, and better teaching

The solid rules of civil government
In their majestic unaffected style
Than all the *oratory* of Greece and Rome."
Milton.

ELOQUENCE. *See* ELOCUTION.

ELUCIDATE. *See* EXPLAIN.

ELUDE. See ESCAPE.

EMANATE. See SPRING.

EMBARRASS. See CLOG.

EMBELLISH. See ADORN.

EMBLEM. SIGN. SYMBOL. SIGNAL. DEVICE.

Of these, SIGN (Lat. *signum*) is the most generic, the others being species of signs. Sign has the manifold meanings of a mark inscribed, as the sign of the cross; a token, as a sign of peace; an indication, as a sign of a man's intentions; or a proof, as a sign that it rained last night. Unlike sign, EMBLEM (Gr. *ἔμβλημα*, *ἐν* and *βάλλειν*, something thrown or laid on) is always visible to the eye—an object representing or symbolizing another object or an idea by natural aptness, or by association: as a circle, the emblem of eternity; a sceptre, the emblem of power. "A SYMBOL," says Coleridge (Gr. *συμβάλλειν*, to throw or put together) "is a sign included in the idea which it represents—an actual part taken to represent the whole, or a lower form or species used as the representative of a higher in the same kind;" as the lion is the symbol of courage, the lamb of meekness. SIGNAL is a specific sign either conventionally agreed upon, or illustrating something else by a pre-established connection in the mind. DEVICE (Fr. *deviser*, to exchange ideas, Lat. *dividere*, to divide or distinguish) is an emblematic mark, figure, or ornament, like emblem in being illustrative, but unlike it in relating not to natural connections, but to arbitrary associations; as an heraldic device. Unlike emblem also is device, in including words and characters as well as figures or objects of representation, as, for instance, in the form of a motto.

"Why may he not be *emblem'd* by 'the cozening fig-tree that our Saviour cursed?'—*Feltham*.

"We come now to the signatures of plants. I demand whether it be not a very easy and genuine inference from the observing that several herbs are marked with some mark or *sign* that intimates their virtue, what they are good for, and there being such a creature

as man in the world that can read and understand these *signs* and characters, hence to collect that the Author both of man and them knew the nature of them both?"—*Sir T. More*.

An emblem is always of something simple. A symbol may be of something complex, as of a transaction which another and inferior transaction may be made to symbolize.

"His laying his hand upon the head of his sacrifice was a *symbolical* action, by which he solemnly acknowledged to God that he had justly deserved to suffer that death himself which his sacrifice was suffering for him."—*Scott, Christian Life*.

It will be observed that in consequence we do not speak of actions as emblematic.

"God and thou know'st with what a heavy heart
I took my farewell when I should depart,
And being shipp'd, gave *signal* with my hand
Up to the cliff where I did see thee stand."
Drayton.

A signal, unlike the rest, is always a thing *specifically* given or made.

"A banner with this strange device,
Excelsior."
Longfellow.

EMBOLDEN. See BOLD and CHEER.

EMBRACE. See COMPRISE.

EMBRYO. FÆTUS.

EMBRYO (from *ἐν*, in, and *βρῦεν*, to swell) is the rudimental state of the young, whether of plants or animals. FÆTUS (Lat. *fœtus*) is not used, like embryo, of plants, but of animals only, and is the development of the embryo. It is used both of viviparous and oviparous animals.

EMEND. See AMEND.

EMERGENCY. See CRISIS.

EMINENT. ILLUSTRIOUS. DISTINGUISHED. PROMINENT.

EMINENT (Lat. *eminere*, to stand out) is only employed of persons: when things stand out conspicuously, they are called PROMINENT. So the eminent characters of history, and the prominent events. Persons are eminent who stand above their fel-

lows. This may be by the accident of birth, by merit, by high station, by talent, by virtue, and even by vices, if they be conspicuous enough. Therefore as a social term it is plain, as a moral one it is dubious.

"While others fondly feed ambition's fire,
And to the top of human state aspire,
That from their airy eminence they may
With pride and scorn the inferior world survey."
Hughes.

ILLUSTRIOUS (Lat. *illustris*) is used strictly only of persons, inasmuch as human acts or character can alone make things illustrious, as being the agents or the recipients of what is illustrious. Thus, we speak of illustrious heroes, illustrious nobles, illustrious titles. If we speak of illustrious deeds or events, it is as being done or brought about by human agency. The state or the historian render deeds or men illustrious. A striking object of Nature, for instance, might be famous, but never illustrious.

"Comparisons should be taken from illustrious noted objects, which most of the readers have either seen or can strongly conceive."—*Blair.*

DISTINGUISHED (Lat. *distinguere*), in like manner, directly relates to persons and to deeds, and to persons for the sake of their deeds. Distinguished conveys the idea of social eminence or prominence as the result of public services rendered, or merit publicly exhibited.

"Few are formed with abilities to discover new possibilities of excellence, and to distinguish themselves by means never tried before."—*Rambler.*

A thing or person is prominent by position, eminent by station, distinguished by peculiarities of good or ill, and illustrious by the testimony and consent of others.

"Lady Macbeth's walking in her sleep is an incident so full of tragic horror that it stands out as a prominent feature in the most sublime drama in the world."—*Cumberland.*

EMISSARY. See SPY.

EMIT. EXHALE.

EMIT (Lat. *emittere*, to send forth) is the wider term, as it includes the more and the less substantial. To

emit is, however, not commonly used of heavy and dense substances; in that case we use discharge. The cannon emits smoke, but does not emit shot. We speak of water, flame, gas, smoke, light, steam, smell, and the like, as emitted. EXHALE (*exhalare*) is used only of the lightest even of these; as to exhale odours, vapours, effluvia. Strictly, both emit and exhale relate to the propulsion of natural, not artificial things. It is only in poetry, for instance, that the bow emits the arrow.

"Lest, wrathful, the far-shooting god
Emit his fatal arrows." *Prior.*

"Is there not as much reason that the vapours which are exhaled out of the earth should be carried down to the sea, as that those raised out of the sea be brought up upon the dry land?"—*Ray.*

EMOLUMENT. See GAIN.

EMOTION. See AGITATION.

EMPHASIS. See ACCENT.

EMPIRE. KINGDOM. DOMINION.
(See REALM.)

EMPIRE (Lat. *imperium*) carries with it the idea of a vast and complicated government, varying in its relationship and degree of power in regard to the many subordinate and independent sovereignties or communities included under it. KINGDOM is more definitely the territory subject to a king or queen; while DOMINION (Lat. *dominus*, a lord) has the vague meaning of political subjection or subordination of any kind, whether at home or abroad, and is even applicable to the lordship which man exercises over the brute creation. In their figurative uses the parallel distinctions are observed: as the empire of mind or reason; the kingdoms of animal, mineral, and vegetable nature; the dominion of the passions.

"If vice had once an ill name in the world, was once generally stigmatised with reproach and ignominy, it would quickly lose its empire, and thousands that are now slaves of it would become proselytes to virtue."—*Sharp.*

"The great and rich kingdom of Granada."—*Bacon.*

"The safety, honour, and welfare of our sovereign and her dominions."—*Book of Common Prayer.*

EMPLOY. USE.

EMPLOY (Fr. *employer*, Lat. *implicare*) and USE (Fr. *user*, Lat. *uti, usus*) are somewhat differenced in usage. We always employ when we use; but we do not always use when we employ. Yet the difference is very slight. Use implies more entire assumption into our service than employ. As regards things, the terms are well-nigh interchangeable. We use or employ means; we use or employ violence; but as regards persons, we employ agents, and we use instruments. We do not use persons, except in some low sense, as machines or tools. Such respect is due to others when performing our behests. So a monarch negotiating with a foreign court would employ, not use, an ambassador. The more moral and dignified uses are expressed by employ.

"Had Jesus, on the contrary, made choice of the great and learned for this *employment*, they had discredited their own success. It might have been then objected that the Gospel had made its way by the aid of human power or sophistry."—*Warburton.*

"I would, my son, that thou would'st use the power

Which thy discretion gives thee, to control
And manage all." *Cowper.*

It may be added that to use has a general and abstract force, which is never apparent in employ. We may use simply; we never employ but for a specific purpose. A man uses, or has the use of, his hands when he simply exercises a natural power. He employs them for purposes which by the inferior animals are effected in other ways.

EMPLOYMENT. BUSINESS. AVOCATION. OCCUPATION. ENGAGEMENT.

EMPLOYMENT (*see* EMPLOY) is used in the twofold sense of employing and being employed. The same remark holds good of occupation and engagement. In the passive sense, employment is any fixed way of passing the time, whether in duty or

pleasure, or ways more indifferent. It may be active or meditative, specific, or habitual.

"Poets we prize, when in their verse we find
Some great *employment* of a worthy mind."

Waller.

BUSINESS (that which busies) is more active employment, which at the time engrosses the time and attention as of primary importance; as in the common phrase, "I will make it my business to attend to it." Business is responsible employment. We choose our employments; our business claims us.

"It seldom happens that men of a studious turn acquire any degree of reputation for their knowledge of *business*."—*Porteus.*

AVOCATION (Fr. *avocation*, a calling). The term is commonly used of the minor affairs of life, less prominent and engrossing than business, or such calls as are beside the man's duty or business of life. It very commonly, therefore, occurs in the plural number, as "multifarious avocations," "employments of every degree of urgency and responsibility."

"In the time of health visits, businesses, cards, and I know not how many other *avocations*, which they justly style diversions, do succeed one another so thick, that in the day there is no time left for the distracted person to converse with his own thoughts."—*Boyle.*

OCCUPATION (Lat. *occupatio*) is used of such employment as has become, or tends to become, habitual: as a favourite occupation, which may be one of seriousness or sport; an occupation in life, meaning a trade or calling.

"These were their learned speculations,
And all their constant *occupations*,
To measure wind and weigh the air,
And turn a circle to a square." *Butler.*

ENGAGEMENT (Fr. *engager*) is an engrossing occupation, not compulsory nor systematic, but casual, yet at the time leaving little or no room for other employments.

"Portia, go in a while,
And by and by thy bosom shall partake
The secrets of my heart.
All my *engagements* I will construe to
thee." *Shakespeare.*

EMPOWER. *See* AUTHORIZE.

EMPTY. VACANT. HOLLOW.
VOID.

EMPTY (A. S. *emtig*, *äamtig*, *emetig*) has reference to foreign or dissimilar substances; while HOLLOW (A. S. *hol*) has reference to internal discontinuity of substance; as an empty purse, a hollow beech. VACANT (Lat. *vacare*, to be empty) belongs to what might be filled, or is intended to be filled or occupied, but at present is not so; as a vacant chair, a vacant office. VOID (Lat. *viduus*) denotes some place so surrounded as to be unoccupied. A plot of ground, for instance, in the middle of a city unbuilt upon might be called void; it is the absence of filling up in other than a purely geometrical sense. An empty place would be in an exceptional or casual state. A void place might be intended to be always void, in the sense of provisionally unoccupied. That which is void conveys an impression of want or emptiness which may be felt.

"All empty is the tonne" (barrel).

Chaucer.

"The pope had accursed the English people because they suffered the bishops' sees to be vacant so long a time."—*Holinshed.*

Vacant is used in an abstract and a metaphorical, not a purely physical application. A vacant space, or a vacant office; but not a vacant vessel.

"Yet it has been noted that many old trees, quite decayed with an inward hollow-ness, have borne as full burdens and constantly as the very soundest."—*Evelyn.*

"And the void helmet followed as he pulled."

Corper, Iliad.

EMULATION. *See* COMPETITION.

ENCHANT. *See* CAPTIVATE.

ENCIRCLE. *See* CIRCUMSCRIBE.

ENCLOSE or INCLOSE. *See* CIRCUMSCRIBE.

ENCOMIUM. *See* PANEGYRIC.

ENCOMPASS. *See* CIRCUMSCRIBE.

ENCOUNTER. *See* ATTACK and ONSET.

ENCOURAGE. *See* CHEER and PROMOTE.

ENCROACH. INTRENCH. IN-
TRUDE. INVADE. INFRINGE.

ENCROACH (Old Fr. *encrouer*, *encroer*, Lat. *incrocare*, Fr. *croc*, a crook or hook) is to come gradually, insensibly, or imperceptibly upon another's land, or, metaphorically, upon his rights. It is this silence and indirectness which characterizes encroachment, so that the trespass is made, and the footing established before the process was heeded.

"Disobedience, if complied with, is infinitely *encroaching*; and having gained one degree of liberty upon indulgence will demand another upon claim."—*South.*

INTRENCH is an old term of feudal history, literally meaning to push forward the trench of fortified line, and so to trespass on another's territory, as when the king entrenched upon the nobles, or the nobles upon the king. The term, unlike encroach, denotes a direct and decisive act, though it may be an indirect result rather than a direct purpose, as if by performing a certain act, or claiming a certain privilege, a noble entrenched on a prerogative of the crown. Men encroach gradually; they intrench presumptuously.

"It is not easily apprehended to be the portion of her care to give it spiritual milk; and therefore it *intrenches* very much upon impiety and positive relinquishing the education of their children."—*Bishop Taylor.*

To INTRUDE (Lat. *in* and *trudere*, to thrust) is to thrust oneself in an abrupt or unwelcome manner upon the presence or society of another; while to INVADE (Lat. *invadere*) denotes a direct, positive, and open violation of another's rights. INFRINGE (*in* and *frangere*, to break) is positively to violate, or negatively to disregard a direct law, treaty, obligation, or right.

"Others have ceased their curiosity, and consider every man who fills the mouth of report with a new name as an *intruder* upon their retreat, and disturber of their repose."—*Rambler.*

ENCUMBER. *See* CLOG.

ENCYCLOPÆDIA. *See* DICTIONARY.

END. See AIM, CLOSE, and FINISH.

ENDING. See CLOSE.

ENDEAVOUR. See EFFORT and TRY.

ENDEMIC. See EPIDEMIC.

ENDLESS. ETERNAL. EVER-LASTING.

ENDLESS (A. S. *ende* and privative termination *less*) is applicable to the idea of infinity of space and of time, EVERLASTING only to infinite duration of time, ETERNAL to chronic period without either beginning or end (Lat. *eternus*, for *æviternus*, *ævum*, age). Endless admits the idea of intermediate though not of final cessation. That might be called endless which is perpetually recurrent, as endless disputes. Everlasting, on the other hand, implies no intermission as well as no end.

ENDOW. ENDUE. INVEST.

ENDOW (Norm. Fr. *endouer*, Lat. *dotare*) retains its etymological force, and in its metaphorical use signifies to furnish with something which is of the nature of a gift. "Man is endowed with reason," implies that reason is regarded as a faculty in the nature of a gift bestowed characteristically upon him by his Maker. ENDUE (Lat. *induere*) is to cover as it were with a vestment, and therefore means no more than permanently furnished. INVEST (Lat. *in* and *vestis*, a vest) is more external than endue. We may say a lover's imagination endues or invests his mistress with every grace; but when the idea is that of clothing with office or authority, we use the term invest.

We are commonly said to endow with privileges or substantial benefits, to endue with moral qualities, and to invest with dignity, authority, and power.

"And yet I do not take humility in man to consist in disowning or denying any gift or ability that is in him, but in a just valuation of such gifts and *endowments*, yet rather thinking too meanly than too highly of them."

—Ray.

"Now an unintelligent being, 'tis evident,

cannot be *endued* with all the perfections of all things in the world, because intelligence is one of those perfections."—Clarke.

"And what were all his most rightful honours but the people's gift, and the *investment* of that lustre, majesty, and honour which for the public good, and no otherwise, redounds from a whole nation into one person?"—Milton.

ENDOWMENT. GIFT. PRESENT.

In their simplest signification the distinction between these is obvious. An endowment is a gift in perpetuity, of which the usufruct is continually accruing; as to give a sum of money, of which the interest may serve to endow a public institution. A GIFT is usually from one who is in some sense a superior, and intended to benefit the person to whom it is given. A PRESENT (Lat. *presentare*, to present) is commonly from an equal or an inferior, as a mark of affection or respect. Of these, gift is the most generic, endowments and presents being forms of gifts. As they relate to moral and intellectual things, gifts and endowments differ in that a gift commonly ends as it were with itself, while an endowment gives the power of other things; and so gift is the more specific, endowment more general. The gift of speech, the gift of eloquence; the endowments of the understanding. Accordingly, a gift gives less the idea of something to be improved by exertion than endowment. The powers of the early church, such as the performance of miracles, the power of tongues, and the like, were both gifts and endowments—gifts of the Spirit when regarded as supernaturally given, endowments when regarded as faculties which might be exercised as occasions presented themselves. (See ENDOW.)

ENDUE. See ENDOW.

ENDURANCE. PATIENCE. RESIGNATION. FORTITUDE.

ENDURANCE is, as the term expresses, the power or act of enduring, that is, of suffering without sinking, and may be a physical or mental quality. It implies a continual pres-

sure of a harassing nature on the one hand, and a competent constitutional power of passive resistance on the other.

"When she with hard *endurance* had
Heard to the end." *Spenser.*

PATIENCE (*patientia, pati, patiens*, to suffer) is endurance which is morally acquiescent. The opposite to endurance is simply exhaustion, the opposite to patience is repining, or irritability and impatience. I may endure impatiently. The qualities of patience are gentleness and serenity in bearing that which, without being agonizing, is wearing or vexatious, whether internally or from the conduct of others. There is a sense in which patience is active, or, at least, more than purely passive, as in the patient teacher of dull or inattentive pupils. Fortitude, on the other hand, is purely passive.

"In the New Testament it is sometimes expressed by the word *ὑπομονή*, which signifies God's forbearance and patient waiting for our repentance; sometimes by the word *ἀνοχή*, which signifies holding in His wrath, and restraining Himself from punishing, and sometimes by *μακροθυμία*, which signifies the extent of His *patience*, His long-suffering and forbearing for a long time the punishment due for sinners."—*Tillotson.*

Still patience applies only to evils actually hanging over us; while **RESIGNATION** (*Lat. resignare*) extends to the possible as well as the actual, and is unresisting, unmurmuring acquiescence in the issue of circumstances or the exercise of the will of another. Resignation is more like to patience than to fortitude, inasmuch as it implies non-resistance; but, on the other hand, it is always passive. It applies not to passing pains or evils, but afflictions of a severe, prolonged, and seemingly hopeless character. It is a religious submission extending to the giving up of earthly hope. Fortitude and patience may be stoical or constitutional; resignation is always on principle.

"Resignation superadds to patience a submissive disposition respecting the intelligent cause of our uneasiness. It acknowledges both the power and the right of a superior to afflict."—*Cogan.*

FORTITUDE (*Lat. fortitudo, fortis*, strong) is a more energetic quality, and might be defined as passive courage or resolute endurance. It not only bears up against the present, and is resigned to what may be in the future, but it looks as it were the future in the face, and is prepared for yet worse things.

"Fortitude expresses that firmness of mind which resists dangers and sufferings."—*Cogan.*

ENDURE. See **LAST** and **SUFFER.**

ENDURING. See **DURABLE.**

ENEMY. **ADVERSARY.** **ANTAGONIST.** **OPPONENT.** **FOE.**

ENEMY (*Fr. ennemi, Lat. inimicus*) is one who is actuated by unfriendly feelings, and in consequence attempting or desiring the injury of another. An enemy may be open or secret, collective or personal. The term is employed of man's relationship to things as well as persons, as an enemy to truth, an enemy to falsehood. A **FOE** (*A. S. fā, fōh*) is a personal enemy, one who bears a more energetic and specific hatred than enemy.

"He who does a man an injury generally becomes the rancorous *enemy* of the injured man."—*Mickle.*

"Curst be the verse, how well soe'er it flow,
That tends to make one worthy man my
foe." *Iope.*

ADVERSARY, ANTAGONIST, and OPPONENT denote primarily personal *opposition*, and only secondarily personal *ill-will*, which in some cases may not exist at all; as in the case of an adversary at fence, an antagonist at chess, and a political opponent. Adversary, antagonist, and opponent are never, like enemy and foe, used collectively, as of a hostile army. An adversary (*Lat. adversarius, ad versus*) is one who takes an opposite part, which he sustains, or a side on which he enlists himself, whether singly or with others, and on behalf of which he strives for victory. An antagonist (*Gr. ἀντί, against, and ἀγωνιστής, a contender*) is purely personal; in the case of antagonists, it is person against person, not party

against party, or cause against cause. An opponent (Lat. *opponens*, from *opponere*, to oppose) is simply one who thwarts another, or seeks to stop his proceedings, without of necessity coming into conflict with him, but seeking to neutralize his acts or measures. The term, however, has an almost technical sense—that of an adversary in argument; where words are the weapons, we employ the term opponent.

“Truth seems to be considered by all mankind as something fixed, unchangeable, and eternal. It may therefore be thought that to vindicate the permanency of truth is to dispute without an adversary.”—*Beattie*.

“The race

Of Satan, for I glory in the name,
Antagonist of heaven’s Almighty King.”

Milton.

“The leading views of the earliest and most enlightened patrons of the economical system have, in my opinion, been not more misrepresented by its *opponents* than misapprehended by some who have adopted its conclusions.”—*Stewart*.

ENERGETIC. See STRENUOUS.

ENERGY. ACTIVITY. POWER.
FORCE. VIGOUR. STRENGTH.

ENERGY (Gr. *ἐνέργεια*), as a term of Greek philosophy, had the meaning of inherent or innate force. In this sense an energy may lie dormant, as “the dormant energies of nature.” From this the word passes to signify power forcibly exerted, as energy of manner or of utterance. It is the manifestation of *living* power. In this sense it is only used of beings possessing will; so vital energy, not mechanical energy.

“The great *energies* of nature are known to us only by their effects; the substances which produce them are as much concealed from our senses as the Divine essence itself.”—*Paley*.

ACTIVITY (Lat. *activus*, *agere*, *actus*) means no more than vigorous operation, or the faculty of it. This is not necessarily attended by great power, nor is it restricted to the vital energies, or an exhibition of the will, or a working in any one given direction. It may be intellectual, physical, instinctive, chemical, mechanical. Activity is not so much power or energy

as a mode in which a certain degree of power or energy is manifested.

“*Orl.* He is simply the most *active* gentleman in France.

“*Const.* Doing is *activity*, and he will still be doing.” *Shakespeare, Hen. V.*

POWER (Fr. *pouvoir*, Lat. *posse*), in its primary meaning, is ability to act, regarded as latent, and thence ability, regarded as manifest or exerted. It is also capable of a passive signification. Power may be predicated of the mind of man, of intelligent beings, of natural forces, or mechanical agents. The following extract relates to power in its metaphysical or psychological sense.

“*Power* then is active and passive. Faculty is active *power* or capacity; capacity is passive *power*.”—*Sir W. Hamilton*.

Mechanically, power commonly relates to the work to be effected, as force to that which is directly exerted by the machine. The force of an engine relates to the pressure exercised upon the rails, the power to the quantity or weight of the load drawn.

FORCE (Fr. *force*, Lat. *fortis*, strong) is active power specifically exerted. In mechanics it is the name given to whatever produces or may produce motion. In its other applications, it still relates to some external effect produced.

“Thy tears are of no *force*

To mollify this flinty man.” *Hayward*.

STRENGTH (A. S. *strengdhu*, *strengdho*, *strengd*, from *streng*, strong) is the quality of being strong, which may be active or passive, while force is always active. Strength is often used in the sense of power to resist force, as the strength of a rope or a castle. It has also the meaning of measurement of force, as the strength of an army or an alcohol. It may be said generally that force is strength exerted. An argument, for instance, is strong when the consideration which it involves is of weight; but it has no force till it is applied. A man collects his strength in order to strike with force. Strength is powerful in resistance, force in attack.

“More huge in *strength* than wise in works he was.” *Spenser*.

VIGOUR (Lat. *vigor*, *vigere*, to flourish)
U

is that mental or physical strength which results from a sound natural condition, as the vigour of intellect, the vigour of an arm, the vigour of a plant, the vigour of an administration. Vigour, like activity, is rather a mode of power than power itself. It is the passive, as activity is the energetic condition of vital power. It is applicable to the exhibition of physical strength, as "the vigour of his arm," or intellectual, as of his mind, or even to a sound and healthy state of animal or vegetative life. Vigour, and its derivatives, however, when directly associated with power, commonly imply active strength, or the power of action and exertion, in distinction to passive strength, or power of endurance. Men act or move, but do not suffer with vigour.

"The *vigour* of this arm was never vain."
Dryden.

ENERVATE. ENFEEBLE. DEBILITATE. WEAKEN.

Of these, WEAKEN (A. S. *wæc*, weak, from *wican*, to yield or totter) is the generic term, predicable of any case of lessened power, force, or strength. ENERVATE, ENFEEBLE, and DEBILITATE are only employed of human powers. Enervate (Fr. *énervé*, Lat. *nervus*, nerve), is to impair the moral powers, as debilitate may be more specifically applied to the physical, and enfeeble to the intellectual and physical. Debility is that weakness which comes from a chronically morbid state of the functions (*debilis*, a contracted form of *de habilis*); while persons may be enfeebled by the effect of age alone, or as the temporary effect of sickness.

"In a word, we ought to act in party with all the moderation which does not absolutely *enervate* that vigour, and quench that fervency of spirit without which the best wishes for the public good must evaporate in empty speculation."—*Burke.*

Enfeeble does not express so strongly as debilitate an organic cause of corporeal weakness. Disease debilitates, fear enfeebles.

"Abject fear, which views some tremendous evil impending from which it cannot possibly escape, as it depresses the spirits, so it *enfeebles* the corporeal frame, and it

renders the victim an easy prey to the evil he dreads."—*Cogan.*

"Sometimes the body in full strength we find,

While various ails *debilitate* the mind."

Jenyns.

"That the power, and consequently the security, of the monarchy may not be *weakened* by diversion, it must descend entire to one of the children."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations.*

ENFEEBLE. *See* ENERVATE.

ENGAGING. *See* ATTRACTIVE.

ENGAGEMENT. *See* BATTLE, EMPLOYMENT, and PROMISE.

ENGENDER. *See* BREED.

ENGROSS. *See* ABSENT.

ENJOYMENT. *See* PLEASURE.

ENLARGE. *See* DILATE.

ENLIGHTEN. ILLUMINE. ILLUMINATE.

To ENLIGHTEN is to throw light upon and, more commonly, metaphorically, the light of truth and knowledge. ILLUMINE (*in* and *lumen*, light) is so to enlighten as to penetrate the substance. ILLUMINATE is to throw light upon in the sense of enlighten, and also in the sense of to light up, whether by light itself, as in the festive illuminations of a city, or by rich colouring, as an illuminated manuscript. It is to be remarked that while enlightened is used as an epithet—an enlightened person or enlightened society—we do not employ illumined or illuminated in this way, but borrow the Italian word *illuminati*, the enlightened.

"The light itself became darkness; and then was a proper season for the great *Enlightener* of the world to appear."—*Secker.*

"*Illumine* with perpetual light
The dulness of our blinded sight."

Church Hymn.

"That need no sun t' *illuminate* their spheres."
Spenser.

In old English writers, however, the verbs *illumine*, *illumine*, and *illuminate* were used interchangeably.

ENLIST. *See* ENROL.

ENLIVEN. *See* CHEER.

ENMITY. *See* HATRED.

ENORMOUS. See HUGE.

ENOUGH. SUFFICIENT.

ENOUGH is an adverb and an adjective, SUFFICIENT an adjective only. Sufficient (Lat. *sufficiens*, from *sufficere*, to suffice) is placed both before and after its nouns. Enough can only elegantly be placed before it. Enough relates to wants and desires, sufficient commonly to some ulterior end or purpose. So a miser or a spendthrift may have sufficient for his requirements, but he never has enough, because he always desires more. Enough, therefore, relates to internal satisfaction; sufficient, to external demand.

ENRAPTURE. See CAPTIVATE.

ENROL. See ENLIST and REGISTER.

ENSLAVE. See CAPTIVATE.

ENSUE. See FOLLOW.

ENTANGLE. IMPLICATE. INVOLVE.

ENTANGLE (tangle, probably connected with Gothic *tagl*, hair) is so to involve as to render extrication a matter of bewildering difficulty. It is used both physically and metaphorically. IMPLICATE (*implicare*, in and *plica*, a fold) and INVOLVE (*in* and *volvere*, to roll) are used only in the metaphorical sense. The difference lies rather in the customary applications of these terms than in any essential unlikeness of meaning. We are entangled in difficulties or difficult relationships, as untoward alliances and acquaintanceships; we are implicated in blame, faults, crime, transactions, the term being always employed in an unfavourable sense. We are involved in things external which take strong effect upon us, as in debt, in ruin, in the untoward consequences of conduct or actions. The term is used also of things, while implicate is confined to persons, as the subject is involved in doubt, difficulty, mystery, obscurity; this involves, that is, implies, or draws after it, the necessity of something else.

"It (integrity) is much plainer and easier, much the safer and more secure way of

dealing in the world; it has less of trouble and difficulty, of *entanglement* and perplexity, of danger and hazard in it."—*Spectator*.

"He is much too deeply *implicated* to make the presence or absence of these notes of the least consequence to him."—*State Trials*.

"The kings of Syria and of Egypt, the kings of Pergamus and Macedon, without intermission worried each other for above two hundred years, until at last a strong power arising in the west rushed upon them and silenced their tumults by *involving* all the contending parties in the same destruction."—*Burke*.

ENTERPRISE. ENTERPRISING. See ADVENTUROUS and UNDERTAKING.

ENTERTAIN. HARBOUR.

These terms are sometimes used metaphorically of the thoughts, and of some sentiments, as hopes, friendship, enmity, and the like. In such cases, ENTERTAIN (Fr. *entretenir*) is less voluntary than HARBOUR (connected with the French *auberge*). To entertain an unfavourable opinion of another may be the result of calm judgment and unhappy experience; to harbour such thoughts rather implies that their soundness has not been proved, but that we readily lend ourselves to the supposition with some hope that it may be true, finding, as it were, a place for it in our minds. We entertain charitable, we harbour uncharitable thoughts.

"The not *entertaining* a sincere love and affection for the duties of religion does both naturally, and by the just judgment of God besides, dispose men to errors and deceptions about the great truths of religion."—*South*.

The unfavourable sense of harbour in regard to thoughts has no doubt sprung from its older use in regard to obnoxious persons, as seen in the following:—

"They judged that all men who suspected any to have been in the rebellion were bound to discover such their suspicions and to give no *harbour* to such persons; that the bare suspicion made it treason to *harbour* the person suspected, whether he was guilty or not."—*Burnet*.

ENTERTAINMENT. See AMUSEMENT and BANQUET.

ENTHUSIAST. FANATIC. VISIONARY. ZEALOT. BIGOT.

ENTHUSIAST (*ἐν*, in, and *θεός*, a deity, as if filled by the presence or inspiration of some deity) is one who is influenced by a peculiar fervour of mind. Enthusiasm is at present employed in the sense of an overweening attachment, not necessarily irrational—in certain limits even admirable—for some cause or subject, as an enthusiastic lover of music. Enthusiasm then begins to be blameworthy and perilous when the feelings have overmastered the judgment. In religion, enthusiasm is often taken to mean the influence of spirit as superseding the ordinary processes of revelation by instruction. In that sense it is spoken of in the following:—

"*Enthusiasm* is that temper of mind in which the imagination has got the better of the judgment. In this disordered state of things, *enthusiasm*, when it happens to be turned upon religious matters, becomes *fanaticism*."—*Warburton*.

"From the consequences of the genius of Henry, Duke of Visco, did the British American empire arise; an empire which, unless retarded by the illiberal and inhuman spirit of religious *fanaticism*, will in a few centuries perhaps be the glory of the world."—*Mickle*.

FANATIC (Lat. *fanaticus*, *fanum*, a temple) is employed to designate one whose overheated imagination has wild and extravagant notions, especially upon the subject of religion, which render him incapable of using his judgment and dangerous to others. For enthusiasm is a solitary, fanaticism a social passion. A VISIONARY, as the term expresses, is one who is moved by visions and influences of the imagination, mistaken for realities. He forms, therefore, impracticable schemes, and creates for himself a present or future state of things, which persons of calm judgment know to be incapable of realization.

"I know not whether the French did not derive their ideas of teaching things instead of words from some celebrated writers of our own country, who, with all their good sense and genius, were *visionaries* on the subject of education."—*Knox*.

ZEALOT (Gr. *ζηλωτής*, from *ζῆλος*, zeal, jealousy) and BIGOT (of which the derivation is very uncertain, but is probably of the same origin as *beguine*, the Germ. *beghart*, a mendicant monk of the middle ages) represent, the one actively, the superstitious partizan, the other, more passively, the superstitious believer and adherent.

"A furious *zealot* may think that he does God service by persecuting one of a different sect. St. Paul thought so, but he confesses he acted sinfully notwithstanding he acted ignorantly."—*Gilpin*.

A *zealot* is in action what a *bigot* is in opinion.

"They are terribly afraid of being called *bigots* and enthusiasts, but think there is no danger of falling into the opposite extreme of lukewarmness and impiety."—*Porteus*.

ENTICE. ALLURE. DECOY. SEDUCE. TEMPT.

ENTICE (Old Fr. *enticer*, connected with the A. S. *stician*, to stick or prick) is to draw on or instigate by means of a feeling *internal* to oneself, as hope or desire. ALLURE (Fr. *leurre*, a bait for animals) is to do the same thing by means of something *external* to oneself, as prospect of gain. DECOY (prefix *dé*, and the Old English word *coy*, Lat. *quietus*, Fr. *coi*, quiet) is to lead on quietly into the snare, as opposed to violent and noisy modes of capture. As the decoy was a term employed for the bird, or likeness of one, used to lead the others into the snare, the verb to decoy has the force of leading on gradually into a snare from which there is eventually no escape, as "to decoy troops into an ambush." To SEDUCE (Lat. *seducere*) is to draw aside from the path of duty, integrity, or chastity by false or alluring representations. To TEMPT (Lat. *tentare*, from *tendere*, to try) is to bring an influence, commonly no creditable one, to bear upon another to induce him to do something. It will be observed that entice, tempt, and allure do not absolutely imply the success of the means used, which, however, is the case with seduce and decoy.

"My son, if sinners *entice* thee, consent thou not."—*Book of Proverbs*.

"Among the Athenians, the Areopagites expressly forbade all *allurements* of eloquence."—*Hume*.

"Man is to man all kind of beasts, a fawning dog, a roaring lion, a thieving fox, a robbing wolf, a dissembling crocodile, a treacherous decoy, a rapacious vulture."—*Cowley*.

"An ingenuous young man takes up the book from the laudable motive of improving his mind with historical knowledge, but as he reads he finds himself *seduced* and cheated into irreligion and libertinism."—*Knorr, Essays*.

"Adam also was *tempted* and overcome; Chryste beeyng *tempted*, overcame the temptour."—*Udal, St. Luke*.

ENTIRE. WHOLE. COMPLETE.
TOTAL. INTEGRAL. PERFECT.

ENTIRE (Fr. *entier*, Lat. *integer*) and WHOLE (A. S. *hæl*, healthy, sound, whole) are very nicely distinguished. In most cases the words are simply interchangeable. The entire house and the whole house are the same thing. But whole relates to what is made up of parts, and a whole thing is a thing in which no part is wanting. Entire does not relate to any idea of parts, but simply to perfect and undiminished unity. So that in cases in which the idea is not resolvable into parts entire is used where whole could not be. So we say, a whole orange, a whole number, the whole quantity. But, "His character or disposition was marked by an entire absence of selfishness," "entire ignorance," "entire confidence," "entire control," and the like. In a word, whole means geometrical unity unbroken; entire also points to moral indeficiency.

"Christ, the bridegroom, praises the bride, His Church, for her beauty, for her *entireness*."—*Bishop Hall*.

"Upon this question, what supported or kept up this chain, would it be a sufficient answer to say that the first or lowest link hung upon a second, or that next above it, the second, or rather the first and second together, upon the third, and so on *ad infinitum*, for what holds up the *whole*?"—*Woolston*.

COMPLETE (Lat. *completo*, *completus*, to fill up) is possessing all that is needful to constitute a thing, or to fulfil a purpose or a definition.

"These discourses which I have written concerning perception, judgment, reasoning, and disposition, are the four integral parts of logic. This sort of parts goes to make up the *completeness* of any subject."—*Watts*.

TOTAL (Lat. *totalis*, from *totus*, whole) is complete in amount, so that in matters which do not relate to mere quantity we cannot use the term. We say, a complete house, meaning one furnished with every requirement of a house; an entire house, meaning the whole and not a part of it; but we could not say a total house; but the total sum, amount, total darkness, because the mere perfection of quantity is all that is regarded. INTEGRAL (Lat. *integer*), like entire, does not convey any idea of parts, but the simple absence of deduction or diminution, and is applicable both to abstract ideas and to the physical conformation of things. That is integral which is essential, complete, and whole, and yet itself bears relation to a larger whole, of which it is a part so truly that it could not be wanting without deficiency in that larger whole. PERFECT (Lat. *perfectus*, *perficere*, to make thoroughly) is a more comprehensive word, relating not only to quantity but also to quality. A perfect thing is not only complete in all its parts, but they are in the best condition and of the best kind. The term embraces the ideas of the utmost possible excellency, physical and moral also.

"God made thee *perfect*, not immaculate."
Milton.

ENTIRE. See NAME and QUALIFIED.

ENTRAP. INVEIGLE. ENSNARE.

To ENTRAP (literally, to catch in a trap, A. S. *trappe*, *trappa*) and ENSNARE (to catch in a snare, Sw. and Icelandic *snara*) seem to be thus differentiated in their moral application: men are entrapped when they fall suddenly and unawares victims to the designs of others; they are ensnared whenever, under false impressions of their own, they have found their way into difficulties, as, for

instance, by their own passions, prejudices, or ignorance. To *INVEIGLE* (Norm. Fr. *enveugler*, connected with the modern *aveugle*) implies the process of *gradual deception*, or luring on by little and little by any arts calculated to win over to the purpose of another. As *entrap* and *ensnare* point more directly to the result, so *inveigle* expresses more immediately the process, which may be by any sort of enticement, as false views of what is to the interest of the party, coloured representations, coaxing, flattery, and the like.

"The Pharisees and Herodians, as we find in the fifteenth verse of this chapter, had taken counsel together how they might *entrap* our Saviour in His talk, and for that end they put several *ensnaring* questions to Him."—*Sharp*.

"A sergeant made use of me to *inveigle* country fellows and list them in the service of the Parliament."—*Tatler*.

ENTREAT. See *ASK*.

ENTREATY. See *PETITION*.

ENTRUST. See *ACCREDIT*.

ENUMERATE. See *CALCULATE*.

ENVIOUS. INVIDIOUS. JEALOUS. SUSPICIOUS.

ENVIOUS (Fr. *envie*, Lat. *invidia*) denotes the feeling of unhappiness or uneasiness produced by the contemplation of any good belonging to another.

"*Envy* is a certain grief of mind conceived upon the sight of another's felicity, whether real or supposed, so that we see that it consists partly of hatred, and partly of grief."—*South*.

INVIDIOUS, though coming from the same root, has a different meaning, and shows that the closest synonyms are not always those which are etymologically cognate. It is used now, not of persons but things, and not in the sense of *possessing* but of *provoking* envy, or, by an extension of meaning, ill-will. An invidious task or office is one which cannot be exercised without causing discontent, or which requires tact to avoid such a result.

"Pythagoras was the first who abated of the *invidiousness* of the name, and from *σφδς*

brought it down to *φιλόσοφος*, from a master to a lover of wisdom, from a professor to candidate."—*South*.

JEALOUS (which is etymologically the same as *zealous*, for jealousy is zeal excited by the circumstances of another) is a feeling of envy mixed with rivalry. I am jealous of another when he stands in some relation to a third person which I should desire to occupy myself. It is this kind of personality which mainly causes envy to differ from jealousy. As *envious* relates to states or possessions merely, and jealousy to the same things in further relation to persons, it follows that the subject matter of jealousy is less definable. We are jealous, not only of the actual but the possible, whence the alliance between jealousy and SUSPICION. Suspicion (Lat. *suspiciere*) is more general. It denotes an inclination to believe in the existence of something which, nevertheless, does not rest upon anything worthy to be called evidence. This may relate simply to matters of fact as such, as a physician might say, "I suspect the existence of organic disease;" but it relates more commonly to thoughts of the character, conduct, and designs of other persons, and wears an inauspicious or unfavourable air. Jealousy is a painful apprehension of rivalry; suspicion, of wrong or harm.

"*Jelousie*,
Of whiche, if I the propertie,
Shall telle after the nicetee,
So as it worceth on a man,
A fever it is cotidian." *Gower*.

"*Suspicion* may be excited by some kind of accusation, not supported by evidence sufficient for conviction, but sufficient to trouble the repose of confidence."—*Cogan*.

ENVIRON. See *CIRCUMSCRIBE*.

ENVOY. See *AMBASSADOR*.

ENVY. See *ENVIOUS*.

EPICURE. GOURMAND. VOLUP-
TUARY. SENSUALIST.

An EPICURE (Epicurus, the Greek philosopher who assumed pleasure, not merely sensual, but the most refined, to be the highest good) is one who is devoted to sensual enjoy-

ments, but most especially the luxuries of the table. With him the quality and not the quantity of things is their recommendation. The GOURMAND (Fr. *gourmand*), on the other hand, is a greedy and ravenous eater. As the epicure is to the gourmand, so is the VOLUPTUARY (Lat. *voluptas*, pleasure) to the SENSUALIST (Lat. *sensualis*, *sensus*, sense). As the voluptuary lives for pleasure, but is nice in his tastes, so the sensualist gratifies his animal propensities with little discrimination. He is a coarse voluptuary.

"The truth is, their very fasts and humiliations have been observed to be nothing else but a religious *epicurism*, and a neat contrivance of luxury."—*South*.

"That great *gourmond*, fat Apicius."

Ben Jonson.

"In vain doth the scornful *voluptuary* ask for an account of it (the peace which passeth all understanding), which can never be given him, for it hath no alliance with any of the pleasures of sense in which he delights; nor hath he any ideas by which the perception of it may be conveyed to him."—*Bishop Atterbury*.

"The beggar who behind the hedge divides his offals with his dog, has often more of the real *sensualist* than he who dines at an elegant table."—*Mickle*.

EPIDEMIC. SPORADIC. ENDEMIC.

These terms are distinguished in their medical application. An EPIDEMIC disease (ἐπὶ, upon, and δῆμος, people) is one of which the cause acts upon a large number at the same time by reason of its wide diffusion. A SPORADIC disease (Gr. σποραδικός, scattered, from σπείρειν, to sow) is a disease which occurs in isolated cases without any concatenating influence. An ENDEMIC disease (ἐν, in, and δῆμος, people) is a disease peculiar to a nation or a number of people, and is an epidemic having its origin in or connected with the local or personal peculiarities of those among whom it prevails.

"A *sporadical* disease is what, in a particular season, affects but few people."—*Arbuthnot*.

EPISTLE. LETTER.

The LETTER (Lat. *literæ*) is an ordinary written communication on ordinary topics. The EPISTLE (Gr. ἐπιστολή, ἐπιστέλλειν, to send) is a more formal, and often public, communication of the kind: as the letters of Madame de Sevigny, the epistles of Horace or St. Paul. When letters, from the interest of their style and subjects, have passed into the public literature, there is a tendency to give them the name of epistles.

EPITHET. ADJECTIVE.

An EPITHET (Gr. ἐπίθετος, from ἐπιτίθεσθαι, to add) is literally a term added, and so is nearly equivalent, etymologically, to ADJECTIVE (Lat. *adjectivus*, from *ad* *dicere*, to add). It used to be employed of any qualifying term, whether substantive or adjective, as, "He applied to me the epithet of liar." But, of late, there has been a tendency among rhetoricians to limit the term to adjectives, and yet, further, to such adjectives as express *inherent* and *not adventitious* qualities; so green is an epithet of grass, because grass is, presumably, always green; but short would not be an epithet of grass, because it is sometimes long. The meaning of adjective is well known.

EPITOME. See ABRIDGMENT.

EPOCH. See DATE.

EQUABLE. See EQUAL.

EQUAL. EVEN. EQUABLE. LIKE. ALIKE. UNIFORM. LEVEL.

EQUAL (Lat. *æqualis*, *æquus*) is applied to number, degree, and measurement, and any subject that admits of them, as, "Things of equal size," "Equal in degree," "This is equal to that," "I am not equal to the task." It is applicable, not only to two or more things, but to one and the same, in the sense of fair, equable, but an external standard of comparison is always supposed.

"In sober silence, we can but admire
Beauty with temper, taste and sense combined.

The body only *equal'd* by the mind."

Warton.

EVEN (A. S. *even, efen, emn*) is superficial equality or sameness of level. An even balance is when one scale is not higher or lower than another; an even road is one which has no superficial elevations and depressions; an even temper is not unduly excited or depressed; an even number, as opposed to 'odd, is one that being divisible by two does not rise higher in one division than the other. It will be seen that, as equal is almost always applied to more than one thing, so even is commonly said of one.

"And shall lay thee *even* with the ground."—*Bible*.

EQUABLE denotes the equality of continuous proportion; a vessel sails at an equable rate when it makes as much in one hour as in the preceding. As equal and even denote modes of the fixed, so equable belongs to action, operation, or movement.

"If bodies move *equably* in concentric circles, and the squares of their periodical times be as the cubes of their distances from the common centre, their centripetal forces will be reciprocally as the squares of the distances."—*Cheyne*.

LIKE (A. S. *lic, gelic*) always denotes two or more things. It expresses all that is expressed by equal, with the additional signification of resemblance. ALIKE expresses *reciprocal* resemblance between two or more. In the term like the resemblance is with *an external object*. John is like James, or John and James are alike, or these six are like those six, or the twelve are alike.

"The darkness and light to Thee are both *alike*."—*Bible*.

"Can any distinction be assigned between the two cases, between the producing watch and the producing planet, both passive unconscious substances; both by the organization which was given them producing their *like* without understanding or design—both, that is, instruments?"—*Paley*.

UNIFORM (Lat. *uniformis, unus, one, and forma, form*) is, in many cases, an interchangeable word with equable. Equable motion is uniform motion; but uniformity is more widely

applicable than equability, as it is available, not only of continuous equality, but of what, on successive trials of observation or experience, strikes us as continuous identity of object, as, "The uniformity of a man's opinions."

"Analogies, harmonies, and agreements are discovered in the works of nature and its several parts explained, that is, reduced to general rules, which rules, grounded on the analogy and *uniformness* observed in the production of natural effects, are most agreeable, and sought after by the mind."—*Berkeley*.

LEVEL (A. S. *læfeldre*, connected with *libella*, the diminutive of *libra*, a balance) is, in its strict geometrical sense, coincident with the plane of the horizon. As even relates to the quality of the surface *per se*, so level relates to it as a plane and its horizontal lie. A level plank on a level floor is itself level, but it is even if it have a well-polished surface, though it be set up on end.

"And when along the *level* seas they flew,
Scarce on the surface curled the briny
dew."
Pope.

EQUITABLE. See FAIR.

EQUITY. JUSTICE.

JUSTICE (Lat. *justitia, justus*, just) and EQUITY (*æquitas, æquus*, equal) are intrinsically the same; but, in the technical sense, equity is the moral redressing of what is legal, where, owing to the imperfection of human laws, what is legal is not exactly just. A court of equity is also sometimes styled a court of justice.

"From this method of interpreting laws by the reason of them, arises what we call *equity*, which is thus defined by Grotius:—"The correction of that wherein the law, by reason of its universality, is deficient."—*Blackstone*.

"Justice is twofold, namely, general or strict justice, which consists in observing the laws, and the aim of which is public good; and particular justice, or equity, which aims at the good of individuals, and is then observed when one obtains no more good, and suffers no more evil than is agreeable to humanity and common sense."—*Beattie*.

EQUIVOCAL. See AMBIGUOUS.

EQUIVOCATE. PREVARICATE.

To EQUIVOCATE (Lat. *æquus* equal, and *vox*, a speech or word) is, strictly, to make use of expressions which do not necessarily violate truth, because they may be taken in more senses than one; the equivocating person giving himself the benefit of this ambiguity, in the hope that the other party may take his expressions in the sense favourable to himself. To PREVARICATE (Lat. *prævaricari*, *varus*, straddling) is a very old term of law. The idea was that of walking, as it were, on two levels, and so colluding. In its modern and familiar use, as equivocate relates to the management of words, so prevaricate relates to the management of the matter. To prevaricate is to deal with the subject in a loose, evasive way, shuffling or quibbling so as to avoid disclosing the truth.

"Tresham, a little before his death in the Tower, subscribed his own hand that he had not seen Garnett in sixteen years before, when it was evidently proved, and Garnett confessed, they had been together the summer before; and all that Garnett had to say for him was, that he supposed he meant to equivocate."—*Stillingfleet*.

The following quotation explains the legal origin of the term prevaricate:—

"There lay an action of *prevarication* when the accuser, instead of urging the crime home, seemed rather to hide or extenuate the guilt. Hence the civilians define a *prevaricator* to be one that betrays his cause to the adversary, and turns on the criminal's side, whom he ought to prosecute."—*Kennet, Rom. Antiq.*

ERA. See DATE.

ERADICATE. EXTIRPATE. EXTERMINATE.

ERADICATE, literally, to pluck up by the root (Lat. *radix*, a root), and EXTIRPATE (Lat. *stirps*, a stem or root) are in their ideas very similar, nor is EXTERMINATE widely different (Lat. *ex* and *terminus*, a border), to remove utterly out of bounds. Their difference lies in their application. We eradicate for the sake of destroying the thing eradicated; we extirpate for the sake of the bettering of what

is left behind. So we speak of eradicating vices, extirpating heresies or sects, and exterminating bodies of living individuals, as a colony, a race, a tribe.

"Hence an attempt to *eradicate* religious fears may be destructive to a principle of action which is not only natural in itself, but has proved highly beneficial. What is the proper inference? That it is the province of true philosophy to give these principles a right direction and a due influence, and it will then rejoice that a total *eradication* has not been accomplished."—*Cogan*.

"The vicious are the disorderly members of a moral state; and were not the Supreme Governor more mild than His representatives, they would be immediately *extirpated* from the society they offend and insult."—*Ibid*.

"The Spaniards, in order to preserve the possession of America, resolved to *exterminate* the inhabitants."—*Robertson*.

ERASE. See EFFACE.

ERECT. See BUILD, LIFT, and ESTABLISH.

ERRAND. MESSAGE.

ERRAND (A. S. *ærende*, *ærend*, *ür*, messenger) is an object for which one goes somewhere, or is sent by another. If the object be to communicate with another in words, then the errand is so far a message. But the errand may be not of this kind, as an errand to buy something at the market. A MESSAGE (Fr. *message*, Lat. *mittere*, *missus*, to send) is a verbal communication sent from one person to another, whether orally or in writing. An errand is an act; a message is a thing of words.

"He would understand men's true *errand* as soon as they had opened their mouths and began their story in appearance to another purpose."—*Locke, Memoirs of the Earl of Shaftesbury*.

"His winged *messengers*,
On *errands* of supernal grace."

Milton.

"To verify that solemn *message*, late
On which I sent thee to the Virgin pure,
In Galilee, that she should bear a Son,
Great in renown, and called the Son of
God." *Ibid.*

ERRATIC. See ABNORMAL.

ERROR. MISTAKE. BLUNDER.

An ERROR (Lat. *error*, *errare*, to wander) is any deviation from the standard or course of right, truth, justice, or accuracy, which is not intentional. A MISTAKE (prefix, mis and take, to take wrongly) is an error committed under a misapprehension or misconception of the nature of a case. An error may be from the absence of knowledge; a mistake is from insufficient or false observation. BLUNDER is a practical error of a peculiarly gross or awkward kind, committed through glaring ignorance, heedlessness, or awkwardness. A blunder is, perhaps, *ceteris paribus*, the most irretrievable; for an error may be overlooked or atoned for, a mistake may be rectified; but the shame or ridicule which is occasioned by a blunder, who can counteract? In the broadest sense of the term error, it may be regarded as the generic term, under which mistake is included; so that a mistake might be defined an error of perception. To miss intellectual truth is error; to confound physical facts is mistake. To say that the Trojan war ended in the victory of the Trojans would be an error; to speak to a person in the street, thinking he was somebody else, would be a mistake. There is a metaphorical sense in which all error has been resolved into mistake, that is, upon the supposition that all knowledge is based upon the observation of external facts or objects. In that way, as all truth comes of right perception, so all error would be wrong perception or mistake. This is Locke's meaning when he says—

"Knowledge being to be had only of visible certain truth, *error* is not a fault of our knowledge, but a *mistake* of our judgment, giving assent to that which is not true."

"For my part, as I was never distinguished for address, and have often even *blundered* in making my bow, such bodings as these had liked totally to have repressed my ambition."—*Goldsmith*.

ERUDITION. See LEARNING.

ERUPTION. EXPLOSION.

ERUPTION (Lat. *crumpere*, *eruptus*, to break out) is the breaking or

bursting forth from inclosure or confinement. This is so often attended by sudden and loud noise that sound is commonly associated with it. On the other hand, many eruptions take place without much noise, indeed without any, as, an eruption of armed men, an eruption of the skin. EXPLOSION (*explodere*, for *explaudere*, to break out with a clap) is essentially the breaking out of a sudden and loud noise. This may be the effect of eruption or not. The eruptions of Vesuvius often occasion explosions; on the other hand, the explosion of gunpowder would never be called an eruption, however true it may be that there is an eruption of minute particles. Explosion seems to have lent itself more readily to the moral in its metaphorical uses, and eruption to the social, as we frequently speak of an explosion of anger, or even folly, and an eruption of political discontent.

"The confusion of things, the *eruptions* of barbarians, the straits of emperors, the contentions of princes, did all turn to account for him."—*Barrow*, *Pope's Supremacy*.

"When, to the startled eye, the sudden glance

Appears far south *eruptive* through the cloud,

And following slower, in *explosion* vast,
The thunder raises his tremendous voice."

Thomson.

ESCAPE. ELUDE. EVADE. SHUN. AVOID. ESCHEW.

ESCAPE (Old Fr. *eschapper*, *eschamper*, probably from the Old Germ. *champf*, combat) is to obtain security from peril, danger, confinement, or evil of any form, whether threatened or inflicted, by persons or otherwise. Sometimes the term is used metaphorically in the sense of having been overlooked, as, the circumstance escaped my notice. In its common application, escape involves the idea of successful effort to avoid danger, or the power, coercion, or even observation of another.

"Sailors that *escaped* the wreck."

Shakespeare.

To ELUDE (Lat. *eludere*) is to escape by artifice, vigilance, or dex-

terity, and implies some person or force at work, from which we escape; as to elude an officer, detection, an argument, a blow, inquiry, search, comprehension, analysis. In the last four examples, elude, like escape, assumes, metaphorically, an active force in matters without action.

"The gentle Delia beckons from the plain,
Then hid in shades *eludes* her eager swain."
Pope.

To **EVADE** (Lat. *evadere*) is to go out of the way or reach of a thing or person. It is commonly done by dexterity, ingenuity, or subterfuge, but, in its literal sense, and as said of one person in regard to another, it is sometimes used of voluntary avoidance or withdrawal; as, "I wished to accost him, but he evaded me," that is, literally walked away.

"The heathen had a method more truly their own of *evading* the Christian miracles."
—Trench.

SHUN (A. S. *scunian*, *sceonian*) carries with it the notion of wary and often systematic avoidance, as knowing too well the nature of the object of avoidance, or holding it in personal dislike.

"It is not supposed that we should have power always to resist, unless we beforehand do what is in our power to *shun* temptation."
—Atterbury.

AVOID is a weaker term, meaning no more, literally, than to leave a void space between oneself and the object, to keep clear of it. Avoid admits of many degrees of force in the feeling which prompts the avoidance; we may avoid a thing as involving certain destruction, or we may avoid as a simple matter of prudence or taste, as to avoid giving offence.

"Nor can a man pray from his heart that God would not lead him into temptation, if he take no care of himself to *avoid* it."
—Mason.

ESCHEW (connected with the German *scheuen*, to avoid, and the English *shy*, as in the phrase, to fight shy) is to avoid, on the score of wrong, or a feeling of distaste or uncongeniality.

"Not only to *eschew* evil, but do good in the world."—Beveridge.

ESCORT. See **ACCOMPANY.**

ESPECIALLY. See **CHIEFLY.**

ESPY. See **DISCERN.**

ESSAY. See **EFFORT.**

ESSAY. TREATISE. DISSERTATION. TRACT. MONOGRAPH.

ESSAY (Fr. *essai*, *essayer*, to try) is a modest term to express an author's attempt to illustrate some point of knowledge or learning by general thoughts upon it. It is tentative rather than exhaustive or scientific. The completeness of the work often surpasses the tentative character of the title given to it, as in the case of Locke's "Essay on the Human Understanding." A distinction between the treatise and the essay is drawn in the following:—

"To write just *treatises* requireth leisure in the writer and leisure in the reader, and therefore are not so fit neither in regard of your highnesses princely affairs nor in regard of my continual service; which is the cause that hath made me choose to write certain brief notes, set down rather significantly than curiously, which I have called *essays*. The word is late, but the thing is ancient. For Seneca's epistles to Lucilius, if you mark them well, are but *essays*, that is, dispersed meditations, though conveyed in the form of epistles."—Bacon.

A **TREATISE** (Fr. *traiter*, to treat) is more formal and scientific than an essay. As an essay gives rather the thoughts and impressions of the writer, so a treatise gives rather what has been said in connection with the subject, and is an accurate or learned exposition of it. A **DISSERTATION** (Lat. *dissertatio*, *dissertare*, to discuss) is of an argumentative character, giving what *may* be said for and against, and involving views of the writer upon subject matter capable of being regarded in different lights, as, "Newton's Dissertations on the Prophecies."

"Beside the repetition of the Augustan confession, before mentioned, concerning the Lord's Supper, the divines of Wittenburgh laboured other articles with the ambassadors,

in single *dissertations*, drawn up by Melancthon, as it appeared."—*Strype*.

A TRACT (Lat. *trahere*, *tractus*, to draw) is of a simpler and shorter character, not argumentative, simply didactic, and commonly, as now used, of a religious nature. The old word was *tractate*.

"Most remarkable was his skill in mathematics, being accounted the Archimedes of that age, having written many *tractates* in that faculty, which carry with them a very good regard at this day."—*Fuller*, *Worthies*.

MONOGRAPH (Gr. *μόνος*, only, and *γράφειν*, to write) is a treatise specially dedicated to the elucidation of one point or subject, upon which the object is to concentrate as much light as possible. The word is recent.

ESSENTIAL. See NECESSARY.

ESTABLISH. SETTLE. CONFIRM.

FIX. INSTITUTE. FOUND. ERECT.

TO ESTABLISH (Fr. *établir*) is to place firmly, or to make firm, and is applicable both to what has been originally planted and to what is now planted for the first time. It is also applicable both to things and persons. It is used of position, opinions or belief, laws, customs, regulations, and institutions. But establish is never used in a purely material sense. To establish is to accord a position and place of residence. It has reference to authority and civil government. It is to give "a local habitation and a name." An established fact, principle, or usage is one which has proof, duration, and public recognition in its favour.

"God, being the author and *establisher* of nature, and the continual sustainer of it by His free Providence, it is not likely that He will suffer the laws and cause thereof to be much violated, except upon occasions very considerable, and for very good purposes."—*Barrow*.

TO SETTLE (from set, A. S. *settan*) is to establish in reference to antecedent movement or agitation; as to settle a person in life; to settle his affairs, that is, place them in a fixed and satisfactory state; to settle a

colony; to settle the mind, or any question which agitates it; to settle an allowance, that is, to make it permanent and not variable; to settle an account or a dispute, as involving previous fluctuation and agitation, or commotion, as a disturbance.

"On her (the Princess Sophia) therefore, and the heirs of her body, being Protestants, the remainder of the crown on the death of King William and Queen Anne without issue was settled by statute 12 and 13 of William III."—*Blackstone*.

TO CONFIRM (Lat. *confirmare*) is to make strong what has been already set up or established; but it is not employed of physical, but of mental, moral, or civil strengthening—the health, not the body, is confirmed. So of other things, as order, truth, justice, determination, conviction, authority, office, suspicion, belief, treaty, law. The opposite to confirm is to unsettle.

"According to the politician's creed, religion, being useful to the state, yet only a well-invented fiction, all experiments, that is, all inquiries into its truth, naturally tend not to confirm but to unsettle this necessary support of civil government."—*Warburton*.

FIX (Lat. *figere*, *fixus*) is to establish in reference to antecedent or future variation or local alterableness. It is to external what settle is to internal change. And it is, like settle, used both as an intransitive and a transitive verb. It is to settle definitely at one degree, or in one place, or in one form or condition.

"From this account of the causes or requisites of *fixity* may be deduced the following means of giving or adding *fixation* to a body that was before either volatile or less fixed."—*Boyle*.

INSTITUTE (Lat. *instituere*) is used only transitively. It does not apply to the purely physical setting up of material objects, but to such matters as laws, rules, orders, inquiries, processes or suits, and what are characteristically termed institutions, that is, what are established so as to have permanent operation, as a permanent mode or custom, or a building devoted to the permanent provision for some object, as an educational or charitable institution. As establish

stands to place, so does institute to time.

"And did *institute*, and in His holy Gospel command us to continue a perpetual memory of that His precious death until His coming again."—*Book of Common Prayer*.

FOUND (Lat. *fundare*, to lay a foundation), unlike *institute*, is employed of the processes of material construction. Analogously, it is used of commencing by furnishing with some amount of *permanent support* capable of being afterwards extended, as to found a fellowship in a university. To found is to take the first step or measures for building, erecting, or establishing.

"It fell not, for it was *founded* on a rock."
—*Bible*.

To **ERECT** (Lat. *erigere*, *erectus*) is used both of physical and analogous setting up of what is meant to remain standing; as to erect a sign-post, a marble column, or a new commonwealth or diocese. It differs from *found*, inasmuch as it means to set up, while *found* means to lay down. So a house may be at the same time founded upon a rock and erected, but a throne or a flag-staff is not founded, but only erected. It always indicates a change of character, and, when applied to institutions or offices, implies an elevation of dignity, as when a province is erected into a kingdom.

"To *erect* a new commonwealth."—*Hooker*.

ESTEEM. See APPRAISE.

ESTIMATE. See APPRAISE and CALCULATE.

ESTRANGEMENT. **ALIENATION.**
ABSTRACTION.

These terms are synonymous in so far as they express in common the state of being drawn away from objects in mind or person. **ABSTRACTION** (Lat. *abstrahere*) expresses no more than the being taken away from certain persons, influences, or occupations, whatever may be the feeling that withdraws us, or that which we entertain to what we leave behind, as abstraction from the world, its cares, pleasures, and pursuits, only a sufficient force is implied, which is for

the most part one of taste and feeling. **ESTRANGEMENT** (Lat. *extraneus*, Fr. *étranger*, *stranger*) and **ALIENATION** (*alienus*, *alius*, alien) denote a stronger and more personal feeling, which positively keeps us away through an altered state of affection. If there be any difference between them, it is such as flows from the words themselves, alienation expressing an internal disharmony of feeling caused by some act, as, "His repeated offences have alienated my regard for him;" estrangement expressing the gradual operation of any circumstances that have caused separation of person or feeling, as, "I have been long estranged from him." A revulsion of feeling alienates; absence and distance may estrange. The distinctive force of estrangement and alienation is shown by the following of Jeremy Taylor:—

"If excommunication be incurred ipso facto, he that is guilty of the fact deserving it, and is fallen into the sentence, is bound to submit to those *estrangements* and separations, those *alienations* of society and avoidings which he finds from the duty of others."

"A youthful passion for *abstracted* devotion should not be encouraged."—*Johnson*.

ETERNAL. See ENDLESS.

EULOGY. See PANEGYRIC.

EVADE. See ESCAPE.

EVASION. See EVADE.

EVEN. See EQUAL.

EVENT. See CIRCUMSTANCE and RESULT.

EVER. ALWAYS.

ALWAYS means at all times. **EVER** has the additional meaning of *at any time*, in which it belongs peculiarly to negative and interrogative sentences, as "Who *ever* (at any time) heard the like of it?" "No man *ever* hated his own flesh." **Ever** expresses uniformity of continuance; always expresses uniformity of repetition. So we might say, "He is ever at home," or, "He is always at home;" but we could not say, "I have called several times, and have ever found him at home," but always. On the other hand, we might say, "I have

ever found him a true friend," that is, at any time when occasion has arisen, or continually.

EVERLASTING. *See* ENDLESS.

EVERY. *See* ALL.

EVIDENCE. *See* PROOF.

EVIDENT. *See* APPARENT.

EVIL. *See* BAD.

EVIL. ILL.

An EVIL (A. S. *efel*, *yfel*, or *hyfel*) is anything that causes harm or suffering. ILL (a contraction from evil) is commonly applied to minor evils, and to such as are incidental to particular states; while evil is often the result of our own actions. We should hardly speak of a trivial evil, but of a trivial ill, the ills of humanity. Sin is of the nature of an evil; misfortune is an ill.

"Thus, after having clambered with great labour from one step of argumentation to another, instead of rising into the light of knowledge, we are devolved back into dark ignorance, and all our effort ends in belief that for the evils of life there is some good, and in confession that the reason cannot be found."—*Johnson*.

"The ills that flesh is heir to."—*Shakespeare*.

EVINCE. *See* SHOW.

EXACT. ACCURATE. CORRECT.
PRECISE. NICE. PARTICULAR.
PUNCTUAL.

EXACT (Lat. *exigere*, to enforce) is applicable both to persons, their habits or style, and to productions of men. Exactness is that kind of truth which consists in the conformity to an external standard or measure, or has an internal correspondence with external requirement. As an exact amount is that which is required, the exact time that which agrees with the sun or the clock, an exact man is he who conforms to the external requirements of time and rule. An exact statement accords with the facts to be expressed. Correctness applies to the style, exactness to the matter. He is an exact writer who attends to truth of fact and pre-

cision of ideas; he is a correct writer who conforms to the rules of grammar and the requirements of usage.

"The Parliament for divers reasons thought it not convenient to comply with the king's propositions, and in answer to the Scots, demanded of them an *exact* account of what was due to them, requiring them to withdraw their garrisons from such places as they possessed in England."—*Ludlow, Memoirs*.

As exact refers to an extraneous standard, so ACCURATE (Lat. *ad* and *cura*, care or pains) to the attention which has been expended upon a thing, and the exactness which may be expected from it. Exactness may be fortuitous; accuracy is always designed. Exactness is of one point, or one at a time; accuracy is of many.

"The knowledge of one action or one simple idea is oftentimes sufficient to give me the notion of a relation; but to the knowing of any substantial being an *accurate* collection of sundry ideas is necessary."—*Locke*.

CORRECT (Lat. *corriger*, *correctus*, to correct) applies to what is conformable to a moral standard, as well as to truth generally, as "correct deportment." Otherwise it closely resembles exact, but is more subjective, exact more objective. An exact account means a true account; a correct account means an account truly given, that is, without error or omission on the part of the narrator. An exact drawing is one which represents with perfect fidelity, a correct drawing one which fulfils all the rules and requirements of the art without faults, an accurate drawing one which observation and pains have made exact.

"But in such lays as neither ebb nor flow,
Correctly cold and regularly low,
That, shunning faults, one quiet temper
keep,
We cannot blame indeed, but we may
sleep." *Pope*.

PRECISE (Fr. *précis*, Lat. *præcisus*, cut off or cut down, and so close) denotes the quality of exact limitation, as distinguished from vague, loose, doubtful, inaccurate, and, in its application to persons, scrupulous. It has a peculiar application to words and expressions, as "The law is precise upon this point," where

we could not have used any of the preceding terms. The idea of precision is that of going straight to the point without error, vagueness, or ambiguity. It casts aside the useless and the superfluous.

"Many cases happen in which a man cannot *precisely* determine where it is that his lawful liberty ends, and where it is that it begins to be extravagant and excessive."—*Sharp*.

NICE (Lat. *nescius*) originally meant ignorant, after which the A. S. *nese* being confounded with it, it came to mean pleasing, delicate. Hence, reflexively, delicate in operation or production, exact, fastidiously discriminating. Nice denotes an union of delicacy and exactness, as "a nice distinction," "a nice point."

"By his own *nicety* of observation he had already formed such a system of metrical harmony as he never afterwards much needed or much endeavoured to improve."—*Johnson*, *Life of Waller*.

PARTICULAR (Lat. *particularis*, *pars*, a part or portion), as applied to persons, means attentive to things singly or in detail, and so combines the exact in observation with the nice in feeling. It relates to the matters of ordinary life and everyday choice and preference. In this sense the term is of modern application. Having passed from the thing to the person, it expresses one who pays attention to details, whether in observation, duty, or taste, as distinguished from one who treats them generally, carelessly, indiscriminately, or, as it were, in the rough. PUNCTUAL (Lat. *punctualis*, *punctus*, a point) stands to the mode of doing things as particular to the things themselves. The punctual man is prompt and exact, especially as to the time appointed. It had originally the sense of exact or accurate, as Burnet, "punctual to tediousness in all he relates."

"The undeviating and *punctual* sun."

Cowper.

EXACT. EXTORT.

To EXACT (Lat. *exigere*, *exactus*) and to EXTORT (*extorquere*, *extortus*, to twist out) agree in expressing a forcible mode of requiring; but

exact has commonly the sense of rigidly insisting upon what is due, while extort relates to the unjust exaction of what is *not due*. Men exact tribute, obedience, demonstrations of respect; they extort money under exorbitant charges or false pretences. The term is also applied to the compulsory procuring or eliciting of what others are unwilling to give, as to "extort a confession."

"'Tis no dishonour to confer your grace

On one descended from a royal race;

And were he less, yet years of service past
From grateful souls *exact* reward at last."

Dryden.

"*Extortion* is an abuse of the public justice, which consists in any officer's unlawfully taking by colour of his office from any man any money or thing of value that is not due to him, or more than is due, or before it is due."—*Blackstone*.

EXALT. See LIFT.

EXAMINE. See EXAMINATION.

EXAMINATION. SEARCH. INQUIRY. RESEARCH. INVESTIGATION. SCRUTINY. EXPLORATION. EXPLOITATION. INSPECTION.

All these terms agree in denoting some kind and degree of effort at the finding out of what is not known. To EXAMINE (Lat. *examen*, a balance) is literally to test by a balance, and, by an extension of meaning, in any appropriate or received method. The subject of examination is always present and known, and the object of it is to procure a fuller and deeper insight into it, or a closer observation of it, as a material substance or composition, a fact, a reason, cause, motive, or claim, the truth of a statement, or the simple force and meaning of it, a theory, or anything which challenges inquiry, an offender in reference to his guilt, or a scholar for his attainments. Examination is a thing of detail, consisting of a complex inquiry or inspection of particulars, for the purpose of coming to a general conclusion or result as to the character or state of the object examined.

"The proper office of *examination*, inquiry, and ratiocination is, strictly speaking, confined

to the production of a just discernment and an accurate discrimination."—*Cogan*.

On the other hand, in SEARCH (Fr. *chercher*, Low Lat. *circare*, from *circum*, around, to look around) implies the looking for something remote from present observation. In this way search may precede examination. The botanist or the entomologist, for instance, first searches for specimens, and then examines them. Search is more laborious than examination, and involves an object more closely related to the person. One examines for the sake of information or knowledge; one searches for the sake of acquiring and possessing. Examination ought to be careful and accurate; search, active and industrious.

"She was well pleased, and forth her damzells sent

Through all the woods, to *search* from place to place,

If any track of him or tidings they might trace." *Spenser*.

INQUIRY (Lat. *inquirere*, *querere*, to seek) is the aiming at or discovery of truth by question, either formal, verbal interrogation, or a recourse to the proper means and sources of knowledge, when the object has been shaped into a question or problem for solution.

"And all that is wanting to the perfection of this art (medicine) will undoubtedly be found, if able men, and such as are instructed in the ancient rules, will make a further inquiry into it, and endeavour to arrive at that which is hitherto unknown by that which is already known."—*Dryden*.

RESEARCH is laborious and sustained search after objects, not of physical, but mental observation and knowledge. It is used in the sense of accumulated results as well as the process of such inquiry, as a "man of great research."

"Nature, the handmaid of God Almighty, doth nothing but with good advice, if we make *researches* into the true reason of things."—*Howell*.

INVESTIGATION (Lat. *in* and *vestigium*, a footstep) is not used of any physical tracking, but of the patient inquiry into matters of science or knowledge along a strict path, and,

as it were, step by step. The subject of investigation, like that of examination, and unlike search, is never absolutely unknown, but it is always partially so. Investigation commonly implies the inquiry into the more hidden connections of something which is itself familiar, as to investigate the causes of natural phenomena. Investigation is literally a mental tracking where facts or appearances, being successively observed and examined, lead the mind on to some complex truth or fact, which is the goal of the inquiry.

"Now all this that I have said is to show the force of diligence in the *investigation* of truth, and particularly of the noblest of all truths, which is that of religion."—*South*.

SCRUTINY (Lat. *scrutinium*, *scrutari*, to search) involves nothing unknown in itself, and is confined to minute examination of what is known and present. It relates to other matters than mere physical substances. A microscopic examination of an insect, for instance, would not be called a scrutiny. "A scrutiny of voters, and their votes." When the object is purely material or physical, we call the process INSPECTION (Lat. *inspicere*, to look into), as "an inspection of a regiment," "an inspection of accounts." But inspection may be a single act; scrutiny is always a complex process.

"Thenceforth I thought thee worth my nearer view

And narrower *scrutiny*." *Milton*.

"With narrow search, and with *inspection* deep,

Considered every creature." *Ibid*.

EXPLORATION (Lat. *explorare*) is to range in inquiry, or to direct one's search over an extensive area, whether geographically or metaphorically, for the purpose of exacter knowledge of the whole area, or of finding some specific object of search comprised or supposed to be comprised in it.

"On the report of the cowardly *explorers* of the land they relapse again into their old delirium. 'Wherefore hath the Lord brought us into this land, to fall by the sword, that our wives and children should be a prey?'"—*Warburton*.

EXPLOITATION is a French term

in reference to mining, and denotes such exploration as has for its object the making available of mines of metals and minerals; hence, secondarily, of investigation for the development of what is useful or valuable.

EXAMPLE. SAMPLE. PRECEDENT. INSTANCE. EXEMPLIFICATION. COPY. PATTERN. MODEL. ILLUSTRATION. CASE.

EXAMPLE (Lat. *exemplum*, from *eximere*, to take out) is literally a portion taken out of a larger quantity, to show the nature of the whole—the sense in which we now use the word SAMPLE. By an extension of meaning, it is used to signify something to be imitated or followed, as a model, copy, pattern, or precedent; or, negatively, to be avoided as a caution, as, “to make an example of a person;” and, finally, an instance serving for illustration of a rule, precept, or principle of science. The discrimination to be drawn between example and INSTANCE (Lat. *instantia*) is as follows: an example is a permanent instance; an instance is a specific example. An example, in the full sense of the term, is necessarily a complete setting forth of that to which it belongs. An example of injustice must contain nothing which is not referable to injustice. An instance of injustice may result from injustice and other things in combination besides. An example proves a rule; an instance does not, nor does it imply the existence of anything so methodical. Example has an active, instance a passive, signification. An example may be a person or a thing. An instance is always an occurrence or a thing done. An example instructs, an instance illustrates or represents. Men may be personally examples of virtue or vice, while their actions may be instances of virtue or vice. Yet instance enters more into the reason of things, while example belongs more to the nature of facts. We act upon or follow examples; we reflect upon instances. An example might do no more than show us what we should

do, imitate, or avoid. An instance would involve the reason why.

“He copies from his master, Sylla, well,
And would the dire *example* far excel.”
Rowe, Lucan.

“Whole troops of heroes Greece has yet to
boast,
And sends thee one, a *sample* of her host.
Such as I am, I come to prove thy might.”
Pope, Iliad.

“Most remarkable *instances* of suffering.”
—*Atterbury.*

An instance of suffering sets forth to our comprehension the nature of that suffering. An example of suffering would teach us how to suffer, or to be ready to incur suffering. We might say of a certain person, “He often does very mean things, and this is an instance of it;” where we could not correctly use the term example. We might use the term EXEMPLIFICATION; but this rather implies that we wanted to prove or establish to the understanding or conviction of another the meanness of which we speak. When we do this in a vivid manner, it may be called an ILLUSTRATION (Lat. *illustrare*, to make bright or clear), which term is also generally applicable to the coming home to the common understanding of some general truth in a distinct and instructive way. The peculiarity of an illustration is that it may be not at all of the nature of a sample or instance, but a similar or analogous case put side by side by another for the purpose of explanation by correspondence; or it may be an embodiment in a more concrete and practical form of what has been expressed in more abstract terms. It deals with the fact as such, not in its cause or reason.

“A moral precept conveyed in words is only an account of truth in its effects; a moral picture is truth *exemplified*; and which is most likely to gain upon the affections it may not be difficult to determine.”—*Langhorne.*

“While the storm was in its fury any allusion had been improper, for the poet could have compared it to nothing more impetuous than itself; consequently he could have made no *illustration*.”—*Dryden.*

COPY, PATTERN, and MODEL stand in close relationship. A copy (Latin

copia, plenty, a multiplication of the original) has the double meaning of a pattern and an imitation of it, or of the thing to be imitated and the thing imitating. A pattern (Fr. *patron*, *patron* and *pattern*) is anything proposed for imitation. It has sometimes the sense of sample, as a "pattern of cloth," and sometimes of design, as "an elegant pattern." Model (*modèle*, Lat. *modus*, dim. of *modulus*) in addition to the meanings of pattern, has that of a perfect pattern, or the best of the kind. When employed in matters connected with imitative art, copy is usually for delineation, pattern for embroidery or textile manufacture, model for plastic or constructive purposes. In moral and secondary applications, to copy the conduct of another is no more than to imitate his doings. The term has no high moral signification, like pattern and model. In this application pattern is the more specific, model the more general. Pattern belongs to some department of conduct, model to conduct and character generally or as a whole. Pattern regards the guidance of others, model the integrity and completeness of the thing or person in itself. A man may be a pattern of honesty, for instance, without being a model citizen.

"The Sorbonists were the original, and our schismatics in England were the *copiers* of rebellion. That Paris began and London followed."—*Dryden*.

"A housewife in bed, at table a slattern,
For all an *example*, for no one a *pattern*."
Swift.

"Socrates recommends to Alcibiades as the *model* of his devotions a short prayer which a Greek poet composed for the use of his friends."
—*Addison*.

PRECEDENT (Lat. *præcedens*, *præcedere*, to precede) is something which comes down to us with the sanction of usage and common consent, as a guide to conduct or judgment, and, in the legal sense of the term, has force in other cases; while an example has no force beyond itself. CASE (Lat. *casus*, *cadere*, a falling out) is used in a loose way of an occurrence of a certain general character, which, and not the law or principle of it, is all that occupies the mind, as a sad

case, a case of fever (in medicine), a case of felony (in law). It is evident that a particular case may become a precedent.

"For much he knows, and just conclusions
draws
From various *precedents* and various laws."
Pope.

"Yet on his way (no sign of grace,
For folks in fear are apt to pray)
To Phœbus he preferred his *case*,
And beg'd his aid that dreadful day."
Gray.

EXASPERATE. AGGRAVATE. IRRITATE. PROVOKE.

Both persons and feelings are said to be EXASPERATED, but more commonly the former (Lat. *exasperare*, from *asper*, rough). It is to provoke bitter feeling, or to aggravate it. To AGGRAVATE (Lat. *aggravare*, *gravis*, heavy) is to make heavy, and so to make worse, to make less tolerable or excusable, and is only properly applicable to evils or offences, though it has come to be used in the sense of irritate and exasperate. In this latter sense it is to be presumed that the idea is to make to feel a burden or a grievance. IRRITATE (Lat. *irritare*), unlike the others, is employable in a physical sense, as "to irritate the skin;" but there is always a connection with persons and their feelings, to both of which the term is directly applicable. To irritate is less strong than the others, and denotes the excitement of slight resentment against the cause or object. To PROVOKE (Lat. *provocare*) is stronger, and expresses the rousing of a feeling of decided anger and strong resentment by injury or insult, such as naturally tends to active retaliation. To exasperate is stronger still, and denotes a provocation to unrestrained anger or resentment, based upon a determined resentment or ill-will. Susceptible persons and persons of nervous temperament are easily irritated. Proud persons, as over-estimating what is due to their case, dignity, consideration, or comfort, are provoked. As irritation may come from circumstances, so provocation is the result of treatment, or supposed treatment, by other persons. Persons of ardent tempera-

ment, strong in their loves and hates, are most capable of being exasperated.

"To *exasperate* you, to awaken your dormouse valour."—*Shakespeare*.

"Cornelius Rufus is dead, and dead too by his own act! a circumstance of great *aggravation* to my affliction."—*Melmoth, Pliny*.

"Dismiss the man, nor *irritate* the God.
Prevent the rage of Him who reigns above."
Pope.

"The reflection calculated above all others to allay the haughtiness of temper which is ever finding out *provocations*, and which renders anger so impetuous, is that which the Gospel proposes, namely, that we ourselves are, or shortly shall be, suppliants for mercy and pardon at the mercy-seat of God."—*Paley*.

EXCAVATION. See CAVITY.

EXCEED. EXCEL. SURPASS.
TRANSCEND. OUTDO.

To EXCEED (Lat. *excedere*, to go beyond) is a relative term, implying some limit, measure, or quantity already existing, whether bulk, stature, weight, distance, number, or power, moral, mental, or mechanical. It is also used intransitively and abstractedly, as "The temperate man will be careful not to exceed;" but even here the measure of sufficiency and sobriety is understood. To EXCEL (Lat. *excellere*) is never employed but in an honourable sense. It is to go far in good qualities or laudable actions or acquirements, or, specifically, as a transitive verb, to go beyond others in such things. To SURPASS (Fr. *surpasser*) is to go beyond another, or others, without the restriction, like excel, to what is laudable, but in anything which admits of degree of power and movement in the human mind, character, and actions, especially in competition. It is used directly both of persons and the particulars above mentioned, and is used both subjectively and objectively; of things and our estimation of them. TRANSCEND (Lat. *transcendere*, *trans*, beyond, and *scandere*, to climb) is to excel in a signal manner, soaring, as it were, aloft, and surmounting all barriers. It belongs less to persons than to qualities and subjects of thought. To

OUTDO is a simple Saxon compound for the Latin or French surpass. It is accordingly a familiar term, with an application also familiar. Hence it has sometimes the undignified force of get the better of another in no very honourable way, as a synonym with outwit. To outdo is simply to do something better than another, and to reap some personal advantage by the fact. As excellence is always good, so excess is always evil, no matter what the nature of the case; a force which belongs to the noun, and not to the verb, which is applicable to both good and evil. To exceed the limits of truth, justice, propriety, or to exceed another in virtue or attainments. In short, exceed is a term of praise or dispraise, of favourable or unfavourable force, according to the nature of the case, by which the term has to be interpreted.

"*Excessive* lenity and indulgence are ultimately *excessive* rigour."—*Knox, Essays*.

"Who all that time was thought *exceeding* wise,
Only for taking pains and telling lies."
Dryden.

"Though the comprehension of our understandings comes *exceeding* short of the vast extent of things, yet we shall have cause enough to magnify the bountiful Author of our being."—*Locke*.

"To mark the matchless workings of the Power
That shuts within its seed the future flower,
Bids these in elegance of form *excel*,
In colour there, and those delight the smell."
Cowper.

EXCEL. See EXCEED.

EXCELLENCE. SUPERIORITY.

EXCELLENCE is an absolute term, SUPERIORITY (Lat. *superior*) is a relative term, denoting the being more excellent than others or another. But superiority is also applicable to differences of social or official grade, while excellence is applicable only to physical, mental, and moral qualities.

"Him whom Thou, profusely kind,
Adorn'st with every *excellence* refined."
Beattie.

"The sense of all which is to oblige us to treat all men as becomes us in the rank and

station we are placed in, to honour those which are our *superiors* whether in place or virtue; to give that modest deference to their judgments, that reverence to their persons, that respect to their virtues, and homage to their desires and commands, which the degree or kind of their *superiority* requires.”
—*Scott, Christian Life.*

EXCEPT. BESIDES. UNLESS.

EXCEPT (Lat. *excipere*, *ex*, out, and *cipio*, to take) is exclusive, BESIDES (literally by the side) is additive. “There was no one present except him,” means, take him away, and nobody was there. “There was no one present besides him,” means, he was there, and alongside of him was nobody. EXCEPT and UNLESS (prefix *un* and *less*) were formerly used interchangeably, but the distinction is now drawn as follows: except relates to some general rule, fact, or case, to which it introduces an exception. Unless denotes a diminution, which being given something else takes place; for instance, “Unless we make haste, we shall be destroyed,” is tantamount to,—our present case, minus making haste, equals destruction.

EXCESS. SUPERFLUITY. REDUNDANCY.

EXCESS (Lat. *excedere*, *excessus*) denotes what is beyond an average, or a fixed or a just amount.

“Since both the ill and good you do alike my peace destroy,
That kills me with *excess* of grief, this with
excess of joy.” *Walsh.*

SUPERFLUITY (Lat. *super*, above, and *fluere*, to flow) has reference to purposes and requirements. That is superfluous which is more than is wanted, or is rendered useless by its abundance. An excess of rain would be a fall of rain exceeding the average; a superfluity would be such a quantity as could not be put to account.

“How farre are they of from good scholers that can not finde in their hartes to depart with a title of the aboundaunce and *superfluitie* of their temporall goodes to helpe their neighbours neede.”—*Tyndall.*

REDUNDANCY (*re*, back, and *unda*, a wave) is superfluous abundance. It

is, however, applied especially to certain matters of supply, as of natural supply, a redundancy of bile; of one's copiousness of words or expressions, as a redundancy of language. An exuberance of supply is redundancy.

“Wars seem to be in a manner a natural consequence of the over-plenitude and *redundancy* of the number of men in the world.”
—*Hale.*

EXCESSIVE. IMMODERATE. INTEMPERATE.

For the idea of EXCESS see EXCEED and EXCESS. It relates to mere amount, and is not necessarily connected with moral agents. This is the case with IMMODERATE (Lat. *in*, not, and *moderare*, *modus*, a measure, to moderate), and INTEMPERATE (Lat. *in*, not, and *temperare*, to temperate), which differ in that the former is applicable both to agents and quantities, the latter to agents alone. That is immoderate which exceeds just, reasonable, or ordinary bounds generally; intemperate applies to the unrestrained indulgence of the desires, or undue licence given to the will, or the acting or speaking without self-control. Immoderate is statical, belonging to quantity, as immoderate ambition; intemperate is dynamical, belonging to force and action, as intemperate speech, enjoyment, licence of feeling or language.

“*Excessive* lenity and indulgence are ultimately *excessive* rigour.”—*Knor, Essays.*

In old-fashioned English immoderate was used in the simple sense of excessive. “The *immoderateness* of cold or heat.”

“Whence multitudes of reverend men and critics

Have got a kind of intellectual rickets,
And by th' *immoderate* excess of study
Have found the sickly head t' outgrow the
body.” *Butler.*

“The people at large, who behaved very unwisely and *intemperately* on that occasion.”
—*Barke.*

EXCHANGE. See BARTER.

EXCITE. AWAKEN. ROUSE or AROUSE. INCITE. STIMULATE.

To EXCITE (Lat. *excitare*) is to call out into greater activity what before

existed in a calm or calmer state, or to rouse to an active state faculties or powers which before were dormant. The term is also used of purely physical action. We excite heat by friction. AWAKEN (A. S. *awacian, awecian*) is to rouse from a state of sleep, or, analogously, to rouse anything that has lain quiet, and, as it were, dormant, as to awaken suspicion, and is applicable only to intelligent subjects. ROUSE (A. S. *rasian*) is to awaken in a sudden or startling manner, so as to bring into an energetic state by a strong impulse. To INCITE (Lat. *incitare*) is to excite to a specific act or end which the inciter has in view. To STIMULATE is to quicken into activity (*stimulus*, a spur) and to a certain end. Men are incited when their passions are roused; they are stimulated when they are induced to make greater exertions, as by a hope of reward or any other external impulse. They are awakened out of indifference, roused out of lethargy and torpor, incited by the designing influence of others, stimulated by new motives of action.

"Hope is the grand *exciter* of industry."—Barrow.

"When their consciences are thoroughly *awakened* by some great affliction, or the near approach of death and a lively sense of another world."—Tillotson.

"His present fears rather than any true penitence *roused* him up."—Waterland.

"The absence of Duke Robert, and the concurrence of many circumstances altogether resembling those which had been so favourable to the late monarch, *incited* him to a similar attempt."—Burke.

Men are incited to what otherwise they would not have given their efforts. They are commonly stimulated to something which they are pursuing, or intending to pursue, but with want of energy.

"The nature of imperfect animals is such that they are apt to have but a dull and sluggish sense, a flat and insipid taste of good, unless it be quickened and *stimulated*, heightened and invigorated by being compared to the contrary evil."—Cudworth.

EXCLAIM. See CLAMOUR.

EXCLUDE. See DEBAR.

EXCULPATE. See ABSOLVE and APOLOGY.

EXCURSION. See JAUNT.

EXCUSE. See APOLOGY and PRETENCE.

EXCUSE. PARDON. FORGIVE.

We EXCUSE (Lat. *excusare*, *ex* and *causa*, a cause) whenever we exempt from the imputation of blame, or, by an extension of meaning, regard as not absolutely calling for blame, and so admitting of being viewed leniently. When used reflectively it sometimes means no more than to decline, or to take such exemption to oneself. Instances of these uses are as follows: "I excuse his conduct, considering the extraordinary provocation under which he acted." "I have received his invitation, but intend to excuse myself" (or to send an excuse), the force of the phrase being to relieve oneself from the blame of neglect by an apology. We excuse a small fault, we PARDON (Fr. *pardonner*) a great fault or a crime. We excuse commonly what relates to ourselves. We pardon offences against rule, law, morals. We excuse, ordinarily speaking, when the circumstances of the case are such that a kindly nature is justified in viewing them leniently. We pardon as a summary act of power, generosity, or mercy. Kings pardon criminals, and friends may excuse each other. Pardon is always from a superior. Excusing may come from a superior or an equal. We also excuse from obligations which are not moral, but only social, official, or conventional, as if the Queen should excuse the attendance on some particular occasion of an officer of state.

"Homicide in self-defence upon a sudden affray is also *excusable* rather than justifiable by the English law."—Blackstone.

"His (the king's) power of *pardoning* was said by our Saxon ancestors to be derived a lege sure dignitatis; and it is declared in Parliament by Statute 27 Hen. VIII. that no other person hath power to *pardon* or remit any treason or felonies."—*Ibid.*

FORGIVE (Eng. fore and give)

differs from both in relating only to offences against oneself. It is etymologically the same as pardon, meaning to give in such a way as to forego, *i.e.*, the memory and the punishment of the offence. Omissions and neglects or slight commissions may be excused. Graver offences and crimes pardoned, personal insults and injuries forgiven.

"Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass against us."—*Lord's Prayer.*

Kindness prompts to forgiveness, mercy to pardon. We are never hindered from forgiving; but the nature of an offence may be, in the eye of the law, such that we may have no power or authority to pardon it.

EXECRABLE. ABOMINABLE. DETESTABLE.

That is EXECRABLE which raises a lively feeling of horror or indignation, as being worthy of reprobation (*Lat. execrari, ex, out, and sacer, sacred*), that is, literally cast out as unholy or generally detestable. That is ABOMINABLE (*see ABOMINATE*) which excites a distinct feeling of personal desire of avoidance from any motive but fear, as an "abominable nuisance." Hatred and contempt combined make the abominable in persons. It is employed of things in the sense of intensely disagreeable. DETESTABLE (*detestari, de and testis, a witness*) is properly used of such abstract properties, or persons in reference to them, as deserve *moral reprobation on principle*, as detestable vices, cruelty, cowardice, tyranny, or tyrants.

"The object of a battle was no longer empty glory, but sordid lucre, or something still more execrably flagitious."—*Knox.*

"Where all life dies, death lives, and nature breeds

Perverse, all monstrous, all prodigious things,

Abominable, inutterable, and worse

Than fables yet have feigned or fear conceived,

Gorgons and hydras and chimæras dire."

Milton.

"Under the strong image of the unfitness

and abominableness and detestableness and profaneness of any uncleanness or impurity appearing in the Temple of God, the odiousness of all moral impurity, of all debauched practices whatsoever in any person who professes himself to be a worshipper of God, is set forth after a more lively and affecting manner."—*Clarke.*

EXECRATION. *See* CURSE.

EXECUTE. *See* ACCOMPLISH.

EXEMPT. *See* FREE.

EXERCISE. PRACTISE. EXERT.

EXERCISE (*Lat. exercere*) is actively to employ a power or property inherent in or belonging to ourselves, whether physical, mental, moral, or social; as to exercise oneself, one's arms or legs, patience or cruelty, authority or office, power or influence. It is less sustained than PRACTISE (*Fr. pratiquer*) and more sustained than EXERT (*Lat. exserere, exsertum*). To exercise forbearance would imply a particular case, to practise forbearance would imply that it was natural, or exhibited habitually by way of self-discipline. We may be said to practise not only mental or moral qualities but occupations, trades, arts. We exert force, strength, violence, ability, in the abstract, or anything within us which is of the nature of an active faculty, as the mind, the powers of invention or imagination, the faculty of reasoning, understanding, and the like. It commonly relates to some specific end or design. In order to exercise we must exert repeatedly. We exert the voice in order to be audible to those who are deaf or distant; we exercise it in order to attain power, flexibility, clearness of enunciation, and the like.

"But we learn from Scripture further that His providence extends even in the minutest instances to each of us in particular, and that not the smallest thing comes to pass but by His appointment or wise permission; that His continual superintendency may be ever exercised towards us for our good."—*Secker.*

"Discourse on subjects of little or no importance is as necessary at times for the relaxation of our minds as exercise without business for the refreshment of our bodies. It is a proper exertion of that cheerfulness

which God hath plainly designed us to show on small occasions as well as great."—*Secker*.

The idea of practice is the active conformity to some established rule, law, method, or custom. It is therefore in its nature imitative, and a thing of discipline whether in morals, manners, calling, art, or science.

"As this advice ye *practise* or reject,
So hope success or dread the dire effect."
Pope, Homer.

EXERT. See EXERCISE.

EXERTION. See EFFORT.

EXHALE. See EMIT.

EXHAUST. See DRAIN.

EXHIBIT. See SHOW.

EXHIBITION. See SHOW.

EXHILARATE. See CHEER.

EXHORT. PERSUADE.

EXHORTATION (Lat. *exhortari*) has for its end something practical either to be done or to be abstained from. It is ordinarily the act of a superior in wisdom or position. PERSUASION (Lat. *persuadere*) is the act of an equal or of one who for the occasion puts himself upon an equality. The power of persuasion, therefore, is more purely moral, having in it more of one's own assent and less of another's entreaty or impelling. Exhortation is commonly on sterner matters, as matters of necessity or duty; persuasion, on matters of self-interest: but persuasion is not of facts or of the abstract truth of propositions. Of old, persuade was used in the sense of inculcate by argument or expostulation, "Persuading the things concerning the kingdom of God." It is now only employed of such inculcation as is successful to move another.

"Every man that will make himself eminent in any virtue will be a light to the world; his life will be a constant sermon, and he will often prove as effectual a benefactor to those about him by his example as others are by their counsels and *exhortations*."—*Sharp*.

"We will *persuade* him, be it possible."—*Shakespeare*.

EXIGENCY. See CRISIS.

EXILE. See BANISH.

EXIST. BE. SUBSIST. LIVE.

BE is called the substantive verb, as expressing substance or being. It is the A. S. *beon*, *beonne*, to be, *beom*, *com*, I am. Parts of what grammarians call the conjugation of the verb to be, are, in fact, radically different derivatives; as, *is*, *was*. Analogous instances occur in other languages, as in Latin, *esse*, *fui*. This verb, except very seldom, as in Shakespeare's, "To be, or not to be," is employed to express relative, modified, or concrete, and not abstract and independent, being, as, "To be happy," "I am miserable," "Hercules was a hero," "Three and two are five." Being thus subjective, the verb is applicable to what has no objective existence at all. Thus a thing very often *is* which does not exist, as, "The philosopher's stone *is* a chimera," in other words, has no existence. The common use of the verb to be is that of a copula, or the logical link between subject and predicate. In the way of a mere copula, the verb EXIST (Lat. *existere*, to stand out) is not used, but always has a force beyond it, even where it may seem that to be might have been substituted for it, and denotes being in its totality, as a truth or fact, and not a mode or relationship. To exist is emphatically opposed to the imaginary, unreal, or pretended. To SUBSIST is a philosophical term, expressing existence as based upon its "formal cause," which was the basis of its existence, as the "material cause" was the basis of our conception of that existence. So characteristic was this idea of a substratum, that the term is applied to the mere vegetative life of animals as *supported* by what tends to nourish them, as, "Tigers *subsist* on flesh," &c. To LIVE (A. S. *libban*, *lifian*, *leofian*) is to exist with the functions of vitality, comprehending every grade from the lowest degree of mere sentience without reflection, consciousness, or will, as in the plants, to the creatures endowed with these.

"Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I *am* hath sent me unto you."—*Bible*.

"Whatever *exists* has a cause, a reason, a

ground of its existence, a foundation on which its existence relies, a ground of reason why it doth exist rather than not exist, either in the necessity of its own nature, and then it must have been of itself eternal, or in the will of some other being, and then that other being must at least in the order of nature and causality have existed before it."—*Clarke*.

"Every person hath his own *subsistence*, which no other besides hath, although there be others beside that are of the same substance."—*Hooker*.

"In Him we live and move and have our being."—*Bible*.

EXIT. See DEPARTURE.

EXONERATE. See ABSOLVE.

EXORBITANT. See INORDINATE.

EXPAND. See DILATE.

EXPECT. AWAIT.

To EXPECT (Lat. *expectare*, to look out for) is a mental act, to AWAIT (Old Fr. *waiter*, *gaiter*, New Fr. *guetter*, to watch, *être aux aguets*, to be on the wait or watch) is a moral act. We expect when we have arrived at the conclusion that something future will really happen in all probability. We await it when we look upon it as certain, and have prepared ourselves to meet it. We may expect what may or may not interest us personally; but we await that which, when it comes, will affect ourselves. The old man expects to die happy if he awaits death with serenity and hope.

"Though virtue is unquestionably worthy to be chosen for its own sake, even without any *expectation* of reward, yet it does not follow that it is therefore entirely self-sufficient, and able to support a man under all kind of sufferings, and even death itself, for its sake, without any prospect of future recompense."—*Clarke*.

"Æneas heard, and for a space resigned
To tender pity all his manly mind,
Then rising in his rage he burus to fight;
The Greek awaits him with collected
might." *Pope, Homer*.

EXPEDIENT. RESOURCE. SHIFT.
CONTRIVANCE.

EXPEDIENT (Lat. *expedire*, to hasten), SHIFT (A. S. *scift*, a turning), and CONTRIVANCE (Fr. *con* and *trouver*, to find) are internal and

artificial. RESOURCE (Fr. *ressource*, Lat. *resurgere*, to rise up again) is, or may be, external and natural. A contrivance indicates mechanical ingenuity, or at least operative skill, which may or may not have been called for under special circumstances. It is used both of the act of contriving and the thing contrived. An expedient is a contrivance more or less adequate but irregular, and sought for by tact and adaptation to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It is a kind of unauthorised substitute for more recognised modes of doing things. A shift is an expedient which does not profess to be more than temporary and very imperfect, a mere evasion of difficulty. A resource is that to which one resorts. It is often, therefore, that on which the others are based. So it may be a test of skill in contrivance to find an adequate expedient in limited resources. Shift is in the commonest matters, and usually relates to objects trivial and external, contrivance to matters of more importance, and expedient to those even of the highest.

"Like tricks of state to stop a raging flood,
Or mollify a mad-brained senate's mood,
Of all *expedients* never one was good."
Dryden.

"Threatenings mixed with prayers, his last
resource." *Ibid*.

"I'll find a thousand *shifts* to get away."
—*Shakespeare*.

"Government is a *contrivance* of human wisdom to provide for human wants."—*Burke*.

EXPEDIENT. FIT.

EXPEDIENCY (see EXPEDIENT) is a kind of FITNESS (connected with the old word *feat*, well-formed), namely, that kind which is personally advantageous. That which is expedient is necessarily fit, for that cannot conduce to an advantageous end which is unsuitable or improper; but unless that which is fitting be required, and be conducive to the welfare or benefit of the person, then, however fitting it may be, it will answer no profitable end, and so will not be *expedient*.

dient. Fitness regards every kind of appropriateness, as moral fitness; expediency regards only adaptation to self-interest.

"It is *expedient* for you that I go away."
—*Bible*.

"He, and He only, is the competent, proper, and unerring judge upon what persons and on what conditions it is *fit* for Him to bestow His favours."—*Clarke*.

EXPEDITE. See ACCELERATE.

EXPEDITION. See QUICKNESS.

EXPEL. See BANISH.

EXPEND. See SPEND.

EXPENSE. See COST.

EXPERIMENT. See EFFORT.

EXPERT. See ADROIT.

EXPIATION. ATONEMENT.

EXPIATION (Lat. *expiare*, *ex* and *piare*, to seek to appease) is to extinguish guilt by suffering or penalty. ATONEMENT adds to this the idea of satisfaction or reparation to an injured party (atonement, at one, the making one or reconciled). The malefactor, for instance, expiates his crimes on the gallows. If this were spoken of as an atonement, it would be under the view of reparation, being thus made either to the parties he had injured, or to humanity, or to the state.

"It was a common and received doctrine among the Jews that for some sins a man was pardoned presently upon his repentance; that other sins were not pardoned till the solemn day of *expiation*, which came once a year; that other sins which were yet greater were not to be *expiated* but by some grievous temporal affliction."—*Sharp*.

"To *atone* or make him at one again with the offender."—*Beveridge*.

EXPIRE. DIE.

To EXPIRE (Lat. *expirare*, to breathe out) is appropriately used of animals which breathe the breath of life. Of these it may be said that they live and that they die or expire. All living things either die or expire. All things that die or expire are not living things, for to die is used analogously, as "to let a secret die within the breast," and oftener with the addi-

tion of the word out or away. Trees live and die, but do not expire. The flame of a candle, and the periods of time, neither live nor die, yet are said to expire.

"Oh why do wretched men so much desire
To draw their days unto the utmost
date,
And do not rather wish them soon *expire*,
Knowing the misery of their estate?"
Spenser.

"In the day that ye eat thereof ye shall surely die."—*Bible*.

EXPLAIN. ELUCIDATE. ILLUSTRATE.

To EXPLAIN (Lat. *explanare*, *planus*, level) is simply to make intelligible by removing obscurity or misunderstanding. To ELUCIDATE (*elucidare*, *e*, out, and *lux*, *lucis*, light) and ILLUSTRATE (*illustrare*) are to make more fully intelligible. The field of explanation may be broad or narrow, as to explain a word, or a chapter of the Bible, while explanation in itself is extended and minute. The field of elucidation is commonly broad. We do not speak of elucidating words, but subjects. Illustration is vivid elucidation by certain specific and effective means, as similitudes, comparisons, appropriate incidents or anecdotes, and the like, graphic representations, and even artistic drawings. Explanation, however, depends as much on the mind and views of the explainer as upon the thing explained. A subject could only be elucidated or illustrated in one way, but it might be explained in different and even contrariant ways, according to the explainers.

"I demanded of him who was to *explain* them. The Papists, I told him, would *explain* some of them one way, and the Reformed another. The Remonstrants and Anti-remonstrants gave their different senses, and probably the Trinitarians and the Unitarians will profess that they understand not each other's explications."—*Locke*.

"Proof and further *elucidation* of the matters complained of."—*Burke*.

"To prove him and *illustrate* his high worth."—*Shakespeare*.

EXPLANATION. See DEFINITION and EXPLAIN.

EXPLANATORY. See EXPLICIT.

EXPLICIT. EXPRESS. EXPLANATORY.

EXPLICIT (Lat. *explicare, explicatus*, to unfold) denotes the entire unfolding of a thing in detail of expression, and so as to meet every point and obviate the necessity of supplement. EXPLANATORY is, on the other hand, essentially supplemental, and the necessity of explanation often arises from matters not having been made sufficiently explicit. EXPRESS (Lat. *exprimere, expressus*) combines force with clearness and notice of detail. Explicit calls attention to the comprehensiveness and pointedness of the particulars, express to the force, directness, and plainness of the whole. An express declaration goes forcibly and directly to the point. An explicit declaration leaves nothing ambiguous. Philosophically, it is opposed to implicit.

"The baptismal creed, I say, must of necessity contain *explicitly* in it at least all the fundamentals of faith."—*Clarke*.

"As to any other method more agreeable to them than a congress—an alternative *expressly* proposed to them—they did not condescend to signify their pleasure."—*Burke*.

"Yet to such as are grounded in the true belief, these *explanatory* creeds, the Nicene and this of Athanasius, might perhaps be spared; for what is supernatural will always be a mystery in spite of exposition."—*Dryden*.

EXPLOIT. FEAT. ACHIEVEMENT.

EXPLOIT (Fr. *exploit*, Lat. *explicare, explicatum*, to unfold) is a term of chivalrous character, indicating a deed of which adventurousness and strength are the characteristics. A FEAT (Nor. Fr. *feat*, Mod. Fr. *fait*, Lat. *factum*, a thing done, a deed) is the same thing on a smaller scale, and admitting a larger admixture of the elements of skill or cleverness; as the exploits of Alexander the Great, a feat of horsemanship. ACHIEVEMENT (Fr. *achever*, to bring to a head, *chef, caput*, a head) points not only to the greatness of the deed but to the qualities which have led to it, which may have been less showy than force

and skill, and have comprised perseverance, patience, and industry.

"The spirit-stirring form
Of Cæsar, raptured with the charm of rule
And boundless fame, impatient for *exploits*."
Dyer.

"The warlike *feats* I have done."—*Shakespeare*.

"But loving virtue, all *achievements* past,
Meets envy still to grapple with at last."
Waller.

EXPLOITATION. See EXAMINATION.

EXPLORE. See EXAMINATION.

EXPLOSION. See ERUPTION.

EXPOSTULATE. See COMPLAIN.

EXPOUND. INTERPRET. (See EXPLAIN.)

EXPOUND (Lat. *expono*) denotes sustained explanation; while a mere word or phrase may be explained, a whole work or parts of it may be expounded. Exposition is continuous critical explanation. INTERPRET (Lat. *interpretes*, an interpreter), beyond the mere sense of verbal translation from one language to another, conveys the idea of private or personal explanation of what is capable of more than one view. Hence interpretation is more arbitrary than exposition and more theoretical than explanation. Expound relates only to words in series, interpretation is applicable also to anything of a symbolical character, as to interpret a dream or a prophecy. It has also, in common with explain, an application to anything which may be viewed in different lights, as the actions of men. In this way, to explain conduct would rather be to account for it; to interpret it would be to assign motives or significance to it. Explanation deals with facts, interpretation with causes also.

"The Pundits are the *expounders* of the Hindu law."—*Sir W. Jones*.

"Are there not many points, some needful
sure

To saving faith, that Scripture leaves
obscure?

Which every sect will wrest a several
way,

For what one sect *interprets* all sects
may."
Dryden.

EXPRESS. See EXPLICIT.

EXPRESS. SIGNIFY. TESTIFY.
INTIMATE.

All these terms are employed in the sense of communicating to others what is in one's own mind. Not only words, but gestures, movements, may serve to EXPRESS, which is simply to manifest in a plain manner. Even silence is sometimes expressive. As express is generally said of feelings and opinions, so SIGNIFY (Fr. *signifier*, Lat. *signum*, a sign, and *facere*, to make) is said of wishes, intentions, or desires; this also may be done in various ways, by looks, words, writing, or other acts, as to signify assent by a nod. Signify implies more strongly than express the existence of some person affected, while express is more abstract, as, "His countenance expressed disappointment," that is, would have done so to any who might have witnessed it. TESTIFY (Lat. *testis*, a witness, and *facere*, to make) is commonly employed of inner feeling as made evident to others, as to testify joy, sorrow, approbation, one's sense of another's merit, and the like; "His countenance testified satisfaction," that is, generally, where signified would have implied some person or persons on whom the expression took effect. To signify is in short a matter of *communication*, testify of *demonstration*, express of *declaration*. To INTIMATE (Lat. *intimus*, innermost) is to express without fulness, but with sufficient aptitude and clearness, avoiding all superfluity of declaration. Hence the term is well employed of such manifestations of feeling as are indirect, as, "His courtly reception of the delegates seemed to intimate that he was not unfavourably inclined to the object of their mission." When one person intimates a thing to another, it is commonly something in which that other is personally interested.

"When St. John Baptist came preaching repentance unto Israel, the people asked him, saying, 'What shall we do?' meaning in what manner they should *express* their repentance."—*Sharp*.

"No one ever saw one animal by its gestures and natural cries *signify* to another, This is mine, That is yours, I am willing to give this for that."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations*.

"In vain Thy creatures *testify* of Thee,
Till Thou proclaim Thyself."

Cowper.

A demonstrative expression is commonly set over against something of an opposite character. Testify, like protest, wears an air of demonstration *against*; but this is accidental, not essential.

"Mr. Plott, who, as he since informed me, had prevailed with them to propose this treaty, earnestly pressed me to lay hold on the opportunity, *intimating* by his words and gestures that if I refused it I should not have another."—*Ludlow, Memoirs*.

EXPRESSION. TERM. WORD.
(See PHRASE.)

WORD is the more general, but could not be called the generic expression here, because an expression may consist of more than one word. Word (A. S. *word*) is the spoken expression (which may be reduced to writing) of a conception or an idea. A TERM (Lat. *terminus*), in its logical sense, is anything which may form the subject or predicate of a proposition, and called the term from the fact that it occupies a position at one or other *end* of it; as, "Every man is mortal;" here every man is the one term, and mortal the other. In reference to the practical distinction between these, word represents generally an utterance of our thoughts or feelings; term is the same thing viewed in connection with a certain class of expressions or subjects, as "a scientific term," "a geographical term," and so on, implying that it has a *specific stamp*; so we say in reasoning, "It is above all things necessary to define the terms employed." On the other hand, it would be utterly superfluous to define all the *words*. In this way, term is restricted to the main parts of speech, nouns, verbs, and adjectives. In a looser way, it is simply synonymous with word. EXPRESSION (Lat. *exprimere*, *expressus*) in this connection means not so much a word

or term, though it may mean this, as a *mode* of speech. Hence expressions are very often phrases or collocations of words. Any number of words which serve to convey an idea or statement, whether one or more, may be called an expression. Even an interjection, as giving utterance to a sentiment, emotion, or feeling, might be called an expression of it. In the choice of words is shown the purity of language, in the choice of terms the precision of speech; on the choice of expressions depend the brilliancy and effectiveness of style.

"He (Charles II.) never read the Scriptures nor laid things together further than to turn them to a jest, or for some lively *expression*."—*Burnet*.

"The ideas the *terms* stand for."—*Locke*.

"Man had by nature his own organs so fashioned as to be fit to frame articulate sounds which we call *words*."—*Ibid*.

EXPRESSIVE. See SIGNIFICANT.

EXPUNGE. See EFFACE.

EXTEND. See DILATE and REACH.

EXTENSIVE. LARGE. (See BIG and BROAD.)

EXTENSIVE (Lat. *extendere*, *extensus*, to stretch out) only applies to superficial spreading. LARGE (Fr. *large*, Lat. *largus*) is much more comprehensive and variously applicable: 1, to superficial extent, in which it is synonymous with extensive, as a large field or an extensive field; 2, of size or bulk, as a large stone; 3, of quantity, as a large supply; 4, number, as a large number, or assembly; 5, of cubic contents, as a large bag. Both large and extensive are employed in secondary senses; large in that case denoting abundance of source or supply, extensive denoting wideness of operation. A large heart, large bounty, extensive benevolence.

"One great cause of our insensibility to the goodness of the Creator is the very *extensiveness* of His bounty."—*Paley*.

"Circles are praised not that abound

In largeness, but the exactly round.

So life we praise that does excel

Not in much time, but acting well."

Waller.

EXTENT. LIMIT.

EXTENT is superficial spreading in one direction, or several, or all. LIMIT (Lat. *limes*, *limitis*) is the bounding or restraining of such extent. The former term, therefore, is expansive in its force, the latter restrictive; the one partakes of the nature of a positive, the other of a negative idea.

"What antic notions form the human mind,

Perversely mad, and obstinately blind,

Life in its large *extent* is scarce a span,

Yet, wondrous frenzy, great designs we plan,

And shoot our thoughts beyond the date of man."

Cotton.

"Ye friends to truth, ye statesmen who survey

The rich man's joys increase, the poor's decay,

'Tis yours to judge how wide the *limits* stand

Between a splendid and a happy land."

Goldsmith.

EXTENUATE. PALLIATE.

These terms are all applicable to moral conduct and the lessening of its guilt. To EXTENUATE (literally, to draw out to fineness, *ex* and *tenuis*, thin) is to diminish the conception of crime or guilt by the allegation of pleas or the consideration of attendant circumstances. To PALLIATE (Lat. *pallium*, a cloak) is to seek to lower the intrinsic guilt or evil of the thing itself. It is an instance of the departure of a term from its etymological meaning; to palliate not signifying any longer to hide a crime by throwing a cloak over it, but to soften down the enormity of it. Wrong is extenuated by attendant circumstances; it is palliated by sophistry. Palliation is never the same thing with justice, but extenuation may be. Palliation is restricted to crime; extenuation is extended to guilt and punishment, and even to ills generally. When we speak of a palliation of evils, it is as opposed to lasting remedies.

"As to the other matters objected against me, which in their turn I shall mention to you, remember once more I do not mean to *extenuate* or excuse."—*Burke*.

The original sense of palliate occurs curiously in the following:—

“Horace had his Mæcenas, and Virgil his Augustus, and it is the accustomed manner of our modern writers always to *palliate* themselves under the protection of some worthy patron.”—*Boulton, Medicine*.

EXTERIOR. EXTERNAL. OUTWARD. EXTRANEOUS. EXTRINSIC. FOREIGN.

OUTWARD is strictly *toward* the outside, as “outward bound,” and, by an extension of meaning, of or belonging to the outside. It is thus the generic term, and may mean on the surface or contiguous to it. EXTERIOR and EXTERNAL (Lat. *extra*, without) both imply *connection*, while EXTRANEOUS (Lat. *extraneus*, from the same root) implies *no connection* with, but detachment or remoteness from, the surface. Exterior is opposed to interior, external to internal. The skin is an exterior, the dress an external, covering. That which is external is connected closely with the outward parts; that which is exterior goes to constitute them. That is extraneous which affects us from a distance, as “extraneous aid.” Extraneous is an epithet of qualities, not substances. EXTRINSIC (Lat. *extrinsecus*) has the sense of external in such a way as to form no essential or inseparable part, as, “The intrinsic faculties of the mind may be improved in power by the extrinsic aids of mental training;” “The external need of dress is one thing, the extrinsic superfluity of ornament another.” FOREIGN (Lat. *foris*, *foraneus*, out of doors) is wholly beside the mark, and has no connection or relevancy at all.

“In speech of man the whispering which they call susurrus in Latin, whether it be louder or softer, is an interior sound, but the speaking out is an *exterior* sound.”—*Bacon*.

“The next circumstance to be remarked is that whilst the cavities of the body are so configured as *externally* to exhibit the most exact correspondency of the opposite sides, the contents of these cavities have no such correspondency.”—*Paley*.

“If the eye,” says He, ‘be single, thy whole body shall be full of light.’ That is, nothing *extraneous* must cleave to or join

with the eye in the act of seeing, but it must be solely and entirely to itself and its bare object, as naked as truth, as pure, simple, and unmixed as sincerity.”—*South*.

“More observe the characters of men than the order of things; to the one we are formed by nature and by that sympathy from which we are so strongly led to take part in the passions and manners of our fellow-men. The other is as it were *foreign* and *extrinsic*.”—*Burke*.

EXTERMINATE. See ERADICATE.

EXTERNAL. See EXTERIOR.

EXTIRPATE. See ERADICATE.

EXTOL. See PRAISE.

EXTORT. See EXACT.

EXTRANEOUS. See EXTERNAL.

EXTRAORDINARY. REMARKABLE.

The EXTRAORDINARY (Lat. *extra*, beyond, and *ordo*, an order, beyond the ordinary) is that which is out of the ordinary course or exceeds ordinary limits. In those cases in which it is matter of specific observation, it is synonymous with REMARKABLE (Fr. *remarquer*, to remark), but where it does not excite such observation or remark, it is of course not remarkable. An extraordinary dress is remarkable; but this could not be said of an “extraordinary loan.” The remarkable combines the extraordinary with the noticeable. It may be observed that there is a twofold sense of the extraordinary—that which is unlike the common course, law, or nature of the object, and that which is unlike the common course of our own observation. The one is extraordinary *in itself*, the other *to us*. The remarkable is the extraordinary to us. The dress of an Asiatic, while not extraordinary in itself, may be extraordinary, and so remarkable, to a European. In common parlance, that is extraordinary which excites surprise; that is remarkable which excites some degree of admiration also.

“They think to atone for their sins and neglects of this kind by showing some *extraordinary* bounty to the poor.”—*Sharp*.

“Above all things this was *remarkable* and admirable in him, the arts he had to acquire the good opinion and kindnesses of all sorts of men.”—*Cowley*.

EXTRAVAGANT. PRODIGAL. LAVISH. PROFUSE.

EXTRAVAGANT (Lat. *extra*, beyond, and *vagari*, to wander) is by no means confined to modes of expenditure of money. Any person or thing which exceeds due bounds in thought, speech, or action, may be termed extravagant; as "extravagant in praise," "extravagant abuse," "extravagant compliment." As applied to manner of living, extravagance comes of allowing the habitual absence of self-restraint and reflection, a vague wandering of the thoughts and desires unrestrained by ideas of measurement and proportion. A man of small means may thus be very extravagant. PRODIGAL (Lat. *prodigere*, to drive away or squander) denotes a love of large and excessive expenditure, which comes of want of recognizing the necessary limitation of *all* human resources, and is by its nature a vice of the rich. The poor man who may be extravagant is hindered by circumstances from being prodigal, though he may have the natural inclination to be so. Extravagant and prodigal are both terms expressive of character or habits, while LAVISH (Old Eng. *lave*, to throw out) and PROFUSE (Lat. *profundere*, *profusus*, to pour forth) relate to specific actions. To lavish is to spend with superfluous and therefore foolish liberality, as the return or good is not in proportion to the expenditure or effort. Men may be lavish of much besides money and treasure, as praise, censure, as we may be also prodigal of time, strength, and the like. Profuse is less strong than lavish, and denotes the giving forth in great abundance. This is so likely to be superfluous, that profuse is often used in an unfavourable sense, as lavish always is. Yet this is not always so, as, "ornaments are profusely employed in the building," is not the same as if we said "too profusely," and "profuse beneficence" is not dispraise. We are extravagant when we spend more than we can afford. We are profuse when we give away in great or excessive quantities. Profusion, therefore, is a mode of ex-

travagance, namely, an extravagant expenditure on other objects than ourselves. A man is extravagant, for instance, in household expenses, house, dress, plate, diet, luxuries of any kind. A man is extravagant in his praise or compliments when he exaggerates them, profuse when he deals too largely in them, lavish when he thinks nothing of reserving or moderating them.

"Upon which accounts it hath been that mankind hath been more *extravagantly* mad in many tenets about religion than in anything else whatsoever. For in other things the use of reason is permitted, but in religion it hath been almost universally denied."—*Glanvill*.

"*Prodigality* is the devil's steward and purse-bearer, ministering to all sorts of vice; and it is hard, if not impossible, for a *prodigal* person to be guilty of no other vice but *prodigality*."—*South*.

"Tertullian very truly observeth, God is not a *lavisher*, but a dispenser of His blessings."—*Fotherby*.

"He who with a promiscuous, undistinguishing *profuseness* does not so much dispense as throw away what he has, proclaims himself a fool to all the intelligent world about him."—*South*.

EXTREME. See CLOSE.

EXTREMITY. See CLOSE.

EXTRICATE. See DISENGAGE.

EXTRINSIC. See EXTERIOR.

EXUBERANT. See LUXURIANT.

EYE. See BEHOLD.

F.

FABLE. FICTION. FABRICATION. PARABLE. ALLEGORY. NOVEL. ROMANCE.

FABLE (Lat. *fabula*, from *fari*, to speak) is a feigned tale intended to convey some lesson of instruction, its proper sphere being that of prudential morality. Such being its object, it does not scruple to violate natural truth, as in feigning talking trees, or talking animals, or introducing unhistoric and unreal per-

sonages. The fable is a sort of dramatic allegory in which the actions are probable and natural, while the agents may be unnatural.

"Fables were first begun and raised to the highest perfection in the eastern countries, where they wrote in signs and spoke in parables, and delivered the most useful precepts in delightful stories, which for their aptness were entertaining to the most judicious, and led the vulgar into understanding, by surprising them with their novelty."—*Prior and Montague*.

FICTION (Lat. *fingere, fictus*, to feign) denotes any production of the imagination, whether dealing in the natural or unnatural. As a literary term it implies an end of amusement or instruction, or both. Fiction may be regarded as the generic term, of which the rest are species. It means, in its broadest sense, anything feigned. Fiction is opposed to what is real, as fabrication is opposed to what is true; the common end of the first is to entertain, of the second to mislead and deceive, either as to the contents of the work or the genuineness of its authorship.

"The fiction of these golden apples kept by a dragon."—*Raleigh*.

"Our books were not fabricated with an accommodation to prevailing usages."—*Paley*.

A FABRICATION (Lat. *fabricare*, to fabricate) differs from a fiction in that the author, knowing it to be false, puts it forth as true. A PARABLE (Gr. *παρά*, alongside, and *βάλλειν*, to cast or place) is an illustration of moral or spiritual truth through the vehicle of natural or secular processes or occurrences. Such at least are the parables of the New Testament, which assume laws in harmony between the natural and the spiritual world, so that the facts of the one may tend to explain the other. Unlike the fable, the parable teaches truth for itself, and not as being the interest of man only; and having this high and sacred end in view, it cannot stoop to such unnatural violations as the fable employs, being animated by a spirit of profounder reverence. There was a time, however, when

the word parable was taken to mean almost anything allegorical in speech, especially if more or less hard to understand; as that which the English version of the Bible calls the parable of Jotham is strictly a fable. So in Ezekiel, "Ah, Lord God, doth he not speak parables?" the word here is equivalent to riddles.

"The Holy Scripture hath her figure and history, her mystery and verity, her parable and plain doctrine."—*Bale*.

AN ALLEGORY (*ἄλλος*, other, and *ἀγορεύω*, I speak) differs both from fable and parable, in that the properties of persons are fictionally represented as attached to things, to which they are as it were transferred. The allegory may be in any kind of artistic or verbal representation. A figure of Peace and Victory crowning some historical personage is an allegory. "I am the Vine, ye are the branches," is a spoken allegory. In the parable there is no transference of properties. The parable of the sower represents all things as according to their proper nature. In the allegory quoted above the properties of the vine and the relation of the branches are transferred to the person of Christ and His apostles and disciples.

"Make no more allegories in Scripture than needs must; the fathers were too frequent in them; they, indeed, before they understood the literal sense, looked out for an allegory."—*Selden*.

A NOVEL (Fr. *nouvelle*, new) is a fiction (as at present employed) with something of dramatic plot, designed to show the workings of human passion, and is such that in themselves there is no impossibility in the incidents of it. Novels in Old English bore the sense of news.

"Some came of curiosity to hear some novels."—*Latimer*.

It then came to mean a tale especially of love and passion, which might be of the nature of a subordinate incident in a larger work, before it came to mean, as at present, a work complete in itself.

"The trifling novels which Ariosto inserted in his poems."—*Dryden*.

The ROMANCE (Low Lat. *romanticum*, the union or fusion of the Latin tongue under the barbarians of the empire, which was in vogue when this species of literature sprang up) is a novel which deals in surprising and adventurous incidents, in order to strike by means of the marvellous, without the historic probability of the novel of the present day. They were commonly metrical, and turned on chivalry, gallantry, and religion.

"The Latin tongue, as is observed by an ingenious writer, ceased to be spoken in France about the ninth century, and was succeeded by what was called the *romance* tongue, a mixture of the language of the Franks and bad Latin. As the songs of chivalry became the most popular compositions in that language, they were emphatically called *romans* or *romants*, though this name was at first given to any piece of poetry."—*Percy Reliques*.

FABRIC. See EDIFICE.

FABRICATE. See BUILD and FORGE.

FABRICATION. See FABLE.

FACE. See CONFRONT.

FACE. FRONT.

Some confusion arises in the figurative use of these terms, from the *literal* meaning of them. The FACE (Lat. *facies*) is the human countenance or features. The FRONT (*frons, frontis*) is the whole anterior side of the figure, and so the words might be supposed simply applicable according to this analogy. But the analogy is not easy, because the Latin *frons* means forehead, and so face. For instance, the face of a clock is analogous to the face of a man, but we should hardly say, the front of a picture, but the face, though it be more analogous to the whole front of a man. The face of a house is the surface of the anterior wall of it, as the posterior wall is the back. Yet the terms often mean the parts in front, or that which the house confronts. On the other hand, the front of a stage is strictly according to analogy. Again, other conceptions enter. The face of a thing is often taken for that part of it which

is distinctively marked and, as it were, featured. It is probably in this way that we speak of the face of a watch.

FACE. COUNTENANCE. VISAGE.

The FACE is that which is anatomically composed of its features; and so the term is applicable to brutes and men. The COUNTENANCE (Lat. *continentia vultus*, the holding together of the features) is the face as expressive of the soul, with its thoughts, reflections, passions, or emotions, and so belongs only to human beings. The VISAGE (Fr. *visage*) is the face regarded in a fixed aspect, and not in its emotional variations. So a laughing face, a laughing countenance, but we should hardly say a laughing visage. Visage is a term indicative of something marked and impressive in the face, as dignity, sternness, grimness. It is not employed of the lighter or more cheerful looks.

"While the men wore shoes so long and picked that they were forced to support the points by chains from their middle, the ladies erected such pyramids on their heads that the *face* became the centre of the body."—*Walpole, Anecdotes of Painting*.

"Even kept her *countenance* when the lid removed
Disclosed the heart unfortunately loved."
Dryden.

"Get you gone!
Out on a most importunate aspect,
A *visage* of demand."

Shakespeare.

FACETIOUS. JOCOSE. JOCULAR. PLEASANT.

FACETIOUSNESS (Lat. *facetia*) is a kind of affected humour, to which it bears the same relation that a smirk does to a smile. JOCOSE and JOCULAR are derived from the Latin *jocus*, a joke, and *joculus*, a little joke. The jocose pokes fun, the joocular insinuates it. PLEASANTRY (Fr. *plaisanterie*) carries the notion, not of abstract joke, like facetious, but a tendency to personal raillery, though of a kind the opposite to obtrusive. The facetious had formerly a higher meaning than at present, when it is hardly used but in modified disparagement,

answering to the Latin *facetus*, elegantly humorous. It denotes at present something like manufactured wit which has no heartiness of joke.

"B. answers very *facetiously*, I must own, that a command to lend hoping for nothing again, and a command to borrow without returning anything again, seem very different commands."—*Waterland*.

Jocose seems to be more general, and jocular more specific. A man's disposition might be jocose, his demeanour on a particular occasion jocular. The jocose love jokes, the jocular make jokes. The jocular, too, is more demonstrative than the jocose.

"I had indeed the corporal punishment of what the gentlemen of the long robe are pleased *jocosely* to call mounting the rostrum for one hour."—*Pope*.

"At different times he appears as serious as a judge, and as *jocular* as a merry-andrew."—*Spectator*.

"People are not aware of the very great force which *pleasantry* in company has upon all those with whom a man of that talent converses."—*Ibid*.

FACILITY. See EASE.

FACT. See CIRCUMSTANCE.

FACTION. See CABAL.

FACTION. SEDITIOUS.

FACTIOUS (Lat. *factio*, originally one of the parties of competitors in the games of the Roman circus) is appertaining to, or, as employed of persons addicted to, raising dissension and opposition, more especially for ends of private interest. SEDITIOUS (Lat. *seditio*, from *se*, apart, and *ire*, to go) is tending to excite disturbance in the state or community, short of insurrection. The terms seem at present differentiated mainly by the scale on which they are used. Seditious relates to the manifestation of political principle or feeling; factious is used in connection with minor affairs of administration. In a meeting of equals for the purpose of coming to resolutions in common, the conduct of individuals might betray factious opposition, that is to say, of a needless kind, and actuated by personal motives, where seditious would be too grave and political a term. The

factious man is troublesome, the seditious man dangerous.

"Christianity is an humble, quiet, peaceable, and orderly religion, not noisy or ostentatious, not assuming or censorious, not *factious* or tumultuous."—*Waterland*.

"If anything pass in a religious meeting *seditiously*, and contrary to the public peace, it is to be punished in the same manner and no otherwise than as if it had happened in a fair or market."—*Locke*.

FACTOR. AGENT. BROKER.

There is little difference in these words themselves. A FACTOR (Lat. *facere*, to do) and AGENT (Lat. *agere*, to act) being persons who act on behalf of others; but an agent has more discretionary power, and represents his employer's interests more generally; a factor transacts business on commission. The factor differs from the BROKER (Old Eng. to broke, to transact business), in that he is the consignee of goods, and buys and sells in his own name, while the broker is only a middleman, and takes no possession.

FACULTY. POWER.

FACULTY (Lat. *facultas*, from *facere*, to do) is active power, but it differs also from POWER (Fr. *pouvoir*, to be able), as applied to sentient beings. Power, as such, belongs to the individual, and is specifically exerted; the faculty is shared with the race. Thus, if we said of any one, "He has not the faculty of speech," we should mean, that he was born without that which with mankind is a natural endowment; if we said, "He has not the power of speech," we should mean that, from some physical cause, permanent or not, he was at the time incapable of articulate utterance.

"For man's natural *powers* and *faculties*, even as they were before the fall entire, were not sufficient or able of themselves to reach such a supernatural end, but needed the power of the Divine Spirit to strengthen, elevate, and raise them thereto."—*Bp. Bull*.

FAILING. FAILURE. IMPERFECTION. WEAKNESS. FRAILTY. FOIBLE. INFIRMITY. FAULT.

FAILING (Fr. *faillir*, Lat. *fallere*)

is always moral and personal. It is the systematic moral failing short of moral agents in one particular; as, "Inscibility is his failing."

"I have *failings*, in common with every human being, besides my own peculiar faults; but of avarice I have generally held myself guiltless."—Fox.

"Our business is to show that objects of great dimensions are incompatible with beauty, the more incompatible because they are greater; whereas the small, if ever they fail of beauty, this *failure* is not to be attributed to their size."—Burke.

FAILURE is the deficiency of supply or performance in any way. The former may or may not be connected with personal conduct, the latter necessarily is so; but in no case does failure express moral habit, but only the character of specific cases; as the failure of the crops, the failure of a promise, or of an individual to perform it. IMPERFECTION (Lat. *in*, not, and *perfectus*, from *perficere*, to make thoroughly) is a more general term still, and is applicable to any defect of nature in natural productions or artificial. When employed of individuals it is not applied physically (in that case we use blemish or defect), but to any point in which human nature falls short of its ideal completeness or normal state, as imperfect sight or hearing. WEAKNESS (A. S. *wac*, weak, from *wican*, to yield) may be used of physical and moral power. A weakness, morally, is that kind of failing which comes from insufficient energy or judgment to resist it, a propensity unrestrained, though acknowledged to be unwise.

"Go wiser thou, and in thy scale of sense
Weigh thy opinion against Providence;
Call *imperfection* what thou fancy'st such,
Say, Here He gives too little, there too much." Pope.

"Through the *weakness* of our mortal nature, we cannot always stand upright."—English Prayer Book.

FRAILTY (Lat. *fragilis*, frail) is the liability to weakness, as well as the fault proceeding from it, and also the liability to fall or offend from the influence of motives external to oneself overpowering the resolution,

blinding the judgment, or exhausting patience and endurance.

"Or further seek his merits to disclose,
Or draw his *frailties* from their dread
abode
(There they alike in trembling hope repose),
The bosom of his father and his God." Gray.

FOIBLE (Fr. *faible*) is commonly used in the sense of a slight or pardonable weakness, implying more of folly than wrong, and having its origin in constitutional defect of mind or character. INFIRMITY (*in*, not, and *firmus*, strong), like imperfection, is a general term, denoting innate and congenital weakness, a constitutional deficiency of physical or moral power.

"I confess my *foible* with regard to flattery. I am as fond of it as Voltaire can possibly be, but with this difference, that I love it only from a masterly hand."—Chesterfield.

FAULT, though connected etymologically with failing, is not, like it, negative, but positive and definite, being that which impairs excellence in a grave and conspicuous manner, an offence only less serious than a crime. Such, at least, is the force which it has come to assume. Traces of its stricter etymological meaning appear in such phrases as, "I will take this in fault of a better," *i. e.*, failing a better; or in the geological application of the term fault to the displacement of a stratum; or, "The hounds are at fault," *i. e.*, the track of the scent has failed them.

"For who is there among the sons of men that can pretend on every occasion throughout his own life to have preserved a *faultless* conduct?"—Blair.

FAILURE. See BANKRUPTCY and FAILING.

FAINT. LANGUID.

FAINT (Old Fr. *faint*, sluggish, as if from *se feindre*, to pretend inability) has several meanings analogous to this primary one, as, lacking physical power, lacking spirit, lacking distinctness of form, delineation, or colouring, or of any other

power which is cognizable by the senses, as a faint smell, a faint sound. As applied to the condition of the human frame, faint denotes the absence of physical strength; *LANGUOR*, the want of vital energy. Faintness in itself, though it may be great at the time, is less chronic than languor, and generally implies some casual cause, as to be faint from loss of blood, fatigue, hunger. *Languor* (Lat. *languere*, to languish) is a relaxed or listless state of body, caused by a continuously operating cause, as constitutional temperament, want of rest, heat, or oppressiveness of weather.

"Methought I saw my late espoused saint
Brought to me like Alcestro from the
grave,

Whom Jove's great son to her glad husband gave,

Rescued from death by force, though pale and faint." *Milton.*

"Methinks the highest expressions that language, assisted with all its helps of metaphor and resemblance, can afford, are very *languid* and *faint* in comparison of what they strain to represent when the goodness of God toward them who love Him comes to be expressed."—*Barrow.*

FAIR. CLEAR.

FAIR (A. S. *fäger*) is primarily free from all that taints, befouls, obstructs, or blemishes; hence pleasing to the eye, light-coloured, cloudless, unobstructed, candid, or impartial, favourable, distinct, common, or ordinary. Fair weather is the opposite to foul or stormy. *CLEAR* (Lat. *clarus*) is bright, undimmed, and so analogously distinct, perspicuous, audible, pure, unclouded, untarnished, unobstructed. In speaking of the weather, that is fair which is not foul or stormy; so that the term admits of degrees, as, "Tolerably fair," "Very fair." *Clear* denotes the absence of cloud, haze, or fog, and the brightness of the heavenly bodies. We might, without impropriety, say, "We had fair weather for the voyage, but not many clear days, for we had a good deal of fog."

FAIR. JUST. EQUITABLE. REASONABLE. MODERATE.

All these terms are applicable to

persons, their conduct, and their demands. *FAIR* (see above) denotes an estimate in detail of what is reciprocally just; a fair price for an article is that which seems right considering the circumstances of buyer and seller and sale. Hence the common use of such expressions as, "Upon the whole that seems fair." So a fair man is he who is ready to look at others' interests as well as his own, and to view matters without partiality, prejudice, or self-seeking. As justice depends upon the due proportion of the thing, so fairness comes of due proportion of feeling in the person.

"I would call it *fair* play."

Shakespeare.

"Would it become a *just* governor to permit his rebellious subjects, those who condemn his laws, to persecute such as were obedient to him, with a kind of scorn and violence, stripes, imprisonment, torments, and death itself; and that for this very reason, because they were willing to do their duties and observe the laws? Would it be a reasonable excuse for such a ruler to say that one of these had received sufficient punishment in the very commission of such crimes, and that the other had a sufficient reward, both of doing his duty and in his suffering for it? What could be more inconsistent with the rules of *justice* and the wise ends of government?"—*Wilkins.*

JUST (Lat. *justus*) is more comprehensive, and implies the application of principles of retributive justice, where it is due, in antagonism to all else, as any temptation to partiality, negligence in award. There is a dignity and sternness about the term just which does not belong to fair, as if it connected itself more directly with personal and responsible action. So prizes are said to be fairly won and justly awarded. *EQUITABLE* (Lat. *æquitas*, *æquus*, equal) is according to equity, and so has the force of the noun itself, which is not mere fairness, but such justice as may serve to supplement the imperfections of law or rule. If justice belongs to the judge, equity should guide the decision of the umpire.

"Justice shalt thou have;
Nor shall an *equitable* claim depend
On such precarious issue." *Smollet.*

REASONABLE (Fr. *raisonnable*, *raison*, *ratio*, reason) denotes what is fair under another aspect. As the fair is the right between man and man, the reasonable is the right in itself, as it would commend itself not only to the just but to the wise man. The reasonable, however, extends beyond the matters of intercourse between man and man, to the essential nature of things, which are in accordance with common sense or common experience. A reasonable prospect of success, for instance, is a prospect which circumstances render probable.

"Argument alone, though it might indeed evince the consistency and *reasonableness* of the doctrine, could never amount to a proof of its heavenly origin."—*Horsley*.

MODERATE (Lat. *moderatus*, *modus*, a limit), as commonly employed, denotes a marked absence of excess in demand; this may or may not flow from justice or fairness—the term states nothing but the fact. "I purchased the article at a moderate price," indicates nothing as to the intentions of the seller. Moderate measures may be, and very often are, the expressions of justice, but they may also originate in prudence, or be dictated by necessity.

"Moderate rain and showers."—*Book of Common Prayer*.

FAITH. See **BELIEF**.

FAITHFUL. **TRUSTY.**

These terms start, as it were, from opposite sides. The **FAITHFUL** servant, for instance (Lat. *fides*, faith) is he who is full of faith, in the sense of fidelity to his master; the **TRUSTY** servant is he who is worthy of his master's trust. Hence, *trusty* is a more comprehensive term than *faithful*, which it includes, together with all other qualities which justify the reposing of confidence. The indiscreet servant, however he might love his master, would not be *trusty*, though we might not speak of him as *unfaithful*.

"Faithful found
Among the faithless." *Milton*.

"The shepherd last appears,
And with him all his patrimony bears;
His house and household gods, his trade of war,
His bow and quiver, and his *trusty* cur."
Dryden, Virgil.

FAITHLESS. **TREACHEROUS.** **PERFIDIOUS.**

FAITHLESS means no more than not keeping faith. The character of faithlessness may therefore vary in degree, and may or may not be accompanied by a desire to deceive or injure others. The sentinel who sleeps at his post is faithless to his duty. **TREACHERY** (Fr. *tricherie*, trickery) and **PERFIDY** (Lat. *perfidia*) are peculiar kinds of faithlessness. *Perfidy* denotes the violation of some trust reposed and recognised or accepted by the other party. *Treachery* is the leading one to trust for the purpose of bringing to harm, or the readiness to break off a trust reposed to one's own benefit, and the injury of another. *Treachery* lures by deceitful appearances to ruin. *Perfidy* only violates engagements from self-interest.

"When the heart is sorely wounded by the ingratitude or *faithlessness* of those on whom it had leaned with the whole weight of affection, where shall it turn for relief?"—*Blair*.

"Thou 'st broke *perfidiously* thy oath,
And not performed thy plighted troth."
Hudibras.

"The promontory or peninsula which disjoins these two bays I call *Traitor's Head*, from the *treacherous* behaviour of its inhabitants."—*Cook's Voyages*.

FALL. See **DROP**.

FALLACIOUS. **SOPHISTICAL.**

FALLACIOUS reasoning (Lat. *fallax*, *fallacia*, *fallere*, to deceive) is that which seems to be fairly conducted and conclusive, but is not so by reason of some vitiating cause, called the fallacy, which lurks beneath it.

"This *fallacious* idea of liberty, whilst it presents a vain shadow of happiness to the subject, binds faster the chains of his subjection."—*Burke*.

SOPHISTICAL reasoning (Gr. σοφιστης, a sophist) is that of which the nature is so subtle, that its faults

cannot easily be detected and exposed, and may be unanswerable without being convincing. Sophistical reasoning may silence and bewilder, but seldom persuades. By fallacious reasoning we may deceive others, and are continually deceiving ourselves, in those cases in which our own hearts give credence to the fallacy; but sophistical reasoning is felt at the time to be inconclusive.

"A set of men smitten not with the love of wisdom, but of fame and glory, men of great natural abilities, notable industry, and boldness, appeared in Greece, and assuming the name of *Sophists*, a name hitherto highly honourable, and given only to those by whom mankind in general were supposed to be made wiser, to their ancient poets, legislators, and the gods themselves, undertook to teach, by a few lessons and in a short time, all the parts of philosophy to any person, of whatever kind were his disposition or turn of mind, and of whatever degree the capacity of it, so that he was but able to pay largely for his teaching."—*Sydenham, Plato.*

"Inconclusive and *sophistical*."—*Bolingbroke.*

FALSEHOOD. FALSITY. UN-
TRUTH. LIE.

Of these terms LIE is the strongest (*A. S. lyge, lygen*). It is criminal falsehood, an untruth spoken for the purpose of deceiving, and, indeed, for the worst of all purposes. An UN-TRUTH is simply a statement which is not true, and may have been uttered without intention to deceive and through ignorance. "I must correct myself; I accidentally spoke an untruth." It is, however, often employed in cases where the term lie seems harsh. So we should censure a little child for telling an untruth, as preferring to use a softer expression than lie, which comprises offences of much greater magnitude. The term FALSEHOOD is somewhat hard to determine. Its ordinary use is that of the *statement* in cases in which FALSITY is the *quality*. I am convinced of the falsity of what is said, and so call the saying a falsehood; though the use of falsehood, in the sense of falsity, is not to be simply reprobated, as some have done; for as likelihood means the quality of being likely, so is falsehood the

quality of being false. The difficulty, however, lies in determining whether falsehood denotes necessarily the violation of truth for purposes of deceit. There can be little doubt that, ordinarily speaking, this is so. Yet, philosophical untruth may be called falsehood, that is, philosophical falsehood. The distinction in this cause seems to flow from the nature of the subject matter; an erroneous statement in any subject matter which is variable or contingent could not be termed a falsehood; on the other hand, a violation of scientific truth, even unintentional, would be a falsehood. For instance, I say, "He is not in the house; he has started for a walk." It turns out that he has returned; but I was in error without any intention to deceive, therefore what I said was not a falsehood. But suppose that a philosopher in ancient times, judging only by natural observation, had said, "The diameter of the moon is greater than that of the sun;" this would have been a falsehood, though uttered with no intention to deceive, that is, a falsehood in science. Still a distinction may be well established between cases in which falsehood and falsity might appear capable of being employed indifferently. "I perceive the falsehood of your declaration," might be misconstrued into giving the lie where no such intention existed. This might have been avoided by using the term *falsity*.

"He put forth a satire against the wickedness of these men, revealing the *falsehood* and knavery that he was made privy to."—*Strype, Memorials.*

"The childish futility of some of these maxims, the gross and stupid absurdity, and the palpable *falsity* of others."—*Burke.*

"A *lie* is a breach of promise, for whoever seriously addresses his discourse to another tacitly promises to speak the truth, because he knows that truth is expected."—*Paley.*

"That which they have been reprov'd for is not because they did therein utter an *untruth*, but such a truth as was not sufficient to bear up the cause which they did thereby seek to maintain."—*Hooker.*

FALTER. HESITATE.

These terms are employed, the

former of speech, the latter of speech, action, and thought. **FALTER** (connected with fault) always comes from weakness or ignorance. **HESITATE** (Lat. *hesitare*, freq. of *hære*, to stick) may be the result of prudence, and voluntary. Where it is used of involuntary hesitation of speech, the tongue falters through emotion, and hesitates through inaptitude of speech.

"Twice she began, and stopp'd: again she tried;

The *faltering* tongue its office still denied."
Dryden, Ovid.

"Without doubt or *hesitancy*."—*Atterbury.*

FAME. REPUTATION. RENOWN. REPUTE.

FAME (Lat. *fama*) may be applied to any object, good, bad, or indifferent, and may even be used of passing rumours. **REPUTATION** (Lat. *reputatio*) belongs essentially to persons, and not to the subject matter of rumour. It implies some amount of publicity of character. **REPUTE** differs from reputation in applying to things as well as persons. He is a man of high reputation; or his character is in good or bad repute. Some articles were at one time valued in trade; but they are of little repute at present. **RENOWN** (Fr. *renom*, *re* and *nomen*, a name) is employed of deeds and characters or persons. Renown is illustrious reputation, but is confined, as reputation is not, to signal deeds. A man may have a high reputation for integrity, but he is renowned for striking deeds, and high achievements, not for moral excellences.

"*Fame* is a blessing only in relation to the qualities and the persons that give it; since otherwise the tormented Prince of Devils himself were as happy as he is miserable; and famousness unattended with endearing causes is a quality so undesirable, that even infamy and folly can confess it."—*Boyle.*

"O father, first for prudence in *repute*,
Tell, with that eloquence so much thy own,
What thou hast heard."

Dryden, Ovid.

"*Reputation* is the greatest engine by

which those who are possessed of power must make that power serviceable to the ends and uses of government."—*Atterbury.*

"A foreign son-in-law shall come from far
(Such is our doom), a chief renowned in war,
Whose race shall bear aloft the Latian name,
And through the conquered world diffuse our fame."
Dryden, Virgil.

FAME. REPORT. RUMOUR.

In this connection, **FAME** is a **REPORT** or **RUMOUR** which invests the subject of it with some degree of importance. It is the hearsay evidence of remarkable persons and events, as, "The fame of our Saviour's miracles went abroad." Report (Fr. *rapport*, Lat. *reportare*, to bring back) is a bringing back of news, and may be authentic or unfounded, or partly true and partly false. The subject of a report, whatever may be the evidence for it, is definite. The subject of a rumour (Lat. *rumor*) is indefinite and vague, inasmuch as it flies about from mouth to mouth in such a way that no reporters of it can be identified.

"And the *fame* thereof was noised abroad."
—*Bible.*

"Or speak ye of *report*, or did ye see
Just cause of dread, that makes ye doubt
so sore?"
Spenser.

"What then befel him little I relate,
For various tales are *rumoured* of his fate."
Hoole, Orlando Furioso.

FAMILIAR. See CONVERSANT.

FAMILIAR. FREE.

FREE conduct (A. S. *fri*, with other forms) is that which exceeds the due bounds of reserve or respect toward another. **FAMILIAR** conduct is the same thing in the presence or toward the person of the other. Free is a term of treatment generally; familiar, of personal demeanour. All familiarity is freedom; but all freedom is not familiarity. I use familiarity toward a superior if I demean myself towards him as an equal, or if I behave to a new acquaintance as if I had known him long and well. The same thing might also be called freedom; but it would be no less freedom

if I were to ask a person high in office for a personal favour when I had no acquaintance with or claim upon him.

FAMILY. *See* RACE.

FAMOUS. CELEBRATED.

FAMOUS (Lat. *fama*, fame or report) denotes what is extensively known and extensively talked about as something more than ordinary of its kind. It is used both in a favourable and unfavourable sense, though more commonly in the former. It is applicable both to persons and things. CELEBRATED (Lat. *celebrare*) is that of which men have spoken or written much, as worthy of interest or praise.

"Men famous for their skill in polite literature."—*Mason*.

"Dr. Warburton had a name sufficient to confer *celebrity* on those who could exalt themselves into antagonists."—*Jolanson*.

FANATIC. *See* ENTHUSIAST.

FANCIFUL. *See* FANTASTICAL.

FANCY. IMAGINATION. CONCEPTION.

FANCY (Fr. *fantaisie*, Gr. *φαντασία*) is that faculty which reproduces the impressions caused by external objects, combines and modifies them anew, and recalls them for purposes of mental delectation. IMAGINATION (Lat. *imago*, an image) is almost the same; but there is a difference, which, after all, depends more upon the subject matter than on any distinctness of faculty. The same power which we should call fancy, if employed on a production of a light nature, would be dignified with the title of imagination if shown on a larger scale. Imagination is a grander, graver exercise of mind than fancy. Its laws are more immediate, and its connection with truth more marked. Imagination is more in earnest than fancy, which is governed by remoter associations, and may be arbitrary and capricious; which imagination, in the higher sense of the term, never is. The historical novels of Scott exhibit

both fancy and imagination; fancy, where scenes are introduced which are not, or in all their details are not, historically true, but such as might have occurred; imagination, where, upon limited historical information, he completes the outline of a character or an event by the play of energetic but accurate creations. CONCEPTION differs from both (Lat. *copere*, to conceive) in being more creative, and having for its object the production of some reality, as the conceptions of the poet, the painter, and the sculptor. Fancy may be wholly unreal. Imagination must be in part real. Conception is altogether real.

"Play with your *fancies*, and in them behold
Upon the hempen tackle ship-boys climbing,
Hear the shrill whistle which doth order give
To sounds confused. Behold the threaten sails,
Borne with th' invisible and creeping wind,
Draw the huge bottoms through the furrowed sea,
Breasting the lofty surge."
Shakespeare.

"Poetry, however, in its ancient original condition, was perhaps more vigorous than it is in its modern state. It included then the whole burst of the human mind, the whole exertion of its *imaginative* faculties."
—*Blair*.

"By sight we have a *conception* or image composed of colour and figure, which is all the notice and knowledge the object imparteth to us of its nature by the eye. By hearing we have a *conception*, called sound, which is all the knowledge we have of the quality of the object from the ear; and so the rest of the senses are also *conceptions* of several qualities or natures of their objects."
—*Hobbes*.

FANTASTICAL. FANCIFUL.

It will be seen above that these words are of the same origin. The FANCIFUL, however, denotes an arbitrary and capricious exercise of imagination or invention. The FANTASTICAL violates order and propriety. It is fancifulness carried to a grotesque pitch. Both are applicable to persons and their thoughts,

and even to objects, as in the quotation from Byron.

"And just as children are surprised with dread,
And tremble in the dark, so riper years,
Even in broad daylight, are possessed with fears,
And shake at shadows *fanciful* and vain
As those which in the breasts of children reign."
Dryden, Lucretius.

"'Twas sweet of yore to see it play,
And chase the sultriness of day,
As springing high the silver dew
In whirls *fantastically* flew,
And flung luxurious coolness round
The air, and verdure o'er the ground."
Byron.

FAR. See DISTANT.

FARE. FOOD. PROVISIONS. VICTUALS.

FOOD (literally, that on which one feeds) is the simplest, and expresses whatever properly supports animal life, whether in men or other animals. The term is sometimes used of plants analogously, and, in a secondary sense, of anything which keeps up a required supply, as food for study.

"Who e'er on wing with open throats
Fly at debates, expresses, votes,
Just in the manner swallows use,
Catching the airy food of news."
Green, The Spleen.

FARE (A. S. *fär*, far, *farn*, journey) is food regularly accruing, and commonly has associated with it some term expressive of its specific character, as good, substantial, poor, meagre. It is specific daily food.

"Yet labouring well his little spot of ground,
Some scattering pot-herbs here and there he found,
Which cultivated with his daily care,
And bruised with vervain, were his frugal fare."
Dryden, Virgil.

PROVISION OR PROVISIONS (Lat. *providere*, to provide or foresee) is suitable food for the procuring of which arrangements have been made.

"With that
Both table and provision vanished quite."
Milton.

VICTUALS (Lat. *victus*, from *vivere*, to live) is employed only of human food. Food and provisions may exist

in a crude state, or unprepared for eating. Fare and victuals denote prepared food. Victuals would not now be applied to uncooked meat, flour, corn, and the like; nor is fare used of any but human beings.

"You had musty victuals,
And he hath help to eat it."
Shakespeare.

FARMER. HUSBANDMAN. AGRICULTURIST.

FARMER (Fr. *fermier*, *ferme*, an inclosure, farm) is one who cultivates land, whether as the freehold proprietor or tenant, for any purpose connected with agriculture. HUSBANDMAN originally meant the master of a family. It afterwards dropped into the meaning of what in our day is commonly called farm-labourer—one who performed manual labour in tillage, whether on his own account or as a hired servant. AGRICULTURIST (Lat. *ager*, a field, and *colere*, *cultus*, to cultivate) admits the idea of scientific or theoretical farming, and farther still, the science of farming without the practice of it.

"Farm or *feorme* is an old Saxon word signifying provisions; and it came to be used instead of rent or render, because anciently the greater part of rents was received in provisions, in corn, in poultry, and the like, till the use of money became more frequent. So that a *farmer*, *firmarius*, was one who held his lands upon payment of a rent or *feorme*, though at present, by a gradual departure from the original sense, the word farm is brought to signify the very estate or lands so held upon farm or rent."
Blackstone.

"The bulk of every state may be divided into *husbandmen* and manufacturers." — *Hume.*

"The farmer is always a practitioner; the agriculturist may be a mere theorist." — *Crabb.*

FASCINATE. See CAPTIVATE.

FASHION. See CUSTOM and FORM.

FASHION, *v.* See FORM.

FAST. See ABSTINENCE.

FAST. FIRM.

FAST (A. S. *fäst*) and FIRM (Lat.

firmus) may often be used interchangeably, as, "Hold firm," "Hold fast;" but there are other instances which show that firm is a subjective, fast an objective term. A thing is firm in itself, fast by external fixture. Drive a nail fast into the wall, and it will be firm enough to hang a weight upon it. Hence firm is used of the internal qualities or substances of things, without reference to anything external, as firm flesh, firm ice, and the like. In their analogous applications the same corresponding ideas appear. A fast friend is one who remains steadfastly united and attached. A firm friend is one whose affection is not easily shaken.

FAST. HARD.

There is a use of these as adverbs of motion. "It rains fast," or, "It rains hard." "To run fast," or, "To run hard." The momentum of a moving body is compounded of the velocity and the weight. So FAST (to rain fast) denotes the velocity; HARD (A. S. *heard*), to rain hard, denotes the weight of the falling fluid. These are not two different things, but the same thing looked at from different points of view.

FASTEN. FIX.

These differ in the degree of proximity implied for what is fastened or fixed to something else. To FIX (Lat. *figere, fixus*) is to fasten with contact, in such a way that the thing fixed has no independent movement. To FASTEN admits of some interval, and is not incompatible with limited independent movement. A horse is fastened to a gate; but the gate-post is fixed in the ground.

FASTIDIOUS. SQUEAMISH.

FASTIDIOUS (Lat. *fastidium*) denotes scrupulousness of taste; SQUEAMISHNESS (which is another form of qualmishness) belongs to matters of propriety in conduct. The fastidious person is apt to think things defective, the squeamish to think them impermissible. The fastidious is hard to please, the squeamish hard to assure. The idea of the

Latin *fastidium* is pride; hence fastidiousness is, literally, the pride which rejects as not good enough. It was also of old used to denote the character of what was rejected from distaste or dislike; as,

"That thing for the which children be oftentimes beaten is to them after *fastidious*."—*Sir T. Elgot*.

A nearer approach to the modern use, yet preserving the radical idea of pride, is the following:—

"What was blameable in the Pharisees was not their bare using of some lawful, indifferent, or else good and commendable things not commanded by God, but their teaching such for doctrines, and laying them as burthens on others; and, what was consequent to this, their discriminating themselves proudly and *fastidiously* from other men upon this account."—*Hammond*.

"The thorough-paced politician must presently laugh at the *squeamishness* of his conscience."—*South*.

Where the term squeamish is applied to matters of taste, it expresses over-scrupulousness on minor points, an excessive and misplaced fastidiousness.

FAT. See STOUT.

FATAL. See DEADLY.

FATE. See DESTINY.

FATIGUE. WEARINESS. LASSITUDE.

FATIGUE (Fr. *fatiguer*, Lat. *fatigare*) is the result of sustained labour or exertion. It involves nothing abnormal. The soldier is fatigued by a long march; by food and rest he is refreshed. But if the march be such as to cause his spirits to flag in any way, as well as to weaken his physical powers, he then suffers WEARINESS (A. S. *werian, werigean, weran*, to wear or carry). Fatigue is applicable to the mental and physical, weariness to the moral powers. Weariness of a war may demoralize an army. LASSITUDE (Lat. *lassitudo, lassus*, weary) is chronic fatigue, owing to some continuously operating cause. It is very like languor; but languor is constitutional, and often might be

thrown off by exertion; lassitude is actual weakness, by relaxation of the physical powers.

"The conqueror *fatigued* in war
With hot pursuit of enemies afar."

Parnell.

"*Weariness* and labour, and to eat in the sweat of his brows, and to turn to dust again."—*Bishop Taylor.*

"*Lassitude* is remedied by bathing, or anointing with oil and warm water."—*Bacon.*

FATIGUE. *See* JADE.

FAVOUR. GRACE.

FAVOUR (Lat. *favor, favere*, to favour) is used for the quality of an act, or an act of goodwill, as distinguished from one of obligative justice or compensation. GRACE (Lat. *gratia*) is used in the same sense; but grace, unlike favour, stands against something in the way of demerit. It is a favour in a sovereign to confer a title on a distinguished subject; it is an act of grace to pardon a criminal.

"He lived with all the pomp he could devise,
At tilts and tournaments obtained the prize,
But found no favour in his lady's eyes."

Dryden.

"But say I could repent, and could obtain
By act of *grace* my former state, how soon
Would height recal high thoughts?"

Milton.

FAVOURABLE. *See* AUSPICIOUS.

FAULT. *See* BLEMISH and FAILING.

FAULTY. *See* CULPABLE.

FEALTY. *See* HOMAGE.

FEAR. *See* ALARM.

FEARFUL. *See* DREADFUL.

FEAR. APPREHENSION. DREAD.

The idea common to these words is the expectation of future evil. They rise in force in the following order. A faint emotion is expressed by APPREHEND, a stronger by FEAR, a stronger still by DREAD. I call on my friend; from the look of the house I apprehend he has gone out.

I fear he is unwell; and after his severe illness I dread to hear of his death. Apprehend denotes generally an anticipation, and sometimes an anticipation of evil. Fear is a generic word. It is an inward feeling which may urge to action or inaction, as against a coming evil. Fear is sometimes a passion, sometimes an intellectual consciousness of danger. It is also employed of possible as well as actual evil. Dread is more definite than fear, and more intense. Fear of God, or of the judgment of society, may be a wholesome principle of action within certain bounds. This could not be said of the dread of them. To dread is commonly used of some impending evil from which we would gladly escape.

"*Fear* is a painful sensation produced by the immediate apprehension of some impending evil."—*Cogan.*

"*Dread* is a degree of permanent fear, an habitual and painful apprehension of some tremendous event."—*Ibid.*

FEARLESS. *See* BOLD.

FEASIBLE. POSSIBLE. PRACTICABLE.

FEASIBLE (Old Fr. *faisible, faire*, to do) denotes that which may be effected by human agency. POSSIBLE (Fr. *possible*, Lat. *posse*, to be able) is of wider meaning, and means capable of existing or occurring. Thus many things may be possible which are not feasible; for feasible belongs to the province of action only, possible to that of thought and action also; as when we say, "It is possible, but not probable." PRACTICABLE (Fr. *pratiquer*, to practise) is very like feasible; but practicable refers to matters of moral practice, while feasible belongs to matters of physical action, or human plans and designs. For instance, we might say, "A feasible," or "A practicable scheme;" but we could only say, "A practicable," not a "feasible virtue." Practicable has the further sense of capable of being made use of; as, "The mountain roads at this season are practicable;" where feasible could not have been employed.

"So Charles VIII., King of France, finding the war of Britain, which afterwards was compounded by marriage, not so *feasible*, pursued his enterprise upon Naples, which he accomplished with wonderful facility and felicity."—*Bacon*.

"Possibilities are as infinite as God's power."—*South*.

"The failure of the attempts hitherto made on this subject are not decisive against the *practicability* of such a project."—*Stewart*.

FEAST. See BANQUET.

FEAT. See EXPLOIT.

FEEBLE. WEAK. INFIRM.

As employed of men's states, WEAK (A. S. *wac*) is used of deficiency of physical, moral, and mental strength; FEEBLE (Fr. *faible*, Lat. *febilis*), of the physical and the intellectual; INFIRM (*in*, not, and *firmus*, firm), of the physical and the moral. Of these weak is the generic term; and feebleness and infirmity are manifestations of weakness; Feebleness is relative weakness; infirmity is chronic weakness. A man is in a feeble state when some cause has occurred to deprive him of his full strength. A feeble attempt is one which might conceivably have been much more effective. Infirmity is said of persons labouring under some form of weakness which has become habitual to them, and which there seems little likelihood of removing.

"With continual pains, teaching the grammar school there and preaching, he changed this life for a better, in great *feebleness* of body more than of soul or mind."—*Strype*, *Memorials*.

"Through the *weakness* of our mortal nature we can do no good thing without Thee."—*Book of Common Prayer*.

"Vehement passion does not always indicate an *infirm* judgment. It often accompanies and actuates, and is even an auxiliary to, a powerful understanding."—*Burke*.

FEED. See CHERISH.

FEELING. SENSATION. PERCEPTION. SENSIBILITY. SUSCEPTIBILITY. EMOTION. PASSION. SENSE. CONSCIOUSNESS. REFLECTION.

FEELING (A. S. *felan*, to feel) is a

term of very comprehensive application. It denotes the faculty of perceiving external objects or certain states of the body itself, the specific sense of touch, the power, self-consciousness, emotional capacity or states, or the manifestation of such emotion, and even intellectual conviction. SENSATION (Lat. *sensus*) is the impression (or capacity of receiving it) produced upon the organization through the organs of sense, or derived from incorporeal objects, as thoughts, announcements, and the like. PERCEPTION (Lat. *percipere*, to perceive) is the conscious reference of sensation to the cause which produced it. Perception combines the internal with the external. Sensation is internal only. SENSIBILITY is the capacity of feeling or perception. SUSCEPTIBILITY (Lat. *suscipere*) is commonly used in the sense of quick sensibility, or the capacity of it. CONSCIOUSNESS (Lat. *conscious*, from *con* and *scire*, to know) is the faculty of regarding one's own mind and thoughts as object matter of knowledge; while REFLECTION (Lat. *reflectere*, to turn back) is the exercise of that faculty. EMOTION and PASSION deserve to be differentiated among themselves. Emotion (Lat. *emovere*, to move forth) is a strong excitement of feeling, tending to manifest itself by its effect upon the body. Passion (Lat. *pati*, *passus*, to suffer) denotes the state when any feeling or emotion masters the mind, which becomes, though energetically influenced, yet passive as regards the strong power which controls it. SENSE is employed in the widest way to comprise the whole range of mental and physical sensation; as, "The things of time and sense."

"Perception is only a special kind of knowledge, and sensation a special kind of feeling."—*Sir W. Hamilton*.

"The true lawgiver ought to have a heart full of *sensibility*."—*Burke*.

"He sheds on souls *susceptible* of light
The glorious dawn of an eternal day."

Young.

"How different the *emotions* between departure and return!"—*Washington Irving*.

"The primary idea annexed to the word

passion is that of *passiveness*, or being impulsively acted upon."—*Cogan*.

"*Consciousness* is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind."—*Locke*.

"By *reflection*, then, in the following part of this discourse, I would be understood to mean that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them, by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding."—*Ibid*.

FEIGN. PRETEND. SIMULATE. DISSIMULATE.

FEIGN (Lat. *fingere*) is to give fictitious existence, or to give an impression of something as actual or true which is not so. To **PRETEND** (Lat. *præ*, forward, and *tendere*, to stretch) is to put forward what is unreal or untrue in such a way as that it may be accepted as true. Feigning commonly misleads the observation, pretence the understanding. Feigning puts out false appearances, pretence false facts also. I feign friendship for another in my outward demeanour and conduct. I pretend that I am his friend as a matter of fact by what I say to mislead the judgment. It will be observed, that what in feign is the primary, in pretend is the secondary meaning. Delusion is the very essence of feigning; but to pretend is etymologically and in its oldest sense simply to put forward; then, derivatively, to put forward as a cloak, or with false purpose. We can only feign what is directly associated with ourselves; but we may pretend in matters of fact generally or as connected with others. I may pretend, for instance, that I enjoy the intimate acquaintance of many great personages; but I can only do this by misrepresentation of facts. It would be impossible for me to feign this without *exhibiting* something to lead to this belief. To **SIMULATE** (Lat. *simulare*, *similis*, like) can, like feign, be only employed of what is personal in oneself. To simulate is to put on and systematically exhibit what are the natural signs and indications of feelings, a character, or a part which do not really belong to one; to act a feigned part. **DISSIMU-**

LATION is the feigned concealment of what really *exists* in one's character or feeling; as simulation is the feigned exhibition of what does *not exist*.

"And much she marvelled that a youth so raw,
Nor felt, nor *feigned* at least, the oft-told flames,
Which, though sometimes they frown,
yet rarely anger dames."

Byron.

"Some, indeed, have *pretended* by art and physical applications to recover the dead; but the success has sufficiently upbraided the attempt."—*South*.

"*Simulation* and *dissimulation*, for instance, are the chief arts of cunning. The first will be esteemed always by a wise man unworthy of him, and will therefore be avoided by him in every possible case. For, to resume my Lord Bacon's comparison, *simulation* is put on that we may look into the cards of another; whereas *dissimulation* intends nothing more than that we should hide our own."—*Bolingbroke*.

FELICITATE. See **CONGRATULATE**.

FELICITY. See **HAPPINESS**.

FELLOWSHIP. **SOCIETY.**

FELLOWSHIP (Old Eng. *felawe*, from A. S. *felaw*, from *feligean*, *fylgean*, *fylgan*, to follow) is expressive of close or continuous intercourse as it relates to men individually; **SOCIETY** (Lat. *societas*, *socius*, a fellow) as it relates to them collectively. I find myself in good or bad society generally. (The term fellowship could not have been employed here.) And I am on terms of good fellowship with this or that person in particular. Moreover, fellowship imports some degree of equality, which society does not.

"Of *fellowship* I speak,
Such as I seek, fit to participate
All rational delight, wherein the brute
Cannot be human consort." *Milton*.

As society expresses community of presence, so fellowship community of privileges, state, enjoyments, possessions, and the like.

"God having designed man for a sociable creature, made him not only with an inclination and under a necessity to have *fellowship* with those of his own kind, but furnished him also with language, which was to be the greater instrument and common tie of *societj*."—*Locke*.

FELON. *See* CRIMINAL.

FEMALE. FEMININE. EFFEMINATE.

FEMALE (Lat. *femella*, diminutive of *femina*) is applied to the sex as opposed to male. FEMININE (Lat. *femininus*) is applied to the properties and characteristics of the sex as opposed to masculine. To matters distinctively related to women we apply the adjective female, as female dress. To matters which are appropriate to women, but not exclusively restricted to them, we apply the adjective feminine, as feminine accomplishments. Feminine branches of learning are taught in female schools. To what belongs to men, but would belong more fitly to women, we apply the adjective EFFEMINATE.

"A wondrous monument of female wiles."
—*Pope*.

"Nothing will be found of such extensive use for supplying the deficiencies of Chaucer's metre as the pronunciation of the *e* feminine."—*Tyrwhitt on Chaucer*.

"An effeminate and unmanly foppery."—*Bishop Hurd*.

FEMININE. *See* FEMALE.

FERMENT. *See* EBULLITION.

FERMENTATION. *See* EBULLITION.

FEROCIOUS. FIERCE. SAVAGE. BARBAROUS.

The two former are equally applicable to men and the lower animals, the third more properly to men, the last exclusively to men. FEROCIOUS (Lat. *ferox*) denotes the quality of fierceness. The hyæna is a ferocious animal even when asleep. FIERCE (Lat. *ferus*) expresses the exhibition of ferocity in an energetic and wild way, which gives to the looks and the movements an expression of passionate eagerness to hurt or destroy. SAVAGE (Fr. *sauvage*, Lat. *sylvaticus*, *sylva*, a wood, as if grown up wild in the woods) denotes the absence of all that might tend to domesticate or soften, and the consequent presence of a native unrestrained licentiousness of nature. BARBAROUS (Lat. *bar-*

barus, Gr. *βάρβαρος*, foreign) is employed of the way in which such dispositions manifest themselves. So we commonly speak of "a savage spirit" showing itself in "barbarous usage" or "treatment." The barbarous is the savage in manner, as the savage is the barbarous in disposition.

"The lion, a *fierce* and *ferocious* animal, hath young ones but seldom, and one at a time."—*Brown, Vulgar Errors*.

"One of them fired a pistol at him (Archbishop Sharpe), which burnt his coat and gown, but did not go into his body. Upon this they fancied he had a magical secret to secure him against a shot; and they drew him out of his coach and murdered him *barbarously*, repeating their strokes till they were sure he was quite dead."—*Burnet*.

"There can be no true liberty where such licentiousness is suffered with impunity. This is part of the *savageness* of corrupt nature."—*Waterland*.

FERTILE. FRUITFUL. PROLIFIC. PRODUCTIVE.

FERTILE (Lat. *fertilis*, from *fero*, to bear) expresses that which has an inherent capacity of producing. It is applied properly to soil, and metaphorically or analogously to the mind or capacity of man, as a fertile field, a fertile imagination, fertile in resources. The fertile source produces what is of a *foreign* nature. FRUITFUL (Lat. *fructus*, fruit) denotes that which produces of *its own* kind, and is opposed to barren, as fertile is opposed to waste. A tree is fruitful or unfruitful, as it bears, or not, of its own fruit. A field might be called either fertile or fruitful; fertile as regards the quality of the soil, fruitful as regards the abundance of the produce. But, generally speaking, the soil is fertile, the tree is fruitful. PROLIFIC (Lat. *proles*, offspring, and *facere*, to make) is producing young in abundance, and is employed both of animals and fruit-bearing trees or vegetables. It also is used metaphorically, as "a measure prolific of evil consequences." The very abundantly and variously fruitful is the prolific. PRODUCTIVE (Lat. *producere*, *productus*, to produce) denotes no more than the fact of producing in

tolerable quantity. This is not, therefore, a term, like fertile and prolific, expressive of a natural property of necessity. The naturally productive is identical with the fertile; but productiveness may be the result of art in tillage. So it might be said, "That field would grow nothing till I mixed a certain manure with the soil. It is now as productive as any on the estate."

"The quickness of the imagination is seen in the invention, the *fertility* in the fancy, and the accuracy in the expression."—*Dryden*.

"We curse not wine—the vile excess we blame,
More *fruitful* than the accumulated hoard
Of pain and misery." *Armstrong*.

"Indeed it is usual in Scripture that covetousness, being so universal, so original a crime, such a *prolific* sin, be called by all the names of those sins by which it is either punished, or to which it tempts, or whereby it is nourished."—*Bishop Taylor*.

"There is one sort of labour which adds to the value of the subject upon which it is bestowed; there is another which has no such effect. The former, as it produces a value, may be called *productive*, the latter unproductive, labour."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations*.

FERVOUR. ARDOUR.

FERVOUR (Lat. *fervor*, from *fervere*, to boil) and ARDOUR (Lat. *ardere*, to burn) seem, in their metaphorical, to keep up the distinction of their physical, meaning. The fervent boils over demonstratively, the ardent burns fiercely. The force of anger is fervent; the force of zeal, love, desire ardent. In their secondary applications, fervour is associated with the motive cause, ardour with the final cause; in other words, we feel with fervour, we pursue with ardour. There is more of principle in fervour, more of passion in ardour. In those cases, therefore, in which energy of desire or pursuit is directed to no high moral ends, we use the term ardour; where this is so, fervour. The fervour of the patriot. The ardour of a lover of the chase.

"A *fervent* faith and glowing zeal."—*Search*.

"Moved on
In silence their bright legions to the sound
Of instrumental harmony that breathed
Heroic *ardour* to adventurous deeds." *Milton*.

FESTIVAL. FESTIVITY. HOLIDAY. FEAST.

In ecclesiastical language a FEAST is any day which (not being a fast) is observed with peculiar solemnity. The greater of these feasts are termed FESTIVALS, as the Festival of the Nativity. The term festival is employed of days of heathen celebration also more commonly than feast, which in this connection would be more likely to mean a solemn banquet in honour of a god. HOLIDAY has well-nigh lost its original meaning of holy day, and is employed to express a time of vacation from study or labour. FESTIVITY has no sacred or solemn force at all, and expresses only the gaiety and enjoyment of social entertainments.

"The morning trumpets *festival* proclaimed
Through each high street." *Milton*.

"Much the same may be observed of the Roman drama, which, we are told, had its rise in the unrestrained *festivity* of the rustic youth."—*Hurd*.

"The same bell that called the great man to his table invited the neighbourhood all round, and proclaimed a *holyday*."—*Ibid*.

- FESTIVITY. See FESTIVAL.
- FETCH. See BRING.
- FETTER. See CLOG.
- FEUD. See QUARREL.
- FICKLE. See CAPRICIOUS and INCONSTANT.
- FICTION. See FABLE.
- FICTITIOUS. See ARTIFICIAL and COUNTERFEIT.
- FIDELITY. See CONSTANCY.
- FIERCE. See FEROCIOUS.
- FIERY. See BURNING.
- FIGURE. See FORM and METAPHOR.
- FINAL. See CONCLUSIVE and LATEST.

FIND. DISCOVER.

FIND (A. S. *findan*) is to light upon, whether unexpectedly or as the result of search.

"Seek, and ye shall find."—*Bible*.

So unessential is purpose to finding, that the word is sometimes used as a synonym of feel or experience.

"I find you passing gentle."—*Shakespeare*.

To DISCOVER (Fr. *découvrir*, Lat. *discooperire*) is to find something which is of a new or strange character when found. I may find a piece of money as I walk along. On the other hand, "find out" is always the result of effort and search in reference to a distinct object to be aimed at, as a thief, a riddle, a mode of solving any difficulty. Discover, on the other hand, combines a general purpose with a specific chance. Discovery is the result of search, either direct or indirect. The existence of the thing discovered may have been previously either known or unknown, or known to others than the discoverer, who in that case becomes a discoverer to himself, and not to the world.

"The distinction of a first *discoverer* made us cheerfully encounter every danger, and submit to every inconvenience."—*Cook's Voyages*.

FINE. See BEAUTIFUL and DELICATE.

FINE. MULCT. PENALTY. FORFEIT. AMERCEMENT.

FINE (Low Lat. *finis*, a sum of money, the payment of which made an end of a transaction, as a claim, a dispute, a trial), in the sense of a penalty, is always pecuniary. MULCT (Lat. *muleta*, *multa*) is also pecuniary. It is, however, a technical term, bearing the sense of a commutation for legal forfeiture, and was not only a punishment, but a compensation, as to be "muled or mulcted in half the amount." PENALTY (contracted from *penalty*, from *pæna*), in its technical sense in law, is mostly applied to pecuniary punishment or for-

feiture, but in its common use denotes any kind of punishment, as "to suffer the extreme penalty of the law." FORFEIT (Fr. *forfait*, *foris factum*, which meant first the offence, and then that which was paid for it) may be pecuniary or otherwise. A fine is imposed, a penalty inflicted, a forfeit incurred. A forfeit springs, as it were, out of the nature of the case, and is due *ipso facto* by prearrangement. AMERCEMENT (Low Lat. *amerciamentum*, from *merces*, wages, penalty) differed from fine in being not fixed in amount, but assessed according to the nature of the offence, by a process which was called "affearing."

"So, two years after, Tracy's heirs sued him for it, and he was turned out of his office of Chancellor, and *fined* in four hundred pound."—*Burnet*.

"A mulct thy poverty could never pay,
Had not Eternal Wisdom found the way."
Dryden.

"But of the tree
Which, tasted, works knowledge of good and evil,
Thou may'st not; in the day thou eat'st thou diest:
Death is the *penalty* imposed."
Milton.

"For so the holy sages once did sing,
That He our deadly *forfeit* should release,
And with His Father work us a perpetual peace."
Ibid.

"The great charter also directs that the *amercement* which is always inflicted in general terms—sit in misericordia—shall be set or reduced to a certainty by the oath of good and lawful men of the neighbourhood."
—*Blackstone*.

FINICAL. See FOPPISH.

FINISH. CLOSE. CONCLUDE. COMPLETE. TERMINATE. END.

Of these, the following three, END, FINISH, and COMPLETE, represent a rise in force or fullness of meaning in that order. To end is to discontinue by leaving off, without expressing anything of the state in which the thing ended is left, as, "He ended his speech by saying so and so." "The fortieth verse ends the chapter;" the verb being used both transitively and intransitively. Whatever begins must end; and whatever

is begun must be ended. The term is quite indefinite. Things may be ended with or without completeness or finish; and things may end prematurely or satisfactorily. To finish is to end working at a thing, to put the last required labour or touch to it, and is employed of action, forces, or influences. "He is finishing his painting," that is, he is employed in putting the final strokes or touches. "The last blow finished him," that is, rendered more blows superfluous. "He finished working, or he ended;" the one expresses final effort, the latter cessation. To complete is to bring finally to fill up the plan, design, or proposed task. A dictionary is ended with the word *finis*. It is finished with the letter Z. It is completed by revisions and interpolations. The world was finished on the last day of its creation; but it is not yet ended. To **TERMINATE** is to bring to an end what has been protracted or continuous, and relates to some degree of space or time traversed in the preceding work or operation. A vista terminates in or with a certain object. A happy remark will sometimes terminate a tedious dispute. A short life ends, a long life terminates. To **CLOSE** is physically to stop by bringing together the parts; as, "to close the mouth by bringing together the lips;" "to close a book by bringing together the leaves;" "to close the eyes;" "to close the ranks of an army." Analogously, to close is to shut up into a compact form what is regarded as having totality, as "to close a bargain;" "to close one's studies." **CONCLUDE** is a stronger term than close, more definitive and positive, and means to close in such a way as to give the thing closed a formal, necessary, or appropriate termination. To close refers only to the act, conclude to the intention. I close my letter, in one sense, when I seal it; in another, when I write the last sentence. I conclude it when I subjoin something without which I should feel the communication to be incomplete.

"An eternal and happy life, a kingdom, a perfect kingdom and glorious, that shall never have ending."—*Bishop Taylor*.

"God is our 'light,' as He sheweth us the state we are in, and the enemies we have to encounter; He is our 'strength,' as He enableth by His grace to cope with and overcome them; and He is our 'salvation,' as the author and *finisher* of our deliverance from sin, death, and Satan."—*Horne*.

It will be seen by the following example that, while finish and end are intrinsic, 'complete takes in accessories also, which may be requisite to the completion of certain things. So a prophecy is not completed before it has been verified in all its historic facts and allusions.

"It was attested by miracles of all sorts, done in great variety and number, by the visible centering of the old prophecies in the person of Christ, and by the *completion* of those prophecies since which He Himself uttered."—*Atterbury*.

"A good commencement has ever been found by experience auspicious to a good progress and a happy *termination*."—*Knorr, Essays*.

"We have it, it seems, in our power, by the exercise of one particular virtue, to secure a pardon to ourselves for neglecting all the rest, and can blot out the remembrance of an ill-spent life by a few acts of charity at the *close* of it."—*Atterbury*.

"Nor, indeed, do I know a text in the Bible that I would more willingly pitch upon to leave with you as the last advice I would give you, and as the sum and *conclusion* of my preaching among you, than these words of St. Paul I have now read to you (Philippians iv. 8)."—*Sharp*.

FINISHED. COMPLETE. PERFECT.

A **FINISHED** painting is one which has had the greatest pains bestowed upon the work. A **COMPLETE** painting is that which fulfils its design of representation, and so leaves nothing unrepresented which belongs to the subject. A **PERFECT** painting is one which is without faults, and combines to the utmost all the excellences of the art.

"A faultless sonnet *finished* thus would be
Worth tedious volumes of loose poetry."
Dryden.

"When the prisoner, who was King Richard, heard the song, he knew that Blondel must be the singer; and when Blondel paused about the middle, the King began the remainder and *completed* it."—*Warton*.

"The French Revolution has this of wonderful in it, that it resembles what Lord Verulam says of the operations of Nature. It was *perfect*, not only in its elements and principles, but in its members and its organs from the very beginning."—*Burke*.

FINITE. LIMITED.

It is a natural property of things to be finite, an artificial property to be limited. Or, again, things are finite in reference to their own nature, limited in reference to power or capacity. Man's powers are limited, for he is himself a finite being.

"And all the difference or distinction there is betwixt them, is only in our different apprehensions of this one being, which acting severally upon several objects, we apprehend it as acting from several properties by reason of the *finiteness* of our understandings, which cannot conceive of an infinite being wholly, as it is in itself, but as it were by piecemeal, as it represents itself to us."—*Beveridge*.

"Absolutely according to pleasure, or *limitedly* according to certain rules prescribed."—*Barrow*.

FIRE. FLAME. BLAZE. CONFLAGRATION. IGNITION. COMBUSTION.

FIRE (A. S. *fyr*) is that kind of combustion which evolves light and heat. FLAME (Lat. *flamma*) is the form under which such combustion is exhibited when the matter is gaseous. A BLAZE (A. S. *blæse*) is a rapid evolution of light, whether accompanied or not with sensible heat, as the blaze of the sun, of lamps, of a meteor. CONFLAGRATION (Lat. *conflagrare*) is the visible consumption by fire of masses of combustible materials. IGNITION (Lat. *ignis*, fire) is in modern phraseology opposed to COMBUSTION (Lat. *comburare*, to burn), the former being commonly taken to mean the consumption by great heat, with manifestations of fire or flame, the latter without. The action, for instance, of the atmosphere upon the human skin produces an insensible combustion of its particles.

FIRM. See FAST and SOLID.

FIRMNESS. See CONSTANCY.

FIT. See BECOMING, EXPEDIENT, and MEET.

FIT. ADAPT. SUIT.

To FIT (feat, neat) is to make physically to tally, or to make proportionate or commensurate. Hence, analogously, to adapt, qualify, or suit. It is, then, the generic term, of which the others may be regarded as modifications. To ADAPT (Lat. *adaptare*, ad, to, and *aptus*, apt or fit) is to make fit for a purpose, and always supposes the requirement of an ulterior design. To SUIT (Fr. *suite*, Lat. *sequi*, *secutus*) is literally to cause to follow or fall in. It is more exclusively employed of the becoming and appropriate; adapt, of the efficient. The suitable harmonizes; the adapted co-operates. We fit one object to another. We adapt means to an end. We suit an object to a quality.

"Sowing the sandy gravelly land in Devonshire and Cornwall with French furze seed they reckon a great improver of their land, and a *fitter* of it for corn."—*Mortimer on Husbandry*.

There is more of judgment in fitting, more of contrivance in adaptation.

"Who could ever say or imagine such a body (as the atmosphere), so different from the globe it serves, could be made by chance, or be *adapted* so exactly to all these grand ends by any other efficient than by the power and wisdom of the infinite God?"—*Derham*.

"If, therefore, in the nature of things we can discover a world of mutual *suitabilities* of this to that, and of one thing to another, it will be a sufficient argument that they all proceed from some wise Cause that had an universal idea of their natures in His mind, and saw how such a thing would *suit* such a thing before ever He actually *adapted* them one to another."—*Scott, Christian Life*.

FIX. See ESTABLISH and FASTEN.

FLAG. See DROOP.

FLAGITIOUS. See HEINOUS.

FLAGRANT. See HEINOUS.

FLAME. See FIRE.

FLARE. FLASH. GLARE.

FLICKER.

A FLASH is a sudden brilliancy in-

stantaneously withdrawn or disappearing. A FLARE is a dazzling, unsteady light. Flare is the German *flackern*, and may be illustrated by the burning of a torch, which alternately blazes brightly and is obscured by the smoke. Flash may be illustrated by its etymology, *fleche*, an arrow, *fleche a feu*, a missile of light shot from a cross-bow in a siege, to light up the operations of the enemy. Flare is more continuous than flash. GLARE (allied to the Latin *clarus*) is a broad, steady, untempered, and, therefore, oppressive light. FLICKER (A. S. *flyccerian*, with other forms) is connected with fly. It expresses a light which is rapidly unsteady, a sort of fluttering flame which conveys the idea of waning or weakness, as the others do of energy, in the burning.

"Like *flaring* tapers, brightening as they waste."—*Goldsmith*.

"Those sallies of jollity in the house of feasting are often forced from a troubled mind, like *flashes* from the black cloud which, after a momentary effulgence, are succeeded by thicker darkness."—*Blair*.

"Strong perfumes and *glaring* light
Oft destroy both smell and sight."

Carew.

"Even as a flame unfed, which runs to waste

With its own *flickering*."

Byron.

FLASH. See FLARE.

FLAT. LEVEL.

FLAT (Icelandic *flatr*, and other Northern forms, allied to the Greek *πλατύς*) is having a level surface, as opposed, for instance, to round. LEVEL (Lat. *libella*, dim. of *libra*, a scale) is having *uniform flatness*. Flat belongs to objects intrinsically level, as compared with the horizon or other objects. Hence an object of which a part is flat may be called flat, in the sense of characterized by flatness, as a flat head, or nose. If the latter were perfectly flat, it would be level with the face. The plane which is raised perpendicularly does not cease to be level. A line may be level; but it is only a plane or surface that can be flat.

"The ordinary shape of the fish's eye being in a much larger degree convex than that of land animals, a corresponding difference attends its muscular conformation, namely, that it is throughout calculated for *flattening* the eye."—*Paley*.

"The setting sun now beams more mildly bright,
The shadows lengthening with the level light."
Beattie.

FLATTERY. COMPLIMENT. ADULATION.

Of these, the least strong is COMPLIMENT. In itself, and etymologically, it does not necessarily express praise at all. A compliment (Fr. *compliment*, from the Old Fr. *complier*, from the Lat. *complere*) is an expression filling up one's regard or duty to another. When this is done with a certain stretch of politeness, and the words express not only respect but admiration, the compliment develops into FLATTERY. Anything is flattery which expresses praise or admiration, not as being simply due and felt, but for the sake of gratifying vanity or gaining favour. Untimely as well as excessive praise is flattery. Flattery is the voluntary tribute of more praise than is due or called for (Icelandic *fladra*, connected with flat, and so to stroke, or as it were smooth or pat, into self-complacency). ADULATION (possibly *ad aulam*, at the entrance, *adulari*, to fawn as a dog upon his master) is excessive and exaggerative flattery, accompanied by a feigned subservience, and is ready to express itself in hypocrisy and falsehood. Flattery improves upon existing excellences or merits; adulation invests its object with such as are created on purpose. Compliments may be hollow but harmless, as being understood and accepted as conventional. They turn upon such matters as appearance or dress, or minor actions and performances, and are the better when they exhibit skill or taste. They suppose an equality. In flattery men place themselves on a lower level, and feign, as it were, to look up with admiration. In adulation they adopt a servile relationship.

"Flattery, if its operation be nearly examined, will be found to owe its acceptance not to our ignorance, but knowledge of our failures, and to delight us rather as it consoles our wants than displays our possessions."—*Rambler*.

"And he that called Arsinoë *Ἥρας ὕψος*, Juno's violet, kept all the letters of the name right, and complemented the lady ingeniously."—*Bishop Taylor*.

"Flattery corrupts both the giver and the receiver; and adulation is not of more service to the people than to kings."—*Burke*.

FLATTERER. SYCOPHANT. PARASITE.

The character of the FLATTERER has been given above. The SYCOPHANT (Gr. *συκοφάντης*, an informer against the illicit sale of figs at Athens) bears at present the meaning of a person of obsequious and servile character. With the sycophant, flattery is only exhibited as a manifestation of servility, without being itself distinctively characteristic of him. The PARASITE (*παρά*, near, and *σιτος*, food) was among the Greeks the overseer and apportioner of the corn brought for the public sacrifices. In Modern English it bears the meaning of one who earns invitations to the tables of the wealthy by flattery and such arts of conversation as tend to recommend him as a guest.

"This it is that giveth unto a flatterer that large field under pretence of friendship, where he hath a fort, as it were, commodiously seated and with the vantage to assail and endamage us, and that is self-love; whereby every man being the first and greatest flatterer of himself, he can be very well content to admit a stranger to come near and flatter him, namely, when he thinketh, and is well willing withal to witness with him, and to confirm that good self-conceit and opinion of his own."—*Holland, Plutarch*.

"A sycophant will everything admire;—

Each verse, each sentence, sets his soul on fire.

All is divine! there's not a word amiss!

He shakes with joy, and weeps with tenderness,

He overpowers you with his mighty praise."

Dryden.

"He knew them flatterers of the festal hour,
The heartless parasites of present cheer."

Byron.

FLAVOUR. See TASTE.

FLAW. See BLEMISH.

FLEET. See SWIFT.

FLEETING. See TEMPORARY.

FLEETNESS. See FLEET, FLEETING, and QUICKNESS.

FLEXIBLE. See PLIABLE.

FLIGHTINESS. See LEVITY.

FLOURISH. THRIVE. PROSPER.

The two former are employed both of vegetative life and growth and of the doings of men, the latter only of men's state and doings. To FLOURISH (*fleurir*, *fleur*, *flos*, *floris*, a flower) is to be in the possession and display of all powers belonging to the individual according to his nature. It implies a certain degree of anterior development. The result of flourishing is the admiration of others, or of beholders. THRIVE (Icelandic *thrifa*, to care) is to prosper by industry and care. Hence, as in flourish the physical sense is the proper, and the moral the improper or metaphorical, so in thrive the idea of social or industrial success is the primary sense, and the physical is the derived. Acquisition in substance by growth is the idea expressed by thrive. Hence it implies less of anterior development than flourish. The full-grown plant flourishes, the seedling thrives. PROSPER (*prosperare*, *pro*, according to, and *spes*, hope) is so to thrive as to be in advantageous circumstances. Prosperity belongs to him who hoped for success, while the merely fortunate man owes it to chance. Men prosper when they successfully carry out certain aims and undertakings. Although prosperity belongs exclusively to the designs of men, the term is employed of things in which they are not directly, yet indirectly, recognized; as the prosperity of the arts, of commerce, of agriculture, and the like.

"By continual meditations in sacred writings, a man as naturally improves and advances in holiness as a tree thrives and flourishes in a kindly and well-watered soil."

—*Bishop Horne.*

"With this advantage then
To union, and firm faith, and firm accord,
More than can be in heaven, we now return
To claim our just inheritance of old,
Surer to prosper than *prosperity*
Could have assured us." *Milton.*

FLOW. ARISE. PROCEED. ISSUE. SPRING. EMANATE.

To express one or more objects coming out of one or more others is the purport of all these words. That which comes out in continuous supply FLOWS (Lat. *fluere*, to flow). That which comes up bodily out of something else gradually is said to rise or ARISE (A. S. *risan*, to rise). What comes forth from another as a starting-point, source, or origin PROCEEDS (Lat. *procedere*, to come forth). That which goes out (Fr. *issue*, Lat. *exitus*, *exire*) from something else which contained or enclosed it ISSUES. That which comes forth bodily, but not gradually, but suddenly or rapidly, SPRINGS (A. S. *springan*, *springean*). That which oozes or drips out of something else, imparting of its own particles, nature, substance, or composition EMANATES (Lat. *e*, out, and *manare*, to distil). The moral application or analogous use of these terms ought to adhere as closely as possible to these physical distinctions. See further remarks under PROCEED.

"Those thousand decencies that daily flow
From all her words and actions." *Milton.*

"Yet many will presume;
Whence heavy persecution shall arise
On all who in the worship persevere
Of spirit and truth." *Ibid.*

"Teach me the various labours of the moon,
And whence *procced* the eclipses of the
sun." *Dryden.*

"Life's warm vapour *issuing* through the
wound." *Pope.*

"'Twas ebbing darkness past the noon of
night,
And Phosphor, on the confines of the light,
Promised the sun ere day began to *spring*." *Dryden.*

It should be observed, that two apparently contradictory ideas are associated with the term spring—the one that of visible, sudden, and

present rising, the other that of remote causation. This no doubt comes from the twofold association of a spring, as the breaking forth of water from the ground, and as constituting also a remote source to which the river is to be traced.

"Aristotle doth not deny God to be the efficient cause of the world, but only asserts that He created it from eternity, making Him a necessary cause thereof, it proceeding from Him by way of *emanation*, as light from the sun."—*Ray.*

FLUCTUATE. See DEMUR.

FLUID. LIQUID.

FLUID (Lat. *fluidus*, *fluere*, to flow) is the generic term, of which LIQUID is a species (*liquidus*, *liquere*, to be liquid). Gas and steam are other species. The characteristic of a fluid is that it retains no definite shape or form, owing to the ease with which its parts change their relative position. Air and the gases are fluids, but not liquids. Water is a fluid, regarded in itself, liquid as opposed to solid.

"The second supposition is, that the earth being a mixed mass, somewhat *fluid*, took, as it might do, its present form by the joint action of the mutual gravitation of its parts and its rotatory motion."—*Paley.*

"In oil of aniseed, which I drew both with and without fermentation, I observed the whole body of the oil in a cool place to thicken into the consistence and appearance of white butter, which with the least heat resumed its former *liquidaess*."—*Boyle.*

FLUTTER. See PALPITATE.

FOE. See ENEMY.

FÆTUS. See EMBRYO.

FOIBLE. See FAILING.

FOIL. See BAFFLE.

FOLLOW. SUCCEED. ENSUE.

Persons and things FOLLOW and SUCCEED; only things ENSUE. To follow (A. S. *folgian*, with other forms) is to move behind and in the same direction, whether with a view to overtake or not. Hence, in analogous senses, to adhere, as to a leader, to copy as an original, to succeed, to result. To succeed (Lat. *succedere*)

is to follow in such a way that the subsequent thing takes the place of the preceding. One such case is sufficient to constitute a succession, as, "The son succeeds to his father's estate;" but what has been once may be repeated in more cases, and succeed may be predicated of several things following in order or series. In such repeated succession the idea still holds good of each succeeding item in the series taking for a time the place of the preceding. In matters of which the eye takes cognizance, this would be objective and local. In matters of the other senses it would be subjective and mental. One wave follows another when it rolls behind it. One wave succeeds another when it rolls over the same rock or breaks upon the same coast. One clap of thunder succeeds another when the mind receives and identifies the impressions of both or all. *Ensue* (Norm. Fr. *ensuer*, Fr. *ensuivre*, Lat. *in* and *sequi*, to follow) is to follow in virtue of a *principle of sequence*, either in the relation of cause and effect, inference, or chronological succession.

"Learning and Rome alike in empire grew,
And arts still *followed* where her eagles
flew." *Pope.*

"For how art thou a king,
But by fair sequence and *succession*?"
Shakespeare.

"Discourse *ensues*, not trivial, yet not dull,
Nor such as with a frown forbids the play
Of fancy, or proscribes the sound of
mirth." *Cooper.*

FOLLOWER. *See* ADHERENT.

FONDLE. *See* CARESS.

FOOD. *See* DIET and FARE.

FOOL. *See* IDIOT.

FOOLISH. *See* ABSURD.

FOPPISH. FINICAL. DANDYISH.

SPRUCE. COXCOMBICAL.

FOPPISH. The character of a fop is to win admiration by personal appearance and dress. Here the essence of his character ceases, and the rest is a necessary outcome of it. He is silly, pert, and affected, not so much on

purpose as because he has no conception of any higher ideal than that which he seeks to realize. The following opposes the fop to the sloven.

"Give me leave to say that I should have liked your introduction better if, instead of pointing your satire entirely against one extreme, you had stated the due and proper medium between *foppery* on one hand and slovenliness on the other."—*Waterland.*

FINICAL (from fine) is affectedly fine. The finical person is conceitedly careful of minutiae about himself—the syllables which he clips, the details of dress and ornaments to which he pays attention, the thousand little-nesses of taste with which his mind is embarrassed, by the minute and incessant interest which he bestows upon them.

"Be not too *finical*, but yet be clean,
And wear well-fashioned clothes like other
men." *Dryden.*

The DANDY is a man who has a weakness for dress or personal finery; which, however, is often very innocent. Men of great worth and intellectual attainments have been touched by it. On the other hand, the fop is essentially asinine and selfish. The Old English form of the word was *dandiprat*. A dandy (Italian *dandolo*, a toy or bauble) is, "probably," says Wedgwood, "first a doll, then a finely-dressed person." *Dandiprat* had also the meaning of a dwarf; the ending may be for *sprat*, something small of its kind. *SPRUCE*, of which the origin is very uncertain, denotes such neatness of attire as fails to produce any effect of elegance or dignity—a prim tidiness, and nothing more. Hall, writing of certain courtiers in the time of Henry VIII., says, "They were *apereyld* after the fashion of Prussia or *Spruce*," which may possibly be the origin of the word.

"Beware of men who are too *sprucely*
dressed;
And look you fly with speed a fop pro-
fessed." *Congreve.*

COXCOMB denotes a vain, showy man, not necessarily vain or showy in dress, though there will be a likelihood of it; whose conceit lies in magnifying his own superficial ac-

quirements. The coxcomb is a sort of intellectual fop.

"The shallow speculations of the petulant, assuming, short-sighted *coxcombs* of philosophy."—*Burke*.

FORBEAR. *See* ABSTAIN.

FORBID. *See* DEBAR.

FORCE. *See* ENERGY and VIOLENCE.

FORCIBLE. COGENT.

As applied to the reasoning and persuasions of men, FORCIBLE is commonly employed of the style or mode of reasoning; COGENT (Lat. *cogo*, for *con* and *ago*, to compel), of the specific inducement or argument. Cogent reasons put in a forcible way.

"He is at once elegant and sublime, *forcible* and ornamented. He unites energy with copiousness, and dignity with variety."—*Louth*.

"No better or more *cogent* reason can be given of anything than that it implies a contradiction to be otherwise."—*More, Immortality of the Soul*.

FOREBODE. *See* AUGUR.

FORECAST. *See* FORETHOUGHT.

FOREFATHERS. ANCESTORS. PROGENITORS. PREDECESSORS.

We descend from FOREFATHERS, ANCESTORS, and PROGENITORS; but forefathers includes parents; ancestors (Lat. *antecessor*, from *ante*, before, and *cedere*, to go) excludes them. PREDECESSORS (Lat. *præ*, before, and *decidere*, to depart) expresses our civil, not our genealogical, ancestry. We are the children of our forefathers, the posterity of our ancestors and progenitors, the successors of our predecessors. Forefathers and progenitors are more ordinary terms. Ancestors implies some dignity of birth.

"The covetousness of the gentry appeared, as in raising their rents, so in oppressing the poorer sort by enclosures, thereby taking away the lands where they had used, and their *forefathers*, to feed their cattle for the subsistence of their families."—*Strype*.

"The blood weeps from my heart when I do shape
In forms imaginary th' unguided days
And rotten times that you shall look upon,
When I am sleeping with my *ancestors*."
Shakespeare.

"Ah! whither shall we go?
Down to the grave, down to those happy
shades below,
Where all our brave *progenitors* are blest
With endless triumph and eternal rest?"
Pomfret.

"When the cause of God and the common interest of our Christian brethren do require it, we should then as freely part with all we have as our *predecessors* in Christianity did."—*Sharp*.

FOREGO. RESIGN. (*See* ABANDON and ABJURE.)

We FOREGO the possible; we RESIGN the actual. We forego claims which we might make, pleasures which we might enjoy. We resign actual pretensions, possessions, and the like.

FOREGOING. *See* PRECEDING.

FOREIGN. *See* EXTERNAL.

FOREIGNER. STRANGER. ALIEN.

STRANGER (Fr. *étranger*, Lat. *extraneus*) denotes one who is strange or unknown, whether a fellow-countryman or not. A FOREIGNER (*see* FOREIGN) is a native of another country. As the stranger needs not be a foreigner, so the foreigner needs not be a stranger. An ALIEN (Lat. *alienus*) is a foreign resident in a country, or one who is not naturalized, or has not the privileges of a subject or a citizen in the country in which he resides.

"The Catholic was rendered a *foreigner* in his native land only because he retained the religion along with the property handed down to him from those who had been the old inhabitants of that land before him."—*Burke*.

"Tis good the fainting soul to cheer,
To see the famished *stranger* fed,
To milk for him the mother-deer,
To smoothe for him the furry bed."
Crabbe.

"It is enacted in the laws of Venice,
If it be proved against an *alien*
That by direct or indirect attempts
He seek the life of any citizen,
The party 'gainst the which he doth con-
trive
Shall seize one half his goods."

Shakespeare.

FORERUNNER. PRECURSOR. HARBINGER. MESSENGER.

FORERUNNER and PRECURSOR belong to the class of perfect synonyms, precursor (Lat. *præ*, before, and *currere*, to run) being exactly in Latin what forerunner is in English. Yet even such synonyms tend in the course of time to assimilate themselves to slight alterations of meaning or application. Forerunner is used both in a literal and a metaphorical sense, precursor only in the metaphorical, in the sense of prognostic or indication. HARBINGER (Ger. *herberger*) is, properly, an officer who precedes a royal progress to ensure lodging in a fit state for the reception of the court. As metaphorically used, it is a more lively image than precursor, and is employed of *visible* forerunners. For instance, we should hardly speak of discontent as the harbinger, but as the precursor, of a revolution. The term has also a favourable, not a mournful, meaning. We speak of the birds as harbingers of spring, more naturally than of certain symptoms as harbingers of the plague. Harbingers of death seems a forcible and proper image, because we are so accustomed to personify death, that the term lends itself to mean an announcement of the approach of the King of Terrors. A MESSENGER (Fr. *messager*, Low Lat. *messagium*, from *mittere*, to send) is one who brings a message or news. He therefore differs from the others in having the present or the past for his subject, while the others have the future. The forerunner announces, the precursor indicates, the harbinger ushers, the messenger declares.

"These signs *forerun* the death or fall of kings."—*Shakespeare.*

"An event which appears like the *precursor* of the Millennium."—*Burke.*

"Think not, however, that success on one side is the *harbinger* of peace."—*Goldsmith.*

"For God will deign
To visit oft the dwellings of just men,
Delighted, and with frequent intercourse
Thither will send His winged *messengers*
On errands of supernal grace."

Milton.

FORESIGHT. FORETHOUGHT. FORECAST. PREMEDITATION.

FORESIGHT is the faculty of anticipating actual experience. FORETHOUGHT is provident care. FORECAST is provident management. The word is of somewhat wider meaning than forethought, and furnishes a verb; to forecast consequences being to exercise forethought upon them, and meet them practically. PREMEDITATION (Lat. *præ*, before, and *meditari*, to meditate) has reference only to such words or actions as are uttered or performed by oneself; the others referring to what is independent of us.

"Give us *foresightful* minds; give us minds to obey

What *foresight* tells."

Sydney, Arcadia.

"A sphere that will demand from him *forethought*, courage, and wisdom."—*I. Taylor.*

"Their lords the Philistines, with gathered powers,
Enter'd Judæa seeking me, who then
Safe to thy rock of Etham was retired,
Not flying, but *forecasting* in what place
To set upon them, what advantaged best."

Milton.

"The orations which he made upon the sudden without *premeditation* before, do show more boldness and courage than those which he had written and studied long before."—*North, Plutarch.*

FORETELL. PREDICT. PROPHECY.

FORETELL is the simplest and most comprehensive. It means generally to declare beforehand what is to happen. This may be in an ordinary or extraordinary way—by sagacity and experience, or by supernatural knowledge, real or pretended. PREDICT (Lat. *prædicere*, *predictus*, to tell beforehand) is much the same as fore-

tell, but is only employed of persons, while foretell is used also of unconscious indicators, as "the clouds foretell" (not predict) "rain." PROPHECY (Gr. *προφητεία*) is properly used only of supernatural knowledge and declaration concerning the future, except when it is used simply in the sense of outspeaking or preaching without reference to the future—a sense it often bears in Scripture, though even in that case it belongs to some more than ordinary influence.

"His birth, if we believe Plutarch, was attended by prodigies *foretelling* the future eminence and lustre of his character."—*Middleton, Life of Cicero.*

"I thank my better stars I am alive to confront this audacious *predictor*, and to make him rue the hour he ever affronted a man of science and resentment."—*Swift.*

"*Prophesy* unto us, Thou Christ, who is he that smote Thee."—*Bible.*

FORETHOUGHT. *See* FORESIGHT.

FORFEIT. *See* FINE.

FORGE. FABRICATE.

These words are both from the same root (Lat. *fabricare*, to fabricate, *faber*, an artisan, *fabrica*, a workshop, the Fr. *forge*). As at present used, FORGE is employed both of manual and mental things, and so combines the meanings of counterfeit and invent, as to forge a signature or a tale. To FABRICATE is only employed of mental fictions, as to fabricate an excuse, except when it means simply to manufacture, as to fabricate woollens.

"*Forgery* may with us be defined at common law to be the fraudulent making or alteration of a writing to the prejudice of another man's right."—*Blackstone.*

"Our books are not *fabricated* with an accommodation to prevailing usages."—*Valley.*

FORGETFULNESS. OBLIVION.

FORGETFULNESS is a quality or habit; the two latter express a condition. A man is characterized by forgetfulness. Things fall into OBLIVION. Forgetfulness, however, may be predicated of things when they are regarded as in a state into which

men's minds have thrown them. The terms oblivious (Lat. *oblivio*, oblivion) and OBLIVIOUSNESS are employed to designate more distinctly in persons a way of being forgetful.

"Hail, gentle sleep!
Nature's soft nurse, how have I frighted thee,
That thou no more wilt weigh mine eyelids down,
And steep my senses in forgetfulness?"

Shakespeare.

"But such as neither of themselves can sing,

Nor yet are sung of others for reward,

Die in obscure oblivion, as the thing

Which never was, ne never with regard

Their names shall of the later age be heard."

Spenser.

"I wonder what *obliviousness* is come upon him, that he so cleaveth unto the doctors whom he affirmed before either to make no mention of it or else very seldom."—*Fryth.*

FORGIVE. *See* EXCUSE.

FORLORN. DESTITUTE.

FORLORN (A. S. *forloren*, lost) applies only to persons, and expresses the fact and the feeling of being deserted by, or at a distance from, friends. DESTITUTE (Lat. *destitutus*, *destituere*, to deprive) means generally wanting in or deprived of resources of any kind, as friends, food, money. Forlorn denotes a matter of feeling, destitute a matter of fact.

"As a distracted mother weeps *forlorn*,
When to the grave her fondling babe is borne."

Fenton.

"With granted leave officious I return,
But much more wonder that the Son of God

In this wild solitude so long should bide,
Of all things *destitute*, and well I know
Not without hunger."

Milton.

FORM. FIGURE. SHAPE. CONFORMATION. MOULD. FASHION.

FORM (Lat. *forma*) is the impression upon the senses produced by the composition of the parts of body into a whole, whether organic or inorganic, natural or artificial, fair or unsightly, as distinguished from the matter of which it is composed. Form may be taken as a term lying intermediately

between SHAPE (A. S. *scapan*, to shape), on one side denoting more of the materialistic, and FIGURE (Lat. *figura*, *figo*, to fix) on the other, denoting more of the conceptional. The shape of a stone; the form of a statue; the figure of a man. CONFORMATION differs from form in being more than merely delineative, and denotes the delineation taken in connection with and consequent upon the structure. MOULD (Fr. *moule*, Lat. *modulus*, *modus*, a measure) expresses the idea of shape or form as the result of some plastic operation or will. FASHION (Fr. *façon*, Lat. *factio*, make, from *facere*, to make) has much in common with mould, inasmuch as it is the result of specific forming. It admits, however, in addition to the idea of shape, that of arrangement, and is commonly the result of labour and workmanship, and is applicable to matters giving less the idea of solidity. Form has a mental and a material meaning—the form of a man, forms of words, forms of belief. Form is of simpler, figure of more complex, outlines. The figure of a man or woman is the form in its details. Between form and shape there is this strong difference, that form includes not only the exterior surface, but also the solidity of a thing—its length, breadth, and thickness; while the shape is merely what we can see of the outside. The words, therefore, though they may often be used interchangeably, have a different meaning. A cannon-ball has the form of a sphere, as being round and solid; the shape of a sphere, as presenting to the eye a spherical surface and outline.

"The earth was without *form* and void."
—*Bible*.

"A *figure* is the superficies, circumscription, and accomplished lineament of a body."
—*Holland, Plutarch*.

"Rude fragments now
Lie scattered where the *shapely* column
stood."
—*Cowper*.

"In the Hebrew poetry, as I before remarked, there may be observed a certain *conformation* of the sentences, the nature of which is, that a complete sense is almost equally infused into every component part,

and that every member constitutes an entire verse."—*Louth*.

"Adam, earth's hallowed *mould*."
—*Milton*.

"Unskilful he to fawn or seek for power,
By doctrines *fashioned* to the varying
hour;
For other aims his heart had learned to
prize,
More skilled to raise the wretched than to
rise."
—*Goldsmith*.

FORM. See FRAME.

FORM. See CEREMONY and CREATE.

FORMAL. CEREMONIAL. CEREMONIOUS.

FORMAL (*see* FORM) bears the two-fold meaning of according to form, and characterized by an excess of form, as, "to make a formal call," "to receive a formal appointment or dismissal." As applied to persons or their manners, the term has always an unfavourable sense—a person being called formal who does anything too much or too demonstratively upon pattern and rule; overprecise in look, speech, manner, or arrangements. CEREMONIOUS and CEREMONIAL (Lat. *ceremonia*) had, not long ago, the same meaning, till ceremonial rested in the sense of connected with public ceremony, and ceremonious branched off into the sense of dealing overmuch in conventional forms of demeanour. Men are formal for themselves, ceremonious towards others.

"So have I seen grave fools design
With *formal* looks to pass for wise;
But Nature as a light will shine,
And break through all disguise."
—*Lansdowne*.

"The two sacraments of the Circumcision and the Passover had assuredly besides the *ceremonialness* annexed to them the institution of typifying Christ to come."—*Goodwin*.

"Too *ceremonious* in testifying their allegiance."—*Raleigh*.

FORMER. See PRECEDING.

FORMIDABLE. See DREADFUL.

FORSAKE. See ABANDON.

FORTIFY. *See* INVIGORATE.

FORTITUDE. *See* RESIGNATION.

FORTUITOUS. *See* CASUAL.

FORTUNATE. *See* HAPPY and
PROSPEROUS.

FORTUNE. *See* CHANCE.

FORWARD. *See* PROMOTE.

FORWARDS. ONWARDS.

FORWARDS expresses movement in the direction which one fronts or which is before one; ONWARDS, movement along a given line towards a proposed point. Forwards is opposed to backwards or sideways. Onwards would be opposed, if such a word had existed, to *offwards*, that is, in any direction but the line of destination. The migratory crab moves onwards but not forwards.

FOSTER. *See* CHERISH.

FOUND. *See* ESTABLISH.

FOUNDATION. *See* BASIS.

FOUNTAIN. *See* SPRING.

FRACTION. FRAGMENT. FRAC-
TURE. RUPTURE.

FRACTION, FRAGMENT, and FRAC-
TURE are derivatives of the Latin *frangere, fractus*, to break. Fragment is properly expressive of the result of physical disintegration, or what is closely analogous to it, as, fragment of a mountain, a dress, a loaf, a fragment of an ancient poet. Fraction is a term bearing more distinct reference to a unit or a magnitude to which it stands proportionably related. Fracture is the violent discontinuity of parts, and applies to hard and more or less brittle substances, as RUPTURE (Lat. *ruptura*, from *rumpere*, to burst) to those which are softer and more elastic. The fracture of the skull; the rupture of a blood-vessel. The force of fracture too is external; that of rupture from within.

"I know we often proceed to *fractions* supposed to express less than unit; but in this notion we impose upon ourselves by shifting our ideas, and, considering that as a

multitude which before we considered as one; therefore we cannot make a *fraction* without multiplying first before we divide."
—*Search.*

"It has been said that if the prodigies of the Jewish history had been found only in the *fragments* of Manetho or Berosus, we should have paid no regard to them, and I am willing to admit this."—*Paley.*

"High-piled hills of *fractured* earth."

Thomson.

"Meanwhile the tepid caves, and fens, and shores,
Their brood as numerous hatch from the egg that soon
Bursting with kindly *rupture*, forth disclosed
Their callow young."
Milton.

FRACTURE. *See* FRACTION.

FRAGILE. *See* BRITTLE.

FRAGMENT. *See* FRACTION.

FRAGRANCE. SCENT. ODOUR.
PERFUME. SMELL.

SCENT (Old Eng. also spelt sent, from the Fr. *sentir*, and the Latin *sentire*, to perceive) and SMELL (Low Germ. *smellen*, to smoke) express both the sense or its exercise, and that which acts upon it. In this latter application, smell is generic, and expresses any kind of emanation which affects the olfactory nerves, whether pleasant or otherwise. Scent is the smell which issues naturally from a body, and is peculiar to it, as the scent of a rose or a fox. ODOUR (Lat. *odor*) is a newer word in English than smell, for which it serves as little more than a polite substitute. PERFUME (Fr. *parfum*, Lat. *per* and *fumus*, smoke) is better applied to inanimate and strong, as FRAGRANCE (Lat. *fragrantia*) is better employed of animate, fresh, and delicate odours. The perfume of incense, or of musk; the fragrance of fresh flowers. In a close and over-scented atmosphere we might complain of the sickening effect of perfume, but hardly of fragrance. Odour is the emanation which affects the organs of sense; a smell is the action of that emanation on the sense. Odour belongs to the body imparting, smell to the body receiving, the impression. In some

cases of disease the patient suffers from smells not excited by odours from without. Odour is to the sense of smelling what light is to the sense of seeing.

"While, whispering pleasure as they fly,
Cool zephyrs through the clear blue sky
Their gathered *fragrance* fling."

Gray.

"The *scentless* and the *scented* rose."

Cowper.

"The whole house was filled with the *odour* of the ointment."—*Bible*.

"The Emperor Commodus retired to Laurentum, as the sea-air, *perfumed* by the odour of the numerous laurels that flourished along the coast, was considered as a powerful antidote against the pestilential vapours."—*Eustace, Italy*.

"All the *smell* of plants and of other bodies is caused by these volatile parts, and is smelled wherever they are scattered in the air; and the acuteness of *smell* in some animals shows us that these effluvia spread far, and must be inconceivably subtle."—*Reid*.

FRAIL. See BRITTLE.

FRAILTY. See FAILING.

FRAME. CONSTITUTION. TEMPERAMENT.

The FRAME (A. S. *fremman*, to frame) is the structure, the CONSTITUTION is the temper or aggregate of powers in such structures as have life and organization. A man's frame is his limbs, muscles, bones, nerves, &c.; his constitution is that same frame taken in connection with its vital powers and condition. Emotion may agitate the frame. Intemperance will shake the constitution. The frame of government in England is its political form or structure, and might be given in a few words. Its constitution is matter of long study and exposition, embracing the growth and development of its forces and their reciprocal action and adjustment. TEMPERAMENT is the state in respect to the predominance of any quality, or the proportion of different qualities or parts.

"Some bloody passion shakes your very *frame*."—*Shakespeare*.

"Our *constitutions* have never been en-

feebled by the vices or luxuries of the old world."—*Story*.

"Galen was not a better physician than an ill divine, while he determines the soul to be the complexion and *temperament* of the prime qualities—no other than that harmony which the elder naturalists dreamed of; an opinion no less brutish than such a soul. For how can *temperament* be the cause of any progressive motion, much less of a rational discourse?"—*Bishop Hall*.

FRAME. FORM.

To FRAME is to give unity by mutual adaptation of parts. To FORM is to give unity in any way. In framing, the parts have as direct a relation to the whole as to one another. In forming, the parts may have a direct relation to the whole, but no organic relation among themselves. The essence of framing is construction; the essence of forming is collocation. A carpenter *frames* a box by shaping and fitting top, bottom, sides, &c. A certain disposition of ground, water, trees, and buildings might *form* a pleasing landscape. Both terms are used in a secondary as well as material sense. In that case frame preserves the analogy of material construction, and applies to the more complex and elaborate, form to the more simple, processes of the mind. We form ideas, conceptions, and the like; we frame arguments, answers, excuses, devices, theories. Frame always denotes the action of man; form is applicable also to the constitutions of nature. The founder of a society frames it; its members form it, that is, constitute it.

"How many excellent reasonings are *framed* in the mind of a man of wisdom and study in a length of years!"—*Watts*.

"God *formed* man of the dust of the ground."—*Bible*.

FRANK. See HEARTY.

FRAUD. GUILF.

FRAUD (Lat. *fraus*, *fraudis*) and GUILF (Old Fr. *guile*) have in common the idea of duplicity, or deceit in action; but they differ in the motives in which they directly originate. Fraud aims at the disadvantage of

another, or is at least such a deceiving of one's neighbour as shall in some way redound to one's own benefit and his loss, inconvenience, or humiliation. Guile is a wily regard for one's own interests, without directly referring to the interests of one's neighbour. In the views of high morality, guile is fraud, as truth is that of which no man ought to be robbed through the instrumentality of deceit. Guile is more an abstract quality than fraud. Guile is in the nature; fraud is embodied in act.

"An Israelite indeed, in whom is no guile."—*Bible*.

"Take heed, my Lord! the welfare of us all

Hangs on the cutting short that *fraudful* man." *Shakespeare*.

FRAY. *See* QUARREL.

FRAUDULENT. *See* FRAUD.

FREAK. *See* CAPRICE.

FREE. EXEMPT.

EXEMPTION is a species of freedom, or freedom from certain things, and under certain circumstances (*eximere*, *exemptus*, to release). FREEDOM may come in various ways, and may be said of anything from which it is desirable to be free; as to be free from pain, inconvenience, oppression, interruption. Exemption carries our minds to a dispensing power. Hence we may be exempted from any natural ill if we deem ourselves leniently or mercifully dealt with by Divine Providence; or we are exempt by virtue of some human authority which binds others, as an obligation, a service, or a tax. Exemption is that sort of freedom which consists in not sharing the liabilities to which *others* are subject.

"In this, then, consists *freedom*, namely, in our being able to act, or not to act, according as we shall choose or will."—*Locke*.

"Can authors their *exemption* draw
From Nature's or the common law?
They err alike with all mankind,
Yet not the same indulgence find."

Lloyd.

FREEDOM. LIBERTY.

FREEDOM is both a quality and a

condition. LIBERTY (Lat. *libertas*, *liber*, free) is only a condition. Freedom is therefore more independent and abstract. Liberty relates to such restriction or confinement as is opposed to it. The slave when set at liberty shares that freedom which his master has all along enjoyed. So we may use the term freedom in the sense of a free manner, or unrestrainedly; as, "They ate, drank, talked, and laughed with freedom." We could not say with liberty. Freedom rather represents a positive, liberty a negative, idea. We may be at liberty to speak in society on any subject we choose; but there will be many on which we shall be prevented from speaking with freedom.

"Freedom, or not freedom, can belong to nothing but what has or has not a power to act."—*Locke*.

"The natural *liberty* of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature for his rule. . . . The *liberty* of man in society is to be under no other legislative power but that established by consent in the commonwealth, nor under the dominion of any will or restraint of any law but what that legislature shall enact according to the trust put in it."—*Ibid*.

FRENZY. *See* ECSTASY.

FREIGHT. *See* CARGO.

FREQUENT. HAUNT.

The difference between these terms is a practical one. When we mean habitual resort of no harmful character, we say FREQUENT (Lat. *frequentare*, *frequens*, often); when we mean to imply the impropriety or unpropitiousness of the resort, we use HAUNT (Fr. *haunter*, A. S. *hentan*, to pursue). This distinction is of comparatively recent introduction into the language. The unfavourable sense has passed over to the hauntings. Ordinary men frequent. Thieves, ghosts, and wild beasts are said to haunt. So in the case of the noun—the resorts of pleasure; the haunts of vice. But this distinction again is of modern growth.

"He frequented the court of Augustus."
Dryden.

"I've charged thee not to *haunt* about my doors."
Shakespeare.

FREQUENTLY. OFTEN. COMMONLY. ORDINARILY. GENERALLY. USUALLY.

OFTEN (A. S. *oft*) commonly refers to a series known to be established; or, given the fact of the series, that the repetition of its items is numerous; or, in other words, often relates to a standard of frequency implied or expressed, and has a sort of fixed value. FREQUENTLY (see FREQUENT) denotes the simple numerous repetition of anything, without any standard to which such repetition can be referred. Uncalculated recurrences occur frequently; calculated recurrences (if so it be) occur often. For instance, "How often does the wheel of that machine revolve in the hour?" It would be absurd to ask, "How frequently?" COMMONLY denotes that kind of frequency, the non-occurrence of which would create surprise; ORDINARILY, that which follows, or seems to follow, a fixed order or rule (Lat. *ordo, ordinis*); GENERALLY, that which occurs in the majority of similar cases, so that the contrary would be an exception or a specific deviation; USUALLY (*usus, custom*), that which occurs in such a way that the idea of custom is connected either with the occurrence itself or with the observation of him who experiences or takes cognizance of it; HABITUALLY (Lat. *habitus, habit*), that which exhibits both the force and the frequency of habit, and usually its frequency alone.

FRESH. NEW.

As NEW (Fr. *neuf*, Lat. *novus*) denotes that which either absolutely and in itself, or relatively to us, has existed only recently, so FRESH (Fr. *fraiche*) denotes that which brings with it some force or characteristic of novelty beyond the fact of it. A new instance of kindness is simply one more. A fresh instance is one that comes as freely as if none others had preceded it, the term expressing freedom of supply.

"A *fresh* pleasure in every *fresh* posture of the limbs."—*Landor.*

"Thou profoundest hell,
Receive thy *new* possessor." *Milton.*

FRET. See CHAFE.

FRETFUL. CROSS. PEEVISH. PETULANT.

FRETFUL (A. S. *frettan*, to eat, gnaw) denotes a disposition which exaggerates and feels unduly causes of annoyance or irritation, and so exhibits itself in a complaining impatience. Fretfulness is constitutional, showing itself in persons of weak and nervous temperament, invalids, and sickly children.

"Are you positive and *fretful*,
Heedless, ignorant, forgetful?"
Swift.

CROSSNESS (as its formation indicates, thwartedness or thwartingness) is such fretfulness as shows itself in unkindness of speech or manner to others. Crossness is a thing of humour and often passes off rapidly. It is peevishness mixed with vexation or anger.

"The lighter sort of malignity turneth but to a *crossness* or aptness to oppose; but the deeper sort to envy or mere mischief."—*Bacon.*

PEEVISH (which is possibly a corrupt form of perverse) denotes a querulous dissatisfaction which it would be impossible to justify. It is often constitutional, the result of temperament, old age, and physical infirmity.

"*Valentine*. Cannot your grace win her to fancy him?"

Duke. No, trust me; she is *peevish*, sullen, forward,
Proud, disobedient, stubborn, lacking duty."
Shakespeare.

PETULANCE (Lat. *petulans*, from the obsolete *petulare*, from *petere*, to assail) is less sour and more energetic than peevishness. It is capricious passion unrestrained, which is impatient of authority and control, and is characteristically exhibited by the young against their elders or superiors.

"The pride and *petulance* of youth."—*Watts.*

FRIENDLY. *See* AMICABLE.

FRIGID. *See* COLD.

FRIGHT. *See* ALARM.

FRIGHTEN. TERRIFY. INTIMIDATE. ALARM. SCARE.

TO FRIGHTEN (*A. S. fyrhtu, fyrhto*, fear) is to put in a condition of fear suddenly, and so violently as to paralyze and take complete possession of the mind. A brave man may feel fear; but it is a manifestation of cowardice to be frightened. Fright proceeds from the apprehension of physical evil. TO TERRIFY (*terrere*, to frighten, and *facere*, to make) is to inflict terror, which is a stronger form of fright, and leading to an instinctive effort at *escape* from the object dreaded. INTIMIDATE (*Lat. in*, and *timidus*, timid) is usually a purposed act, and commonly done with the design of compelling to action, or deterring from it, as to intimidate by threats. Even where the cause is an influence, and not a conscious agent, the result is the same. "He did not put to sea, being intimidated by the weather." TO ALARM (*see* ALARM) is to induce a feeling that cause exists for fear, whether the fear be actually felt or not. TO SCARE (*Ice. skirra*, to drive away) is to cause to desist, or to fly, from fright.

"Antony, on the other hand, was desirous to have him there, fancying that he would either be *frightened* into a compliance which would lessen him with his own party, or by opposing what was intended, make himself odious to the soldiery."—*Middleton, Life of Cicero*.

"Infectious cowardice
In thee hath *terrified* our host."
Chapman, Homer.

"Before the accession of James I., or at least during the reigns of his three immediate predecessors, the government of England was a government by force, that is, the king carried his measures in Parliament by *intimidation*."—*Paley*.

"By proof we feel
Our power sufficient to disturb this heaven,
And with perpetual inroads to *alarm*,
Though inaccessible, his fatal throne;
Which, if not victory, is yet revenge."
Milton.

"And as a child, when *scaring* sounds molest,
Clings close and closer to the mother's
breast."
Cowper.

FRIGHTFUL. *See* DREADFUL.

FRIVOLOUS. *See* IMMATERIAL.

FROLIC. *See* GAMBOL.

FRONT. *See* FACE.

FRONTIER. *See* BORDER.

FROWARD. *See* PERVERSE.

FRUGAL. *See* ECONOMICAL.

FRUITFUL. *See* FERTILE.

FRUITION. *See* ENJOYMENT.

FRUITLESS. *See* VAIN.

FRUSTRATE. *See* BAFFLE.

FULFIL. DISCHARGE. REALIZE.

TO FULFIL is to fill up according to a measure or standard, which may be internal or external, personal or otherwise; as to fulfil one's own intention, promise, the desire of another, a law, an obligation or duty, expectations or hopes entertained. DISCHARGE (*dis* and *charge, Fr. charger*) is to relieve oneself of what is of the nature of a weight laid upon us in the form of an obligation, duty, debt, or office. REALIZE is to bring from abstract or possible into real existence. We realize a scheme when we carry it effectually into execution. We realize a description when we can bring it vividly before the mind's eye. We realize an estate when we have made money for the purchase.

"The Spirit dictates all such petitions, and God Himself is first the author and then the *fulfiller* of them."—*South*.

"Had I a hundred tongues, a wit so large
As could these hundred offices *discharge*."
Dryden.

"It will be as hard to apprehend as that an empty wish should remove mountains; a supposition which, if *realized*, would relieve Sisyphus."—*Glanvill*.

FULLY. *See* LARGELY.

FULLNESS. PLENITUDE.

Although these words are etymologically equivalent (*plenitudo, plenus*, full, being the Latin form of the

English fullness), **PLENITUDE** is used in a higher style, and with a more abstract leaning. Indeed, plenitude is never physical fullness, but moral, denoting the possession of some power or qualification in a noble and pre-eminent degree. The fullness of a stream, the fullness of enjoyment. The plenitude of power, wisdom, authority. Fullness, however, is equally applicable to physical and moral abundance.

"A short sentence may be oftentimes a large and a mighty prayer. Devotion so managed being like water in a well, where you have *fullness* in a little compass."—*South*.

"The painting preserves the same character, not only when He is supposed descending to take vengeance upon the wicked, but even when He exerts the like *plenitude* of power in acts of beneficence to mankind."—*Burke*.

FUNERAL. See **OBSEQUES**.

FUNCTION. See **OFFICE**.

FURIOUS. **VIOLENT.** **VEHEMENT.** **IMPETUOUS.**

FURIOUS (Lat. *furiosus*, *furia*) is having fury, which is excessive and violent *rage*. The term furious as applied to natural forces is not proper. A furious wind is a metaphor, meaning animated as if with the spirit of a furious man. A furious force is one which displays itself in such a way that we cannot foretell the extent to which it may reach, or the mischief it may do. **VIOLENT** (Lat. *violentus*, *vis*, force) is exercising great or undue force contrary to law, reason, or moderation. **VEHEMENT** (perhaps from *ve*, an intensive particle, and *mens*, the mind) conveys the idea of pursuing one's own ends with keenness and energy, though it is not exclusively used of human character or demeanour. A vehement wind or stream is one which seems eagerly bent on running its own course. In their moral applications, men are furious in their passions; violent in speech, manner, and conduct; vehement in their expressions, desires, and pursuits. It may be observed that vehemence is in its effects confined to the subject, while

fury and violence tend to affect others. Violence is never laudable; vehemence may be. **IMPETUOUS** (Lat. *impetus*, *in*, on or forward, and *petere*, to seek) is used both mechanically and morally. Mechanically, impetus is nearly equivalent to momentum, being measured by the multiplication of mass into velocity, but used less strictly and more popularly. Morally, impetuosity conveys the idea of being carried away by the feeling of the moment with eagerness, and with little reflection.

"A power steps in that limits the arrogance of raging passions and *furios* elements, and says, 'So far shalt thou go, and no farther.'"—*Burke*.

In matters of human conduct violence is often coupled, or contrasted, with fraud; violence and fraud being the two main modes of wrong-dealing among men.

"Since he who begins to violate the happiness of another does what is wrong, he who endeavours to obviate or put a stop to that *violence* does in that respect what is right by the terms."—*Woolaston*.

"Thy present wants, or fears, or desires carry thy spirit in thy own prayers eagerly and *vehemently* in pursuit of those thy wants, fears, or desires, because they are things presently incumbent upon thee and in thy view."—*Hale*.

Vehemence is the manifestation in act or demeanour of eagerness. The impetuous man is he who is actuated by a variety of motives of unequal and uncertain power.

"There being no kind of vice which men would not abandon themselves unto, considering the *impetuosity* of their own natural appetites, and the power of external temptations, were this restraint from religion once removed and abolished."—*Wilkins*.

FURNISH. See **SUPPLY**.

FURY. See **RAGE**.

FUTILE. See **IMMATERIAL**.

G.

GAIN. See **ACQUIRE**.

GAIN. **EMOLUMENT.** **LUCRE.**
PROFIT.

GAIN (Fr. *gagner*) is here a generic

term. It denotes that which comes to a man as the fruit of his exertions, or accrues to him as a desirable possession. The gain accrues directly to the man. The PROFIT (*proficere*, to be of advantage) arises from his trade or dealing, and the matters which are the subject of it. Hence gains are commonly upon a considerable scale; profits are commonly made in little instalments. EMOLUMENT (said to be from *emolere*, to grind) is any profit arising from office, employment, or labour. LUCRE (Lat. *lucrum*, gain, profit) is a term very seldom used, and, when used, denotes sordid or ill-gotten gain. The verb to gain is distinguished from the verb to win, as endeavour is distinguished from luck or address; but the noun gain is used in the broadest sense as the opposite of loss. But some amount of action is presupposed, of which gain is the result. That which accrues to a man by fixed order, as for instance, an hereditary estate, is not strictly a gain, though it may be a boon.

"A gentleman who farms a part of his own estate, after paying the expenses of cultivation, should *gain* both the rent of the landlord and the *profit* of the farmer. He is apt to denominate, however, his whole *gain* *profit*, and thus confounds rent with profit; at least, in common language."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations.*

"His *prædia*, in like manner, were tributes, tolls, portage, bankage, stockage, coinage, profits by salt pits, mills, watercourses, and whatsoever *emoluments* grew by them, and the like."—*Holinshed.*

"Albeit for profit and *lucre* all things are set to sale."—*Ibid.*

GAINSAY. See CONTRADICT.

GAIT. See CARRIAGE.

GALE. See WIND.

GALL. See CHAFE.

GALLANT. See BOLD.

GAMBOL. PRANK. FROLIC.

GAMBOL (Old Eng. *gambole*, *gam-bold*) is a skipping, playing, or leaping in merriment. PRANK (Welsh *pranc*, a frolic) is an act which is merry and ludicrous, and tends to

mischievousness towards others, or a personal joke or trick. A FROLIC (Germ. *frohlich*, free) is an exuberant manifestation of a mind which requires sportive relaxation. Dumb animals gambol. Young people have their pranks and frolics.

"Bears, tigers, ounces, pards
Gambol'd before them." *Milton.*

"In came the harpies, and played their accustomed pranks."—*Rulegh.*

"While many a pastime circled in the shade,
The young contending as the old surveyed;
And many a gambol frolicked o'er the ground,
And sleights of art and feats of strength went round."
Goldsmith.

GAME. PLAY.

PLAY (A. S. *plega*, play) is a common term for any active form of amusement. Play becomes GAME (A. S. *gamian*, to play) when it is systematic and is exercised according to rule. The verb to play, however, is employed in reference to games. Boys are at play when they amuse themselves in a random manner. When they go to cricket they begin a game. But in regard to the verbs, to play a game is the phrase used, because to game is restricted to playing at games of chance or gambling.

"It is very remarkable that the people of these islands are great gamblers. They have a *game* very much like our draughts."—*Cook's Voyages.*

"The lamb thy riot dooms to bleed to-day,
Had he thy reason, would he skip and play?
Pleased to the last, he crops the flow'ry mead,
And licks the hand just raised to shed his blood."
Pope.

GANG. See BAND.

GAP. See BREACH.

GAPE. See GAZE.

GARB. See GUISE.

GARMENT. See DRESS.

GARRULOUS. See LOQUACIOUS.

GATHER. See COLLECT.

GAUDY. SHOWY. GAY.

GAUDY is displaying gauds (Lat. *gaudium*) or trinkets; hence ostentatiously showy in colour or decoration. GAY (Fr. *gai*) denotes such colouring as expresses or inspires gladness. Nor is it restricted to colouring; but life, activity, form, festive arrangement, and light, equally contribute to a gay scene. SHOWY (A. S. *sceawu*, *sceaw*, a show) is strikingly conspicuous, on the score of colouring more especially, or ornamentation. The three terms are applicable to inanimate substances as well as to persons; as gaudy furniture, showy dress, a gay parterre. Gay lies at one extreme, and is a term of praise. Gaudy at the opposite extreme, as a term of dispraise. Showy lies between the two.

"The modern invention of multiplying the works of the artists by devices which require no ingenuity, has prostituted the ornaments of a temple to the *gaudiness* of a suburban villa, and the decorations of a palace to the embellishment of a tradesman's door-post."—*Knox, Essays*.

"Belinda smiled, and all the world was gay."
Pope.

"When they had taken any spoils from the enemy, the men would make a present of everything that was rich and *showy* to the women whom they most admired."—*Spectator*.

GAY. See CHEERFUL and GAUDY.

GAYETY. See JOY.

GAZE. GAPE. STARE.

These terms express a fixedness of look, and vary according to the emotion of mind which produces them. We GAZE (connected with A. S. *gäsan*, to smite) when the attention is roused and fixed by the curious, the interesting, the beautiful, or the affecting. We GAPE (A. S. *geapan*, to open) from idle curiosity, ignorant wonder, or listless, open-mouthed amusement of mind. We STARE (A. S. *sturian*) whenever, from any motive, we fasten unconscious looks, as from wonder, surprise, stupidity, fright or horror, impudence or curiosity.

"So, checking his desire, with trembling heart,

Gazing he stood, nor would nor could depart:

Fixed as a pilgrim 'wildered in his way,
Who dares not stir by night, for fear to stray,

But stands with awful eyes to watch the dawn of day."
Dryden.

"The Dutch, who are more famous for their industry and application than for wit and humour, hang up in several of their streets what they call the sign of the *gaper*; that is, the head of an idiot dressed in cap and bells, and gaping in a most immoderate manner. This is a standing jest at Amsterdam."—*Spectator*.

"They stand *staring* and looking upon Me."—*Bible*.

GELID. See COLD.

GENDER. SEX.

SEX (Fr. *sexe*, Lat. *sexus*) is a natural division of animals. GENDER (Fr. *genre*, Lat. *genus*) is the technical or artificial recognition of sex, its exclusion, and its analogies. There are two sexes and three genders.

"*Gender* being founded on the distinction of the two *sexes*, it is plain that in a proper sense it can only find place in the names of living creatures which admit the distinction of male and female, and therefore can be ranged under the masculine or feminine genders."—*Blair*.

GENERALLY. See FREQUENTLY.

GENERATION. See DATE.

GENEROUS. See BENEFICENT.

GENIUS. See ABILITY.

GENTILE. See HEATHEN.

GENTLE. MILD. MEEK. SOFT. BLAND. TAME.

GENTLE (Lat. *gentilis*, *gens*, a family) denoted primarily well-born. Hence refined in manners, and, by a further extension of meaning, of quiet nature and placid disposition. The term, therefore, is applicable to the natures of animals, and only by analogy to external forces and influences; indeed, to anything capable of producing soft and soothing impressions on the one hand, or violent and harsh on the other. A gentle person, look, force, voice, and the like.

"Oh, gently on thy suppliant's head,
Dread Goddess, lay thy chastening hand;
Not in thy Gorgon terrors clad,
Nor circled with the vengeful band."

Gray.

Gentle is thus an essentially relative term, implying the absence of its contrary, and, therefore, most expressive in those subjects where the contrary is usual or conceivable. TAME (A. S. *tam*) denotes that gentleness which is the result of training or domestication. The sheep is a gentle animal; the wolf may be tamed. By a metaphor, tame is used to signify spiritless; as, "a tame resistance," "a tame poem." Tameness is a condition in which ferocity or energy is absent or has been subdued. As gentleness implies inherent energy and power, which is exercised in moderation at the dictates of the will or disposition, so tameness implies the absence of these qualities, as being the manifestation of mere temperament, natural or acquired. Tameness is inanimate tractableness or quiet.

"That it may not be suspected that there is anything of *tameness* or mean-spiritedness in this conduct, the advantage in point of dignity and esteem really lies on the side of the good-natured and peaceable man."—*Waterland*.

MILD (A. S. *mild*) conveys the idea of subdued but not deteriorated energy. The air is mild, which might be harsh; the fruit is mild, which might have been acrid or strong; the expression is mild, which might have been stern; the disposition is mild, which might have been given to severity, but seems alien to it.

"Mildness would better suit with majesty,
Than rash revenge and rough severity."

Drayton.

Mildness and gentleness are compatible with power and penetration, which SOFTNESS (A. S. *sōftness*, *sōftnyss*) is not. A soft voice, a soft light, soft music, all please and soothe, but do not enrapture. The characteristic idea of softness is pleasant impress. It is opposed to harshness and hardness. It is equally opposed to energy and resistingness. Hence the tendency of the term to

assume morally an unfavourable character; as effeminaey, too great susceptibility, and too great simplicity.

"There being only some few Ditheists to be excepted (such as Plutarch and Atticus), who out of a certain *softness* and tenderness of nature, that they might free the one good God from the imputation of evils, would needs set up besides Him an evil soul or Dæmon above the world, self-existent, to bear all the blame of them."—*Cudworth*.

MEEKNESS (Old Eng. *meke*) differs from mildness, gentleness, and softness, in being never applied, like them, to the deportment, but only to the temper or character. It is a theological virtue; but with the world at large it is not in favour; whence has been imposed upon it the idea of *excessive* submissiveness, and an absence of that "spirit" which more readily finds admiration. It may be observed that meekness at least excludes obstinacy as well as pride; while persons who have softness in manner are often found by no means wanting in self-will. Meekness results from the absence of arrogant self-will or self-assertion.

"By inheriting the earth, He meant inheriting those things which are without question the greatest blessings upon earth, calmness or composure of spirit, tranquillity, cheerfulness, peace, and comfort of mind. Now these, I apprehend, are the peculiar portion and recompense of the *meek*."—*Bishop Porteus*.

BLAND (Lat. *blandus*) is producing pleasing impressions by soothing qualities of character, and is employed exclusively of the outer manifestations of expression and manners. It is ordinarily associated with calmness and dignity, with affableness and courtliness in superiors. A bland manner in a friend or equal would be unacceptable, as approaching too nearly to condescension. Milton uses the term of natural influences—"Exhilarating vapours bland."

"Arrayed in arms, and bland in voice and look."
Lewis, *Statius*.

GENUINE. See AUTHENTIC.

GESTICULATION. See ATTITUDE.

GESTURE. See ATTITUDE.

GET. See ACQUIRE.

GHASTLY. GRIM. GRISLY.

GHASTLY (A. S. *gástlic*) is the same word as ghostly; hence the predominant idea is that of a supernatural or deathlike pallor, from which the signification has been extended to denote simply deadly, horrible, as "ghastly wounds."

"Her face was so *ghastly* that it could scarcely be recognised."—*Macaulay*.

GRIM (A. S. *grimman*, to rage) is, on the other hand, essentially connected with *life* and the expression of the *countenance* of man or beast. Surliness, ferocity, and gravity, combined into a fixed and rigid expression, would constitute grimness.

"The *grim* face of law."—*Denham*.

GRISLY (A. S. *grislic*, *grisan*, to dread) applies to the whole form or appearance, and conveys the idea of fear as produced through what is ugly and forbidding.

"My *grisly* countenance made others fly."
Shakespeare.

GHOST. APPARITION. SPECTRE.
PHANTOM. VISION. PHANTASM.

GHOST (Old Eng. *gast*, A. S. *gäst*, breath, spirit) is primarily, though this sense is no longer colloquial, the spirit or soul of a man. Hence, as a synonym with those given above, it denotes an apparition of a specific kind, that is, of the spirit of some departed person in visible though disembodied form.

"I thought that I had died in sleep,
And was a blessed *ghost*."

Coleridge.

APPARITION (Lat. *apparitio*, an appearing, from *apparere*, to appear) is the generic term, of which ghost is a species. A sudden appearance which produces a startling effect from its unexpectedness is an apparition in the broadest sense of the word. An apparition is always of a person or a collective object, not of many objects or a complex view.

"I think it is the weakness of mine eyes
That shapes this monstrous *apparition*."
Shakespeare.

SPECTRE (Lat. *spectrum*) is a preternatural personal appearance without individuality, and therefore not assumed to be in particular the spirit of any, either departed or living. Both ghost and spectre are in their common acceptation taken for something human. An apparition or a VISION (Lat. *visio*, a seeing, from *videre*, to see) might be of a celestial nature, as of angels or an angel; vision including more than a solitary apparition, and admitting the idea of a *scene* or the appearance of many. Nor is the term spectre employed but in the sense of an uncongenial or horrible apparition. A lovely vision; a hideous spectre.

"Thus passed the night so foul, till morning
fair

Came forth with pilgrim steps in amice
gray;

Who with her radiant fingers stilled the
roar

Of thunder, chased the clouds, and laid the
winds

And *grisly spectres*, which the fiend had
raised

To tempt the Son of God with terrors
dire."
Milton.

"Upon the foot of this construction it is supposed that Isaiah, in prophetic dream or *vision*, heard God speaking to him, like as St. Peter heard a voice and saw a *vision* while he lay in a trance, and that in idea he transacted all that God so ordered him to do."—*Waterland*.

PHANTOM (Gr. *φαῖνω*, to show) denotes what has an apparent but no real existence. No spirit is therefore supposed for it. PHANTASM (Gr. *φάντασμα*) equally expresses the unreal, but is purely objective, and refers what is seen or imagined to the mind acting upon itself. A phantom is a single object, as a spectre or a will-o'-the-wisp. A phantasm may be a complex object or a scene. We even speak of phantasms in the sense of creations of a diseased or disordered imagination; but a phantom expresses more the *delusion*, phantasm the *play* of the misguided mind.

"Like the French Republic, the Italian Republic is in their eyes a *phantom* which appeared yesterday, and may vanish to-morrow."—*Eustace, Italy*.

"According to them, the Devil, that is so

often spoken of in the Scriptures, is nothing else but either a disease of the body or a *phantasm* in the brain, or the wicked principles and inclinations of a man's heart."—*Sharp*.

GHOSTLY. See SPIRITUAL.

GIBE. See JEER.

GIDDINESS. See LEVITY.

GIFT. See ENDOWMENT.

GIVE. GRANT. BESTOW. CONFER.

The idea common to these terms is that of communicating to others what is our own, or in our power. And, indeed, GIVE (A. S. *gifan*) denotes this generally, and no more. To GRANT, CONFER, and to BESTOW, are characteristic modes of giving. To grant (Old Eng. *graunt*) is always from one person to one or more others, in accordance with an expectation, prayer, or request. To bestow (*be* and *stow*, a place) meant originally to lay up in store. Hence its latter meaning is to give something of substantial value, with the intention of benefitting the object of the bestowal. Confer (Lat. *conferre*) implies not so much the value of the thing given as the condescension of the giver. Honours, distinctions, favours, privileges are conferred. Goods, gifts, endowments are bestowed. Requests, prayers, privileges, favours, gifts, allowances, opportunities are granted.

"Give, and it shall be given unto you."—*Bible*.

A peculiar sense attaches to the word grant as a legal term, as a piece of land granted to a noble or religious house. So Blackstone speaks of "the transfer of property by sale, grant, or conveyance."

"Grant me the place of this threshing-floor."—*Bible*.

"Almighty God, though He really doth and cannot otherwise do, yet will not seem to bestow His favours altogether gratis, but to expect some competent return, some small use and income for them."—*Barrow*.

"I esteem the encomiums you conferred upon me in the senate, together with your congratulatory letter, as a distinction of the

highest and most illustrious kind."—*Melmoth, Cicero*.

GLAD. JOYFUL. PLEASED. DELIGHTED. GRATIFIED.

GLAD (A. S. *gläd*) denotes the lowest degree of pleasure. It is the opposite term to sorry, and commonly no more denotes joyousness than sorry denotes deep sorrow or grief. Hence it is used to express complimentary feeling, as, "I shall be glad to see you." JOYFUL (Fr. *joie*, Lat. *gaudium*) is, on the other hand, used for the highest degree of pleasure excited by an external event. Gladness admits, however, of degrees, and may be more tempered, thoughtful, and lasting than joy, which may even be exuberant and excessive. PLEASED (from the verb to please, the Fr. *plaire*, and the Lat. *placere*) may denote either the pleasure of joy or the pleasure of satisfaction or approbation. GRATIFIED (Lat. *gratus*, grateful) implies a sense of pleasure due to the behaviour of another. DELIGHTED (Old Eng. *delite*, from the Lat. *delectare*) is a much stronger term than glad or pleased, for expressing the same kind of feeling.

"Then are they glad, because they are at rest."—*Bible*.

"Joy is the vivid pleasure or delight inspired by immediate reception of something peculiarly grateful, of something obviously productive of an essential advantage, or of something which promises to contribute to our present or future well-being."—*Cogan*.

"It is supposed that the very determination which is the ground and spring of the will's act is an act of choice and pleasure, wherein one act is more agreeable and the mind better pleased in it than another; and this preference and superior pleasedness is the ground of all it does in the case."—*Edwards*.

The term gratify extends to a peculiar meaning beyond that of personal conduct of one towards another, in which it is nearly synonymous with indulge; as the gratification of the senses, desires, and the like. When expressive of lively satisfaction at the act or conduct of another, it commonly indicates some supe

riority in the person satisfied; as, the father is gratified by his son's conduct.

"For who would die to *gratify* a foe?"
Dryden.

"So on they fared, *delighted* still to join
In mutual converse." *Milton.*

GLADNESS. *See* GLAD and
CHEERFUL.

GLANCE. GLIMPSE.

A GLANCE (Germ. *glanz*, brightness) expresses both the sudden shooting of a bright object or ray of light before the eyes, and the rapid casting of the vision itself upon an object. GLIMPSE (Dutch *glimmen*, to shine faintly) differs in implying the seeing momentarily and imperfectly, while glance implies that the object is seen momentarily and distinctly. Glance is more commonly voluntary, glimpse involuntary. We take glances; we catch glimpses.

"The poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,
Doth *glance* from heaven to earth, from
earth to heaven." *Shakespeare.*

"Who this is we must learn, for man He
seems
In all His lineaments, though in His face
The *glimpses* of His Father's glory shine."
Milton.

GLARE. *See* FLARE.

GLARING. *See* GLARE.

GLEAM. *See* BEAM.

GLIDE. SLIDE. SLIP.

To SLIP is commonly, though not necessarily, an involuntary movement (A. S. *slipan*). To SLIDE (A. S. *slidan*) is voluntary or involuntary. GLIDE (A. S. *glidan*) is voluntary, or analogous to it. Slip conveys the idea of sliding in an accidental or deviating manner, as when the foot slips, or a bone slips out of its place. A slip is not only sudden and rapid, but it is short, while slide and glide are continuous and protracted. To slide is to move glibly over a surface, and without hindrance. But slide and glide differ, in that slide always supposes a surface or basement upon and over which the movement takes place, while glide expresses the move-

ment alone. Noiseless, uninterrupted, equable, and apparently effortless progress may be called gliding. So a bird may be said to glide in the air, and ghosts glide from one chamber to another. A vessel glides *through* the water, not upon it.

"She (Medea) *glode* forth, as an adder doth."
Gower.

"They have not only *slid* imperceptibly, but have plunged openly into artifice."—
Lord Bolingbroke.

"These worldly advantages, these honours, profits, pleasures, whatever they be, are of uncertain continuance, and may in a little time *slip* away from us; to be sure, we shall in a little time *slip* away from them."—
Atterbury.

GLIMMER. *See* BEAM.

GLIMPSE. *See* GLANCE.

GLITTER. *See* BEAM.

GLOBE. *See* BALL and LAND.

GLOOM, GLOOMY. *See* DARK and SAD.

GLORY. *See* BOAST.

GLORY. HONOUR. FAME.

GLORY (Lat. *gloria*) is the result of success in such things as excite the admiration of men at large—extraordinary efforts, brilliant achievements. HONOUR (Lat. *honor*) is the result of excellence, as acknowledged by the narrower circle in which we personally move, and according to their particular standard of it. Honour is never entirely separated from virtue; but glory may have no connection with it. Honour must ever regard the rights of others; glory may be earned at their expense. FAME (Lat. *fama*) is the result of meritorious success in the more select but less showy walks of life. We speak of the glory of the conqueror, the honour of the gentleman, the fame of the scholar and the philanthropist. Honour and fame are always external to oneself; but glory is sometimes used in the sense of self-glorification, or, as Hobbes has called it, "Internal gloriation or triumph of the mind."

"But since, alas! ignoble age must come,
Disease, and death's inexorable doom,
The life which others pay let us bestow,
And give to Fame what we to Nature
owe.

Brave though we fall, and honoured if we
live,

Or let us *glory* gain, or *glory* give."

Pope, Homer.

"Honour makes a great part of the reward
of all honourable professions." — *Smith,*
Wealth of Nations.

"Fame is the spur that the clear spirit doth
raise

(That last infirmity of noble mind),

To scorn delights and live laborious days.

But the fair guerdon when we hope to
find,

And think to burst out into sudden blaze,
Comes the blind Fury with the abhorred
shears,

And slits the thin-spun life." *Lycidas.*

GLOSSARY. See DICTIONARY.

GLOW. WARMTH. HEAT.

GLOW (A. S. *glōwan*) is a shining with vivid or intense heat. It combines the ideas of brightness and warmth. WARMTH (A. S. *wearm*, warm) is moderate heat, more diffused than glow, more continuous and less addressing itself, or not at all, to the eye. HEAT, in its common acceptation, signifies not merely that principle which is present in all bodies, and on the degree of which depends their fluid or solid state, but the evolution of caloric in a strong or excessive quantity. The analogous use of the terms is regulated by these natural distinctions. We speak of the fire of genius, the heat of passion, the glow of generous feeling, the warmth of friendship, and the like.

"For persons who pretend to feel
The *glowings* of uncommon zeal;
Who others scorn, and seem to be
Righteous in very great degree;
Do 'bove all others take delight
To vent their spleen in tales of spite;
To think they raise their own renown
By pulling of a neighbour down."

Lloyd.

"The heat and hurry of his rage."

South.

"Many persons, from vicious and dead and cold, have passed into life and an excellent grace and a spiritual *warmth* and holy fire;

but from lukewarm and indifferent never anybody came to an excellent condition and state of holiness."—*Bishop Taylor.*

GODLIKE. See HEAVENLY.

GODLY. See RIGHTEOUS.

GOLD. GOLDEN. (A. S. *Goll*.)

These terms are both used as adjectives, with this difference, that the former signifies made of gold, the latter having the characteristics of gold, as wealth, brightness, yellowness. A gold cup; golden corn, sunsets, days, thoughts, or memories.

GOLDEN. See GOLD.

GOODNESS. VIRTUE.

GOODNESS is natural and without effort. It is instinctive VIRTUE (Lat. *virtus*), as virtue is trained or practised goodness. Hence, in some sort, goodness may be without virtue, and virtue without goodness. The tenderness of feeling shown by many children is goodness, not virtue. To abstain from theft in a thief would be virtue, not goodness. Yet goodness, in the highest degree, is superior to any virtue; for He who alone is perfect goodness could not be called virtuous, which is human. Virtue is actual goodness, as set against possible evil in man's thoughts and deeds. Goodness is often used in a specific sense, as equivalent to kindness or benevolence. Goodness is in those—

"Glad hearts, without reproach or blot,
Who do Thy will, and know it not."

But virtue, in resisting and controlling evil temptations and tendencies.

"Goodness is strictly and eminently moral. It is in its nature of a boundless extent. If it be not universally operative, it cannot exist as a perfection. It degenerates into partial attachments and a partial fondness; and thus the idea of an exalted and amiable principle of action is destroyed. This attribute must be universally relative for good. It is in the Divinity a pattern and prototype of the moral relation of man to man."—*Cogan.*

"The exemplary desire of regulating our thoughts and pursuits by right principles constitutes *virtue*; and all the duties which are performed with warmth and feeling are deemed the result of virtuous affections.

The opposite propensities and conduct constitute vice, whose characteristic consists in depraved affections and ungoverned passions."

—*Cogan.*

GOODS. CHATTELS. COMMODITY. MERCHANDIZE. WARES. EFFECTS. PROPERTY. POSSESSION.

GOODS is employed in the sense of transferable articles of property, such as are intended for sale, or might realize a money value if sold. EFFECTS represent the personal estate, even down to the smallest matters in use, and such as would practically be of no value but to the proprietor. CHATTELS (originally the same as cattle, *capitalis*, belonging to the head or sum) is a wider term than goods or effects, and comprises every kind of property except the freehold and what is parcel of it. Chattels are divided into personal and real; the former belonging immediately to the person, the latter appertaining to something in the nature of a dependency. A COMMODITY (Fr. *commodité*) is any movable article valuable by money, but is restricted to articles of necessity. Works of art, for instance, as such, are not commodities; but a painting, if regarded as an article of furniture, might be called a commodity. MERCHANDIZE (Fr. *marchandise*) is the generic term for all articles of trade, considered as such in the aggregate; while WARES (A. S. *waru*) is the sum of articles of a particular kind. POSSESSION (Lat. *possessio*, from *possidere*, to possess) is that of which a man is, as a fact, possessed, whether rightfully or not, or irrespectively of the mode in which he may have acquired it. PROPERTY (Fr. *propriété*, Lat. *proprius*) is that which is properly one's own, and, in the absence of any qualifying expressions, would be taken to imply a legal title to possession.

GOOD-HUMOUR. GOOD-NATURE.

GOOD-HUMOUR is a cheerful state of the spirits, producing gaiety in others, as it is itself gay. Yet it may be transient, and followed by a reactive peevishness. GOOD-NATURE is that plastic disposition which natu-

rally shares the joys of others, yet suffers oftentimes from weak complaisance to their wishes.

GOURMAND. *See* EPICURE.

GOVERN. RULE. REGULATE.

GOVERN (Lat. *gubernare*) is to exercise power or authority with judgment and knowledge; hence govern is never taken by itself in a bad sense. RULE (Fr. *régler*, Lat. *regula*) denotes no more than control and direction by superior authority or power, however exercised. Rule is exercised over the wills and actions of men only. Govern is more extensively applied, as to govern the horses, or the helm. REGULATE denotes the exercise of a controlling power over force already in action or progress, as to regulate the movement of a machine, to regulate finances.

"The Bishop's *governance* should be so gentle and easy, that men hardly can be unwilling to comply with it."—*Barrow.*

"Ne shall the Saxon's selves all peaceably
Enjoy the crown which they from Britons
won,
First ill, and after *ruled* wickedly."
Spenser.

"Some say that under force
Of that controlling ordinance they move,
And need not His immediate hand, who first
Prescribed their course, to *regulate* it now."
Cowper.

GOVERNMENT. *See* CHARGE.

GRACE. *See* FAVOUR.

GRACEFUL. *See* COMELY.

GRACIOUS. MERCIFUL. KIND.

GRACIOUS (*see* GRACE), when compared with KIND (literally entertaining feelings naturally due to creatures of the same kind or nature), differs from it not so much in essence as in exhibition. The gracious being the kind as shown to inferiors, while kindness may be towards any. It has in it an element of condescension. Graciousness can only be shown to creatures of some moral dignity and capacity, who may be able to appreciate the nature and value of actions. Kindness may be shown towards dumb animals. Kindness is a duty in all. Graciousness rather implies

such kindness as is in excess of the mere demands of duty, and is exhibited where it could not be claimed even of moral right.

"I therefore beg you will be *graciously* pleased to accept this most faithful zeal of your poor subject, who has no other design in it than your good, and the discharge of his own conscience."—*Bishop Burnet*.

"Be *kindly* affectioned one to another with brotherly love."—*Bible*.

MERCIFUL (Lat. *misericordia*, mercy) is the quality of withholding pain, evil, or suffering, when it is in one's power to inflict it; or, in a milder sense, the granting of benefits in spite of demerit.

"Blessed are the *merciful*, for they shall obtain *mercy*."—*Bible*.

GRAND. GREAT. SUBLIME.
NOBLE. MAJESTIC. IMPOSING.
MAGNIFICENT. STATELY. SPLENDID.
SUPERB. AUGUST.

GRAND (Lat. *grandis*) is applied to the union of excellence with something which conveys the impression of vastness or greatness in the sense of expansiveness; as a grand mountain or cataract, a grand sight, grand music, a grand monarch, a grand conception, a grand character. The grand expands the mind with a sense of vastness and majesty.

"I have ever observed that colonnades and avenues of trees of a moderate length were, without comparison, far *grand*er than when they were suffered to run to immense distances."—*Burke*.

GREAT (A. S. *great*), as a synonym of grand, denotes less vividly what is impressive, yet is associated with power and gifts capable of accomplishing ends of their own. The truly great man may be sometimes the very opposite of grand. Cincinnatus was great indeed, when having saved his country, he laid aside his grandeur. Greatness, in its moral sense, appeals more directly to the reason than the senses.

"*Greatness* of soul is to be acquired by converse with the heroes of antiquity."—*Knorr*.

SUBLIME (Lat. *sublimis*) is the highest of all these terms. It is so

high in character that the sublime inspires awe rather than delight in the scenes of art or nature, and in the character and deeds of men. The truly sublime is not only awful but elevating.

"The age was fruitful in great men; but, if we except the *sublime* Julian Leader, none, as regards splendour of endowments, stood upon the same level as Cicero."—*De Quincey*.

NOBLE (Lat. *nobilis*) is a term of opposition, and derives its force from that against which it is set. It is that which is above the puny, petty, low, mean, or dishonourable, with any, the smallest degree, of which it is incompatible. It is properly a social and moral term; and it is only by a sort of picturesque analogy that we speak of a noble tree or palace. A noble nature or action is innately superior to that which is base.

"Know this, my lord, *nobility* of blood
Is but a glittering and fallacious good:
The *nobleman* is he whose *noble* mind
Is filled with inborn worth unborrowed
from his kind." *Dryden*.

MAJESTIC (Lat. *majestas*, majesty) refers exclusively to external effect of form or movement, and has no connection with moral greatness. The basest tyrant might have a majestic person or air. The movements of an epic poem should be majestic. Concentrated strength, self-possession, and grace make up the majestic.

"But in the midst was seen
A lady of a more *majestic* mien;
By stature and by beauty marked their
Sovereign Queen." *Dryden*.

IMPOSING, like majestic, is purely external; but that which is majestic has always an individuality, while many things in detail may combine to produce an imposing effect. The term is not of old usage. Nor is imposing a term of unqualified praise; for that may have an imposing exterior which has little intrinsic substance or solidity. MAGNIFICENT (*magnus*, great, and *facere*, to make) is applied to objects of beauty on a large scale, and especially, in the case of works of art, to those which combine size, excellence, elaborateness of conception

and execution, with great effectiveness; though the term magnificence by no means expresses the character of a work of art simply as such, however excellent. That costliness and elaborateness are requisite to entitle a work of art to the epithet magnificent, may be seen in the case of architecture. The Gothic cathedral may be magnificent; the Great Pyramid is stupendous, but not magnificent. On the other hand, a purely natural production might be called magnificent for its uniform beauty and size; as a magnificent pearl.

"Man He made, and for him built
Magnificent this world." *Milton.*

STATELY is exhibiting state or dignity, or what is analogous to them, and can only be applied to what has, or may be conceived to wear, an air of imposing dignity; as a stately figure, walk, palace, avenue, or forest-tree. Stateliness involves the combination of height and grace.

"Ye that in waters glide, and ye that walk
The earth, and stately tread or lowly
creep." *Milton.*

SPLENDID (Lat. *splendidus*, *splendere*, to shine) is like magnificent, but less strong, and differs from it in being applied to abstract qualities, which magnificent never is. Splendid, not magnificent, talents. The splendid implies always something brilliant, gorgeous, or striking.

"Liveries whose gorgeousness evinces not
the footman's deserts, but his lord's splendid-
ness."—*Boyle.*

SUPERB (Fr. *superbe*, Lat. *superbus*, proud) has no application in our language to human disposition, but is used of objects of nature or of art which are of the best, that is, the largest or best developed, the best manufactured, the most imposing or elaborate; as a superb diamond, tree, house, carpet, bracelet, equipage. The original force of the Latin *superbus* still runs through the modern use of the term. It indicates that striking superiority to other objects of the same class which, in conscious creatures, would naturally be accompanied by pride.

"With laboured visible design
Art strove to be superbly fine."
Churchill.

AUGUST (Lat. *augustus*, *augere*, to heap sacrifices or honours) is only employed of persons and of what emanates from them as creating extraordinary respect, or respect mingled with awe. There seems, however, to be no reason why the term should not be employed analogously of visible objects, as the august mountain solitudes; but there is a kind of personality attributed to such features of nature.

"Not with such majesty, such bold relief,
The forms august, the king, or conquering
chief,
E'er swelled on marble as in verse have
shined—
In polished verse—the manners and the
mind." *Pope.*

GRANDEUR. See GRAND.

GRANT. See ADMIT, ALLOW, CEDE, and GIVE.

GRASP. See CATCH.

GRATEFUL. See ACCEPTABLE, AGREEABLE, and GRATITUDE.

GRATIFIED. See GLAD.

GRATIFY. INDULGE. HUMOUR. SATISFY. PLEASE. SATIATE. GLUT. CLOY.

To GRATIFY (Lat. *gratus*, grateful, and *facere*, to make) is first to please, then to indulge, and, in the latter sense, to indulge not only persons, but the mind and its tastes or desires, the senses and the appetites. INDULGE (Lat. *indulgere*) is to concede something to a weakness or a wish. The subject-matter of gratification is more positive than that of indulgence. We gratify passions, desires, and the like; we indulge humours or other less powerful influences. In indulging we escape the trouble or effort of resisting; in gratifying we look for keen enjoyment. The former is a sign of weakness, the latter often of vicious determination.

"His (Virgil's) sense always somewhat to
gratify our imagination on which it may en-
large at pleasure."—*Dryden.*

"Restraint she will not brook ;
And, left to herself, if evil then ensue,
She first his weak *indulgence* will accuse."
Milton.

To HUMOUR (Lat. *humor*) is to adapt oneself to the variable mood of another.

"By *humouring* the mind in trifles, we teach it to presume on its own importunity in greater matters ; and it will be found a convenient rule in the management of our passions, as of our children, to refuse a compliance with them, not only when they ask improper things, but when they ask anything with impatience."—*Bishop Hurd.*

To gratify is capable of much difference in the character of the gratification. The lowest and most sensual passions may be gratified, and the purest wishes on behalf of another, as when a father is gratified with the successes of his son. To SATISFY (Lat. *satisfacere*, to give enough) is to fill up the measure of a want, whether the want be ordinate and lawful, or unlawful and inordinate, and, like gratify, admits of many degrees and kinds ; but satisfy does not imply pleasure, as it is implied in gratify ; but the feeling, though less vivid, is more substantial. Hence it follows that there may be satisfaction without gratification, and gratification without satisfaction. The cravings of a hungry man are satisfied with very plain diet, in which there is no gratification of the palate. The gratification of licentiousness and worldliness are often felt to be utterly unsatisfactory.

"The word *satisfaction* is frequently employed to express the full accomplishment of some particular desire, which always communicates a temporary pleasure, whatever may be the nature of that desire."—*Cogan.*

PLEASE (Fr. *plaire*, Lat. *placere*) has the twofold meaning of exciting, 1, anything of the nature of pleasure ; and 2, specifically a feeling of honourable satisfaction, as when a superior expresses himself as pleased with another. Pleasure holds an intermediate position between satisfaction and gratification, being more than the first, and less than the second. To be pleased denotes a more lasting condition than to be gratified, and also

conveys the idea of combined gratification and approval of the judgment arising from objects which operate continuously upon our minds ; as to be pleased with a landscape we contemplate, or a book we are reading, or with the conversation, or society, or manner, or conduct of others.

"The soul has many different faculties, or, in other words, many different ways of acting, and can be intensely *pleased* or made happy by all these different faculties or ways of acting."—*Addison.*

SATIATE denotes excessive satisfaction, or satisfaction and something more. It deserves, however, to be remarked, that as extremes proverbially meet, to be satiated is often, practically, the opposite of being satisfied ; for to be satisfied denotes pleasure and contentment, while satiety is the feeling of dissatisfaction and discontent produced by over-satisfaction. Satiare, GLUT (Lat. *glutire*, Fr. *engloutir*), and CLOY (Fr. *clouer*, *clou*, Lat. *clavus*, a nail, to nail, close up, and so clog) have much in common. Indeed, glut and cloy may be taken as the complement of satiety, the former denoting the excess of supply over demand or legitimate requirement, the latter the reaction in individual feeling by way of loathing, dissatisfaction, and loss of appreciation, naturally and necessarily consequent upon the excess. Glut is used impersonally, as when a market is said to be glutted or overstocked ; cloy, only of persons and their desires.

"The variety of objects dissipates care for a short time ; but weariness soon ensues, and *satiety* converts the promised pleasure to indifference at least, if not to pain."—*Knox.*

"Thus must ye perish on a barbarous coast !
Is this your fate, to *glut* the dogs with
gore,
Far from your friends, and from your
native shore?" *Pope, Homer.*

"Alas ! their love may be called appetite ;
No motion of the liver, but the palate
That suffer surfeit, *cloyment*, and revolt ;
But mine is all as hungry as the sea,
And can digest as much." *Shakespeare.*

GRATITUDE. THANKFULNESS.

GRATITUDE (Lat. *gratus*, grateful)

relates rather to the inner state of feeling, THANKFULNESS to the exhibition of it in words. We commonly use grateful in reference to human agents; thankful, to Divine Providence. We may look grateful. We speak our thanks. Thankfulness is mistrusted if it be not expressed; but gratitude may be too deep for words. Thankfulness is uneasy till it has acknowledged a kindness; gratitude, till it has recompensed it.

"*Gratitude* is a pleasant affection excited by a lively sense of benefits received or intended, or even by the desire of being beneficial. It is the lively and powerful reaction of a well-disposed mind upon whom benevolence has conferred some important good."—*Cogan*.

"Give us that due sense of all Thy mercies, that our hearts may be unfeignedly thankful."—*Book of Common Prayer*.

GRATUITOUS. VOLUNTARY. WILLING.

GRATUITOUS (Lat. *gratuitus*, gratis) is given without equivalent or recompense, granted irrespectively of claim, or where none exists; hence in the applied sense of uncalled-for by circumstances, and, still further, unwarranted by them, as a gratuitous insult is one that was wholly unmerited, and as a gratuitous assertion is one for which no proof is forthcoming. VOLUNTARY (Lat. *voluntas*, *volo*, to will) is more restricted in its sense than WILLING, having the negative signification of not done under compulsion. All our outward actions, whatever may be the full nature of their motives, must be called voluntary; but they are not necessarily performed willingly, that is, it does not follow that our wishes and inclinations go along with the actions performed. The vows of the cloister must, of necessity, be taken *voluntarily*. There are multitudes of cases in which they have not been taken *willingly*. It may be observed that willing and voluntary are applicable both to the agent and the act; gratuitous, only to the act. Voluntary and willing belong more to the freedom of act and motive in the agent himself; gratuitous, to its effect

upon others, or the character of such acts or motives in relation to others. A voluntary benefit is one which is given with freedom of will; a gratuitous benefit is one which has been purchased by nothing on the part of the receiver.

"The Greek word signifies most *gratuitous*, most free, undeserved, and the pure effect of grace."—*Bates*.

"Nothing is more certain than that God acts not necessarily, but *voluntarily* with particular intention and design, knowing that He does good, and intending to do so, freely and out of choice, and when He has no other constraint upon Him but this, that His will inclines Him to communicate Himself and to do good."—*Clarke*.

"His *willingness* to forgive returning sinners."—*Ibid*.

GRATUITY. GIFT.

GIFT being simply a thing given, GRATUITY (*see* GRATUITOUS) is a certain kind of gift. It is commonly expected as due, but could not be enforced as a legal claim.

"The Cavaliers and Presbyterians of the city, hoping to improve this opportunity, invited them to join with the city, as they termed their party there, promising them their whole arrears, constant pay, and a present *gratuity*, giving them some money in hand as an earnest of the rest."—*Ludlow, Memoirs*.

GRAVE. *See* TOMB.

GRAVE. SERIOUS. SOLEMN.

GRAVE (Lat. *gravis*, heavy) is characterized by weight, but not used in the physical but only in the moral or analogous sense; hence important, and, as applied to character or persons, having the appearance of being charged with affairs weighty or important. It is opposed to gay, and may be predicated of manner, appearance, and expression of countenance. As grave denotes an appearance of habitual self-control or sense of responsibility, so SERIOUS (Lat. *serius*) conveys the idea of consideration or reflectiveness, as applied to the air or expression of countenance. Like grave, it is used of circumstances, and then has a stronger force. A grave consideration is one of argumentative

weight; a serious circumstance is one that is likely to affect us. While grave as so employed means no more than important, serious means giving cause for apprehension, attended with danger or disastrous consequences. A grave, but not a serious, assembly of old men. SOLEMN (Lat. *solemnis*) is primarily marked by religious rites, hence fitted to awake serious reflections. When used of the manner or countenance of an individual, it has the sense of affectedly serious, and implies ridicule. The judge is grave, the preacher serious; the service or the cathedral solemn.

"Justice is *grave* and decorous, and in its punishments rather seems to submit to a necessity than to make a choice."—*Burke*.

"One might have expected that events so awful and tremendous as death and judgment, that a question so deeply interesting as whether we shall go to heaven or hell, could in no possible case, and in no constitution of mind whatever, fail of exciting the most *serious* apprehensions."—*Paley*.

"But they who have the misfortune to be of this make should by no means trust to their own most *solemn* purposes, or even vows. Their chief safety is in flight."—*Secker*.

GRAVITY. WEIGHT. HEAVINESS.

These terms are compared here in a physical sense. GRAVITY is weight scientifically considered, and is therefore a scientific term. WEIGHT (the amount weighed) is wholly indefinite, and is opposed only to that which is imponderable. The lightest substances have some amount of weight. Weight, however, is always abstract, while HEAVINESS is concrete, that is, expresses the *sensation* of weight (A. S. *hefig, hæfig*). This is not always the case with the adjective heavy. A heavy burden means one of which the weight is severely felt; but, "How heavy is this?" is equivalent simply to, "What is the weight of this?" Weight, from its association with the balance, has a sense peculiar to itself—that of determining power, as weighty considerations. Everything has weight, being the natural tendency of all bodies to the centre of the earth.

Those bodies which have much weight, either in proportion to their bulk or to the force and strength applied to them, are heavy. A bag of gold is heavier than a bag of feathers of the same size, because gold has more weight than feathers. Weight depends more upon substance, heaviness on quantity. A pound of feathers and a pound of gold have equal weight, though feathers and gold are not equally heavy. In their secondary senses, gravity denotes the weight of practical importance, heaviness the weight of care or trouble, weightiness the urgency of fact or reasoning. Heavy, rather than weighty, is the term employed to express the force which results from the weight of a body in motion. Thus we speak of a heavy, not a weighty, blow. The felled tree falls not weightily, but heavily, to the ground.

"Eutellus wastes his forces on the wind,
And thus deluded of the stroke designed,
Headlong and heavy fell." *Dryden*.

"Without *gravity*, the whole universe, if we suppose an undetermined power of motion infused into matter, would have been a confused chaos without beauty or order, and never stable or permanent in any condition."—*Bentley*.

GREAT. *See* BIG and GRAND.

GREATNESS. *See* BULK.

GREEDINESS. *See* EAGERNESS.

GREET. *See* ACCOST.

GRIEF. *See* AFFLICTION.

GRIEVANCE. *HARDSHIP*.

A GRIEVANCE (*grief, gravis*, heavy) is a mental hardship, or a hardship as dwelt upon in the mind. *HARDSHIP* is externally suffered. Purely physical endurances, as exposure to the elements, are hardships, not grievances. Grievance carries the idea of matter of complaint or trouble, which might have been otherwise but for the conduct of men. So heavy taxation is a hardship when viewed in its pauperizing effects, a grievance as furnishing ground of complaint against a government or an administration. Hardship comes from a force stronger than ourselves, whether from nature or from man. Grievance

may exist between equals. Among civilized nations one may have a grievance against another, where hardship could not be predicated; yet the national grievance might be such as to entail hardship upon individuals.

"Heroes are always drawn bearing sorrows, struggling with adversities, undergoing all kinds of *hardships*, and having in the service of mankind a kind of appetite to difficulties and dangers."—*Spectator*.

"Cause of the war and *grievance* of the land."
Pope, Homer.

GRIEVE. MOURN. LAMENT.

To GRIEVE is purely mental (*see* GRIEVANCE); it is to feel the pain of an inward distress. To MOURN (*A. S. murnan, meornan*) and LAMENT (*Lat. lamentari*) are to give outward expression to grief, the former in visible, the latter in audible signs. Bitter grief; deep mourning; loud lamentation. Unlike mourn and lament, the verb *grieve* is used in the sense of actively to trouble or hurt, as well as intransitively to feel trouble. Misfortune grieves me, or causes me to grieve.

"Who fails to *grieve* when just occasion calls,

Or *grieves* too much, deserves not to be blessed."
Young.

The term *mourn* may indicate sorrow, either expressed or unexpressed; but *lament* implies its expression of necessity.

"As the apostle says of circumcision and uncircumcision, so say I here, that neither *mourning* for sin, nor confession of it, avail anything, but a new creature."—*South*.

"Eve, who, unseen,
Yet all had heard, with audible *lament*
Discovered soon the place of her retire."
Milton.

GRIEVED. *See* SORRY.

GRIM. *See* GHASTLY.

GRIPE. *See* CATCH and PINCH.

GRISLY. *See* GHASTLY.

GROAN. MOAN.

These words are both onomatopoeic, or imitative of what they express. The GROAN is produced by hard

breathing, and consists of inarticulate sounds. The MOAN is a plaintive sound produced by the organs of utterance, and is often slightly articulate. The moan is often also voluntary; the groan is involuntary, the result of deep pain, unless it be simulated. There is a difference, however, in the causes by which the two are produced. Moaning comes always from some pain or misery; groaning comes from pain, but it may also come from a strong feeling of resistance to what is felt to be burdensome or unjust; hence it is often an expression of indignation. The groans of suffering and of indignation are combined in the following:—

"Nor Philoctetes had been left inclosed
In a bare isle, to wants and pains exposed,
Where to the rocks with solitary *groans*
His sufferings and our baseness he be-
moans."
Dryden, Ovid.

GROSS. *See* COARSE.

GROUND. *See* BASIS.

GROUP. *See* ASSEMBLY.

GROW. BECOME.

To GROW (*A. S. growan*) is gradually to BECOME. A man may become suddenly angry, but he only grows angry by degrees. Grow often indicates a state which one is approaching; become, a state which one has reached. To become is to be one thing from having been another. To grow is to be approaching to some state. A man is growing old *before* he has reached old age. Not till he has reached it has he become old.

GROW. INCREASE.

To GROW is the process of which to INCREASE is the result or manifestation. Trade has been growing for years past, and is now considerably increased. To increase, however, does not necessarily imply to grow; rapid expansion or dilatation of parts will produce increase in bulk; but the process of growth implies either an accretion of parts by external apposition, or an assimilative power from within, as in the vital force. The snowball grows by

accretion, and so increases as it rolls. The tree grows by its own vitality, and increases also in size.

GRUDGE. SPITE. PIQUE.

A GRUDGE (Old Eng. *grutche*) is a feeling of continuous and sullen dislike cherished against another, having its origin in some act of the person against whom it is felt. SPITE (an abbreviation of despite Lat. *despicere*) is a more active and demonstrative form of malevolence, but not so enduring as grudge, which shows itself in cutting words and irritating demeanour. It belongs to persons who are quick to feel and weak to control or hide their feelings. We owe a grudge, and show spite. PIQUE (Fr. *piquer*, *piquer*, to prick) is purely personal, and comes of offended pride, or a quick sense of resentment against a supposed neglect or injury, with less of malevolence than grudge or spite, both of which are characterized by a desire to injure, which does not belong to pique. The verb to grudge has a negative force unknown to the noun grudge. We grudge another that which we do not regard him sufficiently to give him, or to contemplate him as possessing, with complacency. On the other hand, a grudge is always an actively malicious feeling, which would hurt if it had the opportunity.

"Esau had conceived a mortal *grudge* and enmity against his brother Jacob."—*South*.

"Begone, ye critics, and restrain your *spite* ;
Codrus writes on, and will for ever write."
—*Pope*.

"Out of a personal *piquer* to those in service, he stands as a looker-on when the government is attacked."—*Addison*.

As a reflective verb, to pique oneself expresses a feeling of pride unwounded, as—

"Men *piquer* themselves on their skill in the learned languages."—*Locke*.

GUARANTEE. See WARRANT.

GUARD. See DEFEND.

GUARD. GUARDIAN.

Of these GUARD (Fr. *garde*) is applied both to persons and things; GUARDIAN, less often to things, and

more commonly to persons. But a more marked difference is that guard denotes a protector against physical danger, violence, theft, and the like; guardian, against anything which may militate against the interests of persons, especially during youth or minority, when they are too inexperienced to manage their own affairs.

"The *guard* which kept the door of the king's house."—*Bible*.

"You may think, perhaps, that man is too mean, too insignificant a being to be worthy of the ministrations and *guardianship* of celestial spirits."—*Bishop Porteus*.

GUERDON. See COMPENSATION.

GUESS. CONJECTURE. DIVINATION. SUPPOSITION. HYPOTHESIS. SURMISE.

To GUESS (Old Eng. *gesse*) is to make a statement upon what is unknown, with the hope of being right; if by lucky chance only, this is in the strictest sense a guess; if with a very slight amount of knowledge, which is just sufficient to incline the scale of probability, this is a CONJECTURE (Lat. *conjectura*, from *conjacere*, to cast together). Hence conjecture is employed of complex, while guess belongs to the simplest, things. I hold something in my hand, and in play I say to a child, "Guess what it is." An historian or a diplomatist who is furnished with inadequate evidence for knowledge, conjectures motives and consequences, as best he may. The Roman augurs would sometimes cast down cubic lots inscribed with marks or letters, whence they inferred the future. This *throwing together* of lots was called a *conjectura*, or conjecture. SUPPOSITION (Lat. *sub*, under, and *ponere*, to place) belongs to that of which part is known and part unknown; a fact, for instance, is known; its cause is unknown; therefore the cause, or supposed cause, is placed under the fact as a theoretical foundation for it. And generally, to imagine with probability, to infer from evidence which, though not complete, is the best that can be had, is supposition. HYPOTHESIS is the Greek form of the Latin *suppositio*, but is technically

employed of philosophical supposition, learned or scientific theories. DIVINATION (*divinus*, divine) is literally a term of ancient augury for the gathering the will of heaven, either naturally by a divine inspiration, or artificially from certain manifestations; in this sense, divination precedes prediction. To divine, accordingly, as commonly employed, is to use such conjecture as depends both upon hazard and upon natural sagacity. It may be observed, in its relation to prediction, that, unlike that term, it is not restricted to the future, but is equally applicable to facts of the past. SURMISE (Old Fr. *surmise*, accusation, imposition, in the sense of imputation) is a conjecture of a matter of fact. Of the above, those which are most nearly related to one another are, guess, conjecture, and surmise. The subject of a guess is always a fact, or something regarded in the simple light of a fact; a conjecture is more vague and abstract, and may be on the possibility of a fact. The subject of a guess is definite and unmistakable when known. The subject of a conjecture may remain indefinite and unknown. If a sentence be a set enigma, I guess its meaning, and so know it. If it be involved and indistinct, I can but conjecture its meaning, and may not arrive at it after all. In guessing, if successful, we arrive at a certain or probable conclusion from uncertain premises. In conjecturing, we arrive at an uncertain conclusion from uncertain premises.

"You go on arguing and reasoning what necessity of nature must signify, which is only talking without book, and *guessing* what words anciently meant, without consulting the ancients to know the fact."—*Waterland*.

"You may see how our (English) tongue is risen, and thereby *conjecture* how in time it may alter."—*Camden*.

"A sagacity which *divined* the evil designs."—*Bancroft*.

"I am sure his reason by which he would persuade you to become a convert to their Church is shewed to be no reason, because it proceeds upon this false *supposition*, that the Church of Rome was once the Catholic Church, which it never was."—*Sharp*.

"Hypothetical necessity is that which the *supposition* or *hypothesis* of God's foresight and preordination lays upon future contingents."—*Clarke*.

"There are various degrees of strength in judgments, from the lowest *surmise*, to notion, opinion, persuasion, and the highest assurance, which we call certainty."—*Search*.

A surmise is in matters personal and practical, what hypothesis is in matters purely scientific.

GUIDE. See LEAD.

GUIDE. RULE. DIRECTION.

GUIDE (Fr. *guide*) is primarily a living director; hence, when employed of inanimate influences or media, it conveys the idea of something which is not rigidly invariable, but still keeps up with our needs under alteration of circumstances. RULE (Lat. *regula*), on the other hand, is a rigid and inflexible thing, a form of thought or a form of words, a maxim which must be acted up to. So conscience is the guide of men's actions. The duty to one's neighbour is the rule of Christian reciprocity. A DIRECTION (Lat. *dirigere*, *directus*) may be given at a distance, or once for all, and is to be acted upon by being remembered. It is not universally applicable, but only suited to the particular case. When coming from a superior, a direction has the force of an instructive command.

"Common sense, or that share and species of understanding which Nature has bestowed upon the greater part of men, is, when competently improved by education, and assisted by Divine grace, the safest *guide* to certainty and happiness."—*V. Knox, Essays*.

Rule is employed in more senses than one. To say nothing of its purely physical meaning of a rod or measure, it signifies also an uniform course of things, a regulative order, a constant method, and both the exercise of governing powers and the state of those on whom it is exercised. In the sense in which it is synonymous with guide and direction, as the guide regulates the movements, and the direction indicates the course, so the rule regulates

principally the actions, or what one ought to do; but it is cold and without force in itself.

"There is something so wild and yet so solemn in Shakespeare's speeches of his ghosts and fairies, and the like imaginary persons, that we cannot forbear thinking them natural, though we have no rule by which to judge them."—*Addison*.

A rule is a compendium of principles which is familiar to us, and so available for application under new or unfamiliar circumstances.

"I have before made mention how Muscovie was in our time discovered by Richard Chancellor in his voyage toward Cathay by the direction and information of M. Sebastian Cabota, who long before had this secret in his mind."—*Hackluyt*.

GUILE. See FRAUD.

GUILT. See CRIME.

GUISE. HABIT. GARB.

The former (Fr. *guise*) includes the latter, GUISE being the combined effect of dress and deportment. GARB (Norm. Fr. *garbs*, clothes) is official or appropriate dress. HABIT is much the same; but garb, like dress, may comprise several articles of apparel, while habit denotes one such article of a somewhat ample character, as the habit of a monk.

"In easy notes and *guise* of lowly swain,
'Twas thus he charmed and taught the
listening train." *Parnell*.

"Habited like a jurymen."—*Churchill*.

"That by their Moorish *garb* the warriors
knew
The hostile band."
Hoole, Orlando Furioso.

GULF. ABYSS.

GULF (Fr. *golfe*, connected with the Greek *κόλπος*) is a great hollow; the essential idea being simply vast concavity, the hollow may extend either horizontally or downwards. ABYSS (Gr. *ἄβυσσός*, without bottom) extends only downwards.

"And besides all this, betwixt us and you
there is a great *gulf* fixed."—*Bible*.

"To whom Satan, turning boldly, 'Ye
powers

And spirits of this nethermost *abyss*,
Chaos, and ancient Night, I come no spy,
With purpose to explore or to disturb
The secrets of your realm.'" *Milton*.

GUSH. FLOW. STREAM.

Of these, FLOW (Lat. *fluere*) is the generic term, and the others are modes of flowing. GUSH (Dutch *gudsen*, Germ. *gieszen*) is to flow abundantly and forcibly, or, as it were, burstingly. STREAM (A. S. *stream*) is to flow amply and continuously but quietly. A body of water may flow broadly or narrowly; it streams narrowly; it gushes violently.

"While his life's torrent gushed from out
the wound." *Pope*.

"Oh, could I flow like thee, and make thy
stream

My great example, as it is my theme:

Though deep, yet clear; though gentle,
yet not dull,

Strong without rage, without o'erflowing,
full." *Denham*.

GUST. See WIND.

H.

HABIT. See CUSTOM, DRESS,
and GUISE.

HABITATION. ABODE. DOMICILE.

HABITATION (Lat. *habitare*) is a place which one inhabits, not necessarily a house or tenement of any kind. ABODE (see ABIDE) has the same sense, but with a less direct reference to the constant passing of one's life there. DOMICILE adds to the idea of habitation and abode a relationship to society and civil government, and is consequently a term rather technical than conversational. An abode is pleasant or unpleasant, convenient or inconvenient. A habitation is suitable or unsuitable, healthy or unhealthy, commodious or otherwise. Habitation points more directly than abode to furnishing necessary shelter and protection. The woods are the abodes of birds, their nests are their habitations.

"The body moulders into dust, and is utterly incapable of itself to become a fit habitation for the soul again."—*Stillingfleet*.

"We will come and make our *abode* with him."—*Bible*.

The legal force of the term *domicile* is a residence at a particular place, with positive or presumptive proof of an intention to remain there.

HAIL. See ACCOST.

HALLOW. See CONSECRATE.

HANDSOME. See BEAUTIFUL.

HANDY. See CONVENIENT.

HAPPEN. CHANCE. OCCUR.

To HAPPEN (that is, to fall out by hap or chance) is used of all occurrences, whether accidental or not, which are not regarded as the result of specific design on the part of the individual to whom the term is applied. For that which is the issue of a train of circumstances, however connected, may be said to happen to those who have had no hand in bringing it about. To CHANCE (Lat. *cadentia*), on the other hand, is only used when the character of the event, as regards the individual whom it befalls, is fortuitous. To OCCUR (Lat. *occurrere*, to run against) is a relative term, equivalent to happening to a person, or to fall undesignedly in his way. It is said, not only of events, but of ideas or thoughts which suggest themselves. Events of remote history happen; but they are not occurrences *to us*.

"When four different persons are called upon in a court of justice to prove the reality of any particular fact that *happened* twenty or thirty years ago, what is the sort of evidence which they usually give? Why, in the great leading circumstances which tend to establish the fact in question, they in general perfectly agree."—*Bishop Porteus*.

HAPPINESS. FELICITY. BEATITUDE. BLESSEDNESS. BLISS. BLESSING.

HAPPINESS (happy, Eng. *hap*) is that feeling which results from the conscious enjoyment of an aggregate of good things. It is a state of the soul, and is applied to every degree of consciousness of well-being, and is not employed of any state, however keen, of mere animal gratification, irrespectively of the mental state. FELICITY (Lat. *felicitas*, from *felix*, happy or fortunate) is not only a more formal word for happiness, but also involves a substantial ground of the feeling. It is the consciousness not only of enjoyment, but of a

state of prosperity. BLESSEDNESS denotes a state of the most refined and pure happiness, arising from the possession of the choicest goods or material of happiness, and is the characteristic of the person's entire state in soul and body. BLISS is happiness of a rapturous or ecstatic nature. BEATITUDE (Lat. *beatus*) is the Latin form of the English blessedness, and is used in the higher and more spiritual style. It conveys the idea of *imparted* blessedness. BLESSING nearly answers to the Latin benediction; but, while benediction is used only of good wishes, blessing is used both of good wishes and good things. (See HAPPY.)

"The word happy is a relative term; in strictness, any condition may be denominated happy in which the amount or aggregate of pleasure exceeds that of pain; and the degree of *happiness* depends upon the quantity of this excess."—*Paley*.

Happiness depends on the possession of such things as wealth, honour, friends, health; the satisfaction of mind involved in the enjoyment of such things constitutes felicity.

"Did faith ever violate peace, or obedience impair domestic *felicity*?"—*Warburton*.

"As almost here she with her *bliss* doth meet."
Davies, Immortality of the Soul.

"Jupiter has by him two great vessels, one filled with *blessings*, the other with misfortunes."—*Tatler*.

"About Him all the sanctities of heaven
Stood thick as stars, and from His sight
received

Beatitude past utterance." *Milton*.

"The deeps and the snows, the hail and the rain, the birds of the air and fishes of the sea, they can and do glorify God, and give Him praise in their capacity; and yet He gave them no speech, no reason, no immortal spirit, no capacity of eternal *blessedness*."—*Bishop Taylor*.

HAPPY. FORTUNATE. LUCKY.

HAPPY denotes the possession of goods which are really such; FORTUNATE (Lat. *fortunatus*, *fortuna*, fortune), the possession of what are so considered. Men may be called fortunate in reference to very small things; as a lucky throw in a game of chance. Happy involves a larger

scale of benefit. A man is happy in what he has; fortunate, in getting it. There is a close connection between LUCKY (Icelandic *lukka*, to favour) and fortunate; but lucky is used only of minor occurrences; fortunate, of the larger results of favourable chance. To be lucky is less than to be fortunate; to be fortunate, less than to be happy. Lucky excludes all idea of effort; but a man may be fortunate in his undertakings. A fortunate man obtains what he wishes and hopes to gain. A lucky man gets what he may desire, but did not expect to gain. Merchants who make successful speculations are fortunate. Lottery prizes and unexpected legacies fall to the lucky.

"Oh! *Happiness*, our beings' end and aim,
Good, Pleasure, Ease, Content, whate'er
thy name,
That something still which prompts th'
eternal sigh,
For which we bear to live or dare to die,
Which still so near us, yet beyond us, lies,
O'erlooked, seen double, by the fool and
wise.
Plant of celestial seed, if dropped below,
Say in what mortal soil thou deign'st to
grow." *Pope.*

"As Sylla was sacrificing in his tent in the fields of Nola, a snake happened to creep out of the bottom of the altar; upon which, Postumius, the Haruspex, who attended the sacrifice, proclaiming it to be a *fortunate* omen, called out upon him to lead his army immediately against the enemy."—*Middleton, Life of Cicero.*

"He who sometimes lights on truth is right but by chance; and I know not whether the *luckiness* of the accident will excuse the irregularity of the proceeding."—*Locke.*

HARANGUE. *See ADDRESS.*

HARASS. *See JADE.*

HARBINGER. *See FORERUNNER.*

HARBOUR. *See ENTERTAIN and HAVEN.*

HARD. *See ARDUOUS and FAST.*

HARDENED. *See OBDURATE.*

HARDIHOOD. *See BOLDNESS.*

HARDLY. *See SCARCELY.*

These terms are correctly employed in proportion as it is borne in mind

that SCARCELY relates to quantity, HARDLY to degree. "It is scarcely ten miles off." "I shall hardly be able to finish this work."

HARDSHIP. *See GRIEVANCE.*

HARM. *See HURT.*

HARMLESS. INOFFENSIVE. UN-OFFENDING. INNOCUOUS.

HARMLESS denotes in a twofold sense the absence of the disposition to do hurt, and the state of immunity from harm. In the former sense, it is used in reference to the power or disposition of living creatures. We speak of harmless animals. INNOCUOUS (Lat. *in*, not, and *nocere*, to hurt), on the other hand, is employed of things, and not persons, as an innocuous potion, atmosphere, plant. IN-OFFENSIVE and UNOFFENDING differ in that the former means not being even indirectly a source of annoyance or offence, while the latter means devoid of all disposition to offend. Un-offending can only be employed of human beings. Inoffensive, of influences in general, which are capable of being unpleasantly or noxiously felt; as inoffensive odours. Harmless and innocuous belong to the nature of beings; inoffensive and un-offending, to what they may be on specific occasions.

"For when through tasteless flat humility,
In dough-baked men some *harmlessness* we
see,

'Tis but his phlegm that's virtuous, and
not he." *Donne.*

"Useful and *inoffensive* animals have a claim to our tenderness, and it is honourable to our nature to befriend them."—*Beattie.*

"Horace very truly observes that whatever mad frolics enter into the heads of kings, it is the common people, that is, the honest artizan and the industrious tribes in the middle ranks, unoffended and *unoffending*, who chiefly suffer in the evil consequences."—*Knor, Essays.*

"And not only *innocuous*, but they (spiders) are very salutiferous too, in some of the most stubborn diseases."—*Derham.*

HARMONY. *See CONCORD and MELODY.*

HARSH. ROUGH.

HARSHNESS (see ACRIMONY) acts upon the affections and the feelings, to which it does violence. ROUGHNESS is a matter of manner, which externally annoys, as indicating a want of consideration or deference, but is easily endured by sensible persons, where it is seen to be a mere defect of polish. Roughness is not necessarily a defect. Morally, harshness is always offensive to the mind, taste, feelings, or senses.

"Harshness and brutality."—*Shaftesbury.*

"I could endure

Chains nowhere patiently, and chains at home,

Where I am free by birthright, not at all. Then what were left of roughness in the grain

Of British natures, wanting its excuse, That it belongs to freemen, would disgust And shock me." *Cowper.*

HASTEN. See ACCELERATE.

HASTE. DISPATCH. HURRY. SPEED. BUSTLE.

HASTE (Germ., Dan., and Swedish *hast*) is voluntary speed directed to the commencement or continuation of something. HURRY (Germ. *hurren*, to move hastily) is an effort of haste embarrassed by confusion or want of self-collectedness. Haste signifies heat of action; hurry implies haste, but includes trepidation or perturbation. What is done in haste may be done well; what is done in a hurry can at best only be done inaccurately. Haste implies a wish for quickness; speed, its attainment.

"Homer himself, as Cicero observes above, is full of this kind of painting, and particularly fond of description, even in situations where the action seems to require haste."—*Goldsmith.*

"Sisters, hence with spurs of speed,
Each her thundering falchion wield,
Each bestride her sable steed,
Hurry, hurry, to the field." *Gray.*

SPEED (A. S. *spedan*, to make haste) is the degree of rapidity with which things are done. DISPATCH (Fr. *dépêche*) is the promptitude and speed which are brought to bear upon the execution of a task, business, or trans-

action. BUSTLE (Old Eng. *buskle*) is tumult or stir arising from hurried activity, whether on the part of one person or of a crowd. It is the most unpractical and weakest exhibition of hurry.

"He saw a young Indian, whom he judged to be about nineteen or twenty years old, come down from a tree, and he also ran away with such speed as made it hopeless to follow him."—*Cook's Voyages.*

"A husbandman or a gardener will do more execution by being able to carry his scythe, his rake, or his flail with sufficient dispatch through a sufficient space, than if with greater strength his motions were proportionately more confined and slow."—*Paley.*

HASTINESS. RASHNESS. TEMERITY. PRECIPITANCY.

HASTINESS is the disposition to over-haste, and is applicable to too great quickness of feeling as well as action; as a hasty temper, a hasty act. The others relate only to actions. RASHNESS (Germ. *rasch*) is the quality of determining or acting from the impulse of the feelings, with little or no reflection on the cost or consequence. It is the courage of unreflection and inexperience. TEMERITY (Lat. *temeritus*, from *temere*, rashly) is that kind of rashness which under-rates or disregards personal danger or consequences, and is the passive state of which rashness is the active quality. To enter upon a hazardous speculation would be called rashness, but not temerity. To approach too near to the brink of a precipice would be temerity. Rashness has in it more of the excited, and temerity more of the dogged. Rashness refers to the act, temerity to the disposition. PRECIPITANCY (Lat. *præceps*, headlong) is employed, not of acts, but of the judgment which dictates them. Haste in deciding upon measures which required more consideration and reflection, is what is commonly called precipitancy. A man is precipitate who judges, or acts, or speaks before the time.

"But Epiphanius was made up of hastiness and credulity, and is never to be trusted where he speaks of a miracle."—*Jortin.*

"His beginnings must be in *rashness*, a noble fault; but time and experience will correct that error, and tame it into a deliberate and well-weighed courage."—*Dryden*.

"It must be acknowledged that the *temerity* of making experiments may casually lead to improvements in medical science; but it is a cruel *temerity*, for experiments in medicine are made on the sick at the hazard of life."—*Knox*.

"But if we make a rash beginning, and resolve *precipitantly* without observing the above-named rules and directions, in all probability our hasty purposes will end in a leisurely repentance."—*Scott, Christian Life*.

HASTY. CURSORY.

HASTY is only employed of observation in this connection, CURSORY (Lat. *currere*, to run) also of treatment. The subject was viewed hastily, and treated cursorily. Hasty is always at least an unsatisfactory epithet. Cursory is not so much so; as a cursory review may be all that is needed. Hasty is that which occupies little time; cursory, which occupies little thought.

HATE. DISLIKE.

HATE (A. S. *hatian*) is to feel such an enmity as to desire the injury, destruction, or removal of the object. It is applied to persons and qualities of a personal kind, though not always strictly personal; as to hate the light, for instance, which really means to hate the knowledge which comes from wise men. It is a perversion of language to speak of hating the impersonal. DISLIKE is aversion in a milder form, aversion being a strong, settled, and avowed dislike. Dislike is applicable, as hate is not, to impersonal influence, as to dislike a particular taste or smell. Hate is a matter of principle; dislike, a matter of taste, feeling, or sentiment.

HATEFUL. ODIUS.

These terms are etymological synonyms (Latin *odium*, hate); but HATEFUL is the stronger term, ODIUS being frequently employed of what is irksome, while hateful is nearly equivalent to detestable. Hateful tyrants, hateful vices; odious measures, odious smells. Nothing is

truly hateful but that which is evil; while the offensive may be odious.

HATRED. AVERSION. ANTI-PATHY. ENMITY. REPUGNANCE. ILL-WILL. RANCOUR. MALICE. MALEVOLENCE.

HATRED (A. S. *hatian*, to hate) is a very general term. Its characteristics have been given above. AVERSION (Lat. *avertere*, to turn away) is strong dislike. We dislike what is unpleasant to us. We have an aversion to what shocks or disgusts, or inspires us with horror.

"Strictly speaking, *aversion* is no other than a modification of desire; a desire of being liberated from whatever appears to be injurious to well-being."—*Cogan*.

ANTI-PATHY (Gr. *ἀντί*, against, and *πάθος*, feeling) is used of causeless dislike, or at least one of which the cause cannot be defined. It is founded upon supposition or instinctive belief, often utterly gratuitous, often not without some truth, of the character of the person as worthy of dislike.

"There are many ancient and received traditions and observations touching the sympathy and *antipathy* of plants; for that some will thrive best growing near others, which they impute to sympathy, and some worse, which they impute to *antipathy*."—*Bacon*.

ENMITY (Fr. *ennemi*, Lat. *inimicus*) is the state of personal opposition, whether accompanied by strong personal dislike or not; as "a bitter enemy," or, on the other hand, "the enemy," meaning the hostile party. In some of its metaphorical or applied senses it is little more than equivalent to strong opponent, as an enemy to falsehood; but an enemy is one who carries hatred into practice.

"And by these guileful means he more prevailed

Than had he open *enmity* profest;

The wolf more safely wounds when in sheep's clothing drest." *Lloyd*.

REPUGNANCE (Lat. *repugnare*, to fight against) is characteristically employed of acts or courses of action, measures, pursuits, and the like. We do not employ it directly of persons, so as to say, "I have a repugnance to such an one;" here we should use the

term aversion. It denotes an involuntary resistance to a particular line of conduct to which circumstances impel us. A repugnance to study. There is a use of repugnant and repugnance analogous to that of abhorrent and abhorrence, in which the terms denote a strong contrariety and dissimilarity between any two objects or subjects capable of being brought into juxtaposition or comparison; as slavery is repugnant to Christianity. So in the following:—

“If things in themselves evil, *repugnant* to the principles of human nature, and those of civil societies, as well as to the precepts of Christianity, are made lawful only for the carrying on their design, we need not go farther to examine them, for by these fruits we may know them.”—*Stillingfleet*.

ILL-WILL is a settled bias of the disposition away from another. It is very indefinite, and may be of any degree of strength. RANCOUR (Lat. *rancor*, from *rancere*, to be rank or rancid) is a deep-seated and lasting feeling of ill-will. It preys upon the very mind of the subject of it. While enmity may be generous and open, rancour is malignant and private. It commonly denotes such ill-will or disturbance of feeling towards another as survives from a former enmity or difference. So that, even after the forms of enmity are laid aside in reconciliation, something of rancour is apt to remain behind.

“*Rancour* is that degree of malice which preys upon the possessor.”—*Cogan*.

MALICE (Lat. *malitia*, from *malus*, evil) is that enmity which can abide its opportunity of injuring its object, and pervert the truth or the right, or go out of its way, or shape courses of action, to compass its ends. MALEVOLENCE (Lat. *male*, ill, and *volo*, to will) is the casual or habitual state of ill-will, but differs from ill-will in that the latter is *always* casual, while malevolence is with some habitual, or so easily excited as to seem so.

“*Malice* is more frequently employed to express the dispositions of inferior minds to execute every purpose of mischief within the more limited circle of their abilities.”—*Cogan*.

“*Malevolence* commences with some idea of evil belonging to and connected with the object; and it settles into a permanent hatred of his person and of everything relative to him.”—*Cogan*.

MALIGNITY (Lat. *malignus*) is yet worse; it is cruel malevolence, or innate love of harm for the sake of doing it. A further difference, it seems, ought to be noted between malignity and MALIGNANCY. While malignity denotes an inherent evil of nature, malignancy denotes its indication in particular instances. Malignant spirits, for instance, convey the idea of spirits already engaged on their errands of mischief; and, again, malignity always implies evil purpose, while malignancy is said of unpurposed evil. The malignancy, not malignity, of a disease.

“Now this shows the high *malignity* of fraud and falsehood, that in the direct and natural course of it, it tends to the destruction of common life by destroying that trust and mutual confidence that men should have in one another.”—*South*.

“I will not deny but that the noxious and *malignant* plants do many of them discover something in their nature by the sad and melancholick visage of their leaves, flowers, and fruit.”—*Ray*.

HAVE. See POSSESS.

HAVEN. HARBOUR. PORT.

A HAVEN (A. S. *hāfen*) is always a *natural* harbour. A HARBOUR (Old Eng. *herbour*) is first a station for rest, shelter, lodging, entertainment; and thence a sheltered station for ships, whether *natural* or *artificial*. A PORT (A. S. *port*, Lat. *portus*) is commonly employed in the sense of a frequented harbour, with its commercial restrictions and regulations, customs, dues, and the like. A port is a harbour viewed in its national, civic, or commercial relations.

“And now the surrender of Dorchester (the magazine from whence the other places were supplied with principles of rebellion) infused the same spirit into Weymouth, a very convenient harbour and haven.”—*Clarendon*.

“These legal *ports* were undoubtedly at first assigned by the crown, since to each of them a court of port-note is incident, the

jurisdiction of which must flow from royal authority."—*Blackstone*.

HAUGHTINESS. See ARROGANCE and DIGNITY.

HAUL. See DRAW.

HAUNT. See FREQUENT.

HAZARD. See CHANCE and DANGER.

HEAD. LEADER. CHIEF.

HEAD (A. S. *heafod*, with other forms), as coming from the Teutonic, is the analogue of CHIEF (Fr. *chef*, Lat. *caput*), as coming from the Latin. But, as now employed by ourselves, head denotes no more than the first in an organized body, while chief expresses pre-eminence, personal and active. A person may be the head of a number, because there must be *some* head; but if he is the chief, his personal importance and influence is felt, whether for good or ill. So personal is the idea of chief, that a man may be chief among others without being in any sense their head, that is, bound to them in a relationship of command. A LEADER (A. S. *ledan*, to lead) is one who controls, directs, and instigates others in indefinite lines of movement or action. The head is the highest man. The chief is the strongest, best, or most conspicuous man. The leader is the most influential man.

"A reform proposed by an unsupported individual in the presence of *heads* of houses, public officers, doctors, and proctors, whose peculiar province it would have been urged is to consult for the academic state, would have been deemed even more officious and arrogant than a public appeal."—*Knox*.

"I thank God I am neither a minister nor a leader of opposition."—*Burke*.

"The chief of sinners."—*Bible*.

HEADSTRONG. See OBSTINATE.

HEADY. See OBSTINATE.

HEAL. See CURE.

HEALTHY. WHOLESOME. SALUBRIOUS. SALUTARY.

HEALTHY (A. S. *hældh*, health) bears the twofold meaning of *possessing* health, and *imparting* health. A healthy person; a healthy atmosphere.

WHOLESOME (whole, in the sense of sound) is tending to health or soundness, or not inconsistent with them, whether of body or mind; as a wholesome appetite, wholesome air, wholesome advice. But both healthy and wholesome are commonly employed in more than a negative sense, as when we say, "the situation is perfectly healthy," "the food is quite wholesome." Healthy or healthful stands to wholesome as the positive to the negative. The former promotes or increases our bodily strength; the latter does no harm to our physical constitution. And so healthy is more commonly applied to what comes to us in the way of exceptional benefit; wholesome, to the necessities of life. Unwholesome food disorganizes the functions of the body; healthy air and recreation improve the physical powers. In like manner, a wholesome truth, wholesome advice, is preservative of morality and our interests. A healthy tone of mind tends to the improvement of our faculties. The wholesome is assimilated and acted upon by us; the healthy acts upon us.

"A few cheerful companions in our walks will render them abundantly more *healthful*, for, according to the ancient adage, they will serve instead of a carriage, or, in other words, prevent the sensation of fatigue."—*Knox, Essays*.

"Not only grain has become somewhat cheaper, but many other things, from which the industrious poor derive an agreeable and *wholesome* variety of food."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations*.

BUT SALUBRIOUS and SALUTARY (Lat. *salus*, health) are stronger and more positive. A salubrious air tends actually to *establish* health, while that which is salutary tends to *restore* it. It may be observed that, while salutary is employed of morals, as salutary advice, salubrious has no such application. It may be added that salubrious is employed in a passive sense. Salutary is always active. A salubrious condition; salutary remedies.

"Give the *salubrious* draughts with your own hand;

Persuasion has the force of a command." *King*.

"When St. Paul delivered over to Satan,

the design of it was *salutary*, that the spirit might be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus."—*Waterland*.

HEAP. ACCUMULATE. AMASS. PILE.

TO HEAP (A. S. *heap*, *heapian*) is to place particles or substances upon one another, so as to form some degree of elevation. The action is indefinite in character, and may be performed with or without rule or system. In this respect it differs from PILE, which is to heap piecemeal, and with system or care. To heap stones is general; to pile them is specific. But even if the process of heaping have been performed with care, the heap which is the result has no distinctness of parts. On the other hand, the word pile may be used in a phrase expressive of praise. A heap of ruins. A noble pile of architecture. To ACCUMULATE (Lat. *cumulus*, a heap) conveys the idea of chance or desultory heaping. Men heap things when they know where to lay their hands to find them; they accumulate things when they heap them as they find them; hence accumulate tends more strongly than heap to a figurative or moral meaning. The farmer heaps, but does not accumulate, corn, unless he buys it up from different quarters for storing. But by industry and good fortune he accumulates wealth. AMASS (Fr. *amasser*, *masse*, a mass) is to accumulate in large quantities what is of substantial value, for the purpose of creating a store or fund; as to amass wealth or learning: while that which is accumulated may be of no value; as an accumulation of old clothes, or mud at a river's mouth.

"The whole performance is not so much a regular fabric as a *heap* of shining materials thrown together by accident, which strikes rather with the solemn magnificence of a stupendous ruin, than the elegant grandeur of a finished *pile*."—*Johnson*.

We heap things of the same or different kinds; we accumulate things of the same kind.

"He did conceive that it was against the first principles of Nature and false, that an heap or *accumulation* should be and not be of homogeneous things; and therefore that which in its first being is not reasonable

can never confer to make up an *accumulative* treason."—*State Trials*.

"The heire shall waste the whoured gold, amassd with much payne."—*Surrey*.

HEARKEN. ATTEND. LISTEN.

These terms have each a primary and secondary meaning. The primary meaning belongs to the acts, the secondary to the characteristics of the acts. The primary meaning of to HEARKEN is voluntarily and specifically to exercise the faculty of hearing; of ATTEND (Lat. *attendere*), to perform the mental act of bringing the understanding to bear on what is so heard; and of LISTEN (A. S. *hlystan*), to hearken and attend conjointly with some degree of propensity or interest. The secondary meanings are in accordance with these. We hearken to injunctions, commands. We attend to instructions or advice. We listen to entreaty and persuasion.

"But here she comes; I fairly step aside
And *hearken*, if I may, her business."

Milton.

"He now prepared

To speak, whereat their doubled ranks they bend

From wing to wing, and half inclose him round,

With all his peers; *attention* held them mute."

Bibl.

"The external ear, we are told, had acquired a distinct motion upward and backward, which was observable whenever the patient *listened* to anything which he did not distinctly hear."—*Paley*.

HEARTY. SINCERE. CORDIAL. FRANK. CANDID. OPEN. IN- GENUOUS. WARM.

HEARTY is having the heart in a thing—earnest, sincere. Heartiness implies honesty, simplicity, and cordiality; but the term leans rather to expressing the outward demonstration of feeling than any quality of the feeling itself, though this is by no means excluded; as a hearty desire, a hearty laugh, a hearty shake of the hand, to return hearty thanks. So a hearty meal is one partaken of with good-will instead of with a languid or sickly appetite.

"Where leisurely doffing a hat worth a tester,
He bade me most *heartily* welcome to
Chester." *Cotton.*

SINCERE (Lat. *sincerus*, said to be *sine cera*, without wax, as if an epithet of pure honey), unlike hearty, expresses nothing of the strength of feeling, but only denotes that it is genuine, and not pretended. Sincere is very often mistaken for hearty, as in the common phrase, "I return my *most sincere thanks*." Thanks are either sincere or not. Sincerity does not admit of degrees, though the exhibition of feeling does. Sincerity is when the man disguises nothing from others or from himself; and so may be predicated both of principle and of practice or demeanour. It is truth or truthfulness of motive. Sincerity combines reality of conviction and earnestness of purpose with purity or freedom from unfairness or dishonesty. Unless these be combined, sincerity becomes a very fallacious term.

"And a good man may likewise know when he obeys God *sincerely*. Not but that men often deceive themselves with an opinion, or at least a groundless hope, of their own *sincerity*. But if they will deal fairly with themselves, and use due care and diligence, there are very few cases (if any) wherein they may not know their own *sincerity* in any act of obedience to God. For what can a man know concerning himself if not the reality of his own intentions?"—*Tillotson.*

CORDIAL (Lat. *cor*, *cordis*, the heart) is the Latin form of the Saxon hearty, and differs rather in the mode of application than in the essence of the meaning. Cordial is more subjective. Hearty, more objective. Cordial feelings; hearty manifestations of them. Cordial thanks are thanks warmly felt. Hearty thanks are thanks warmly expressed. As sincere relates to the disposition, so **FRANK** (Fr. *franc*) and **CANDID** (Lat. *candidus*, *candere*, to be white) relate to the speech and manner. That man is frank who is open and unreserved in the expression of his sentiments, whatever they may be. That man is candid who is fair of mind, without prejudice, ready to admit his own faults or errors.

"Then would Britain and Ireland have

but one interest; and it is rank absurdity in politics to expect any *cordiality* between them whilst their interests are separate."—*Anecdotes of Bishop Watson.*

"Reserve with *frankness*, art with truth allied,
Courage with softness, modesty with pride."—*Pope.*

Candour is openness towards oneself; frankness, towards others.

"If our modern infidels received these matters with that *candour* and seriousness which they deserve, we should not see them act with such a spirit of bitterness, arrogance, and malice."—*Spectator.*

OPENNESS (A. S. *open*) denotes no more than an opposite tendency to that of concealment, reticence, or reserve. It is a less active quality than frankness; and, while openness is consistent with timidity, frankness implies some degree of boldness. **INGENUOUS** (Lat. *ingenuus*) implies a permanent moral quality. A man may be not remarkable for frankness, yet at heart thoroughly ingenuous, that is, a lover of integrity, and a hater of dissimulation. Men of retiring manner are often truly ingenuous; for ingenuousness is, after all, more allied to modesty than to frankness. **WARM** relates to all the feelings, and indicates the quality of specific feeling as entertained in a high degree. We speak, therefore, of the warmth of resentment as well as of friendship.

"By their frequent change of company they (soldiers) acquire good breeding and an *openness* of behaviour."—*Hume.*

"The evangelists *ingenuously* confess the misbehaviour of the apostles on some occasions."—*Jortin.*

"The young plainly need it (admonition) most, as they are just entering into the world, with little knowledge, less experience, and yet scarcely even any distrust, with lively spirits and *warm* passions to mislead them, and time to go a great way wrong if they do not go right."—*Secker.*

HEAT. See **GLOW.**

HEATHEN. **PAGAN.** **GENTILE.**

HEATHEN (Germ. *heide*, heath, open country, as it were living in wild, uncivilized regions) is a term now em-

ployed to comprise all nations or religions besides Christianity, Judaism, and Mahomedanism. PAGAN (Lat. *paganus*, *pagus*, a village) originally denoted those who were remote from the centres of Christianity and civilization. GENTILE (Lat. *gentilis*, from *gens*, a nation) bore, under the Hebrew term *goim*, the meaning of all men who had not received the Jewish rite of circumcision. It was afterwards transferred by the Christians to all who were not Christians or Jews. In civil matters, Gentile was one who was not a Roman. The distinction at present prevailing between heathen and pagan is that the former denotes a false creed, the latter a superstitious worship. Heathen superstitions and pagan idolatries. When used as an epithet, heathen has always an unfavourable sense. Not so pagan; as pagan art or architecture is employed to designate those simply which Christianity has had no influence in producing.

"It has always been my thought that *heathens* who never did, nor without miracle could, hear the name of Christ, were yet in a possibility of salvation."—*Dryden*.

"The ruin of *Paganism* in the age of Theodorus is perhaps the only example of the total extirpation of any ancient and popular superstition, and may therefore deserve to be considered as a singular event in the history of the human mind."—*Gibbon*.

"A light to lighten the *Gentiles*, and the glory of Thy people Israel."—*English Bible*.

HEAVE. See LIFT and SWELL.

HEAVENLY. CELESTIAL. DIVINE. GODLIKE.

HEAVENLY is of or belonging to heaven (A. S. *heofon*, *heben*, probably connected with heave—the place heaved or raised), in its fullest sense material and spiritual, and so like those pure spirits with which heaven is peopled; "heavenly bodies," "heavenly bliss," heavenly virtues." CELESTIAL (Lat. *cælum*, heaven) is the Latin equivalent of the Saxon heavenly, but lends itself more readily to the ideas of heathen religions; while heavenly has been consecrated to Christian ideas. Celestial is also rather a poetic than a prosaic term.

DIVINE (Lat. *divinus*) is restricted to the person of God or celestial beings, and is not employed of the material heavens; as Divine Being, Divine excellences, not Divine bodies. The term is always of a personal character, though not always strictly personal; as Divine beauty, that is, beauty as of a Divine being; the Divine will, or will of God. GODLIKE, like God, or like a God, is not used simply as a qualifying term, like heavenly and divine, but is a term of *great praise*, whether of individuals or qualities; as a godlike form, the godlike quality of forgiveness.

"Were a man, say they, to stop the course of the *heavenly* bodies, which is above the reach of all the powers of his nature, this would be a miraculous operation; but were a superior being, who had power equal to such a work, to suspend the motion of the *heavenly* bodies, this would be no miracle at all."—*Farmer on Miracles*.

"Endued with *heavenly* virtues."—*English Liturgy*.

"That mind will never be vacant which is frequently recalled by stated duties to meditations on eternal interests; nor can any hour be long which is spent in obtaining some new qualification for *celestial* happiness."—*Rambler*.

"Which *Divine* revelation both the necessities of men and their natural notions of God gave them reasonable ground to expect and hope for."—*Clarke*.

"Vain, wretched creature, how art thou misled,
To think thy wit these *godlike* notions bred!

These truths are not the product of thy mind,
But dropt from Heaven, and of a nobler kind."—*Dryden*.

HEAVINESS. See GRAVITY.

HEAVY. See BURDENSOME.

HEED. CARE. ATTENTION.

HEED (A. S. *hêdan*, to mind) combines attention and care; but, while ATTENTION (Lat. *attendere*) has the general sense of a careful giving of the mind to anything that is proposed to it, heed has exclusive relation to what concerns one's own interests. One pays attention to another; one takes heed to one's own ways. Heed

is practical attention on motives of caution. CARE (Lat. *cura*) is also cautious regard, but may be exercised on behalf of others as well as oneself. To take care of another, would be to associate with him. To take heed of him, would be to avoid him in care for yourself. Care extends to actions; heed and attention are confined to thought, except when attention is thought as used in the sense of waiting on another.

"He who considers what Tacitus, Suetonius, Seneca say of Tiberius and his reign, will find how necessary it was for our Saviour, if He would not die as a criminal and a traitor, to take great heed to His words and actions, that He did or said not anything that might be offensive, or give the least umbrage to the Roman Government."—*Locke*.

"With as much care and little hurt as doth a mother use."—*Chapman, Homer*.

"Due attention to the inside of books, and due contempt for the outside, is the proper relation between a man of sense and his books."—*Chesterfield*.

HEEDLESS. See **HEED** and **IN-ATTENTIVE**.

HEIGHTEN. See **LIFT**.

HEINOUS. **FLAGITIOUS.** **FLAGRANT.** **ATROCIOUS.**

HEINOUS (Fr. *haineux*, *haine*, hatred) is strictly hateful, odious; hence, hatefully bad. That is heinous which partakes of the nature of aggravated crime or offence. That is **FLAGITIOUS** (Lat. *flagitium*) which is disgracefully and shamefully bad in persons, practices, or times. **FLAGRANT** (*flagrans*, *flagrare*, to burn) marks more strongly than flagitious the striking character, or glaring badness of the thing. A flagitious thing may be done in secret; a flagrant crime, misrepresentation, or violation of duty, is one of which the public necessarily takes cognizance. Flagrant, unlike flagitious, applies to error as well as crime. **ATROCIOUS** (Lat. *atrox*) carries the deed back to the source, and represents it as springing from a violent or savage spirit, or attended with aggravating circumstances. Heinous and flagrant intensify specific kinds

of action; flagitious and atrocious are simply applicable to actions. So flagitious or atrocious deeds; heinous cruelty; a flagrant blunder. Flagitious expresses the badness of the deed; atrocious, the badness of the motive, as one of violent and energetic evil.

"There are many authors who have shown wherein the malignity of a lie consists, and set forth in proper colours the heinousness of the offence."—*Spectator*.

It deserves to be remarked that all these epithets appertain to character and deeds, but are not directly applicable. We cannot say a heinous, flagrant, or flagitious man, nor very easily an atrocious man; but an atrocious tyrant, a heinous offence, a flagitious character. Milton, however, in an old-fashioned way, says, "Punishing tyrants and flagitious persons."

"Ruined fortunes and flagitious lives."—*Middleton, Cicero*.

"The mysteries of Bacchus were well chosen for an example of corrupted rites and of the mischief they produced, for they were early and flagrantly corrupted."—*Wurburton, Divine Legation*.

"When Cataline was tried for some atrocious murders, many of the consulars appeared in his favour, and gave him an excellent character."—*Bishop Porteus*.

HELP. **AID.** **ASSIST.** **SUCCOUR.** **RELIEVE.**

To **HELP** (A. S. *helpan*) is the broadest of these terms, of which the rest are modifications. It denotes the furnishing of additional power, means of deliverance, or relief; as to help a man in his work; to help him to escape; to help his sickness, his infirmities, or his troubles. To **AID** (Fr. *aider*, Lat. *adjuvare*) is less energetic than help, and lends itself better to that inactive kind of assistance which is rendered by, or rather derived from, inanimate things. "I fell, but recovered myself by the help of a friend." "I crossed the mountains safe with the aid of a chart and a staff." To aid is to help by co-operation, and, in some instances, to enable to help oneself. **ASSIST** (Lat. *assistere*, to stand by) is purely personal, though

assistance is used with more latitude. It would not be permissible to say, "My stick assisted me to rise;" yet we might say, "I rose with the assistance of my stick;" the simple word *help* or *aid* would, however, be much better. *Help* is something more urgently needed than *assistance*. *Help* is required in labour, danger, difficulties, and the like; *assistance* in the pursuit of a study or the performance of a work. He who is doing needs often to be assisted; he who is suffering, to be helped. The man who is attacked by robbers needs *help*, not *assistance*, unless, after his rescue, he should find himself strong enough to endeavour to rout or capture them. *SUCCOUR* (Fr. *secours*, Lat. *succurrere*, to run up to) relates to a condition of trouble or distress, and implies celerity and timeliness in the aid brought. To *RELIEVE* (Fr. *relever*, Lat. *levare*, light) is to lighten of a burden, or to lighten the burden itself. It is applicable to anything of the nature of a burden, as pain, distress, poverty. We *help* generally; we *aid* the weak; we *assist* the struggling; we *succour* the indigent or bereaved; we *relieve* the needy, the afflicted, or the anxious. The *aider* should be active, the *helper* strong, the *assister* wise, the *succourer* timely, the *reliever* sympathising.

"Who travels by the weary wandering way,
To come unto his wished home in haste,
And meets a flood that doth his passage stay,
Is not great grace to *help* him over past,
Or free his feet that in the mire stick fast."
Spenser.

"*Aiders*, advisers, and abettors."—*Blackstone.*

"But genius and learning, when they meet in one person, are mutually and greatly *assistant* to each other; and in the poetical act Horace declares that either, without the other, can do little."—*Beattie.*

"The devotion of life or fortune to the *succour* of the poor is a height of virtue to which humanity has never arisen by its own power."—*Tatler.*

"The inferior ranks of people no longer looked upon that order as they had done before, as the comforters of their distress and the *relievers* of their indigence."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations.*

HERESY. HETERODOXY. SCHISM.

HERESY (Gr. *ἁίρεσις*, a choice) is a new opinion in religion set up by an individual or a sect against the old, and is taken to relate to fundamental and vital points. *HETERODOXY* (Gr. *ἑτερος*, another, and *δόξα*, an opinion) is a milder term, and denotes slighter deviations or defects in the creed, for which the person is not necessarily responsible; for heterodoxy may be the result of an inexact theology, while heresy is deliberately maintained. *SCHISM* (Gr. *σχίσμα*, from *σχίζω*, to rend) is a rending of external unity or religious communion, of which heresy is often the cause.

HERO. See *CHAMPION.*

HEROIC. See *BOLD.*

HESITATE. See *DEMUR* and *FALTER.*

HESITATION. See *DOUBT.*

HETERODOXY. See *HERESY.*

HIDE. See *SKIN.*

HIDE. *CONCEAL.* *SECRETE.*
COVER. *SCREEN.* *SHELTER.*

HIDE (A. S. *hýdan*) is so to place physically as to render invisible, or so to treat morally as to make imperceptible. Strictly speaking, this is an act of a voluntary agent; but the licence of colloquial language employs the term in the sense of mere exclusion from view; as, "The trees *hide* the house." To *hide*, however, is always positive, while *CONCEAL* (Lat. *con* and *celare*) may be negative. A man *hides* his feelings by a deliberate effort, or by misleading the minds of others; he *conceals* his intentions sometimes by simply not revealing them.

"Heaven from all creatures *hides* the book of fate."—*Pope.*

"The next ground upon which such as are wont to promise themselves security both from the discovery and punishment of their sins, is the opinion which they have of their own singular art and cunning to *conceal* them from the knowledge, or at least of their power to rescue them from the jurisdiction of any earthly judge."—*South.*

SECRETE (Lat. *secernere*, *secretus*) is never used in other than a phy-

sical sense, and denotes the specific and purposed hiding of what is of a movable nature. Under this term oneself must be included.

"The whole thing is too manifest to admit of any doubt in any man how long this thing has been working, how many tricks have been played with the Dean's (Swift's) papers, how they were *secreted* from time to time."—*Pope*.

The term *secrete* commonly supposes an unworthy or unlawful motive.

To COVER (Lat. *coopere*) is only accidentally to hide. Hiding or concealment from view being the result of total covering and other circumstances, as the non-transparency of the covering material. It may be observed that hiding and concealment imply an impossibility of seeing or perceiving, though, of course, not an impossibility of detection. A man is concealed or hidden in a cupboard; but he is not so if his form is simply covered by some covering which exhibits the outline of his figure, unless owing to some circumstance the searcher failed to observe it. Complete covering on the one side, or such as to produce non-recognition on the other, is needful to constitute concealment. All that is essential to covering is super-extension; anything else as concealment is accidental.

"Cover thy head, cover thy head, nay, prithee, be covered."—*Shakespeare*.

SCREEN (Old Fr. *escran*) is to place in relation to an interposed obstacle for the purpose of protection or concealment. In the former case, the influence may not be such as to render invisibility necessary, as to screen from wind or draught by a plantation or a transparent glass partition. To SHELTER (connected with shield) is very nearly the same as screen; but while screen is employed of protection against the less violent, shelter is used of the more violent, annoyances. Shelter also is more complete than screen. Screening is partial shelter. To screen from harm; to shelter from attacks; to screen from the sun or the wind; to shelter from the storm and blast;

to screen from blame; to shelter from violence.

"He brought our Saviour to the western side

Of that high mountain, whence He might behold

Another plain, long, but in breadth not wide,

Washed by the southern sea, and on the north

To equal length, backed with a ridge of hills

That screened the fruits of th' earth and seats of men

From cold septentrion blasts."

Milton.

"It was a still

And calmy bay, on th' one side sheltered
With the broad shadow of an hoary hill."

Spenser.

HIDEOUS. SHOCKING.

HIDEOUS (Old Fr. *hide*, fright) is primarily frightful to behold, as a hideous monster. It has been extended to sounds, as a hideous noise. The effect of the hideous is produced through the senses or the imagination, not through the pure reason. SHOCKING (Fr. *choc*, a shock) acts with more sudden effect, and is applicable to the moral feelings and the taste. Things can be only casually shocking; but hideous is a permanent quality. The hideous contradicts only beauty; the shocking contradicts morality.

"The war-dance consists of a great variety of violent motions and *hideous* contortions of the limbs, during which the countenance also performs its part."—*Cook's Voyages*.

"The grossest and most *shocking* villanies."
—*Secker*.

HIGH. TALL. LOFTY.

HIGH (A. S. *heah*, with other forms), as regards their purely physical application, has an additional sense to that of the other two, as denoting, 1, continuous extension upwards; and 2, position at a point of elevation. A tree may be high, tall, or lofty. Clouds are high without being tall. In the sense in which it is synonymous with the other two, high denotes considerable elevation. So we say, a high house, but not a high man. TALL (Welsh *tâl*) is high in

stature, that is, with a slenderness as well as height, and implies growth upwards, natural or artificial. Hence we speak of a tall man, tree, column, mast, but not of a tall mountain or house. LOFTY (Germ. *luft*, the upper air) denotes an imposing elevation, or the union of expansion with height; as a lofty room. High and lofty are applicable to moral characteristics; tall is not.

"The full blazing sun,
Which now sat *high* in his meridian tower."
Milton.

"I fear to go out of my depth in sounding imaginary fords which are real gulfs, and wherein many of the *tallest* philosophers have been drowned, while none of them ever got over to the science they had in view."—*Bolingbroke.*

"Did ever any conqueror *loftily* seated in his triumphal chariot yield a spectacle so gallant and magnificent?"—*Barrow.*

HILARITY. JOVIALITY or JOL-LITY.

These differ as the subjects. HILARITY (Lat. *hilaritas*, *hilaris*, joyous) belongs to social excitement, especially of the table among more refined company; JOVIALITY (Lat. *Jovialis*, from Jupiter, *Jovis*, the planet, which was supposed to impart the mirthful character to those who were born under it), to the same thing among the less refined. It is only to state the same thing in another form, to say that hilarity is more an affection of the mind, joviality of the animal spirits. *

"It (music) will perform all this in an instant, cheer up the countenance, expel austerity, bring in *hilarity*."—*Burton, Anatomy of Melancholy.*

"The sport of their loudest *jovialities*."—*Barrow.*

HIND. See PEASANT.

HINDER. See CLOG and DEBAR.

HINT. SUGGESTION. INTIMATION. INSINUATION. INNUENDO.

A HINT (A. S. *hentan*, to pursue) is an indirect communication of instruction, the incompletely expressed form of which has commonly for its

cause a reluctance on the part of the hinter to speak more fully and plainly. SUGGESTION (Lat. *suggerere*, *suggestus*) is given visibly or entire to the persons receiving it, though the communication is commonly concealed from others. The man who makes a good suggestion claims more gratitude than the hinter, who shuns responsibility, unless it is the best that he could do under the circumstances. Both hint and suggest have ordinarily reference to practical assistance and directions, hint referring to the present or the past, and suggestion to the future; a hint of danger, a suggestion how to avoid it. But hint rather concerns matters of knowledge; suggest, matters of conduct. To INTIMATE (Fr. *intimer*, Lat. *intimus*, nearest) meant at first to share secretly or privately, in which sense it is at present obsolete. It now means to give obscure or indirect notice, or to suggest apart from others. It is in this point that intimate differs from hint and suggest, which relate to the affairs of the person to whom the hint or suggestion is made; while intimate may relate primarily to the mind or intentions of him who makes the intimation. I give another a hint, or make him a suggestion; intimate my own wishes or purpose. But the subject of the intimation is commonly one in which the other is personally concerned. To INSINUATE (Lat. *in* and *sinus*, the bosom) is to introduce gradually and artfully, to state by remote allusion. Like hint, it comes commonly from a wish to impart a fact or an impression without incurring the responsibility of plainly stating it. An INNUENDO (Lat. *innuere*, to give a nod) is a term of the old Law Latin, and is now used much in the same sense as insinuation, but has more specific aim at personal character and conduct, and is couched in language of double meaning, as insinuation of indirect application.

"He hath frequently taken the *hint* from very trifling objections to strengthen his former works by several most material considerations and convincing arguments."—*Nelson, Life of Bull.*

"If good? Why do I yield to that suggestion,

Whose horrid image doth unfix my hair,
And make my sealed heart knock at my ribs,

Against the use of nature?"

Shakespeare, Macbeth.

"Mr. Plott, who, as he since informed me, had prevailed with them to propose this treaty, earnestly pressed me to lay hold on the opportunity, *intimating* by his words and gestures that if I refused it I should not have another."—*Ludlow, Memoirs.*

"Cervantes made Don Quixote say, 'If the stories of chivalry be lies, so must it also be that there ever was a Hector or an Achilles, or a Trojan war.' A sly stroke of satire by which this mortal foe of chivalry would, I suppose, *insinuate* that the Grecian romances were just as extravagant and as little credible as the Gothic."—*Hurd.*

"As, by the way of *innuendo*,
Lucus is made a non lucendo."

Churchill.

HIRE. See SALARY.

HIRELING. MERCENARY.

HIRELING (A. S. *hyrling*) is one who serves or acts for hire, and is not necessarily a term of venality, though never one of honour. MERCENARY (Lat. *mercenarius*, *merces*, wages) is also one who serves for wages, but is employed exclusively in a bad sense when used of the character, though not so when used of the employment. Hired soldiers, called mercenaries, may earn their wages honourably. A mercenary match is one made for the sordid love of money. The acting for profit exclusively in any way is called mercenary.

"The *hireling* fleeth because he is an *hireling*."—*Bible.*

"This is to show both how tyranny stands in need of *mercenary* soldiers, and how those *mercenaries* are by mutual obligation firmly assured unto the tyrant."—*Ralegh.*

HISTORY. ANNALS. CHRONICLES.

ANNALS (Lat. *annales*, *annus*, a year), the bare public registration of events connected with the progress of affairs of state, are the germ and rudiments of history. These are followed by CHRONICLES (Gr. *χρονικὸς*, belonging to time, *χρόνος*) which are only

amplified narratives, and fall short of that analysis of motive and action, cause and effect, which are needed to make up the idea of philosophic HISTORY. By a poetic licence, annals is used as an elegant word for history; as, "The short and simple annals of the poor."

"For justly Cæsar scorns the poet's lays;
It is to *history* he trusts for praise."

Pope.

"For among so many writers there hath yet none to my knowledge published any full, plain, and mere English *history*. For some of them of purpose meaning to write short notes in manner of *annales*, commonly called abridgments, rather touch the times when things were done than declare the manner of the doings."—*Grafton.*

"A *chronicler* should well in divers tongues
be seen,

And eke in all the arts he ought to have
a sight,

Whereby he might the truth of divers
actions deem,

And both supply the wants, correct that
is not right.

He should have eloquence, and full and
fitly write;

Not mangle stories, snatching here and
there;

Not glose to make a volume great appear.
He should be of such countenance and wit

As should give witness to the histories
he writes.

He should be able well his reasons so to
knit

As should continue well the reasons he
recites.

He should not praise, dispraise, for fa-
vour or despite,

But should so place each thing in order
due

As might approve the stories to be true."

Mirror for Magistrates.

HIT. See BEAT.

HOARD. TREASURE.

HOARD (A. S. *hordan*, *heordan*) is to amass with commonly some degree of privacy or secrecy, and is a term of collective application. TREASURE (Fr. *trésor*, Lat. *thesaurus*) is applicable to a single thing or to a number. We hoard that which we believe may stand us in good stead; we treasure that which is intrinsically valuable, or on which we personally place a value.

HOIST. See LIFT.

HOLD. See CONTAIN and POSSESS.

HOLD. ARREST. DETAIN. KEEP. RETAIN. PRESERVE.

To HOLD (A. S. *healdan*), as used in a purely physical sense, is to cause to remain in a fixed position or relation, and is equally applicable to voluntary agents and mechanical force or support. To ARREST (Fr. *arrester*, to cause to stop) is to exercise a holding power upon what is in action, movement, or progress, and, like hold, may be voluntary or mechanical. To DETAIN (Lat. *detinere*) is a milder term than arrest, the result being physical, but the cause not necessarily so, as to be detained by important business; or physical causes operating indirectly upon the person, as to be detained by an accident. KEEP (A. S. *cepan*) is to hold in some desirable relation to oneself, whether direct possession or not, against separating or depriving forces, and hence has often the sense of guardianship. RETAIN (Lat. *retinere*) is to keep as against any *intrinsic* alteration or loss of power to hold; as, a metal retains heat; I still retain my intention. To PRESERVE (Lat. *præ* and *servare*) is to cause to continue whole, unbroken, or unimpaired; as, to preserve fruits, to preserve silence. He kept silence, that is, as something from which he would not part. He held his tongue, that is, as something which he would not allow to move. He retained his silence, that is, in spite of attempts to induce him to abandon it. He preserved silence, that is, from being broken.

"A person lays *hold* upon a thing when he takes possession of it, and claims it as his right and property. In this sense the apostle speaks with much diffidence and humility of his hope of laying *hold* of his reward."—*Horsley*.

"Consent to pay thee that I never had!
Arrest me, foolish fellow, if thou dar'st."
Shakespeare.

"If I lend a man a horse, and he afterwards refuses to restore it, this injury consists in the *detaining*, and not in the original

taking; and the regular method for me to recover possession is by action of detinue."—*State Trials*.

"Am I my brother's keeper?"—*Bible*.

"Whosoever sines ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whosoever sines ye retain; they are retained."—*Ibid*.

"In this case, would this man, think we, act rationally, should he, upon the slender possibility of escaping, otherwise neglect the sure infallible *preservation* of his life by casting away his rich goods?"—*South*.

HOLE. See CAVITY.

HOLIDAY. See FESTIVAL.

HOLLOW. See EMPTY and CAVITY.

HOLY. See DEVOUT.

HOMAGE. FEALTY. COURT.

HOMAGE (Lat. *homagium*, *homo*, a man) was the act by which a feudal inferior professed himself to be the man or subject of the feudal lord. FEALTY (Old Fr. *feal*, *foi*, faith) was the fidelity of such a tenant; and, more strictly, a lower species of homage made by oath on the part of such tenants as were bound to personal service. COURT (Old Fr. *court*, New Fr. *cour*) is to endeavour to gain favour by such demeanour or acts as are practised at the courts of princes. In present parlance, we pay homage to men of excellence, virtue, or power, or, by a figure of speech, to the excellences themselves; we show fealty to principles by which we have professed to be guided, or to persons who are not so far our superiors as is implied in homage. And we pay court when we desire personal favour, consulting the character and humour of the person to whom we pay it.

"All these are spirits of air, and wood, and springs,
Thy gentle ministers who come to pay
Thee *homage*, and acknowledge thee their Lord.
What doubt'st Thou? Son of God, sit down and eat." *Milton*.

"Studios to win your consort, and seduce
Her from chaste *fealty* to joys impure."
Fenton.

"Needs a shipwrecked seaman be *courted*
to come to shore, or a weary traveller to a
place of rest?"—*Bishop Beveridge*.

HONESTY. SINCERITY. UPRIGHTNESS. PROBITY. INTEGRITY.

HONESTY (Fr. *honnêteté*) is a perfectly plain and unambiguous term. It denotes fairness and straightforwardness of thought, speech, purpose, or conduct. SINCERITY (Lat. *sincerus*) has a double meaning, either, 1, reality of conviction or earnestness of purpose; or, 2, exemption from unfairness or dishonesty. The one is the condition of mind in itself; the other, the relation of this state to practical matters. Hence a man may be sincere and dishonest. Sincere in his profession of his purpose, and dishonest in the means he employs to effect it. UPRIGHTNESS is honesty combined with a native dignity of character; it belongs to men who can mix with their fellow-men and retain an independent bearing; while the poorest labouring man who has no contact with the world may be strictly honest. As commonly taken, honesty is not so much a matter of principle as of act and habit. A man is said to be honest who will not defraud, directly or indirectly. An honest tradesman asks fair prices, and sells good articles. He may be a sad slanderer, and deprive others of their due in this respect; yet the world would still call him honest. PROBITY (Lat. *probus*) and INTEGRITY (Lat. *integer*, whole) are higher terms, indicative of higher virtues and larger characteristics. The man of probity is a man of principle, and not merely of habit; he is far more than commercially honest; he gives men their due in all respects. Integrity comes from a sense of responsibility, a desire to keep that whole in oneself which ought not to be broken. It will show itself in the discharge of a trust or the execution of an office, but not only so. To the man of integrity life itself is a trust. Fidelity to the obligations of law and duty suffice for probity. Integrity is an habitual regard to the principles of morality and conscience.

“Goodness is that which makes men prefer their duty and their promise before their passions or their interest, and is properly the object of trust. In our language it goes

rather by the name of *honesty*, though what we call an *honest* man the Romans called a good man; and *honesty* in their language, as well as in French, rather signifies a composition of those qualities which generally acquire honour and esteem to those who possess them.”—*Sir W. Temple*.

“Let us consider that *sincerity* is a duty no less plain than important, that our consciences require it of us, and reproach us for every breach of it, that the light of nature taught it the very heathens, though imperfectly, as it did everything else, and that Scripture abounds with the strictest precepts of it, and strongest motives to it.”—*Knox*.

“Then,” says the good Psalmist, ‘shall I not be ashamed;’ that is, then may I safely confide in my own innocence and *uprightness*, when I have respect unto all Thy commandments, when I find myself equally determined to obey every Divine precept, and resolved to allow myself in no practice whatsoever which the law of God doth not allow of.”—*Atterbury*.

“If we could once get ourselves possessed of this *probity*, this purity of mind and heart, it would better instruct us in the use of our liberty, and teach us to distinguish between good and evil.”—*Sharp*.

HONOUR. See GLORY.

HOPE. EXPECTATION. TRUST. CONFIDENCE. ASSURANCE.

All these terms denote the reposing of the mind upon the future. The anticipation of the future is common to HOPE (A. S. *hopian*, to hope) and EXPECTATION (Lat. *expectare*, *e* or *ex*, out, and *spectare*, to watch). In proportion as it is welcome, we hope; in proportion as it is certain, we expect. We may expect, but not hope for, an occurrence which will cause us pain. CONFIDENCE and ASSURANCE closely resemble each other; but confidence (*confidentia*, *confidere*, *fides*, faith) is properly used only in relation to moral agents and on the ground of probity of character. Assurance (Fr. *assurer*, *sur*, *s-curus*, sure) is confidence in oneself, or such confidence as flows from internal conviction upon matters of fact. Assurance is passive; confidence is active. Confidence is such assurance as leads to a feeling of security or reliance. To TRUST is to rest upon another as able to bear what we impose; so we

trust in what is solid or unsolid ; men, who are trustworthy or otherwise ; statements, which may be veracious or not ; strength or efforts, which may or may not be equal to the task. Trust in opinion is belief ; in religious opinion, faith ; in pecuniary worth, stability, and integrity, credit ; and in moral probity, combined with sufficiency of power, confidence. Assurance is based upon mental confidence on moral evidence in favour of the thing expected.

"Hope is the encouragement given to desire, the pleasing expectancy that its object shall be obtained."—*Cogan*.

"In its general operation the indulgence of hope is mixed with certain portions of doubt and solicitude ; but when doubt is removed, and the *expectation* becomes sanguine, hope rises into joy ; and it has been known to produce transports and ecstasies equally with the full accomplishment of ardent desires."—*Ibid*.

"In a word, every man implicitly *trusts* his bodily senses concerning external objects placed at a convenient distance ; and every man with as good a reason puts even a greater *trust* in the perceptions of which he is conscious in his own mind."—*Bishop Horsley*.

"Yet not terrible

That I should fear ; not sociably mild,
Like Raphael, that I should much *confide* ;
But solemn, whom, not to offend,
With reverence I must meet, and then retire."
Milton.

"On informing him of our difficulties and asking whether we might venture across the plain, he bid us, like Cæsar, with an air of *assurance*, follow him and fear nothing."—*Gilpin*.

HOPELESS. DESPERATE.

HOPELESS is an epithet of things ; DESPERATE, of things and persons. Hopeless is less strong than desperate, because it sometimes denotes no more than an absence of hope of success in matters where success is desirable, and desired, but no more. A project may have been hopeless from the first ; so that no real hope was placed in it. A desperate undertaking is one which is associated with great if not absolute *abandonment* of hope, in what is not only desired but begun. It deserves, however, to be observed, that the full force of

despair does not survive in the adjective desperate. There must be *some degree of hope* in a desperate undertaking ; though a desperate act must be the simple result of despair.

HORRIBLE. See DREADFUL.

HORRID. See DREADFUL.

HOST. ARMY.

HOST (Lat. *hostis*, enemy) denotes an opposing or hostile force of indefinite number, not strictly organized ; hence, generally, a very numerous collection. ARMY (Fr. *armée*, Lat. *arma*, arms) is composed of a definite number of organized soldiers.

HOSTILE. See ADVERSE.

HOT. See BURNING.

HOUSE. FAMILY. LINEAGE. RACE.

HOUSE (A. S. *hūs*), when employed as a synonym with the rest here given, is only employed of very distinguished families, as the House of Austria, the House of York or Lancaster, and is an historical term comprising successive generations. FAMILY (Lat. *familia*) denotes those who descend from one common progenitor ; hence the term may be applied to the whole human race or "family of man." LINEAGE (Lat. *linea*, a line) is that common line of descent which constitutes the house or family. RACE (Fr. *race*, Lat. *radix*, root) is more comprehensive, indefinite, and broad ; as the human race, the Caucasian or Mongolian race—indicating masses of men ethnologically one.

HOWEVER. YET. NEVERTHELESS. NOTWITHSTANDING. STILL. BUT.

BUT (A. S. *butan*, to be outside) has a twofold meaning, which might be expressed by the phrases, "But yet," and, "But on the contrary ;" as, "This is not summer, but it is as warm ;" and, "This is not summer, but winter." It is with the first of these meanings that the other terms given above are synonymous. HOWEVER has

a waiving or cancelling force. "However, the matter is not important," would mean, that in any case it is so, whether what had been advanced were admitted or not. It seems equivalent to saying that what follows is so indisputable, that the speaker is willing to forego all that has been said. YET is stronger than but; and STILL yet stronger. It does not cancel, but retains previous argument, and admits it; but maintains that what follows is not removed for all that. "All you say is true; still I think." NOTWITHSTANDING and NEVERTHELESS are still stronger; nevertheless being the strongest of all. Yet brings into contrast both expanded statements and simple ideas. "Addison was not a good speaker; yet he was an admirable writer," might have been rendered by, "Addison was not an orator, but a writer;" or, "Addison was ineloquent, yet accomplished;" where it will be observed that but follows a negative expression, and yet a positive but adverse, or seemingly adverse, one; or, conversely, "He was accomplished, but not eloquent." Nevertheless and notwithstanding are almost identical; they have no difference beyond that which is apparent on the face of the structure of these composite forms. First, it will be observed that nevertheless is a conjunctive adverb, while notwithstanding is also a preposition. "He contradicted me, but I maintained the truth of what I had said, notwithstanding," or, "nevertheless;" but we might also say, "I maintained my statement, notwithstanding his contradiction;" where nevertheless could not have been used. This force, however, has grown up out of transposition of the order; in old and more formal English, it would have been, "His contradiction of me notwithstanding;" that is, affording no effectual opposition. Notwithstanding implies that the *fact* stated remains true; nevertheless, that its *force* remains undiminished.

HUE. COLOUR. TINT.

HUE (*hiw* and other forms) was formerly written hew. It is, strictly

speaking, a compound of one or more colours, so forming an intervenient shade. The COLOURS (Lat. *color*) are properly the seven prismatic colours deduced from light by the prism. TINT (Lat. *tingere, tinctus*) is a colour or hue faintly exhibited. Hue is a vague conversational, rhetorical, or poetical term. Colour is strictly artistic and scientific. Colours are divided into *primary*—those which are developed by the sun's ray from the prism; these are regarded by some as seven—red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo, and violet; which are reduced by some to red, yellow, and blue; *complementary*, which are colours so related to each other that when blended they produce white light; and *subjective or accidental* colour, or that which exists only in impression upon the retina, as a white wheel with a regularly subdivided circumference rapidly revolving upon a black ground, assumes the appearance of teeth of different shades of colour varying with the degree of motion.

HUGE. ENORMOUS. PRODIGIOUS. VAST.

These terms express excessive size. HUGE (Old Eng. *hogge, houg*) denotes great size, with shapelessness or massiveness preponderating over proportion. ENORMOUS (Lat. *e, out*, and *norma*, a rule) is huge of its particular kind, far exceeding its own proper average or standard. PRODIGIOUS (Lat. *prodigium*, a prodigy) expresses size or quantity in regard to the effect produced of astonishment in our own minds. VAST (Fr. *vaste*, Lat. *vastus*, empty) expresses the quality of great superficial extent.

"The knight himself even trembled at his fall,

So huge and horrible a mass it seemed."

Spenser.

"And on the other hand, had man's body been made too monstrously strong, too *enormously* gigantic, it would have rendered him a dangerous tyrant in the world, too strong in some respects even for his own kind, as well as the other creatures."—*Derham.*

"We may justly, I say, stand amazed that men should be so *prodigiously* supine and

negligent in an affair of this importance as we see they generally are."—*Sharp*.

"What a vast field for contemplation is here opened!"—*Wooluston*.

HUMANITY. See BENIGNITY.

HUMBLE. See ABASE and LOWLY.

HUMILIATE. See ABASE.

HUMIDITY. See DAMP.

HUMOUR. See BURLESQUE, CAPRICE, JUICE, and MOOD.

HUNT. See CHASE.

HURL. See THROW.

HURRICANE. See STORM.

HURRY. See HASTE.

HURT. DAMAGE. DETRIMENT.
INJURY. HARM. PREJUDICE.
INJUSTICE. WRONG. MISCHIEF.

HURT (A. S. *hyrt*) is physical injury causing pain, and is applied to animals as having a sensitive life, and to plants as being quasi-sensitive. When used of the mind or feelings, hurt is employed analogously, in the sense of receiving a rude shock; as, "His pride was hurt." The word is employed in its strict meaning in the following:—

"The least hurt or blow, especially upon the head, may make it (an infant) senseless, stupid, or otherwise miserable for ever."—*Spectator*.

Some degree of physical violence is implied in hurt. A subtle noxious influence would injure, but not hurt. The constitution might be injured or harmed, but not hurt, by residence in an unhealthy locality.

DAMAGE (Old Fr. *damage*, from the Lat. *damnum*, loss or injury) is harm externally inflicted on what is of value, as trees, movable property, crops, personal reputation. A slave so severely hurt as to lose the use of limb is damaged, as being a valuable commodity.

"That to the utmost of our ability we ought to repair any damage we have done to others, is self-evident."—*Beattie*.

This refers of course only to such damage as involves a wrong done.

On the other hand, damage may be purely material, as the damage done to crops by a storm, or as in the case given above.

DETRIMENT (*deterere*, *detritus*, to rub off) is used very generically, and would include loss of value by internal causes. It is also applied to what is of the nature of a good without having a strictly appreciable value; as a detriment to religion and morals.

"Though every man hath a property in his goods, yet he must not use them in detriment of the commonwealth."—*State Trials*.

INJURY (Lat. *injuria*) has the purely physical meaning of permanent hurt to physical objects, and of harm to whatever is susceptible of it, as moral beings, and even abstract goods; as, a tree is injured by a storm; injury to a man's person or to his character; injury to the cause of religion or of progress. The word injury is one of the rarer cases in which a term of moral import has become applicable in a physical sense, instead of the converse. The primary idea is that of wrong or a deed against justice. As such deeds are often done by violence, and accompanied by material hurt, the term has come to be applicable to the infliction or result of violence even in unconscious subjects.

"Many times we do injury to a cause by dwelling on trifling arguments."—*Watts*.

HARM (A. S. *harm*, *hearm*) is personal and intentional injury, but is not confined to this, and may be unintentional and impersonal. Harm is that sort of hurt which causes trouble, difficulty, inconvenience, loss, or impedes the desirable growth, operation, progress, and issue of things. Harm is that which contradicts or counteracts well-being, and is unfavourable to the proper energy of what has activity.

"And who is he that shall harm you, if ye be followers of that which is good?"—*Bible*.

PREJUDICE (Lat. *prejudicium*) is a foregone conclusion, and, by an unfavourable extension of meaning, against a person; hence generally harm. It is, however, employed only of persons and their interests or

causes; though the adjective prejudicial has a wider application in the sense of hurtful.

"I am not to *prejudice* the cause of my fellow poets, though I abandon my own defence."—*Dryden*.

INJUSTICE is the principle of which injury is the manifestation. Injustice is also used in the sense of moral injury, as a suspicion which does another an injustice. Injustice relates to existent rights, which are disregarded or violated.

"If this people resembled Nero in their extravagance, much more did they (the Athenians) resemble and even exceed him in cruelty and *injustice*."—*Burke*.

WRONG is an injury done by one person to another in express violation of justice. It may be observed that both injustice and wrong lie in the principle, injury in the act. So one may commit a wrong or an injustice without committing an injury, supposing that circumstances turned out more favourably or less unfavourably to the person than we contemplated or intended. On the other hand, where design was absent, there might be injury without injustice.

"The distinction of public *wrongs* from private, of crimes and misdemeanours from civil injuries."—*Blackstone*.

MISCHIEF (Old Fr. *meschief*, from Lat. *minus*, less, and *chef*, Lat. *caput*, a head) is harm or damage produced by something blameworthy, as heedlessness, neglect, perversity, wantonness. It is a confusion of thought to use the term as simply equivalent to injurious, and to say, as is sometimes said, "The heavy rains have been mischievous to the crops." Mischievous conveys the idea of a bad or wantonly injurious intent, as well as the harm in which it results, and so belongs to beings of intelligence and will, not to elemental or mechanical forces. Mischievous is, however, not so grave a term as injury or damage. It commonly denotes not so much destructive as detrimental effects produced by the folly, idleness, or perversity of men.

"Why boasteth thou thyself, thou tyrant, that thou canst do *mischiefs*?"—*English Psalms*.

HURT. See SORRY.

HURTFUL. See NOXIOUS.

HUSBANDMAN. See FARMER.

HUSBANDRY. See CULTIVATION.

HYPOCRITE. DISSEMBLER.

HYPOCRITE (Gr. *ὑποκριτής*, an actor) is a false pretender to virtue or piety, and is a DISSEMBLER (Lat. *dissimulare*) as to one half of his character, that is, as to being what he pretends not to be (see DISSEMBLE), but not as to the other, namely, the not being what he pretends to be. Hypocrisy, it has been observed, is the homage which vice pays to virtue; an idea which is only expanded in the following:—

"*Hypocrisy* is a more modest way of sinning. It shows some reverence to religion, and does so far own the worth and excellency of it as to acknowledge that it deserves to be counterfeited."—*Tillotson*.

"Thou liest, *dissembler*! on thy brow
I read distracted horrors figured in thy looks."
Ford.

HYPOTHESIS. See GUESS.

I.

IDEA. NOTION. CONCEPTION. PERCEPTION.

The perceiving of something external by the mind through the senses is called a sensation; the image as it exists in the mind as a matter of reflection is an IDEA. The idea is thus present to the fancy, and independent of the cause which excited it. When two or more ideas are combined, so that the expression of them would take the form of an affirmation, this is a NOTION. "I saw the moon last night;" this was sensation or physical perception. "I recollect the image of what I saw;" this is the idea. I connect it with roundness of shape, so as to say, "It was spherical;" this is a notion. Ideas are faint or vivid, vague or distinct; notions are single or complex, true or false. A notion is true of which the ideas are veritably associated in nature; false when we

associate ideas necessarily or naturally incoherent. In a complex notion we often associate some that are naturally united with some that are incoherent. The truth can only be obtained by disentangling the parts, and comparing anew the parts and their combinations with experience. Such is the sense of the word *idea*, for which we are indebted to Locke, according to the Cartesian system. Before him the term *idea*, as employed according to the system of Plato, meant the archetypes or patterns of created things, as they existed from eternity in the mind of the Creator before, and independently of, their embodiment in outward and visible things. **CONCEPTION** (Lat. *concipere*, *conceptus*) is a conscious act of the understanding, classifying objects or impressions; that is, referring them to the same general class or order by means of some or more characters in common. **PERCEPTION** (Lat. *percipere*, *perceptus*) is a term of which the use varies with philosophers. Its older use was nearly identical with that of consciousness. It has of late been narrowed to the faculty whereby we acquire knowledge, and especially, through the senses, of the external world. With others perception and sensation are confounded; while with others, again, sensation is physical, and perception that operation of the mind in regard to external things which follows and is based upon sensation.

IDEAL. IMAGINARY.

The use of the adjective **IDEAL** flows from the Platonic use of the term *idea*. It is not opposed to the real, but abstracted from it. The ideal is formed from the actual by abstracting what is excellent in individual specimens into an imaginary whole. **IMAGINARY** denotes what has no existence but in the imagination. In the ideal the component parts are real, though the whole may be called imaginary, inasmuch as it is not practically met with; but the imaginary is applicable to such things as *never could be met with*; things created by the mind independently

of experience, as the animal called the griffin, for instance.

"With inward view,
Thence on th' *ideal* kingdom swift she turns
Her eye, and instant, at her powerful glance,
Th' obedient phantoms vanish or appear."

Thomson.

"When time shall once have laid his lenient hand on the passions and pursuits of the present moment, they too shall lose that *imaginary* value which heated fancy now bestows upon them."—*Blair*.

IDEAL. MODEL.

When these terms appear as synonyms, it is that either might be taken to mean the perfect form of anything. **MODEL** (see **EXAMPLE**) may mean either a pattern of what a thing is, or a pattern of what it might be at the best. In the latter case, it stands to the **IDEAL** as the conception to the illustration. The *Venus de Medicis* is the ideal of female beauty as it is a conception of the sculptor, a model as it is a statue.

IDIOM. See **LANGUAGE**.

IDIOT. **FOOL.**

An **IDIOT** (Gr. *ἰδιώτης*, a private person unqualified to bear the burdens of the state, hence, by a modern extension of meaning, of weak mind) is one who is destitute of the ordinary intellectual powers of man. He is a born fool, the mental condition being commonly accompanied by some defect in the physical formation. **FOOL** (Fr. *fol*, *fou*) is capable of other meanings, as a person of very languid mind and sluggish comprehension, or one who lives contrary to the principles of practical wisdom.

IDIOTCY. See **MADNESS**.

IDLE. **LAZY.** **INDOLENT.**

IDLE (A. S. *idel*, *ydel*) originally meant unprofitable, as, "idle pastures," that is, not supporting cattle. It has at present a twofold meaning, 1. unemployed, and 2, averse to employment. Idleness bears reference to a man's proper tasks and duties. He who escapes from these, and will do nothing useful, is idle, although he may be far from **LAZY**, and the opposite to indolent. Idleness is

consistent with activity in mischief. **INDOLENT** (*in*, not, and *dolere*, to suffer pain) denotes a love of ease and an aversion to active effort, whether of mind or body. It is possible to be indolent in mind, and not in body, and *vice versâ*. Lazy is a stronger and more disparaging term than indolent, expressive of a slothful habit of body, to which physical effort, and especially industrious employment, is hateful.

"The soul's play day is always the devil's working day, and the idler the man still the busier the tempter. The truth is, *idleness* offers up the soul as a blank to the devil for him to write what he will upon it."—*South*.

"Shall we keep our hands in our bosom, or stretch ourselves on our beds of *laziness*, while all the world about us is hard at work pursuing the designs of its creation?"—*Barrow*.

"But, indeed, there are crowds of people who put themselves in no method of pleasing themselves or others; such are those whom we usually call *indolent* persons. Indolence is, methinks, an intermediate state between pleasure and pain, and very much unbecoming any part of our life after we are out of the nurse's arms."—*Spectator*.

IDLE. LEISURE. VACANT.

As applied to portions of time, **IDLE**, as an idle hour, is always taken in a sense more or less unfavourable. An idle hour is confessedly one which might have been better spent. A **LEISURE** hour (Fr. *loisir*, Lat. *licere*) is one which has been rightly spared from business, or which is open to being so, but of which nothing is said as to the spending. A **VACANT** hour (Lat. *vacans*, from *vacare*, to be vacant) is indefinitely one which might have been filled up, but is not. A leisure time is welcome; a vacant hour may be unwelcome if employment were desired.

IGNITION. See **FIRE**.

IGNOMINY. INFAMY. OPPROBRIUM. SHAME.

IGNOMINY (Lat. *ignominia*, *in*, not, and *nomen*, name, deprivation of good name) is public disgrace which attaches to persons. **INFAMY** (Lat. *infamia*) is total loss of reputation,

or extreme baseness, as attaching to character or deeds. **Infamy** is stronger than **ignominy**, inasmuch as it consigns the subject of it to public detestation, while **ignominy** brings contempt. It may also be observed that **ignominy** depends upon the sentiments of men, who may inflict it where it is undeserved; whereas **infamy** depends upon the fact of deeds done. **OPPROBRIUM** is less strong, indicating a mingled feeling of reproach and disdain, which may be undeserved. **SHAME** (A. S. *scamu*) carries with it the additional idea of the sense or feeling of disgrace.

"Who (the king) never called a Parliament but to supply his necessities, and having supplied those, as suddenly and *ignominiously* dissolved it, without redressing any one grievance of the people."—*Milton*.

"But the afflicted queen would not yield, and said she would not damn her soul nor submit to such *infamy*; that she was his wife, and would never call herself by any other name."—*Burnet*.

"He," saith St. James, 'that speaketh against his brother, and judgeth his brother, speaketh against the law and judgeth the law;' that is, he *opprobriously* doth imply the law to be defective until he doth complete or correct it."—*Barrow*.

"*Shame*, which is an uneasiness of the mind upon the thought of having done something which is indecent, or will lessen the valued esteem which others have for us."—*Locke*.

IGNORANT. ILLITERATE. UNLEARNED. UNLETTERED.

IGNORANT (Lat. *ignorare*) denotes want of knowledge, either of a single fact, or, generally, of such matters as it is considered that men ought to know. **ILLITERATE** (Lat. *in*, not, and *littera*, a letter) is ignorant of letters. Some persons are ignorant of common practical every-day matters, who are far from being illiterate; others are illiterate who, without the opportunities of good education, have picked up a considerable stock of general information. **UNLEARNED** and **UNLETTERED** differ from illiterate in not implying reproach. A man may be learned in one branch of learning, and unlearned in another.

Unlettered is rather a rhetorical and poetical than a prosaic term. An honest peasant of little or no education ought to be called unlearned; a pretentious rich man, but uneducated, may well be styled illiterate.

"Yet ah! why should they know their fate,
Since sorrow never comes too late,
And happiness too swiftly flies?
Thought would destroy their paradise.
No more. Where *ignorance* is bliss,
'Tis folly to be wise." *Gray.*

"Others are not capable either of the employments or divertisements that accrue from letters. I know they are not, and therefore cannot much recommend solitude to a man totally *illiterate*."—*Cowley.*

"The immortality of the soul has been commonly believed in all ages and in all places by the *unlearned* part of all civilized people, and by the almost general consent of all the most barbarous nations under heaven."—*Clarke.*

Unlettered is a very old word in English, as in the following:—

"And thei sighen the stidefastnesse of Peter and Joon, for it was founden that thei weren men *unlettrid*."—*Wielif.*

ILL. *See* EVIL and BADLY.

ILLNESS. *See* INDISPOSITION.

ILLITERATE. *See* IGNORANT.

ILLUMINATE. *See* ENLIGHTEN.

ILLUMINE. *See* ENLIGHTEN.

ILLUSION. *See* DECEPTION.

ILLUSTRATE. *See* EXAMPLE and EXPLAIN.

ILLUSTRIOUS. *See* EMINENT.

ILL-WILL. *See* HATRED.

IMAGINARY. *See* IDEAL.

IMAGINATION. *See* FANCY and THOUGHT.

IMAGINE. *See* APPREHEND.

IMBIKE. ABSORB.

In IMBIBING (Lat. *in* and *bibere*, to drink) the moisture taken away from one body is taken into another. In ABSORBING (Lat. *absorbere*, to suck away) the moisture is simply taken away. For instance, a sponge both absorbs and imbibes moisture. It absorbs it, inasmuch as it sucks it

away from the place where it was lodged; it imbibes it, inasmuch as the particles of moisture pass into the sponge. On the other hand, the rays of the sun absorb moisture, but do not imbibe it. The same difference appears in the moral or secondary applications of the words. We imbibe what we assimilate to ourselves in the way of instruction, doctrine, principles, and the like. We are ourselves absorbed by some occupation which takes all our time, interest, and attention.

IMITATE. FOLLOW.

These terms both denote the regulation of our actions by some thing proposed or set before us for the purpose. But we IMITATE (Lat. *imitari*) what is external to us; we FOLLOW what is sometimes external, sometimes internal. We imitate an example, or, which is tantamount to the same thing, we follow it; but we may also follow the dictates of reason and common sense; we may follow even our own devices. We imitate objects, persons, actions; we follow guides, influences, dictates of reason, impulses, and propensities.

"Acts of benevolence and love
Give us a taste of heaven above.
We *imitate* the immortal powers
Whose sunshine and whose kindly showers
Refresh the poor and barren ground,
And plant a paradise around."

Somerville.

"I am sensible that common sense has lately met with very great discouragement in the noble science of politics, our chief professors having thought themselves above those rules that had been *followed* by our ancestors, and that lay open to vulgar understandings."—*Chesterfield.*

IMMATERIAL.

IMMATERIAL. This term has two significations, practically altogether distinct, though closely connected etymologically. *In*, not, and *materies*, matter, is the etymology; hence the senses of, 1, popularly, of not being of great matter, that is, unimportant; and 2, more scientifically, not having the quality or nature of matter, that is, spiritual. It will be necessary to consider separately these two lines of synonyms.

IMMATERIAL. UNIMPORTANT.
INSIGNIFICANT. INCONSIDERABLE.
TRIFLING. TRIVIAL. FRIVOLOUS.
FUTILE. UNESSENTIAL. IRRELEVANT.
PETTY.

IMMATERIAL is used of the unimportant in minor and familiar matters, especially in matters of practice; while UNIMPORTANT commonly relates to abstract difference of result; as, "It is immaterial whether we go to-morrow or not;" "It is unimportant whether the word be taken in the one sense or the other." Unimportant is general; immaterial is specific. Immaterial is unimportant as regards argumentative or practical considerations, and so is an epithet of things, and not of persons. An unimportant person is one who carries little or no weight, either generally, or in regard to a specific case. The epithet immaterial is not applicable in this way.

"It is true that there be some scholastical and *immaterial* truths, the infinite subdivisions whereof have rather troubled than informed Christendom, which, for the purchase of peace, might be kept in and returned into such safe generalities as minds not unreasonable might rest in."—*Bishop Hall*.

"They would be surprised to be informed that one of the ancient critics has acquired a great reputation by writing on an art which is conversant in sound rather than in sense, and which is therefore in their opinion *unimportant*."—*Knox*.

INCONSIDERABLE and INSIGNIFICANT differ not so much essentially as in their application; *inconsiderable* being used of size, number, weight, importance; *insignificant*, of matters of personal character, appearance, weight of character.

"Let him calmly reflect that within the narrow boundaries of that country to which he belongs, and during that small portion of time which his life fills up, his reputation, great as he may fancy it to be, occupies no more than an *inconsiderable* corner."—*Blair*.

"What schoolboy, what little *insignificant* monk, could not have made a more elegant speech for the king, and in better Latin, than this royal advocate has done?"—*Milton*.

TRIFLING applies not only to ques-

tions of importance, but also of value or utility. The trifling is opposed to the grave and considerable. TRIVIAL (*tres viæ*, three roads, as if met with in the public ways) denotes that which is destitute of originality or force, or is unimportant by reason of the commonplace character of the thing, and is very commonly employed of matters of consideration or remark, pursuits, and the like. FRIVOLOUS (Lat. *frivulus*) denotes that which is in such a manner unimportant as to be destitute of gravity or earnestness, so that it involves disgrace to allege, to follow it, or to heed it. The term is applicable both to persons and things; trivial, to things alone. Frivolous is a term of habit and disposition; trifling, of specific matters. FUTILE (Lat. *futilis*, from *fundere*, to pour or let loose, easily melting or falling to pieces) is employed of intellectual subject-matter only, or its expression by statement and argument; as futile theories or arguments.

"Those who are carried away with the spontaneous current of their own thoughts must never humour their minds in being thus *triflingly* busy."—*Locke*.

The fundamental sense of trivial is seen in the following, where it is opposed to philosophical:—

"And for the pretended *trivialness* of the fifth and sixth days' work, I think it is apparent from what we have noted on the fifth day, that Moses his ranging of fish and fowl together is a consideration not vulgar and *trivial*, but philosophical."—*More*.

"It is the characteristic of little and *frivolous* minds to be wholly occupied with the vulgar objects of life."—*Blair*.

Bacon employed the term futile in the sense of having a tendency to pour forth in conversation, and so to pour forth what was weak:—

"As for talkers and *futile* persons, they are commonly vain and credulous withal."

It is now not applied directly to persons, but to mental efforts in the way of arguments, and especially of objections.

"He was prepared to show the madness of their declaration of the pretended rights of man, the childish *futility* of some of their

maxims, the gross and stupid absurdity, and the palpable falsity of others."—*Burke*.

UNESSENTIAL is literally belonging not to the essence, but, as it were, to the accidents of a thing, not going to form part of the thing itself. So unessential and immaterial differ in denoting what does not constitute, the former conceptional, the latter practical completeness. Station, it might be said, is unessential to virtue, that is, does not enter into the idea or definition of it; unimportant to it, that is, virtue can act without it. IRRELEVANT belongs to argumentative considerations. An irrelevant remark (*in*, not, and *relevare*, to lighten, whence the French *relevier*, to hold in feudal tenure) is one which does not appertain in any way to the argument, does not, as it were, hold of it, is not subordinate to, but unconnected with it. The term PETTY (*Fr. petit*, small) we apply to what is so small as to be beneath consideration. It denotes a somewhat contemptible insignificance or meanness.

"Neither difference of time, nor distance of place, nor rigour of unjust censure, nor any unessential error, can bar our interest in this blessed unity."—*Bishop Hall*.

"Some of which dispositions were upon oath, some upon honour, and others neither upon oath nor honour; but all or most of them were of an irregular and irrelevant nature, and not fit or decent to be taken by a British magistrate, or to be transmitted to a British Government."—*Burke*.

IMMATERIAL. INCORPOREAL. SPIRITUAL. DISEMBODED.

IMMATERIAL (*see above*) is employed of everything which exists, or may be conceived to have existence, apart from material composition, or which does not fulfil the definition of matter. Light and other imponderable agents might be called *immaterial* in this sense, but more decidedly the mind and thoughts of man. INCORPOREAL (*Lat. in*, not, and *corpus*, a body) denotes the absence of organized matter in the constitution. Angels are incorporeal beings. Incorporeal and immaterial

are relative and negative. SPIRITUAL (*Lat. spiritus*) is absolute and positive, indicative of the actual presence or possession of that distinct condition of existence which we call spiritual, and which is not a mere negation of the material or the corporeal, as in the case of the pre-existence of spirits to the formation of matter, the earth, or man. DISEMBODED is employed of such existences as have *ceased* to be corporeal.

IMMEDIATELY. *See DIRECTLY.*

IMMENSE. INFINITE. BOUNDLESS.

The IMMENSE (*Lat. in*, not, and *metior, mensus*, to measure) is the relatively INFINITE (*infinitus, in*, not, and *finis*, an end or bound). The infinite is the *essentially* BOUNDLESS. The infinite is so by virtue of itself; the immense, by virtue of our inability to place or discern limits. The power of God is infinite; the expanse of ocean immense. Boundless is more applicable to what meets the eye, which searches in vain for limits; while immense expresses the effect upon the mind, and the inability practically to define or limit; as, boundless deserts, boundless beneficence.

"This power of repeating or doubling any idea we have of any distance, and adding it to the former as often as we will, without being ever able to come to any stop or stint, let us enlarge it as much as we will, is that which gives us the idea of *immensity*."—*Locke*.

"I know that whatsoever hath or must necessarily have limits or fines, is not, cannot be *infinite*; and, therefore, this globe in my hand cannot be *infinite*; and if I can find in any other thing a parity of reason, I do and may remove *infiniteness* from it as reasonably and evidently as I do from this globe I hold, or this hour I write, or this life I live."—*Hale*.

Boundless is a term poetical, rhetorical, and inexact.

"Where'er the eye can pierce, the feet can move,
This wide, this boundless universe is Jove."
Lyttelton, Speech of Cato.

IMMINENT. IMPENDING. THREATENING.

These terms are all employed in

regard to some evil near at hand in the way of peril or misfortune. **IMMINENT** (Lat. *imminere*, in, on, and *mineo*, to project) denotes that which is ready to fall, and is near at hand. So we may say, "He was in imminent danger." But we could not say, "He was in IMPENDING danger," inasmuch as impending is indefinite as to time. The evil imminent or impending is, however, already brought into contact with us, while a **THREATENING** evil (A. S. *threatian*, to urge) is in the future, and may pass off without coming near us at all. The imminent and impending evil has nearly touched us, though we may have escaped from them. We ourselves escape from imminent and impending danger; but the threatening danger passes away from us. Thus also imminent has the force of expressing degree; impending, of expressing fact—any danger, while it is impending; but only a *great* as well as *close* danger would be said to be imminent. We might therefore say thus, "I think it my duty to warn you that danger is impending. But I would not alarm you needlessly. I do not speak of it as imminent, because I think that, by timely precautions, you may reasonably hope to escape it." He who at night approaches a precipice through ignorance is in imminent danger of his life; but death is impending in the natural course of things even when we are most safe.

"So it is certain that it is absolutely necessary my life should be out of *imminent* hazard before I can take a delight in the sufferings of others, real or imaginary, or, indeed, in anything else, from any cause whatsoever."—*Burke*.

"Destruction hangs o'er yon devoted wall,
And nodding Ilion waits th' *impending*
fall." *Pope*.

"The honour, sir, that flames in your fair
eyes
Before I speak, too *threateningly* replies."
Shakespeare.

IMMODERATE. See **EXCESSIVE**
and **INORDINATE**.

IMMODEST. **INDECENT.** **INDELICATE.**

The first of these (*in*, not, and *mo-*

destus, modest, *modus*, a limit) belongs to the character and disposition; the second (*in*, not, and *decens*, becoming, *decere*, to become), to outward acts and appearance, or expressions, as conveying them. Want of reflection might lead to indecency; corruption of nature is the cause of immodesty. **INDELICATE** (see **DELICATE**) denotes an offence against refined propriety, good manners, or perfect purity of mind. Indelicacy relates to what is conventional. The coarser modes of thought and speech of the humbler classes, or their mode of dress, indicates no immodesty of necessity *in them*. On the other hand, an indelicacy in words, as coming from a refined and educated person, being calculated to convey more than its superficial meaning, may be very much so. The refined licentious literature of the day makes use of the indelicate to express the indecent, knowing the trained and susceptible intellects with which it has to deal. Indelicate, however, is also applicable to moral propriety purely, and often denotes want of sensitive consideration for others; as, to laugh in the house of mourning is indelicate, even where unfeeling would be too strong a term, as it might be done thoughtlessly.

IMMUNITY. EXEMPTION.

IMMUNITY is a kind of **EXEMPTION** (*immunis*, free, especially from a *munus*, a public service or duty), as from any charge, duty, tax, or imposition. It is sometimes used metaphorically of matters which are regarded in the light of burdens; as immunity from pain, that is, regarded as something which the human race is compelled to pay as a tax. Exemption (*eximere*, *exemptus*, to remove or free) is any sort of privileged safety from liabilities commonly pressing upon others. But exemption is a stronger term than immunity. The former might be employed of freedom from the very worst evils or calamities; the latter, from what is grievous rather than from what is destructive or deadly. Exemption stands over against law and ordinance; immunity, against

common obligation, and the pressure of common necessity. Exemption may be from the power of one; immunity is from the will and power of more than one. We may enjoy an exemption from simple evils; we enjoy immunity where the evil is such that something is lost, surrendered, or forfeited on our own part. Exemption may come by nature or condition; immunity is the result of privilege conferred.

"As no man is *exempt* from some defects, or can live free from some misdemeanours, so by this practice (slander) every man may be rendered very odious and infamous."—*Barrow*.

"But man is frail, and can but ill sustain
A long *immunity* from grief and pain."
Cowper.

IMPAIR. INJURE.

To *IMPAIR* (Fr. *pire*, worse, Lat. *pejus*) is to injure in a lasting manner, so that though the detriment be but partial, it is permanent. We hear that a friend has received an injury in the eye; we hope that his eyesight will not be impaired. Hence injury is of bodies themselves; impairing is of their value, their action, their utility, or their properties. (See *INJURY*.)

"Time sensibly all things *impairs*.
Our fathers have been worse than theirs,
And we than ours."
Roscommon, Horace.

IMPART. COMMUNICATE.

IMPART is to give a part or share. *COMMUNICATE* is to give so as to have in common (*communis*, common). *Impart* has the stronger meaning in one respect. We communicate what has come to us generally; we impart what we regarded as peculiarly our own. "He told me the fact. I now communicate it to you," might or might not be a favour to the other party; but, "I impart it to you," would imply that I consider myself in some sense as conferring a favour in making the communication. *Impart* is often used of natural action not accompanied by consciousness or purpose; as the sun *imparts* warmth. *Communicate* involves also the will

or intention to impart; so we should naturally refrain from saying that the clouds communicated rain.

"Well may he then to you his cares *impart*."
Dryden.

"As the inquisitive, in my opinion, are such merely from a vacancy in their own imaginations, there is nothing, methinks, so dangerous as to *communicate* secrets to them; for the same temper of inquiry makes them as *impertinently communicative*."—*Spectator*.

IMPASSABLE. IMPERVIOUS.

IMPASSABLE denotes that which cannot be passed along, over, or through; as an impassable road, barrier, or morass. It relates to the movements of living creatures. *IMPERVIOUS* (*in*, not, *per*, through, and *via*, a way) relates to that which cannot be pierced or penetrated by inanimate influences; as a wood is impervious to the sun's rays. *Impassable* denotes an accidental or temporary, *impervious* a permanent quality.

"But lest the difficulty of passing back
Stay his return, perhaps over this gulf
Impassable, impervious, let us try
Advent'rous work."
Milton.

IMPEACH. See *CHARGE*.

IMPEDE. See *CLOG*.

IMPEDIMENT. See *DIFFICULTY*.

IMPEL. See *ACTUATE*.

IMPENETRABLE. See *INSCRUTABLE*.

IMPENDING. See *IMMINENT*.

IMPERATIVE. See *AUTHORITATIVE*.

IMPERFECTION. See *FAILING*.

IMPERIOUS. See *AUTHORITATIVE*.

IMPERTINENT. *IMPUDENT*. *INSOLENT*.

IMPERTINENT (Lat. *impertinens*, not pertaining to the matter in hand) has the primary meaning of irrelevant; hence unbecoming in speech or action. He is *impertinent* who meddles with matters in which he has no concern. He is rude because he does not see his own subordinate relation to the matter in question.

IMPUDENCE (Lat. *impudentia*, *in*, not, and *pudere*, to be ashamed) is an unblushing assurance which is accompanied by cool disregard of the presence or claims of others to respect, manifested in words, looks, tones, gestures, or even affected silence. **IMPUDENT** (*in*, not, and *solere*, to be accustomed) has for its radical meaning a disposition to act in violation of the established rules of social intercourse. It is now used in the sense of unbridled exhibition of impudence or pride, to the disregard of the feelings of others, or their purposed wounding. The impudent person may be so from levity of character. The impertinent is so from want of humility and deference. The insolent is commonly urged, by some feeling of dislike, rebellion, or opposition, to a studied disrespect. Impertinence is no respecter of propriety; impudence no respecter of delicacy; insolence no respecter of persons. Impertinence is the converse of reserve; impudence of modesty; insolence of meekness.

"I'd have the expression of her thoughts be such

She might not seem reserved, nor talk too much;

That shows a want of judgment, and of sense;

More than enough is but *impertinence*."

Pomfret.

"Can any one reflect for a moment on all those claims of debt which the minister exhausts himself with contrivances to augment with new usuries, without lifting up his hands and eyes in astonishment at the *impudence* both of the claim and the adjudication?"—*Burke*.

"The clergy, according to the genius of that religion, having their authority fortified with such severe laws, were now more cruel and *insolent* than ever."—*Burnet*.

IMPERVIOUS. See **IMPASSABLE**.

IMPETUOUS. See **FURIOUS**.

IMPIOUS. **IRRELIGIOUS.** **PROFANE.**

IRRELIGIOUS is negative. **IMPIOUS** and **PROFANE** are positive (Lat. *pro*, without, and *fanum*, the temple, literally excluded from religious mys-

teries). A man under no influence of religion is irreligious. When applied to things, however, it implies a tendency to be unfavourable to religion, though without of necessity a premeditated determination or desire to be so. **Impious** denotes a defiant irreligion, and a disposition to do dishonour to what religious men hold in veneration, especially as regards the character, works, or dealings of the Supreme Being. As **impious** relates more commonly to the thoughts, so **profane** to the words or acts of men. **Profanity** is irreverence in speech about sacred things. It may be observed that **profane** has the milder sense, also, of secular, or *not distinctively* religious, as history may be divided into sacred and profane. **Impious** thoughts; **irreligious** persons or books; **profane** language.

"They were the words of Job at a time when to his other calamities this domestic affliction was added, that one who ought to have assuaged and soothed his sorrows provoked his indignation by an *impious* speech."—*Blair*.

"In his (Lord Bolingbroke's) reasonings for the most part he is flimsy and false, in his political writings factious, in what he calls his philosophical ones *irreligious* and *sophistical* in the highest degree."—*Ibid*.

"Somewhat allied to this (blasphemy), though in an inferior degree, is the offence of *profane* and common swearing or cursing."—*Blackstone*.

IMPLACABLE. **INEXORABLE.**
UNRELENTING. **RELENTLESS.**

IMPLACABLE (Lat. *implacabilis*, *in*, not, and *placare*, to appease) denotes a disposition which nothing can appease. **INEXORABLE** (Lat. *inexorabilis*, *in*, not, and *exorare*, to succeed in intreating) is implacable to entreaty in particular and in a specific case. **UNRELENTING** is not relenting (Fr. *ralentir*, Lat. *lentus*, pliant), that is, yielding, from harshness, hardness, or cruelty, as a fact; while **RELENTLESS** is unyielding as a property or habit. A relentless cruelty; an unrelenting line of conduct. "In spite of the sufferings of his enemy, his revenge was implacable. He looked on the tears and heard the entreaties of his prisoner, but remained inex-

orable." Unrelenting belongs rather to the person, relentless to the quality which he exhibits. The implacable man is so from moral hardness of heart; the inexorable may be so from mental stubbornness or inflexible resolution. If partiality in the administration of justice were asked by the accused, the judge would be bound to show himself inexorable.

"An object of *implacable* enmity."—*Macaulay*.

"*Inexorable* equality of laws."—*Gibbon*.

Unrelenting is passive, relentless active. The former denotes rather the specific fact of not giving way before external influences, which would tend to stop the course of injustice or cruelty; the latter the condition of nature which suggests nothing in the way of forbearance.

"He (Oldham) has lashed the Jesuits with deserved and *unrelenting* rigour. But though severe punishment is often necessary, yet to see it inflicted with the wanton cruelty of an assassin is not agreeable."—*Knox*.

"Nor hope to be myself less miserable

By what I seek, but others to make such
As I, though thereby worse to me redound.

For only in destroying I find ease
To my *relentless* thoughts."—*Milton*.

IMPLANT. INGRAFT. INCULCATE. INFUSE. INSTIL.

IMPLANT, INGRAFT, and INCULCATE (*inculcare*, to tread in, *in* and *calx*, the heel) are employed of abstract principles, and rules of right and wrong. INSTIL (*instillare*, *in* and *stilla*, a drop) and INFUSE (*infundere*, *infusus*, to pour in), of such things as move the heart, feelings, and passions. To implant conveys the idea of that tender and careful cultivation of the young which belongs to the office of parents. That which is implanted becomes part of the nature, and grows with the growth. To ingraft conveys the idea of such later training of the more mature mind as belongs to the master or preceptor. Instil conveys the idea of gently and gradually introducing sentiments with the aid of influences collateral to the influence of the

person instilling them. While infuse denotes the direct endeavour of the person; nor does infuse imply such permanency in what is infused as instil. We instil abiding sentiments; we may infuse what is temporary, as a spirit of patriotism, or military ardour. To inculcate points to the repeated efforts of exhortation, precept, and the like, which are employed to give force to what is impressed, by way of practical admonition.

"To provide effectually for the maintenance of the social virtues, it hath pleased God to *implant* in man not only the power of reason, which enables him to see the connection between his own happiness and that of others, but also certain instincts and propensities which make him feel it."—*Hurd*.

"*Ingrafted* love he bears to Cæsar."—*Shakespeare*.

"The Earls of Monmouth and Warrington were *infusing* jealousies into their party with the same industry that the Earl of Nottingham was at the same time *instilling* into the king jealousies of them; and both acted with too much success."—*Burnet*.

"For the wisdom of poets would first make the images of Virtue so amiable that her beholders should not be able to look off, rather gently and delightfully *infusing* than *inculcating* precepts."—*Davenant*.

IMPLEMENT. See INSTRUMENT.

IMPLICATE. See ENTANGLE.

IMPLORE. See ASK.

IMPLY. SIGNIFY. INVOLVE.

IMPLY (Lat. *implicare*) is to involve in substance or by fair inference, or by construction, though not expressed in words. INVOLVE (Lat. *involvere*) denotes a drawing after by practical force, as imply by metaphysical force. Hence an implication may often be recognized or not at will; while that which is involved follows of stern logical or practical necessity. War implies fighting; but it involves such things as taxation and bloodshed. The premises of a syllogism do not imply but involve the conclusion which is evolved from them. On the other, a relative term, as father, implies its correlative, son. SIGNIFY (Fr. *signifier*, Lat. *signum*, a sign, and *facere*, to make) is to declare by any kind of conventional

sign, as by words—which are signs of ideas—gestures, signals, writing—which is written signals—and the like. Implication is indirect signification. Words which signified little might be made to imply much by the tone or manner in which they were uttered.

“Your smooth eulogium, to one crown addressed,
Seems to imply a censure on the rest.”

Cowper.

“One of which boats I sent away with an officer round a point on the larboard hand, to look for anchorage. This he found, and signified the same by signal.”—*Cook’s Voyages.*

Imply is opposed to express; involve goes beyond the interpretation of things, and has to do with their necessary relations.

“We cannot demonstrate these things so as to show that the contrary involves a contradiction.”—*Tillotson.*

IMPORT. PURPORT. MEANING.
SENSE. SIGNIFICATION. TENOR.
DRIFT. SCOPE.

The IMPORT (Fr. *importer*, Lat. *importare*, to carry or convey) is that which a word, statement, phrase, or document is intended to convey. The import of a thing is that which it is specifically and directly designed to convey. We, however, more commonly speak of the meaning or signification of words, and the import of expressions or statements.

“To draw near to God is an expression of awful and mysterious import.”—*Blair.*

The PURPORT (Fr. *pour* and *porter*, to carry) is the import of something continuous, or regarded in its continuity, and may be applied to continuous action as well as continuous speech. Import is more allied to meaning and signification; purport, to drift and scope.

“Thus there he stood, whilst high over his head

There written was the purport of his sin,
In cyphers strange, that few could rightly read.”

Spenser.

Both import and purport are employed of moral, not material, subjects. Thus a certain vegetable production is the meaning or signification,

not the purport, of the word oak. But where more than this is meant we may employ the term import; as a human habitation of a certain character, capacity, solidity, and the like, is the import of the word house.

MEANING (A. S. *mænan*, to tell, recite) is used in a twofold sense, either, 1, the casual intention of the person, or, 2, the fixed import of the thing. “That is not my meaning,” illustrates the first. “Take the words in their grammatical meaning,” the second.

“What mean ye to weep and to break mine heart?”—*English Bible.*

“The word is always sufficiently original for me in that language where its meaning, which is the cause of its application, can be found; and seeking only meaning, when I have found it, there I stop; the rest is a curiosity whose usefulness I cannot discover.”—*Tooke.*

SENSE (Lat. *sensus*), unlike meaning, is inseparably attached to the thing or the expression, and is irrespective of the uses. We say, “I used the word in that sense;” but we could not say, “That is my sense,” for meaning. Sense is imposed force or technical recognized acceptance.

“And that no man hereafter shall either print or preach to draw the article aside in any way, but shall submit to it in the plain and full meaning thereof, and shall not put his own sense or comment to be the meaning of the article, but shall take it in the literal and grammatical sense.”—*Preface to Thirty-Nine Articles.*

SIGNIFICATION is nearly identical with meaning or import. Signification, however, is the act of making known, as well as the intention of the terms employed for the purpose. Signification is attached to the thing, and does not belong to the person. “As the words have that signification,” we could not say, “That is my signification.” Signification has a stricter reference than meaning to what is of a symbolical nature, as the signification of words or of demonstrations; but meaning is capable of reference to anything which requires interpretation or accounting for, as, “I cannot understand the meaning of such conduct;” that is, “I am at a loss to

interpret or account for it." The term meaning is the most generic of all these synonyms.

"It (Lord) is a word, therefore, of large and various *signification*, denoting dominion of every sort and degree, from the universal and absolute dominion of God, to the private and limited dominion of a single slave."—*Bishop Horsley*.

Tenor, drift, and scope relate not to isolated terms, but to continuous speech. The TENOR (Lat. *tenere*) is the general course and character which holds on through a speech or a remark. The DRIFT (or object towards which it drives) is the object, not, however, expressly notified, but gathered generally—the tendency of it, or aim not formally avowed. The SCOPE is the avowed design, that which it is aimed at and is intended to embrace. "To discuss such a point does not fall within the scope of this discourse." The tenor and drift differ, the former including more than what is actually said, and comprising the character of it, the latter relating to the remarks or statements only.

"The whole *tenor* of the Gospels and Epistles shows that human virtues are all light in the balance, and have no proper efficacy in themselves for procuring human salvation."—*Waterland*.

"But so strangely perverse is his commentator, that he will suppose him to mean anything rather than what the obvious *drift* of his argument requires."—*Warburton on Pope*.

"I think I could easily demonstrate that from Adam to Moses, from Moses to the Prophets, from the Prophets to Jesus Christ, the main *scope* and design of all Divine revelation hath been the gradual discovery of this great mystery of the mediation."—*Scott, Christian Life*.

IMPORTANCE. CONSEQUENCE.
WEIGHT. MOMENT.

IMPORTANCE (see IMPORT) is the quality of being important; but CONSEQUENCE (Lat. *consequentia*, *consequi*, to follow upon) is not in this sense the quality of being consequent. In other words, it is only the nouns, and not the adjectives, that are synonymous. Another adjective, however, has been framed—consequential,

which means, assuming the air of dignity and importance. As applied to persons, a person may be of importance specifically, so that a matter could not well go on without him; but he is of consequence inherently. Consequence in this sense is recognized importance in a social point of view; a person of high rank and consequence may not be of importance in regard to a particular matter. WEIGHT (*wegan*, to bear, or move) is efficacious importance, which may have the effect of practical influence, as a character or consideration of great weight. MOMENT (Lat. *momentum*, for *movementum*, from *movere*, to move) is not thus applicable to persons, but only to events, affairs, transactions, or practical considerations. Weight belongs to words and arguments, moment to occurrences. Consequence, as regards things, is that sort of importance which attaches to what is attended with decided results. A thing of no consequence is a thing which ends with itself. "It is a matter of great consequence that we should not delay our departure; for business of moment depends upon it; and the importance of your position will give weight to the expression of your views."

"The cause was not common and ordinary, such as were wont to be tried before the governors of provinces, but of an unusual and public nature, not a question of words and names, as Gallio thought it, but a matter of the highest *importance* to the world."—*Stillington*.

"The corruption of our taste is not of equal *consequence* with the depravation of our virtue."—*Warton*.

"When to demonstration on the one side, there are opposed on the other only difficulties raised from the want of our having adequate ideas of the things themselves, this ought not to be esteemed an objection of any real *weight*."—*Clarke*.

"Whoever shall review his life, will find that the whole tenor of his conduct has been determined by some accident of no apparent *moment*."—*Johnson*.

IMPORTUNATE. URGENT. PRESSING.

IMPORTUNATE, which expresses the quality of the verb importune (Lat.

importunus) is only applicable to persons, and denotes a peculiar tenacity and troublesome pertinacity of application. URGENT (Lat. *urgere*) and PRESSING (Lat. *premere, pressus*) are equally applicable to matters of business and practical considerations generally. There is a very slight difference between them; but pressing seems to be more commonly used of the abstract nature of things; urgent, of the things themselves: as pressing necessity; pressing importance; an urgent appeal; an urgent case; urgent affairs. It may be added, that that which is pressing demands immediate *attention*; that which is urgent, immediate *action*; as also that persons are pressing, and circumstances urgent.

"But of all other passages of Scripture the necessity and efficacy of this *importunity* in prayer that we speak of, is most wisely set forth to us by our blessed Saviour, in that remarkable parable of His in the eleventh of St. Luke's Gospel."—*Sharp*.

"But time is *urgent*. Haste we to consult Priest, prophet, or interpreter of dreams (For dreams are also of Jove), that we may learn
What crime of ours Apollo thus resents."
Couper.

"Mr. Gay, whose zeal in your concern is worthy a friend, writes to me in the most *pressing* terms about it."—*Pope*.

IMPORTUNITY. SOLICITATION.

SOLICITATION (Lat. *sollicitare*, to trouble, stir) is no more than earnest, IMPORTUNITY (see IMPORTUNATE) is *vexatious*, request.

IMPOSING. See GRAND.

IMPOST. See TAX.

IMPOSTOR. DECEIVER.

AN IMPOSTOR (or one who imposes on others) is a deceiver of the public, while DECEIVER might be of the public or of a private individual. Any one who deceives by word or deed is a deceiver. An impostor assumes a false appearance, and impersonates what is not truly his. An impostor acts for his own benefit; a deceiver may act simply for the injury of another.

"But now, when Time has made th' *imposture* plain
(Late though he followed Truth, and limping held her train),
What new delusion charms your cheated eyes again?"
Dryden.

"Surely, if these things prove true, let me be registered to my perpetual infamy, not only for a most notorious *deceiver*, but such an hypocrite as never trod upon the earth before."—*Strype*.

IMPRECATION. See CURSE.

IMPRESS. IMPRINT.

IMPRESS (Lat. *imprimere, impressus*) and IMPRINT (Fr. *empreint*, participle of *empreindre*, the same as Latin *imprimere*) have their physical and their metaphorical senses. In the former they are identical—meaning to press for the purpose of making a mark. In the latter, imprint is so to press upon the mind as to produce a lively image of the thing; impress is so to press as to produce a conviction of its importance or necessity. "My father's kind maxims are imprinted on my mind; he early impressed me with their importance." We imprint on the imagination or the memory; we impress on the understanding and the heart.

"It seeming to me a near contradiction to say that there are truths *imprinted* on the soul which it perceives or understands not; *imprinting*, if it signify anything, being nothing else but the making certain truths to be perceived."—*Locke*.

IMPRESSION. INDENTATION.
MARK. PRINT. STAMP.

In its physical sense, IMPRESSION (see IMPRESS) is a mark made by pressure, either on the surface, or so as to penetrate below the surface of a body. It is of a distinct outline. INDENTATION (Lat. *in* and *dens*, a tooth) is a mark as of a tooth, either a sharp depression by violence of the surface of a solid body or a lateral notching of it, as in the indentations of a saw. It may be entirely wanting in distinctness of outline. MARK (Fr. *marque*) is more general, and may be cut, coloured, pressed, smeared, or produced in any way which causes a visible trace, whether accidentally

or by design, in protuberance or depression. **PRINT** (*see IMPRESS*) is an impression of definite outline, as the print of feet upon sand, but implying less force and depth than impression. **STAMP** (it occurs in almost all languages, as the German *stempfen*, Fr. *étamper*, Italian *stampare*, and others) is commonly employed at present of merely superficial impression, without depression of the surface, with colouring matter, as to stamp a letter. Sometimes, however, it is so accompanied; so that the characteristic meaning of stamp is rather a formal, official, or symbolical impression. Impression may be made by any part of the body, or by an instrument. Indentation commonly implies an instrument. Mark is indefinite. Print may be either; and stamp usually denotes an instrument. A stamp is a characteristic mark impressed.

IMPRINT. *See IMPRESS.*

IMPRISONMENT. *See CAPTIVITY.*

IMPROVE. BETTER. MEND.

It is somewhat remarkable that, contrary to the usual rule, the Latin term **IMPROVE** (*in* and *probus*, good) is of more extensive application than the Saxon **BETTER**, which is seldom used but of the outward circumstances or condition; while **improve** expresses all that is expressed by the phrase to make better, and is applicable to anything which may be conceived by the mind as existing in degrees of possible goodness. **MEND** (abbreviated from the Fr. *amender*, the Lat. *emendare*) has not the general scope of **improve**, but relates specifically to what is or has become defective or faulty. The mind of the child is improved when it is gradually instructed; his circumstances are bettered when he is well fed and clothed instead of poor. **Mend** is more generic, and applies to what is physically impaired, or morally ill-conducted. **Improve** is better applicable than either of the others to what exists only in the mind abstractedly; as a plan, conception, form of expression, matter of taste, subject of beauty or power.

"Reflect upon that great law of our nature, that exercise is the great source of *improvement* in all our faculties."—*Blair*.

Of old the term better had much the sense of improve. So Bishop Taylor,

"Grace is the improvement and *bettering* of nature; and Christian graces are the perfections of moral habits, and are but new circumstances, formalities, and degrees."

IMPUDENCE. *See BOLDNESS.*

IMPUDENT. *See IMPERTINENT.*

IMPUGN. *See CONFUTE.*

IMPUTE. *See ASCRIBE.*

INABILITY. *See DISABILITY.*

INACCESSIBLE. UNAPPROACHABLE.

UNAPPROACHABLE (Fr. *approcher*, *proche*, Lat. *prope*, near) expresses more than **INACCESSIBLE** (Lat. *in*, not, and *accedere*, to come to), for that which is unapproachable cannot be even drawn near to; that which is inaccessible cannot be come up to.

INACTIVE. INERT. SLUGGISH. SLOTHFUL.

INACTIVE is the more general. It simply denotes absence of activity, or indisposition to behave or act with vigour. This may proceed from a variety of causes. Persons may even remain inactive *purposely*. **INERT** (Lat. *iners*, *in*, not, and *ars*, *artis*, art, unskilled, idle) denotes something natural, constitutional, or habitual. **SLUGGISH** (from slug) indicates even more than this, as if some defect of temperament obstructed all efforts. **SLOTHFUL** (from sloth) is commonly employed as a relative term in connection with activity as a duty; hence such terms as, "Slothful in business." The man is slothful who is sluggish in such a way as to be dilatory or negligent of the duties which claim his attention. The sluggish man does what he has to do lazily or inertly; the slothful man gives his own ease the preference, and indulges it when he ought to be at work.

"Every one exerted himself to the utmost with a quiet and patient perseverance

equally distant from the tumultuous violence of terror, and the gloomy *inactivity* of despair."—*Cook's Voyages*.

"If to your builder you will conduct give,
A power to choose, to manage, and contrive,
Your idol chance, supposed *inert* and blind,
Must be enrolled an active, conscious mind."
Blackmore, Creation.

"Every man who has undertaken to instruct others can tell what slow advances he has been able to make, and how much patience it requires to recall vagrant inattention, to stimulate *stuggish* indifference, and to rectify absurd misapprehensions."—*Knox*.

"Not *slothful* in business, but fervent in spirit."—*English Bible*.

INADEQUATE. INSUFFICIENT.

INADEQUATE (*in*, not, and *adæquare*, to make equal) refers to an *external*, INSUFFICIENT (*in*, not, and *sufficere*, to suffice) to an *internal* requirement. That which is inadequate is insufficient for a purpose; while insufficient may refer only to a want, or abstract requirement. For instance, we might say, "You undertook to bring a hundred; but you have brought only ninety; this is insufficient." We could not use the term inadequate without specifying or implying a purpose for which the number was so. In very many cases the terms may be used interchangeably. Yet even in such cases, insufficient rather relates to quantity, inadequate to proportion. If we said, "The population is inadequately represented," we should mean, that the number of representatives was not in proportion to the number of the population. If we said insufficiently, that there were too few of the representatives themselves. An insufficient number; an inadequate force; an insufficient amount; an inadequate provision. When the insufficient has been so adjudged by the mind it may be called inadequate, which very often means, the insufficient conceived or determined to be such—subjective insufficiency. Moreover, insufficiency denotes more simply a lack of quantity; inadequate, a lack of force or quality, where no purpose or direct requirement exists. A prolix speaker

may have treated his subject quite sufficiently, yet very inadequately.

"We must accept them (translations) with all their unavoidable imperfections, as in general sufficiently representative of the sense of their originals, though in some particulars that sense be *inadequately* conveyed to us."—*Hurd*.

The word sufficient had of old a meaning answering to adequate; as when St. Paul asks, "Who is sufficient for these things?"

"It may here perhaps be pretended by modern deists, that the great ignorance and undeniable corruptness of the whole heathen world has always been owing, not to any absolute *insufficiency* of the light of Nature itself, but merely to the fault of the several particular persons in not sufficiently improving that light."—*Clarke*.

INADVERTENCY. INATTENTION.

INADVERTENCY (Lat. *in*, not, and *advertere*, to turn towards) is the quality or effect of not taking notice; INATTENTION (*in*, not, and *attendere*, to turn or stretch towards), of not taking heed. In the former case there was an involuntary accident; in the latter a culpable neglect. Or if there is anything culpable in inadvertency, it is of another nature, and comes from not realizing the importance of what was overlooked, not from any heedlessness as the cause of the overlooking, which would be inattention. Inadvertency therefore is occasional; inattention is more sustained, and, indeed, may involve many acts of inadvertency.

"When the intention seems upright, and the end proposed is to make men better and wiser, what is not ill executed should be received with approbation, with good words, and good wishes; and small faults and *inadvertencies* should be candidly excused."—*Jortin*.

"The universal indolence and *inattention* among us to things that concern the public, made me look back with the highest reverence on the glorious instances in antiquity of a contrary behaviour in like circumstances."—*Tatler*.

INANIMATE. See DEAD.

INANITY. VACUITY. VACANCY.

INANITY (Lat. *inanis*, empty) is not now used in a physical sense. It

denotes such mental emptiness as implies want of strength of mind, or want of character, a characterless rapidity of mind. The older philosophers used the terms *inane* and *inanity* in the sense of void, the voidness of space in the abstract, as Locke:—

“The great *inane*, beyond the confines of the world.”

The noun *inanity* is employed to express the emptiness of the body either from want of food, or want of digestive power.

“But nothing still from nothing would proceed.

Raise or depress, or magnify or blame,
Inanity will ever be the same.”

Smart.

“However pleased people may appear, they commonly retire from the company in which these (noise and laughter) have formed the only entertainment with an unsatisfied and uneasy *vacuity*, and sometimes with disgust and disagreeable reflection.”—*Knorr, Essays.*

“He landed them in safety, and conducted them to their companions, among whom he remarked the same *vacant* indifference as in those who had been on board.”—*Cook's Voyages.*

VACUITY (Lat. *vacuus*, empty) denotes simply emptiness, or an empty space. **VACANCY** draws attention to the fact that such emptiness is customarily filled, and so only temporary. **Vacuity** of mind would denote that the mind was unstored by education; **vacancy** of mind, that it was for a time idle or unoccupied, or was wanting in the common faculties.

INATTENTION. *See* **INADVERTENCY.**

INATTENTIVE. **CARELESS.**
THOUGHTLESS. **HEEDLESS.** **NEGLIGENT.** **REMISS.**

INATTENTIVE (*see* **INATTENTION**) is specific, and relates to casual matters. It is not so much an expression of an habitual temperament as of an occasional state, though this may often come from an habitual impatience of persistent thought. Like **HEEDLESS**, it relates to the passing matters of the moment, heedlessness (*A. S. hēdan*, to

mind) being inattention of a certain kind or to certain particulars, as to practical warning, advice, and consequences of conduct. **CARELESS** denotes that want of attention to matters of minor or ordinary moment which comes from unawakened interest or indifference. **THOUGHTLESS** is employed of more serious inattention to matters of graver moment. It designates that quality which, though apparently not highly reprehensible, may lead to very disastrous results. It is the unrestrained conduct of the man who does not pause to weigh the importance of actions or the probability of results. **NEGLIGENT** and **REMISS** both refer especially to cases where the contrary qualities are matters of duty and responsibility; but negligent is a term of more reproach than remiss. **Negligence** (Lat. *negligere*, to neglect) may lead to the omission of duty altogether; while remissness (Lat. *remittere*, *remissus*, to slacken) at least implies its performance, though in a careless manner. **Negligence** indicates want of care and interest; remissness, want of activity and energy.

“What prodigies can power divine perform
More grand than it produces year by year,

And all in sight of *inattentive* man?”

Cowper.

“Therefore for Coriolanus neither to care whether they love or hate him manifests that true knowledge he has in their disposition, and out of his noble *carelessness* lets them plainly see it.”—*Shakespeare.*

“It may be necessary to inform those who are unacquainted with the disposition and habits of seamen that they are so accustomed in ships of war to be directed in the care of themselves by their officers, that they lose the very idea of foresight, and contract the *thoughtlessness* of children.”—*Cook's Voyages.*

“To have no apprehension of mischief at hand, nor to make a just estimate of the danger, but *heedlessly* to run into it, be the hazard what it will, without considering of what use or consequence it may be, is not the resolution of a rational creature, but a brutish fury.”—*Locke.*

“This paper hath undone me; 'tis th' account

Of all that world of wealth I have drawn together

For mine own ends—indeed, to gain the
popedom,
And see my friends in Rome. Oh, negli-
gence!
Fit for a fool to fall by.”

Shakespeare.

“A wise or good man will not break with his friend for every offence, for a hasty word, for a slight affront or disrespect, for some indiscretion of conduct or frowardness of temper, for some *remissness* or tardiness in good offices, or some neglects or failures in services.”—*Waterland.*

INBORN. INBRED. INHERENT. INNATE.

The INBORN denotes more strictly what is involved in the nature, INBRED what has been involved in the habits or training of individuals. INNATE (Lat. *in* and *nascor*, *natus*, to be born) is the Latin equivalent of the Saxon inborn, but is used in a more philosophic way; as, “the doctrine of innate ideas,” that is, derived from sources independent of sensations from external objects. INHERENT (Lat. *in* and *herere*, to stick), unlike inborn and inbred, is applicable to many other things than those which have life, and has the general force of essentially, necessarily, vitally, or logically involved; as the inherent properties of matter, as distinguished from what may be temporarily or accidentally attached to it. Innate, inborn, and inherent may often be used interchangeably; inherent denoting permanent indwelling; innate and inborn, that this indwelling is not artificial or designed, but congenital.

INBRED. *See* INBORN.

INCAPABLE. INCOMPETENT.

INCAPABLE (Lat. *in*, not, and *capabilis*, *capio*, to take or hold) is an absolute term, denoting want of spatial extent or adequacy to contain, inadequate mental, or physical, or moral power, or general unfitness or insusceptibility. INCOMPETENT (Lat. *incompetens*, *see* COMPETENT) denotes a specific and relative incapacity as to a given task, duty, office, or undertaking. Incompetent is only employed of persons; incapable may be employed

of inanimate substances, as a bridge may be so dilapidated as to be incapable of repair. An incompetent person; an incapable subject. The incompetent cannot act; the incapable cannot be acted upon. The twofold force of incapable, or its active and passive significations, appears in the following, where the word means incapable in essence, and incapable in operation.

“The third and last shift is an endless succession of causes and effects, where all the subtlety consists in the word endless. For whatever is *incapable* of being a cause in any time ever was and ever will through eternity continue equally *incapable*.”—*Brooke.*

“Now that *incompetence* arises from this, that no man can judge rightly of two things but by comparing them together; and compare them he cannot unless he exactly know them both.”—*South.*

INCARCERATION. *See* CAPTIVITY.

INCESSANT. *See* CONTINUAL.

INCIDENT. *See* ACCIDENT and CIRCUMSTANCE.

INCIDENTAL. *See* CASUAL.

INCITE. *See* EXCITE.

INCLINATION. *See* BENT.

INCLINED. *See* LEAN.

INCLOSE. *See* CIRCUMSCRIBE.

INCLUDE. *See* CIRCUMSCRIBE and COMPRISE.

INCOHERENT. INCONGRUOUS. INCONSISTENT. INCOMPATIBLE.

INCOHERENT (Lat. *in*, not, *cohærere*, to stick together) is seldom employed of material substances, the term incohesive better supplying its place. It is generally applicable to cases which are deficient in that sort of unity which depends upon the interdependence of parts, especially in sequence or continuity, and commonly implies defective form of *statement*, because mere ideas, though they may be incoherent, cannot be pronounced so till they are expressed. INCONGRUOUS (*in*, not, and *congruere*, to agree) denotes that kind of absence of harmony or suitableness of which the taste and experience of men takes

cognizance; INCONSISTENT (*in*, not, and *consistere*, to stand together), that kind which cannot be adjusted to some recognized third term as a standard; INCOMPATIBLE (*in*, not, and *compatibilis*, from *con*, together, and *patior*, *passus*, to suffer), that which cannot exist under similar circumstances, conditions, or suppositions. Unlike the others, incompatible is only used specifically of cases preceded by the term *with*. Generally speaking, it is reason which decides upon inconsistency, taste upon incongruity, experience upon incompatibility, and judgment upon incoherency.

"Observe the *incoherence* of the things here joined together, making 'a view extinguish,' and 'extinguish seeds.'"—*Blair*.

"God commands not impossibilities; and all the ecclesiastical glue the liturgy or laymen can compound is not able to soder up two such *incongruous* natures into the one flesh of a true beseeching marriage."—*Milton*.

"If we should suppose Him to have been an impostor and a false prophet, a character would arise full of such contradiction and *inconsistency*, of such prudence and folly, of such knowledge and ignorance, of such goodness and wickedness, as never appeared in the world before or since."—*Jortin*.

"I affirm that, from our knowledge of any being's having certain properties *incompatible* with the essential properties of matter, we may certainly infer that the substance of that being and the substance of matter are not the same, though we have no idea of the substances themselves."—*Clarke*.

INCONGRUOUS. See INCOHERENT.

INCOMPATIBLE. See INCOHERENT.

INCOMPETENT. See INCAPABLE.

INCONSIDERABLE. See IMMATERIAL.

INCONSISTENT. See INCOHERENT.

INCONSTANT. CHANGEABLE. MUTABLE. VARIABLE. FICKLE. VERSATILE.

That which is INCONSTANT (Lat. *in*, not, and *constare*, to stand together), whether the term be employed of persons or qualities (it is only by poetic licence that the term is used of anything else, as Shakespeare's

"inconstant moon"), owes its character to an impatience of uniform or sustained adherence and attachment. CHANGEABLE denotes no more than exhibiting the phenomenon of easy or frequent change, whether in opinions, feelings, or the phenomena of physical nature and appearances; as a changeable disposition, changeable weather. As epithets of character, inconstant and changeable stand related to each other as negative and positive. The changeable person is continually rejecting what he has adopted, in order to take up something new. The inconstant person simply attaches himself to nothing long. Changeableness is active, inconstancy passive. Changeableness is a fault of commission, inconstancy of omission.

"Success on Mævius always does attend;
Inconstant Fortune is his constant friend."
Pomfret.

"I choose to give an instance in the stuff I have been speaking of, because the mixture being more simple, the way whereby the *changeableness* is produced may be the more easily apprehended."—*Boyle*.

MUTABLE (Lat. *mutabilis*, from *mutare*, to change) is seldom used of anything but external circumstances and events of life, though Byron has the forced phrase, "Most mutable in wishes." Mutable is a term of moral reflection, and is commonly associated with change, as it affects men's hopes, desires, attachments, observation, and experience.

"What man that sees the ever-whirling wheel
Of change, the which all mortal things doth sway,
But that thereby doth find and plainly feel
How *mutability* in them doth play
Her cruel sports, to many men's decay?"
Spenser.

VARIABLE denotes indefinite multiplicity of change. A thing may be changeable which is liable to one or two changes. It is variable when its transmutations are so numerous that they defy anticipation, and may assume many different phases in a short space. In matters of the will or feelings of men we use the term

variable; in physical matters, changeable. FICKLE (A. S. *ficol*) denotes that specific changeableness which exhibits itself in matters of taste, purpose, and attachment—the changeableness of easily transferred likes and dislikes. VERSATILE (Lat. *versatilis*, *versare*, to turn frequently) denotes changeableness, not as involuntary, but voluntary; not as weakness, but as indicating power of mind, an ability easily to adapt oneself to altered circumstances; as a “versatile genius.”

“We should also recollect that besides this temporary *variableness* of the mind, the tongue is unruly.”—*Knox*.

“The one was fire and *fickleness*; a child
Most mutable in wishes; but in mind
A wit as various, gay, grave, sage, or
wild,
Historian, bard, philosopher combined.”
Byron.

“Nature seems incapable of such extraordinary combinations as composed his (Julius Cæsar’s) *versatile* capacity.”—*Ibid*.

INCONTROVERTIBLE. INDUBITABLE. UNQUESTIONABLE. INDISPUTABLE. UNDENIABLE. IRREFRAGABLE.

These terms all express conclusiveness of evidence, not absolute certainty or truth. INCONTROVERTIBLE (*in*, not, and *controvertere*, to dispute) applies to such matters as are so clear and certain as not to admit of lengthened and argumentative questioning or contradiction. INDUBITABLE (Lat. *in*, not, and *dubitare*, to doubt) throws the matter back yet farther, and asserts that not only may the matter not be controverted in terms, but not even doubted of in the mind. UNQUESTIONABLE expresses that which may not be called in question; INDISPUTABLE, that which may not be disputed; UNDENIABLE, that which may not be denied; IRREFRAGABLE (Lat. *in*, not, and *refragari*, from *frangere*, to break), that of which the argumentative force or the evidence may not be broken. It is in their application that their differences consist. Incontrovertible is employed of statements, views, or opinions, evidence, and the like, but

not of simple facts; indubitable, of facts and assertions; unquestionable, of propositions; indisputable, of rights and claims also; undeniable, of statements; irrefragable, of evidence and arguments.

INCORPOREAL. See IMMATERIAL.

INCREASE. See GROW.

INCREASE. ACCESSION. AUGMENTATION. ADDITION.

INCREASE (Old Fr. *encrois*, Lat. *increscere*) is the most comprehensive of these terms, and indeed includes the rest. It denotes addition of bulk, quantity, number, degree, value, force, and extension, either by internal vitality or accession from without. ACCESSION (Lat. *accedere*, *accessus*) is an accidental mode of increase by addition from without; while both ADDITION (Lat. *addere*, *additus*) and AUGMENTATION (Lat. *augmentare*, *augere*, to increase) imply *purposed* increase. Augmentation is commonly increase in what is of the nature of a desirable possession, and is not consonantly with present custom employed, like addition and accession, of such things as are evils, as misery or misfortune. Increase and augmentation are intrinsic, accession and addition extrinsic, being applicable to the thing which causes, not that which receives, increase. Increase stands to addition or accession as the effect to the cause, and expresses not an operation, but a state or result. In the case of increase and augmentation, the thing added loses its individuality, and passes into the general mass and unity of the matter augmented; in addition and accession, they still remain, as it were, outside it. So the addition and accession may still be contemplated after the union has been made; but no separate part or item is expressed by increase or augmentation. An estate bequeathed to a proprietor, in addition to that which he holds already, may be a valuable accession, and tend not only to increase his property, but to augment considerably the revenue derived from it.

“Wherever the commerce between the

sexes is regulated by marriage, and a provision for that mode of subsistence to which each class of the community is accustomed can be procured with ease and certainty, there the number of the people will *increase*; and the rapidity as well as the extent of the *increase* will be proportioned to the degree in which these causes exist.”—*Paley*.

“Ancient Troy, seated on an eminence at the foot of Mount Ida, overlooked the mouth of the Hellespont, which scarcely received an *accession* of waters from the tribute of those immortal rivulets the Simois and Scamander.”—*Gibbon*.

“Though fortune change, his constant spouse remains,
Augments his joys, or mitigates his pains.”
Pope.

“Every man of common sense can demonstrate in speculation, and may be fully convinced that all the praises and commendations of the whole world can *add* no more to the real and intrinsic value of a man than they can *add* to his stature.”—*Swift*.

INCRECULITY. *See* DISBELIEF.

INCULCATE. *See* IMPLANT.

INCURSION. *See* INROAD.

INDEBTED. OBLIGED.

INDEBTED (in and debt, Lat. *debere*, *debitus*, to owe) is in reference to what may have been received from or done for us by others. It is a much stronger term than OBLIGED. “I am indebted to him for saving my life.” It would be inadequate to say obliged (Lat. *obligare*, to bind over). Obligated is never employed directly of events or circumstances—which is the case with indebted—but only of persons. “For the abolition of slavery in this country we are mainly indebted (not obliged) to Christianity.” The feeling of moral obligation is not necessarily implied in indebted; hence the term is employed with readiness of *many* agents, where obliged could not be so employed. In such cases it seems to mean little more than acknowledgment of a cause or source; as, “For such elements of the national character we are indebted to our Saxon ancestry.” On the other hand, obliged always indicates *some* amount of favour received, and gratitude due, though the favour may be very slight, and cannot, as we have seen, be *very*

great; as to be obliged by an act of substantial kindness, or a piece of common courtesy.

“As a misery is not to be measured from the nature of the evil, but from the temper of the sufferer, I shall present my readers who are unhappy either in reality or imagination with an allegory, for which I am *indebted* to the great father and prince of poets.”—*Tatler*.

“Thus man to heaven by his own strength would soar,
And would not be *obliged* to God for more.”
Dryden.

INDECENT. *See* IMMODEST.

INDELICATE. *See* IMMODEST.

INDENTATION. *See* IMPRESSION.

INDICATE. *See* SHOW.

INDICATION. TOKEN. SYMPTOM.

INDICATION (Lat. *indicare*, *indicatus*, to indicate) is a subjective token, that is, its force as a sign depends upon the understanding of the observer. Hence an indication may be either very simple, direct, and palpable, or complex, indirect, or inferential. TOKEN (A. S. *tæcon*, with other forms connected with *tecan*, to teach) conveys simpler and more direct evidence, and may consist in a visible material object; as a book is given in token, or as a token of friendship. An indication is not so used, and is of a more complex character; as an act, a speech, an expression, a line of conduct. SYMPTOM (Gr. *σύν*, together, and *πῶμα*, from *πίπω*, to fall) is a specific token or indication naturally attached to that which it indicates, so that seeing the one enables us to infer the other. Like indication, but more strongly, it consists not in simple objects, and derives its force from experience and induction of instances in which it occurs. A token is recognized by sense and feeling; an indication, by observation and experience; a symptom, by knowledge and science.

“Modesty is the certain *indication* of a great spirit, and impudence the affectation of it.”—*Spectator*.

“In every canoe there were young plantains and branches of a tree which the Indians call e midho. These, as we after-

wards learnt, were brought as *tokens* of peace and amity."—*Cook's Voyages*.

"It will save the patient from that *symp-tome* of being afraid of water, which is incident unto such as be so bitten."—*Holland, Pliny*.

Tokens and symptoms are of things present; indications may also be of things to come. Symptoms accompany. Tokens are given. Indications are made or given, accompany, precede, or even follow.

INDIFFERENCE. APATHY. INSENSIBILITY.

INDIFFERENCE (*in*, not, and *differentia*, difference) denotes no more than a casual fact, namely, that the presence or absence of something makes no difference to a person. This may be in many ways, as with or without a full knowledge of circumstances, so that it might be removable or not. It expresses a state, and not any quality of persons. INSENSIBILITY and APATHY (Gr. *ἀπαθεία*, *á*, not, and *πάθος*, suffering or feeling) are qualities inherent, though insensibility is commonly acquired or produced, apathy innate; but apathy and insensibility are used in different relations; for insensibility may be either intellectual or moral; apathy is always moral. Insensibility may be either from want of understanding or from want of feeling; apathy is from want of feeling. Again, in apathy and insensibility the matter is looked at from different points of view. Apathy as it exists in the person; insensibility as its existence is evidenced by the unavailability of external appliances or influences to excite feeling. Hence apathy is used abstractedly, insensibility in specific reference to some such appliance or influence. A man is simply apathetic. He is insensible to something.

"In matters of religion, he (the upright man) hath the *indifference* of a traveller whose great concernment is to arrive at his journey's end; but for the way that leads thither, be it high or low, all is one to him, so long as he is but certain that he is on the right way."—*Sharp*.

"Pride is always an ignorant, lazy, or cowardly acquiescence in a false appearance of excellence, and proceeds not from con-

sciousness of our attainments, but *insensibility* of our wants."—*Rambler*.

"Does he (the sage) constantly indulge this severe wisdom, which, by pretending to elevate him above human accidents, does in reality harden his heart and render him careless of the interests of mankind and of society? No; he knows that in this sullen *apathy* neither true wisdom nor true happiness can be found."—*Hume*.

Apathy, or *dispassion*, was recommended by the Stoical philosophers as the secret of human happiness.

INDIGENT. See POOR.

INDIGENOUS. ABORIGINAL.

The separation in use between these terms is at present wider than formerly. INDIGENOUS (Lat. *indigenus*, *inde*, for *in*, and *genus*, *gigno*, to beget) is seldom used of races, but most commonly of the vegetable productions of a country; while ABORIGINAL (Lat. *aborigines*, *ab*, from, and *origo*, origin) is used only of men. But, even as employed of men, a distinction is observable. An indigenous people is an ethnological, aborigines an historical, term. The former term is used to express the earliest in physical history, the latter the earliest in the history of civilization. The race found in existence in newly-discovered countries by civilized explorers is called aboriginal. Indigenous is used in a metaphorical way, not applicable to aboriginal, as—

"The emotions *indigenous* to the human mind."—*I. Taylor*.

INDIGNATION. RESENTMENT.

INDIGNATION (Lat. *indignatio*, *in*, not, and *dignus*, worthy) is a feeling akin to anger, but without its selfishness, being excited by a real or supposed wrong towards ourselves or others, in which the feeling of wrong predominates over and tempers the sense of hurt, and in which the existence of injury, though it must mostly follow practically, is not essential. RESENTMENT (Fr. *ressentir*, *re*, again, and *sentire*, to feel) is more energetic and active than indignation, which may be expressed only in words, or even a look; while resentment seeks

to make itself felt. It is the reaction of the mind against personal injury or insult. It may be more or less lasting; and in its purer and more unselfish form may be excited on behalf of others. It denotes a stronger feeling of personal dislike against the offender than indignation, which springs from the act.

"*Indignation* expresses a strong and elevated disapprobation of mind, which is also inspired by something flagitious in the conduct of another."—*Cogan*.

Up to a late period of English literature, the word resentment was used to signify the appropriate return of feeling, whether in the way of gratitude or its opposite, which is the simple and etymological force of the word. So Bishop Bull writes—

"Throughout this excellent song the sacred Virgin expresseth a deep sense of her own unworthiness, and upon that account a profound *resentment* of the singular favour of the Almighty bestowed upon her."

"*Resentment*," says *Cogan*, "is a lesser degree of wrath, excited by smaller offences committed against less irritable minds. It is a deep, reflective displeasure against the conduct of the offender."

INDIGNITY. See INSULT.

INDISCRIMINATE. See PROMISCUOUS.

INDISPOSITION. ILLNESS. (See DISEASE.)

INDISPOSITION is a slight disorder of the healthy functions of the body. ILLNESS is continuous indisposition. It supposes an actual or probable termination, and conveys an idea of the accidents of sickness generally, without the features of any specific complaint.

INDISPUTABLE. See INCONTROVERTIBLE.

INDISTINCT. CONFUSED. OBSCURE.

INDISTINCT (*in*, not, and *distinguere*, *distinctus*, to distinguish) may, like the other synonyms here mentioned, be employed of the physical or the mental perception—of the sight, the hearing, or the understanding. That

is indistinct which does not present itself to the eye or the mind in clear outline and definite totality, so that we comprehend it positively and negatively, and see at once what it is, and what it is not. The distinct is clear in itself, and separable from surrounding objects. CONFUSED (Lat. *confundere*, *confusus*, to confound or pour together) denotes a manifold indistinctness of parts, relations, or objects in relationship. OBSCURE (Lat. *obscurus*) expresses that which is difficult to comprehend from want of light, clearness, or perspicuity. Indistinctness and obscurity, as they are applied to matters of the understanding, commonly relate, the former to the mode of expression, the latter to the subject matter. A person's words may be indistinct even from thickness of utterance. His expressions may be so from want of power to make things plain. If he is obscure, it is probably from insufficient statement, or even from the inherent abstruseness of the subject. So we speak of indistinct ideas, confused statements, obscure subjects, meanings, or allusions.

"The colours of objects, according as they are more distant, become more faint and languid, and are tinged more with the azure of the intervening atmosphere. To this we may add that their minute parts become more *indistinct*, and their outline less accurately defined."—*Reid*.

"Amphion so made stones and timber leap
Into fair figures from a *confused* heap.
And in the symmetry of her parts is
found

A power like that of harmony in sound."
Walter.

"These questions of predestination being perplexed, thorny, and troublesome through their *obscureness*, may, without all detriment of salvation, be either unknown or discussed."
—*Bishop Hall*.

INDIVIDUAL. PARTICULAR.
SINGLE. SOLITARY.

The difference between these terms is best seen by considering that against which each stands opposed. INDIVIDUAL (Lat. *individuus*, *in*, not, and *dividere*, to divide) is opposed to collective; PARTICULAR (Lat. *particularis*, *pars*, *partis*, a part), to universal.

Hence an individual instance is one, and *not more*; particular is one, and *not another*. SINGLE (Lat. *singulus*) has the force of *only one*, or even one, standing against a possible plurality, and hence is commonly employed in a negative sentence; while SOLITARY (Lat. *solitarius*, *solus*, alone) is employed in positive sentences. "I have found one solitary instance." "I have not found a single instance." Particular implies something specifically, as distinguished from generally or universally, true. If I say, "It is true in this particular case," I discard all responsibility of statement as regards other such cases.

INDOLENT. See IDLE.

INDUBITABLE. See INCONTROVERTIBLE.

INDUCE. See ACTUATE.

INDUCEMENT. See MOTIVE.

INDULGE. See GRATIFY.

INDUSTRIOUS. See DILIGENT.

INEBRIATION. See DRUNKENNESS.

INEBRIETY. See DRUNKENNESS.

INEFFABLE. UNSPEAKABLE. UNUTTERABLE. INEXPRESSIBLE.

INEFFABLE (Lat. *ineffabilis*, *in*, not, *e*, out, and *fari*, to speak) is commonly used only of those things which transcend expression by their admirable or precious qualities; as the ineffable joys of heaven. UNSPEAKABLE serves the purpose of a superlative adjective of quantity, especially in summing up states of mind; as unspeakable joy, misery, satisfaction. UNUTTERABLE has a tendency to the unfavourable, as INEXPRESSIBLE to the favourable. We more often speak of unutterable sorrow than unutterable joy. Unutterable, however, has the meaning of too deep to be uttered at all; while inexpressible means too high or too deep to be *adequately* conveyed in terms. Hence it may apply to the inherent expressiveness of *words only*, to which the others are inapplicable;

as, "Such an idea of a foreign writer may be inexpressible in English."

"He said, and on His Son with rays direct
Shone full. He all His Father full expressed

Ineffably into His face received,
And thus the filial Godhead answering
spake." *Milton.*

"And therefore if a man will rightly think of God Himself, let his mind overrun all worldly creations, and conceive Him only, alone, which is highest, best, most excellent, most mighty, and Him that without exception doth *unspeakably* exceed all other things."—*Fisher, Godly Treatise.*

"I believe few parents would wish their sons to live the life of Cowper, which, though virtuous and amiable, was at certain times *unutterably* woeful."—*Knox.*

"Who since the morning hour set out from
heaven,
Where God resides, and ere mid-day
arrived
In Eden, distance *inexpressible*
By numbers that have name." *Milton.*

INEFFECTUAL. VAIN. ABORTIVE. FRUITLESS.

Of these terms, which all relate to human endeavour, VAIN is the most general (Lat. *vanus*, empty). It may apply to the object of the attempt as well as to the attempt itself. Accordingly, this twofold force is often expressed in the use of vain. A vain ambition may mean that the effort will be fruitless, and the object not worth achieving were it otherwise. Accordingly, as the rest express failure as limited by human weakness, vain may express that failure which comes necessarily from the nature of the thing aimed at, or even desired. Thoughts, hopes, and desires or suppositions may be vain; but only efforts are ineffectual, abortive, or fruitless. INEFFECTUAL and FRUITLESS differ as the specific from the general. The former relates to a particular end, which is represented as not gained; the latter to the absence generally of profitable results. Again, ineffectual is applicable to material influences or powers; fruitless, to the exertion of the human will. We speak of fruitless attempts or ineffectual attempts, but ineffectual,

not fruitless, remedies. ABORTIVE, like fruitless, is only applicable to voluntary efforts, not mere natural powers, and commonly to such efforts as imply some amount of design, or complex efforts and schemes (Lat. *abortivus*, *ab*, away from, and *orior*, *ortus*, to spring). Ineffectual and fruitless imply more strongly that the failure is owing to the weakness of the person making the attempt; abortive is more external in its character, and may denote the untoward issue as the result of unforeseen or irresistible counteraction of what has been well prepared. Unforeseen casualties may render the best-laid plans abortive.

"Hereford was surprised on the 18th of December by Colonel Birch and Colonel Morgan, after it had been besieged for about two months *ineffectually* by the Scots."—*Ludlow*.

"Full sure he thought Troy's fatal hour arrived.

Fain thought! he knew not the designs of Jove,

That both to Greeks and Trojans he ordained

Hard conflict yet, and agonies and groans."—*Cowper*.

"Any enterprise undertaken without resolution, managed without care, prosecuted without vigour, will easily be dashed, and prove *abortive*, ending in disappointment, damage, disgrace, and dissatisfaction."—*Barrow*.

"The *fruitlessness* of their inquiries into the arcana of the Godhead."—*Warburton*.

INEQUALITY. See DISPARITY.

INERT. See INACTIVE.

INEXORABLE. See IMPLACABLE.

INEXPRESSIBLE. See INEFFABLE.

INFAMY. See IGNOMINY.

INFAMOUS. See SCANDALOUS.

INFATUATION. FOLLY.

FOLLY is of two kinds—mental and practical. The former is weakness of understanding; the latter, weakness of conduct. INFATUATION (Lat. *fatuus*, foolish) brings out more strongly the idea of folly (Fr. *fol*, fool) in its practical aspect. The infatuated man acts under some

peculiar beguiling, fascinating influence, leading him from the paths of prudence and self-control; some one thought or desire which blinds his understanding to what he ought to do or avoid, and for the sake of which other needful considerations are sacrificed.

"The *infatuations* of the sensual and frivolous part of mankind are amazing; but the *infatuations* of the learned and sophistical are incomparably more so."—*I. Taylor*.

"What *folly* 'tis to hazard life for ill!"
Shakespeare.

INFECTION. See CONTAGION.

INFERENCE. DEDUCTION. CONCLUSION. CONSEQUENCE. INDUCTION.

INFERENCE (Lat. *in*, and *ferre*, to bring) is the broadest of these terms, denoting any process by which from one truth or fact laid down or known we draw another. Inference may be either by induction or deduction, and hence may be probable or certain. Inference by induction is more or less probable, except where all cases of the kind have been collated, when it ceases, strictly speaking, to be inference, and is only the assigning of a common name, or stating an universal proposition. From having seen twenty swans all white, one might infer that all swans are so. This would be only a probability in itself, and, as a fact, not true. In induction we observe a sufficient number of individual facts or cases, and extending by analogy what is true of them to others of the same class, establish a general principle or law. This is the method of physical science. The process of deduction is the converse of this. We lay down a general truth, and connect a particular case with it by means of a middle term. When inference is conducted by the syllogistic process, it is DEDUCTION (Lat. *deducere*, to draw from), which, if rightly conducted, must be logically sound, though not necessarily true in fact. In a chain of reasoning the minor, subordinate, or less fully-expressed conclusions are called inferences, as distinguished from the great common inference or CONCLUSION, which terminates and

establishes, or, as it were, shuts up (*concludere*, to shut) the argument. A conclusion is a proposition viewed relatively to others from which it has been deduced. A CONSEQUENCE (Lat. *consequi*, to follow) is a conclusion regarded as admitting of degrees of closeness or directness. Between the first stage of any argument and any particular consequence several links of reasoning may intervene. Hence the common phrase, "remote consequences," as meaning results which will follow sooner or later from what has been stated or conceded.

"Though it may chance to be right in the conclusion, it is yet unjust and mistaken in the method of *inference*."—*Glanvill*.

"From the words of Moses cited by our Saviour, the doctrine of a future state may as clearly be *deduced* as from any single text which can be produced out of any one of the Prophets."—*Jortin*.

"He granted him the major and minor, but denied him the *conclusion*."—*Addison*.

"Link follows link by necessary *consequence*."—*Coleridge*.

"When by thus comparing a number of cases agreeing in some circumstances, but differing in others, and all attended with the same result, a philosopher connects, as a general law of nature, the event with its physical cause, he is said to proceed according to the method of *induction*."—*Stewart*.

INFERIOR. SECOND. SECONDARY. MINOR.

INFERIOR (Lat. comparative of *inferus*, low) is not employed in the physical sense, but expresses the quality of being lower in rank, importance, excellence, force, value, and the like. SECOND (Lat. *secundus*) relates to a presumed or declared order of sequence, implying a first, which it immediately succeeds. The principle of the sequence may be any; as, place, time, value, dignity, or arbitrarily assumed. SECONDARY is opposed to primary, and denotes second in order of necessity, importance, or operation. MINOR (Lat. *minor*, less) has, in addition to the idea of inferiority, that of subordination; as the minor sections of a body, where the relation is not extrinsic, but intrinsic.

"*Inferiors* both in fortune and in understanding."—*Tatler*.

"But here you exclaim of 'the strange abuse made of quotations and *second-hand* representations.'"—*Waterland*.

"If Europe herself hath so many mother-languages quite discrepant one from the other, besides *secondary* tongues and dialects which exceed the number of their mothers, what shall we think of the other three huge continents in point of different languages?"—*Howell*.

"Asia Minor."—*Geography*.

INFIDELITY. See DISBELIEF.

INFINITY. See BOUNDLESS.

INFIRM. See FEEBLE.

INFIRMITY. See FAILING.

INFLUENCE. See AFFECT.

INFLUENCE. SWAY. ASCENDANCY.

INFLUENCE is hidden or indirect exercise of power, which, in personal matters, may spring from a variety of sources, as talent, wealth, position, or persuasive power. It is in moral things analogous to what takes place in physical, when effects are produced by gentle, gradual, or unobserved processes for good or ill. SWAY (Prov. Eng. *sweg*, connected with weigh and swing) is power of control consciously exerted to definite ends; while influence may be altogether indefinite. ASCENDANCY (ascendant, or that degree of the ecliptic which rises above the horizon at the time of birth, supposed to exercise great influence over the character and destiny of individuals) denotes, according to its origin, a governing or controlling power in relation to a certain time or set of circumstances. It is casual influence. Sway is relative to a supposed course or line of procedure which has been effected. To sway the counsels or decisions of an assembly, for instance, is to exercise an altering or modifying influence.

INFORM. ACQUAINT. APPRISE. ADVISE. INSTRUCT. TEACH.

INFORM (Lat. *in* and *forma*, shape or form) relates only to matters of

fact made known to one who could not have known them before. IN-

STRUCTION (Lat. *instruere, instructus*) relates to principles drawn from known facts. TEACHING (A. S. *tecan*, to teach), as distinct from instruction, is applied to practice (it may be the practice of an art or branch of knowledge). A child is instructed in grammar, and taught to speak a language. Teach has a purely mechanical application, which does not belong to instruct. A dog may be taught a trick; but he could not be instructed in anything. The two processes of teaching and instruction may thus go on simultaneously. In mathematics there is no information, because the propositions are not statements of fact, but are based upon principles assumed. Information is of new facts; instruction is of undeveloped truths. Information extends knowledge; instruction gives additional understanding; teaching, additional power of doing. ACQUAINT (Fr. *accointer*, Lat. *accognitare*, from *cognosco, cognitus*, to know), APPRISE (Fr. *appris*, from *apprendre*, the Lat. *apprehendere*), and ADVISE (Fr. *aviser*, Lat. *ad* and *videre, visus*, to see) closely resemble inform, inasmuch as they relate to the communication of matters of fact. I inform a man when I simply tell him a fact which he did not know before. I acquaint him with that of which I furnish him with all the details. So I inform him of the fact, and acquaint him with the particulars of it. I apprise him of what particularly concerns him to know, whether it be a good or an evil, or a danger, or a probability of any sort. I advise him of that which I impart to him formally, officially, or as in duty bound, of what occurs in due course.

"Your (Algernon Sidney's) present abode was no secret to me before I knew it from your own hand; that *information* having been given me about two or three months since by some English gentlemen who passed from Italy through Germany and these parts into England."—*Sir W. Temple*.

"Divers that first believe the Scripture but upon the Church's score are afterwards by *acquaintedness* brought to believe the Scripture upon its own score; that is, upon the discovery of those intrinsic excellences

and prerogatives which manifest its heavenly origination."—*Boyle*.

"Since, then, the expiation of sin by the sacrifice of Christ is a doctrine not only taught in the Gospel itself, but enforced also by him who came only to prepare the way for it, it is evident from the care taken to *apprise* the world of it, even before Christianity was promulgated, how important and essential a part this must be of that Divine religion."—*Bishop Porteus*.

"There were several letters from France just come in with *advice* that the king was in good health."—*Addison*.

"The coldness of passion seems to be the natural ground of ability and honesty among men, as the government or moderation of them the great end of philosophical and moral *instructions*."—*Sir W. Temple*.

"As a child is *taught* to expect from its parent, so are we taught to expect from God every good of which our nature is capable."—*Gilpin*.

INFORMATION. See INFORM.

INFRACTION. INFRINGEMENT.

Although these terms are connected by a common derivation (Lat. *infringere, frangere, fractus*, to break), they are differently applied: INFRACTION being reserved for the violation of public rights and formal treaties; INFRINGEMENT of minor, or else more personal and social claims. The infraction of a treaty of commerce; the infringement upon one's neighbour's liberty or convenience; an infringement of the laws of good society or good manners.

"The criminals destined to eternal punishment in this division are the *infringers* of the duties of imperfect obligation, which civil laws cannot reach; such as those without natural affection to brothers, duty to parents, protection to clients, or charity to the poor."—*Warburton*.

"The young King of Denmark, upon his coming to the crown, complained of these *infractions*."—*Burnet*.

INFRINGE. See ENCROACH.

INFRINGEMENT. See INFRACTION.

INFUSE. See IMPLANT.

INGENIOUS. CLEVER.

INGENIOUS (Lat. *ingenium*, the

mind) is purely mental. **CLEVER** (*see* **CLEVER**) is practical as well as mental. Ingenuity is more akin to genius, cleverness to talent; the one is inventive, the other executive. The use of clever in English is overdone, as the term is made to stand for every form of intellectual ability and adaptive faculty. Ingenuity is genius on a small scale, or as shown in matters of minor moment or less gravity and seriousness. A readiness in nicely doing actions not habitual is commonly called cleverness, where bodily, and ingenuity, where mental, activity is engaged. Cleverness is ingenuity of the body, as ingenuity is cleverness of the mind. Men may contrive ingeniously, and manage cleverly.

"Of all the means which human *ingenuity* has contrived for recalling the images of real objects, and awakening by representation similar emotions to those which are raised by the original, none is so full and extensive as that which is executed by words and writing."—*Blair*.

"He (the Duke of Monmouth) gave the hangman but half the reward he intended, and said if he cut off his head *cleverly*, and not so butcherly as he did Lord Russell's, his man should give him the rest."—*Burnet*.

INGENUOUS. *See* **HEARTY**.

INGRAFT. *See* **IMPLANT**.

INGRATiate. **INSINUATE.**

These terms differ as to the modes adopted. **INSINUATE** (*in* and *sinus*, a fold) leans to an unfavourable signification, as often implying artfulness of purpose and selfish ends; **INGRATiate** (*in* and *gratus*, pleasing), the compassing the same end with candour and merit. **Insinuate** is used of physical influences and substances, and, metaphorically, of influences in the abstract; **ingratiate**, only of the acts and demeanour of human agents. **Ingratiate** is never employed, like **insinuate**, of simple ideas, notions, suppositions, or statements. **Insinuation**, in this sense, is indirect declaration, or a statement of a part, leaving more to be inferred.

"One of those who came off was the old man who had already *ingratiated* himself into our favour."—*Cook's Voyages*.

"Some are wont to have this device,

namely, in taking their time and opportunity to commend those who love, choose, and do the self-same things, and, briefly, who are of the same conditions, and given to the same humour with themselves, do wind and *insinuate* into the grace and favour of the hearer, and by such an occasion draw his heart unto them."—*Holland, Plutarch*.

INHERENT. *See* **INBORN**.

INHUMAN. *See* **BARBAROUS**.

INIMICAL. *See* **ADVERSE**.

INIQUITY. *See* **CRIME**.

INIQUITOUS. *See* **NEFARIOUS**.

INJUNCTION. *See* **COMMAND**.

INJURE. *See* **IMPAIR**.

INJURIOUS. *See* **NOXIOUS**.

INJURY. *See* **CRIME and HURT**.

INJUSTICE. *See* **CRIME and HURT**.

INNATE. *See* **INBORN**.

INNOCUOUS. *See* **HARMLESS**.

INNER. **INWARD.** **INTERNAL.**

INTERIOR. **INTRINSIC.**

These terms may be partly illustrated by those to which they stand opposed. Thus **inner** is opposed to **outer**, **inward** to **outward**, **internal** to **external**, **interior** to **exterior**. **INNER** is employed of such things as admit of degrees of comparison in relation to a state or position inwards. Thus **inner** means more towards the centre, and has a superlative—inmost or innermost. The inner walls of a fortification are those which approach the stronghold. **INWARD** is used, not like **inner**, of physical locality or relationship, but morally to express the quality of being within, as opposed to being exposed to observation or view; as, "He believes it in his inward heart, whatever he may say." **INTERNAL** is always specific, being not an absolute but a relative term, and coupled with some object in particular implied or expressed; as, the internal arrangements of a house; internal trade, which implies external commerce, to which it stands opposed. **INTERIOR**, like **inner**, admits of degrees, which are excluded from **internal**; as the interior

districts of a country, which are removed in different degrees from the borders or confines of it. **INTRINSIC** is internally or inherently belonging, as distinguished from what is only apparent or fictitious; hence genuine, real.

INOFFENSIVE. See **HARMLESS.**

INORDINATE. IMMODERATE. EXCESSIVE. EXTRAVAGANT. EXORBITANT.

INORDINATE (Lat. *inordinatus*, *in*, not, and *ordinare*, *ordo*, *ordinis*, order, not limited to rule) is well employed of human desires; as an inordinate ambition, or love of pleasure. **IMMODERATE** (*in*, not, and *moderare*, *moderatus*, *modus*, a limit) has a wider application to anything exceeding just limits; as immoderate demands, immoderate grief. **EXCESSIVE** (*excedere*, *excessus*, to go beyond) differs from immoderate in relating to the thing itself, not to the person; as, "He was immoderate in his claims;" or, "The demand itself was excessive." In the term excessive expenditure there is not the same reflection on the conduct of individuals as in immoderate expenditure. **EXTRAVAGANT** (Lat. *extra*, beyond, and *vagari*, to wander) has the same application, with the idea of a reckless absence of calculation or proportion; as an extravagant demand. **EXORBITANT** (*ex*, out, and *orbita*, an orbit) denotes the designedly extravagant. A demand may be extravagant from want of attention; it is exorbitant as the result of an extortionate aim, or a desire to enjoy or acquire more than is reasonable, fair, or just.

"Their object is to merge all natural and all social sentiment in *inordinate* vanity."—*Burke*.

"In the fourth place, from all that has been said, we should learn never to be *immoderately* anxious about our external situation, but submit our lot with cheerfulness to the disposal of Heaven."—*Blair*.

"*Excessive* lenity and indulgence are ultimately *excessive* rigour."—*Knox, Essays*.

"They declaimed against human reason. They depressed it as *extravagantly* as their adversaries had advanced it."—*Warburton*.

"The distresses of government aided the friends of liberty, who managed their advantage so well as in process of time to support their claims, redress their grievances, establish their rights, and, in a word, to reduce the crown from the *exorbitances* it affected within the ancient and legal boundaries of the constitution."—*Bishop Hurd*.

INQUIRE. INTERROGATE. ASK. QUESTION.

INQUIRE (Lat. *inquirere*, *in* and *quero*, to seek) denotes the process of seeking for truth by one or more questions, which may be put in different ways and in different directions, or answered from different sources. **INTERROGATE** (Lat. *inter* and *rogare*, to ask) is to put several questions in a formal and systematic manner, and is directed only to one quarter and to living persons. **ASK** is simpler, and generally turns upon a simple affirmative or negative answer to a matter of fact; as, "Ask him if such is the case." **QUESTION** (Lat. *questio*, *querere*, to seek) is of wider meaning; and, in addition to the sense of interrogate, has that of disputing or arguing from a doubt of some specific statement or alleged fact. Where question is used in the sense of putting questions, it differs from interrogate in being of wider signification. Interrogation is of some fact. Question may be of the possession of knowledge in a more extended way, as to question a student in history. Hence question, unlike the others, turns upon matters more strictly connected with the condition of the person questioned. Curiosity leads us to question. Authoritativeness appears in interrogation; desire of knowledge, in inquiry.

"And all that is wanting to the perfection of this art (of medicine) will undoubtedly be found if able men, and such as are instructed in the ancient rules, will make a further *inquiry* into it, and endeavour to arrive at that which is hitherto unknown by that which is already known."—*Dryden*.

"The traveller, whoever he might be, coming to the fortified habitation of a chieftain, would probably have been *interrogated* from the battlements, admitted with caution at the gate, introduced to a petty monarch,

fierce with habitual hostility, and vigilant with ignorant suspicion."—*Johnson*.

"Th' eternal quest'ner shun; a certain rule,

There is no blab like to the quest'ning fool.
Ev'n scarce before you turn yourself about,

Whate'er he hears his leaky tongue runs out."
Hamilton, Horace.

"We own it to be highly proper that men should ask themselves why they believe; but it is equally proper for them to ask why they disbelieve."—*Secker*.

INQUIRY. See EXAMINATION.

INQUISITIVE. CURIOUS. PRYING.

The CURIOUS person (see CURIOUS) is eager for information generally, or for the possession of it in any one of many ways, as in problems of Nature, art, or science, as well as effects and causes of little or no importance or concern to himself. He is INQUISITIVE (Lat. *inquisitivus, inquirere*) who busies himself with inquiries on a small scale of no intrinsic importance or of little concern to himself. The PRYING man (the derivation of pry is very uncertain) uses his own powers of observation, rather than questions put to others, for the purpose of discovering their secret affairs from a puerile or low-minded curiosity.

INROAD. INVASION. INCURSION. IRRUPTION. INTRUSION.

Forceful or unallowed entrance is common to these words. An INROAD is an entry by some novel and forceful method, involving an injury and trespass in the action. INVASION (Lat. *invadere*, to invade) denotes a forceful entry upon what is the property of another, with a violation of his right of property, and with the direct intention of depriving him of some such right, or in retaliation for alleged injuries committed by him. INCURSION (Lat. *incurrere, incursus*, to run into) is a lighter kind of invasion, without the idea of permanence or occupation, and, as a transitory act, involving the original intention of a return. IRRUPTION is more violent and sustained, being done in the spirit of destruction and conquest. INTRUSION is such an entry as, being

without violence, is nevertheless without right or welcome.

"Far from their inroads in my pastures feed

The lowing heifer, and the pampered steed."
Tickell, Iliad.

"The universal good-will which is so strong in him exposes him to the assaults of every invader upon his time, his conversation, and his property."—*Tutler*.

"Raise an embattled wall, with lofty towers;
From space to space be ample gates around

For passing chariots, and a trench profound.

So Greece to combat shall in safety go,
Nor fear the fierce incursions of the foe."

Pope, Homer.

"Letters had there been happily profest in very ancient time with frequency of scholars, until irruptions of pagans had brought them to this lately restored deficiency."—*Drayton*.

"The Pope would not desire any violation of the immunities of the realm, or to bring those into public contention which had been hitherto enjoyed without intrusion or molestation."—*Burnet*.

INSANITY. See MADNESS.

INSCRUTABLE. UNSEARCHABLE. IMPENETRABLE.

INSCRUTABLE (*in*, not, and *scrutabilis, scrutari*, to investigate) relates to that particular form of the unsearchable which baffles intrinsic inquiry, and so denotes what cannot be comprehended by reason of the mystery and complexity which belong to it. UNSEARCHABLE relates to what cannot be explored by reason of its intrinsic depth or distance. Hence inscrutable is applicable to things of ordinary kinds, but of extraordinary difficulty; as, "inscrutable designs:" unsearchable, to extraordinary things; as, the "unsearchable attributes of God." IMPENETRABLE stands to inscrutable as the more specific to the more generic. Inscrutable denotes the nature of the thing; impenetrable may apply also to what is made inscrutable. The decrees of God are inscrutable; the designs of a subtle diplomatist may be impenetrable by the disguise in which he clothes his ideas. Inscrutable belongs to the whole; impenetrable, also to the parts in detail.

"'Tis not in man

To yield a reason for the will of Heaven,
Which is *inscrutable*."

Beaumont and Fletcher.

"He who without warrant but his own fantastic surmise takes upon him perpetually to unfold the secret and *unsearchable* mysteries of high Providence, is likely for the most part to mistake and slander them."—*Milton.*

"Nothing almost escaped that he achieved not, were the thing never so difficle, or (as who sayth) *impenetrable*."—*Sir T. Elyot.*

INSENSIBILITY. See INDIFFERENCE.

INSERT. See INTRODUCE.

INSIDE. INTERIOR.

These terms differ in dignity. Anything which has an outside may have an inside. But, as the exterior is a graver word than outside, so is interior than inside. The interior of St. Paul's Cathedral conveys a different impression from the inside; the latter is simply that which is not the outside or the neighbouring street; the former is architecturally correlative to the exterior. In the same way, in speaking of insignificant objects, we use the term inside; as the inside, not the interior, of a glove or a shoe.

INSIDIOUS. TREACHEROUS.

An enemy is *INSIDIOUS* (*insidere*, to sit or lie in wait). A friend is *TREACHEROUS* (see *FAITHLESS*). The insidious man carries on a system of deceptive treatment under the mask of indifference. The treacherous man betrays all at once the friendship or confidence which has been reposed in him. In their metaphorical meanings, this distinction is sustained. A treacherous climate is one which, under the appearance of cloudless skies and warmth, harbours fever or other disease, which may at any time take sudden effect. An insidious disease is one of which the virulence and certain progress are marked by the absence of pain, and the slow degrees by which it develops itself.

"The upright man hath little of the serpent, none of its lurking *insidiousness*."—*Barrow.*

"The world must think him in the wrong,
Would say he made a *treach'rous* use
Of wit, to flatter and seduce."

Swift.

INSIGHT. INSPECTION.

INSIGHT is for oneself. INSPECTION (Lat. *inspicere*, to look into) is for some purpose external to oneself directly connected with the object inspected. Insight extends knowledge or experience. Inspection is for the sake of assurance or amendment. Insight is quick, and may be instantaneous; inspection is careful and gradual. Insight is connected with the understanding; inspection more simply with the bodily vision.

"Angels, both good and bad, have a full *insight* into the activity and force of natural causes."—*South.*

"The king himself did not much like it. But the Earl of Clarendon told him Scotland, by a secret and ill management, had begun the embroilment in his father's affairs which could never have happened if the affairs of that kingdom had been under a more equal *inspection*."—*Burnet.*

INSIGNIFICANT. See IMMATERIAL.

INSINUATE. See INGRATIATE.

INSINUATION. See HINT.

INSIST. PERSIST.

INSIST (Lat. *insistere*) and PERSIST (*persistere*) both denote determined continuance in speech or action against some amount of opposition, which is overcome in the former case by determination and energy of will; in the latter by perseverance and patience. We insist as against others. We persist in what exclusively relates to ourselves. "He persisted in that course." "He insisted on his friend's adopting it." Insist implies some alleged right, as authority or claim. Persist may be from obstinacy alone, and either with or against rights.

"I urged you further; then you scratched your head,

And too impatiently stamped with your foot;

Yet I *insisted*; yet you answered not,
But, with an angry wafter of your hand,
Gave sign for me to leave you."

Shakespeare.

"I, on the other side,
Us'd no ambition to commend my deeds;
The deeds themselves, though mute, spoke
loud the doer.
But they *persisted* deaf, and would not seem
To count them things worth notice."

Milton.

INSNARE. See ENTRAP.

INSOLENT. See IMPERTINENT.

INSOLVENCY. See BANKRUPTCY.

INSPECTION. See EXAMINATION
and INSIGHT.

INSPIRE. See ANIMATE.

INSTANCE. See EXAMPLE.

INSTANT. See MOMENT.

INSTANTANEOUSLY. See DI-
RECTLY.

INSTANTLY. See DIRECTLY.

INSTIGATE. See URGE.

INSTIL. See IMPLANT.

INSTITUTE. See ESTABLISH.

INSTRUCT. See INFORM.

INSTRUCTION. See EDUCATION.

INSTRUMENT. IMPLEMENT. TOOL.

INSTRUMENT (Lat. *instrumentum*, *instruere*, to [order]) is used in more than reference to physical manipulation. We speak of agricultural and surgical, but also of mathematical instruments. Anything which is employed to do a work or effect an end is an instrument, as a musical instrument. IMPLEMENT (Lat. *implementum*, *implere*, to fill up) is always restricted to physical use. TOOL (A. S. *tól*) is a simpler word for an instrument of the manual arts, and differs from implement in being more general or less specific. An implement is a tool regarded in reference to its particular purpose. In the metaphorical application, instrument is capable of an honourable or indifferent, as well as dishonourable, tool only of a dishonourable, sense. "The tool of a party." "An instrument in the hands of God." "An instrument in bringing about a peace between the two nations."

"The bold are but the *instruments* of the wise."
Dryden.

"Dilated and infuriate, shall send forth
From far with thund'ring noise among our
foes
Such *implements* of mischief as shall dash
To pieces and o'erwhelm whatever stands
Adverse."
Milton.

INSUFFICIENT. See INADEQUATE.

INSULT. AFFRONT. OUTRAGE.
INDIGNITY.

An INSULT (Lat. *insilire*, *insultus*, to leap upon) is never accompanied by violence, as at present used—this sense being reserved for assault (*assilire*), another 'compound of the same verb—but consists in words or actions of an offensive and derogatory kind. AFFRONT (Lat. *ad* and *frons*, forehead or face) is a marked intentional, if not public, breach of politeness. It lies more in manner than in words, and may be unaccompanied by words. It is more demonstrative and less bitter than insult. OUTRAGE (Lat. *ultragium*, *ultra*, beyond) is gross and violent insult and indignity, or overbearing or cruel violation of the feelings or the person. INDIGNITY (Lat. *in*, not, and *dignus*, worthy) can only be practised upon persons claiming or entitled to high respect; the force of it depending upon the contrast between the worth or station of the person, and the treatment to which he is subjected.

"The cause assigned of forbidding to answer therefore plainly insinuates that the defender of religion should not imitate the *insulter* of it in his modes of disputation, which may be comprised in sophistry, buffoonery, and scurrility."—Warburton.

"If thy brother or thy neighbour have offered thee an injury or an *affront*, forgive him."—Chillingworth.

As indignity implies superiority in the object of it, so affront implies equality; while insult may be to the strong or the weak, to superiors, equals, or inferiors. The weakness and modesty of women are said to be insulted or outraged, not affronted.

"This is the round of a passionate man's life: he contracts debts when he is furious, which his virtue, if he has virtue, obliges him to discharge at the return of reason. He spends his time in *outrage* and reparation."
—Johnson.

"The Spaniards took it as the greatest indignity in the world that Holland should pretend to oblige the crown of Spain to accept the very conditions of France, after an invasion so unjust as they esteemed this last."—*Sir W. Temple*.

INSUPERABLE. INSURMOUNTABLE.
INVINCIBLE. UNCONQUERABLE.

Mental barriers are commonly said to be INSUPERABLE (Lat. *in*, not, and *superare*, *super*, to get over); such are difficulties, obstacles, or objections. That is said to be insuperable which the person has not the power of overcoming; as that is INSURMOUNTABLE (*in*, not, *super*, above, and *mons*, mountain, Fr. *surmonter*, to surmount) which does not admit of sufficient external appliances; so, an insuperable aversion, an insurmountable objection. INVINCIBLE (*in*, not, and *vincere*, to conquer) is employed to denote that which power cannot overcome, as invincible ignorance, the Invincible Armada; UNCONQUERABLE to denote what cannot be overcome by the particular power of reason or persuasion (prefix *un* and conquer, Lat. *conquerere*), and is accordingly applied usually to the resistance which proceeds from antagonistic feeling, as unconquerable prejudice, aversion, and the like.

"Many who toil through the intricacy of complicated systems are *insuperably* embarrassed with the least perplexity in common affairs."—*Rambler*.

"Doubtless they saw in the attempt (to convert the people beyond the Rhine) *insurmountable* difficulties, either from the diversity of language, or the ferocity of these nations so remote from Christian mildness."—*Jortin*.

"The *invincibleness* of general custom."—*Wilkins*.

"All is not lost; the *unconquerable* will
And study of revenge, immortal hate,
And courage never to submit or yield,
And what is else not to be overcome."

Milton.

INSURRECTION. SEDITION. REBELLION. REVOLT. REVOLUTION. MUTINY.

AN INSURRECTION (Lat. *insurgere*, *insurrectus*, to rise up) is a rising up of individuals against the laws of a com-

munity or state. This may or may not be carried out into fighting or active opposition, the mere taking up arms against the state being sufficient to constitute insurrection. SEDITION is, literally, a separation of the people (*se*, apart, and *ire*, *itio*, a going). It is such a commotion in the state as manifests public discontent, without aiming at violent opposition to the laws. REBELLION is from the Latin *re*, again, and *bellum*, war. The term was applied by the Romans, not to risings at home, but abroad, among those conquered nations who, in seeking to cast off the Roman power, involved the state in a *new* war. It is employed by us in the sense of a rising of the whole or the great majority of a people against the supreme ruler or government, being an extended insurrection or revolt. REVOLT (Fr. *révolte*, Lat. *revolvere*, *revolutus*, to roll back) is a violent attempt to shake off one ruler or form of government, for the purpose of substituting another. REVOLUTION, which is of the same derivation, is such a radical change in the political organization as supposes a revolt successfully carried out. MUTINY (Old Fr. *meute*, connected with the Latin *movere*) is a movement of revolt against minor institutions or against military or naval authorities or commanders, as the mutiny of a regiment or a ship's crew.

"Our people here at home, grown discontent
Through great exactions, *insurrections*
breed." *Daniel*.

"*Sedition* is of the like tendency with treason, but without the overt acts that are essential to the latter."—*Brande*.

"For *rebellion* being an opposition, not to persons but to authority, which is founded only in the constitution and laws of the government, those, whoever they be, who by force break through, and by force justify their violation of them, are truly and properly rebels. For when men by entering into society and civil government have excluded force, and introduced laws for the preservation of property, peace and unity amongst themselves, those who set up force again in opposition to the laws do rebellare, that is, bring back again the state of war, and are properly rebels."—*Locke*.

"Our discontented counties do revolt."
Shakespeare.

Revolt is not commonly employed of individuals, but of communities which form part of a more extended jurisdiction, as the "revolted provinces."

"The violence of *revolutions* is generally proportioned to the degree of the maladministration which has produced them."—Macaulay.

"In every mutiny against the discipline of the college he was the ringleader."—*Ibid.*

INTEGRAL. See ENTIRE.

INTEGRITY. See HONESTY.

INTELLECT. INTELLIGENCE. UNDERSTANDING.

INTELLECT (Lat. *intellectus*, *intelligere*, to understand) is, in the strict scientific view, that part of the human soul by which it knows, as distinguished from those by which it feels or wills. It is employed in the further sense of the capacity for higher forms of knowledge, as distinguished from the faculties of perception and imagination; the faculty of seeing the relations of objects, involving comprehension and judgment. The former identity of intellect and intelligence has been of late years widened; and INTELLIGENCE, to say nothing of its meaning of the subject-matter of information (as the intelligence contained in the newspapers), now means a good quality of the understanding, a readiness to comprehend things of ordinary occurrence, which may be quickened by practice and experience; while intellect is confined to the mental powers and their capacity in the abstract. UNDERSTANDING is the Saxon expression for the Latin intellect and intelligence. Its characteristic seems to flow from this fact. It is a native colloquial word, and so applied in a more colloquial way, and to the things of life in their more familiar and practical aspects. Hence such phrases of frequent occurrence, as, "A sound practical understanding." "I understand it sufficiently for practical purposes."

"The word *intellect* can be of no essential use whatever, if the ambiguity in the signi-

fication of the good old English word *understanding* be avoided; and as to *intellection*, which a late very accurate writer has attempted to introduce, I can see no advantage attending it."—Stewart.

INTELLECTUAL. MENTAL.

MENTAL (Lat. *mens*, *mentis*, the mind) is simply belonging to the mind as distinct from the body; INTELLECTUAL (see INTELLECT) to the powers, attributes, and dignity of mind, as distinguished from sense or matter. "The conversation turned on mental subjects," would mean metaphysics; on intellectual subjects, might mean any branch of high knowledge or education.

"For it is ascribed to no less persons than to Plato, and to Aristotle after him, as borrowing it from him, and that by several of the most eminent interpreters of the latter, both ancient and modern; all of them proceeding upon this ground, that in order to the actual intellection of any object, there is a spiritual *intellectual* light necessary to enable the object to move or affect the intellectual faculty, which yet the object cannot give to itself, nor yet strike or move the said faculty without it."—South.

"A strong expression of mental energy."—Stewart.

INTELLIGENCE. See INTELLECT and NEWS.

INTEMPERATE. See EXCESSIVE.

INTEND. See DESIGN.

INTERCEDE. INTERPOSE. MEDIATE. INTERFERE. INTERMEDDLE.

To INTERCEDE (*inter*, between, and *cedere* to go) is of words; to INTERPOSE (*inter* and Fr. *poser*, Lat. *ponere*, to place) is of action. We intercede with a superior on behalf of an equal or inferior; we interpose between equals. In interposition we exercise our own power or authority; in intercession we endeavour to enlist on our behalf the power or authority of another. MEDIATE (Lat. *medius*, middle) is to interpose between two parties, as the equal friend of each, with influence recognized by each. INTERFERE (*inter* and *ferire*, to strike) and INTERMEDDLE are applicable to any pre-existent or appointed course

of things, whether matters of personal conduct or not; as, to interfere in a dispute; to interfere with arrangements; or one arrangement may interfere with another. It implies the exercise of influence, personal power, or authority, for the purpose or with the effect of altering or modifying some established course. Intermeddle is only employed of the interference of one conscious agent with the affairs of others in an obtrusive way, and without any recognized right, but of self-will.

"Moses *interceded* for transgressors, and caused an atonement to be made for them, and stopped the wrath of God: so did Christ."
—*Jortin*.

"Those who in quarrels *interpose*
Must often wipe a bloody nose." *Gay*.

"And thereupon was Warwick (by whose cast

All must be wrought) employed to *mediate*
A present marriage, to be had between
Him and the sister of the young French
queen."
—*Daniel*.

"In truth, it is not the *interfering* or keeping aloof, but iniquitous *intermeddling* or treacherous inaction which is praised or blamed by the decision of an equitable judge."—*Burke*.

INTERCHANGE. See BARTER.

INTERCOURSE. CONNECTION.

COMMUNICATION. COMMUNION.

DEALING.

INTERCOURSE (Lat. *inter*, between, and *cursus*, a running or course) subsists only between persons, CONNECTION (*con* and *nectere*, to knit) and COMMUNICATION (*communis*, common) between both things and persons. Intercourse is a very wide term, comprehending every kind of reciprocal action and dealing between persons and nations in matters of business, thought, words, or feelings, from matters of the gravest to the most ordinary character. Connection is permanent, as communication is temporary, intercourse; the former involving an unity and community of purpose or dealing; the latter a more casual interchange of words and thoughts in the common affairs of life. COMMUNION, which lies less

in externals than communication, is among many, being such interchange of offices as flows from a bond of unity in sentiment, feeling, or conviction. Communication is from one to another; communion is reciprocal. DEALING (A. S. *dealan*, to divide) is entirely confined to external transactions, being inapplicable to matters of the mind and feelings.

"This sweet *intercourse*
Of looks and smiles." *Milton*.

"We may therefore surely conclude that there must be a future state, wherein those rewards shall be bestowed, and this love of God to good men made to appear, and the eternal and inseparable *connection* between virtue and happiness manifested in the sight of angels and men."—*Atterbury*.

"Cardinal Wolsey, in his ambassage into France, commanded all his servants to use no French, but mere English to the French in all *communications* whatsoever."—*Camden*.

"On flowers reposed, and with fresh flowrets
crowned,
They eat, they drink, and in *communion*
sweet

Quaff immortality and joy." *Milton*.

"It (charity) must preside with a superiority over all the desires of our hearts, that neither wantonness nor lust, nor anger and revenge, nor covetousness and ambition, may carry us aside from the ways of righteousness and equity in our *dealings* one with another."—*Sherlock*.

INTERDICT. See DEBAR.

INTEREST. CONCERN.

CONCERN (*con*, together, and *cernere*, to look) is grave interest. As INTEREST (Lat. *interesse*, to be of importance) may flow from what touches our feelings, so concern belongs to what is of practical importance to our circumstances and state. So grave is the character of concern (while we may be interested even in trifles), that the term is sometimes employed to express the extreme of compassion and even sorrow. There is a distinct and objective use of the term interest, in which it is synonymous, not with concern, but with advantage.

INTERFERE. See INTERCEDE.

INTERIOR. See INNER and INSIDE.

INTERLOPER. INTRUDER.

The INTERLOPER was one who ran in between the legal trader and his trade, for the purpose of appropriating its profits and advantages. We owe the term to the Dutch, and the period when they monopolized the carrying trade of the world. As at present employed, the word retains this force. The INTRUDER (Lat. *in* and *trudere*, to thrust) is one who pushes himself into a place or a society in an unwelcome manner; the interloper is an intruder with the further design of benefiting himself by the intrusion, which he seeks to establish for a continuance; while the intruder may possibly offend only once or momentarily.

"They see plainly, whatever privileges are allowed your company at Dort will be given by the other towns, either openly or covertly, to all those *interlopers* who bring their woollen manufacture directly thither."
—*Sir W. Temple*.

"An *intruder* upon their retreat, and a disturber of their repose."—*Rambler*.

INTERMEDDLE. See INTERCEDE.

INTERMEDIATE. INTERVENING.

These differ as being in the middle differs from coming into the middle. INTERMEDIATE time, space, points (*inter* and *medius*, middle). INTERVENING occurrences (*inter* and *venire*, to come). The intermediate is calculated and fixed; the intervening is accidental and often unforeseen. There is, however, a sense in which intervenient stands to intermediate as the observation of a fact to the fact itself. When the intermediate is discerned in the course of observation it is intervenient, or accruing in the course of time.

"First, he (St. Paul) had represented to him the most perfect joys of the third or highest heaven, of which we hope to be partakers after the resurrection; and then, lest so long an expectation should discourage us, he saw also the *intermediate* joys of paradise, wherewith the souls of the faithful are refreshed until the resurrection."—*Bishop Bull*.

"But a law is then properly dispensed with when it is capable of being obeyed, and the person capable of yielding such obedience to

it is yet, by an *intervenient* power, discharged from his obligation to obey."—*South*.

INTERMENT. See BURIAL.

INTERMISSION. INTERRUPTION.
CESSATION.

CESSATION (Lat. *cessare*, to cease) is final. INTERMISSION and INTERRUPTION are not final, inasmuch as they denote rest intermediate between two movements. The one is extinct, the others suspended motion. Intermission (Lat. *inter*, between, and *mittere*, *missus*, to send) is internal; interruption external. Intermission is temporary cessation regarded in itself, or as self-produced; interruption (*inter* and *rumpere*, *ruptus*, to break) is the same thing as produced by external force or influence. It may be observed that intermission denotes complete cessation, while interruption may denote no more than such check as produces an alteration of proceeding. The stream which is interrupted by a rock still flows on. An intermission of a supply of water implies, for the time, a cessation of the flow. An interruption of a speech would denote that it was still pursued, though the uniformity of its delivery had been interfered with.

"Scourge after scourge, and blows succeeding blows;

Lord, has Thy hand no mercy, and our woes

No *intermission*?"

Harte.

"But though the parliaments and two or three high-spirited kings had given some *interruption* to the cruel exactions, and other illegal proceedings of the court of Rome, yet that court always gained their designs in the end."—*Burnet*.

INTERNAL. See INNER.

INTERPOSE. See INTERCEDE.

INTERPOSITION. See INTERVENTION.

INTERPRET. See EXPOUND.

INTERROGATE. See INQUIRE.

INTERRUPTION. See INTERMISSION.

INTERVENING. See INTERMEDIATE.

INTERVENTION. INTERPOSITION.

These differ as the involuntary from the voluntary. INTERVENTION (*inter*, between, and *venire, ventus*, to come) being employed of accidental forces and influences, as well as the acts of voluntary agents, INTERPOSITION (*inter*, between, and *ponere, positus*, to place) only of the latter. The moon is obscured by the intervention of clouds; a happy intervention of circumstances. Human or Divine interposition. An exception to this, however, occurs in the purely physical sense, in which interposition is sometimes used, as the privation of the sun's light by the interposition of an opaque body. In that case, the difference between the terms is that one implies previous motion, the other not. Every planetary obscuration is an interposition, implying intervention. In the acts of men, the motive of intervention is commonly less authoritative or forcible than interposition. "He owed his life to the intervention of another," would mean, entreaty or help; interposition would involve rescue.

"The species not only of sensible objects, but even of notions of the mind, are preserved in the memory, without confusion and dissipation, notwithstanding lapse of time and *intervention* of infinite variety of numbers."—*Hale*.

"The righteous would be detained prisoners here below by the chains of their unhappy natures, were there not some extraordinary *interposure* for their rescue and enlargement."—*Glanvill*.

INTERVIEW. MEETING.

MEETING (A. S. *mētan*, to meet) is the simplest and more comprehensive, but less distinctive of these terms. It may serve to express any coming together of physical or inanimate, as well as animate objects or voluntary agents; as the meeting of the waters, of clouds, of friends, of an assembly or conference. It may be designed or accidental. An INTERVIEW (Fr. *entrevue*, Lat. *inter* and *videre*, to see) is, as its name denotes, a mutually-recognized meeting between two or more persons, usually preconcerted, and for a purpose already known. It

involves a common matter of importance to both parties, which demands formal adjustment.

"Stay, stay your steps, and listen to my vows;

"Tis the last *interview* that fate allows."
—*Dryden, Virgil*.

"We can just as easily conceive the connection and mutual influence of soul and body as we can explain how two mathematical lines indefinitely produced can be for ever approaching each other, yet never meet."
—*Bishop Porteus*.

INTIMACY. See ACQUAINTANCE.

INTIMATE. See EXPRESS.

INTIMATION. See HINT.

INTIMIDATE. See FRIGHTEN.

INTOMBMENT. See BURIAL.

INTOXICATION. See DRUNKENNESS.

INTRENCH. See ENCROACH.

INTREPID. See BOLD.

INTRICACY. See COMPLEXITY.

INTRINSIC. See INNER.

INTRODUCE. INSERT. PRESENT.

INTRODUCE (Lat. *intro*, within, and *ducere*, to lead or bring) has its physical and its moral senses. In the former it is synonymous with INSERT (Lat. *inserere, insertus*), in the latter with PRESENT (*presentare, præsens, præ esse*, to be in the presence of). As employed of physical operations, to introduce implies an easier process than insertion, and is better employed of cases where the way is partly open or facilitated; insert, of cases where the way has to be artificially made. Moreover, that which is introduced may be hidden from view; that which is inserted is partly visible after insertion. Insert has a more purely physical force than introduce, and commonly implies a more permanent purpose. An additional topic is introduced; an additional paragraph is inserted. The surgeon's probe, having only a temporary use, is introduced, not inserted, into the wound. Introduction may be a gradual process; insertion is done at once.

"They are the plainest and best dealers in the world, which seems not to grow so much

from a principle of conscience or morality as from a custom or habit *introduced* by the necessity of trade among them, which depends as much upon common honesty as war does upon discipline."—*Sir W. Temple*.

In its other sense, and as a synonym with present, introduce is to bring forward one person to the presence of another as an equal; to present is to do the same thing to one who is superior to the person presented or introduced. Persons are introduced to the acquaintance of one another generally; they are presented, for instance, at court.

"The bud *inserted* in the rind,
The bud of peach or rose,
Adorns, though differing in its kind,
The stock whereon it grows
With flower as sweet, or fruit as fair,
As if produced by Nature there."

Couper.

"Our laws make the Ordinary a disturber if he does not give institution upon the fitness of a person *presented* to him, or at least give notice to the patron of the disability of his *presentee*."—*Ayliffe*.

INTRODUCTORY. PRELIMINARY.
PREPARATORY.

In the case of the INTRODUCTORY (see INTRODUCE), the proceeding commonly has reference to thought and understanding, while PRELIMINARY (*præ*, before, and *limen*, a threshold) relates to matters of action. An introductory treatise; a preliminary step. The one precedes wider exhibition or fuller knowledge, the latter more extended action. PREPARATORY (Lat. *præ* and *parare*, to arrange) relates to the purpose rather than the object, or the doer rather than the deed. In the preparatory, I do what will enable me the better to do something beyond. The preliminary is congruous; the preparatory is effective; the introductory is natural. Preliminaries commonly belong to matters of social arrangement or compact, whether amicable or otherwise, as the preliminaries of a contract, a marriage, or a duel.

"This *introductory* discourse itself is to be but an essay, not a book."—*Boyle*.

"I have discussed the nuptial *preliminaries* so often, that I can repeat the forms in which

jointures are settled and pin-money secured."—*Johnson*.

"A creature which is to pass a small portion of its existence in one state, to be *preparatory* to another, ought, no doubt, to have its attention constantly fixed upon its ulterior and permanent destination."—*Paley*.

INTRUDE. See ENCROACH.

INTRUDE. OBTRUDE.

Unwelcome things or persons INTRUDE themselves; self-asserting things or persons OBTRUDE themselves. We desire to rid ourselves of that which intrudes by reason of its inherent uncongeniality to us; of that which obtrudes by reason of the simple irrepressibility of it. When certain thoughts intrude themselves on our minds, they make us uneasy; when they obtrude themselves, they prevent us from thinking of anything else.

INTRUSION. See INROAD.

INTRUDER. See INTERLOPER.

INVADE. See ENCROACH.

INVASION. See INROAD.

INVECTIVE. ABUSE.

ABUSE (Lat. *ab* and *uti, usus*, to use), as compared with INVECTIVE (*invehere*, to bear along), is more personal and coarse, being conveyed in harsh and unseemly terms, and dictated by angry feeling and bitter temper. Invective is more commonly aimed at character or conduct, and may be conveyed in writing and in refined language, and dictated by indignation against what is in itself blameworthy. It often, however, means public abuse under such restraints as are imposed by position and education.

"It seemeth, therefore, much amiss that against them whom they term sacramentaries so many *invective* discourses are made."—*Hooker*.

"At an entertainment given by Pisistratus to some of his intimates, Thrasippus, a man of violent passion, and inflamed with wine, took some occasion not recorded to break out into the most violent *abuse* and insult."—*Cumberland*.

INVEIGH. See DECLAIM.

INVEIGLE. See ENTRAP.

INVENT. See CONTRIVE.

INVERT. See REVERSE.

INVEST. See ENDOW.

INVESTIGATION. See EXAMINATION.

INVIDIOUS. See ENVIOUS.

INVIGORATE. STRENGTHEN.
FORTIFY.

STRENGTHEN (A. S. *strengdhu*, strength) is the simplest of these terms, but it is not so positively expressive as the others. Anything is strengthened which is made never so little stronger than before, though it be after all comparatively weak. INVIGORATE (Lat. *vigor*, *vigere*, to grow) is specifically to strengthen, as relates to the vital force of a body, or what is analogous to it, as the spirit of a constitution. Hence only living systems can be invigorated. FORTIFY (Lat. *fortis*, strong, and *facere*, to make) is applied to structures and systems, as such, and not in reference to any vital force which animates the organization. The end of invigoration is increased efficiency of action; of fortification, increased efficiency of resistance. That which is strengthened may yet be weak; that which is invigorated or fortified becomes strong.

"With the fierce race
Poured in a fresh, *invigorating* stream,
Blood where unquelled a mighty spirit
glowed." *Thompson, Liberty.*

"And there appeared an angel unto Him
from heaven, *strengthening* Him."—*English Bible.*

"Timidity was *fortified* by pride."—*Gibbon.*

INVINCIBLE. See INSUPERABLE.

INVITE. See BID.

INVITING. See ATTRACTIVE.

INUNDATION. See DELUGE.

INVOLVE. See COMPRISE, IMPLY, and ENTANGLE.

INWARD. See INNER.

IRE. See WRATH.

IRKSOME. See TEDIOUS.

IRONY. See BURLESQUE.

IRRATIONAL. See ABSURD.

IRREFRAGABLE. See INCONTROVERTIBLE.

IRRELIGIOUS. See IMPIOUS.

IRREPROACHABLE. BLAMELESS.

The former is a stronger term, conveying higher praise than the latter. BLAMELESS (Fr. *blame*, Low Lat. *blasphemare*) expresses no more than the harmless absence of what is worthy of censure. IRREPROACHABLE (in, not, and *reprobare*, to reprove), the possession of that which deserves praise in relation to social life. An act may be blameless; a course of conduct irreproachable. To be irreproachable is put forth in positive commendation; to be blameless, in negative defence.

"He (Berkeley) erred; and who is free from error? but his intentions were *irreproachable*, and his conduct as a man and a Christian did honour to human nature."—*Beattie.*

"To this we owe much of the innocency, and in some respects *blamelessness*, of our lives, that we have not been a scandal to the Gospel, a shame to the good, and a scorn to the bad."—*Hopkins.*

IRRITATE. See EXASPERATE.

IRRUPTION. See INROAD.

ISSUE. See RESULT.

ISSUE. See OFFSPRING.

ISSUE. EMERGE.

ISSUE (Lat. *exitus*, from *exire*, to come out), in the purely physical sense, denotes the coming forth of one body out of another which comprised it, and had some close relationship to it, even if it were not so close as that of cause and effect; while EMERGE (Lat. *emergere*) denotes no more than the becoming visible by coming out of what before had the effect of concealing. "Horsemen issued from the wood," would convey the idea of their having been previously stationed there; that they emerged, would mean, that they were seen to come out of it. Issue is as often the

result of mechanical force exercised on inanimate things; as the stream issued from the rock. Emerge is more appropriate to the movements of voluntary agents. In the secondary or analogous applications of these words, issue denotes the existence of cause and effect; emerge, that of antecedent and consequent.

"Since God is the Father of all, since His mercy is over all His works, since He puts it in the power of every person to perform all that He requires of him, and since men are exposed to many temptations, it is reasonable to think that from this Supreme Being, from this Eternal Fountain of all truth and of all good gifts, there issues light which lighteth every one that cometh into the world."—*Jortin*.

"At the very moment when some of them seemed plunged in unfathomable abysses of disgrace and disaster, they have suddenly emerged."—*Burke*.

J.

JADE. WEARY. TIRE. HARASS. FATIGUE.

JADE (Prov. Eng. *yauld*, a sorry horse) denotes the superinducement of weariness by forced repetition of the same act or effort; a sensation of physical weariness to little profit of work done. To WEARY denotes the wearing effect (A. S. *wêrig*) of mental or bodily exertion, which is accompanied with dissatisfaction and distaste of the employment. Weariness is less than the former the result of specific exertion, and may follow from satiety; so that men may weary even of enjoyments. TIRE (A. S. *terian*, *tirian*, to vex, irritate) has much the same force with weary, but commonly refers to more active causes and greater lassitude in consequence. It is the result of the difficult, the laborious, or the burdensome. FATIGUE (Lat. *fatigare*) relates to normal and systematic exertion, which has resulted in such a moderate effect as repose may correct. HARASS (Fr. *harasse*, a large and heavy shield) combines with the idea of wearying that of mental annoyance in care, importunities, perplexity. The weariness,

however, is secondary. So that a person may be considerably harassed without being wearied or fatigued. An accumulation of petty efforts and instigations results in the feeling of being jaded.

"What thousands seek,
With dishes tortured from their native taste,
And mad variety, to spur beyond
Its wiser will, the jaded appetite!"

Armstrong.

"Whether by fate, or missing of the way,
Or that she was by *weariness* detained."

Surrey, Virgil.

"Yet whatever degree of elegance he possesses, the natural monotony of French verse *tires* the ears accustomed to the various harmony of our English poet."—*Knor*.

"Bankrupt nobility, a factious, giddy, and
Divided senate, a *harass'd* commonalty,
Is all the strength of Venice." *Otway*.

"And so the conqueror, *fatigued* in war,
With hot pursuit of enemies afar,
Reclines to drink the torrent gliding by,
Then lifts his looks to repossess the sky."
Parnell.

JANGLE. JAR. WRANGLE.

JANGLE (Old Fr. *jangler*) is a term formed to express the sound of confused talk, as of persons disputing with one another. It expresses the lighter discordance of feeling, and the state of persons who are out of humour with one another. As jangle stands to *disputation* and contradiction, so does WRANGLE (Low Germ. *wrangen*) stand to *contention*; that is, it involves more of argument, and of a subject matter in which the disputants are contending for points in which they are *personally interested*. JAR (a word formed to represent the sound, like the Germ. *kerran*, to croak, and the Latin *garrire*, to chatter) denotes more than the mere sound or expression of disagreement, and includes discordant sentiment, feeling, purpose, and the like.

"There are those, I know, who will regard this praise, whatever it be, as injurious to the learned prelate rather than honourable to him; who will be ready to tell us that controversial *janglings* are out of date, that they never did any good, and are now at length fallen into general and just contempt."—*Hurd, Life of Warburton*.

"Cease, cease such jars, and rest your minds
in peace." *Shakespeare.*

"I worship as my fathers did before me,
Unpractis'd in disputes and wrangling
schools.

I seek no farther knowledge, and so keep
My mind at peace, nor know the pain of
doubting." *Rome.*

JAR. *See* JANGLE.

JAUNT. EXCURSION. TOUR.
TRIP. RAMBLE.

JAUNT (connected with Fr. *gentil*, nice, or, according to others, *jante*, the felly of a wheel) is a pleasant journey of a lively character, and so not commonly accompanied with the fatigue of walking, having no specific object or purpose beyond that of pleasurable locomotion. An EXCURSION (*ex*, out, and *currere*, *cursus*, to run) is a trip for pleasure or health, commonly undertaken in company, and with a definite point or place in view. TOUR (Fr. *tour*, a turn) is a systematic excursion, having for its object the visiting of certain places, or the observation of a particular district. The road of return is different from the setting out. RAMBLE is a roving excursion taken at leisure, with no determinate object in view, and an expectation that matters of interest sufficient will present themselves in the course of the roaming—with which word roam, ramble is probably connected. A TRIP (Dutch *trippen*) is a short, active expedition to a particular place, undertaken with a view to a speedy return. The word jaunt had of old a graver meaning, equivalent to a wearisome journey on foot. So Milton—

"Our Saviour meek, and with untroubled
mind,
After his aery jaunt, though hurried
sore,
Hungry, and cold, betook him to his
rest."

The modern use of the term is illustrated by the following:—

"Then a fresh maggot takes them in the
head,
To have one merry jaunt on shore;
They'd not be fettered up, they swore."
Yalden.

"Of rest was Noah's dove bereft,
When with impatient wing she left
That safe retreat the ark.
Giving her vain excursions o'er,
The disappointed bird once more
Explored the sacred bark." *Cotton.*

"But when the 'Centurion' drove out to sea, and left the commodore on shore, he one day, attended by some of his officers, endeavoured to make the *tour* of the island."—*Anson's Voyages.*

"The little boat was obliged to make three *trips* before we could all get over to the rest of the party."—*Cook's Voyages.*

"We must not *ramble* in this field without discernment or choice, nor even with these must we *ramble* too long."—*Bolingbroke.*

JEALOUS, JEALOUSY. *See* EN-
VIOUS.

JEER. SCOFF. GIBE. SNEER.

JEER (Old Eng. *geere*, *geare*) is personal, consisting of words addressed to an individual; which is also the case with GIBE (Prov. Fr. *jiber*, equivalent to *jouer*, to play); but jeer conveys more of ridicule and contempt, gibe of bitter scorn and ill-will. SCOFF (Icelandic *skuppa*, to laugh at) is to manifest contempt in any way, as by looks, gestures, or words. It relates not so much to the person as to the force of what he says or does. SNEER is connected with the grimace of expression rather than with words. If employed, as it may be, of *spoken* contempt, sneering is covert and indirect, while scoff is open, insolent, and defiant.

JEOPARDY. *See* DANGER.

JEST. JOKE. SPORT.

As they relate to the display of the humorous, a JEST (Old Eng. *jest* and *gest*, connected with the Lat. *gerere*, *gestus*, *gestum*, a deed) is for the sake of others; a JOKE (Lat. *jocus*) for one's own. Jokes spring more purely out of the imagination, and less from external circumstances, and are therefore commonly less personal and more harmless. Joke indicates more of pure hilarity, wit, or humour; jest more of ridicule and satire. SPORT (Lat. *disportare*, being an abridgment of *disport*) relates to both persons

and things, and denotes no more than that they are treated in a light, where they might have been treated in a graver, manner. Sport stands to jest as playfulness to ridicule.

"Let your *jest*s fly at large; yet therewithal

See they be salt, but yet not mixed with gall,

Not tending to disgrace,

But fairly given,

Becoming well the place,

Modest and even;

That they with tickling pleasure may provoke

Laughter in him on whom the *jest* is broke." *Drayton.*

"And joyous mirth

Engages our raised souls, pat repartee,

Or witty *joke*, our airy senses moves

To pleasant laughter." *Gay.*

"And while the robes imbibe the solar ray,
O'er the green mead the *sporting* virgins play,

Their shining veils unbound. Along the skies,

Tost and retost, the ball incessant flies;

They *sport*, they feast, Nausicaa lifts her voice,

And warbling sweet, makes heaven and earth rejoice." *Pope, Homer.*

JOCOSE. See FACETIOUS.

JOCULAR. See FACETIOUS.

JOIN. See COALESCE.

JOKE. See JEST.

JOVIALITY. See CHEERFUL and HILARITY.

JOURNEY. TRAVEL. VOYAGE.

These differ as the special from the general. TRAVEL (Fr. *travailler*) is locomotion from place to place. JOURNEY (Lat. *dies, diurnus*, daily) is the portion of travel performed on any one occasion. It is well enough known that VOYAGE (Lat. *via, viagium*, Fr. *voyage*) is now restricted to travel by sea; but it may be remarked that this belongs to the usage, not the derivation, of the word, the French voyage being used in the sense of journey. Travel is indefinite; journey definite, having its appointed destination. We journey to a country, and travel in it.

"We must all have the same *journey's* end, if we hope to get to heaven; but some may meet with a freer road, and a calmer season, and better company in their *journey* than others."—*Stillingfleet.*

"It was the well-known remark of the Emperor Charles V., who had travelled so frequently through both countries, that everything abounded in France, but that everything was wanting in Spain."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations.*

JOY. GAIETY.

JOY (Fr. *joie*, Lat. *gaudium*) is the pleasure excited in the mind by the acquisition or prospect of a good. It is confined to the mind; while GAIETY (Fr. *gai*) is external in the demeanour, or in objects which tend to excite delight, as bright or festive scenes and exhibitions.

JOYFUL. See GLAD.

JUDGE. UMPIRE. ARBITER. ARBITRATOR.

JUDGE (Lat. *judex*, Fr. *juge*) is generic, denoting, in its widest sense, one who has knowledge sufficient to decide a question; and, in its more restricted sense, one who is invested with authority to do so. The UMPIRE (Fr. *impair*, unequal, or not a pair, the third party called in between other two) and ARBITER (Lat. *arbitrator*, a judge) are such, not by natural qualifications, but by specific appointment, and only in private matters. They pronounce a decision on their own personal responsibility, and are not required to give reasons or quote precedents. The umpire is commonly chosen for his skill and converseance with the subject-matter of the question; the arbitrator, for his good-temper and impartiality; the cases which come under the cognizance of the former, being questions for adjudication in competition; of the latter, cases of dispute. Arbitrator is the old term for what is now expressed by ARBITRATOR, but has risen to a loftier meaning—that of sovereign controller, or one whose power of governing and deciding is unlimited. An umpire may be called in where there is not agreement among arbitrators.

"And now by this their feast all being ended,
The judges which thereto selected were
Into the Martian field adown descended,
To deem this doubtful case for which they
all contended." *Spenser.*

"If they (the arbitrators) do not agree, it is usual to add that another person be called in as *umpire* (imperator or impar), to whose sole judgment it is then referred."—*Blackstone.*

"It is a sign from Jove.
Now follows war, with all its woes again;
Or peace between us, by his fixed award;
For Jove is *arbiter* of both to man."
Cowper, Iliad.

"The judgments of the more disinterested and impartial of us receive no small tincture from our affections. We generally consult them in all doubtful points, and it happens well if the matter in question is not almost settled before the *arbitrator* is called into the debate."—*Sterne.*

JUDGMENT. *See* DISCERNMENT.

JUICE. LIQUOR. LIQUID. HUMOUR.

JUICE (Fr. and Latin *jus*, broth) is the moisture which is naturally furnished by bodies in greater or less quantity, and may be expressed from them, as in vegetables and fruits, and less commonly in animal bodies. LIQUID is fluid which is not aeriform. LIQUOR is liquid in relation to artificial uses and treatment. HUMOUR (Lat. *humor*, *humere*, to be moist) is especially the moisture or fluid of animal bodies secreted in health or disease.

"If so, yet still I can assure our safety;
For as you fear my softness of complexion,
I'll stain it with the juice of dusky leaves."
Mason.

"A fermented *liquor*, for example, which is called beer, but which, as it is made of molasses, bears very little resemblance to our beer, makes a considerable part of the common drink of the people in America."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations.*

"In oil of aniseeds, which I drew both with and without fermentation, I observed the whole body of the oil in a cool place to thicken into the consistence and appearance of white butter, which with the least heat resumed its former *liquidity*."—*Boyle.*

"*Æmil.* Is he not jealous?

"*Desdemona.* Who? he? I think the sun where he was born

Drew all such *humours* from him."
Shakespeare.

JUST. *See* FAIR and BECOMING.

JUSTICE. *See* EQUITY and RECTITUDE.

JUSTIFICATION. *See* APOLOGY.

JUVENILE. *See* YOUNG.

K.

KEEN. ACUTE. SHARP.

In their primary and physical applications, KEEN (A. S. *cēne*) denotes an exceeding degree of SHARPNESS, which is the generic term (A. S. *scearp*), and applies both to points and edges; while ACUTE (Lat. *acuere*, *acutus*, to sharpen) belongs only to points. A knife should be sharp; a skewer sharp-pointed, or acute; a razor keen. In their secondary and moral meanings, the keen person is one of great penetration; the acute, of understanding in speculative matters; the sharp, of quickness in matters of every-day practice, business, and conversation.

"In his Etnæan forge the God of fire,
That falchion laboured for the hero's sire,
Immortal *keenness* on the blade bestowed,
And plunged it hissing in the Stygian flood."
Dryden, Virgil.

Acute and sharp are more generally epithets of bodily, and keen of mental, pain. Acute is in this sense technically opposed to chronic. In this application sharp is an epithet of pain generally, acute of some specific disease also; as sharp pain, acute rheumatism, a keen sense of injury or disappointment, keen annoyance; also keen relish or enjoyment, a keen sense of the ridiculous.

"His *acuteness* was most eminently signalized at the masquerade, where he discovered his acquaintance through their disguises with such wonderful facility."—*Johnson.*

"To this the Panther *sharply* had replied;
But having gained a verdict on her side,
She wisely gave the loser leave to chide."
Dryden.

KEEP. See HOLD.

KEEPING. CUSTODY.

KEEPING is simple and generic. CUSTODY (Lat. *custodia*) is a specific keeping, involving responsibility, and is for the sake of obviating escape in the case of persons, and loss in the case of inanimate objects; as the custody of prisoners or documents.

KILL. MURDER. SLAY. ASSASSINATE. SLAUGHTER.

To KILL is the broadest and simplest term (A. S. *cwellan, cwelian*), meaning no more than to deprive of life, and is applied in the fullest sense of the term life, as the vegetative life of plants, which may be killed by frost. In the case of persons, the act may be the result of accident or self-defence, as well as in malice pre-pense. To MURDER (A. S. *mordhur*) was anciently employed only of the secret killing of one human being by another, but now means the killing with malicious forethought and intention. To ASSASSINATE is to murder by secret, close, and sudden attack upon the person, who is generally one of importance. The nature of the deed flows from the origin of the word—*hashish*, inebriating hemp by which the Assassins of the East, or followers of the Old Man of the Mountain, were excited to their work. It is a deviation from the original sense to apply it to poisoning. SLAY (A. S. *slahan, sleahan, slagan*) is to kill with a weapon, or by violence, not, for instance, by poison, and in a sort of animal way, that is, with little thought but that of destroying animal life, whether in men or other animals. It is violent, but not necessarily illegal, as to slay in battle. SLAUGHTER commonly denotes killing in a promiscuous way, or extensively. This is still the case, even when the butcher slaughters a single beast, the idea being; that of supplying the meat market. Kill and slay, but not the others, are applicable to cases of suicide, though in composition we meet with the term self-murder.

"Thou shalt not kill."—*Decalogue*.

"The first great disturbance in the world

after the fall of man was by a murderer, whom the vengeance of God pursued to that degree that he professed that his punishment was greater than he could bear, though he himself could not say that it was greater than he had deserved."—*South*.

"Man. Of ruin, indeed, methought I heard the noise.

Oh, it continues! they have slain my son!
Chorus. Thy son is rather slaying them;
that outcry

From slaughter of one foe could not ascend."
Milton.

"He (Oliver Cromwell) said assassinations were such detestable things that he would never begin them; but if any of the king's party should endeavour to assassinate him, and fail in it, he would make an assassinating war of it, and destroy the whole family."—*Burnet*.

KIND. See CHARACTER.

KIND. See GRACIOUS.

KINDNESS. See BENIGNITY.

KINDRED. See AFFINITY.

KINGDOM. See EMPIRE.

KINGLY. ROYAL. REGAL.

KINGLY means like a king; ROYAL (Fr. *roi*, Lat. *rex, regis*, a king), belonging to the person of a king; REGAL, belonging to the attributes of a king. A kingly form; a royal residence; regal magnificence.

KINSMAN. RELATIVE.

KINSMAN is one of the same kin, and so related by blood. RELATIVE (Lat. *referre, relatus*) is one connected either by blood or by affinity.

KNAVISH. DISHONEST.

The latter simply states that the person is the opposite to honest, or that the act is so; the former (*knabe*, a young man, footman, or servant) carries the mind directly to the person and his frauds and artifices. DISHONEST is a term of grave, KNAVISH of contemptuous, reproach. The former expresses a habit; the latter a propensity.

KNOWLEDGE. LEARNING. ERUDITION. SCIENCE. LITERATURE. ART. LETTERS.

KNOWLEDGE is a general term,

denoting the fact or the subject of knowing, clear perception or apprehension, familiar cognizance.

LEARNING (A. S. *leornian*, *liornian*, to learn) is acquired knowledge in any branch of science or literature. SCIENCE (Lat. *scientia*, *seire*, to know) is, literally, knowledge, but usually denotes knowledge according to system. Science embraces those branches of knowledge of which the subject is ultimate principles, or facts as explained by principles, or laws arranged in natural order. LITERATURE (Lat. *litera*, a letter), in its widest application, embraces all compositions which do not appertain to the positive sciences. As a man of literature is versed in the *belles lettres*, so a man of learning excels in what is taught in the schools, and belongs almost wholly to the past; while literature includes the current compositions of the day. ERUDITION (e and *rudis*, rude, unlettered) relates to literature and learning rather than to science, and to its extensive attainment, involving a knowledge of subjects commonly unfamiliar. ART (Lat. *ars*, *artis*) is the application of knowledge to practice. As science consists of speculative principles, so art is a system of rules, serving to facilitate the performance of certain actions. Arts are divided into two classes, the useful, mechanical, or industrial arts, and the liberal, polite, or fine arts. The former are called trades; the latter have to do with imagination and design, as poetry, painting, sculpture, designing, and the like. The term "liberal arts" was formerly applied to the subjects of academical education; as, "Degrees in arts at the universities." LETTERS—equivalent to the French "*belles lettres*," polite learning—is to literature as the abstract to the concrete; literature being letters in specific relationship, as the literature (not the letters) of a particular country.

"Knowledge, then, seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. In this alone it consists. Where this perception is there is *knowledge*; and where it is not there, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we

always come short of *knowledge*. For when we know that white is not black, what do we else but perceive that these two ideas do not agree?"—*Locke*.

"The parts of human *learning* have reference to the three parts of man's understanding, which is the seat of *learning*, history to his memory, poesy to his imagination, and philosophy to his reason."—*Bacon*.

"'Twere well, says one sage, *erudite*, profound,

Terribly arch'd and aquiline his nose,
And over-built with most impending
brows—

'Twere well could you permit the world
to live

As the world pleases. What's the world
to you?"—*Couper*.

"The works of speculation or *science* may be reduced to the four classes of philosophy, mathematics, astronomy, and physic."—*Gibbon*.

"Our descendants may possibly contemplate with equal ridicule and surprise the preposterous partiality which the present age has shown to the frippery and tinsel of French *literature*."—*Eustace, Italy*.

"Art can never give the rules that make an *art*. This is, I believe, the reason why artists in general, and poets principally, have been confined in so narrow a circle."—*Burke*.

"Iche for sothe in science of *lettres* knowe thy konnyng."—*R. Gloucester*.

L.

LABOUR. See WORK.

LABORIOUS. See DILIGENT.

LACK. WANT. NEED. NECESSITY.

LACK (Old Sw. *lacka*, to fail) refers more directly to the failing or inadequate source or supply; WANT (Icelandic *vanta*, to be wanting), to the inadequate supply or possession, combined with the requirement or demand. NEED relates directly to the urgency of the demand, and indirectly to the absence of supply. Want is commonly absence of mere possession; need, absence of means of action. As they express states, NECESSITY (Lat. *necessitas*) is stronger than need (A. S. *nead*, *ned*, *nid*), for whereas need is negative, necessity

has a positive and compelling force. A man is in need of food. Under some circumstances there is a necessity for immediate action. Need is pressing, necessity unyielding. Need is the strongest degree of requirement, necessity of demand. In the phrase of the English Psalms, "See that such as are in need and necessity have right," the second term is an augmentation of the first. Need may be temporarily and easily removed; necessity is more lasting and less remediable. We need, in cases of difficulty, the advice and support of friends; but lacking this, we are often compelled, by necessity, to decide and act for ourselves. The words lack, want, and need rise in force. The superfluities of life—wealth, estates, great power or influence—I lack; the conveniences which I am without, I want; the necessities which I am without, I need. Lack is the absence of excess; want, of comfort; need, of sufficiency.

"But though each court a jester lacks,
To laugh at monarchs to their face,
Yet all mankind, behind their backs,
Supply the honest jester's place."

Dodsley.

"There is yet another cause of necessity which has occasioned great speculation among the writers upon general law, namely, whether a man in extreme want of food or clothing may justify stealing either to relieve his present necessities."—Blackstone.

"It is evident that nothing can be more amiable, suitable, and universally subservient both to the needs and to the refreshments of the creature than light."—South.

LADING. See CARGO.

LAG. LINGER. LOITER. SAUNTER. TARRY.

LAG (Gael. *lag*, weak, faint) is commonly relative to others, with whom the movements of the lagging person are slow in comparison, a definite line of progress being common to all. LINGER (A. S. *lengra*, comparative of *lang*, long) relates not to any definite onward movement, either of others or of the person lingering, but simply to the locality at or near which the lingerer stops and delays. It is sometimes employed of inani-

mate, and therefore involuntary things; as, a lingering hope or sickness. LOITER (Dutch *leuteren*, *lo-teren*, to delay) is to linger from tardiness or indolence, as linger implies a constraining or retarding influence attached to the locality. SAUNTER (which has been derived from *sainte terre*, the Holy Land, as if connected with the strolling of pilgrims, but is, more probably, a modification of the German *schlennern*, to wander idly, of which other forms are *schlendern* and *slendern*) is to move onwards, but in a lazy, dreamy fashion. TARRY (Old Eng. *targen*, connected with the Latin *tardus*, slow) differs from the others in denoting, for a time, movement absolutely suspended, but in reference to an implied progress. We lag through laziness or absence of mind; linger through attachment; loiter through idleness; saunter for pleasure; and tarry for a purpose.

"Yet not content, more to increase his shame,
When so she lagged, as she needs mote so,
He with his spear (that was to him great blame)
Would thump her forward, and enforce to go."
Spenser.

"On yonder cliffs, a grisly band,
I see them sit; they linger yet,
Avengers of their native land." Gray.

"We must proceed on speedily, and persist constantly, nowhere staying or loitering."—Barrow.

"Upon the first suspicion a father has that his son is of a sauntering temper, he must carefully observe him whether he be listless and indifferent in all his actions, or whether in some things alone he be slow and sluggish, but in others vigorous and eager."—Locke.

"Why is his chariot so long in coming? why tarry the wheels of his chariot?"—English Bible.

LAMENT. See BEMOAN, COMPLAIN, and GRIEVE.

LAND. COUNTRY. SOIL.^f MOULD. EARTH. GLOBE. WORLD.

LAND (A. S. *land*) denotes, severally, the solid, as distinguished from the fluid, portions of the globe; any

portion of that mass as related or appertaining to an individual or a people; the composition of the earth's surface as regards its agricultural use; and, by a rhetorical extension of meaning, the persons inhabiting a particular land. COUNTRY (Fr. *contrée*, Lat. *contra*, the tract over against the spectator) is a tract of land as it meets the eye, or such a tract as connected with residents or inhabitants, or as opposed to the city or the town. It is also, like land, often used for the inhabitants of the country; as, "The unanimous feeling of the country." SOIL (Lat. *solum*) is never employed but of the physical components of the earth's surface. EARTH, GLOBE, and WORLD have a special connection with one another. Omitting the use of earth in the sense of soil, from which it differs in that soil is employed of the aggregate of superficial substances, while earth designates only the lighter and looser particles, as MOULD (A. S. *molde*), which again denotes especially the highly fertile and fine particles of decayed organic matter, we come to regard it as a synonym with globe (Lat. *globus*, a ball) and world (A. S. *weorald*, *world*, and other forms). In speaking of the earth we commonly have in mind its external and material part. The term world denotes the moral and abstract view of the same thing; the world of Nature and the world of man in combination. We speak of the construction, the productions, the geological formation, the planetary movements of the earth and its relative place in the solar system. The world is the earth viewed in relation to its inhabitants. The earth abounds in wonders and beauties. The world is subject to the control of a supreme Moral Governor. The world is thus a term of higher moral dignity than earth; so we speak of the civilized world, not earth. It is in relation to its character as the abode of recently-discovered peoples, that the continent of America was called the New World. The intellectual, political, religious, gay, scientific world, a poet's world of dreams, and the like, all denote the idea of sentient occupation, or

peopling. The same character of connection with mind and sentient recognition, as of the Creator or of the angels, belongs to the use of the term world in reference to the heavenly bodies; as, "The unnumbered worlds which lie outside our own." Earth is limited to our own planet, though we speak of other worlds. A future life of social happiness is called a better world. Globe is used for the earth poetically, and also under its scientific aspects, as in geology and physical geography.

"As soon as the *land* of any *country* has all become private property, the landlords, like all other men, love to reap where they never sowed, and demand a rent even for its natural produce."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations.*

"The place which is shown for the haven is on a level with the town, and has probably been stopped up by the great heaps of dirt that the sea has thrown into it; for all the *soil* on that side of Ravenna has been left there insensibly by the sea's discharging itself upon it for many ages."—*Addison.*

"It is said of Archimedes that he would undertake to turn about the whole *earth*, if he could but have some place beside the *earth* to fix his feet upon."—*South.*

"Look downward on that *globe*, whose
hither side
With light from hence, though but reflected, shines;
That place is *earth*, the seat of man; that
light
His day."—*Milton.*

"Sure there is need of social intercourse,
Benevolence, and peace, and mutual aid
Between the nations, in a *world* that seems
To toll the death-bell of its own decease,
And by the voice of all its elements
To preach the gen'ral doom."—*Cowper.*

LANDSCAPE. PROSPECT. VIEW.

The English termination ship, like the German *schaft*, is connected with the verb *schaffen*, to shape. Thus lordship, friendship, is that which constitutes a lord, a friend, and the like. To this class of words belongs LANDSCAPE. Thus landscape is a shape of land, or the artistic representation of it. It is therefore such a prospect as comprises rural objects, or an open space of country. PROSPECT (Lat. *prospectus*, from *prospicere*, to

look forward) is a more general term, denoting a broad expanse overlooked, without denoting anything of what composes it. Hence we may have a prospect of the open sea or the starry heavens. VIEW (Fr. *vue*, Lat. *videre*, to see) is yet wider in its application, and is applicable to single objects, as a view of a town or a street, as well as of an extensive tract. It implies unity in variety, and details combined into a whole.

"Straight my eye hath caught new pleasures,
Whilst the *landscape* round it measures."
Milton.

"Heavens! what a goodly *prospect* spreads
around,
Of hills, and dales, and woods, and lawns,
and spires,
And glittering towns, and gilded streams,
till all
The stretching *landscape* into smoke de-
cays." Thomson.

Unlike the rest, view is used subjectively for the act of viewing, as well as objectively for the thing viewed.

"For what can force or guile with Him?
Or who deceive His mind, whose eye
Views all things at one *view*? He from
heaven's height
All these our motions vain sees and derides."
Milton.

LANGUAGE. DIALECT. IDIOM. TONGUE. SPEECH.

LANGUAGE (Fr. *langue*, Lat. *lingua*, the tongue) is the most comprehensive of these terms. It denotes any mode of expressing or conveying ideas; as, the language of the deaf and dumb. It may be written as well as spoken, nor is the idea dependent upon any particular mode of transmission. On the other hand, in the word TONGUE (Goth. *tong*), the idea of spokenness is exclusively retained. Tongue, SPEECH, and the other terms are applicable only to human beings, while language may be employed of the natural utterances of irrational animals; as the language of birds. Speech is the faculty or expression of articulate sounds, and is used broadly of the whole human race, while tongue is commonly restricted to the peculiar speech of a people; as the English or mother

tongue. DIALECT is speech characterized by local peculiarities or specific circumstances; as, for instance, a science or a profession (Gr. *διὰλέγεσθαι*, to converse); provincial dialect; the dialect of the learned. IDIOM (Gr. *ἰδίωμα*, *ἴδιος*, proper or peculiar) is a form of expression peculiar to a language or an author; and, in a wider sense, the aggregate of peculiarities in a language; that is, its general cast or genius. The idioms of a language belong to its structure, and are the same, wherever the language is spoken. The dialects vary, as being forms engrafted upon it here and there, or mutations to which it has been subjected locally.

"The ends of *language* in our discourse with others being chiefly these three—first, to make known one man's thoughts to another; secondly, to do it with as much ease and quickness as is possible; and thirdly, thereby to convey the knowledge of things, *language* is either abused or deficient when it fails in any of these three."—Locke.

"And we all know the common *dialect* in which the great masters of this art used to pray for the king, and which may justly pass for only a cleaner and more refined kind of libelling him in the Lord, as that God will turn his heart and open his eyes."—South.

"But whence art thou inspired, and thou alone,
To flourish in an *idiom* not thine own?"
Dryden.

"For what royalme almoste (Englande excepted) hath not all the good autours that ever wrote translated into the mother-tongue?"—Udal.

"The acts of God to human ears
Cannot without process of *speech* be told."
Milton.

LANGUID. See FAINT.

LANGUISH. See DROOP.

LARGE. See BIG, BROAD, and EXTENSIVE.

LARGELY. COPIOUSLY. FULLY.

As adverbs expressing modes of abundance, LARGELY (Fr. *large*, Lat. *largus*) commonly implies the will of an agent; as, "He distributed honours largely among the citizens;" COPIOUSLY (Lat. *copia*, plenty), the mere natural abundance of supply;

as, "Rivers copiously supplied in rainy seasons." FULLY (A. S. *full*) applies indiscriminately to both, but commonly implies an antecedent measure of requirement or capacity. It is also more proper to abstract things than the others; as, "To be fully persuaded."

"*Largelie* promised, and slacklie per-
foumed."—*Holinshed*.

"If our barren wits were dried up, they might be *copiously* irrigated from those fruitful well-springs."—*Burton, Anatomy of Melancholy*.

"All hail, Patroclus! let thy vengeful ghost

Hear and exult on Pluto's dreary coast;
Behold Achilles' promise *fully* paid,
Twelve Trojan heroes offered to thy shade."
Pope, Homer.

LASSITUDE. See FATIGUE.

LAST. CONTINUE. ENDURE.
REMAIN.

LAST (A. S. *læstan*, to perform, continue) denotes a continuance in time, and also a condition unimpaired. It is applicable to physical and to abstract things; as, "This memorial will last for many generations;" "The storm lasted through the night;" "Under the violence of the waves, the ship will not last much longer." The term, it will be seen, lends itself less appropriately to the expression of mere physical conservation, and better to abstract duration. It would be impossible now to say, with Bacon, the "lasting of trees," meaning their preservation. CONTINUE (Fr. *continuer*, Lat. *continere*) is not applicable at all in this sense, but only to permanence in place, in time, and in sequence as a matter of observation; as, "The sound continues;" "The border continues round the pattern." To ENDURE (Fr. *endurer*, Lat. *in* and *durare*, *durus*, hard) conveys the idea of lasting, in spite of influences at work to destroy, and is applicable to physical and moral permanence; as, "Metals endure a certain degree of heat without melting." "His patience, it is to be feared, will not endure much longer." REMAIN (Lat. *remanere*) has the same relation to rest as continue has to action and

movement. The walker continues walking; the stander remains standing.

"Your sufferings are of a short duration; your joy will *last* for ever."—*Hart, Meditation*.

"The same dull sights in the same landscape mixt,

Scenes of still life, and points for ever fixt,

A tedious pleasure in the mind bestow,
And pall the sense with one *continued* show."
Addison.

"The favour of God is to them that obtain it, a better and an *enduring* substance, which, like the widow's barrel and cruse, wastes not in the evil days of famine."—*Horne*.

"Entellus thus: My soul is still the same,
Unmoved with fear, and moved with martial fame;

But my chill blood is curdled in my veins,

And scarce the shadow of a man *remains*."
Dryden, Virgil.

LASTING. See DURABLE.

LATENT. SECRET. HIDDEN.
OCCULT.

LATENT (Lat. *latere*, to be hid) is applied to those cases of the hidden or secret in which the possibility or propriety of the contrary state is contemplated; as, a latent motive; a latent cause of mischief. It is most commonly employed of that which is of the nature of an undeveloped or *suppressed force*. What is SECRET (Lat. *secretus*, *secernere*, to set apart) is so far removed from common observation as to be unperceived. It involves a purposed hiding; and, therefore, that which is secret must be known to *some one*. What is HIDDEN (A. S. *hydan*, to hide) is so covered as to be invisible, which may be from natural or from artificial causes. In the case of the former, it was never known to any; as with the hidden minerals not yet disinterred from the earth. OCCULT (Lat. *occulere*, *occultus*, to hide) denotes the untraceable rather than the unknown, and is a term of processes and influences, the existence of which is known, but their mode of operation latent, below the surface, and not exposed to the sight and observation of mankind.

"Every breach of veracity indicates some latent vice, or some criminal intention which an individual is ashamed to avow. And hence the peculiar beauty of openness or sincerity."—*Stewart*.

"The blind, laborious mole
In winding mazes works her hidden hole."
Dryden.

"My heart, which by a secret harmony
Still moves with thine, joined in connection
sweet."
Milton.

"It is of an occult kind, and is so insensible in its advances as to escape observation."
—*I. Taylor*.

LATEST. LAST. FINAL. ULTIMATE.

LATEST, the superlative of late (A. S. *late*), applies only to the last in the order of time, being opposed to the earliest. LAST, which is an abbreviated form of the same word, relates to the order of succession generally, as well as of time in particular. FINAL (Lat. *finis*, an end) is employed of that which, in reference to human actions, brings with it an end, as a final decision, which puts, as it were, the finishing stroke to a thing. ULTIMATE (Lat. *ultimus*, last) brings out more strongly, in relation to cause and effect, the fact of preceding circumstances, as well as the finality of the fact itself. The ultimate belongs to a line of purpose or inquiry, as final does to a line of action. An ultimate object; ultimate principles. A final farewell; a final (not ultimate) touch to a painting. An ultimate conclusion; a final (not ultimate) word.

LAUDABLE. PRAISEWORTHY.
COMMENDABLE.

LAUDABLE (Lat. *laus*, *laudis*, praise) and COMMENDABLE (*commendare*, to recommend) seem better applicable to the actions or qualities of individuals, and PRAISEWORTHY to the individuals themselves; as, a praiseworthy character; laudable ambition; commendable propriety. Laudable is stronger than commendable; the former denoting that praise is due, the latter, that it is appropriate and right.

LAUGHABLE. See DROLL.

LAVISH. See EXTRAVAGANT.

LAW. See DECREE.

LAWFUL. LEGAL. LEGITIMATE.
LICIT.

LAWFUL denotes conformable to law (Fr. *loi*, Lat. *lex*), in any sense in which the term law may be employed, whether the law of the land, moral law, propriety, or specific regulation. LEGAL is conformable or appertaining to the law of the land. LEGITIMATE has the wider sense of conformable to law, rule, principle, justice, fairness, or propriety. LICIT (*licere*, to be lawful) is far less common than its negative, illicit. These terms regard the lawful or legal in reference to mutual trade, intercourse, connections, or relations between man and man.

"This judicial trial of right yet remains in some cases, as a divine lot of battle, though controverted by divines, touching the lawfulness of it."—*Bacon*.

"But if you lessen the rate of use, the lender, whose interest it is to keep up the rate of money, will rather lend it to the banker at legal interest than to the tradesman or gentleman who, when the law is broken, shall be sure to pay the full natural interest, or more."—*Locke*.

"Every such process of reasoning, it is well known, may be resolved into a series of legitimate syllogisms, exhibiting separately and distinctly in a light as clear and strong as language can afford each successive link of the demonstration."—*Stewart*.

LAX. LOOSE. VAGUE.

LAX (Lat. *laxus*, loose) is connected with loose. It is employed of intellectual and moral, as well as physical, matters; as, a lax statement; lax principles or habits; a lax fibre. It implies want of logical strictness, moral restraint, or physical tension.

"The flesh of that sort of fish being lax and spongy, and nothing so firm, solid, and weighty as that of the bony fishes."—*Ray*.

"In this general depravity of manners and laxity of principles, pure religion is nowhere more strongly inculcated than in our universities."—*Johnson*.

LOOSE (A. S. *leas*) has the same applications, but, as physically employed, differs from lax. A loose

rope may have been purposely let loose; but lax would imply a want of due constriction in its texture, as, for instance, by dryness. Morally, lax is not employed of speech and actions so commonly as loose; lax principles; loose talk or behaviour. VAGUE (Fr. *vague*, Lat. *vagus*) is employed only of intellectual things. As lax and loose denote both what is wanting in logical strictness and moral propriety, so vague denotes that which is indefinite, and so ambiguous, whether from want of clearness and precision of statement or conception, or from definiteness of authority. A vague idea; a vague proposition; a vague report, which is equivalent to a rumour; a vague notion or impression.

"The most voluptuous and loose person breathing, were he but tied to follow his dice and his courtships every day, would find it the greatest torment that could befall him."
—*South*.

"This law has been styled—and, notwithstanding the objections of some writers to the *vagueness* of the language, appears to have been styled with great propriety—"the Law of Nature."—*Mackintosh*.

LAY. PUT. PLACE. SET.

Of these, the simplest and most comprehensive, and, therefore, the least distinctive, is PUT, which denotes no more than to bring in any way to a position or relation; as, to put a question; to put a book on the shelf. To PLACE (Fr. *place*, Lat. *platea*, a street) is to put in a particular part of space, or in a specific position. A book is placed on the shelf, as being the appointed arrangement for it. To LAY (A. S. *lægan*, to cause to lie, *liegan*) can be used only of those things which may be made in some degree to lie; while SET (A. S. *settan*), only of those which may be made to stand. We lay a plate on the table, and set a candlestick.

LAZY. See IDLE.

LEAD. CONDUCT. GUIDE.

To LEAD (A. S. *lædan*) is only employed of animate objects, with commonly, though not necessarily,

the idea of preceding, to show the way. It is associated with the ideas of care, responsibility, and persuasion. CONDUCT (Lat. *conducere*, *conductus*) and GUIDE (Fr. *guider*) are applicable to inanimate objects, and to affairs in general; as, to conduct or guide a traveller or a transaction. As applied to sentient beings, conduct is more prominently associated with the ideas of authority and office; guide, with those of knowledge and skill.

"He tried each art, reprov'd each dull delay,
Allured to brighter worlds, and led the way."
Goldsmith.

"A favour'd goat, *conductor* of my herd,
Strayed to a dale whose outlet is the post
To Phocian's left, and penetrates to Greece."
Glover, Leonidas.

"Common sense, or that share and species of understanding which Nature has bestowed on the greater part of men, is, when competently improved by education, and assisted by divine grace, the safest guide to certainty and happiness."—*Knox, Essays*.

LEADER. See HEAD.

LEADING. See CHIEF.

LEAGUE. See ALLIANCE.

LEAN. MEAGRE.

LEAN (A. S. *læne*) signifies devoid of fat, MEAGRE (Fr. *maigre*, Lat. *macer*), devoid of flesh. Meagre lends itself much more readily to metaphorical uses, in the senses of destitute of fulness and power, deficient in quantity or requisite quality; as, a meagre supply; a meagre statement, argument, exposition, or treatment of a subject.

"Thirst, *leanness*, excess of animal secretions, are signs and effects of too great thinness of blood."—*Arbuthnot*.

"Thou art so lean and meagre waxen late,
That scarce thy legs uphold thy feeble gait."
Spenser.

LEAN. BEND. INCLINE.

Of these, BEND (A. S. *bendan*) and INCLINE (Lat. *inclinare*) do not involve of necessity a relation to the perpendicular, which is implied in LEAN (A. S. *hlinian*, *hleonian*, *linian*), except when it is used in the meta-

phorical sense of leaning in opinion or moral inclination. That which inclines, leans or bends only in a slight degree, and in relation to any kind of line, vertical, horizontal, or otherwise. The tower of Pisa leans, and might be said to incline, in a certain direction. In this case, incline is only a more refined word. A road inclines to the right, if its deviation is but slight; it bends, if it is sufficiently rapid to form a distinct curve. In their moral usage, a man leans to certain opinions, as having a natural or constitutional tendency to adopt them. He bends when strong external pressure of circumstances bears upon him; as, to bend to necessity. He inclines when he is prompted by natural preference and bias, or tendency of the will. Both bend and incline are intrinsic; lean has also an extrinsic application when it is followed by the prepositions upon or against.

"Thus to relieve the wretched ~~was~~ his pride,
And ev'n his failings *leaned* to virtue's side."
Goldsmith.

"She had also contrived another puppet, which, by the help of several little springs to be wound up within it, could move all its limbs, and that she had sent over to her correspondent in Paris, to be taught the various *leanings* and *bendings* of the head, the risings of the bosom."—*Spectator*.

"Shall I venture to say, my lord, that in our late conversation you were *inclined* to the party which you adopted rather by the feelings of your good nature than by the conviction of your judgment?"—*Burke*.

LEARNING. See KNOWLEDGE.

LEAVE. LIBERTY. LICENCE. PERMISSION.

LEAVE is the simplest term (A. S. *leaf*); it implies the placing of a person in a position to act or not, as he pleases; a discretionary permission; LIBERTY (Lat. *libertas*), that all obstructions or hindrances are removed to specific action; as, liberty of speech; liberty of access. LICENCE is liberty in a particular case, formally, or even legally granted by special permission; as, a licence to print. PERMISSION (Lat. *permittere*)

is the mere absence on the part of another of anything preventive or of opposition, without implying sanction or approval.

"Then let us not think hard
One easy prohibition, that enjoy
Free *leave* so large to all things else, and
choice
Unlimited of manifold delights."

Milton.

"So that the idea of *liberty* is the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other."—*Locke*.

As licence implies the principle of liberty, so it implies also a contrary principle of restraint, except when it is employed of oneself, in which it is simply equivalent to reckless assumption of liberty. He who receives licence from authority receives certain free powers, but modified by the authority which granted it. So, politically, licence may imply not a little which is against freedom.

"My lords, from the precedent now before us, we shall be induced—nay, we can find no reason for refusing—to lay the press under a general *licence*, and then we may bid adieu to the liberties of Great Britain."—*Chesterfield*.

"The will
And high *permission* of all-ruling Heaven
Left him at large to his own dark designs."
Milton.

LEAVE. QUIT.

We LEAVE that to which we may return. We QUIT (Fr. *quitter*) that to which we purpose not to return (see ABANDON).

LEGAL. See LAWFUL.

LEGITIMATE. See LAWFUL.

LEISURE. See IDLE.

LENITY. See MERCY.

LESSEN. See ABATE.

LETHARGIC. See DROWSY.

LETTER. See CHARACTER and EPISTLE.

LETTERS. See KNOWLEDGE.

LEVEL. See EQUAL and FLAT.

LEVITY. GIDDINESS. LIGHT-
NESS. VOLATILITY. FLIGHTINESS.

LEVITY (Lat. *levitas*, *levis*, light) is that kind of lightness which denotes an inability or inaptitude to weigh the importance of principles in thought and action, and so borders on immorality, if it is not actually such. It is, in its lightest form, a disregard of the proprieties of time and place. GIDDINESS (A. S. *gidig*, *gydig*, *gyddig*) is wild thoughtlessness, especially such as comes of exuberant spirits, combined with scanty powers of reflection, as in some young persons; an inability, as in the case of vertigo, to collect the thoughts. LIGHTNESS (A. S. *liht*, *leoht*, *leht*) is that quality of mind which disposes it to be influenced by trifling considerations, and shows itself therefore in inconstancy of purpose and want of steadfastness and resolution. VOLATILITY (Lat. *volare*, to fly) is active lightness of disposition; a tendency to fly from one thing to another from curiosity and petty interest, and to extract pleasure of a passing kind from a variety of objects and pursuits. FLIGHTINESS (A. S. *fliht*, *flyht*, a flying) comes of mental unsteadiness, which shows itself in capricious fancies, irregular conduct, and disordered intentions; it betokens intellectual deficiency.

LEXICON. See DICTIONARY.

LIABLE. See ACCOUNTABLE and SUBJECT.

LIBERAL. See BENEFICENT.

LIBEL. See CALUMNY.

LIBERATE. See DELIVER.

LIBERTY. See FREEDOM and LEAVE.

LICENCE. See LEAVE.

LICENTIOUS. See DISSOLUTE.

LICIT. See LAWFUL.

LIE. See FALSEHOOD.

LIFE. See ANIMATION.

LIFELESS. See DEAD.

LIFT. HEAVE. RAISE. ELE-
VATE. ERECT. EXALT. HOIST.
HEIGHTEN.

The idea common to these terms is that of making high or higher than before. To LIFT (Icelandic *lypta*, to raise) is to bring up from a specific spot to a higher by a direct exertion of personal or mechanical force, producing a separation in the thing lifted from its former points of rest or support. That is lifted which is drawn up into the air, as that is RAISED (A. S. *rasian*, *arasian*, from *risan*, *arisan*, to raise, being to cause to rise) which still preserves mediate or immediate contact with the ground—that is, of course, in the physical senses of these terms. We lift a ladder when we take it up off the ground. We may raise it by one end only, so as to place it against the house. HEAVE (A. S. *hebban*, *hefan*) denotes the raising slowly, as of weight or with difficulty. It has the additional force of impelling as well as raising; as to heave a stone at an object. ELEVATE (Lat. *elevare*, *levis*, light in weight) is to raise *relatively*, or to bring from a lower place to a higher. To ERECT (*erigere*, *erectus*) is to raise *perpendicularly*, still preserving the relation to, and support of, some base or foundation on which the thing erected rests. To EXALT (*ex* and *altus*, high) is so to raise as to produce with the raising an impression of dignity and superiority; the physical being emblematical of a moral raising. HOIST (Old Eng. *hoise*) commonly combines the ideas of gradual raising of what is weighty by mechanical means, or at least of what requires some effort; as to hoist a package, a sail, or an ensign. HEIGHTEN is to increase an already existing height, as opposed to lowering; to make higher or taller. A thing already raised or erected may be further heightened, as a flag-staff, by an addition to its substance.

LIGHTNESS. See LEVITY.

LIKE. See EQUAL.

LIKENESS. RESEMBLANCE. SIMI-
LARITY. SIMILITUDE.

LIKENESS (A. S. *lic, gelic*) is the most familiar and comprehensive. It is applicable both to the internal nature and to the outward semblances of things. RESEMBLANCE (Fr. *ressembler*, Lat. *re* and *simulare, similis*, like) has much the same meaning, but has a more subjective, as likeness a more objective, force; that is, likeness belongs rather to objects themselves; resemblance, to their properties, and the effect produced by them. Hence likeness seems more appropriate in the case of visible and palpable objects; resemblance, in the qualities of things, and where the likeness is fainter. A strong likeness in feature; a faint resemblance in manner. SIMILARITY (Lat. *similis*) lends itself more readily to express likeness in properties or accidents of things than things themselves; as, a similarity of appearance, nature, disposition, of proceeding, of result, or of such things as are judged purely by the mind, and not the senses; as a similarity of belief. SIMILITUDE is to similarity as the concrete to the abstract, similitude being embodied similarity or likeness as it is not only recognized or appreciated, but represented and expressed. Hence a similarity may be shown by a similitude, in the rhetorical sense of the term. When a tyrant is called a tiger, it is a similitude based upon a similarity.

"There is a fabulous narrative that in the northern countries there should be an herb that groweth in the *likeness* of a lamb, and feedeth upon the grass."—*Bacon*.

"To do good is to become most like God. It is that which of all other qualities gives us the *resemblance* of His nature and perfection."—*Sharp*.

"From the knowledge I had of this tree, and the *similarity* it bore to the spruce, I judged that, with the addition of inspissated juice of wort and molasses, it would make a very wholesome beer."—*Cook's Voyages*.

"Thus they turned their glory into the *similitude* of a calf that eateth hay."—*English Psalms*.

LIMB. MEMBER.

MEMBER (Lat. *membrum*) is a general term applied to any distinct

section or portion of an organized body performing a distinct office, as the eye, the ear. LIMB (Old Eng. *lyme, lymme*) is the term restricted to the arms and legs.

"And on the grass her dainty *limbs* did lay,

In secret shadow, far from all men's sight."—*Spenser*.

"But now are they many *members*, yet but one body; and the eye cannot say unto the hand, I have no need of thee; nor again the head to the feet, I have no need of you."—*English Bible*.

LIMIT. See BORDER, CIRCUMSCRIBE, and EXTENT.

LIMITED. See FINITE.

LINEAGE. See HOUSE.

LINGER. See LAG.

LIQUID. See FLUID and JUICE.

LIQUOR. See JUICE.

LIST. See CATALOGUE.

LISTEN. See HEARKEN.

LISTLESS. CARELESS. SUPINE.

The LISTLESS person (A. S. *lystan, lustan*, to lean or incline, with less, the termination of privation) is in a state of mental and moral torpor, which excludes the desire of any object which requires exertion. Listless stands to the ends of action as CARELESS to action itself, whether physical or mental. The careless man does his work without pains; the listless man does not think it worth doing at all. SUPINE, the Latin *supinus*, lying on the back, is opposed to *pronus*, bending forwards. So the supine is without that proneness which comes from the propensity to activity and the faculty of interest. As listlessness is employed of minor matters, so supineness implies matters of some principle and obligation. The careless person is not necessarily supine; he may be active, energetic, and lively, but specifically indifferent or uninterested in the object before him. The listless person has no interest. The supine may have some amount of it, but not enough to be an incentive to action, or enough to overcome a constitutional laziness.

Listlessness is rather the absence of desire; supineness, the absence of pure interest. Carelessness may come from an excess of animal spirits, and a playful defiance of fortune. A person is supine by nature; circumstances may make him listless.

"Moreover, since the French invasion, it seems to have suffered from the negligence or from the poverty of the proprietors, owing partly to the heavy contributions laid on the town, and partly to that *listlessness* and depression of spirits which generally accompany national disasters."—*Eustace, Italy.*

"If, indeed, the little improvement they apparently derive from such perfunctory lectures arises from their own *supineness*, themselves only are justly culpable; but I suspect their very *supineness* usually arises from the indifference and dullness of the tutors' manner."—*Knox, Essays.*

LITERATURE. See KNOWLEDGE.

LITTLE. SMALL. DIMINUTIVE. MINUTE.

LITTLE (A. S. *lytel*, *litel*, *lyt*) is the most general term, and is applicable to quantity as well as size; as a little person, a little water. SMALL (A. S. *smäl*, *smal*, *smæl*) applies to that which is wanting in extension or extent. We could not say, "a small water," but "quantity" or "piece of water." Both have the moral import of insignificant or mean. Little and small being both relative terms, the former is in excess of the latter; little meaning remarkably or exceptionally small. Hence small belongs more purely to standards of comparison, without implying disparagement. If my income has diminished, I must occupy a smaller (not a littler) house. Little is opposed to big; small to large. A little child is contrasted with a grown man. A small child is a *proportionately* small, that is, puny or ill-developed child. Little is often associated with the feelings, as small is not. So it may be a term of endearment; as a little darling. DIMINUTIVE (Lat. *diminuere*, to diminish) is relative to an assumed or expressed standard, as a diminutive person is one who falls far below the average size. MINUTE (*minuere*, *minutus*, to diminish) is that which

requires or implies closeness of observation or inspection, and is a term of purely physical proportion, except when it is used analogously or metaphorically.

"I confess I love *littleness* almost in all things; a *little*, convenient estate, a *little*, cheerful house, a *little* company, and a very *little* feast."—*Cowley.*

"Thenceforth I 'gan in my engrieved breast
To scorn all difference of great and small,
Sith that the greatest often are oppress,
And unawares do into danger fall."
Spenser.

"At all our concerts he was a constant but an invisible performer. For while he stood on tiptoes thrumming his bass viol the *diminutiveness* of his figure was totally eclipsed by the expansion of his instrument."
—*Student.*

"Whose corpuscles, by reason of their *minuteness*, swim easily for a while in the water."—*Boyle.*

LIVE. See EXIST.

LIVELIHOOD. LIVING. SUBSISTENCE. SUPPORT. MAINTENANCE. SUSTENANCE.

The means of living or supporting life, or the life so supported, are the ideas common to these terms. LIVELIHOOD stands to LIVING as the general result to the course or means; the getting of the living being the livelihood, that is, occupation, calling, or work in life. A livelihood is a calling or profession regarded as the condition of subsistence; while living is the subsistence itself. Both livelihood and living are restricted to rational creatures, whose maintenance depends upon their own exertions. SUBSISTENCE (*sub*, under, and *sistere*, to stand) is employed of what furnishes support to animal life generally and directly, as food; while to SUPPORT (Lat. *supportare*, *sub*, under, and *portare*, to carry) is to furnish with the means of sustenance in any shape, as money, food, and the like. MAINTENANCE (Fr. *maintenir*, Lat. *manus*, the hand, and *tenere*, to hold) has a wider meaning, and denotes generally the keeping up of anything which has to be upheld in a course of being, action, or operation; as the maintenance of life, of the body, of a fabric,

of respectability, of splendour, of public war or worship. **SUSTENANCE** (Lat. *sub*, under, and *tenere*, to hold) denotes no more than means of supporting life, but is not restricted to animal life, being applicable to the vegetative life of plants. Sustenance passes into the body of things; not so maintenance, nor (in all cases) support. Livelihood is earned. Living is procured. Subsistence accrues. Support is given. Maintenance is afforded. Sustenance is imparted. Unlike the rest, maintenance and support are applicable to things of the moral nature: as the support of courage and hope; the maintenance of order, cheerfulness, or resolution.

"My lord, saith he, was never worthy man
So nobly bred, and of so high descent,
Of so fair *livelihood*, and so large rent."

Drayton.

"Tis the very profession and *livelihood* of such people, getting their *living* by those practices for which they deserve to forfeit their lives."—*South*.

"By the means of *subsistence*, I understand not the means of superfluous gratifications, but that present competency which every individual must possess in order to be in a capacity to derive a support from his industry in the proper business of his calling."—*Bishop Horsley*.

"By giving up the belief of a God, I throw away all these considerations, and leave myself utterly destitute and *supportless*."—*Scott, Christian Life*.

"All men are sensible of the necessity of justice to maintain peace and order; and all men are sensible of the necessity of peace and order for the *maintenance* of society."—*Hume*.

"It is a mistake to suppose that the rich man *maintains* his servants, tradesmen, tenants, and labourers. The truth is, they *maintain* him."—*Paley*.

"The sheriffs of Hertford and Essex were commanded to ward him there, and to prevent all *sustenance* to be brought him."—*Drayton*.

LIVELY. See **CHEERFUL**.

LIVING. See **LIVELIHOOD**.

LOAD. See **BURDEN**.

LOATH. See **RELUCTANT**.

LOATHE. See **ABHOR**.

LOCATION. See **POSITION**.

LOCALITY. See **POSITION**.

LOFTINESS. See **DIGNITY**.

LOFTY. See **HIGH**.

LOITER. See **LAG**.

LONELY. **SOLITARY.**

LONELY (abbreviated from *alone*) conveys the idea of the melancholy or the forsaken; while **SOLITARY** (Lat. *solitarius*, *solus*, alone) denotes no more than the absence of life or society. A bird of solitary habits is distinguished from gregarious. A lonely wanderer is not only solitary, but feels it in sadness. Places are solitary, as being without inhabitants. They are lonely, as producing in persons the effects of isolation. So we may be lonely, though not solitary, in crowds. As the essence of solitariness is separation, not the feelings consequent upon it, it is a synonym of single; as a solitary instance, that is, one, and only one.

"To the misled and *lonely* traveller."

Shakespeare.

"Hie home unto my chamber,
Where thou shalt find me sad and *solitary*."

Ibid.

LOOK. See **BEHOLD**.

LOOSE. See **LAX**.

LOQUACIOUS. **TALKATIVE.** **GARRULOUS.**

The **LOQUACIOUS** person (*loquax*, *loqui*, to speak) is one who is in the habit of talking continually or excessively. The **TALKATIVE** person is not necessarily so exclusively fond of the sound of his own voice, and likes talkativeness in others as well. The **GARRULOUS** person (Lat. *garrulus*, *garrive*, to blab) is unduly communicative, and fluently eloquent in imparting small and valueless information. He tends more distinctively to talk about his neighbour's affairs and his own. He is full of petty experiences, which he occupies the time of others in detailing. Children are often talkative; lively women loquacious; old men garrulous.

"Why *loquacity* is to be avoided, the wise man gives us a sufficient reason, Prov. x. 19: 'In the multitude of words there wanteth not

sin;' and Eccles. v. 7: 'In many words there are divers vanities.'—*Ray*.

"Pardon, my lord, the feeble *garrulity* of age, which loves to diffuse itself in discourse of the departed great."—*Burke*.

"With such cautions, there is no doubt but that *talkativeness* is greatly to be preferred to taciturnity, both for our own and others' pleasure and improvement."—*Knox, Essays*.

LOT. *See* DESTINY.

LOUD. NOISY. CLAMOROUS. OBSTREPEROUS. SONOROUS.

LOUD (A. S. *hlūd*) is producing any kind of sound in a high degree, whether continuously or not. It is a characteristic also of the sound itself striking the ear with force. NOISE (Old Fr. *noise*, *nose*, Lat. *noxa*, from *nocere*, to hurt) is producing confused, unmusical, senseless, and abnormal sound, which cannot be reduced to musical notes, or a ratio of vibration. CLAMOROUS (Lat. *clamare*, to call) applies only to the unrestrained and noisy exercise of the human or animal voice, as the manifestation of some strong sentiment or desire. OBSTREPEROUS (Lat. *obstreperare*, to make a noise at) is producing a disturbing or tumultuous noise. SONOROUS (Lat. *sonus*, sound) is having the power or quality of loudness by nature, as a sonorous voice, a sonorous metal; and carries with it no disagreeableness of impression, on the one hand, or musical character, on the other, but is simply opposed to weakness or deadness of sound.

"The *loudest* peals and rattlings of our conscience."—*Barrow*.

"The king's demand of a supply produced one of those *noisy* speeches which disaffection and discontent regularly dictate."—*Johnson*.

"We may much more easily think to *clamour* the sun and stars out of their courses, than to word the great Creator of them out of the steady purposes of His own will by all the vehemence and *loudness* of our petitions."—*South*.

"There are who, deaf to mad ambition's call, Would shrink to hear th' *obstreperous* trump of fame, Supremely blest if to their portion fall Health, competence, and peace."

Beattie.

"They have *sonorous* instruments, but they can be scarcely called instruments of music: one is the shell called the Triton's trumpet, with which they make a noise not unlike that which our boys sometimes make with a cow's horn."—*Cook's Voyages*.

LOVE. *See* AFFECTION.

LOVELY. *See* BEAUTIFUL.

LOVER. *See* SUITOR.

LOW. *See* BASE.

LOWER. REDUCE.

To LOWER is the simpler and generic term, being applicable to anything which exists in degree, and of which that degree may be altered for more or less. To REDUCE (Lat. *reducere*) is to lower in a certain way, that is, to lower in reference to an exclusively internal standard. We lower a bucket into a well. We reduce a substance to powder, the particles being regarded as in their individuality prior to their existence in combination. We reduce expenses, that is, make them lower by bringing them back to what they have been or ought to be. We reduce an argument to a simple statement when we regard this statement as containing the primary truth or meaning, and all else as accretion, accident, or surplusage. To lower is to reduce in respect to size, quantity, rank, value, and the like.

"Mr. Locke, Mr. Law, and M. Montesquieu, as well as many other writers, seem to have imagined that the increase of the quantity of gold and silver, in consequence of the discovery of the Spanish West Indies, was the real cause of the *lowering* of the rate of interest through the greater part of Europe."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations*.

"Consequently they resolve that all manner of life whatsoever is generable and corruptible, or educible out of nothing, and *reducible* to nothing again; and these are the Anaximandrian and Democritic atheisms."—*Cudworth*.

LOWLY. HUMBLE. MODEST. DIFFIDENT.

LOWLY is rather a term of the natural disposition, and sometimes expresses simply the natural state; HUMBLE (Lat. *humilis*), of the spirit

and intellect, except when meaning socially inferior, as a humble station of life. Humility is more reflective than lowliness. A man by self-discipline and thoughtfulness may become truly humble, who is by no means of a lowly disposition naturally. Humility resembles modesty; but it implies rather a readiness to yield what is due to us than a shrinking from notice. Humility, it has been well observed, does not consist in a disposition falsely to underrate ourselves, but "in being willing to waive our rights, and descend to a lower place than might be our due; in being ready to admit our liability to error, and listening patiently to objections, even when they thwart our views; in freely owning our faults when conscious of having been wrong; and, in short, in not being over-careful of our own dignity." MODESTY (Lat. *modestia*) does not imply self-distrust, but an unwillingness to put ourselves forward, and the absence of over-confidence in our own powers. The modest man is not ignorant of his powers, but does not vaunt or assume upon them. A DIFFIDENT man, on the other hand (*diffidere*, to distrust), is over-distrustful of his own powers, and, whether from an exaggerated dread of failure, or from any other cause, shrinks from undertaking what he may be quite competent to perform. Modesty and humility are virtues; diffidence is not in itself a virtue, and may amount to a defect. The opposite to diffidence is confidence; to modesty, impudence or assurance; to humility, pride or conceit. Diffidence, however, unlike the rest, bears the additional sense of distrust of others. In short, diffidence is distrust. This, when entertained of others, is a kind of suspicion; when of ourselves, a kind of modesty, or, in excess, a kind of fear.

"As lofty pines o'ertop the lowly reed,
So did her graceful height all nymphs exceed."
Congreve.

"I will invite all manner of persons, of what manners or dispositions soever, whether the ambitious or humble-minded, the proud or pitiful, ingenuous or base-minded." — *Spectator*.

"Modesty is a kind of shame or bashfulness proceeding from the sense a man has of his own defects compared with the perfections of him whom he comes before." — *South*.

"The use that our Saviour makes of this lively description of Providence is to teach us to rely at all times upon the care and protection of God, without unreasonable anxiety, diffidence, and distrust." — *Clarke*.

As illustrating the other force of the term diffident, we may take the following:—

"There are some essays made faintly, diffidently, and occasionally at first, like those of men who, emerging out of darkness, were dazzled as well as enlightened." — *Bolingbroke*.

LUCID. See BRIGHT.

LUCKY. See HAPPY.

LUCRE. See GAIN.

LUDICROUS. See DROLL.

LUMINOUS. See BRIGHT.

LUNACY. See MADNESS.

LUSTRE. See BRIGHT.

LUSTY. See STOUT.

LUXURIANT. EXUBERANT.

LUXURIANT (*luxuria*, luxury) applies only to vegetation and what is analogous to growth; as luxuriant crops, a luxuriant imagination. EXUBERANT (*ex* and *uber*, the udder) is to the production what luxuriant is to the growth; the former denotes a flourishing life, the latter a copious, and sometimes excessive, produce. Hence exuberance is sometimes employed to imply that kind of abundance which needs to be restrained, as exuberant grief, exuberant joy; while luxuriant is never used but in a happy and favourable sense.

"Poets no less celebrated for the luxuriance than for the elegance of their genius." — *Observer*.

"Continue yet to cleanse your vines from exuberant branches, that too much hinder the sun." — *Evelyn*.

"So that allowing me in my exuberance one way, for my deficiencies in the other, you will find me not unreasonable." — *Burke*.

M.

MADNESS. DERANGEMENT. INSANITY. MANIA. FRENZY. IDIOTCY. ABERRATION. ALIENATION.

MADNESS (A. S. *gemæd*, *gemæd*) expresses any kind or degree of disorder of the intellect, whether permanent or transient, casual or congenital; as hereditary madness, the madness of rage or any other passion. INSANITY (*in*, not, and *sanus*, sound) is a more philosophical or technical term for madness, and is popularly used for all such diseases. It is not employed, like madness, of passing derangement. LUNACY has now nearly the same extent of meaning, though once used to denote periodical insanity (*luna*, the moon). DERANGEMENT, ALIENATION, ABERRATION are not scientific but colloquial terms, expressive of the aspects of the disease. MANIA, DELIRIUM, and FRENZY denote excited states of the disease; mania (Gr. *μανία*, *μαίνεσθαι*, to rage), as denoting simply its violence; delirium (supposed to be derived from *de*, from, and *lira*, a furrow), a wandering, inconsecutive state of mind. Frenzy (Gr. *φρενίτις*, *νόσος*, mind-disease, *φρην*, the mind) is applied of more ordinary and temporary kinds of mental excitement; as, a frenzy of rage; the frenzy of the prophet or the poet.

MAGNIFICENT. See GRAND.

MAGNITUDE. See BULK.

MAJESTIC. See GRAND.

MAIM. MUTILATE. MANGLE.

To MAIM (Old Fr. *mahaigner*, and written in law language *maïhem* and *mayhem*) is to deprive of the use of a member or limb of the body, so as to render a person less able to attack or to defend himself in fighting, or, by an extension of the term, less competent to physical action and movement generally. To MUTILATE (Lat. *mutilus*) is to deprive, not only of the use of the limb or member, but of the limb or member *itself*, or of any portion of the body. To MANGLE

(A. S. *be-mancian*, to maim) is to cut or bruise with repeated strokes or injuries in an irregular manner, with ruptures and lacerations.

MAIN. See CHIEF.

MAINTAIN. ASSERT. VINDICATE. HOLD. SUPPORT.

MAINTAIN (Lat. *manus*, the hand, and *tenere*, to hold), in the sense in which it is synonymous with the other terms here given, denotes the holding firmly or with vigour and constancy; while HOLD (A. S. *healdan*) denotes simply entertaining with any degree of firmness in argumentative defence, and even without argument at all. We hold views, opinions, or belief; we maintain, besides these, positions, arguments, rights, claims. To ASSERT (*asserere*, to grasp with the hand) is to lay down a statement or advance a claim in a positive manner, as if identifying oneself with it, and being ready to accept its consequences. Asserting commonly precedes maintaining; the former being positive declaration, the latter persistent upholding afterwards. We assert facts and claims. To VINDICATE (Lat. *vindicare*) is to defend with an implied degree of success. It stands to justice as assert and maintain to truth. Hold is always used of persons; support, also of evidence. We hold truths or convictions; we support the forms in which they are expressed as propositions. To hold is moral or intellectual; to support is operative or technical.

"Judge Anderson, who sate at the assizes in the county of Suffolk, did adjudge it not *maintainable*, because it was not spoken maliciously."—Wood, *Athenæ Oxonienses*.

"Now nothing is more shameful and unworthy a natural philosopher than to assert anything to be done without a cause, or to give no reason of it."—Ray.

"For God,
Nothing more certain, will not long defer
To vindicate the glory of His name
Against all competition, nor will long
Endure it doubtful whether God be Lord,
Or Dagon." Milton.

"This is the unity of the Christian Church, the holding of Christ for the head, and not,

as the present Church of Rome teaches, the holding of the Pope for the visible head of it."—*Pearce, Sermons.*

"The question is not whether a thing be mysterious, for all things are mysterious, but whether the mystery be supported by evidence."—*Gilpin.*

MAINTENANCE. *See* LIVELIHOOD.

MAKE. *See* CREATE.

MALADY. *See* DISEASE.

MALEDICTION. *See* CURSE.

MALEFACTOR. *See* CRIMINAL.

MALEVOLENCE. *See* HATRED and MALICIOUS.

MALICE. *See* HATRED.

MALICIOUS. MALEVOLENT. MALIGNANT.

MALICIOUS denotes the character which delights in doing harm for harm's sake. It may, however, be applied to parts of the character, or to manifestations of it; as to take a malicious pleasure in anything. MALEVOLENT (*male*, badly, and *volens*, willing) is more strictly personal against others. MALIGNANT (Lat. *malignans*, from *malignare* or *ari*) is that which is virulently bent upon harm or evil, and lends itself more readily to express the character of inanimate influences, where the harm is contemplated without the intention; as a malignant ulcer or fever. Malicious carries the idea of designing; malevolence, that of impulse of nature; malignant, intrinsic vice or harmfulness.

"Malicious slander is the relating of either truth or falsehood for the purpose of creating misery."—*Paley.*

"Emulation is indeed frequently accompanied with ill-will toward our rivals; but it is the desire of superiority which is the active principle, and the malevolent affection is only a concomitant circumstance."—*Stewart.*

MALIGNANT. *See* MALICIOUS.

MANAGE. *See* CONTRIVE.

MANAGEMENT. *See* CHARGE.

MANFUL. MANLY. MANNISH.

MANFUL is commonly applied to conduct; MANLY, to character. Man-

ful opposition; manly bravery. Manful is in accordance with the strength of a man; manly, with the moral excellence of a man. Manful is what a man would, as such, be likely to do; manly, what he ought to do, and to feel as well. MANNISH expresses the unseemly imitation or likeness to the character of a man, in those who have some other character to support; and so is applicable to the coarseness of women, or the assumption and precocity of children.

"For models made to mend our kind
To no one clime should be confined,
And *manly* virtue, like the sun,
His course of glorious toil should run,
Alike diffusing in his flight
Congenial joy, and life, and light."

Swift.

"I kill'd a man, whose death I much repent;
But yet I slew him *manfully* in fight,
Without false vantage, or base treachery."

Shakespeare.

"But, alas! the painted faces and *manishness*, and monstrous disguisedness of one sex."—*Bishop Hall.*

MANGLE. *See* MAIM.

MANIA. *See* MADNESS.

MANIFEST. *See* APPARENT and SHOW.

MANLY. *See* MANFUL.

MANNER. *See* AIR, CUSTOM, and MODE.

MANNERS. *See* CUSTOM.

MARGIN. *See* BRIM.

MARINE. MARITIME. NAVAL. NAUTICAL.

MARINE (Lat. *marinus*, *mare*, the sea) and MARITIME (Lat. *maritimus*, from the same) both mean belonging to the sea, but under different aspects; marine, to the sea in its simplest aspect or natural state, as marine productions or deposits; maritime, to the sea as it is employed by man, or in relation to the life of man; as a maritime people, maritime trade or occupations. An analogous difference may be observed in the use of the terms naval and nautical. NAVAL is simply belonging to ships; NAU-

TICAL, belonging to anything with which ships are specially connected, or for which they are employed. A naval life, the naval profession, a naval armament; nautical discoveries, a nautical almanac (Gr. *vâos*, Lat. *navis*, a ship).

"The code of *maritime* laws, which are called the laws of Oleron, and are received by all nations in Europe as the ground and substructure of all their *marine* constitutions, was confessedly compiled by our King Richard the First, at the Isle of Oleron, on the coast of France, then part of the possessions of the crown of England."—*Blackstone*.

"The victory of Duilius, as it was honoured at Rome with the first *naval* triumph that was ever seen in that city, so gave it unto the Romans a great encouragement to proceed in their wars by sea."—*Raleigh*.

"The *nauticall* compasse."—*Camden*.

MARINER. SAILOR. SEAMAN.

MARINER (*see* MARINE) is one whose occupation is connected with the navigation of ships. A SAILOR, as at present employed, designates one who serves especially in the navy; while SEAMAN is common to the navy and the merchant service.

MARITIME. *See* MARINE.

MARK. *See* BUTT and IMPRESSION.

MARRIAGE. WEDDING. NUP-TIALS. MATRIMONY. WEDLOCK.

MARRIAGE (Fr. *mariage*, from *marier*, to marry, Lat. *maritus*, a husband) is properly the act which unites man and wife; MATRIMONY (Lat. *matrimonium*, *mater*, a mother), the state of such union, with all its relationships, rights, and obligations. Although marriage is sometimes used for the state, matrimony is never used for the act. WEDLOCK is the old Saxon term for matrimony, and is a term of legal associations; as lawful wedlock. WEDDING (A. S. *weddian*, to covenant, promise) is employed only of the ceremony of the marriage. NUP-TIALS (*nuptiæ*, from *nubere*, *nuptus*, to marry) is little more than the Latin equivalent of the Saxon wedding. Like most Latin

equivalents, however, it has a more dignified meaning. We should naturally speak of a village wedding, and the nuptials of a prince.

"*Marriage* Love's object is, at whose bright eyes

He lights his torches, and calls them his skies;

For her he wings his shoulders and doth fly

To her white bosom as his sanctuary.

She makes him smile in sorrows, and doth stand

"Twixt him and all wants with her silver hand;

In her soft looks his tender feet are tied,
And in his fetters he takes worthy pride."

Ben Jonson.

"The misinterpreting of the Scripture directed mainly against the abuses of the law for divorce given by Moses, hath changed the blessing of *matrimony* not seldom into a familiar and co-inhabiting mischief; at least into a drooping and disconsolate household captivity, without refuge or redemption."—*Milton*.

"Is mirth seasonable on the day of *marriage*? Behold, the greatest *wedding* that ever was is this day solemnized; heaven and earth are contracted; divinity is espoused to humanity; a sacred, an indissoluble knot is tied between God and man."—*Barrow*.

"The relation between Christ and His Church, it is evident, must be of a nature not to be adequately typified by anything in the material world; and nothing could be found in human life which might so aptly represent it as the relation of husband and wife in the holy state of *wedlock*."—*Bishop Horsley*.

"He (Earl Athelwold) then besought me for some little space

The *nuptials* might be secret."

Mason.

MARTIAL. WARLIKE. MILITARY. SOLDIER-LIKE.

MARTIAL (from *Mars*, *Martis*, the God of War) is, to a great extent, equivalent to WARLIKE; as, a martial or warlike people; a martial or warlike appearance. However, warlike lends itself better to express what belongs to war in action. So a martial, not a warlike, sentence or tribunal; martial, not warlike, law. MILITARY (Lat. *miles*, *militis*, a soldier) is directly pertaining to soldiers, and so indirectly pertaining to war; as military discipline,

which includes much besides what is peculiar to war, as, for instance, the keeping of hours, military provisions, ammunition, a military road. The town wore a very military appearance; that is, there were many soldiers going about. **SOLDIER-LIKE** expresses what is appropriately belonging to the character, conduct, and appearance of a soldier, and is individually, not collectively, applied.

MARVEL. PRODIGY. WONDER. MIRACLE. MONSTER.

MARVEL (Fr. *merveille*, Lat. *mirabilis*, *mirari*, to wonder) is commonly a related wonder. **PRODIGY** (Lat. *prodigium*) is an unusual effort of Nature. **WONDERS** (A. S. *wunder*, *wundor*) are natural and true, and owe their character to our inexperience. **MIRACLES** (*miraculum*, *mirari*, to wonder) are deviations from the known and established constitution and course of things, being supernatural, as wonders are natural, and marvels, for the most part, fictitious. **MONSTER** (Fr. *monstre*, *monstrum*, a divine omen, from *monstrare*, to show, and that from *monere*, to indicate or advise) is a marvellous deviation from the ordinary type, being some specific form, wonderful for enormity or shapelessness. A marvel and a wonder is complex, as a prodigy is simple. The former are occurrences, the latter phenomena. What is wonderful takes our senses, what is marvellous takes our reason, by surprise; what is prodigious is opposed to our experience. The wonderful is opposed to the common, the marvellous to the probable. Nature is full of wonders. The old romances abounded in the marvellous. Miracles attest the prophet. Prodigies were of frequent occurrence, according to Livy, in the earlier Roman history, as when a statue sweated, or cow spoke with the human voice. A monster may be a creation of the imagination or a freak of Nature, as the hydra in one case, or a calf with six legs in the other. Wonder may be regarded also as the generic term which comprises the rest.

"With which they wrought such wondrous marvels there."

Spenser.

"And yesterday the bird of night did sit,
Ev'n at noonday, upon the market-place,
Hooting and shrieking. When these prodigies

Do so conjointly meet, let not men say
These are their reason, they are natural;
For I believe they are portentous things
Unto the climate that they point upon."
Shakespeare.

"Behold a wonder! they but now who seemed

In bigness to surpass earth's giant sons,
Now less than smallest dwarfs in narrow room

Throng numberless." Milton.

"A miracle, then, is the extraordinary effect of some unknown power in Nature limited by divine ordination and authority to its circumstances, for a suitable end,"—Grew.

"A monster which hath not the shape of mankind, but in any part evidently bears the resemblance of the brute creation, hath no inheritable blood, and cannot be heir in any land, albeit it be brought forth in marriage."—Blackstone.

MASK. See CLOAK.

MASON. See BUILDER.

MASSACRE. CARNAGE. BUTCHERY. SLAUGHTER.

MASSACRE (Fr. *massacre*) denoted originally the killing of victims for sacrifice. It now denotes the promiscuous slaughter of many, and is more commonly applied to the destruction of human than of merely animal life. **CARNAGE** (Lat. *caro*, *carnis*, flesh) is such slaughter as produces a mass of animal remains. **BUTCHERY** (Fr. *boucher*, a butcher) points more directly to the character of the person or persons committing acts of slaughter upon men, as if they were no better than animals. **SLAUGHTER** (Germ. *schlachten*, to butcher or slay) points not so directly to the character of the person as of the deed, and commonly denotes extensive, indiscriminate, or superfluous taking away of life, whether human or otherwise. It bears, however, no necessary meaning of wantonness or cruelty, but only extensive destruction of life, or the killing of a large carcase, when it is employed of the inferior animals.

MASSIVE. See BULKY.

MASTER. POSSESSOR. OWNER.
PROPRIETOR.

As a synonym with the following, MASTER (Lat. *magister*) relates primarily to beings gifted with life; the master of a house is the master of the persons inhabiting it. The other terms apply to mere *goods* as such. Master, however, denotes an active power; otherwise, though one might be POSSESSOR, he would not be master. OWNER (A. S. *āgan*, to possess) and PROPRIETOR (Fr. *propriétaire*, Lat. *proprius*, one's own) are essentially the same; but the former is more familiar and employed of less important as well as more important possessions. The owner of a book or an estate; the proprietor of an estate, not of a book. Unlike master, these three terms indicate not of necessity active control. So a minor is, in the eye of the law, owner, proprietor, and possessor of his estate; but he is not master of it until he comes of age. So of insane persons, who possess that over which they are not permitted to exercise control.

MATCH. See TALLY.

MATE. See COMPANION.

MATERIAL. See CORPORAL.

MATERIALS. MATTER. SUBJECT.

MATERIALS (Lat. *materialis*, *materies*, matter) is MATTER so selected or prepared as to serve the purpose of artificial production; while matter denotes, in the aggregate, all that constitutes the palpable and visible, as distinct from the world of mind, and spiritual conception or being. The productions of Nature are composed of matter; those of art, of materials. In their metaphorical application to things intellectual and literary, the matter of a work is the whole substance of it, as composed by the author; the materials are the external elements which he imports and assimilates in the production of his work. The SUBJECT, in this case (*subjicere*, *subjectus*, to throw or place under), is that concerning which state-

ments are made, or which is generally brought into view by discussion and illustration. In philosophy we meet with the compound term *subject-matter*; this is distinguished from object-matter. For instance, of philosophy at large, it might be said, that its subject-matter is truth; its object-matter, happiness.

MATRIMONY. See MARRIAGE.

MATTER. See MATERIALS.

MATURE. RIPE.

These words illustrate the tendency so often observable of Saxon words to adhere to the physical and literal, and of Latin words, to the moral and metaphorical. RIPE is in Saxon what MATURE (*maturus*, ripe) is in Latin. Ripe denotes complete natural development, or what is simply analogous to it; as a fruit is ripe, or a plan of action is ripe. Consideration, judgment, thought, when carried out to the full, are said to be mature.

"*Maturity* is a mean between two extremities, wherein nothing lacketh or exceedeth, and is in such a state, that it may neither increase nor diminish without losing the denomination of maturity. When they (the acts of men) be done with such moderation that nothing in the doing may seem superfluous or indigent, we say that they be *maturely* done."—Sir T. Elyot, *The Governour*.

"Should they submit ere our designs are
ripe,
We both must perish in the common
wreck,
Lost in a general undistinguish'd ruin."
Addison, Cato.

MAXIM. See PROVERB.

MAY. CAN.

CAN denotes power; MAY, probability, possibility, and permission. I can, or cannot, walk; that is, I have, or have not, the power to walk. It is remarkable that the negative cannot is used in the sense of extreme improbability; as, "Surely it cannot be raining with this bright sun;" in which cases it seems to take the place of may not. So we should say, "I think, with the wind from the south, it may rain to-day." But we should not say, "Surely, with the wind from the north, it may not," but

"it cannot, rain to-day." May not negatives, not probability, but permission.

MEAGRE. See LEAN and SCANTY.

MEAN. ABJECT. For MEAN see BASE and DESIGN.

The ABJECT represents the extreme of lowness as produced by mental causes, or social circumstances. Abject melancholy; abject poverty. It is not a term of purely moral import. Abject misery; abject superstition; not abject vice. It belongs to the low, not as it is base, but disesteemed.

MEANING. See IMPORT.

MECHANIC. See ARTIST.

MEDIATE. See INTERCEDE.

MEDITATE. CONTEMPLATE. MUSE. REFLECT. CONSIDER. REGARD. PONDER.

To CONTEMPLATE (Lat. *contemplari, contemplatus*) is a more direct act of the mind than MEDITATE (*meditari, meditatus*) or MUSE (Fr. *muser*, to loiter or trifle), as is seen in the difference of their grammatical use; contemplate being essentially a transitive verb; meditate and muse, except where meditate is used in the sense of intend, being followed by the preposition upon. Meditation is internal; contemplation external. The poet, for instance, meditates; the astronomer contemplates. Not but that we may mentally contemplate a mental subject; yet, in that case, we still take, as it were, an external view of it, and consider it in itself, and in its totality; when we meditate upon it, we regard its internal nature, properties, bearings, relations, or issues. Contemplation takes in the whole at once; meditation takes it to pieces. Contemplation is fixed and sustained attention; meditation implies analysis, and the viewing of a subject in many different ways. To muse is to meditate with less effort of mind, and is incompatible with its painful exercise. We may meditate on a matter which has caused us profound sorrow; we should hardly be said to

muse upon it. Yet muse seems to denote more decided absence of mind than meditate. Musing belongs to the past, and, in this respect, unlike contemplate and meditate, is inapplicable to the future.

"He that accustoms himself to *meditate* upon the greatness of God, finds these questions continually rising and stirring in his heart: how shall dust and ashes ever be able to stand before Him? how shall weakness and imperfection enjoy that Nature that it is at a loss even to think of, and never contemplates upon without amazement?"—*South*.

"To *Contemplation's* sober eye,

Such is the race of man;

And they that creep and they that fly,
Shall end where they began."

Gray.

"There flow'ry hill, Hymettus, with the sound

Of bees' industrious murmur oft invites

To studious *musings*."

Milton.

REFLECT (Lat. *re, back*, and *flectere*, to bend) applies *solely* to the past. It is the turning back of the mind to meditate upon itself, its own acts and states, or what has occupied it, or been presented to it as external facts. Reflection is commonly said of matters of speculation or moral action; CONSIDER (Lat. *considerare*), of matters practical, requiring the use of observation and judgment. We reflect upon what we are or shall be, have done or ought to do. We consider facts or cases presented to us, our present condition, position, and resources, and what steps we ought to take for right action.

"Forced by *reflective* reason, I confess

That human science is uncertain guess."

Prior.

"But mercy, lady bright, that knowest well
My thoughts, and seest what harms that
I feel.

Consider all this, and rue upon my sore."

Chaucer.

To REGARD (Fr. *regarder*) is to look at with attention or interest; hence to consider in such a way as to form a judgment. This force it shares with consider; as, "I consider or regard him as a friend." In this sense consider implies more previous thought than regard. "I consider that he has acted wisely," would involve a more deliberate judgment

to that effect, than "I regard his action as a wise one." The latter is to look upon in a certain light; the former is to do this upon certain grounds. PONDER denotes a long-sustained meditation on what is of deep personal concern.

"He valued his religion beyond his own safety, and regarded not all the calumnies and reproaches of his enemies, as long as he made this his constant exercise—to keep a conscience void of offence, both towards God and towards men."—*Stillingfleet*.

"The modest queen awhile, with downcast eyes,
Pondered the speech, then briefly thus replies."
Dryden, Virgil.

MEDLEY. MIXTURE. MISCELLANY.

MEDLEY (Old Fr. *meslee*, *medlee*, *mellee*, New Fr. *mêlée*, *meler*, to mix) is such a compound as involves a mass of ill-assorted, unrelated, or confused ingredients. MISCELLANY (Lat. *miscellaneus*, *miscere*, to mix) is a compound of things which are so various as not to stand strictly connected, yet may be brought together for a purpose and with method. A miscellany has the diversity without the incongruity of medley. MIXTURE (Lat. *mixtura*, *miscere*, *mixtus*, to mix) is the more general term, denoting a combination or interfusion of particles or ingredients, which may be either congruous or incongruous, proportionate or disproportionate, judicious or injudicious. A mixture may be of two; a medley is of more than two.

"More oft in fools' and madmen's hands
than sages,
She seems a medley of all ages."

Swift.

"In great villainies there is often such a mixture of the fool as quite spoils the whole project of the knave."—*South*.

"The miscellaneous matter I propose to give in these sheets, naturally coincides with the method I have taken of disposing them into distinct papers."—*Observer*.

MEED. See COMPENSATION.

MEEK. See GENTLE.

MEET. FIT. APT.

MEET (A. S. *gemêt*, from *metan*, to

meet or come together, thus answering strictly to the Latin *conveniens*, and the older English convenient, in the sense of fit) is a moral term, as FIT is both natural and artificial or acquired, and APT natural only.

MEETING. See ASSEMBLY and INTERVIEW.

MELANCHOLY. See DEJECTION and SAD.

MELODY. HARMONY. ACCORDANCE. CONCORD. UNISON.

MELODY (Gr. *μελωδία*, *μέλος*, song or tune, and *ρῆ* for *αἰδή*, song) is the rythmical succession of single notes in music, so as to form a whole or musical thought. HARMONY (Gr. *ἁρμονία*, a joint, fitting, harmony) is the concord of two or more musical strains differing in quality and pitch. CONCORD (Lat. *concordia*, *con*, together, and *cor*, *cordis*, the heart) is the fitness of two or more sounds not being UNISONS (*unus*, one, and *sonus*, sound) or repetition of octaves to be struck together. ACCORDANCE expresses the abstract quality of which any given concord is the specific illustration. The first, third, and fifth notes of a key, being in accordance, form a concord when struck together.

MEMBER. See LIMB.

MEMOIR or MEMOIRS. See ACCOUNT.

MEMORABLE. SIGNAL.

These terms are applied to facts or exemplifications of principle, properties, or character, but with some little difference of subject-matter. SIGNAL (Lat. *signum*, a sign) is used of events in regard both to their moral and their historical value or importance. Thus we might say, "a signal bravery;" "a memorable exploit;" "signal," not memorable, "benevolence." It may be added, that signal expresses an already existent notoriety; memorable, that such notoriety is due.

"These knowing no other Europeans but Spaniards, it might be expected they would

treat all strangers with the same cruelty which they had so often and so *signally* exerted against their Spanish neighbours."—*Anson's Voyages.*

"Yet registers of *memorable* things

Would help, great prince, to make thy judgment sound,

Which to the eye a perfect mirror brings,
Where all should glass themselves who would be crowned." *Stirling.*

MEMORIAL. MONUMENT. REMINDER.

MEMORIAL (Lat. *memoria*, the memory) and MONUMENT (*monumentum*, for *monimentum*, *monere*, to advise) have, etymologically, the meaning in common, of something which puts in mind, or aids the memory. They differ in their applications. A monument is public, and purposely set up to keep in general remembrance. A memorial may be private, having the effect of such keeping in remembrance attached to it, not by the nature of the thing, but by circumstance and association. REMINDER is a casual and temporary memorial, and applies, as the other two do not, more especially to the future, in connection with obligations and intentions incurred or formed in the past. Memorial belongs more to the feelings of individuals; monument, to the cherished remembrance of illustrious deeds by the public. A memorial is the more affectionate; monument, the more laudatory.

"And was it not worthy his being hated of his brethren, and being sold out of his country, to give such a noble example of fidelity and chastity, as to stand a *monument* of it in Holy Writ for the admiration and imitation of all following ages?"—*South.*

A memorial or a reminder may consist in words. Not so a monument, though it may bear them.

"Though of their names in heavenly records
now

Be no *memorial*, blotted out and razed

By their rebellion from the Book of Life."
Milton.

MEMORY. RECOLLECTION. REMEMBRANCE. REMINISCENCE.

MEMORY (*see above*) is the generic term, expressive of that capacity of

the mind by which we retain the knowledge of past thoughts or events.

REMEMBRANCE (*re* and *memorare*, *memor*, mindful, *memoria*, memory) and RECOLLECTION (*re*, again, and *colligere*, *collectus*, to collect) express, the former the simple action, the latter the exercise of the memory.

"Do you remember me?" "I do." This implies no more than a state; an impression has not been effaced. Recollect denotes an effort often of a complex character. "I cannot recollect all the circumstances of the story, but I remember it generally." REMINISCENCE (Lat. *re* and *meminisse*, to remember), like recollection, involves a more decidedly conscious, and less spontaneous, exercise of the memory than remember; but reminiscence is the recovery of single traces or circumstances; recollection denotes the combination of several. What sensibility is to sensation, memory is to remembrance.

"This laying up of our ideas in the repository of the *memory*, signifies no more but this, that the mind has a power in many cases to revive perceptions which it has once had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that it has had them before."—*Locke.*

"In other cases, the various particulars which compose our stock of knowledge are recalled in consequence of an effort of our will. This latter operation, too, is often called by the same name, memory, but is more properly distinguished by the word *recollection*."—*Stewart.*

"Plato imagined, after more ancient philosophers, that every man is born with a certain *reminiscence*, and that when we seem to be taught, we are only put in mind of what we knew in a former state."—*Bolingbroke.*

Reminiscence is intermediate between remembrance and recollection, being more conscious and energetic than remembrance, but less particular and detailed than recollection.

MENACE. *See* THREAT.

MEND. *See* IMPROVE.

MENIAL. *See* DOMESTIC.

MENTAL. *See* INTELLECTUAL.

MENTION. NOTICE.

A MENTION (Lat. *mentio*, *meminisse*, to remember) is more explicit

than NOTICE (*notitia, notus*, known, *noscor*, to know), in one sense of the term notice, and less so in another. Mention commonly means the simple direction of attention to an object in words, without further account or treatment of it. Notice, as it is purely mental and is synonymous with observation, falls short of this. On the other hand, as synonymous with announcement, notice is more explicit than mention, being the formal mention of something by way of information. In both senses, however, there is in notice a more active excitement of attention in our own mind or in that of another. We mention a fact as such; we give notice of it, as being a matter of interest to others. So much less lively is the sense of mention than that of notice, that the word sometimes means little more than the utterance of the name of a person or an object, as in the following example:—

“Now the *mention* (of God’s name) is vain when it is useless, and it is useless when it is neither likely nor intended to serve any good purpose.”—*Paley*.

“But they persisted deaf, and would not seem

To count them things worth *notice*.”

Milton.

MERCANTILE. See COMMERCIAL.

MERCENARY. See HIRELING and VENAL.

MERCHANDIZE. See GOODS.

MERCIFUL. See GRACIOUS.

MERCILESS. UNMERCIFUL.

The former is actively, the latter passively, deficient in mercy (*Lat. misericordia*). The man who is bent upon retaliation or retribution, and will not listen to any pleading or possible extenuation of the offence, is UNMERCIFUL. If, when the time of vengeance is come, he sanctions or inflicts excessive pain upon the offender, he is MERCILESS.

MERCY. CLEMENCY. LENIENCY. COMPASSION. PITY. COMMISERATION. CONDOLENCE. SYMPATHY.

MERCY (Old Fr. *merci*) has relation

to the infliction of retaliation or punishment, and denotes in general a disposition not to exact all the suffering from an offender which would be due on the score of his offence; or, in a wider sense, not to exact the whole amount of what is due on the score of any obligation when the rendering of it would inflict pain or privation. Mercy is often judicial in its character, without sentiment, and laying hold of external circumstances which may warrant a diminution of punishment. PITY, on the other hand (*Lat. pietas*, kindness) is more purely personal and *emotional*, not discriminating calmly, as mercy does, between circumstances which do and do not diminish the culpability of the individual, or are affected by his moral character. Moreover, mercy is felt or exercised toward those who are in our power; pity, to such as may not be so. The judge may have mercy upon the criminal or not. The crowd may pity him or not. We pity others *as sufferers*. We are merciful to them *as offenders*. COMPASSION and pity (*con*, together, and *pati*, *passus*, to suffer) are much alike; but compassion is such fellow-feeling in trouble as comes from an equal; pity, such as comes from one who in some sense is a superior. We should feel, for instance, pity, not compassion, for a dumb animal overburdened, or in any way ill-treated. Pity often implies an approach to contempt, which compassion never does, having in it more of tenderness, and less of weakness. We compassionate those into whose state or feelings we may conceive ourselves as entering. We may pity those with whom we feel at the time nothing in common, as the reckless or the silly. Hence a high-spirited person will feel it a degradation to be an object of pity. The martyr or the dying hero are not objects of pity. The object of pity, according to Aristotle, is suffering not wholly unmerited, but the result of faults rather than crimes, as shown in characters of common stamp.

“The Lord is long-suffering, and of great *mercy*, forgiving iniquity and transgression, and by no means clearing the guilty.”—*Bible*.

"His fate *compassion* in the victor bred.
Stern as he was, he yet revered the dead."
Pope.

"Oughtest thou not to have had *compassion* on thy fellow-servant, even as I had *pity* on thee?"—*Bible.*

CLEMENCY (Lat. *clementia*) and LENIENCY (*lenis*, mild), like merey, are employed not of suffering generally, as pity and compassion, but in regard to offenders or merited punishment. Clemency lies rather in the disposition of the person; leniency, in the character of the act. We speak of lenient, but could not speak of clement, punishment. Clemency is a magisterial virtue. SYMPATHY (Gr. *συμπάθεια*, σύν, together, and πάθος, feeling or suffering) is literally a fellow-feeling with others, whether in joy or grief. It is now commonly restricted to such a feeling under pain or trouble, and so nearly resembles COMMISERATION (*con*, together, and *miseria*, misery); but sympathy involves equality, while commiseration may, and most commonly does, denote inferiority in some sense on the part of the suffering party. Commiseration may be regarded as standing midway between pity and compassion, having less contempt than pity, and less generosity than compassion. Clemency is used analogously of other forces than human action; as the clemency of the seasons. It denotes no more than an indisposition to employ rigorous measures, where it is used of persons. Leniency expresses the fact of such absence of rigour, and is applicable to the judgment as well as the conduct. We may judge as well as treat leniently. In some such cases the leniency may come of other kinds of disposition besides compassion; and accordingly leniency is not so purely moral as clemency. Prejudice, weakness, or even guilt in ourselves, may induce us to regard the character or conduct of others with leniency.

"I know you are more *clement* than wild men,
Who of their broken debtors take a third,
A sixth, a tenth, letting them thrive again
On their abatement. That's not my desire."
Shakespeare.

"Say that my *lenity* shall grant your prayer.
How for the future shall I rest assured
Of your allegiance?" *Smollett.*

"Common experience is my guide, and that must have informed everybody how much we continually *sympathize* with the sentiments and affections of the company among whom we converse."—*Search, Light of Nature.*

"There is one kind of virtue which is in-born in the nobility, and indeed, in most of the ancient families of this nation;—they are not apt to insult on the misfortunes of their countrymen. But you, sir—I may tell it you without flattery—have grafted on this natural *commiseration*, and raised it to a nobler virtue."—*Dryden.*

CONDOLENCE (*con*, together, and *dolere*, to grieve) is to sympathy as the expression of feeling to the feeling itself.

"I come not, Samson, to *condole* thy chance,
As these, perhaps; yet wish it had not been,
Though for no friendly intent."
Milton.

MERE. See BARE.

MERIT. DESERT. WORTH.

Of these, DESERT (Old Fr. *deserte*, *desserte*, from *deservir*, *desservir*, Lat. *de* and *servire*, to serve) and MERIT (Lat. *mereri*, to deserve) have the two-fold meaning of good and evil deserving; while WORTH (A. S. *weorðh*, with other forms) is employed only in a favourable sense. Worth is the intrinsic and permanent value of moral character, and belongs to the person. Merit belongs to the action and particular case. The verb merit is stronger than the verb deserve, "He deserves a reward," would imply no more than that there is a fitness in the case for such reward. "He merits a reward," that there would be an injustice in withholding it. Worth describes the qualities; merit, the actions of a man. Merit and desert are well-nigh identical in meaning; but merit is used more abstractedly; as, "the merits of the case;" "the merits of a literary production." It represents excellency less strictly in connection with its dues than does desert, which always takes into

account some correspondent treatment of persons.

"All power

I give thee. Reign for ever, and assume
Thy merits." Milton.

"Had they no ground for hope but *merit*, that is to say, could they look for nothing more than what they should strictly deserve, their prospect would be very uncomfortable."—*Paley*.

"Fame due to vast *desert* is kept in store,
Unpaid till the deserver is no more."
Congreve.

MERRY. See CHEERFUL.

MESSAGE. See ERRAND.

MESSANGER. See FORERUNNER.

METAMORPHOSE. TRANSFIGURE.
TRANSFORM. TRANSMUTE.

We speak of a thing as METAMORPHOSED (Gr. *μετά*, beyond, and *μορφή*, form) in two different senses; 1, when, the identity being preserved, the form, or particles composing it are entirely changed, as of the yolk into the embryo; or 2, of partial transmutation of such particles, as of a tadpole into a frog. TRANSFIGURATION is such a marked change as still, however, leaves the original figure or form plainly discernible. TRANSFORMATION is the normal or permanent change in the form of bodies, which is the result of internal laws of growth; as the transformation of a caterpillar into a butterfly. TRANSMUTATION (*trans* and *mutare*, to change) is employed more commonly, not of the whole, but of the particles which constitute it. Transformation usually does not go beyond a change of visible appearance; as the transformation of an actor by a change of dress. Metamorphosis is change of internal structure also. Narcissus was accordingly more than transformed into the likeness, he was metamorphosed into the substance, of a flower. Transfiguration and transmutation denote the highest degree, the former of spiritual, the latter of material, change. Our Saviour was transfigured upon the mount. It was supposed that the philosopher's stone, if found, would transmute other substances into gold.

METAPHOR. FIGURE. SIMILITUDE. SIMILE.

FIGURE, as here referred to, is a rhetorical mode of expressing abstract ideas in words, suggesting pictures drawn from the world of sensible images. METAPHOR (Gr. *μεταφορά*, *μετά* implying change, and *φέρειν*, to carry) is a SIMILITUDE (Lat. *similitudo*, *similis*, like) conveyed in a word, as a similitude is a comparison by an image conveyed in more than one term. As "A torrent of eloquence," is a metaphor. "His words flow like a stream," is a similitude. The SIMILE is the root idea of which the similitude is the rhetorical amplification. The simile is a matter of thought; the similitude, a feature of style.

METHOD. See CUSTOM and SYSTEM.

MIEN. See AIR.

MIGHTY. STRONG. POWERFUL.
POTENT.

MIGHTY (A. S. *meaht*, *mihl*, from the root of may, A. S. *magan*, to be able) denotes the possession of force or power of any kind, whether bodily or mental; and, in an extended sense, the possession of ample resources for effective action; as, a mighty nation. STRONG (A. S. *strang*, and other forms) is a term of great simplicity and breadth, denoting physical power in action, in endurance, or in resistance, the possession of ample resources of action, morally or logically cogent or influential, efficacious, stimulating, well-established, vigorous by nature, or energetic on a specific occasion. POWERFUL, according to its derivation (Fr. *pouvoir*), denotes the capability of producing great effects of any kind, which is also the definition of POTENT (Lat. *potens*, *posse*, to be able); but potent is not so commonly employed of directly physical force, but of physical and moral influence, or of influence alone. A powerful arm or blow. A potent remedy; a potent prince. Mighty expresses the union of majesty with strength, and belongs peculiarly to living beings. It would be only by an effort of the imagination, attri-

buting to it a kind of personality, that a machine could be called mighty. Nor in this case should we say strong, but powerful, unless we meant that it was firmly constructed. Strong and powerful are both used of physical force; the latter, both of that which is mechanical and that which is muscular; the former, only of that which is muscular. In their application to persons, a powerful man is strong; but a strong man is not necessarily powerful. Strong is more appropriately used of those who are of sound constitution and firmness of body, and are so capable of bearing much fatigue; powerful, of those who can put forth great force at the moment. Power is active in its signification; strength, active and passive. A strong mind is firm, and not easily shaken by adverse circumstances. A powerful mind exerts strong influence over others.

"Great Gormond, having with huge mighti-
ness

Ireland subdued, and therein fixed his
throne." *Spenser.*

"He ceased; and next him Moloch, scepter'd
king,

Stood up, the *strongest* and the fiercest spirit
That fought in heaven, now fiercer by de-
spair." *Milton.*

"*Strong* and substantial, it hath stood
against all the storms of factions, both of
belief and ambition, which so *powerfully* beat
upon it."—*Daniel.*

"His founder's merit was the merit of a
gentleman raised by the arts of a court and
the protection of a Wolsey to the eminence
of a great and *potent* lord."—*Burke.*

MILD. See GENTLE.

MILITARY. See MARTIAL.

MIMIC. IMITATE. APE. MOCK.

To MIMIC (Lat. *mimus*, a mimic) is to ridicule by imitation of what is personally peculiar. To IMITATE (*imitari*, *imitatus*) is the generic term, of which the rest are kinds, having the broad sense of following as an example or pattern, or producing an external semblance of anything, and is applicable both to physical production, and to moral conformity of conduct. To APE is servilely to imitate, especially in externals, com-

monly implying the inability to imitate higher peculiarities, and better worth imitating. The term does not of necessity, like mimic, involve contemptuous imitation. MOCK (Fr. *mocker*) denotes such action as manifests ridicule or contempt. A derisive exhibition of personal peculiarities is an easy and natural way of showing such contempt; but, inasmuch as it is not the only way, mockery includes the idea of personal insult and derision in any manner openly indicative of contempt, even though there be no mimicry in the mocking.

MIND. INTELLECT. SPIRIT.
SOUL.

MIND (A. S. *mynd*) is taken to denote the whole rational faculty in man, the power of judgment, and sometimes a particular state of the judgment; a bias of the intellectual or the moral nature; a judgment or opinion; an inclination or desire. The INTELLECT (Lat. *intellectus*) is commonly taken for the faculty of man's nature by which he knows, as distinguished from those by which he perceives only or desires, especially his capacity for the higher forms of knowledge. The word was formerly commonly used in the plural. SPIRIT (*spiritus*, *spiro*, to breathe) and SOUL (A. S. and Old Eng. *saul*) both denote that in a man's nature which is not his body; but spirit is used relatively; soul, absolutely. Spirit is employed when some idea of the body which it tenants, or has tenanted, is still in the mind; soul, as man's higher, spiritual, and immortal self. When taken by themselves, spirit often expresses energy of moral resolution; soul, energy of feeling. A spiritless performance; a soulless composition. Mind is opposed to matter; soul, to body; spirit, to flesh. The intellect is often coupled, and even contrasted, with the will.

"First, in man's *mind* we find an appetite
To learn and know the truth of every-
thing,

Which is co-natural, and born with it,
And from the essence of the soul doth
spring."

Davies, Immortality of the Soul.

"I cannot but think that having too the privilege of a much nearer access than is allowed us to contemplate God's perfections, the advantage of having incomparably more illuminated *intellects* to apprehend them with, they must frame otherguise conceptions of the divine attributes, and glorify the possessor at an otherguise rate than is allowed to those whose understandings are so dim, and whose residence is so remote from that blessed place where the perfections they would extol are most displayed." —Boyle.

"Or unsphere

The *spirit* of Plato, to unfold
What worlds or what vast regions hold
Th' immortal mind that hath forsook
Her mansion in this fleshy nook."

Milton.

"Four different opinions have been entertained concerning the origin of human *souls*: 1. That they are eternal and divine. 2. That they were created in a separate state of existence before their union with the body. 3. That they have been propagated from the original stock of Adam, who contained in himself the mental as well as the corporeal seed of his posterity. 4. That each soul is occasionally created and embodied in the moment of conception." —Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*.

MINGLE. See CONFOUND.

MINISTER. See AMBASSADOR.

MINUTE. See CIRCUMSTANTIAL and LITTLE.

MIRACLE. See MARVEL.

MIRTH, MIRTHFUL. See CHEERFUL.

MISCELLANY. See MEDLEY.

MISCHANCE. See CALAMITY.

MISCHIEF. See HURT.

MISCONSTRUE. MISINTERPRET.

The difference is slight between the usages of these terms; yet MISCONSTRUE (Lat. *construere*, to construct) seems more commonly employed of things of which the meaning has to be gathered by inference; MISINTERPRET (*interpres*, an interpreter), of those of which it is directly expressed. Hence we should say, "to misinterpret words or actions;" "to misconstrue motives." The simple verb construe stands to sentences as interpret does to words. Misconstrue

seems more general than misinterpret, which is more direct and personal. Interpretations should be truthful. Construtions of conduct should be charitable. I misinterpret a man's actions when I pass wrong judgment. I misconstrue them when I err in the nature of their intentions.

"When the apostle had been speaking of the righteousness of God displayed by the wickedness of man, he was not unaware of the *misconstruction* to which this representation was liable, and which it had in fact experienced; which *misconstruction* he states thus: 'we be slanderously reported, and some affirm that we say, Let us do evil that good may come.'" —Paley.

"Mr. Hume's great principle with respect to the origin of our ideas, which (as I before hinted) is only that of Locke under a new form, asserts the same doctrine with greater conciseness, but in a manner still less liable to *misinterpretation*." —Stewart.

MISDEED. See CRIME.

MISDEMEANOUR. See CRIME.

MISERABLE. UNHAPPY.

WRETCHED.

UNHAPPY (prefix *un* and *hap*, luck) is the least forcible of these terms. A child deprived of its toy is unhappy. It may amount to little more than the absence of positive contentment. MISERABLE (Lat. *miserabilis*, *misereor*, to pity), and WRETCHED (A. S. *wrecca*, *wracca*, an exile, wretch) are employed only of the extreme degrees of unhappiness in feeling and reflection. Miserable seems to denote rather the feeling or state; wretched, the outward exhibition of such unhappiness; as the beggar who is in a miserable condition presents a wretched appearance.

"Our language, by a peculiar significance of dialect, calls the covetous man the *miserable* man." —South.

Miserable and wretched imply a higher organization and faculties of reflection than unhappy. An irrational animal might be unhappy. He who loses hope is miserable, and, if he fall into despair, is wretched.

"Since no retreat can be impervious to His eye, no corner so much out of the way as not to be within His plan; no doubt there is to every wrong and vicious act a suitable

degree of *unhappiness* and punishment annexed, which the criminal will be sure to meet with some time or other."—*Woolaston*.

"Every man, be he never so extreme and *wretched* a sinner, may and ought to hope assuredly, that albeit the majesty of God is supereminent and unspeakable dignity, yet is He gracious, merciful, and mild."—*Fuller*.

MISERLY. See NIGGARDLY.

MISFORTUNE. See CALAMITY.

MISGIVING. See DIFFIDENCE.

MISHAP. See CALAMITY.

MISINTERPRET. See MISCONSTRUE.

MISLEAD. See DECEIVE.

MISTRUST. See DIFFIDENCE.

MISUSE. See ABUSE.

MITIGATE. See APPEASE.

MIX. See CONFOUND.

MIXTURE. See MEDLEY.

MOAN. See GROAN.

MOB. See CROWD.

MOCK. See MIMIC.

MODE. MANNER.

While MODE (Lat. *modus*) is also applicable to way of *being*, MANNER (Fr. *manière*) denotes way of *action*. Manner, too, is casual; mode, systematic. Mode might be defined regular manner. Hence manner of action implies voluntariness on the part of the agent; mode of action, uniformity in the thing acting. Modes of existence. Manners of conduct or operation.

"If they find a determinate intellection of any *modes* of being which were never in the least hinted by their external or internal senses, I'll believe that such can realize *chimeras*."—*Glanvill*.

"To whom I answered, It is not the *manner* of the Romans to deliver any man to die before that he which is accused have the accusers face to face, and have licence to answer for himself concerning the crime laid against him."—*English Bible*.

MODEL. See EXAMPLE and IDEAL.

MODERATION. See ABATEMENT and TEMPERANCE.

MODERATE. See FAIR.

MODERN. NEW. NOVEL. FRESH. RECENT.

MODERN (Lat. *modernus*) denotes the thing of to-day, as distinguished historically from the things of former times; NEW (Lat. *novus*), that which has been just formed, or just submitted to our observation or experience; NOVEL, that which being new, strikes us also with a feeling of strangeness; FRESH (Fr. *fraiche*), that of which the influence is unabated or revived, or which, being new, strikes us with a sense of abundance in supply; RECENT (Lat. *recens*), that between which and the present moment a short interval only has elapsed. It may or may not be in existence still. Modern belongs at least to an order of things which still exists, and has its influence on society. Recent facts are fresh in our memory. Modern fashions are in vogue in the present day. What we get in exchange for the old is new. What has never occurred before, or never in the same form, is novel. As new is opposed to old, so is novel to familiar or expected. That which is new presupposes something precedent. That which is novel is abruptly new. The new year follows the old. A new edition is one more edition. A novel style of writing is one which is exhibited for the first time. The novel affects our understanding, imagination, or taste; the new is only a fresh item of our experience.

"Yet was much taxed, by that age precise,
For faults which *modern* times not strange
have thought." *Stirling*.

"And thou profoundest hell,
Receive thy *new* possessor."

Milton.

"I must beg not to have it supposed that I am setting up any *novel* pretensions for the honour of my own country."—*Walpole*.

"That love which first was set will first decay;
Mine, of a *fresher* date, will longer stay."
Dryden.

"Amphitryon, *recent* from the nether sphere."
Lewis, Statius.

MODEST. See BASHFUL and LOWLY.

MOISTURE. See DAMP.

MOLEST. See ANNOY.

MOMENT. INSTANT.

INSTANT (Lat. *instare, instans, instantis*, to be at hand) is the point of time now present. MOMENT (*momentum*, for *movimentum*, from *movere*, to move) is not restricted to the present, but is common to it and the past. We say, "Do so this instant;" or, "He thought so at the moment" (not "at the instant"); or, "Do so this moment." But they may be used interchangeably when they are used abstractedly from what occurs in them, or as simply equivalent to a point, or the shortest possible or conceivable time. "In the twinkling of an eye." "In a moment;" or, "In an instant." "It happened at that moment," or "at that instant."

"All these which in a *moment* Thou behold'st,
The kingdoms of the world, to Thee I give."
Milton.

"He made him stoop perforce unto his knee,
And do unwilling worship to the saint
That on his shield depainted did he see:
Such homage, till that *instant*, never
learned he."
Spenser.

MONARCH. PRINCE. SOVEREIGN. POTENTATE.

MONARCH (Gr. *μόναρχος, μόνος*, only, and *ἄρχειν*, to rule) denotes the possessor of supreme and peculiar power politically. It determines nothing of the extent of such power, but only that it is undivided. Hence the term is employed rhetorically of what is first of its kind in Nature. "The monarch of the forest, or of the beasts." The term PRINCE (Lat. *princeps*) is also indefinite as to the extent of power, and commonly denotes an inferior degree of it; so that a monarch or his nobles might equally be called princes. SOVEREIGN is an hereditary monarch viewed in his relation to his own subjects; while POTENTATE (Low Latin *potentatus*, from *potentare*, to exercise power) expresses his relation to other princes

and nations, or, as they are sometimes called, powers.

MONEY. See CASH.

MONSTER. See MARVEL.

MONUMENT. See MEMORIAL.

MOOD. TEMPER. HUMOUR.

HUMOUR (Lat. *humor, humere*, to be moist) and MOOD (A. S. *mōd*, mind, disposition) agree in denoting a temporary state of the mind and feelings; but mood relates more directly to the mind, humour to the feelings. TEMPER (Fr. *tempérer*, Lat. *temperare*) is the constitution of the mind, particularly in regard to the passions and affections, or to some one which modifies its disposition generally.

MOODY. See SAD.

MORBID. DISEASED.

These are etymologically equivalent, MORBID being the Latin form (*morbidus, morbus*, disease) of the English disease; but morbid has a technical application to cases of a prolonged nature; to continuous derangement or deterioration without violent symptoms, and is as often used of the mental as of the physical constitution; as, a morbid condition of the nervous system, a morbid sensibility. It is also employed, only abstractedly, of states and conditions, not of parts affected. We say, "a diseased," but not "a morbid limb." Morbid expresses that abnormal influence which tends to show itself in disease.

"Whilst the distempers of a relaxed fibre prognosticate and prepare all the *morbid* force of convulsion in the body of the state, the steadiness of the physician is overpowered by the very aspect of the disease."—*Burke*.

"They should choose such places as were open to the most favourable aspects and influence of the heavens, where there was a well-tempered soil, clear air, pure springs of water, that *diseased* persons coming from unhealthy places might obtain recovery."—*Bates*.

MOREOVER. BESIDES.

These terms agree in expressing an additional fact by way of reason to

what may have been stated already. They seem to differ, not in themselves, but in the relative weight of the reason which they introduce; **MOREOVER** implying that what is added is of some importance; while **BESIDES** implies that though stated with a view to add weight, the case would have been good enough without it. "I cannot well go out to-day; I am much engaged; besides, it is beginning to rain." "There will always be war among men, so long as ambition reigns in human hearts; moreover, other causes are perpetually at hand."

MOROSE. SULLEN.

MOROSENESS (*morosus, mores, manners*, literally, one who has a fixed manner) and **SULLENNESS** (Old Eng. *solein, solain*, Lat. *solus*, alone, lonely) are states of mind or temper; but the former manifests itself in those who are in influence; the latter, in those who are in subservience. "If the master is morose, little wonder that the servant is sullen." Moroseness comes from harsh views of human nature; sullenness, from a feeling of discontent. The one is wrong actively; the other, wrong passively. The one is a matter of treatment; the other, a matter of endurance. Moroseness is more purely mental; sullenness shows itself in the demeanour.

"Many in all ages have followed St. John into the wilderness, and chosen retirement, not out of any *moroseness* of temper or misanthropy, but that they might give themselves without let or molestation to the pursuit of divine knowledge."—*Bishop Horne*.

"I found him seated with so much *sullen* and stupid gravity, that, notwithstanding what had been told me, I really took him for an idiot, whom the people, from some superstitious notions, were ready to worship."—*Cool's Voyages*.

MORTAL. See **DEADLY**.

MORTIFICATION. See **VEXATION**.

MOTION. **MOVEMENT.**

MOTION (Lat. *motio, movere, motus*, to move) is abstract, **MOVEMENT** (*momentum, movimentum*, from the same

verb) is concrete, that is, bound up with the thing itself that moves. So the laws of motion; the movements of the planets; the movements of an army; or a body of men in motion. The motion of the heavenly bodies might be spoken of as well as their movements. In that case, the idea of motion is opposed to that of rest; movement is definite and specific motion in regard to a particular subject. Hence motion is a more scientific or technical word than movement. So we use the terms, "perpetual motion;" "composition and resolution of motion," not of movement. On the other hand, where personal action is regarded as under rule, we apply to such changes of the bodily position the term movement. "He made a motion with his hand." "Some animals are naturally graceful in their movements."

MOTIVE. **PURPOSE.** **OBJECT.**
INDUCEMENT.

MOTIVE (*motivus*, Fr. *motif, movere, motus*, to move) is the term commonly employed of that which excites to action and determines choice. The motive is of the nature of an **INDUCEMENT** when it leads us to action (*inducere*, to lead on) by its agreement with our inclinations or desires of good. It is a **REASON** (Fr. *raison*, Lat. *ratio*) when it takes such a form as commends itself to our reason or judgment. **OBJECT** (*obicere, objectus*, to cast over against one) is that to which the desires are directed, and on which the purpose is fixed as the end of action or effort; something which it is endeavoured to realize or bring about; the final cause. The **PURPOSE** (Old Fr. *purpos*, Lat. *proponere, propositum*) is the operation of that process of which the object is the end and aim. The object is definite and fixed; the purpose is continuous and variable till the object is gained. The inducement is always practicable and tangible; the reason is the definition of the inducement. The purpose may, however, be regarded from two points of view; that is, either as an end, in which case it is identical with object,

or as a plan for attaining it. But an object is external to oneself; a purpose may be internal, as a purpose to lead a new life.

"By *motive*, I mean the whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjointly."—*Edwards, Freedom of the Will.*

"He travelled the world on *purpose* to converse with the most learned men."—*Guardian.*

"*Object*, beside its proper signification, came to be abusively applied to denote motive, end, final cause. . . . This innovation was probably borrowed from the French."—*Sir W. Hamilton.*

"Let, then, the fortune or the honour (for both are included in the magical word silver) which eminent worth may propose to itself, be among the *inducements* which erect the hopes and quicken the application of a virtuous man."—*Bishop Hurd.*

MOTTLE. See SPECK.

MOULD. See CHARACTER and FORM.

MOUNT. See ASCEND.

MOURN. See GRIEVE.

MOURNFUL. See SAD.

MOVE. STIR.

The verbs are used both as transitives and intransitives. As transitives, to MOVE (Lat. *movere*) is to impel a thing so as to cause it to change its place; being employed analogously of what induces moral as well as physical change. To STIR (A. S. *styrian*) is to move in such a way that the movement is accompanied by some amount of internal commotion or disturbance. Again, stir expresses more distinctively that kind of quick, short movement which is confined to the individual or object, and implies little or no change of locality.

"All those sublime thoughts which tower above the clouds, and reach as high as heaven itself, take their rise and footing here in all that real extent wherein the mind wanders in those remote speculations it may seem to be elevated with; it *stirs* not one jot beyond those ideas which sense or reflection have offered for its contemplation."—*Locke.*

"In Him we live and move and have our being."—*English Bible.*

MOVEMENT. See MOTION.

MOVING. See PATHETIC.

MULCT. See FINE.

MULTITUDE. See CROWD.

MUNIFICENT. See BENEFICENT.

MURDER. See KILL.

MURMUR. See COMPLAIN.

MUSE. See MEDITATE.

MUSTER. See COLLECT.

MUTABLE. See INCONSTANT.

MUTE. See DUMB.

MUTILATE. See MAIM.

MUTINY. See INSURRECTION.

MUTUAL. RECIPROCAL.

MUTUAL (Lat. *mutuus*) implies nothing as to time or order of action. RECIPROCAL (*reciprocus*, from *recipere*, to take back) involves an idea of priority and succession. A mutual thing is simply a thing which exists between two persons; a reciprocal thing so exists as the result of a giving and returning. "The attachment was mutual," would mean simply that it was felt on both sides; that it was reciprocal, that what one had given the other also had returned.

"God in the nature of each being founds
Its proper bliss, and sets its proper
bounds;

But as He framed a whole, the whole to
bless,

On *mutual* wants built *mutual* happiness,

So from the first eternal order ran,

And creature linked to creature, man to
man." *Pope.*

"This atonement was the end of the incarnation, and the two articles *reciprocate*; for an incarnation is implied and presupposed in the Scripture doctrine of atonement, as the necessary means to the end."—*Bishop Horsley.*

MYSTERIOUS. MYSTICAL.

MYSTERIOUS (Gr. *μυστήριον*) denotes that a thing is not only obscure, but that there is in the character of that obscurity something which excites curiosity and wonder. MYSTICAL (Gr. *μυστικός*) denotes that which does not so much excite emo-

tion as baffle curiosity and comprehension, by secret meanings involved in the subject as it meets the ear or the eye; as, mystic words of prophecy, that is, words which have a meaning not limited to their primary application. Mazes of the mystic dance; that is, whose movements are more than they seem, and are significant of ideas and emotions. The mysterious opposes itself to inquiry; the mystical invites it.

"By a silent, unseen, *mysterious* process, the fairest flower of the garden springs from a small, insignificant seed, the majestic oak of the forest from an acorn, the strongest and wisest man from a wretched, senseless, and helpless infant, the holy and exalted saint from a miserable sinner."—*Horne*.

"Fool, thou didst not understand
The *mystic* language of the eye, nor hand."
Donne.

N.

NAKED. BARE. UNCOVERED.

NAKED (A. S. *nacod*, *nacud*, *naced*) denotes the absence of any covering; BARE (A. S. *bar*, *bær*), destitute of some specific or proper covering. A man is naked when he has no clothes upon him; his head is bare when his hat or head covering is absent. A tree which has lost its leaves in winter could only be called naked by analogy, that is, by being regarded as destitute of a kind of clothing. It is, when stripped of its leaves, commonly called bare. When applied to objects in general, bare commonly conveys the idea of destitution or privation; bare walls means unfurnished walls. While naked is used sometimes in a favourable sense, as meaning unobscured, unnumbered, as the naked truth, bare always denotes want, insufficiency, or isolation. UNCOVERED (prefix *un* and *couvrir*, Lat. *coopere*) is entirely a colourless term, and depends upon the context. Anything may be uncovered which is capable of being covered. Commonly speaking, the naked is the uncovered where it *might* be covered; the bare, the uncovered where it *ought* to be, or might be better conceived as, covered.

"Wretched, and miserable, and poor, and blind, and *naked*."—*English Bible*.

"For never-resting time leads summer on
To hideous winter, and confounds him
there;
Sap checked with frost, and lusty leaves
quite gone;
Beauty o'ersnowed, and *bareness* every-
where."
Shakespeare.

"None of the Eastern people use the compliment of *uncovering* their heads when they meet, as we do."—*Dampier's Voyages*.

NAME. APPELLATION. DENOMINATION. TITLE. DESIGNATION.

Of these, NAME (A. S. *nama*), connected with the Latin *nomen*, is the simplest and most generic, indicating simply the word by which a thing or person is distinguished. It is the current representation of the thing itself. APPELLATION (Lat. *appellare*, to call) properly denotes a descriptive term where some individual is expressed, or some peculiar characteristic; as, "Alexander of Macedon's appellation was 'the Great;'" or, "S. Thomas Aquinas' appellation was 'the Angelic Doctor.'" A TITLE (Lat. *titulus*) is a name in some way indicative of dignity, distinctiveness, or prominence. DENOMINATION (Lat. *de* and *nominare*, *nomen*, a name) is a distinctive name, implying sectional division or classification. It may be expressed by either a noun or an adjective; as, Pharisee, good, bad. It deserves, however, to be remarked, that the term belongs to such distinctions as are imposed by men, not such as are based upon the differences of nature; though the denominations so imposed may agree with natural distinctions. We do not, for instance, speak of plants, animals, or minerals of different denominations. DESIGNATION (*designare*, *signum*, a sign) is a distinctive title, pointing out more specifically one individual from others. The word carries the mind beyond the fact of a distinctive name, to the effort of those who imposed it as peculiarly appropriate or characteristic.

"A *name* which every wind to heaven would
bear,
Which men to speak, and angels joy to
hear."
Cowley.

"Men must endeavour to palliate what they cannot cure. They must institute some persons, under the *appellation* of magistrates, whose peculiar office it is to point out the decrees of equity, to punish transgressors, to correct fraud and violence, and to oblige men, however reluctant, to consult their own real and permanent interests."—*Hume*.

"If the qualities which I have ranged under the head of the sublime be all found consistent with each other, and all different from those which I place under the head of beauty; and if those which compose the class of the beautiful have the same consistency with themselves, and the same opposition to those which are classed under the *denomination* of sublime, I am in little pain whether anybody chooses to follow the *name* I give them or not, provided he allows that what I dispose under different heads are in reality different things in nature."—*Burke*.

"Every substance that exists has its peculiar constitution, wherein depend those sensible qualities and powers we observe in it; but the ranking of things into species, which is nothing but sorting them under several *titles*, is done by us according to the ideas that we have of them."—*Locke*.

"This is a plain *designation* of the Duke of Marlborough. One kind of stuff used to fatten land is called marl, and every one knows that borough is the name of a town."—*Swift*.

NARRATION. *See* ACCOUNT.

NARRATIVE. *See* ACCOUNT.

NARROW. CONTRACTED. CONFINED.

NARROW (A. S. *nearu*, *nearo*, connected with *near*) denotes no more than the being of little breadth, without of necessity implying either that it is the result of any artificial process, or any disparaging force; as, a narrow stream. A narrow escape is one in which the interval between the point of danger and the person avoiding it is near or narrow. CONTRACTED (Lat. *contrahere*, *contractus*, to draw in) implies an artificial process, or the result of narrowing influences. Metaphorically, a narrow mind is so by nature; a contracted mind is so by association, training, or prejudice. CONFINED (*con* and *finis*, a boundary) implies more strongly than contracted the operation of *external* forces. A stream is

contracted within its ordinary course by the drought of summer; it is confined to a narrow bed by artificial embankments.

NATAL. *See* NATIVE.

NATION. *See* PEOPLE.

NATIVE. NATAL. NATURAL.

NATIVE (*nativus*, *nasci*, *natus*, to be born) indicates a relation by origin to an object; pertaining to one's birth, as native land or language; conferred by birth, as native genius. NATURAL (*natura*, nature), pertaining to the constitution of Nature, or some particular nature, as opposed to what is unconnected with Nature, as artificial, distorted, or the like. NATAL (*natalis*) means belonging to the event or circumstances of a man's birth; as a natal day, hour, star.

NATURE. *See* CHARACTER.

NAVAL. *See* MARINE.

NAUGHTY. *See* BAD.

NAUTICAL. *See* MARINE.

NAUSEA. LOATHING. DISGUST.

As employed of repugnance of feeling towards objects, NAUSEA (literally, sea-sickness, Gr. *vais*, a ship) is commonly employed of that dislike which is the result of overmuch supply, involving tediousness and satiety; LOATHING (*see* LOATHE), of a strong constitutional dislike, whether physical or of the moral taste; DISGUST (*dis* and *gustare*, to taste), of what strongly offends the moral sense rather than the physical, as disgust at the conduct of another.

NEAR. NIGH. CLOSE.

As adverbs, NEAR (A. S. *nearu*, *nyra*, comparative of *neah*, *neh*, nigh), NIGH, and CLOSE (Fr. *clos*, Lat. *clausus*, *claudere*, to shut) may be thus in usage distinguished. We commonly now employ *near* both of time and space, while we restrict *nigh* to space. *Nigh* at hand. "The time draweth nigh," would be now expressed by the "Time draws near." We seldom employ *nigh* but with

amplification; as, nigh at hand. Near is by no means so strong and definite as close. Houses are near to each other which are separated by what the speaker may consider a moderate interval; they are close when they almost touch. Near is employed as an adjective, an adverb, and a preposition; nigh, as an adjective and an adverb, but not as a preposition; in that case, it requires the addition of to. Near is only, however, used as an adjective when it is separated by the verb from its substantive; as, "The house is near;" but not "a near house." Both near and close have a metaphorical sense of parsimonious, which is not to the present purpose.

NECESSARY. ESSENTIAL. REQUISITE. NEEDFUL.

NECESSARY (Lat. *necessarius*) is an indefinite term. Necessity may relate to the order and course of Nature, or the projects and designs of men, or the laws of thought and argumentation. REQUISITE (Lat. *requirere, requisitus*) relates to some end, whether of thought or action, which the requisite indispensably subserves. ESSENTIAL (Lat. *essentia, esse*, to be) denotes what is needful to make a thing what it is or professes to be—being regarded as vitally part and parcel of the thing itself. Necessary relates to the course of things; essential, to the constitution of things, and our conceptions of them; requisite, to human deliberation and choice. NEEDFUL is less abstract than necessary, and applies to personal requisites specifically and in detail. "To cross the water is necessary in order to travel in France; but money is needful to travel at all." Necessary is a term primarily of logic; essential, of metaphysics; requisite, of practical life. That is necessary to a thing which the very notion of it seems to draw after it. That is essential without which it would not fulfil its definition or be what it is. That is requisite without which it would be in a condition of deficiency or want.

"A certain kind of temper is *necessary* to the pleasure and quiet of our minds."—*Tillotson*.

"Judgment is more *essential* to a general than courage."—*Denham*.

"All truth *requisite* for men to know."
Milton.

It may be observed that nothing is more common than the employment of essential in the sense of strongly desirable or necessary. Hence such intolerable vulgarisms as that "It is very essential to wrap oneself in cold weather." It should have been either requisite or necessary; the latter representing the act as induced by circumstances; the former, by our own wants and feelings.

"All things *needful* for defence abound."
Dryden.

The needful is, generally speaking, that form of the necessary which involves a double object—the immediate and the remote. The necessary is wanted for itself, except so far as abstract ends are additionally considered, as happiness, comfort, and the like; the needful, for something also to which it conduces.

NECESSITOUS. *See* NEEDY.

NECESSITY. *See* LACK.

NEED. *See* LACK.

NEEDFUL. *See* NECESSARY.

NEEDY. NECESSITOUS.

NEEDY (A. S. *nead, ned, nyd*, Old Eng. *nede*) and NECESSITOUS (*see* NECESSARY) are both employed of persons lacking the common necessities of life, or of their station in it; but needy is employed more directly of the person, and necessitous of the condition. Hence necessitous may imply a casual state; while needy implies one more permanent, as being characteristic of the individual or class.

NEFARIOUS. INIQUITOUS.

These terms both express the strongest disapprobation of human conduct or transactions; but NEFARIOUS (*nefas*, impiety) points more directly to the intrinsic badness of the deed; INIQUITOUS (Lat. *iniquus*, *in*, not, and *æquus*, equal or just), to the detriment done to others, who are involved in the object or consequences of the act.

"That for their own *nefarious* ends
Tread upon Freedom and her friends."

Cunningham.

"In this city (Athens) there were parties, and avowed ones too, for the Persians, Spartans, and Macedonians, supported each of them by one or more demagogues pensioned and bribed to this *iniquitous* service."—*Burke.*

NEGLECT. DISREGARD. SLIGHT.

These may be all regarded as both nouns and verbs. NEGLECT (*negligere, neglectus*) is not so positive as SLIGHT (Old Germ. *leicht*, smooth, simple). Neglect may be the consequence of inattention or preoccupation. Slight is always an act of dislike and contempt. It is not absolutely confined to persons as its object. We may slight as well as neglect an opportunity. To neglect it is to overlook it; to slight it is to think little of it, and so undervalue it. DISREGARD relates more specifically to what is brought into personal relation to oneself, and has commonly a positive and deliberate force, amounting to intentional neglect; as, to disregard an insult, or an attempt, on the part of another, to do one an injury. We should speak of slighting rather than disregarding the *good* offices of others. *Some* exercise of judgment, whether wisely or not, is involved in disregard; while slight may be the result of prejudice, and neglect, of ignorance or inattention.

"Thus said, he turned, and Satan, bowing low,

As to superior spirits is wont in heaven,
Where honour due and reverence none

neglects,
Took leave."

Milton.

"It is too common for those who have been bred to scholastic professions, and passed much of their time in academies, where nothing but learning confers honours, to *disregard* every other qualification, and to imagine that they shall find mankind ready to pay homage to their knowledge, and to crowd about them for instruction."

—*Rambler.*

"Hear your own dignity so much profaned,
See your most dreadful laws so loosely

slighted,

Behold yourself so by a son disdained."

Shakespeare.

NEGLIGENT. *See* INATTENTIVE.

NEGOTIATE. *See* TRANSACT.

NEIGHBOURHOOD. VICINITY.

NEIGHBOURHOOD (A. S. *neahbûr*, with many other forms) is Saxon, VICINITY (Lat. *vicinitas, vicinus*, a neighbour) is Latin. Hence, as commonly happens, the Saxon term is the more comprehensive. Neighbourhood is, in the first place, employed both of the place or places in the vicinity, and of the persons inhabiting them; vicinity, only of the place. Again, neighbourhood is employed to designate the general nearness or collectiveness of persons or objects among one another; vicinity, only of the nearness of one thing to another, or a person to a place. Hence a difference in the form of expression; as, to live in the vicinity of the sea, rather than the neighbourhood, nothing more being meant than physical proximity. Vicinity expresses nearness; neighbourhood, social nearness.

"Till, towards night, they came unto a plain,

By which a little hermitage there lay,
Far from all *neighbourhood* the which annoy
it may."

Spenser.

"The weather was pleasant, and we daily saw some of those birds which are looked upon as signs of the *vicinity* of land, such as boobies, men-of-war, tropic birds, and gannets."—*Cook's Voyages.*

NEOPHYTE. *See* CONVERT.

NEVERTHELESS. *See* HOWEVER.

NEW. *See* FRESH and MODERN.

NEWS. TIDINGS. INTELLIGENCE.

NEWS denotes what is generally new in the way of intelligence from any or all quarters. This may be interesting to ourselves in common with others, or it may be wholly uninteresting. TIDINGS are news of what has tidied or betided (A. S. *tid*, tide or time), more or less expected from a particular quarter, and always personally interesting. As we may have news of a foreign war, and tidings of our friends engaged in it. News may be good or bad; but we speak of good more often than

of evil or bad tidings. INTELLIGENCE (Lat. *intelligere*, to understand) is a more formal word, denoting public or official communication of news, and is always of general interest, whether good or bad, and commonly on definite subjects.

"I wonder that, in the present situation of affairs, you can take pleasure in writing anything but news."—*Spectator*.

"When presumptuous Spain
Baptized her fleet invincible, in vain,
Her gloomy monarch, doubtful, and resigned
To every pang that racks an anxious mind,
Asked of the waves that broke upon his coast

'What tidings?' and the surge replied, 'All lost!'" —*Couper*.

"My lion, whose jaws are at all hours open to *intelligence*, informs me that there are a few enormous weapons still in being." —*Steele*.

NICE. See DELICATE and EXACT.

NIGGARDLY. MISERLY. AVARICIOUS. COVETOUS. SORDID.

All these terms describe excess of selfishness in the use or acquisition of money or valuable possessions. The NIGGARDLY man (Icelandic *knögr*, niggard, sparing) is hard upon others; the MISERLY man (*miser*, miserable), upon himself as well. The AVARICIOUS (Lat. *avaritia*, *avarus*, greedy of gain) is simply rapacious for himself; the COVETOUS (Fr. *convoiter*, Old Fr. *covoiter*, from Lat. *cupidus*, *cupere*, to desire) is so at the expense of others. The quality of the miser starving in the midst of plenty is more ridiculous than pitiable; that of the niggardly man, the more pitiable and hateful; that of the avaricious and covetous, the more formidable. Avarice is greediness: but covetousness would snatch the food from another's mouth. The avaricious man is a man of cares and desires; the covetous man, one of envy and design. SORDID expresses the sacrifice or loss of what is noble, and the adoption of what is mean in feeling and conduct in reference to the acquisition of gain. As the covetous man is desirous of appropriating the wealth of others, so the avaricious man is simply inordi-

nately desirous of gain. The avaricious are eager to get, and hug it when got. The covetous are also eager to obtain, but not so desirous of keeping. The avaricious are never profuse, but the covetous may be, and may even be spendthrifts, desiring the wealth of others that they may squander it or keep it. As the character of the avaricious and covetous are more concerned with acquiring, so the niggardly is more concerned with retaining. The niggardly man finds it hard to part with his money, and would cheapen as far as possible the just claims of others upon him.

"On the other side, there is not in Nature anything so remotely distant from God, or so extremely opposite to Him, as a greedy, griping niggard."—*Barrow*.

"For the sake of collecting what is never to be used, and adding to his beloved heap, the miser will forego the comforts, the conveniences, and almost the necessities of existence, and voluntarily submit all his days to the penuries and austerities of a mendicant."—*Horne*.

"Still, however (said Asem) the inhabitants must be happy. Each is contented with his own possessions, nor avariciously endeavours to heap up more than is necessary for his own subsistence; each has therefore leisure for pitying those that stand in need of compassion."—*Goldsmith*.

"The difference between avarice and covetice is this, covetice is for to covet swiche things as thou hast not, and avarice is to withholde and keep swiche things as thou hast without rightful nede."—*Chaucer*.

"Sordid, unfeeling, reprobate, degraded, Spiritless outcast."

Southey, Anti-Jacobin.

NIGH. See NEAR.

NIGHTLY. NOCTURNAL.

NIGHTLY is derived directly from the English word *night*; NOCTURNAL, from the Latin *nox*, *noctis*, night, whence *nocturnus*. Yet they are somewhat differently employed. The former is a term of more familiar character than the latter; but a further difference is discernible, flowing, however, from the same difference of origin. Nightly means simply, at time of night, or every night; while nocturnal means, connected with the nature of the night.

A nightly visit. The nocturnal habits of some birds, insects, and quadrupeds.

NIMBLE. AGILE.

NIMBLE (A. S. *nemol*, *numol*), connected with *niman*, to take or catch, has, contrary to the common order, been transferred from the mental to the bodily capacities. It is AGILITY (Lat. *agilis*, *ago*, to act) in the specific process of running; while agility refers to the active use of the limbs in other ways. So Addison evidently distinguished between the two when he wrote—

“Ovid ranged over Parnassus with great *nimbleness* and *agility*.”

Yet this is hardly adhered to with strictness at present. The difference seems to be of the same nature, but broader; nimbleness being associated with change of place; agility, with the mere flexibility and elasticity of the body and limbs.

NOBLE. See GRAND.

NOCTURNAL. See NIGHTLY.

NOISE. See SOUND.

NOISELESS. See DUMB.

NOISY. See LOUD.

NOMINATE. APPOINT.

As applied to the APPOINTMENT to certain offices, the NOMINATION (Lat. *nominare*, *nomen*, a name) commonly stands to the appointment (Lat. *ad* and *punctus*, a point) as the first step to the completion. The appointment consists in the formal conferring of office in a regular method; the nomination, in the right of naming the individual to be so appointed. Where there is no discretion left, the nomination is virtually, but not formally or legally, the appointment. But there are cases in which the two are distinct; as where a person or a corporate body has the right of nominating more than one person to an office, out of which one is selected by a higher power for the appointment.

“The *nomination* of persons to places being a prerogative of the king.”—*Charendon*.

“The accusations against Columbus gained

such credit in a jealous court, that a commissioner was *appointed* to repair to Hispaniola, and to inspect into his conduct.”—*Robertson*.

NOTE. ANNOTATION. COMMENT. COMMENTARY. OBSERVATION. REMARK.

In the sense in which it is synonymous with the other terms here given, NOTE (Lat. *nota*, a mark) is always written, being either a brief writing to assist the memory, or a marginal comment or explanation. It is this latter aspect of the word which is more fully expressed by ANNOTATION, especially in illustration of the meaning of a text. COMMENT (Lat. *comminiscor*, *commentus*) has a less systematic meaning, and denotes the expression of anything which may casually suggest itself as worth making in relation to what is said or written, and may be itself either written or said. When the comment is only spoken as well as casual, and has relation rather to the circumstances of the case than to its interpretation, it may be called an OBSERVATION or REMARK. This last (Fr. *remarquer*) is of more general meaning still, and may be employed of anything by way of observation, even where no explanation or illustration is intended, and by way of reference to any subject which may be thought worthy of it, or to afford an opportunity for it. Observation (Lat. *observare*, to observe) is not only non-explanatory but presupposes a complete understanding of the matter upon which the observation is founded. COMMENTARY is a systematic collection of comments in a literary form, and by way of explanation and illustration. In the title, “*Cæsar’s Commentaries*,” the term bears the meaning of memoirs of particular transactions. Its more ordinary meaning is that of a book of expositions on the work of an author. Certain differences are specially worthy of notice between the verbs to observe and to remark. To remark is slighter than to observe, and a remark slighter than an observation. I may make a casual remark which is very remotely con-

ned with the subject under consideration; hence such phrases as, "I may as well remark in passing." To remark is to note down casually; to observe is to note down more carefully. A phenomenon in the heavens may be remarked by a casual spectator; and if it be conspicuous can hardly escape remark. It will be observed by an astronomer. Observation often follows upon remark, and is the analysis or expansion of it. "Did you remark the level of the thermometer yesterday at mid-day?" "No, I did not; but I will observe it more carefully to-day." The careful general remarks those individuals who behave with bravery, while he observes the operations of the enemy. The remark is commonly the statement of a fact; the observation is more likely to be the statement of a principle or an inference.

NOTED. *See* NOTORIOUS.

NOTICE. *See* MENTION.

NOTION. *See* IDEA and OPINION.

NOTORIOUS. NOTED.

While NOTED is reserved for that which is well known, favourably or eminently, NOTORIOUS is employed to express what is publicly known, and universally in men's mouths, commonly, though not invariably, with an unfavourable meaning. But this is only a rough distinction. The case seems to be affected by the question whether the matter is one of facts or persons. At least, notorious is never used of what is known purely for good. We speak indiscriminately of a notorious or a noted fact, but not person; nor is virtue and excellence ever said to be notorious.

NOTWITHSTANDING. *See* HOWEVER.

NOVEL. *See* FABLE and MODERN.

NOURISH. *See* CHERISH.

NOXIOUS. HURTFUL. PREJU-

DICIAL. PERNICIOUS. DETRIMENTAL. DELETERIOUS. INJURIOUS.

Of these, the most general in their application are HURTFUL (*see* HURT) and INJURIOUS, of which the others may be regarded as modifications. NOXIOUS (Lat. *noxius*, *noxa*, *nocere*, to hurt) is applied physically and analogously to physical influences, and to what is like them in morals, as a noxious air or climate; noxious principles or practices. PREJUDICIAL (*præ*, beforehand, and *judicium*, judgment, a judgment, with an implied unfavourable character, formed beforehand) bears specific relation to some particular nature, action, or operation as prejudicial to character, interest, health, life. PERNICIOUS (Lat. *perniciēs*, destruction) denotes that which tends, by its injurious quality, to the destruction of its subject. DETRIMENTAL (Lat. *detrimētum*, from *deterere*, to wear away or impair) is less strong than pernicious, and denotes a tendency, not to destroy, but to impair and diminish in force or value. DELETERIOUS (Lat. *delere*, to destroy or abolish) brings out more strongly the purely physical side of pernicious, as "deleterious medicines," and is most commonly employed in connection with the life and health of men.

"Again it is urged that Nature has not only produced many *noxious* and poisonous herbs, but also destructive and devouring animals, whose strength surpasseth that of men."—*Cudworth*.

"Charles II. had great vices, but scarce any virtues to correct them; he had in him some vices which were less *hurtful*, which corrected his more *hurtful* ones."—*Burnet*.

"That which in the first instance is *prejudicial* may be excellent in its remoter operation; and its excellence may arise even from the ill effects it produces in the beginning."—*Burke*.

"He who has vented a *pernicious* doctrine, or published an ill book, must know that his guilt and his life determine not together."—*South*.

"Though every man hath a property in his goods, he must not use them in *detriment* of the commonwealth."—*State Trials*.

"In some places those plants which are entirely poisonous at home lose their deleterious quality by being carried abroad."—*Gold-mith.*

"We naturally love excellence wherever we see it; but the envious man hates it, and wishes to be superior to others, not by raising himself by honest means, but by injuriously pulling them down."—*Beattie.*

NUMBER. COUNT.

These terms, **NUMBER** (being derived from *numerare*, *numerus*, a number) and **COUNT** (from Fr. *compter*, the Lat. *computare*, to compute, of which count is an abbreviation), may often be employed strictly in the place of count, as to number the sand of the seashore (or to count it); but number (to say nothing of such a phrase as, "To number houses in a street," meaning, to fix numbers upon them) has also the force of presenting as the result of computation; as, "The army numbered fifty thousand." It has also a more rhetorical and solemn character than count, in the sense of to pass into a previously existing number; as, "He was numbered with the dead." On the other hand, it is devoid of that force of reckoning, in the sense of moral estimation, which belongs to count, as in such a phrase as, "I count it simple folly;" and expresses no more than arithmetical computation or addition. I number, denotes the same thing as, I tell off, not, I estimate.

NUMERAL. NUMERICAL.

NUMERAL is of or belonging to numbers, and is applied to terms, especially of grammar; as a numeral adjective. **NUMERICAL** is of or belonging to number in the abstract; as a numerical difference—a difference of number, as distinguished, for instance, from one of quality. The difference between six oranges and eight, where all are of equal size and goodness, would be numerical.

NUPTIALS. See **MARRIAGE.**

NURTURE. See **CHERISH.**

O.

OBDURATE. HARDENED. CALLOUS. OBSTINATE. PERTINACIOUS. CONTUMACIOUS.

While **HARDENED** is the most general term, the others, with the exception of obstinate, may be regarded as modifications of it. We speak of persons or their feelings as hardened, when we mean to express the result of habituation, and this actively or passively; as, hardened in vice; hardened against impressions, as, for instance, scenes of suffering. **CALLOUS** (Fr. *calleur*, Lat. *callosus*, from *callum*, *callus*, the thick skin of animal bodies) commonly denotes rather insensibility through nature or habituation, than any blunting of the moral feelings. This latter use, however, is not excluded, as in the phrase, "A callous conscience." **OBDURATE** (Lat. *obdurare*, *obduratus*, to harden), on the other hand, denotes the state of being hardened against moral influences. They rise in meaning in the following order: callous denotes a deadening of the sensibilities; hardened, a settled disregard of and habit of resistance against the claims of persuasion, duty, and sympathy; obdurate, a moral determination in opposition to both moral principle and natural feeling. **OBSTINATE** (Lat. *obstinare*, *obstinatus*, a lengthened form of *obstare*, to stand out) is more purely mental than moral, and denotes such inflexible conduct as consists in standing out against persuasion, instruction, entreaty, and, by an extension of the use of the term, against attack. **PERTINACIOUS** (Lat. *pertinax*, *pertinere*, to hold on) represents obstinacy, as it were, from the other or opposite point of view. As obstinacy consists in holding out, so pertinacity consists in holding on. The man who reiterates and clings to his own purpose or opinion is pertinacious; the man who does so in direct opposition to external influences is obstinate. **CONTUMACIOUS** expresses the resistance to the demands of constituted authority.

"The ear is wanton and ungoverned, and the heart insolent and *obdurate*, till the one is pierced, and the other made tender by affliction."—*South*.

"Tell such people of a world after this, of their being accountable for their actions, and of the Gospel denunciations of damnation upon all who lead such ungodly lives without repentance; they are *hardened* to everything of this kind."—*Gilpin, Sermons*.

"Licentiousness had so long passed for sharpness of wit and greatness of mind, that the conscience is grown *callous*."—*L'Es-trange*.

"So was both sides with *obstinate* despite,
With like revenge, and neither party
bowed." *Daniel*.

"Disputes with men *pertinaciously* obstinate in their principles are, of all others, the most irksome."—*Hume*.

"Now, these courts being thus established in the Church, when any offender is presented into any of them, he is cited to appear there, which if he neglect or refuse to do, he is pronounced *contumacious*."—*Beveridge*.

OBEDIENT. COMPLIANT. YIELD-
ING. SUBMISSIVE. DUTIFUL. OB-
SEQUIOUS.

OBEDIENT (Lat. *obedire, obediens*, to obey) involves a relationship of inferiority to another, and a recognized physical or moral subserviency; but the moral power is the primary, the physical the secondary, application. We obey God, men, and laws, commands, and the like, as the media through which their will is expressed and made known to us. It is only by analogy that the ship is said to obey the helm, or a body to fall in obedience to the law of gravitation. COMPLIANT (Fr. *complier*, in which have probably been confounded the two senses of the Latin *complevere* and *complicare*) indicates more equality between the parties than obedient. As obedience stands to law, command, injunction, or precept, so compliance stands to wishes, desires, demands, requests, proposals, and the like. YIELDING is a term expressive of the natural disposition or tendency to comply, and involves commonly some weakness of nature and incapacity of resistance to the will of another, where such resistance is lawful or needful. SUBMISSIVE (Lat.

submittere) is a stronger term than obedient, and carries the meaning of prospective obedience or compliance with possible as well as actual commands or desires of another. DUTIFUL (duty from due, Fr. *dû*) denotes that character of act, conduct, or disposition which allows itself to be swayed by the consciousness of a moral relationship, involving the right of the one party to submission, obedience, or deference, and the obligation of the other party to render it without coercion, but by the understood, rather than expressed, power of control. OBSEQUIOUS (Lat. *obsequi*, to obey) has now lost its original use, in which it was equivalent to compliant, and has lapsed into the unfavourable meaning of over-compliant, or demonstratively, over-courteously, and almost servilely attentive to the wishes of another.

"Yet to whate'er above was fated,
Obediently he bowed his soul;
For what all-bounteous Heaven created,
He thought Heaven only should control."
Cowper.

"The Earl of Surrey, afterwards Duke of Norfolk, to show how *compliant* he was to the humours of the princes which he served, did as dexterously comply with his prodigality as he had formerly with his father's sparingness."—*Burnet*.

"That *yieldingness*, whatever foundations it might lay to the disadvantage of posterity, was a specific to preserve us in peace in his own time."—*Lord Halifax*.

"He in delight
Both of her beauty and *submissive* charms,
Smiled with superior love, as Jupiter
On Juno smiles when he impregns the
clouds
That shed May flowers." *Milton*.

"I advised him to persevere in *dutifully* bearing with his mother's ill-humour."—*Anecdotes of Bishop Watson*.

"The common people have not yet contracted that *obsequiousness* and submission which the rigour of their government, if no revolution occurs to redress it, must in time reduce them to."—*Observer*.

OBJECT. See AIM, MOTIVE, and SUBJECT.

OBLIGATION. See DUTY.

OBLIGE. See BIND.

OBLIGED. *See* INDEBTED.

OBLIGING. *See* CIVIL.

OBLITERATE. *See* EFFACE.

OBLIVION. *See* FORGETFULNESS.

OBLONG. OVAL.

OBLONG (Lat. *oblongus*) means longer than broad; OVAL (Lat. *ovum*, an egg), egg-shaped. The oval is therefore a species or one form of the oblong. Figures may be oblong which are formed by right lines and right angles, not being squares, and are called rectangular parallelograms; but the oval is a curvilinear oblong figure, as ellipses, which are distinguished from, or deviations from, the circle.

OBLOQUY. CONTUMELY.

The contemptuous speaking against another is common to these words; but while OBLOQUY denotes disparagement generally (Lat. *obloqui*, to speak against), CONTUMELY (Lat. *contumelia*, probably connected with *tumere*, to swell, as if a swelling against superior position or merit) involves the unmerited treatment of another, accompanied with disrespect. A person may be publicly spoken against out of his own hearing, in which case he still incurs obloquy; but contumely is shown to his face, and is not confined to words.

"For the word *καταλέγειν*, according to its origination, and according to some use, doth signify all kind of *obloquy*, and so may comprise slander, harsh censure, reviling, scoffing, and the like kinds of speaking against our neighbour; but in stricter acceptation, and according to peculiar use, it denoteth that particular sort of *obloquy* which is called detraction or backbiting."—*Barrow*.

"Nothing aggravates tyranny so much as *contumely*."—*Burke*.

OBNOXIOUS. *See* ACCOUNTABLE.

OBSCURE. *See* DARK and INDISTINCT.

OBSEQUIES. FUNERAL.

These terms express different aspects of the same thing. FUNERAL (Lat. *funus, funeris*) represents the interment of the dead as accompanied by its proper rites, ceremonies, and

attendance. OBSEQUIES (Lat. *obsequium*, compliance, *obsequi*, to follow) is the same funeral solemnity regarded as the last duty performed to a deceased person. The idea of obsequies is that of respectful valediction; that of funeral is mournful ceremony.

"But you must know, your father lost a father,

That father lost, lost his; and his survivor bound

In filial obligation for some term

To do *obsequious* sorrow."

Shakespeare.

"The funeral bake-meats coldly furnish'd forth

The marriage table."

Ibid.

OBSEQUIOUS. *See* OBEDIENT.

OBSERVANCE. *See* CEREMONY.

OBSERVANCE. OBSERVATION.

OBSERVANCE (Lat. *observantia, observare*, to observe) is the due rendering to rule, law, custom, or occasion a formal or practical recognition. The observance of sacred days; the observance of the principles of truth, justice, or the laws. OBSERVATION (Lat. *observatio*) is simply the act of close and attentive contemplation, with the view of becoming closely acquainted with it, as the observation of the heavens. The intention of an observance is the fulfilment of a moral or religious duty; the intention of observation is to acquire or retain exactly some additional fact for the information of ourselves or the instruction of others.

"Since the obligation upon Christians to comply with the religious *observance* of Sunday arises from the public uses of the institution, and the authority of the apostolic practice, the manner of observing it ought to be that which best fulfils these uses, and conforms the nearest to this practice."—*Paley*.

"The difference between experiment and *observation* consists merely in the comparative rapidity with which they accomplish their discoveries, or rather in the comparative command we possess over them as instruments for the investigation of truth."—*Stewart*.

OBSERVE. *See* BEHOLD and WATCH.

OBSERVER. *See* SPECTATOR.OBSOLETE. *See* OLD.OBSTACLE. *See* DIFFICULTY.OBSTINATE. *See* OBDURATE and STUBBORN.OBSTRUCT. *See* CLOG.OBTAIN. *See* ACQUIRE.OETRUDE. *See* INTRUDE.OBIATE. *See* PREVENT.OBVIOUS. *See* APPARENT.OCCASION. *See* CREATE.

OCCASION. OPPORTUNITY.

OCCASION (Lat. *occasio*, *ob* and *casus*, *cadere*, a befalling) is no more than something which falls in our way, or presents itself in the course of circumstances or events. An OPPORTUNITY (Lat. *opportunus*, sometimes derived from *ob* and *portus*, a harbour) is an occasion regarded in its relation to ourselves and our own intentions, as an available source or season of action by reason of fitness and convenience. The occasion commonly *controls us*; but we *avail ourselves* of the opportunity. We may have frequent occasion to meet a certain person, but no opportunity of taking him apart to converse with him privately. An occasion is sometimes nearly of the nature of a cause, when an internal motive finds excitement in external circumstances; but an opportunity is nothing unless we care to seize it.

"Every man is obliged by the Supreme Maker of the universe to improve all the *opportunities* of good which are afforded him."
—*Johnson*.

"Sin, taking *occasion* by the commandment, deceived me."—*English Bible*.

OCCASIONAL. *See* CASUAL.OCCULT. *See* LATENT.

OCCUPANCY. OCCUPATION.

The difference between these two words flows from the different forces of the verb *occupy*—to take possession, and to hold possession. OCCUPANCY (*occupare*, *ob* and *capere*, to take) is the taking or having possession in re-

lation to rights, claims, or privileges; OCCUPATION, in relation to no more than the fact of possessing and holding. We speak of the occupancy of an estate; and the occupation, not occupancy, of a country by an army. Occupancy has a passive, occupation also an active sense.

"As we before observed that *occupancy* gave the right to the temporary use of the soil, so it is agreed upon all hands that *occupancy* gave also the original right to the permanent property in the substance of the earth itself, which excludes every one else but the owner from the use of it."—*Blackstone*.

"Whereas of late yeares a great compasse hath yielded but small profit, and this onelie through the idle and negligent *occupation* of such as dailie manured and herd the same in occupying."—*Holinshed*.

OCCUPATION. *See* EMPLOYMENT.OCCUPY. *See* POSSESS.OCCUR. *See* HAPPEN.OCCURRENCE. *See* CIRCUMSTANCE.ODIOUS. *See* HATEFUL.ODOUR. *See* FRAGRANCE.ECONOMICAL. *See* ECONOMICAL.OFFENCE. *See* CRIME.

OFFEND. DISPLEASE. VEX. MORTIFY.

OFFEND (Lat. *offendere*, *ob*, against, and *fendere*, to thrust) relates always to the conduct of one person towards another, and implies, therefore, conscious agents on both sides, and a condition of real or supposed slight on one side. It belongs to superiors and equals rather than to inferiors to be offended. In the case of equals, it still implies an alleged deficiency of regard or consideration. DISPLEASE is less strong, and belongs not so much to personal offence received at the hands of another, as the feeling of dissatisfaction on the part of a superior, where the measure of requirement or duty has not been fulfilled by the other. Displease is more directly applicable to the conduct of the person; offend, to the person himself. VEX (*vexare*) is to make

angry, or irritated by petty provocations or annoyances, especially if repeated. MORTIFY differs from all in being absolutely referrible to occurrences irrespective of actions or agents; and expresses a strong feeling of personal disapproval mixed with disappointment in what has occurred or been done, where the question is of persons.

"The emperor himself came running to the place in his armour, severely reproofing them of cowardice who had forsaken the place, and grievously *offended* with those who had kept such negligent watch."—*Knolles*.

"When Thou wert so wrathfully *displeased* at him."—*English Bible*.

"In disappointments where the affections have been strongly placed and the expectations sanguine, particularly where the agency of others is concerned, sorrow may degenerate into *vexation* and chagrin."—*Cogan*.

"I am *mortified* by those compliments which were designed to encourage me."—*Pope*.

OFFENDER. DELINQUENT.

The one is an active and positive, the other a passive and negative, transgressor. He who violates law or social rule is an OFFENDER; he who neglects to comply with its requirements is a DELINQUENT (Lat. *de* and *linquere*, to leave). It may be observed that, as every citizen is bound positively to obey the laws of his country, as well as negatively not to slight or fall short of them, so a delinquency, though by the force of the term it implies omission, may, in some cases, be a commission. So in the following—

"A *delinquent* ought to be cited in the place or jurisdiction where the *delinquency* was committed."—*Ayliffe*.

In this broader sense, a delinquent is one whose acts fail of his obligations to the state. So again—

"He that politicly intendeth good to a common weal may be called a just man; but he that practiseth either for his own profit, or any other sinister ends, may be well termed a *delinquent* person."—*State Trials*.

Delinquent is a more limited term than offender. The delinquent offends against the majesty and justice of law. The offender may run counter

to any law, rule, custom, or even to taste.

"The proud he tamed, the penitent he cheered,
Nor to rebuke the rich *offender* feared."
Dryden.

OFFER. GIVE. PRESENT.

All these words describe forms of donation. To GIVE (*see* GIVE) is the simplest, and expresses plain, direct, and unqualified bestowal, but is applicable to what is injurious as well as desirable, as to give a blow or an offence, as well as what is distinctively termed a gift. PRESENT (*presentare*) is a more formal word than give, and is therefore employed of the gift from an inferior to a superior. OFFER (Lat. *offerre*) is of a more contingent nature, and involves the question of acceptance on the other side. We offer a gift, and then present it if accepted. Where there is no qualification, gift is generally taken to imply something of considerable value; present, something of no great value; and offering, what is given to a superior in some formal manner in token of such superiority or to conciliate favour. A present has for its motive some feeling of regard; a gift may be without any. Any benefit conferred, without compliment to its object, may be called a gift. Hence the gifts, not the presents, of Nature or of fortune.

"When *offers* are disdained, and love denied."
Pope.

"And when they had opened their treasures, they presented unto Him *gifts*, gold, and frankincense, and myrrh."—*English Bible*.

"Mrs. Johnson used to define a *present*, that it was a gift to a friend of something he wanted or was fond of, and which could not be easily gotten for money."—*Swift*.

OFFICE. FUNCTION. DUTY.

OFFICE (*officium*) has more than one sense, as a special duty conferred by public authority for a public purpose; and so any special duty, trust, or charge. By an extension of meaning, it is employed of what is analogous to duty in reasoning beings, that is, a definite operation,

as the office of the gastric juice in digestion, or of a particular piece in machinery. **FUNCTION** (*functi*, to discharge) is, properly, the discharge of the office or **DUTY**, and follows the application of those terms to both conscious and unconscious action. There is connected with function the idea of continuous action, and of belonging to an organized body, or to what is analogous to it. Duties are performed, offices filled, functions discharged. Office is set and appointed work arising out of a relative connection with system, whether natural or conventional. The function is the carrying out of the office. The duty is the function regarded in connection with the obligation to discharge it, and so belongs not, except by a strained analogy, to any but beings of intelligence and responsibility.

"All members have not the same office."—*English Bible*.

"Every soldier was able to do all the functions of an officer."—*Burnet*.

"The hardest and most imperative duty."—*Hallam*.

OFFICIOUS. See **BUSY**.

OFFSPRING. **ISSUE.** **PROGENY.**

OFFSPRING (literally, that which springs off from another) and **PROGENY** (Lat. *progenies*) are applicable to the young of all animals; while **ISSUE** (Fr. *issue*, Lat. *exitus*, *exire*, to go forth) is applicable only to the human race. Offspring applies more commonly to the first; progeny also to succeeding generations; issue is a term not so much of nature as of genealogy, and is employed where a record for any purpose is kept of the individual members of a family. It is more commonly after a man's death that we speak of his issue. Offspring and issue relate directly to the parents; progeny to ancestors generally, even though not in the direct line of parentage. Perhaps, too, we more commonly use the term offspring in connection with physical qualities or characteristics; progeny, in connection with moral. The degenerate progeny of noble ancestors. A numerous and healthy offspring.

"From whence it follows that these were notions not descending from us, not our offspring, but our brethren."—*South*.

"Next him King Leyr in happy peace long reigned,

But had no issue male him to succeed,
But three fair daughters, which were all uptrained

In all that seemed fit for kingly seed."
Spenser.

"What idle progeny succeed
To chase the rolling circle's speed,
Or urge the flying ball." *Gray*.

OFTEN. See **FREQUENTLY**.

OLD. **ANCIENT.** **ANTIQUE.**
ANTIQUATED. **AGED.** **ELDERLY.**
OBSOLETE.

OLD (A. S. *ald*, *eald*) denotes what has existed for a long time, and, in some cases, exists still, as an old man, in some not, as the old Romans. It has also the force of standing for a simple expression of duration of existence, without implying that this duration is of great extent, as an infant a week old. **ANCIENT** (Fr. *ancien*, Low Lat. *anteanus*, from *ante*, before) has the same application to that which is past, and that which still continues to exist. The Ancient Britons have ceased to exist. An ancient forest exists still. It is opposed to modern, and has the force of historically old or of age in what has been long recognized by men. **ANTIQUE** (*antiquus*, ancient) now conveys the idea of what is curiously old, and is peculiar to the age to which it belongs, or exhibits peculiarities in consequence of its age; as, "An antique carving;" "Antique root of an oak." **ANTIQUATED** describes that which, by lapse of time, has passed out of fashion or use. **AGED** (Fr. *age*, Lat. *atus*) carries with it the progress of years in life and growth, whether human or any other life, as, an aged man; an aged tree. It is a term of more dignity than old, connecting the subject with times and events which have successively passed over it. **ELDERLY** is never used but of men and women, and denotes the approach of old age. **OBSOLETE** (Lat. *obsolescere*, to grow out of use) expresses that of which

the life or force has fallen into desuetude. It is applied chiefly to terms, documents, customs, and observances, and is never used of persons.

"So must thou live, till like ripe fruit thou drop
Into thy mother's lap, or be with ease
Gathered, not harshly plucked, for death
mature;
This is *old* age." Milton.

"Had *ancient* times conspired to disallow
What then was new, what had been *ancient*
now?" Pope, *Epistles of Horace*.

Ancient is generic; antique, specific. Ancient qualifies anything which belongs to the nations of antiquity, except the style of their art, which is called antique. Hence, in some cases, the antique is not, in fact, ancient, but modern. Ancient architecture is the science of building as practised by the ancients; antique architecture exhibits the style of long-past ages. This may be in a recently-erected building.

OLDER. See ELDER.

OMEN. PROGNOSTIC. PRESAGE.

OMEN (Lat. *omen*) and PROGNOSTIC (Gr. *πρὸ*, before, and *γνωστικός*, to be known) are both indications observed in external objects; but the omen rests on fanciful or superstitious association; prognostic, on the laws of nature, and is based upon a knowledge of the sequence of phenomena. The term omen is, however, used conversationally in the sense of a possible or probable prognostic; something which renders the occurrence of another thing probable, or to be hoped, or dreaded. It is, however, more commonly referred to the former than the latter. In our elder literature, prognostic often occurs in the sense of divination. A PRESAGE (Fr. *présage*, Lat. *præ*, before, and *sagus*, wise) is subjective, and commonly expresses something anticipated for good or ill, of which it seems impossible to give the grounds, but of which one feels the strong probability. Such being its indefinite character, it is of course often to be resolved into the mere effect of emotion or of fancy. The omen may belong to the present and its under-

takings; the presage and prognostic belong to what is future.

"The chief subjoins, Oft have these eyes
beheld
Dire omens, and my skill the cause revealed;
Yet never felt I this excess of fear,
Or did the stars more *ominous* appear."
Lewis, *Statius*.

"The consequences are before us, not in remote history, not in future *prognostication*; they are about us, they are upon us."—Burke.

When presage is founded upon some external fact or appearance, it is then identical with omen or prognostic; but it differs from them in being capable of denoting a mere feeling of anticipation without assignable grounds. In that case it is more commonly, like foreboding, used of the calamitous than the fortunate; as Pope says, "With sad, *presaging* heart."

"The enthusiastic love of Nature, simplicity, and truth in every department both of art and of science, is the best and surest *presage* of genius."—Stewart.

OMIT. NEGLECT.

The act of letting pass is common to these two words; but OMIT (Lat. *omittere*) is entirely neutral in its meaning, and expresses no more than the negation of action or attention. This may be laudable, culpable, or indifferent, according to the nature and circumstances of the case. We may omit purposely, or through oversight and forgetfulness, and that where action would be wise, prudent, and right, or altogether the contrary of these. NEGLECT (*negligere*, *neglectus*) is *always* imprudent or culpable, implying omission where the contrary was a matter of duty, wisdom, or obligation. The term omit is in some cases applied to things without life; while neglect is never applied but to creatures of consciousness and will. "The text of a certain manuscript *omits* the passage in question."

"Our Saviour likewise tells us that men shall not only be proceeded against for sins of commission, but for the bare *omission* and neglect of their duty, especially in the works of mercy and charity."—Tillotson.

"In heaven,
Where honour due and reverence none
neglects."
Milton.

ON. *See* OVER.

ONLY. SINGLE.

As *one* (A. S. *æn, ain*) expresses simple unity, so ONLY (which is one-ly or one-like) and SINGLE (Lat. *singulus*) express modifications of unity. Only denotes unity in reference to a class; single, one as distinguished from many others. Single has often the sense of one where more might be expected or wanted, and is thus joined, as only cannot be, with a negative; as, not a single drop, which is tantamount to, not even one drop. It may be observed that, while single is an adjective, only is an adverb, except when used as an adjective in such phrases as, "An only son."

ONSET. ATTACK. ASSAULT.
ENCOUNTER.

ONSET (literally, a setting on) is commonly applied to such an attack or charge as betokens the commencement of a sustained effort. It is only employed where there are two parties to the conflict, the one attacking, and the other resisting. We may speak of an onset upon the walls of a castle, but only as implying living defenders. Nor is the term commonly used of individual, but of collective, attacks; an army or a detachment, not an individual combatant, makes an onset. ATTACK (Fr. *attaquer*) and ASSAULT (Fr. *assault*, Lat. *assilire, ad and salire*, to leap) may be made upon unresisting objects, as a fortification; assault being more direct and violent than attack, which may be impersonal; as, to attack the enemy or the enemy's camp, a man, or his opinions. Both these are applicable to individuals. ENCOUNTER (Old Fr. *encontre*, Lat. *in and contra*, against) is a hostile meeting face to face between two persons or parties, often the result of a *chance* meeting, and is never employed of unresisting or inanimate material, as the walls of a fortification. But in the sense of

coming upon by chance, we employ the term of inanimate things; as, to encounter a difficulty. In this application the term is seldom used but of the abstract that is the difficulty, not that which constitutes it. So a ditch being a possible obstruction, we might speak of encountering an obstacle in the form of a ditch, but hardly of encountering the ditch itself.

"As when in Indian forests wild,
Barbaric armies suddenly retire
After some furious onset."
Grainger.

"Satan, who that day
Prodigious power had shown, and met in
arms

No equal ranging through the dire *attack*
Of fighting seraphim, confused, at length
Saw where the sword of Michael smote."
Milton.

"At length a universal hubbub wild
Of stunning sounds and voices all confused,
Borne through the hollow dark, *assaults*
his ear
With loudest vehemence."
Ibid.

An exception to this is in the legal use of the term assault, which implies no attack or stroke, but even excludes them.

"Assault is an attempt or offer to beat another, without touching him; as if one lifts up his cane or his fist in a threatening manner at another, or strikes at him but misses him."—*Blackstone.*

ONWARDS. *See* FORWARDS.

OPAQUE. *See* DARK.

OPEN. *See* HEARTY.

OPENING. APERTURE.

OPENING means, generally, any place naturally made, or purposely left. open (A. S. *openian*, to open). APERTURE (Lat. *aperire, apertus*, to open) is the same thing, but used in an exacter and, as it were, more scientific sense. To say nothing of opening in the sense of beginning or introduction, opening may be very loosely employed; as, "An opening in the mountains, with nothing but sky beyond." An aperture is commonly an opening of the nature of a perforation, being surrounded by

the substance which exhibits it, as an aperture to admit light into a but. An opening may be extremely slight; an aperture is of some considerable size. We occasionally see openings in bad masonry or ill-seasoned wood-work, which we should not call apertures.

OPERATE. WORK. ACT.

WORK (A. S. *wyrcean*, *wyrcean*, *wcorcan*) is employed of the systematic and regular exhibition of force, whether conscious or mechanical. OPERATE (*operare*, *opus*, a work) is a term more definitely involving rule and purpose or effect than work. A fermenting fluid might be said to work, or the muscles of the face under agitation; but operate, for the most part, includes moral influences or abstract forces, as a law may be said to operate for the harm or benefit of society, or a system or institution is in full or partial operation. ACT (*agere*, *actus*), when not employed of the result of moral motives, but in a physical sense, is ordinarily used to denote the mechanical operation of that which is working *as it ought*, or so as to produce the required result; as a part of a machine which has been obstructed, when the obstruction is removed, begins to act. Action is uniform movement according to appointment and design. A diseased joint, when healed, might be said to work or to act, not to operate. Act commonly refers to structural working or freedom of play in a complex or organized subject.

"Nature and grace must *operate* uniformly, even as gravitation *operates* uniformly upon matter, instinct upon brutes, and those secret powers upon men by which the blood circulates, the pulse beats, the breath comes and goes, and other functions are continually performed in us without our knowledge and endeavour."—*Jortin*.

"Oh, thou hast read me right, hast seen me well;

To thee I have thrown off that mask I wore;

And now the secret *workings* of my brain
Stand all revealed to thee." *Rouve*.

"An increase of the electrical matter adds much to the progress of vegetation. It

probably *acts* there in the same manner as in the animal body."—*Brydone*.

OPINION. SENTIMENT. NOTION.

As the sensations stand to the ideas of men, so are their SENTIMENTS (Fr. *sentiment*, Lat. *sentire*, to feel) to their OPINIONS (Lat. *opinio*). Each involves the exercise of judgment; the former concerning sensations and external, the latter concerning ideas and internal, phenomena. An opinion is maintained by the pure intellect on the subjects of science, argument, principles, or facts and occurrences. The sentiments are opinions entertained in matters of feeling and taste. A sentiment may therefore be either an erroneous opinion, or an unformed one, according as it is not or is verified by the pure judgment. Judgments formed of the truth or falsehood of religious doctrine are opinions; judgments formed of the spirit of its precepts, and of practices flowing out of them, are sentiments. Sentiments depend upon the moral constitution and habits; opinions are of the nature of inferences and deductions, which fall short of absolute knowledge. Sentiments are things of the heart and mind; opinions, of the mind alone. There is more of instinct in sentiment; more of definition in opinion. "I contemplate a work of art, and myself feel the admiration to which I consider it to be generally entitled." This is a sentiment. "I see in it a style of art which seems to betoken a foreign artist. I refer it to an Italian school of sculpture." This is an opinion.

"*Opinion* is the result of obscure and intermediate perception. That the planets revolve about the sun is a branch of knowledge; that they are inhabited by beings similar to men is only an *opinion*."—*Belsham*.

"These arguments on each side are so plausible, that I am apt to suspect they may, the one as well as the other, be solid and satisfactory, and that reason and *sentiment* concur in almost all moral determinations and conclusions."—*Hume*.

NOTION (Lat. *notio*, *noscere*, *notus*), in this sense, denotes the uninformed or immature decision of the mind, resulting rather from the appear-

ances of things, and are equivalent to opinions which the existent state of our knowledge inclines us to entertain. Metaphysically, a notion is that which is expressed by a logical proposition, as idea is that which is expressed by a logical term. It is sometimes extended to the process of forming the judgment which is expressed by the proposition.

"*Notion*, again, signifies either the act of apprehending, signalising, that is, the remarking or taking note of the various notes, marks, or characters of an object which its qualities afford, or the result of that act."—*Sir W. Hamilton.*

OPINIONATED. *See* EGOTISTICAL.

OPPONENT. *See* ENEMY.

OPPORTUNITY. *See* OCCASION.

OPPOSE. RESIST. WITHSTAND.

THWART.

To OPPOSE (Lat. *opponere, oppositus*) is always active, and implies a direct object. RESIST (*resistere*, to stand against) is both active and passive, and may have an indirect object. The former is the exertion of conscious force; the latter is employed of inanimate objects, as water of itself might be said to resist the action or progress of fire, while its progress might be said to be opposed by those who are engaged in extinguishing it. Opposition consists in bringing to bear an adverse force of our own; resistance, merely in neutralizing an adverse force. With in WITHSTAND is equivalent to the *re* in resist. The term has a purely negative sense. We oppose by active force. We resist by inherent power. We withstand by inherent firmness. To THWART (A. S. *thweort*, with other forms, oblique, transverse) denotes, not in particular any kind or degree of force, and denotes such action as defeats a purpose, design, or scheme. It relates, therefore, exclusively to the opposition to mental power exerted towards the accomplishment of an object, which it is the interest of the opposing party to defeat, or which it is in the nature of circumstances to counteract.

"I am too weak to oppose your cunning."
Shakespeare.

"That mortal dint,
Save He who reigns above, none can resist."
Milton.

"Some village Hampden, that with dauntless breast
The little tyrant of his fields withstood,"
Gray.

"E'en at thy altars while I took my stand,
The pen of truth and honour in my hand,
Fate, meditating wrath 'gainst me and mine,
Chid my fond zeal, and thwarted my design."
Churchill.

OPPOSITE. *See* ADVERSE.

OPPROBRIUM. *See* IGNOMINY.

OPPUGN. *See* CONFUTE.

OPTION. *See* CHOICE.

OPULENCE. *See* WEALTH.

ORAL. VERBAL. VOCAL.

ORAL (*os, oris*, the mouth) means spoken by word of mouth; VERBAL (*verbum*, a word), the same thing; VOCAL (*vox, vocis*), belonging to the voice. The difference is in the application. They stand each in opposition to other ideas. Oral is opposed to written or printed in volumes and documents, and stands related to history, records, and tradition; verbal, to common and brief communications; vocal, to instrumental in music, or to sounds produced in other ways, or to silence.

"Before the invention of the arts of writing, carving, and painting, oral tradition must have been the only vehicle of historical knowledge; and with respect to this, it is well worth our notice that the wisdom of Providence has made provision for the instruction of youth in the dispositions and circumstances of their aged parents."—*Priestley.*

"These verbal signs they (children) sometimes borrow from others, and sometimes make themselves, as one may observe among the new and unusual names children often give to things in their first use of language."
—*Locke.*

"Nothing can be said to be dumb but what naturally speaks; nothing can speak naturally but what hath the instruments of speech, which, because spirits want, they can no otherwise speak *vocally* than as they take voices to themselves in taking bodies."
—*Bishop Hall.*

ORATION. *See* ADDRESS.

ORATORY. *See* ELOCUTION.

ORB. *See* BALL.

ORBIT. *See* BALL.

ORDAIN. *See* PRESCRIBE.

ORDER. *See* CHARACTER, CLASS, COMMAND.

ORDER. DISPOSE.

To DISPOSE involves no more than an orderly or harmonious *placing* of things. To ORDER (Fr. *ordre*, Lat. *ordo*) is applicable to the *continuous* exercise of a controlling power. Dispose belongs rather to things external; order, to things moral.

"To him that *ordereth* his conversation right will I show the salvation of God."—*English Bible*.

"The rest themselves in troops did else *dispose*." *Spenser*.

ORDINARY. *See* COMMON.

ORDINARILY. *See* FREQUENTLY.

ORIFICE. *See* CAVITY.

ORIGIN. *See* BEGINNING and REASON.

ORIGINAL. PRIMARY. PRISTINE. PRIMITIVE.

ORIGINAL (Lat. *origo*, *originis*, an origin) denotes that which is connected with the origin or beginning of a thing. The original meaning of a word is that which it bore at or near its first employment, without of necessity involving the ideas of priority or succession. PRIMARY (Lat. *primus*, first) essentially involves succession; as the primary meaning of a word implies other derived or secondary senses; while its original meaning may be that which it retains still; so a primary consideration comes first in order of importance. PRISTINE (Lat. *pristinus*) has relation to the morals, manners, and customs of men. PRIMITIVE conveys the idea of original in mode, fashion, or form; so we speak of the primary meaning, and the primitive form, of a word; primitive manners; primitive simplicity.

"His form had not yet lost
All its *original* brightness." *Milton*.

"Those I call original or *primary* qualities of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us, namely, solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number."—*Locke*.

"Parliaments never recover their *pristine* dignity, honour, power, privileges, if this should miscarry."—*Prynne*.

"This is that that will restore to the world the golden age of *primitive* Christianity, when the love and unity of the disciples of Jesus was so conspicuous and remarkable that it became a proverb, 'See how the Christians love one another.'"—*Sharp*.

OSTENSIBLE. COLOURABLE. SPECIOUS. PLAUSIBLE.

OSTENSIBLE (Lat. *ostendere*, to show or hold out) is, literally, that which may be (and so is) held out; 1, by way of true account; and 2, by way of fictitious account. The latter is now its more frequent application. That which is ostensible presents such an appearance as affords a presumption of reality. COLOURABLE denotes that which is so artificially treated as to conceal the truth and lull suspicion, giving an appearance of right or justice. SPECIOUS (*speciosus*, fair) is superficially fair, just, or correct, appearing well at first view, but in reality unsound. PLAUSIBLE (Lat. *plausibilis*, *plaudere*, to applaud) is said of those things which please the ear and do not satisfy the judgment; while specious relates, etymologically, to what pleases the eye, yet is not truly what it seems to be. Ostensible causes, pretexts, motives. Colourable views, statements, arguments, interpretations. Specious argument, talk. Plausible representations, accounts, stories.

"It is certain that he (D'Ouvilly) ingratiated himself much with that favourite, and attended him into Spain, where he was even employed in the treaty of marriage, though *ostensibly* acting only in the character of a painter."—*Walpole*.

"Let them be well assured that the honey which they eat with fraud shall turn in the end into live gall, forasmuch as laws are the sacred image of His wisdom, who most severely punisheth those *colourable* and subtle

crimes that seldom are taken within the walk of human justice."—*Hooker*.

"I propose next to describe the *specious* or decent man. By the decent man, I mean him who governs all his actions by appearances."—*Gilpin*.

"Covetousness is apt to insinuate itself by the *plausibility* of its pleas."—*South*.

OSTENTATION. PARADE. SHOW.

Of these, the simplest is *SHOW* (A. S. *sceawu*, *sceaw*) which expresses the purposed exhibition of what might be kept concealed, or less demonstratively displayed. It has also the peculiar force of appearance, as distinguished from reality. *OSTENTATION* (*ostentare*, *ostendere*, to show) is studied display without the external effect of show, but with a stronger implication of motives. A man may make a show of his wealth in equipages, plate, and the like, and make large subscriptions for purposes of ostentation; that is, producing the same inference of his wealth through something not so striking to the eye. *PARADE* (Fr. *parade*, Lat. *parare*, *paratus*, to prepare) is, like show, essentially external. As ostentation is a parade of virtues or other qualities, so parade is ostentation of anything calculated to impress the minds of others in relation to one's own capacities, powers, possessions, or superiority and excellences of any kind.

"I mention this, not *ostentatiously*, as taking credit on the score of industry and discovery, but hoping that the labour of the task will be some apology on my behalf."—*Observer*.

"We are dazzled with the splendour of titles, the *ostentation* of learning, and the noise of victories."—*Spectator*.

"It was not in the mere *parade* of royalty that the Mexican potentates exhibited their power."—*Robertson*.

"A crown,
Golden in *show*, is but a wreath of thorns."
Milton.

OUTLINE. See SKETCH.

OVAL. See OBLONG.

OVER. ABOVE. BEYOND. ON.
UPON.

That is OVER (A. S. *ofer*, over)

another thing which is higher vertically or in a perpendicular line, either with or without intervening space; as, a bird may hover over its prey; to spread a cloth over a table. It is employed to express, not only position, but a movement over; as to leap over a stream. Its other senses are analogical, a mode of employment which it shares with the rest, and with which we are not concerned; as, for instance, in cases of measurement or superiority. When trees or branches are said to hang over a wall, there seems to be implied a double force of verticality and passage over it. ABOVE denotes excess of height. BEYOND (A. S. *begeond*, prefix *be* and *geond*, yond, or yonder) betokens that which surpasses a given point in distance from the spectator; but this measurement, though primarily taken horizontally, is not so confined. In speaking of ivy, for instance, as growing up the side of a house, we might say, that it had already grown beyond the first story, the idea being that of space measured vertically. ON and UPON require to be distinguished. ON denotes that the thing is placed on the upper side of the other, and of course in contact with it; upon denotes that the position is one of a certain degree of elevation. We place a book upon a shelf; but it is idle and contradictory to say that we place it upon, instead of simply on, the ground.

OVERBEAR. OVERPOWER. OVERWHELM.

That which OVERBEARS is inherent weight or power; that which OVERPOWERS is strength put forth against resisting strength; that which OVERWHELMS covers and, as it were, drowns in incapacity. A domineering manner overbears. Weight of superior argument or superior muscle overpowers. Masses of matter or adverse circumstances overwhelm. In overpower the idea is conveyed of reduction to the power of another. This is less strongly implied in overbear, and not at all in overwhelm (over and whelm, A. S. *hwelfan*, to overwhelm).

"The judgment being the hegemonical power and director of action, if it be led by the *overbearings* of passion, and stored by lubricious opinions instead of clearly conceived truths, and be peremptorily resolved in them, the practice will be as irregular as the conceptions erroneous."—*Glanvill*.

"They spoke like men conquered with an *overpowering* force and evidence of the most concerning truths."—*South*.

"The story was proved by *overwhelming* testimony to be false."—*Macaulay*.

OVERCOME. *See* CONQUER.

OVERFLOW. *See* DELUGE.

OVERPOWER. *See* OVERBEAR.

OVERRULE. *See* SUPERSEDE.

OVERRUN. OVERSPREAD.

To OVERRUN is said of many individuals, and commonly in a hostile or offensive sense; OVERSPREAD, either of many individuals, or a common substance, and commonly in a neutral sense. It is the necessity of implying intervals in the subject, instead of continuous expansion, which has originated such an expression as, "ground overrun with weeds."

"Then did her glorious flowers wax dead and wan,
Despised and trodden down of all that
overran," *Spenser*.

"Undoubted signs of such a soil are found,
For here wild olive-shoots *o'erspread* the
ground,
And heaps of berries strew the fields
around," *Dryden*.

OVERSIGHT. SUPERINTENDENCE.

A reference to the word OVER will show how OVERSIGHT has acquired two apparently opposite meanings—that of control or supervision, and that of inadvertency. The former flows from the stationary, the latter from the motive, force of the word over (*see* INADVERTENCY). It differs from inadvertency in being purely negative, while inadvertency may denote active error. We do wrong things through inadvertency. We omit to do right or needful things through oversight. It differs from superintendence in that it relates only to persons. The superintend-

ence of an institution, and the oversight of its inmates.

OVERWHELM. *See* OVERBEAR.

OUTCRY. *See* CLAMOUR.

OUTDO. *See* EXCEED.

OUTLIVE. SURVIVE.

Although these terms are nearly the same in form, SURVIVE (Lat. *super*, above, and *vivere*, to live) being the Latin equivalent of the Saxon word OUTLIVE, yet outlive is commonly employed of the correspondent lifetime of other persons; while survive is employed generally of any point of time, and even of influences antagonistic to life. We outlive persons and periods. We survive efforts or effects, as a severe accident.

"Conscience accompanies man to his grave; he never *outlives* it; and that for this cause only, because he cannot *outlive* himself."—*South*.

"Christ's soul *survived* the death of His body, therefore shall the soul of every believer survive the body's death."—*Bishop Horsley*.

Outlive expresses the superiority of life in duration; survive, its inherent power also. It is often the difference between length and strength of existence.

OUTRAGE. *See* INSULT.

OUTSIDE. EXTERIOR.

For the analogous difference between the uses of these terms, *see* INSIDE.

OUTWARD. *See* EXTERIOR.

OUTWEIGH. PREPONDERATE.

The former is used directly as a transitive verb; the latter requires the addition of a preposition. In that way they are synonymous. OUTWEIGH, however, is used of intrinsic, PREPONDERATE (Lat. *præ*, before, and *pondus*, *ponderis*, a weight) of extrinsic, objects of comparison. Thus we say, "one advantage *outweighs* another;" but of several advantages considered collectively, one preponderates.

"Since evil outweighs good, and sways mankind,

True fortitude assumes the patient mind."

Savage.

"This only may be said in general, that as the arguments and proofs pro and con, upon due examination, nicely weighing every particular circumstance, shall to any one appear upon the whole matter in a greater or less degree to *preponderate* on either side, so they are fitted to produce in the mind such different entertainment as we call belief, conjecture, guess, doubt, wavering, distrust, disbelief, &c."—*Locke.*

OWN. *See* ACKNOWLEDGE.

OWNER. *See* MASTER.

P.

PACE. STEP.

A PACE (Lat. *passus*) is either a measured STEP, consisting generally of three feet, as to measure the ground for eleven paces, or it is an abstract term, denoting the aggregate of steps, and the mode in which they are taken, especially in relation to the rapidity of movement. A step (A. S. *stepe, step*) is employed in the sense of an unmeasured pace, an advance made by one removal of the foot; or, objectively, that which aids the foot to do this, as the steps of a staircase; or, yet further by analogy, any gradation, as to do a thing step by step; or a movement morally considered, as to take a bold step. Both step and pace are used in the abstract of the manner of progressive movement by the feet; but in this use pace is employed, as has been observed, as distinguishing one mode or rate of progress from another, as a walk from a trot; step as being peculiar to the individual, as to know a person by his step. A person may move at a rapid pace without taking quick steps.

PACIFIC. *See* PEACEABLE.

PACIFY. *See* APPEASE.

PAGAN. *See* HEATHEN.

PAIN. AGONY. ANGUISH. SUFFERING. PANG.

PAIN (Lat. *pæna*, Gr. *πῶνῃ*), first, penal infliction, and then, suffering of body or mind, is still used in this double sense, as to be in great pain, to act under pain of another's displeasure. Pain is the energetic opposite to pleasure—the state, whether physical or mental, which is most repugnant to conscious and sensible beings. It is indefinite as to degree, and may be slight or severe. PANG (connected with pain) is severe and transient, as AGONY (Gr. *ἀγῶνία*, a struggle or contest) is severe and permanent pain. ANGUISH (Fr. *angoisse*, connected with *angere*, to press together, *angustus*, narrow, and the Gr. *ἄγγειν*, to squeeze) is employed to denote the distraction, as agony the struggles, of pain. The mind or body in anguish is enslaved by physical or mental pain, so wrung or distressed as to be incapacitated by it. SUFFERING is strictly the state of which pain is the cause and account. I see a person in an evident state of suffering. I do not know the cause or nature of his suffering till he has told me that he is under the influence of physical or mental pain, as the case may be.

"What pleasure and *pain* are we learn by experience, and they are feelings the idea of which cannot be communicated by definition."
—*Belsham.*

"The virtue and good intentions of Cato and Brutus are highly laudable; but to what purpose did their zeal serve? Only to hasten the fatal period of the Roman government, and render its convulsions and dying *agonies* more violent and painful."—*Hume.*

"The death of Wolsey would make a fine moral picture, if the hand of any master could give the pallid features of the dying statesman that chagrin, that remorse, those pangs of *anguish* which in those last bitter moments of his life possessed him."—*Gilpin.*

"*Suffering*, abstaining, quietly expecting, Without distrust or doubt that He may know
What I can *suffer*, how obey. Who best
Can *suffer* best can do; best reign who
first
Well hath obeyed." *Milton.*

"Oh, sharp convulsive *pangs* of agonizing pride!" *Dryden.*

PAINT. *See* COLOUR.

PAIR. *See* BRACE.

PALE. PALLID. WAN.

The comparative absence of colour constitutes *paleeness* (Lat. *pallere*, to be pale), from whatever cause the fact may spring. A PALE cheek indicates sickness or delicacy. A pale blue may be the natural colour of a flower. It is also applied to the comparative absence of light, as a pale star. PALLID (*pallidus*) denotes an abnormal condition of paleeness. WAN (A. S. *wann*, and other forms) denotes a lurid, livid, or sickly paleeness in the human countenance, but is employed analogously, as the wan light of the moon, which means imparting a paleeness like wanness to the objects on which it rests.

"And now the pale-faced empress of the night

Nine times had filled her orb with borrowed light."
Dryden, Ovid.

"There the red anger dared the pallid fear."
Dryden.

"Moreover, in the wars of Antony the sun continued almost a year long with a pale and wan colour."—*Holland, Pliny.*

PALLIATE. See EXTENUATE.

PALLID. See WAN.

PALPITATE. FLUTTER. PANT. THROB.

To PALPITATE (Lat. *palpitare*) is to pulsate with strong, quick, and regular beats. To FLUTTER (Low Germ. *fluttern*) is to pulsate with weak and irregular beats. PANTING (Old Fr. *pantois*, out of breath) is with regard to the breath what palpitation is with regard to the heart; while THROB denotes a pulsation from the inside to the outside of any part of the frame, the action appearing to be outwards toward the surface.

PANEGYRIC. ENCOMIUM. EULOGY.

The idea of praise is common to these words. ENCOMIUM (Gr. *ἐγκώμιον*, something sung, *ἐν κῶμῳ*, in the festival and in honour of the god) denotes no more than warm praise. EULOGY (Gr. *εὐλόγιον*, *εὖ*, well, and *λόγος*, speech) is more formal, and is applied only to persons. PANE-

GYRIC (Gr. *πανήγυρις*, an assembly of the people) is an elaborate oration; a laudatory discourse. Encomium is employed of things as well as persons; but in that case the thing is always the result of human action, though not directly the object of personal praise, as to pass encomiums on the Constitution of Great Britain. Eulogy commonly relates to meritorious actions; panegyrics, to personal character. The panegyric should be public; the encomium, warm; the eulogy, eloquent.

"I think I am not inclined by nature or policy to make a *panegyrick* upon anything which is a just and natural object of censure."—*Burke.*

"Thus Plutarch assures us that our author (Cicero), having made a speech in public full of the highest *encomiums* on Crassus, he did not scruple, a few days afterwards, to reverse the *panegyric*, and represent him before the same audience in all the darkest colours of his invective."—*Melmoth, Cicero.*

"Take away this love, and the whole earth is but a desert. And though there were nothing more worthy *eulogies* than virginity, it is yet but the result of love, since those that shall people paradise, and fill heaven with saints, are such as have been subject to this passion, and were the products of it."—*Boyle.*

PANG. See PAIN.

PANT. See PALPITATE.

PARABLE. See FABLE.

PARADE. See OSTENTATION.

PARAGRAPH. See PHRASE.

PARASITE. See FLATTERER.

PARDON. See EXCUSE.

PARE. PEEL.

PEEL (Old Fr. *poiler*, *peiler*, *peler*, Lat. *pilare*, to deprive of hair, *pilus*, hair) denotes a natural, as PARE (Fr. *parer*, Lat. *parare*, to prepare) an artificial process. That is pared which is abraded into specific shape; that is peeled which is deprived of a natural layer or integument spread over it. Peel is used only in a material sense; pare, in a moral sense.

"The king began to *pare* a little the privilege of clergy."—*Bacon.*

Peel is used metaphorically by 'Milton, when he says:—

"But govern ill the nations under yoke,
Peeling their provinces."

PARODY. See BURLESQUE.

PARSIMONIOUS. See ECONOMICAL.

PART. DIVISION. PORTION. SHARE.

Of these terms, PART (Lat. *pars*, *partis*) is the most general in signification. It is equal or unequal, being that which is less than the whole, in number, quantity, or bulk. Hence, specifically, an equal or proportionate division of quantity; as, "an homer is the tenth part of an ephah." It may be organic or inorganic, physical or conceptional, or even metaphorical, in the sense of portion allotted or interest possessed. DIVISION (Lat. *dividere*, *divisus*, to divide) always implies action or design, which has been exercised in limitation and separation. A division always retains connection with that which is divided. We might say, "a disintegrated part or portion;" but "a disintegrated division" would be a contradiction of terms. PORTION (Lat. *portio*) has commonly the meaning of such a division as bears reference to an individual or to the whole of which it is a part, as viewed or treated by an individual. So a portion of land is a quantity in which some person or persons are interested. A portion of Scripture is such as comes under review, as a division made, not in reference to the subject matter, but the person dealing with it. SHARE (A. S. *scæaru*, *scæru*, from *sceran*, to divide or shear) is especially a portion allotted by purpose or accident, and so is much more subjective than portion, which is more objective. In reference to the testamentary allotment simply of property, for instance, we should use the term portion. In reference to the claim or possession of such portion by an individual inheritor, we should use the term share.

"All the *parts* were formed in his mind into one harmonious whole."—*Locke*.

"The communities and *divisions* of men."
—*Addison*.

"In the primitive ages women were married without *portions* from their relations, being purchased by their husbands, whose presents to the woman's relations were called her dowry."—*Potter, Antiquities of Greece*.

"When they trade upon a joint stock, each member *sharing* in the common profit or loss in proportion to his *share* in this stock, they are called joint-stock companies."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations*.

PARTAKE. PARTICIPATE. SHARE.

To PARTAKE is literally to take a part, share, or portion (and is followed by "of," sometimes by "in") in common with others. This is also the etymological force of PARTICIPATE (Lat. *partem*, *capere*, to take part), which is the Latin equivalent of it. But in participate there is implied a more perfect unity and community of feeling or possession. Hence it is followed, not by "of," but "in." Two persons may partake of the same dish; but they participate in each other's feelings, convictions, joys, or sorrows. To SHARE (see PART) is to partake or participate according to an allotted or regulated method. Share is more easily and naturally applicable to such things as are desirable, but is also by a kind of analogy employed of a proportionate amount of what is undesirable; as to have one's share of the goods and ills of life; to share another's joys and sorrows. Partake is sometimes employed in the sense of taking a part of something. So we partake of a dish by helping ourselves to a portion of it. Participate would imply that others share it with us.

"From court retired, and pomp's fastidious pride,

The hero dared to throw the king aside,
And in the rustic cot, well pleased, *partook*

Of labour's mean repast and cheerful look."
Lloyd.

"Of all this I have not only had knowledge,

But great *participation* in your joys."

Digby, Elvira.

"It redresses the old Manichaean impiety, so derogatory to it (God's glory), which makes an evil principle a *sharer* with Him in the direction of the universe."—*Warburton*.

PARTICULAR. *See* APPROPRIATE, CIRCUMSTANTIAL, EXACT, INDIVIDUAL, and SPECIAL.

PARTICULARLY. *See* CHIEFLY.

PARTISAN. *See* ADHERENT.

PARTNER. *See* COMPANION.

PARTNERSHIP. *See* ASSOCIATION.

PARTY.

PARTY. *See* CABAL for the special use of this word, which is common to all the synonyms there given. In its common sense it denotes a number of persons united in opinion or action, or both, with a desire to influence the remainder of the body; or, in a degree less marked, a number taking part in the same thing.

PASSAGE. COURSE.

Both these terms have the twofold signification of the act and the way of movement. PASSAGE (Fr. *passage*, *passer*, to pass) is more mechanical; COURSE (Fr. *cOURSE*, Lat. *cursus*, *currere*, to run) is less mechanical, though not necessarily implying actual volition. A man finds a passage, but pursues a course. Any transit from one point to another is a passage. A line of movement chosen, directed, or circumscribed is a course. We speak of the course, not the passage, of the stars generally, and of the passage of a planet, if we meant no more than its transit from one definite point to another in the heavens.

"The sickly young sat shiv'ring on the shore,
Abhor'd salt water, never seen before,
And prayed their tender mothers to delay
The *passage*, and expect a better day."

Dryden.

In their secondary meanings, the word passage is commonly internal and mental or conceptional, course external. The passage of the mind from one point of consideration to another; the course of events, history, law, or the world.

"Therefore this sin of kind not personal,
But real and hereditary was;
The guilt thereof, and punishment to all
By *course* of nature and of law doth
pass." *Davies, Immortality of the Soul.*

PASSION. *See* FEELING.

PASSIONATE. ANGRY. HASTY.

PASSIONATE denotes a constitutional temperament of readily excited passion in the specifically restricted sense of irascibility. The passionate man is easily roused by injury or insult, or the supposition of them, not commonly resentful or malicious. ANGRY denotes rather a state than a disposition (Lat. *angor*, a compression or throttling, connected with the Gr. *ἄγγελω*, to squeeze). Anger has less of the vehement and impetuous, more of deep disturbance of feeling. To be passionate is always inexcusable. To be angry may be even laudable and rightful, if the feeling do not pass into selfish vindictiveness, but be excited simply by the wrong, and not by the personal provocation of the action. HASTY denotes that eagerness of temperament which is combined with want of reflection, and which therefore shows itself in other ways besides anger, as in unreflecting speech, or hasty conclusions. The hasty man is soon offended, but not generally ready to offend in return. The passionate person shows his feeling by excited looks and utterances, and indications of violence under a loss of self-control, without of necessity any sense of injury, but more commonly of provocation or annoyance. A sense of injury, or of annoyance so great as to seem to amount to it, produces anger and resentment.

"It is a very common expression that such a one is very good-natured, but very *passionate*. The expression, indeed, is very good-natured to allow *passionate* people so much quarter; but I think a *passionate* man deserves the least indulgence imaginable."—*Spectator.*

"They have their several sounds and notes of expression, whereby they can signify their dislike and *anger*; but only man can clothe his angry thoughts with words of offence, so as that faculty which was given him for an advantage is depraved to a further mischief."—*Bishop Hall.*

"'As for that heat and *hastiness*,' quoth he, 'which was in him misliked and offensive, age and time would daily diminish and bereave him of it; grave and sage counsel,

which now was wanting, would come on apace every day more than other."—*Holland, Livy.*

PASSIVE. PATIENT. SUBMISSIVE.

PASSIVE (Lat. *patior, passus*, to suffer) relates simply to matters of action, and is opposed to active, or in some cases to non-resistance, resistance being, however, a species of action. It follows therefore that, except where the state of being passive is purposely assumed, there is nothing of moral force in the term; while PATIENT, another form of the same verb (*patiens*, participle of *patior*, to suffer), is essentially a moral term. It may be remarked, however, that this moral force is by no means so strong in the adjective patient as in the noun patience. Patient may mean bearing what is painful or disagreeable, without any expression of suffering or discontent, as a patient animal under its burden. It is, however, applicable only to conscious agents, while passive may be employed of that which makes no physical resistance, whether conscious or unconscious. SUBMISSIVE (Lat. *submittere, submissus*, to submit) denotes that which shows patience in a specific relation, that is, to some particular exercise of will in a superior, by self-surrender.

"The primary idea attached to the word is that of *passiveness*, or being impulsively acted upon."—*Cogan.*

"In medical language a person oppressed with disease is called a *patient*, or an involuntary sufferer, and the calmness with which he submits is termed *patience*; that is, the mind yields with tranquillity to the pains and indispositions of the body."—*Ibid.*

"If thou sin in wine and wantonness,
Boast not thereof, nor make thy shame thy glory;
Frailty gets pardon by *submissiveness*.
But he that boasts shuts that of his story;
He makes flat war with God, and doth defy
With his poor clod of earth the spacious sky."
Herbert.

PASTIME. See AMUSEMENT.

PATHETIC. AFFECTING. MOVING. TRAGIC.

Of these terms, the most general is MOVING, which, though its etymology indicates no more than raising feelings or passion, is by usage restricted to tender or mournful feeling; the tendency to excite feelings of other kinds being commonly expressed by the kindred word stirring. The AFFECTING and the PATHETIC are of necessity nearly allied, the Greek *πάθος* nearly expressing the Latin *affectus*; but pathetic expresses more the effect of the person and the narration; affecting, the simple nature of the facts of the case. A sad tale may be affecting when read as a mere account of facts. A pathetic narrative is one which, besides the moving nature of the circumstances, is told in a moving manner. Hence the story is pathetic, the circumstances affecting, the appeal moving. TRAGIC (Gr. *τραγῳδία*, tragedy, literally a goat-song, because the hymn to the god was accompanied by the sacrifice or award of a goat) is a term which serves to combine the idea of the pathetic with a certain degree of dignity in the sufferer. The suffering of a child might be very affecting, but would hardly be spoken of as tragic in itself. The tragic requires the element of personal history combined with a certain considerableness of personal character. That is more forcibly tragic which involves the misery of many at once. The violent death of the father, by which the whole family are reduced to want and wretchedness, is essentially tragic.

"Had the words, 'except these bonds,' been placed anywhere else, the *patheticalness*, grace, and dignity of the sentence had been much abated."—*Blackwall, Sacred Classics.*

It is only by usage that affecting is confined to the sense of exciting, not this or that feeling generally, but the feeling of pity or commiseration in particular. Burke used the term in its wider sense when he wrote—

"It is one thing to make an idea clear, and another to make it *affecting* to the imagination."

"I would have had them writ more movingly."
Shakespeare.

"Tragedie is to sayn a certain storie,
As olde bookes maken in memorie
Of him that stood in gret prosperitee,
And is fallen out of high degree
Into miserie, and endeth wretchedly."

Chaucer.

"Sith that the greatest often are opprest,
And unawares doe into danger fall;
And ye that read these verses *tragicall*
Learne by their losse to love the low degree."

Spenser.

PATIENCE. See ENDURANCE.

PATIENT. See PASSIVE.

PATTERN. See EXAMPLE.

PAUSE. HESITATE.

These terms are applicable to speech and action. We PAUSE (Fr. *pause*, Gr. *πάυσις*, a cessation, *πάειν*, to cease) on purpose, as in speaking, in order to give effect to what we say, or in action to give time for reflection. We HESITATE involuntarily, as not having sufficient converseance with our subject, or from natural defect, or as not sure of our ground, or as not having determined or judged.

"Constant rotation of th' unwearied wheel

That Nature rides upon, maintains her health,

Her beauty, her fertility. She dreads
An instant's *pause*, and lives but while she moves."

Cowper.

"Upon these grounds, as they professed, they did without any mincing, *hesitancy*, or reservation, in the most full, clear, downright, and peremptory manner, with firm confidence and alacrity, concurrently aver the fact."—*Barrow.*

PAY. WAGES. STIPEND. SALARY. PAYMENT.

Of these, the simplest is PAY (Fr. *paier*, the Lat. *pacare*, *par*, peace, to appease). It applies to money regularly or systematically given, as compensation for fixed services—in this way differing from PAYMENT, which is specific compensation on some one account. The soldier receives pay; the tradesman payment. WAGES (Fr. *gager*, Lat. *vadum*, a pledge) conveys the idea of pledged pay for

services agreed upon, the services being manual or of an inferior sort; in this way differing from SALARY and STIPEND, which are for services of a higher than manual character. The servant receives wages; the master, for work of another kind, receives stipend or salary. The difference between stipend (Lat. *stipendium*, from *stips*, *stipis*, a small coin, and *pendere*, to pay or weigh) and salary (Lat. *salarium*, originally a Roman soldier's allowance for salt, from *sal*, salt) is as follows: the salary flows out of the appointment; the stipend, out of the duties performed. Thus a fixed stipend would be equivalent to a salary. Yet, though the salary is more continuous and regular than the stipend, the stipend, so far as it goes, is more sure than the salary; for the stipend implies a contract between the parties, which could not be set aside without mutual consent; while a salary may be contingent upon the will or liberality of him who pays it.

"From the time of the siege of Veii, the armies of Rome received *pay* for their service during the time which they remained in the field. Under the feudal governments, the military service, both of the great lords and of their immediate dependants, was after a certain period universally exchanged for a *payment* in money, which was employed to maintain those who served in their stead."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations.*

"We do not, like those in the prophet, spend our labour for that which satisfieth not, nor spend our money for that which is not bread; for both temporal prosperity and eternal felicity are the *wages* of the labour which we take therein."—*Barrow.*

"The *stipends* of the most useful part of the clergy—those who officiate—are often not greater than the earnings of a hireling mechanic."—*Knox.*

"As to my *salary*, he told me I should have twenty-four dollars per month, which was as much as he gave to the old gunner."—*Dampier's Voyages.*

PEACE. PEACEFUL. See CALM.

PEACEABLE. PEACEFUL. PACIFIC.

These terms, though belonging to the same root, are variously applied.

PEACEABLE (Fr. *paix*, Lat. *pax*, peace) refers more directly to the character or disposition of men; PACIFIC, to the designs and intentions of men; while PEACEFUL refers to the state or condition both of men and things. A peaceable disposition; pacific measures; a peaceful attitude of affairs, or a peaceful scene.

PEACEFUL. See PEACEABLE.

PEASANT. CLOWN. COUNTRYMAN. HIND. SWAIN. RUSTIC.

The first three of these terms owe their distinctive character to that to which by implication each stands opposed. So a PEASANT (Fr. *paysan*, *pays*, Lat. *pagus*) is a countryman, as distinguished from the lords or tenants of the soil; a CLOWN (Lat. *colonus*) is a countryman, as distinguished from one trained and educated in cities; and a COUNTRYMAN, one who lives and works in the country (Fr. *contrée*, Lat. *contra*, against, the tract which lies over against the spectator), as distinguished from a citizen. HIND and SWAIN are now seldom used, except in poetry. As the clown is the boorish countryman, so the hind (A. S. *hine*, whence *hina-man*, a farmer) is the simple-minded and illiterate, as the swain (A. S. *swän*, Old Eng. *swein*, a freeholder) is the innocent and homely countryman, who appears in Arcadian pictures of rural life and loves. The RUSTIC (*rusticus*, *rus*, the country) is the countryman regarded under the combined view of his unlettered simplicity of mind and manners, and as a type and representative of the life which he leads, and the manners by which he is surrounded. Hence, as an epithet, rustic seems to oscillate between the two ideas of the word rude, that is, simplicity and coarseness.

"By an easy extension of the word, pagan and rural became almost synonymous, and the meaner rustics acquired that name which has been corrupted into *peasants* in the modern languages of Europe."—Gibbon.

"His soul belied the features of his face;
Beauty was there, but beauty in disgrace.

A clownish mien, a voice with rustic sound,
And stupid eyes that ever loved the ground."
Dryden.

"A simple countryman that brought her figs."
Shakespeare.

"Let him use his harsh
Unsavoury reprehensions upon those
That are his *hinds*, and not on me."
Beaumont and Fletcher.

"Remote from cities lived a swain."
Gay.

"Let bashfulness, that rustic virtue, by;
To manly confidence thy thoughts apply."
Dryden, *Uvid*.

On the other hand, Spenser has—

"And gentle sprite deform with rude rusticity."

PECULIAR. See APPROPRIATE and SPECIAL.

PEEL. See PARE.

PEEL. RIND.

We commonly use PEEL only of the separable external integuments of natural productions; RIND (A. S. *rind*, *hrind*), of the harder, harsher integuments of artificial productions, though, rarely, of natural also. Comparative hardness and difficulty of separation seem involved in rind; comparative softness and ease of separation, in peel. The structure in the case of the peel assists, of the rind resists the operation.

PEEVISH. See FRETFUL.

PELLUCID. See TRANSPARENT.

PENALTY. See FINE.

PENETRATE. PIERCE.

To PENETRATE (Lat. *penetrare*, from the root *pen*, whence *penitus*, inwards) is to make a way into a thing, with commonly the implied notion of some degree of difficulty, and, therefore, a gradual operation; nor is the nature of the means or instrument of penetration of any definite character. To PIERCE, on the other hand (Old Fr. *perser*, Mod. Fr. *percer*, from the Latin *perfundere*, *pertusus*, to beat through), denotes a quick penetration with a sharp instrument. In most cases, pene-

trate denotes a natural, pierce an artificial, process. The same distinction is preserved in their secondary or moral meanings. It is genius or intuition that pierces; it is sagacity and labour of investigation that penetrates.

"The world may search in vain with all their eyes,
Nor ever *penetrate* through this disguise."
Dryden.

"We have enough to fill us with admiration of the munificence, power, and wisdom of the infinite Creator, when we contemplate the noble faculties of this our superior part, the vast reach and compass of our understanding, the prodigious quickness and *piercingness* of its thoughts."—*Derham.*

PENETRATION. See DISCERNMENT.

PENITENCE. See REPENTANCE.

PENMAN. See WRITER.

PENURIOUS. See ECONOMICAL and POOR.

PENURY. See POVERTY.

PEOPLE. NATION.

PEOPLE (Lat. *populus*) is a term denoting, primarily, a community under the mere aspect of number, and so is often used of the multitude of the governed, as distinguished from their rulers. As people is a geographical, so NATION (Lat. *natus*, born) is a political term, implying some ethnological unity, though not necessarily one and the same government; as the German nation. In this sense, it were possible to speak of the Irish nation, as being descended from one stock, and subject to one government, though the government were foreign to the stock.

"Thou must prophesy again before many peoples."—*English Bible.*

"Mountains interposed
Make enemies of *notions*, who had else,
Like kindred drops, been mingled into."
Cowper.

PERCEIVE. See BEHOLD.

PERCEPTION. See FEELING and IDEA.

PEREMPTORY. DOGMATICAL.

PEREMPTORY (Lat. *perimere*, *peremptus*, *peremptorius*) is, literally, destructive, but, specifically, destructive of debate or remonstrance. A peremptory command is one which leaves no alternative but to obey. It thus belongs more to the will and temper of the individual than to the subject-matter of what he says or thinks. It is a wider term than DOGMATICAL (Gr. *δόγμα*, from *δοkein*, to seem), which represents a particular kind of peremptoriness, namely, the insisting in another on the acceptance of one's own opinion, or the submission to it, as laid down in an arrogant or magisterial way. As dogmatical belongs to matters of belief and opinion, it is only connected with beings capable of entertaining these; while peremptory, expressing, primarily, force of demand, and, secondarily, of personal demand, is applicable to the requirements or exactions of unintelligent force, as, for instance, of circumstances, obligations, and the like.

"*Peremptoriness* is of two sorts, the one a magisterialness in matters of opinion, the other a positiveness in relating matters of fact."—*Government of the Tongue.*

"And though, when they speak in the general of the weakness of our understandings and the scantiness of our knowledge, their discourse may even justify scepticism itself, yet in their particular opinions they are as assertive and *dogmatical* as if they were omniscient."—*Glanvill.*

PERFECT. See ENTIRE and FINISHED.

PERFIDIOUS. See FAITHLESS.

PERFORATE. See PENETRATE.

PERFORATION. See CAVITY.

PERFORM. See ACCOMPLISH.

PERFORMANCE. PRODUCTION.

Both these terms represent the idea of a work that is the product of operation in skilled labour of an artistic kind. In the case of PRODUCTION, the idea may be one of analogy, as when we speak of the productions of Nature. In the case of PERFORM-

ANCE, the idea is restricted to conscious agency or operation. In this last way, performance is more external than production, inasmuch as it denotes that which is done by the exercise of skill; while production involves the idea of mental power. A painting is a performance; a poem is a production. In the performance the manner is everything, and the result next to nothing; in the production the result is everything, and the manner next to nothing. In production, the purpose of the operation is the thing produced; in performance, the thing is done for the sake of doing it.

"His musical performances, indeed, were not to the taste of the Italians."—*Macaulay*.

"It is a great mortification to the vanity of man, that his utmost art and industry can never equal the meanest of Nature's productions, either for beauty or value."—*Hume*.

PERFORMER. *See* ACTOR.

PERFUME. *See* FRAGRANCE.

PERIL. *See* DANGER.

PERIOD. *See* DATE.

PERISH. *See* DECAY.

PERMANENT. *See* CONSTANCY and DURABLE.

PERMISSION. *See* LEAVE.

PERMIT. *See* ALLOW.

PERNICIOUS. *See* DESTRUCTIVE and NOXIOUS.

PERPETRATE. *See* COMMIT.

PERPETUAL. *See* CONTINUAL.

PERPLEX. EMBARRASS. PUZZLE.
POSE. ENTANGLE.

We are PUZZLED (Low Germ. *puseln*, connected with *pose*) when our faculties are confused by what we cannot understand, by moral or physical antagonisms or contradictions, which we cannot reconcile or clear. We are POSED (Fr. *poser*, Lat. *ponere*, to place) when we are arrested by a mental difficulty, or meet with a problem which we cannot solve. We are PERPLEXED (Lat. *perplexari*, *per* and *plectere*, to weave) when we are unable, under contend-

ing feelings or views, to determine an opinion or to pursue a definite line of conduct. We are EMBARRASSED (Low Latin *barra*, a bar), in matters of action, thought, or speech, by anything that interferes with their free action. The perplexed person does not know which way to turn. The embarrassed person moves, but with difficulty. We are ENTANGLED (Goth. *tagl*, hair) when we find ourselves in verbal or practical difficulties, either by our own error or oversight, or by the designs of others. We are puzzled by calculations or riddles; perplexed by casuistry; embarrassed, in some cases, before our superiors, or in speaking a foreign language, or in our efforts to express ourselves.

"Till, by their own perplexities involved,
They ravel more, still less resolved,
But never find self-satisfying solution."
Milton.

"Awkward, embarrassed, stiff, without the skill
Of moving gracefully, or standing still;
One leg, as if suspicious of his brother,
Desirous seems to run away from t'other."
Churchill.

"Hebrew, the general puzzler of old heads,
Which the gray dunce with pricks and
comments reads,
And dubs himself a scholar, by it grew
As natural t' him as if he'd been a Jew."
Brome.

"This text is produced by our Saviour out of Moses his law, in answer to a question wherewith a learned Pharisee thought to pose and puzzle him."—*Burrow*.

"It (integrity) is much plainer and easier, much the safer and more secure way of dealing in the world; it has less of trouble and difficulty, of entanglement and perplexity, of danger and hazard in it."—*Spectator*.

PERSEVERE. PERSIST. CONTINUE.

CONTINUE is the generic term, denoting no more than to do as one has done hitherto. To PERSEVERE (Lat. *perseverare*, *per*, very, and *severus*, strict) is to continue in a given course in spite of discouragements. While continuance is neutral, inasmuch as it may be from habit or no very definite cause, and is applicable to unintelligent operations, perse-

verance has commonly a favourable sense, as coming from reflection and judgment, and as indicative of moral energy. PERSISTENCE (Lat. *persistere*, to endure) has commonly an unfavourable force, as coming of dogged desire to gain one's point, or reluctance to surrender it. Persevere carries with it more weight, and is employed of graver matters than persist. A boy may persevere in his studies, or persist in playing and trifling. Persistence may be inactive and mental; perseverance is active and practical. Persevere has to do more with the doing a thing; persist, with the motive. We persevere in study; we sometimes, in spite of sound argument to the contrary, persist in the same opinion.

"Another usual concomitant of infidelity is its obstinacy and pertinacious *persisting* in error. This, likewise, was the temper of the Jews, not to be convinced by any evidence that could be offered to them. When our Saviour had several times put them to silence, so that they were not able to answer Him, yet they obstinately *persisted* in their former conceit, and stiffly held the conclusion, though they were not able to make good the premises."—*Tillotson*.

"He might have learnt
Less overweening, since he failed in Job,
Whose constant *perseverance* overcame
Whate'er his cruel malice could invent."
Milton.

Continue is more applicable than even persist to purely inactive states, and has sometimes the sense of mere absence of movement or change.

"Continue thou in the things which thou hast learned, and hast been assured of, knowing of whom thou hast learned them."—*English Bible*.

PERSIST. See INSIST and PERSEVERE.

PERSISTENT. See DURABLE.

PERSONS. PEOPLE.

In colloquial language, these terms are synonymous: as, many PERSONS say so; many PEOPLE do it. The difference seems to be, that in the term persons the individuals are more thought of, and with more deference, while in the term people, the individuals are merged in the aggregate.

"At the dinner yesterday there were five people," would be, if not inelegant, expressive of contemptuousness. "People of that sort." "Persons of distinction." "People say." "It is said by many respectable persons." It may be observed that persons in this general sense does not appear in the objective case. "This often pleases people" (not persons).

PERSPICUITY. CLEARNESS.

As applied to what is spoken or written, CLEARNESS is the more general term, denoting the capability of being well understood, which comes from plainness and directness of thought or particular expressions; while PERSPICUITY (*perspicuus*, *per*, through, *spicere*, in composition, to see) is employed of the style of expression rather than the mode of thought.

"I shall, with as much impartiality and *perspicuity* as I may, like a faithful advocate to my country, and cordial indifferent well-wisher both to king and parliament, truly state and debate this controversy."—*Frymte*.

"O prophet of glad tidings, finisher
Of utmost hope! now clear I understand
What oft my steadiest thoughts have
searched in vain,
Why our great expectation should be
called
The Seed of woman." *Milton*.

PERSUADE. See CONVICT and EXHORT.

PERTINACIOUS. See OBDURATE.

PERTINACITY. See TENACITY.

PERVERSE. FROWARD.

PERVERSE (Lat. *pervertere*, *perver-*
sus) is, literally, turned aside, turned the wrong way, hence disposed, more or less, to be obstinately wrong. FROWARD (from, and the termination of direction, ward) is nearly the English equivalent; a person who is fromward being one who swerves from the line of regularity or government. In usage, froward denotes the disposition which is reluctant to obey or submit; hence it has a direct relation to the will of others. Perverse denotes a settled contradiction to the will of others, and a tendency

to do the distasteful to others for its own sake. Frowardness is a fault of children; perversity of all who are old enough to form contradictory judgments and determinations, and to adhere to them out of a settled crookedness of heart.

PERVERT. *See* CONVERT.

PEST. *See* BANE.

PESTILENTIAL.

PESTILENTIAL (Lat. *pestilentia*, *pestis*, the plague) is, literally, tending to produce the plague; by an extension of meaning, any contagious or infectious disease; also morally applied (*see* CONTAGION and EPI-DEMIC).

PETITION. PRAYER. ENTREATY. SUIT. REQUEST.

PETITION (Lat. *petitio*, *petere*, to seek or ask) and PRAYER (Fr. *prier*, Lat. *precare*, *precer*, prayers) differ in that the prayer is commonly for greater gifts, or blessings of supreme importance; while petition relates to the more ordinary wants of our nature or circumstances. From this flows the further difference, that prayer involves a more decided superiority in him who is the object of prayer; while petition may be to a superior or an equal. The characteristic idea of petition is the formal recognition of power or authority in another; of prayer, earnestness and submission in oneself. ENTREAT (prefix *en* and *treat*, Fr. *traiter*, Lat. *tractare*, from *trahere*, to manage, handle, draw) involves a certain equality between the parties; it is a request of an urgent character dictated by the feelings, and having reference to some specific act in the power of the other to perform, or, in some cases, to abstain from. REQUEST (Lat. *requirere*, *requestus*) is a more simple and less forcible expression, and may come from a superior, an equal, or (with due deference) an inferior. Its subject is action in another. The SUIT (Fr. *suite*, a following, or following up, *suivre*, Lat. *sequi*, to follow) is a petition often prolonged, for some

favour toward oneself, and so is only made to those who have it in their power to grant favours; as, a gentleman pays his suit to a lady, a courtier to a prince. It indicates not necessarily the general superiority of another; but a superiority on the point with which the request is concerned, as being the possessor of that which he may grant to another.

"If there should happen any uncommon injury or infringement of the rights before mentioned, which the ordinary course of law is too defective to reach, there still remains a fourth subordinate right appertaining to every individual, namely, the right of *petitioning* the king, or either house of parliament, for the redress of grievances."—*Blackstone*.

"For some I sought
By prayer th' offended Deity to appease,
Kneeling, and before Him humbled all my heart.

Methought I saw Him placable and mild
Bending His ear." *Milton*.

"*Entreat* me not to leave thee,* nor to return from following after thee."—*English Bible*.

"When a person hath received an injury, and thinks it worth his while to demand a satisfaction for it, he is to consider with himself, or take advice, what redress the law has given for that injury, and thereupon is to make application or *suit* to the Crown, the fountain of all justice, for that particular specific remedy which he is determined or advised to pursue."—*Blackstone*.

PETTY. *See* IMMATERIAL.

PETULANT. *See* FRETFUL.

PHANTOM. *See* GHOST.

PHANTASM. *See* GHOST.

PHRASE. SENTENCE. EXPRESSION. PROPOSITION. PERIOD. PARAGRAPH.

A PHRASE (Gr. *φράσις*, from *φράζω*, to speak) is a portion of a sentence consisting of two or more words, and is impressed with a character of its own, though it is not grammatically independent. A SENTENCE (Lat. *sententia*) is grammatically complete, and stands for any short saying of that character. An EXPRESSION (Lat. *exprimere*, *expressus*, to express) is a distinctive form of utterance, regarded in a technical or rhetorical

point of view, and may therefore consist of either one or more words. A PERIOD (Gr. *περίοδος*, a circuit) is a sentence wholly divested of the idea of its meaning, and regarded only in its material construction as a matter of grammar. A PARAGRAPH (Gr. *παρά*, alongside, and *γράφειν*, to write) meant, at first, a marginal writing, but has come to signify a group of sentences or periods limited by the common point to which they refer. A PROPOSITION (Lat. *proponere*, *propositus*, to lay down) is a sentence regarded in a logical point of view, that is, as stating the connection or disconnection between the subject and predicate, by an affirmative or negative copula; as, "Men are, or are not, responsible for their actions."

"So bravely set forth, so equipt, and so shod,

That, as Homer has *phrased* it, he looked like a god." *Byron.*

"A sentence is an assemblage of words expressed in proper form, and ranged in proper order, and concurring to make a complete sense."—*Lorth.*

"Eternal God, for whom whoever dare
Seek new *expressions*, do the circle square,
And thrust into strait corners of poor wit
Thee who art cornerless and infinite,
I would but praise Thy name, not name
Thee now." *Donne.*

"Logicians use to clap a *proposition*,
As justices do criminals, in prison,
And in as learned authentic nonsense,
writ
The names of all their moods and figures
fit." *Butler.*

"A *period* is the distinction of a sentence in all respects perfect, and is marked with one full prick over against the lower part of the last letter, thus (.)"—*Ben Jonson.*

"The king's secretaries must first allow and *paragraph* them, and then they are allowed."—*Evelyn.*

PHRASEOLOGY. DICTION. STYLE.

In the order in which these words here stand, they advance from the more particular to the more general. PHRASEOLOGY (see PHRASE) is the employment of particular expressions in such a way as to be distinctive, but not as a matter of critical praise or blame. We do not speak of good

or bad phraseology. DICTION (Lat. *dictio*, *dicere*, *dictus*, to speak) is the construction, disposition, and application of words. The term is employed in cases where clearness and accuracy are at stake; while STYLE (Lat. *stylus*, an iron pen) is employed of the characteristics of productions and performances which lay claim to an artistic character, as writing, oratory, painting, and the like.

"The Book of Sophisms (of Aristotle) still supplies a very convenient *phraseology* for marking concisely some of the principal fallacies which are apt to impose on the understanding in the heat of a *viva voce* dispute."—*Stewart.*

"Though he (Dryden) wrote hastily, and often incorrectly, and his style is not free from faults, yet there is a richness in his *diction*, a copiousness, ease, and variety in his expression, which have not been surpassed by any that have come after him."—*Blair.*

"It is the region within which we look for everything that is sublime in description, tender in sentiment, and bold and lively in expression; and therefore, though our author's plan should be faultless, and his story ever so well conducted, yet if he be feeble or flat in *style*, destitute of affecting scenes, and deficient in poetical colouring, he can have no success."—*Ibid.*

PHRENZY. See MADNESS.

PIECE. PART.

PIECE (Fr. *piece*) is a part actually separated; while PART (Lat. *pars*, *partis*) may be separated or divided only conceptionally. So we speak of a part of a joint before it is cut off, a piece afterwards. Piece involves the idea of comparative smallness; part, of comparative magnitude. A certain part of a volume might comprise pages; choice pieces, would naturally mean small extracts.

PIERCE. See PENETRATE.

PILE. See HEAP.

PILLAGE. PLUNDER. RAPINE.
BOOTY. SPOIL. PREY.

The idea of property violently taken from others is common to these terms. PILLAGE (Fr. *pillage*, from *pillier*, to plunder) points more directly to the stripping undergone by

those who are deprived of their goods; **RAPINE** (Lat. *rapere*, to seize), to the snatching away on the part of the robbers themselves of whatever valuables come within their reach; **PLUNDER** (Germ. *plunder*, frippery, baggage), to the quantity and value of the things carried off. **Plunder** and **BOOTY** (Fr. *butin*) differ in the comparative lawfulness of the latter. **Booty** is spoil taken in war; but the term **SPOIL** is more pertinent to individuals, booty to the army. An army carries off booty; spoil is the gain of combatants. Like pillage, it implies (Lat. *spolium*) emphatically the stripping of others of their personal property and goods. **PREY** (Lat. *præda*) is that which is seized for purposes of possession under the impulse of animal appetite.

"Whereupon I went myself, and took away from our men whatever they had pillaged, and gave it to the owners."—*Hakluyt's Voyages*.

"Let that go heap a mass of wretched wealth,
Purchas'd by *rapine* worse than stealth,
And brooding o'er it sit." *Ben Jonson*.

"For the *plundering* of malignants, and sequestering their estates, I answer that I think the parliament never yet approved the *plundering*, or, in plain English, robbing of any man by any of their forces, they having *plundered* no places taken by assault, for aught I hear, though the king's forces, on the contrary, have miserably *plundered* all the kingdom almost."—*Prynne*.

Robbing is more specific than plundering. Persons are sometimes robbed of their purses or their watches. It is yet worse if they are plundered of all they possess. Hence, *plundering*, as applied to houses or localities, denotes a more varied or promiscuous kind of robbery.

"Which, when the soldier finds his hopes in vain,
So rich a *booty* forced to forsake,
To put himself and prisoner out of pain,
He on the sudden stabs him, and doth swear,
Would th' have his ransom, they should take it there." *Drayton*.

"He combated this strong one, this mighty and dreadful foe of ours, and baffled him, and bound him, and disarmed him, taking away the whole armour in which he

trusted, and *spoiled* him, rifled all his baggage, bare away all his instruments of mischief."—*Barrow*.

"In gallant trim the gilded vessel goes,
Youth on the prow, and Pleasure at the helm,
Regardless of the sweeping Whirlwind's sway,
That, hushed in grim repose, expects his evening prey." *Gray*.

PILLAR. COLUMN.

PILLAR (Fr. *pilier*) commonly conveys the idea of support; **COLUMN** (Lat. *columna*) superadds those of size and ornamentation. Support is, however, not an essential idea of either, which may be used analogously of what is like a pillar or column; as, "Lot's wife became a pillar of salt;" "The columns of an army." In this case, column is a term of greater dignity than pillar; an architectural monument, though in the form of a pillar, is thus called a column.

PINCH. SQUEEZE. GRIPE. PRESS.

PINCH (Fr. *pincer*) denotes terminal compression, as between two substances closing upon their extremities; as to pinch with pincers or the fingers; the shoe pinches when the two sides, or the upper leather and sole, have the effect of meeting too closely or tightly upon the foot; a pinch of snuff is so much as is compressed between the ends of the fingers. Objects animate or inanimate, acting mechanically, may be said to pinch, **SQUEEZE**, or **PRESS**; while **GRIPE** denotes a voluntary action. **Press** (Lat. *premere*, *pressus*) denotes no more than the effect of forcible action persistently passing from one body to another; hence, as pinching involves two directions or applications of force, pressing may be applied to one or many. In pressing paper the active force is employed only on one side or direction. **Squeeze** (A. S. *cwisan*, with other forms, to crush or squeeze) denotes a compression of larger surfaces or more points of contact than pinch, while it implies, unlike press, more than one side for the application of the force. **GRIPE** (A. S. *gripan*) de-

notes movement which results in tight, sharp holding, and is a voluntary action.

PINE. *See* DROOP.

PIOUS. *See* DEVOUT.

PIQUE. *See* GRUDGE.

PITEOUS. PITIFUL. PITIABLE.

DESPICABLE. CONTEMPTIBLE.

The former three terms, though drawn from the same word pity (Fr. *pitie*, Lat. *pietas*, and so an abbreviation of piety), have different shades of meaning. PITIABLE means deserving of pity, that is, it relates to what is a fit object of pity. PITEOUS is moving or exciting pity; PITIFUL, full of what awakens pity, as a characteristic of disposition, but afterwards transferred from the subject feeling or exhibiting to the object awakening pity. Piteous is sometimes, however, used in the sense of feeling pity. DESPICABLE and CONTEMPTIBLE are only partially synonymous with the above, that is, so far as pity and contempt are akin, or as that which would awaken contempt in one mind might excite pity in another. Crime and error may be viewed under the light of unhappiness and misfortune, though vice, which merits more than pity and misfortune, is no fit object of contempt. Despicable (*despicere*, to despise) is commonly employed in reference to the energetic and the positive; contemptible (Lat. *contemnere*, to condemn), of the inactive and negative. Man's conduct is despicable when it proceeds from motives, or exhibits a character which we despise on account of meanness or vice; whereas we use the term contemptible of characters or efforts which we disregard on the simple ground of weakness. "He exhibited a despicable ingratitude and selfishness." "His opponent seems to have regarded his opposition as contemptible." Vanity is contemptible; malice is despicable:

"She sitting by him as on ground he lay,
Her mournful notes full *piteously* did
frame,
And thereof made a lamentable lay."
Spenser.

On the other hand, Thomson, in his advice to the angler:—

"But if too young and easily deceived,
A worthless prey scarce bends the pliant
rod;
Him, *piteous* of his youth, and the short
space
He has enjoyed the vital light of heaven,
Soft disengage, and back into the stream
The speckled captive throw."

So in the case of pitiful:—

"And as they went, they heard a rueful
cry
Of one that wailed and *pitifully* wept."
Spenser.

On the other hand:—

"Miles Smith was hurtful to none but himself; he was *pitiful* to the poor, and hospitable to his neighbours."—Wood, *Athen. Oxon.*

"Samson possesses all the terrific majesty of Prometheus chained, the mysterious distress of Oedipus, and the *pitiable* wretchedness of Philoctetes."—*Observer.*

"And," as he says rarely well, "though some creatures seem to be made of much coarser stuff than others, yet even in the vilest the Maker's art shines through the *despicableness* of the matter."—Boyle.

"A Nazarite in place abominable,
Vaunting my strength in honour to their
Dagon?
Besides, how vile, *contemptible*, ridiculous,
What act more execrably unclean, profane!"
Milton.

PITY. *See* MERCY.

PLACE. *See* LAY.

PLACE. *See* POSITION.

PLACID. *See* CALM.

PLAIN. *See* APPARENT.

PLAN. DESIGN. SCHEME. PROJECT.

PLAN (Fr. *plan*) is, literally, something drawn on a plane; hence, a method of action or construction in any way. The plan has reference to the means to be adopted for an end rather than the end itself; as the plan of a campaign has victory over the enemy for its final object. A plan is well or ill arranged or devised, effectual or ineffectual, practicable or impracticable. A DESIGN (Lat. *designare*, to design) is the con-

ception of the final object or purpose, and is, morally, good or bad, or, artistically, worthy or unworthy. SCHEME (Gr. *σχῆμα*) and PROJECT (Lat. *pro-jicere*, *projectus*, to forecast or propose) include both end and means. A scheme carries the ideas of ingenuity and contrivance; project, the combination of whatever faculties or efforts are needed for carrying out designs of importance, and is a word of greater dignity than scheme, which is often employed of mean and petty designs. A man has a project in view; he constructs a scheme; he acts upon a plan which he considers may enable him to realise his design. Plan, scheme, and project may be confined to oneself and one's own affairs; design operates upon some thing or person beyond them. Project is more general than design, which is more specific. "I have a project for making money." "I have a scheme for doing so at other people's expense."

"The vigour of a boundless imagination told him how a *plan* might be disposed that would embellish Nature and restore art to its proper office—the just improvement or imitation of it."—*Walpole, Anecdotes of Painting.*

"The machine which we are inspecting demonstrates by its construction contrivance and design. Contrivance must have had a contriver, design a designer, whether the machine immediately proceeded from another machine or not."—*Paley.*

"The idea of the possibility of multiplying paper money to almost any extent was the real foundation of what is called the Mississippi scheme, the most extravagant project, both of banking and stock-jobbing, that perhaps the world ever saw."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations.*

PLAUSIBLE. See OSTENSIBLE.

PLAY. See GAME.

PLAYER. See ACTOR.

PLAYFUL. See PLAY.

PLEA. See APOLOGY.

PLEAD. See PLEA.

PLEADER. ADVOCATE. DEFENDER.

Taking these terms, not in their technical, but their ordinary and con-

versational use, a DEFENDER (Lat. *defendere*, to defend) assists him who or that which is attacked; a PLEADER (see PLEA) is one who urges a requirement in favour of another. ADVOCATE (Lat. *advocare*, *advocatus*, to call to the side for support) is employed of any who promotes by words; as to advocate certain principles. We defend persons; plead for their necessities; advocate their cause.

PLEASANT. See AGREEABLE and FACETIOUS.

PLEASE. See GRATIFY.

PLEASED. See GLAD.

PLEASING. See AGREEABLE.

PLEASURE. COMFORT. ENJOYMENT.

PLEASURE (Fr. *plaisir*, Lat. *placere*, to please) is a very extensive word, embracing almost every feeling or sensation which is not painful, from its lowest to its highest degree. ENJOYMENT (Fr. *joie*, joy, Lat. *gaudium*) is keen pleasure specifically derived from a particular source. COMFORT (Lat. *con* and *fortis*, strong) has acquired a twofold meaning, 1, a state of quiet enjoyment flowing from a sense of complete supply of every want; and 2, relative ease afforded under mental trouble, in which sense it is nearly the same as consolation, but consolation is more active. We give consolation, and take comfort. Comfort, in this case, applies to the mitigation of lesser evils.

PLEDGE. DEPOSIT. SECURITY. EARNEST.

These terms vary according to the different interests which are consulted or secured. A PLEDGE (Old Fr. *plege*, *pleige*, probably from the Latin *præbere*, to produce or afford) is something deposited with another as a security for a debt or engagement, enabling that person to verify and claim the issue of it. It is commonly given in return for a favour received or a claim recognized. It is a specific article. DEPOSIT (Lat. *deponere*, *depositus*, to put down) is very general, and expresses any case in which a

part is lodged with another as a responsible keeper, in relation to the whole as forthcoming. It may be anything of value, as a sum of money. A SECURITY (Lat. *securus*, *se* and *cura*, without care or anxiety) is something given to place another beyond risk of loss, and applies, technically, to the document, transaction, or source of this security. EARNEST, like firstfruits, is a part paid or given, as a warrant that more is forthcoming of the same kind. In the case of pledge, the forthcoming thing is a definite and specific article; in the case of earnest, it is general and indefinite. It may be, and generally is, some *act*; as a victory in a youthful competition may be an earnest of future energy and success in life.

"But threw his gauntlet, as a sacred *pledge*
His cause in combat the next day to try."
Spenser.

"To them were committed the oracles of God, that is, with them were entrusted all the revelations of the will of God, the law and the prophecies, as the people with whom God thought fit to *deposit* these things for the benefit of the world."—*Clarke.*

"For your *security* from any treachery, having no hostage worthy to countervail you, take my word, which I esteem above all respects."—*Sidney, Arcadia.*

"And when the Gospel is preached unto us, we belevé the mercy of God, and in beleving we receive the Spirite of God, which is the *earnest* of eternal lyfe."—*Tyndall.*

The legal account of earnest is thus given by Blackstone:

"If any part of the price is paid down, if it be but a penny, or any portion of the goods delivered as *earnest*, which the civil law calls *arra*, and interprets to be *emtionis venditionis contractæ argumentum*, the property of the goods is absolutely bound by it."

PLENIPOTENTIARY. See AMBASADOR.

PLENITUDE. See FULLNESS.

PLENTIFUL. PLENTEOUS. See COPIOUS.

PLIABLE. PLIANT. FLEXIBLE. SUPPLE.

PLIABLE (Fr. *plier*, Lat. *plicare*, to

fold) is stronger than PLIANT, which has the same derivation. The stick of a driving-whip may be pliant; the lash is pliable. A stick of wax, which would only just bear bending without breaking, we should call pliant rather than pliable. Pliant may be defined as capable of bending; pliable, of being bent about. FLEXIBLE (Lat. *flectere*, to bend) commonly imparts the idea of specific purpose, and might be defined specifically pliable, or pliable for a particular purpose. As pliable expresses the nature, so flexible implies an object, of the bending, and applies to portions of the body bent about at will. SUPPLE (Fr. *souple*, Lat. *supplex*, from *sub*, under, and *plicare*, to fold, whence supplicate, to bend the knees under one) is primarily used of the joints of the body, and of other substances analogously. It denotes an easy, active, or, as it were, willing pliability, and would be inapplicable to substances which bend sluggishly and by force, like sealing-wax. In their metaphorical application, a pliant disposition means easy-going; pliable, easily affected and altered by external influences. Flexible is employed of the mind and purpose, denoting one whose determination may be changed, especially by persuasion or entreaty. Supple has sometimes the force of moulding itself to suit a purpose. A supple character, meaning one capable of cringing to another; but this is an employment metaphorical rather than strictly analogous.

"So is the heart of some men. When smitten by God, it seems soft and *pliable*, but taken off from the fire of affliction, it presently becomes horrid, then stiff, and then hard as a rock of adamant, or as the gates of death and hell."—*Bishop Taylor.*

So, physically, the fingers of those who are quick-handed might be called pliable; the arm of the agile, pliant.

"The younger they are when they begin with that art (of music), the more *pliable* and nimble their fingers are touching the instrument."—*Sharp.*

"Who foremost now delight to cleave,
With *pliant* arm, thy glassy wave."
Gray.

"Which *flexibility* (of the spine), we may

also observe, varies in different parts of the chain; is least in the back, where strength rather than flexure is wanted; greater in the loins, which it was necessary should be more supple than the back; and greatest of all in the neck, for the free motion of the head."—*Paley*.

"This gives the mind a freedom, and the exercising the understanding in the several ways of inquiry and reasoning, which the most skilful have made use of, teaches the mind sagacity and wariness; and a suppleness to apply itself more closely and dexterously to the bents and turns of the matter in all its researches."—*Locke*.

PLIANT. See PLIABLE.

PLIGHT. PREDICAMENT.

PLIGHT (A. S. *pliht*) meant originally a pledge; and, as a pledge is a matter of risk, so it came secondly to mean a condition of risk, danger, or difficulty. PREDICAMENT is a term of scholastic philosophy, the Latin *predicamentum* being the translation of the Greek *karyyopia*, a generalized mode under which statements or propositions could be made. According to Aristotle, these were ten in number—substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, time, place, situation, habit. Hence to be in a predicament is to be emphatically in a state or marked condition, and, by a peculiar restriction, a condition of awkwardness or difficulty. Predicament is commonly used of such embarrassments as are consequent on our own actions, and are of a moral nature; plight, of such as are accidental, physical, or external. A man who by oversight, for instance, has bound himself to two different engagements at different places at the same time, is in a predicament. One who has fallen into a ditch in full dress is in a plight.

PLOT. See CABAL.

PLUCK. See DRAW.

PLUNDER. See PILLAGE.

PLUNGE. See DIVE.

POISE. See BALANCE.

POISON. VENOM.

POISON (Fr. *poison*, Lat. *potio*, a potion) is general, but commonly de-

notes what is received into the system as such by the mouth or the respiratory organs, as hemlock or noxious gas; VENOM (*venenum*), what is discharged from animals, and received externally, as in the bite or sting of the serpent or the scorpion. The metaphorical uses of the terms correspond to this distinction. The instillation of false principles into the mind is [poisonous. The shafts of malice are venomous.

"As souls, they say, by our first touch take in

The poisonous tincture of original sin."

Donne.

"The God of truth defend you and all other that maintain His truth from the venomous poyson of lyars."—*Strype*.

POLISHED. See POLITE.

POLITE. POLISHED. REFINED.

FOR POLITE, as expressing the external manner, see CIVIL. POLISHED (Lat. *polire*, to polish) may be applied to anything which exhibits traces of finish in training or preparation; as a polished man, polished manners, a polished discourse. REFINED (prefix *re* and FINE, which see) expresses anything which shows that it is purified from what is coarse, low, vulgar, or inelegant. As polite is opposed to rude, so polished is opposed to rough, and refined to coarse. Politeness and polish are attributes of external things; refined, of the mind, thoughts and feelings, training, education, and principles, as well as manners and speech. It may be observed that in politeness two things are needed—the feeling of respect according to right proportion, and due adherence to conventional modes of expressing such respect. Politeness is the result of a perfect sense of propriety, acquired by moving in the higher circles of more refined society. True politeness is not over-courteous to superiors, nor over-affable to inferiors, but satisfies by a behaviour which weighs and discriminates aright. Polite, unlike polished, which is exclusively applied as a generic quality to manners and productions, is employed of learning and literature.

"What but custom could make those salutations *polite* in Muscovy which are ridiculous in France or England? We call ourselves, indeed, the *politer* nations; but it is we who judge thus of ourselves, and fancied *politeness* is something more owing to custom than reason."—*Watts, Logic.*

"Though graced with *polished* manners and fine sense," *Cowper.*

"This *refined* taste is the consequence of education and habit; we are born only with a capacity of entertaining this *refinement*, as we are born with a disposition to receive and obey all the rules and regulations of society, and so far it may be said to be natural to us, and no farther."—*Keynolds.*

POLITIC. PRUDENT.

Practically, these terms are often interchangeable; but **PRUDENT** (Lat. *prudens*, for *providens*, looking forward) is a term which conveys somewhat of moral praise (see **PRUDENCE**); while **POLITIC** (*politicus*, πῶλις, a city) expresses only the more selfish side of prudence. As prudence is self-preservation, so policy is self-seeking. A prudent action involves reflection and self-control; a politic action, worldly wisdom and ingenuity. **Politic** had originally the same meaning with the present use of political, which it still retains in such phrases as, "body politic," till it came to mean something of the character of personal diplomacy.

"When that comes, think not thou to find me slack

On my part aught endeavouring, or to need

Thy *politic* maxims." *Milton.*

"It is no disparagement to a wise man to learn, and by suspecting the fallibility of things, and his own aptness to mistake, to walk *prudently* and safely with an eye to God, and an ear open to his superior."—*Bishop Taylor.*

POLLUTE. See **CONTAMINATE.**

POMP. MAGNIFICENCE. SPLENDOR.

POMP is derived from the Greek πομπή, a sending or conducting; hence, a procession. By an extension of meaning, it denotes a show of magnificence. But the character of pomp is always personal; and the purpose of

pomp is the exhibition of what tends to exalt the dignity or importance of persons. This character is more marked in the adjective pompous, which, when said of persons, denotes such a manner as betrays self-importance. A pompous retinue. A pompous military display is one of which the object is to display the power and importance of the state, the army, the general, or the government. **MAGNIFICENCE** and **SPLENDOR** lie more inherently in the objects themselves. **Magnificence** (Lat. *magnificentia*) is imposing from greatness, costliness, and the like. **Splendour** (*splendor, splendore*, to shine) is dazzling from the brightness and richness of the things exhibited. A vast and finely-grown tree is magnificent without being splendid. A magnificent army might mean one of the finest and bravest men; a splendid army, one richly conditioned or accoutred. **Magnificence** is employed of objects of beauty on a large scale, not to human conduct, but to scenery, animal forms, and artificial productions. The materially prominent is needed to make up the magnificent.

"The mighty potentate, to whom belong
These rich regalia pompously displayed,"
Young.

"Far distant, he deseries,
Ascending by degrees *magnificent*
Up to the walls of heaven, a structure high,"
Milton.

"Millions of spirits for his fault amerced
Of heaven, and from eternal splendours
flung
For his revolt." *Idid.*

PONDER. See **MEDITATE.**

PONDEROUS. See **BURDENSOME.**

POOR. INDIGENT. NEEDY. NECESSITOUS. PENURIOS.

Of these terms, **POOR** (Fr. *pauvre*, the Latin *pauper*) must be regarded as the simplest and most generic; the others expressing some mode or aspect of poverty. **INDIGENT** (Lat. *indigens*, *indigere*, to want) denotes a relative poverty; poverty in respect to such things as are naturally or necessarily pertinent to a man's state, circum-

stances, or position in life, and is commonly applied to persons of some standing in society. We should not speak of a common beggar as indigent. **NEEDY** is a term which expresses not so much the severe pressure, as the petty inconveniences and privations of poverty. The needy man is he who never has quite enough for his wants. **NECESSITOUS** has much the same meaning, but is capable of application to a specific condition. We should say a necessitous rather than needy condition; a needy rather than necessitous person. It is remarkable that, while the substantive **PENURY** (Lat. *penuria*) expresses permanent and abject want, especially as the result of imprudence or misfortune, as in the phrase, "to be brought to penury," the adjective penurious is well-nigh restricted to the meaning of exhibiting penury toward others, or treating oneself penuriously. Hence the word is equivalent to niggardly or parsimonious. Poor may be employed in reference to the want or absence of anything that has value, even to impersonal objects. A thing is poor as a production of literature, science, or art. So a person may be poor in some respects, not in others.

"Hath not God chosen the *poor* of this world, rich in faith, and heirs of the kingdom which He hath promised to them that love Him? But ye have despised the *poor*."—*English Bible*.

The poor, unlike the rest designated by the other synonyms, are a permanent class of society, as distinguished from the rich.

"Themistocles, the great Athenian general, being asked whether he would choose to marry his daughter to an *indigent* man of merit, or to a worthless man of an estate, replied that he should prefer a man without an estate to an estate without a man."—*Spectator*.

"Spare the blushes of *needy* merit."

Dwight.

"There are multitudes of *necessitous* heirs and *penurious* parents."—*Arbuthnot*.

POPULOUS. See **CROWD**.

PORT. See **HAVEN**.

PORTEND. See **AUGUR**.

POSITION. **PLACE.** **SITUATION.**
POSTURE. **ATTITUDE.** **STATION.**
LOCATION. **LOCALITY.**

POSITION (Lat. *positio*, *ponere*, *positus*, to place) has both a subjective and an objective meaning; that is, it denotes the *state* or *manner* of being placed, and so is synonymous with placement or attitude, or the spot where something is placed. Out of these, metaphorical or analogous senses naturally flow. **PLACE** (Fr. *place*, Lat. *platea*, a street or square) is purely objective, denoting a separate or distinct portion of space, and sometimes that portion specifically occupied by a body. The meanings which the word also bears of rank, office, and the like, are no more than analogous applications of this. Where position is used as synonymous with place, it signifies place as it concerns or affects the person or thing placed. Hence a house is in this or that place, is no more than to say that it stands here or there. That it is in this or that position, means that it bears certain relations more or less advantageous to the objects by which it is surrounded. In this sense position nearly coincides with **SITUATION** (Lat. *situs*, a site). **Situation** may be defined "relative position." **POSTURE** (Fr. *posture*, Lat. *positura*, *ponere*, *positus*, to place) is said only of the variable positions of animal figures. For its difference from attitude see **ATTITUDE**. **STATION** is a fixed and definite place of staying or stopping (*stare*, *status*, to stand), with the idea of antecedent and subsequent progress or movement more or less strongly implied. It sometimes denotes habitual stay. **LOCATION** (Lat. *locare*, to place, *locus*, a place), like most words of similar formation, stands both for the act and the result of locating. The difference is to be observed between locality and location. Locality is objective, location subjective. Locality is place regarded externally to the object located; location is place regarded relatively to it, and in connection with it, and the assignment of it.

"We have different prospects of the same

thing, according to our different *positions* to it."—*Locke*.

"What *place* can be for us within heaven's bound?" *Milton*.

"The word *place* has sometimes a more confused sense, and stands for that space which any body takes up; and so the universe is a *place*."—*Locke*.

The situation of a thing or person is the correlative of the condition; that is, the situation is the state in reference to external objects or influences. The condition is the internal state irrespectively of such externals.

"Nor did the shores and woods appear less destitute of wild fowl, so that we hoped to enjoy with ease what in our *situation* might be called the luxuries of life."—*Cook's Voyages*.

"Besides, it were a coward's part to fly
Now from my hold that have let out so
well;

It being the *station* of my life, where I
Am set to serve and stand as centinel."

Daniel.

"A lot of earth so singularly *located* as marks it out by Providence to be the emporium of plenty, and the asylum of peace."
—*Observer*.

Locality differs from place in possessing, besides the meaning of material placement, the abstract quality of existing in place.

"It is thought that the soul and angels are devoid of quantity and dimension, and that they have nothing to do with grosser locality."—*Ghruvill*.

POSITIVE. See ACTUAL, DEFINITE, and ABSOLUTE.

POSSESS. HAVE.

HAVE (Lat. *habere*) is a simpler and wider term than POSSESS (Lat. *possidere*), possession being a mode of having. Generally it may be said that one has what is part of or closely connected with oneself. One possesses what is external to oneself, but appropriated for certain purposes. I have or I possess an estate; but I have, not I possess, a bad cold. When possess is used of what is internal to oneself, the thing is regarded externally; that is, in reference to its use and purpose, rather than the subject in which it resides. Thus a man has legs by virtue of his human organization. He possesses legs, as being an

animal gifted with that particular means of locomotion. So, in reference, not to what a man is, but what he does, or is capable of doing, we say, that he possesses reason and certain mental faculties or powers. To have generally expresses a transitory, possess a more permanent, power or control. To possess is always therefore to have; but to have is not always to possess. A man is said to have money, which is, however, always changing and circulating, and to possess a house, lands, and the like. We are masters of what we possess, not always so of what we have.

"It is held

That valour is the chiefest virtue,
And most dignifies the *haver*."

Shakespeare.

"If the soul is not in the very time of the act in the *possession* of liberty, it cannot at that time be in the use of it."—*Edwards on the Will*.

POSSESSIONS. See GOODS.

POSSESSOR. See MASTER.

POSSIBLE. See FEASIBLE.

POSTPONE. See DEFER.

POSTURE. See ATTITUDE and

POSITION.

POTENT. See MIGHTY.

POTENTATE. See MONARCH.

POVERTY. See POOR.

POUND. See BRUISE.

POUR. SHED. SPILL.

POUR (Old Eng. *powere*) is to cause to flow in a profuse manner. The term is indicative of design, or at least arrangement as to the source and quantity in the matter; as, "the clouds pour down rain." SPILL (A. S. *spillan*) is more limited as to quantity, and commonly implies accident, though not absolutely, as the spilling of blood in a duel. Yet even here the action is indirect. SHED (A. S. *sceddian*) is to give forth with a certain profuseness, though not necessarily in a liquid form (to which pour also is not absolutely restricted), of what formed part of, or was intimately connected with, the body from which the matter is parted; as, a man sheds his blood or

the blood of another. A tree sheds its leaves; a bird, its feathers; serpents, their skins, and the like.

"A multitude, like which the populous North
 Poured never from her frozen loins to pass
 Rhene or the Danaw, when her barbarous sons
 Came like a deluge on the South, and spread
 Beneath Gibraltar and the Libyan sands."
Milton.

"The *shedding* trees began the ground to strow
 With yellow leaves, and bitter blasts to blow."
Dryden.

"He who would have shuddered to *spill* a drop of blood in a hostile contest as a private man, shall deluge whole provinces as an absolute prince, and laugh over the subjugated plains which he has fertilized with human gore."—*Knox.*

POWER. See ENERGY and FACULTY.

POWERFUL. See MIGHTY.

PRACTICABLE. See FEASIBLE.

PRACTICE. See CUSTOM.

PRACTISE. See EXERCISE.

PRAISE. APPLAUD. APPROVE.
 COMMEND. EXTOL.

TO PRAISE (Old Fr. *preisier*, with other forms, New Fr. *priser*, from the Latin *pretium*, price) is, literally, to set a high value upon, and, by a further extension of meaning, to express it in words, and is the generic term. APPLAUD (Lat. *ad* and *plaudere*, to clap the hands) is to praise with some degree of excited feeling, and in a demonstrative way. As praise ought to be judicious, and the result of judgment, so applause is commonly the result of impulse, and is given to minor performances; as, we might applaud a rope-dancer without praising him; that is, without any expression of moral feeling; we express our admiration of his mere skill. To EXTOL (Lat. *ex* and *tollere*, to raise) denotes a sustained expression of praise for lofty acts, and usually in lofty language. APPROVE (Lat. *approbare*) is a much milder term, and denotes no more than the

entertainment of a judgment in favour either of persons or acts and proceedings, with an understanding in many cases that it is expressed; but approval is always specific, while praise may be general. We praise a man generally, or his character. We approve his acts or his conduct in particular cases. To COMMEND (Lat. *commendare*) means, in the first place, to intrust, and afterwards to mention as worthy of trust; that is, to praise. It differs from praise, in that praise may be the expression of the attributes of the excellent for its own sake; while commend implies an act of judgment on our part, which precedes the expression. We praise, but could never presume to commend, the Almighty. We bestow commendation. We offer as well as bestow praise. Praise and commendation are by speech; applause may be by act.

"If these words have any meaning at all, by *praise* they must mean the exercise or testimony of some sort of esteem, respect, or honourable regard."—*Edwards on the Will.*

"The Greeks have a name in their language for this sort of people, denoting that they are *applauders* by profession, and we stigmatise them with the opprobrious title of table-flatterers."—*Melmoth, Pliny.*

As praise and applaud have reference to human character and acts, so extol is sometimes used of what has no direct connection with these, as virtue in the abstract, or some particular virtue, or something which is simply excellent or practically beneficial, as an institution, form of government, and the like. We applaud under feelings of approbation suddenly excited. We praise by reason. We applaud by impulse.

"Extollers of the Pope's supremacy."—*Barrow.*

"It is lawful, in short, as our Saviour expresses it, to do well on the Sabbath day, to preserve ourselves, and to benefit our fellow-creatures. Thus far, then, we may go, and no farther. In other respects, the rest of the Lord's day is to be observed, and those very exceptions which our Saviour makes are a proof that in every other case He approves and sanctions the duty of resting on the Sabbath day."—*Bishop Porteus.*

"He had mean better than his outward show.

Can any way speak in his just commend?

For by his rusty outside he appears

To have practised more the whip-stock than the lance."

Shakespeare.

PRAISEWORTHY. See LAUDABLE.

PRANK. See GAMBOL.

PRATE. See BABBLE.

PRATTLE. See BABBLE.

PRAYER. See PETITION.

PRECARIOUS. UNCERTAIN.

The PRECARIOUS is a species of the UNCERTAIN. Derived from the Latin *precari*, to pray, it signified primarily contingent upon the will of another to grant. It retains its etymological force so far that it relates always to matters of personal interest, or affecting the condition of men. Matters of fact are uncertain; matters of possession or acquisition are precarious. A thing is uncertain until it is determined. It is precarious until it is assured or secured to ourselves.

PRECEDENCE. PRIORITY. PRE-EMINENCE. PREFERENCE.

PRECEDENCE (Lat. *precedere*, to go before) is matter of privilege, a distinction of rank or priority of consideration. It is also used of priority of time and order. PRIORITY (Lat. *prior*, earlier) denotes an anterior point either of time or order, without implying necessarily anything else. PRE-EMINENCE is absolute priority of nature or quality, more commonly, but not universally, in a good sense. PREFERENCE (Lat. *preferre*, to prefer) is the deliberate selection of a thing or person, as being worthy of higher estimation, or the state of a thing or person so selected.

"The younger sons and daughters of the king, and other branches of the royal family who are not in the immediate line of succession, were therefore little farther regarded by the ancient law than to give them, to a certain degree, *precedence* before all peers and public officers, as well ecclesiastical as temporal."—*Blackstone*.

"In payment of debts he must observe the rules of *priority*, otherwise, on deficiency of assets, if he pays those of a lower degree first,

he must answer those of a higher out of his own estate."—*Blackstone*.

"The sense of sight, accordingly, maintains the same *pre-eminence* over our other senses in furnishing materials to the power of conception that in its actual exercise belongs to it, as the great channel of our acquired information, and the habitual medium of our communication with things external."—*Stewart*.

"I trust it will be allowed by all, that in every act of will there is an act of choice, that in every volition there is a *preference* or a prevailing inclination of the soul, whereby the soul at that instance is out of a state of perfect indifference with respect to the direct object of the volition."—*Edwards on the Will*.

PRECEDENT. See EXAMPLE.

PRECEDING. ANTECEDENT. ANTERIOR. FOREGOING. FORMER. PREVIOUS. PRIOR.

ANTECEDENT (*ante*, before, and *cedere*, to go), PRECEDING, FOREGOING, and PREVIOUS (*præ*, before, and *via*, a way) are used of what *goes* before; ANTERIOR (comparative of *ante*, before), FORMER (A. S. *forma*, masc., *forme*, fem., first), and PRIOR (Lat. *prior*), of what *exists* before. Antecedent relates only to the order of time, denoting priority in an established course or sequence. Anterior is opposed to posterior; antecedent, to subsequent. Antecedent and preceding differ in that the former may be separated from the point or object to which it relates by a considerable interval, while the latter excludes this. Previous has a less abstract force than preceding. Thus a preceding inquiry is merely an inquiry that went before; a previous inquiry would have in it something of a relative character, as preparatory or preliminary. Foregoing is the same as preceding, but is restricted to matters of statement, and also implies a relative character; as, the foregoing argument. We do not speak of foregoing events. FORMER is restricted—though this was not the case in the Old English—to a comparison of one object with one other, as opposed to latter, and connected with no other idea than that of priority in time.

PRECEPT. See COMMAND.

PRECINCT. *See* BORDER.

PRECIOUS. VALUABLE. COSTLY.

Of these terms, VALUABLE (Lat. *valere*, to be worth) is the weakest and most indefinite, inasmuch as it denotes any degree of value, and may even be opposed to valueless. PRECIOUS (Lat. *pretium*, price) expresses the possession of *great* value. The value of the precious is inherent; that of the COSTLY (Lat. *constare*, to stand at) is conventional and extrinsic. A precious stone is synonymous with a jewel. A costly stone would be any which had been largely paid for. An elaborate work of art, as a carved mantel-piece, would be costly rather than precious; but we speak of valuable, not costly, paintings, because they do not present criteria of marketable value.

"In the *precious* metals, where a small difference in the quantity makes a great difference in the value, even the business of weighing with proper exactness requires at least very accurate weights and scales."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations.*

The precious is commonly not remarkable for quantity, but for quality.

"Besides, there lies a nearer way for good qualities to arrive at their *valuableness*; for we find the very sight of them raising an esteem in the beholder, without staying for the benefits to be received from them."—*Search.*

"Sir John Gates, vice-chamberlain to the king, who was now grown into great favour, obtained another part; for the king gave him all the duke's rich furs, and much of his *costly* household stuff."—*Strype.*

PRECIPITANCY. *See* HASTINESS.

PRECISE. *See* EXACT.

PRECLUDE. *See* DEBAR and PREVENT.

PRECURSOR. *See* FORERUNNER.

PREDECESSOR. *See* FOREFATHER.

PREDICAMENT. *See* PLIGHT.

PREDICT. *See* FORETELL.

PREDOMINANT. PREVAILING.

PREVALENT. RULING.

That is said to be RULING (rule, Fr. *regle*, Lat. *regula*, *regere*, to rule)

which exercises a decided influence over one or more in reference to moral, but not physical, influence. So we should not speak of a ruling sickness or disease, but of a ruling fashion, for instance. PREVAILING and PREVALENT, however, are used both of moral and physical influences; but prevailing lends itself more readily to the former, prevalent to the latter. The prevailing feeling in a community; a prevalent disease. The noun prevalence seems equally applicable to both. PREDOMINANT, as the word indicates (*præ*, before, and *dominare*, to rule) is *overruling* or exercising a force or influence to the suppression of others. Prevalent, however, expresses more of energy than prevailing. A prevailing belief is one which is widely spread; a prevalent opinion, one which exercises a wide influence. Prevailing and prevalent relate to numbers or area of extension; ruling and predominant, to inherent force. The ruling passion is that which exercises the strongest sway, not necessarily over a number, but over the individual.

"Almost every one has a *predominant* inclination, to which his other desires and affections submit, and which governs him, though perhaps with some intervals, through the whole course of his life."—*Hume.*

What generally prevails is prevalent; what actually prevails is prevailing. Many such forms of adjectives exist in English; the former preserving the Latin, and the latter the Saxon, participial ending, as consistent, consisting, different, differing; the former qualify generals, the latter particulars. "Consumption is a *prevalent* disease in England." "After an expensive war, taxation is a *prevailing* cause of discontent."

"At length that groundless maxim,
So ripe and celebrated in the mouths
Of wisest men, that to the public good
Private respects must yield, with grave
authority
Took full possession of me, and *prevailed*."
Milton.

"Condillac has certainly contributed more than any other individual to the *prevalence* of the logical error now under consideration."
—*Stewart.*

PRE-EMINENCE. *See* PRECEDENCE.

PREFACE. PRELUDE.

The former is compounded of *præ*, before, and *fari*, to speak; the latter, of *præ*, before, and *ludus*, a game. In their common usage, this distinction of ideas is preserved. A PREFACE is made up of preliminary words; a prelude, of preliminary acts. Although a PRELUDE is commonly used of conscious acts, as ushering in others, and subsequent acts or events, it is also, by an extension of meaning, sometimes used of events abstractedly, as indicating others to follow by relation or sequence; as, "The growling of thunder is a prelude to the coming storm." On the other hand, a preface is always an indication of design. It is the laying down of something which shall prepare the mind for subsequent statement or representation.

"As when of old some orator renown'd
In Athens, or free Rome, where eloquence
Flourished, since mute, to some great
cause address'd,
Stood in himself collected; while each
part,
Motion, each act, won audience, ere the
tongue;
Sometimes in height began, as no delay
Of *preface* brooking, through his zeal of
right." *Milton.*

"The moving storm
Thickens amain, and loud triumphant shouts,
And horns, shrill-warbling in each glade,
prelude
To his approaching fate." *Somerville.*

PREFER. PREFERENCE. *See*
CHOICE and PRECEDENCE.

PREFERABLE. *See* ELIGIBLE.

PREFERMENT. *See* PROMOTION.

PREJUDICE. *See* HURT and
PREPOSSESSION.

PREJUDICIAL. *See* NOXIOUS.

PRELIMINARY. *See* INTRO-
DUCTORY.

PRELUDE. *See* PREFACE.

PREMEDITATION. *See* FORE-
SIGHT.

PREPARATORY. *See* INTRO-
DUCTORY.

PREPONDERATE. *See* OUTWEIGH.

PREPOSSESSION. PREJUDICE.

The common distinction drawn between these words is that they both express a judgment formed beforehand, and without full inquiry; while in the case of PREPOSSESSION (Lat. *præ*, before, and *possessio*, *possidere*, to possess) it is favourable, and in PREJUDICE (*præ*, before, and *judicium*, a judgment) it is unfavourable. But a further difference has to be noted. Prejudice relates only to questions of practical, while prepossession is applicable to those of purely theoretical, judgment. For instance, a person might commence the study of astronomy, prepossessed with the idea that the moon was larger than the sun. This, though a prepossession, would not be a prejudice. It deserves to be remarked that falsehood and unfairness is implied both in prejudice and prepossession, and that preconceived or premature judgments *happening to be right* are not provided for in the terms. A correct prejudice and a right prepossession are, according to usage, moral contradictions, though they are not so in fact, by reason of the instinctive tendency of our minds to relegate to the category of the positively false all matters of mere anticipation by conjecture. Both prejudice and prepossession involve a mingled state of feeling and opinion respecting a person or other object; but feeling is the more influential in prepossession; opinion, in prejudice.

"Let us suppose for a moment that this happy era were arrived, and that all the *prepossessions* of childhood and youth were directed to support the pure and sublime truths of an enlightened morality."—*Stewart.*

"If, after all his profession, he cannot bear any opposition to his opinion, if he cannot so much as give a patient hearing, much less examine and weigh the arguments on the other side, does he not plainly confess it is *prejudice* governs him?"—*Locke.*

PREPOSTEROUS. *See* ABSURD.

PREROGATIVE. *See* CLAIM.

PRESAGE. See AUGUR and OMEN.

PRESCRIBE. See DICTATE.

PRESCRIPTION. See CUSTOM.

PRESENT. See ENDOWMENT.

PRESENT. See OFFER and INTRODUCE.

PRESERVE. See HOLD.

PRESS. See PINCH.

PRESSING. See IMPORTUNATE.

PRESUME. See APPREHEND.

PRESUMING. See PRESUMPTIVE.

PRESUMPTION. See ARROGANCE.

PRESUMPTIVE. PRESUMPTUOUS.

PRESUMING.

These terms comprise different applications of the same idea—that of taking before or beforehand (*præ*, before, and *sumere*, to take). He is PRESUMING who takes to himself anything before it is allotted to him, and so is forward, obtrusive, arrogant. He is PRESUMPTUOUS who is habitually presuming, in whom presumption in this sense is natural. PRESUMPTIVE has the passive sense of being that which is habitually presumed; that is, taken on previous supposition and probable evidence without demonstration.

PRESUMPTUOUS. See PRESUMPTIVE.

PRETENCE. PRETEXT. EXCUSE. PRETENSION.

PRETENCE and PRETENSION (Lat. *præ* and *tendere*, to stretch or put forward) differ as the false from the real. A pretence is a show in act or in word of what has no real existence in oneself, a justification of one's conduct before others in some fictitious way, or a fictitious assumption of what does not really belong to us. It involves both the exhibition of something unreal, and the concealment of something real. Pretension, as the word is commonly taken, is the setting forward or putting before the public something, which really

belongs to us, or at least a claim which we are prepared to vindicate, and involves no concealment whatever, except where a public claim is made to what is in itself untenable. Pretension is active and demonstrative; pretence is defensive on account of others. PRETEXT (*præ*, before, and *texere*, to weave) is anything which is put forward as the ostensible ground of action, and is relative to something lying beyond it, and justified by it. A pretext is a false or colourable vindication of action. Pretext differs from EXCUSE (*excusare*, *ex* and *causa*) as the asserter from the disclaimer. A pretext declares a thing to be right; an excuse declares it to be only permissible, if not wrong. A pretext is a ground of independent action; an excuse involves a condition of dependence on the judgment of others. A false excuse is a pretence. Pretext and pretence are also different. The pretext deceives as to facts; the pretence, as to consequences. The former conceals the true; the latter puts forward the false. The pretence disguises the motive; the pretext covers the act. If we say, "Religion has often been used as a pretext for persecution," we mean that it has been employed to compass the perpetration of certain acts of cruelty. When we say, "He obtained money under false pretences," we mean, he induced others by his misrepresentations to act upon false motives in giving him the money.

"I believe, upon a due survey of history, it will be found that the most considerable villainies which were ever acted upon the stage of Christendom have been authorised with the glistening pretences of conscience, and the introduction of a greater purity of religion."—*South*.

"He said there were some among them that, under colour and pretext of honesty, did commit many lewd parts."—*North, Plutarch*.

"You see that an opinion of merit is discouraged, even in those who had the best pretensions to entertain it, if any pretensions were good."—*Paley*.

"In vain would his excusers endeavour to palliate his enormities by imputing them to madness."—*Swift*.

PRETEND. *See* AFFECT and FEIGN.

PRETENSION. *See* CLAIM.

PRETEXT. *See* PRETENCE.

PRETTY. *See* BEAUTIFUL.

PREVAILING. *See* PREDOMINANT.

PREVALENT. *See* PREDOMINANT.

PREVARICATE. *See* EQUIVOCATE.

PREVENT. ANTICIPATE. OBVIATE. PRECLUDE.

To PREVENT (Lat. *præ*, before, and *venire*, *ventus*, to come) is literally to go before simply, and in Old English meant to go before with the implied purpose of aiding, now with the implied purpose of counteracting. It differs from ANTICIPATE (*ante*, before, and *capere*, to take) as the negative from the positive; to prevent being to cause a thing not to be done or take place; to anticipate is to cause it to take place or effect by doing it or bringing it about oneself or in one's own way. To OBVIATE (Lat. *ob*, against, and *via*, a way) is to place a thing in the way, or interrupt the course of things; hence, specifically, to prevent a thing from taking its course. To obviate is to prevent by interception. Obviate never has the purely physical sense of prevent; as we could not say, "To obviate a man from passing along a particular road." It denotes not necessarily the bringing of design to bear upon the natural force and sequence of things, for circumstances may obviate. To PRECLUDE (Lat. *præcludere*) is to shut out by anticipation, or to prevent by necessary consequence. To prevent removes force; to obviate neutralizes force. All these synonyms are applicable both to conscious and unconscious force. To prevent a difficulty, would be to cause the difficulty *not to occur*. To preclude the difficulty, would be to render it impossible *that it should occur*. To obviate the difficulty, would be to neutralize it *when it did occur*. Hence we commonly speak of preventing occurrences, obviating necessities, precluding possibilities, suppositions, or contingencies. The

permissible or possible is precluded; the urgent or cogent is obviated.

"For physick is either curative or *preventive*. *Preventive* we call that which, by purging noxious humours and the causes of diseases, *preventeth* sickness in the healthy, or the recourse thereof in the valetudinary." —Brown, *Vulgar Errors*.

"Time! thou *anticipatest* my dread exploits." *Shakespeare*.

"The following outlines will, I hope, not only *obviate* this inconvenience, but will allow me in future a greater latitude of illustration and digression than I could have indulged myself in with propriety, so long as my students were left to investigate the chain of my doctrines by their own reflections." —Stewart.

"The design of subscription being to preserve one uniform tenor of faith, to *preclude* diversity of opinions, to have her own explanations, and none other (as to points determined), taught and inculcated, and to tie men up from spreading and receiving doctrines contrary to the public determination." —Waterland.

PREVIOUS. *See* PRECEDING.

PREY. *See* PILLAGE.

PRICE. *See* COST.

PRIDE. *See* ARROGANCE.

PRIMARY. *See* ORIGINAL.

PRIMARILY. *See* CHIEFLY.

PRIMITIVE. *See* ORIGINAL.

PRINCE. *See* MONARCH.

PRINCIPAL. *See* CHIEF.

PRINCIPALLY. *See* CHIEFLY.

PRINCIPLE. *See* DOCTRINE.

PRINT. *See* IMPRESSION.

PRIOR. *See* PRECEDING.

PRIORITY. *See* PRECEDENCE.

PRISTINE. *See* ORIGINAL.

PRIVACY. RETIREMENT. SOLITUDE. SECLUSION. LONELINESS.

PRIVACY (Lat. *privatus*, from *privus*) is opposed to publicity, and is a condition of persons. RETIREMENT (Fr. *retirer*, to draw back) is a condition both of places and persons. Privacy may be of short duration; retirement implies a longer duration.

Hence we say, "hours of privacy;" "a life of retirement." SOLITUDE (Lat. *solitudo*, *solus*, alone) and SECLUSION (*se*, separately, and *claudere*, to shut) imply more than this—an absence from all society; while both privacy and retirement are compatible with the companionship of a few, but in different senses. Seclusion is sought; solitude may be imposed. The prisoner in his compulsory confinement is not said to be in seclusion, though the word etymologically expresses this exactly. Nor is solitude applicable to persons collectively, but individually. The inhabitants of a retired village might be said to live in seclusion, but hardly in solitude. LONELINESS has been well defined the solitude of the heart. Some have never felt more lonely than in a crowd, where it has been an utterly strange and unsympathizing one; the very fact of the mere external publicity bringing home the more forcibly the feeling of moral isolation. As privacy is opposed to publicity, so retirement may be opposed to sociability; solitude, to society; seclusion, to sociability; loneliness, to companionship (see LONELY).

"Which fair and happy blessing thou might'st well

Have far more raised, had not thine enemy

Retired: *privacy* made thee to sell

Thy greatness for thy quiet."

Daniel.

"He was banished into Patmos, a little island in the archipelago, and during his retirement there was favoured in a particular manner with revelations from heaven, which he committed to writing, and left behind him for the benefit of the Church."—*Waterland*.

"At which this honest man,

Finding that naught but hate and scorn he wan,

Amongst these idiots and their beastly kind,

The poor, small remnant of his life behind

Determineth to solitude to give,

And a true hermit afterward to live."

Drayton.

"The invisible mansion of departed spirits, though certainly not a place of penal confinement to the good, is nevertheless in some respects a prison. It is a place of seclusion from the external world."—*Bishop Horsley*.

PRIVILEGE. See CLAIM.

PRIZE. See CAPTURE.

PRIZE. VALUE. ESTEEM.

To VALUE (Lat. *valere*, Fr. *valoir*, Old Fr. *valere*) is to set any value upon a thing, great or small, real or fictitious, pecuniary or moral. PRIZE (Lat. *pretium*) and ESTEEM (Lat. *estimare*) denote mental actions; the former being commonly employed of external, the latter, of moral things, or of external things for the sake of something beyond themselves. "I value a book highly or cheaply." "I prize it for its intrinsic worth, or for the sake of the person who gave it to me." "I do not esteem it at all, though I may esteem the friend who presented it to me."

"No: dear as freedom is, and in my heart's
Just estimation *prized* above all price,
I had much rather be myself the slave,
And wear the bonds, than fasten them on
him." *Cowper*.

The state of mind involved in prizing anything is one of the strongest regard; the thoughts are concentrated on the object; it is treasured with a strong personal feeling; it is jealously guarded, and the possession of it confers a happiness on its possessor which he is fain to think peculiar to himself. He is more fortunate than others who have it not.

PROBABILITY. See CHANCE.

PROBITY. See HONESTY.

PROCEDURE. See PROCEEDING.

PROCEED. ADVANCE.

To PROCEED (Lat. *procedere*) is simply to go on; to ADVANCE (Fr. *avancer*) is to go forward. He proceeds who does not halt. He advances who makes ground and is growing nearer to a proposed point. We cannot advance without proceeding; but we may proceed without advancing. To advance regards the end, to proceed, the beginning, of our journey. In advancing we are nearer to a point before us; in proceeding we leave a point behind us. How obvious is the difference between "to proceed with one's studies," and "to advance in one's studies!"

PROCEED. ARISE. FLOW. EMANATE. ISSUE. SPRING.

The two first of these terms are employed to express the course of cause and effect; but PROCEED lends itself more readily to moral, ARISE to physical, sequence and causation. So we might say, with nearly equal propriety, "His cordial reception proceeded from his popularity," inasmuch as the circumstance is regarded both as an external fact or occurrence, and as a moral result; but we should say, "The scanty harvest arose," not proceeded, "from the drought." Simple causation, too, is best expressed by arise; complex, by proceed. FLOW and EMANATE (Lat. *fluere*, to flow, and *emanare*, to distil) are metaphorical terms, and are therefore best employed when the metaphors are best preserved. To flow denotes continuity and abundance; emanate, little more than source and origin. "All these sad occurrences have *flowed* from a bad system of administration." "The timely hint *emanated* from his good-nature." ISSUE and SPRING differ in that issue (Lat. *exitus*, *exire*, to go out, whence Fr. *issue*) takes into consideration the end as well as the beginning; while spring (A. S. *spring*, a leap, or leap of a fountain) regards only the beginning. "Such attempts spring from ignorance, and must issue in failure." We might say also, "issue from ignorance." Spring more strongly marks the relation of cause and effect; while issue often denotes little more than the relation of antecedent and consequent.

"Teach me the various labours of the moon,
And whence *proceed* th' eclipses of the
sun." *Dryden.*

"Yet many will presume;
Whence heavy persecution shall arise
On all who in the worship persevere
Of spirit and truth." *Milton.*

"Those thousand decencies that daily *flow*
From all her words and actions." *Ibid.*

"That subsisting form of government from
which all laws *emanate*."—*De Quincey.*

"Since God is the Father of all, since His
mercy is over all His works, since He puts it

in the power of every person to perform all
that He requires from him, and since men
are exposed to many temptations, it is reason-
able to think that from this Supreme Being,
from this eternal fountain of all truth and
of all good gifts, there *issues* light which
lighteth every one which cometh into the
world."—*Jortin.*

PROCEEDING. PROCEDURE. PRO-
CESS. PROCESSION.

A PROCEEDING is a complex action
capable of being distinguished as
to its parts, steps, or stages. PRO-
CEDURE is proceeding in the abstract,
that is, the act or manner of proceed-
ing; the PROCESS is the proceed-
ing regarded as separate or apart
from the agent, more especially as
something conducted by method and
rule. The PROCESSION is the move-
ment, as the *procedure* is the mode, of
proceeding.

"What could be more fair than to lay open
to an enemy all that you wished to obtain,
and to desire him to imitate your ingenious
proceeding?"—*Burke.*

"If the external *procedures* of God's pro-
vidence be the rule to measure His love or
hatred by, then it cannot be avoided but that
the rich and powerful have the fairest plea
for heaven, and the martyr the shrewdest
marks of reprobation."—*South.*

In Old English the word process was
used to signify detailed description,
or the *account* of what we now call a
process, as in the following of Shake-
speare:—

"In brief, to set the needless *process* by,
How I persuaded, how I prayed and
kneeled,
How he repel'd me, and how I replied."

PROCESS. See PROCEEDING.

PROCESSION. See PROCEEDING
and TRAIN.

PROCLAIM. See ANNOUNCE.

PROCLAMATION. See DECREE.

PROCRASTINATE. See DEFER.

PROCRASTINATING. See DILA-
TORY.

PROCURE. See ACQUIRE.

PRODIGAL. See EXTRAVAGANT.

PRODIGIOUS. See HUGE.

PRODIGY. See MARVEL.

PRODUCE. See AFFORD and CREATE.

PRODUCE. PRODUCT. PRODUCTION.

PRODUCE (Lat. *producere*, to bring forth) is now restricted to what is naturally produced from any source, as by the soil in vegetation, but for useful purposes, and in the aggregate, as the produce of a poultry-yard, a farm, a field. PRODUCT is specific, in the sense of that which is produced by some operation in particular, whether mental, moral, mechanical, or natural. PRODUCTION is used both of the operation and the result of producing. In the latter sense, it is not confined to the useful or the natural, but is applicable to the ornamental and the artistic. The production may be viewed simply as a phenomenon in itself. The product has a theoretical or material value.

"It is evident he means not only external actions, but the acts of choice themselves, when he speaks of all free actions as the production of free choice."—*Edwards on the Will*.

"Man is the flower and chief of all products of Nature upon this globe of the earth."—*More*.

"The value of land consists in this, that by its constant production of saleable commodities it brings in a certain yearly income."—*Locke*.

PRODUCT. See PRODUCE.

PRODUCTION. See PRODUCE.

PRODUCTIVE. See FERTILE.

PROFANE. See IMPIOUS.

PROFESS. DECLARE.

To PROFESS (Lat. *profiteor*, professus) is employed only of what relates to oneself. To DECLARE (see DECLARE) is employed of any fact coming within one's cognizance. There is always a particular and private motive for profession. A declaration may be made on any account, as, for instance, in obedience to duty, or for the sake of another.

PROFESSION. See PROFESS.

PROFESSION. TRADE. BUSINESS. ART.

BUSINESS is the most general, and comprises any exercise of knowledge and experience for purposes of gain. When learning or skill of a high order is required, it is called a PROFESSION. When it consists of buying and selling merchandise, it is a TRADE (Fr. *traite*, Lat. *trahere*, *tractus*, to draw or carry). When there is a peculiar exercise of skill, it is called an ART. Those exercise an art who exchange skilled labour for money; those a trade, who exchange commodities for money; those a profession, who exchange intellectual exertion for money. The art of the baker lies in making loaves; his trade, in selling them.

"Amongst so many great foundations of colleges in Europe, I find strange that they are all dedicated to professions, and none left free to arts and sciences at large."—*Bacon*.

"A bank cannot consistently with its own interest advance to a trader the whole, or even the greater part of the circulating capital with which he trades."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations*.

"It seldom happens that men of a studious turn acquire any degree of reputation for their knowledge of business."—*Bishop Porteus*.

"Art can never give the rules that make an art."—*Burke*.

PROFICIENCY. IMPROVEMENT. PROGRESS.

PROFICIENCY (Lat. *proficere*, to make progress) is more marked than IMPROVEMENT (prefix *im* and Old Fr. *prover*, *probare*, to esteem as good). As improvement is employed of things both manual and mental, active and reflective, proficiency is employed more commonly of matters of practical skill or active exercise of mind. Any degree of better condition, capability, or performance is improvement; but proficiency denotes such a degree as finds the person in possession of a positive power and skill. PROGRESS (Lat. *progredior*, *progressus*, *pro*, forward, and *gradus*, a step) is more indefinite, expressing movement onwards, without implying any point gained. It deserves to be remarked that the English word improve is

wholly vitious, and has attributed to it in our language a meaning which is without parallel. The Latin infinitive *improbare* has the totally dissimilar sense of to censure, disapprove, or disallow.

"The clergy in particular, as they then engrossed almost every other branch of learning, so, like their predecessors, the British Druids, they were peculiarly remarkable for their *proficiency* in the study of the law."—*Blackstone*.

"Reflect upon that great law of Nature, that exercise is the chief source of *improvement* in all our faculties."—*Blair*.

"Growth is *progress*, and all *progress* designs and tends to the acquisition of something which the growing person is not yet possessed of."—*South*.

PROFIT. See ADVANTAGE and GAIN.

PROFLIGATE. See ABANDONED.

PROFUNDITY. See DEPTH.

PROFUSE. See EXTRAVAGANT.

PROFUSENESS. PROFUSION.

PROFUSENESS (*profundere, profusus*, to pour out) is simply the quality or exhibition of the profuse. PROFUSION is the existence of the profuse in what is desirable or good. Profuseness of epithets; profusion of praise. Profuseness is the quality which, as a cause, produces profusion as a result.

"He who with a promiscuous, undistinguishing *profuseness* does not so much dispense as throw away what he has, proclaims himself a fool to all the intelligent world about him."—*South*.

"The raptured eye,
The fair *profusion*, yellow Autumn spies,"
Thomson.

PROFUSION. See PROFUSENESS.

PROGENITORS. See FOREFATHERS.

PROGENY. See OFFSPRING.

PROGNOSTIC. See OMEN.

PROGNOSTICATE. See AUGUR.

PROGRESS. See PROFICIENCY.

PROHIBIT. See DEBAR.

PROJECT. See PLAN.

PROLIFIC. See FERTILE.

PROLIX. See DIFFUSE.

PROLONG. See DEFER.

PROMINENT. See EMINENT.

PROMISCUOUS. INDISCRIMINATE.

PROMISCUOUS (Lat. *pro* and *miscere*, to mix) is a term applied to objects; INDISCRIMINATE (*in*, not, and *discrimen*, a difference), to actions. A promiscuous crowd; an indiscriminate accusation. The promiscuous appearance of several objects brought together may be owing to the indiscriminate way in which they have been dealt with.

"Say, Muse, their names then known, who
first, who last,
Roused from the slumber on that fiery
couch,
At their great emperor's call, as next in
worth,
Came singly where he stood on the bare
strand,
While the *promiscuous* crowd stood yet
aloof."
Milton.

"Since, then, in our own order of being, the power of the individual over external bodies is not at all proportioned to his piety or his morals, but is exercised *indiscriminately*, and in equal degrees, by the good and by the bad, we have no reason from analogy to suppose but that the like *indiscrimination* may obtain in higher orders, and that both the good and evil angels may exercise powers far transcending any we possess, the effects of which to us will seem preternatural."—*Bishop Horsley*.

PROMISE. ENGAGEMENT.

PROMISE (Fr. *promesse*, Lat. *promittere, promissus*) is used directly of the object, as to promise a gift. We do not say, to engage a gift, but that the person shall receive it. AN ENGAGEMENT (Fr. *engager, gager*, wages or pledge, the Low Latin *vadium*) is only in this sense a stronger word than promise, by which it is intended to express that the promiser feels as if he had put himself under a pledge to execute his promise. "I promise that you shall have it," means, simply, "I give you my word that I will give it to you." "I engage that you shall have it," means, "I pledge everything in my power to cause you to have it." The

word of the promiser is, as it were, put in pledge, though no actual pledge is given. It is like saying, "I pledge my word that it shall be so."

"Christian simplicity relates to *promises* and acts of grace and favour, and its caution is that all promises be simple, ingenuous, agreeable to the intention of the promiser, truly and effectually expressed, and never giving less in the performance than in the *promises* and words of the expression."—*Bishop Taylor*.

"The king objected that the rendezvous being appointed for the next week, he was not willing to quit the army till that was passed; because if the superior officers prevailed, they would be able to make good their *engagement*, if not, they must apply themselves to him for their own security."—*Ludlow, Memoirs*.

PROMOTE. ADVANCE. FORWARD. ENCOURAGE.

We speak of *PROMOTING* (Lat. *promovere, promotus*, to move forward) interests, of *ADVANCING* (Fr. *avancer*) causes, and of *FORWARDING* plans or purposes, and of *ENCOURAGING* (Fr. *encourager, cœur*, the heart) efforts. The last application is a little distorted, inasmuch as to encourage meaning to give heart, it is, strictly speaking, only *persons* that can be encouraged. We encourage an undertaking by lending countenance and strength to those who undertake it. *Promote* is used both of good and evil designs or movements; advance, only of good. We might speak of promoting happiness and contentment, or discontent and disturbance. We should speak of advancing happiness, not unhappiness; here we should use *promote*. To *promote* seems to mean no more than to give additional influence; advance, to do so in cases where such influence is a fair object of desire. Forward is a simpler term, but is always more closely connected with persons. We should endeavour to advance the truth on all occasions, and to forward the efforts of those to whom it is dear, but never believe that we can promote good in any way by promoting persecution.

"All my mind was set Serious to learn and know, and thence to do What might be public good; myself, I thought

Born to that end, born to *promote* all truth, All righteous things." *Milton*.

"True religion is the best support of every government, which being founded on just principles, proposes for its end the joint *advancement* of the virtue and the happiness of the people."—*Bishop Horsley*.

"The occasional propensity to this superstition (of symbolic figures) was, without question, *forwarded* and *encouraged* by the priesthood."—*Warburton*.

PROMOTION. ADVANCEMENT. PREFERMENT.

As applied to the raising of persons in their social position, *PROMOTION* seems restricted to those offices which are held in a scale of gradation, as in the army, navy, government offices, and mercantile houses. *ADVANCEMENT* is a general term, applicable to any raising of individual position; while *PREFERMENT* (Lat. *præ* and *ferre*, to carry) involves some peculiar greatness or dignity of office in that to which the person is preferred, especially in Church or State.

"The government is elective; *promotion* depends in a great degree upon talents and virtues, and consequently there is a stimulus to exertion, and a scope for honourable ambition."—*Eustace, Italy*.

"Those that are *advanced* by degrees are less envied than those that are *advanced* suddenly."—*Bacon*.

"Sir Antonio More was made receiver of the revenues of West Flanders, a *preferment* with which they say he was so elated, that he burned his easel, and gave away his painting tools."—*Walpole, Anecdotes of Painting*.

PROMPT. See APT.

PROMULGATE. PUBLISH. DIVULGE. REVEAL. DISCLOSE. (See DISCLOSE.)

PROMULGATE (Lat. *pro* and *vulgus*, the common people, and so for *promulgate*) is a mode of *PUBLISHING* (Lat. *publicus*, public, for *populicus*, from *populus*, the people); for to publish is indefinite, and means simply to make known, as facts;

while promulgate is to make *extensively* known, to give a wide, and, if possible, extending, publicity. Nor is it applied to facts, but rather to principles, opinions, doctrines; hence promulgation is not only publication, but systematic and often repeated publication. DIVULGE (of the same derivation as promulgate) is to make known where there was some propriety or obligation of keeping secret. To REVEAL (literally, to draw back the veil which hid an object) differs from divulge, inasmuch as reveal implies no more than the bare fact of antecedent ignorance, not any propriety or obligation of concealment. To divulge is to give knowledge of facts before kept secret. To reveal is this, and more. It is applicable to what was unknown from being high, abstruse, or mysterious. It applies also to principles as well as facts, and to knowledge in its broadest acceptation. All these differ from DISCLOSE (*dis* and *claudere*, *clausus*, to shut), in that disclose may express the accidental or unintentional, while they involve a purpose. We reveal that which is to their interest to know to whom the revelation is made. We divulge what is to the interest of some *not* to make known.

"An absurd theory on one side of a question forms no justification for alleging a false fact or *promulgating* mischievous maxims on the other."—Burke.

"How best the mighty work He might begin,
Of Saviour to mankind, and which way first
Publish His God-like office, now mature."
Milton.

"Descamps says that this mystery, as it was then held, was stolen from Vaillant by the son of an old man, who scraped the grounds of his plates for him. This might be one of the means of *divulging* the new art (of mezzotinto)."—Walpole.

"Early the morrow next before that day,
His joyous face did to the world *reveal*,
They both uprose and took their ready way
Unto the church, their prayers to appeal."
Spenser.

"Thus it was then, and thus it hath been ever since, Truth has had concealed and timorous friends, who, keeping their senti-

ments to themselves or *disclosing* them only to a few, complied with errors and superstitions which they disliked and despised."—Jortin.

PRONENESS. See BENT.

PRONOUNCE.

PRONOUNCE (Lat. *pronuntiare*) is to speak with distinctness and positiveness. According to the one or the other characteristic, it has two distinct sets of synonyms: to pronounce with positiveness being to declare; with distinctness, to articulate.

PRONOUNCE. UTTER. ARTICULATE. DELIVER.

What is given forth by the voice as mere sound may be said to be UTTERED (A. S. *utter*, *üter*, outer, exterior). What is spoken in distinct syllables is ARTICULATED (*articulus*, a limb, member, or section). What is spoken in harmonious, proportioned, and sustained articulations is PRONOUNCED, as words or sentences. What is given forth by sustained pronunciation is DELIVERED (*de* and *liberare*, *liber*, to free). Thus do these terms grow upon one another, as *sound*, *syllables*, *words*, and *speech*.

PRONOUNCE. DECLARE.

As applied to the making known by verbal utterance, DECLARE denotes the clear and positive assertion of a thing; PRONOUNCE denotes such a declaration as rests, in some degree, upon individual responsibility. We declare facts, intentions, and the like; we pronounce sentence, judgment, an opinion.

PROOF. TESTIMONY. EVIDENCE.

PROOF (Old Fr. *prove*, New Fr. *preuve*, from the Latin *probare*) is used in two senses: 1, any effort or process which tends to establish a fact or truth; and 2, such an amount of it as shall lead to conviction, and produce belief. Being a simpler word than TESTIMONY (*testimonium*, *testis*, a witness) and EVIDENCE (*evidentia*, *e* and *videre*, to see), it is used more generally of the ordinary facts of life. Evidence is a term of higher

dignity, and is applied to that which is moral and intellectual; as, the evidences of Christianity, or the body of proofs, or alleged proofs, tending to establish facts in law. Testimony is strictly the evidence of a witness given under oath. It always implies, more or less directly, proofs afforded by a living witness, though it is often used of unconscious things in the way of analogy; as the testimony of Nature, of conscience, and the like.

"To conform our language more to common use, we ought to divide arguments into demonstrations, *proofs*, and probabilities; by *proofs* meaning such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition."—*Hume*.

"The difficulty is when *testimonies* contradict common experience, and the reports of history and witnesses clash with the ordinary course of Nature or with one another."—*Locke*.

"*Evidence* signifies that which demonstrates, makes clear, or ascertains the truth of the very fact or point in issue, either on the one side or on the other."—*Blackstone*.

PROPAGATE. SPREAD. CIRCULATE. DISSEMINATE.

Of these, to SPREAD (*A. S. spradan*) is the most indeterminate, so that the rest may be regarded as modifications of this. To CIRCULATE (*circulus*, from *circus*, a circle) is to spread within a circle or particular area; as, "the rumour circulates, or is circulated, through the town." To DISSEMINATE (*Lat. dis* and *seminare, semen*, to sow) is a metaphorical term, conveying rather the idea of scattering and diffusion than that of any after up-growth. This is indicated by PROPAGATE (*propago*, a slip or shoot). A rumour is propagated when many in succession give force to it. Doctrines are propagated when those who spread them succeed in making them take root. Ideas are disseminated when they are largely scattered about, and, as it were, sown broadcast. That which is circulated is matter of local and temporary interest; that which is disseminated is accepted and retained; that which is propagated becomes deeply and lastingly established.

"It was the singular and miraculous blessing of the Gospel in the hands of the first *propagators* of it, that there was no speech nor language where their voice was not heard."—*Bishop Hall*.

"He chooses a company of very ordinary unlettered men, but very honest men, to be the witnesses of His conversation and doctrine; and these He designs for the *spreaders* of His religion throughout the world."—*Sharp*.

"Our God, when heaven and earth He did create,
Formed man, who should of both participate.

If our lives' motions theirs must imitate,
Our knowledge, like our blood, must circulate."—*Denham*.

"The horrid scenes that have been passing there have all been, it has been said, by the dissemination of speculative notions about liberty and the rights of man among the negroes of that island."—*Horsley*.

PROPENSITY. See BENT.

PROPER. See BECOMING.

PROPERTY. See GOODS.

PROPERTY. QUALITY. ATTRIBUTE.

PROPERTY (*proprietas, proprius*, proper or peculiar) is a peculiar quality. It is thus very extensively applied; as, the properties of matter, which are, in some cases, *permanent*, as extension, gravitation, or colour; *transmutative*, as shown in chemical affinities, as, for instance, the explosiveness of gunpowder, these being accompanied by change in the substances themselves; and *perceptible*, that is, such as produce affections on sentient beings, as smells, poisons. These latter have been termed *organo-leptic*, that is, taking hold of the sensations of animals or organized beings. QUALITY (*Lat. qualitas, qualis*, such as) is that which makes, or helps to make, a thing what it is. It is therefore a subjective or metaphysical term; and in metaphysics qualities are primary and secondary, or necessary to the conception of a thing, and not so essential; as, whiteness is a primary quality of snow, and a secondary quality of a horse. ATTRIBUTE (*Lat. ad, to, and tribuere, tributus*, to give) is, more properly,

a *personal quality*, and so is mainly moral, as property is mainly physical, and quality metaphysical; as, "Justice and mercy are attributes of God." We may say, roughly, that qualities are perceived; properties, discovered; attributes, ascribed.

"*Property* is correctly a synonym for peculiar quality; but it is frequently used as co-extensive with quality in general."—*Sir W. Hamilton*.

"Humility and Patience, Industry and Temperance, are very often the good *qualities* of a poor man."—*Addison*.

"But mercy is above this scepter'd sway;
It is an *attribute* to God Himself."
Shakespeare.

It may be added that we do not speak of the attributes of any but *great* persons or personifications; while we speak of the properties of brute matter, and the qualities even of the commonest men.

PROPITIOUS. *See* AUSPICIOUS.

PROPHESY. *See* FORETELL.

PROPORTION. RATE. RATIO.

PROPORTION (Lat. *pro*, for, and *portio*, a portion) is the relation or adaptation of one portion to another or to the whole in point of magnitude or quantity, and is a term of greater dignity than the others, being employed, not of mere quantity only, but of such quantity as relates to truth, justice, or artistic impression. RATE (*rata*, sc. pars., a reckoned part) is an established portion or measure, a fixed allowance. Proportion is a *fixed* value; rate is a *concurrent* value; and is thus employed of movement or continuous proportion. "At the rate or running value or proportion of six miles an hour." RATIO is only employed of the relation which one quantity or magnitude has to another; for instance, as two is to four, so is four to eight; as two is to six, so is six to eighteen, and the like.

"*Proportion* is the measure of relative quantity."—*Burke*.

"Nor will the purity which is inseparable from it ever let us know what the vast and sinking expenses of lewdness and uncleanness are. In a word, it is vice only that is the chargeable thing; it is only shame and

repentance that men buy at such costly rates."—*Sharp*.

PROPORTIONATE. *See* ADEQUATE.

PROPOSAL. PROPOSITION.

These terms represent two aspects of the word propose—that is, lay down (Lat. *proponere*). A PROPOSAL is something laid down before another for consideration. A PROPOSITION is something laid down in words simply—any affirmation or denial—that is, logically, any assertion of the connection or disconnection of two terms—being a proposition, affirmative or negative. The terms are often confounded. But it is also true that the same thing may be called a proposal and a proposition, according to the view taken of it; that is to say, a statement is a proposition; a statement made for purposes of consideration is a proposal also; yet there seems also a further difference in usage; proposition being used for something *to be deliberated upon*; proposal, something *to be done*.

"Spare that *proposal*, father! spare the trouble
Of that solicitation." *Milton*.

"If a *proposition* ascribing the nature of things has an indefinite subject, it is generally to be esteemed universal in its propositional sense."—*Watts, Logic*.

PROPOSE. OFFER. PURPOSE.

The meaning of PROPOSE has been partly considered under PROPOSAL. To propose or to OFFER (Lat. *offerre*, *ob*, against, and *ferre*, to carry) both relate to practical affairs. We propose for consideration; we offer for acceptance. In argument, to propose a remark, would mean, to lay it down for deliberation or discussion on its own merits; to offer a remark, would mean, to present it for acceptance or rejection, as relevant or irrelevant. To offer commonly implies a single undivided interest; to propose implies complex or common interests. Where one person is concerned, we offer, or where many are as one in community of condition. Where many are concerned, we propose. No two terms are more commonly confounded than purpose and propose; but the former denotes a

settled, the latter, a contingent, state of mind. I propose to do something, if I have not yet made up my mind. I purpose when I *have* made it up. Yet the words purpose and propose might often be used indifferently, provided it be remembered that they express different aspects of the same thing. I purpose to do a thing when I have formed a practical intention to do it. I propose to do it when I recognize it as a design which I shall carry out, provided that nothing should occur to hinder or deter me.

"But I should ill become this throne, O peers,
And this imperial sovereignty, adorned
With splendour, armed with power, if
aught *proposed*,
And judged of public moment, in the shape
Of difficulty or danger, could deter
Me from attempting." *Milton.*

"The ship a naked helpless hull is left ;
For'd round and round, she quits her
purposed way,
And bounds uncertain o'er the swelling
sea." *Rowe, Lucan.*

PROPOSITION. *See* PHRASE and PROPOSAL.

PROPRIETOR. *See* MASTER.

PROROGUE. ADJOURN.

PROROGUE is a legislative term (*pro* and *rogare*, to ask, in the sense of asking the people's consent to a law), and only applied to national legislative assemblies. ADJOURN (*ad* and *diurnus*, daily, *dies*, a day) is employed of ordinary deliberative meetings.

PROSECUTE. *See* PURSUE.

PROSELYTE. *See* CONVERT.

PROSPECT. *See* LANDSCAPE.

PROSPER. *See* FLOURISH.

PROSPERITY. WELFARE. WELL-BEING.

WELFARE and WELL-BEING are abstract terms. PROSPERITY (*pro* and *spero*, *spes*, to hope) is a relative term. It is welfare regarded as the successful issue of conduct in the acquisition of material goods, and such estimation as is founded upon the possession of them. Success and

progress are involved in the idea of prosperity. Welfare is not so high a term as well-being; welfare denotes a sufficiency of material goods; well-being denotes that it is well with *the whole nature*, moral as well as bodily; as, virtue is necessary to the well-being, though not to the welfare of a man, to which it is, in some respects, often opposed.

"Prosperity is but a bad nurse to virtue, a nurse which is like to starve it in its infancy, and to spoil it in its growth."—*South.*

"Therefore, fair damsel, be ye well aware,
Lest that too far ye have your sorrow
sought,
You and your country both I wish *welfare*,
And honour both, for each of other worthy
are." *Spenser.*

"A necessity, indeed, of fitness, that is, that things could not have been otherwise than they are without diminishing the beauty, order, and *well-being* of the whole, there may be, and, as far we can comprehend, there certainly is."—*Clarke.*

PROSPEROUS. FORTUNATE.

The man is FORTUNATE (*fortuna*, fortune) whose welfare was unlooked for; PROSPEROUS, whose welfare was matter of hope and effort. Good fortune comes; but prosperity is, partly, at least, earned, though not of necessity honestly and well earned.

"Amongst men, those who are *prosperously* unjust are entitled to panegyric; but afflicted virtue is insolently stabbed with all manner of reproaches."—*Dryden, Juvenal.*

"For first with words, nearer admiration than liking, she would extol his excellences, the goodness of his shape, the power of his wit, the valiantness of his courage, the *fortunateness* of his successes."—*Sidney, Arcadia.*

PROTECT. *See* DEFEND.

PROTEST. *See* ASSERT.

PROTRACT. *See* DEFER.

PROVE. *See* PROOF.

PROVERB. APHORISM. APOPH-
THEGM. BYWORD. AXIOM. MAXIM.
SAYING. ADAGE. SAW. TRUISM.
PRINCIPLE.

The term PROVERB (Lat. *pro-*

verbum) is employed with considerable latitude of meaning, as equivalent to any saying which is frequently repeated, especially one forcibly expressing some practical truth, the result of experience or observation. It had of old attached to it the idea of mystical value, and hence came to signify something difficult to understand; as, "His disciples said unto Him, Lo, now speakest Thou plainly, and speakest no proverb."

"The *proverb* is true, that light gains make heavy purses, for light gains come often, great gains now and then."—*Bacon*.

APHORISM (Gr. ἀφορισμός, a definition, from ἀπορίζω, to mark off) differs from proverb in relating to abstract truth rather than to practical matters. The aphorisms of Hippocrates defined the symptoms of disease. An aphorism may be defined the substance of a doctrine. The characteristic of an aphorism seems to be the disproportion between the simplicity of the expression and the richness of the sentiment conveyed by it.

"That *aphorism* of the wise man, 'The desire of the slothful killeth him, for his hands refuse to labour,'"—*Barrow*.

ΑΠΟΡΗΘΕΓΜ (Gr. ἀπορθέγμα; it is often spelt *apothegm*, which is incorrect) is a terse, concise saying, of a sententious character. The *apophthegm* is in common what the *aphorism* is in higher matters. Its characteristic is terseness.

"In a numerous collection of our Saviour's *apophthegms*, many of them referring to sundry precepts of the Jewish law, there is not to be found an example of sophistry, or of false subtilty, or of anything approaching thereunto."—*Paley*.

BYWORD originally meant little more than a common saying, whether expressed by a single term or in more than one. It has taken to itself in later times a contemptuous signification, as if what is frequently named were a thing of meanness or derision; something the familiarity of whose mention has bred contempt.

"I agree with him fully in the last, and if I were forced to allow the first, I should

still think, with our old coarse *byword*, that the same power which furnished all their restaurateurs sent also their present cooks."—*Burke*.

An **AXIOM** (Gr. ἀξίωμα, ἀξιόω, to demand) is something which is claimed to be conceded as a self-evident proposition. It differs, however, from **TRUISM**, in being worthy of being developed into illustration or proof, which a truism is not. Moreover, truism belongs to morals; axiom, to science.

"There are a sort of propositions which, under the name of *maxims* and *axioms*, have passed for principles of science."—*Locke*.

"Allow a man the privilege to make his own definitions of common words, and it will be no hard matter for him to infer conclusions which, in one sense, shall be true, and in another, false, at once seeming paradoxes and manifest *truisms*."—*Berkeley*.

MAXIM (Lat. *maximus*, greatest, *maxima sententia*) is an established principle or proposition in matters of practical truth; its characteristic is the *authority* with which it is invested, so that it may be appealed to retrospectively. It is abstract and speculative, though founded upon observation and experience; so differing from **PRINCIPLE** (Lat. *principium*, beginning), which carries knowledge with it, and is applicable to action as a guide or basis of proceeding. A principle is a fundamental truth, or comprehensive law, from which others are derived, or on which they are founded.

"A good *principle* not rightly understood may prove as hurtful as a bad."—*Milton*.

It may be observed, generally, that principles are last in the order of investigation, and first in the order of practice. They are arrived at by analysis, and when found become bases or starting-points for action or scientific inquiry. A **SAYING** and a **SAW** are etymologically connected, and represent, the former the more philosophical, the latter, the more vulgar aspect of a proverb. A "wise saw," for instance, is an expression somewhat satirical, to denote the aiming at the sententious in that which is really commonplace. **ADAGE** (Lat. *adagium*) re-

presents in proverbs the aspect of their long establishment; as maxim, their authority; and the term proverb, their commonness. Hence we commonly find the word coupled with some adjective expressive of this: "the old adage," or the like; as, the common proverb; the vulgar saw; the excellent saying; the incontrovertible maxim; the established or universal principle.

"Severe to censure, earnest to advise,
And with old *saws* the present age chastise."
Francis, Horace.

"It was a common *saying* with him, that such altercations were for a logician and not merely for a philosopher."—*Sir T. More.*

The term saying, it will be seen, does not of necessity imply much authority, and is often the habitual expression of an individual only.

"The antithetic parallelism gives an acuteness and force to *adages* and moral sentences, and therefore abounds in Solomon's Proverbs."—*Lowth.*

PROVIDE. *See* SUPPLY.

PROVIDENCE. PRUDENCE.

These words are etymologically identical (*prudential*, prudence being a contracted form of *providential*, from *pro* and *videre*, to see); but PROVIDENCE is a habit; PRUDENCE, a quality. Hence the first may be employed of the inferior animals; the latter, only of men. Providence is more restricted than prudence, for it is directed only to the supplying of needful wants, or the making preparation against want, danger, or necessity; while prudence is applicable to everything which belongs to our interests, even of the highest kind. Prudence is rather contemplative, and guards; providence is active, and anticipates.

PROVIDENT. PRUDENT. *See* above.

PROVISION. *See* FARE.

PROVOKE. *See* EXASPERATE.

PRUDENT. *See* CAUTIOUS, POLITICAL, and WISE.

PRUDENT. PRUDENTIAL.

We use PRUDENT of character and

conduct; PRUDENTIAL, of the motives of conduct. Hence, a prudent course; prudential morality; that is, morality which is founded upon the theory that virtue is safer than vice. Prudent is exhibiting the moral quality of prudence. Prudential is actuated by nothing higher than prudence.

"Our blessed Saviour having prefaced concerning prudence, adds to the integrity of the precept, and for the conduct of our religion, that we be simple as well as prudent, innocent as well as wary."—*Bishop Taylor.*

"I know not how any honest man can charge his conscience in *prudentially* conniving at such falsities."—*More on Enthusiasm.*

PRYING. *See* INQUISITIVE.

PUBLISH. *See* ADVERTISE, ANNOUNCE, and DIVULGE.

PUERILE. *See* YOUNG.

PULL. *See* DRAW.

PUNCTUAL. *See* EXACT.

PUNISH. *See* CHASTISE.

PURCHASE. *See* BUY.

PURIFY. *See* CHASTEN.

PURLIEU. *See* BORDER.

PURPORT. *See* IMPORT.

PURPOSE. *See* MOTIVE.

PURPOSE. *See* PROPOSE.

PURSUE. *See* CHASE.

PURSUE. PROSECUTE.

There is the closest etymological affinity between these words, the former coming to us, mediately, through the French *poursuivre*; the latter, directly, from the Latin *prosequi*, *prosecutus*, to follow out. As applied to processes of mental application, they differ very slightly; but PURSUE seems rather more to belong to general, PROSECUTE, to specific, investigations or undertakings. So we commonly say, to pursue one's studies (indefinitely); but (definitely) to prosecute a particular line of inquiry.

PUSH. SHOVE. THRUST. PROPEL.

All these words denote giving an

impulse to a body, but differ as to the manner. PUSH (Fr. *pousser*, Lat. *pulsare*, from *pellere*, to drive) is indefinite. It may mean to press against with force, with or without producing change of place in the object. To SHOVE (A. S. *scōfan*, *scōfun*) is to drive along, and so implies a change of position; the action being by gradually increasing force or pressure, and not by sudden impulse, especially by causing it to slide or move along the surface of another body. THRUST (Icelandic *thrista*, to force) is applicable to cases in which a definite line of movement or a point of contact is supposed. We push persons; we thrust at them in cases in which a line of aim, especially with some weapon, is contemplated. PROPEL (Lat. *pro* and *pellere*, to drive) denotes a more equable or regulated application of force, commonly also sustained, for the purpose of pushing along a given course or line of movement, and so is often used in speaking of the scientific application of power to locomotion.

PUT. See LAY.

PUTREFY. ROT. CORRUPT.

These terms may be taken in the following order: CORRUPT (*corrumpere*, *corruptus*, to break up), PUTREFY (Lat. *putris* and *facere*, to make putrid), and ROT (A. S. *rotian*), to express the different stages of decomposition of organized bodies. The first, that in which the form as seen in life is beginning to be marred; the second, that in which it decays offensively; and the last, that in which its particles cease to cohere and begin to mingle with foreign matter. The verb corrupt is seldom used now in an intransitive sense. Formerly this use was more common, as by Bacon, but always rare.

Q.

QUAKE. See SHAKE.

QUALIFIED. COMPETENT. ENTITLED.

A man is QUALIFIED (Lat. *qualis*,

such as, *facere*, to make; to make such as may be required) for a task when his powers, either by training or by nature, have a special aptitude for that task. A man is COMPETENT to such a task when he has simply the natural powers, so that after-training may be added. Hence qualification is competency specifically developed. It follows that a man may be competent without being qualified, inasmuch as competency regards native powers; qualification, artificial acquirements. But qualification extends even beyond this; and, while competency always belongs to inherent power, qualification sometimes denotes such powers as are altogether extraneous to the individual, and come to him from without, or are conferred upon him. The fulfilment of any necessary condition whatever is, so far, a qualification. So that we speak of persons as qualified by their age to hold certain offices. ENTITLED (prefix *en*, and *titulus*, a title) denotes an assertive kind of qualification; that is, is applied to cases not only of fitness but of privilege, and denotes the condition to claim with success.

"The true reason of requiring any qualification with regard to property in voters is to exclude such persons as are in so mean a situation that they are esteemed to have no will of their own."—*Blackstone*.

"But the Socinians, who concluded that this was not thus, because they knew not how it could be thus, are highly to be reproved for their excess in the inquiries of reason, not where she is not a competent judge, but where she is not competently instructed."—*Bishop Taylor*.

"Entitling themselves to a contemptuous mercy by a display of their imbecility and meanness."—*Durke*.

QUALITY. See PROPERTY.

QUARREL. DIFFERENCE. DISPUTE. ALTERCATION. AFFRAY or FRAY. FEUD. BROIL.

A QUARREL (Old Eng. *querele*, Lat. *querela*, *queri*, to complain) is vague, general, and indefinite. Any angry contest, confined, however, to words, may be called a quarrel. The etymological force of the word, however, so far survives, that a quarrel

always presumes a wrong, or ground of complaint of some kind. Hence the phrase, "to pick a quarrel" (Shakespeare), meaning to seek wilfully that occasion of contest which does not readily present itself. By an extension of meaning, the verb to quarrel is applied to matters in which no question of right at all is concerned, and so denotes little more than actively to complain, as in the phrase, "to quarrel with one's food;" or to find fault, as, "to quarrel with a slight mistake."

"If upon a sudden *quarrel* two persons fight, and one of them kills the other, this is manslaughter."—*Blackstone*.

DIFFERENCE (Lat. *differentia*) is employed of personal matters of minor consequence. It is used both for the dissimilarity of opinion or feeling and for the manifestation of it. A DISPUTE (Lat. *disputare*) is a difference more or less strong kept within the bounds of argument and the expression of opponent views or claims. It may be upon a point external to both parties. It closely resembles ALTERCATION (*alter*, each or other), which is literally the alternate expression of feelings of difference. Altercations properly involve but two persons; while disputes may involve many. An altercation is a wordy dispute.

"Ought lesser *differences* altogether to divide and estrange those from one another whom such ancient and sacred bonds unite?"—*Blair*.

"I here, in this place, make this offer to them, that if I (Prynne) may be admitted a fair *dispute* on fair terms for my cause, that I will maintain, and do here make the challenge, against all the prelates in the king's dominions, and against all the prelates in Christendom, let them take in the Pope and all to help them, that their calling is not *jure divino*."—*State Trials*.

"When Jacob abruptly left the house of his father-in-law Laban, and was pursued and overtaken by him, a warm *altercation* took place."—*Gilpin*.

AFFRAY or FRAY (being from the Old French *affraier*, *affreer*, connected with the Latin *frigidus*, cold) is literally to cause to turn cold, or to cause to fear. The etymology therefore

indicates that in this case the quarrel, as the cause of alarm, is of a *public* nature. Hence it has been defined by Blackstone, "The fighting of two or more persons in a public place to the terror of others."

"The Provost of Edinburgh, his son, and several citizens of distinction were killed in the *fray*."—*Robertson*.

A FEUD (Low Latin *faida*, *feida*, A. S. *fähdh*) is, properly, a combination of kindred to avenge injuries or insults, which in uncivilized times extended from the offenders on either side to their kith and kin, and tended to perpetuate itself for generations. Hence the term expresses a deep-rooted, long-standing animosity between two parties, and, by an extension of meaning, sometimes between two individuals. A BROIL (Old Eng. *broyle*, *browyl*) is an angry contention of more than two persons, carrying with it the idea of chance disturbance and fortuitous entanglement in quarrel.

"Yet oftentimes in his maddest mirthful mood,

Strange pangs would flash along Childe Harold's brow,

As if the memory of some deadly *feud*,
Or disappointed passion, lurked below."

Byron.

"There is no preserving peace, nor preventing *broils* and stirs but by punctually observing that ordinary rule of equity that in cases of doubtful debate, and points of controverted practice, the fewest should yield to the most, the weakest yield to the strongest, and that to the greatest number should be allowed at least the greatest appearance of reason."—*Barrow*.

QUARTER. See DISTRICT.

QUERY. QUESTION.

A QUESTION is simply such a form of inquiry as involves a verbal answer. A QUERY is a question on a peculiar subject-matter, that is, where the answer involves a knowledge of the scientific or abstruse. A question may be grave or idle. A query is always grave. Truth generally is the object of a question; *curious* truth, of a query.

"St. Paul, answering that *querie* of the philosophick infidel, 'How are the dead raised

up, or with what body do they come?' re-
plieth in this manner."—*Cudworth.*

"But this *question* asked puts me in doubt."
Milton.

QUESTION. See INQUIRE and
QUERY.

QUICKNESS. CELERITY. EX-
PEDITION. RAPIDITY. SWIFTNESS.
VELOCITY. FLEETNESS.

QUICKNESS (Old Eng. *quick*, alive) is the generic term, of which all the rest may be regarded as specific applications. CELERITY (Lat. *celer*) and SWIFTNESS (A. S. *swift*, from *swifan*, to move quickly) can only be said of objects passing from one spot to another; while the more generic term quickness may be used of things moving upon the same spot. Quickness has relation to time by itself, as well as to space; as, quickness of sight or hearing. Celerity is commonly used of such movement as results from will, and so belongs to persons and impersonations; while RAPIDITY (Lat. *rapidus*) and swiftness are employed both of conscious and mechanical movement. The quick answer to a call, a ready pursuit of an object in a creature of intelligence, is celerity. So we do not speak of the celerity of a cannon-ball, or even of a bird in its flight, but the velocity of the one, and the rapidity of the other. VELOCITY (Lat. *velox*) is employed where mechanical rapidity, and nothing else, is intended or contemplated, and is a scientific term for rate of movement, however slow. EXPEDITION (Lat. *expedire*, *expeditus*, to hasten) is exclusively confined to the complex actions of intelligent agents; and FLEETNESS (Icelandic *fljóte*, quick), to the quickness of animal movements from place to place. If employed of inanimate things, it is by a rhetorical analogy to animate motion. In rapid is sometimes implied the idea of quick succession, that is, quickness which has the effect of diminishing intervals. So the swift revolutions of a wheel, would mean the mere velocity of the wheel's rotatory movement; the rapid revolutions, would mean the short periods in which the rotations were completed.

"Hamlet, this deed of thine for thine espe-
cial safety,
Which we do tender as we dearly grieve;
For that which thou hast done must send
thee hence

With fiery quickness." *Shakespeare.*

"Time, with all its celerity, moves slowly
to him whose whole employment is to watch
its flight."—*Idler.*

"With winged expedition, swift as light-
ning." *Milton.*

"We mortals could have little better
ground for our faith and hope in such an
omnipotent arbitrary will as this, than we
could have in the motions of senseless atoms
furiously agitated, or of a rapid whirlwind."
—*Cudworth.*

"Herald, be swift, and bid Machaon bring
His speedy succour to the Spartan king."
Pope, Homer.

"It appears, from experiments of falling
bodies, and from experiments of pendulums,
which, being of equal lengths and unequal
gravities, vibrate in equal times, that all
bodies whatsoever in spaces void of sensible
resistance, fall from the same height with
equal velocities."—*Clarke.*

QUIET. See CALM and EASE.

QUIT. See LEAVE.

QUIVER. See SHAKE.

QUOTE. CITE.

To CITE (Lat. *citare*, from *ciere*, to call) is literally to call as a witness, and, in its literary sense, to call in the words of another in aid of one's own. In this way it becomes a synonym with QUOTE (Old Fr. *quoter*, from the Latin *quotus*, how many, or which in order). To cite an author, and to quote an author, have practically nearly the same meaning; but we use the term cite when the mind dwells primarily upon the matter imported; quote, when we think of the precise words. To cite Shakespeare as an authority, does not imply so exact a reproduction of his words as the term quote, for we may cite roughly, but we are bound to quote exactly.

"I propose this passage entire, to take off the disguise which its *quoter* put upon it."—*Atterbury.*

"This little song is not unlike a sonnet ascribed to Shakespeare, which deserves to be cited here, as a proof that the Eastern imagery is not so different from the European as we are apt to imagine."—*Jones on Eastern Poetry.*

R.

RACE. *See* HOUSE.RAGE. *See* WRATH.RAIMENT. *See* DRESS.RAISE. *See* LIFT.RALLY. *See* BANTER.RAMBLE. ROAM. ROVE. RANGE.
STROLL. WANDER.

The idea of going in a free, irregular manner is common to these terms. To RAMBLE is to go about from place to place without any determinate object in view, but in sheer relaxation of mind. To ROAM (Old Fr. *romier*, a pilgrim, especially a pilgrim going to Rome) has not the freedom and carelessness of ramble, and is often associated with restlessness, or an impulse to *uneasy* wandering. As roam implies something in the past impelling to wander, so ROVE involves the idea of a future purpose, and is commonly associated with search or wandering in quest of an object. RANGE (Fr. *rang*, connected with Eng. *rank*) differs from the preceding in being within certain limits, as the *ranger* of a park. The hunter ranges the woods or the mountains, that is, wanders about some more or less definitely prescribed area, and with no listlessness or want of aim, but, on the contrary, with a purpose of observation or quest. It implies a right and a freedom. To WANDER (A. S. *wandrian* and *wandorian*) and to STROLL (Prov. Germ. *strollen*, with other forms) closely resemble each other; but a stroll is commonly on foot, while wander may be also on horseback or on water. Stroll excludes that idea of accident and ignorance of the course or road which sometimes attaches to the idea of wandering. Nor has it so direct a reference to a line of right or proposed movement which has been erroneously left or lost.

"We must not *ramble* in this field without discernment or choice, nor even with these must we *ramble* too long."—*Bolingbroke on the Study of History*.

"Where'er I *roam*, whatever realms I see,
My heart, untravell'd, fondly turns to thee,
Still to my brother turns with ceaseless pain,
And drags at each remove a lengthening chain."
Goldsmith.

"The wild *roving*s of men's fancies into odd similitudes, startling metaphors, humorous expressions, and sportive representations of things, are grown more acceptable in almost all conversations than the most solid reason and discourse."—*Scott, Christian Life*.

"A milk-white hind, immortal and unchanged,
Fed on the lawns, and in the forest ranged.
Without unspotted, innocent within,
She feared no danger, for she knew no sin."
Dryden.

"These mothers *stroll* to beg sustenance for their helpless infants."—*Swift*.

"They *wandred* about in sheepskins and goatskins."—*English Bible*.

RANCOUR. *See* HATRED.RANGE. *See* RAMBLE.RANK. *See* CLASS.

RANSOM. REDEEM.

These words are etymologically identical, RANSOM being the French *rançon*, and this a modification of the Latin *redemptio*, from *re*, back, and *emere*, to buy. In its application, redeem is general; ransom, particular. We redeem things and persons. We ransom persons only. Moreover, the means of redeeming are manifold. We may redeem not only by money, but by care, by the expenditure of labour, and the like. We ransom only by money. Character, life, honour may be redeemed. Only persons, or their life or liberty, are the objects of ransom.

"Talk not of life or *ransom*, he replies;
Patroclus dead, whoever meets me dies."
Pope, Homer.

"For no way else, they said, but this could be,
Their wrong-detained honour to *redeem*,
Which true-bred blood should more than
life esteem."
Daniel.

RAPACIOUS. RAVENOUS. VORACIOUS.

RAPACIOUS (Lat. *rapax*, from

rapere, to seize) is given to seizing from a desire of possessing. This is applicable to matters of greed in food, but obviously extends far beyond them. RAVENOUS (from *raven*, written also *ravin*, another form of *rapine*) and VORACIOUS (*vorax*, *vorare*, to devour) apply only to matters of food, except by rhetorical analogy. Of these two, ravenous denotes rather the state, voracious, the nature, of the animal. A voracious beast is one that satisfies its appetite by large quantities of food; a ravenous animal or appetite may have been simply made so by long privation. There are some animals which cannot be called voracious, for they pass considerable intervals without taking any food; yet at the times of eating they have become ravenous.

"There are two sorts of avarice; the one is but of a bastard kind, and that is the *rapacious* appetite of gain, not for its own sake, but for the pleasure of refunding immediately through all the channels of pride and luxury."—*Cowley*.

"The curiosity of the one, like the hunger of the other, devours *ravenously*, and without distinction, whatever comes in its way, but neither of them digests."—*Bolingbroke, Study of History*.

"But it ought to be observed that it is this slowness which alone suspends the *voracity* of this animal (the sloth)."—*Paley*.

RAPID. See QUICK.

RAPINE. See PILLAGE.

RAPTURE. See ECSTASY.

RARE. SCARCE.

We call a thing RARE (Lat. *rarus*) when only a few of the kind exist, or can be procured. We speak of a thing as SCARCE, which exists, or is to be had at the present time, in diminished quantities. Diamonds are rare when they are compared with pebbles. They are scarce when there happen to be comparatively few in the market. Thus rare bears reference to the intrinsic character of things; scarce, to their relation to circumstances and requirements. Scarce implies a previous plenty, which is not the case with rare. Rare qualifies what is an object of novelty, curiosity, or

intrinsic value; scarce, what is a matter of necessity or common demand. Things are rare by nature; they become scarce by circumstances.

"A perfect union of wit and judgment is one of the *rarest* things in the world."—*Burke*.

"For the *rarity* of transparent gems, their lustre, and the great value which their *scarceness* and men's folly sets upon them, emboldens some to say, and inclines others to believe, that such *rare* and noble productions of Nature must be endowed with proportionable and consequently with extraordinary qualities."—*Boyle*.

RASHNESS. See HASTINESS.

RATE. See CALCULATE and PROPORTION.

RATIO. See PROPORTION.

RATIONAL. REASONABLE.

These are respectively forms coming to us directly from the Latin (*ratio*, reason) and the French *raison*. RATIONAL has relation to reason as a faculty of the mind, and is opposed to irrational; as, a rational being, a rational state of mind. REASONABLE has reference not so much to the speculative as to the practical reason, denoting governed by, or in accordance with, *right* reason; as, "Reasonable views involve prospects of success."

"Can there, then, be enthusiasts who profess to follow reason? Yes, undoubtedly, if by reason they mean only conceits. Therefore such persons are now commonly called reasonists, or rationalists, to distinguish them from true reasoners, or *rational* inquirers."—*Waterland*.

"The adjective *reasonable*, as employed in our language, is not liable to the same ambiguity as the substantive from which it is derived. It denotes a character in which reason, taking it in its larger acceptation, possesses a decided ascendancy over the temper and passions, and implies no particular propensity to a display of the discursive power—indeed, it does not exclude the idea of such a propensity."—*Stewart*.

RAVAGE. DEVASTATION. DESOLATION.

RAVAGE (Fr. *ravage*, as if from the Low Latin *rapagium*, from *rapere*, to seize or plunder) is the violence that

mars and spoils; DEVASTATION (*de* and *vastus*, waste), the violence that destroys and lays waste; DESOLATION (*de* and *solus*, alone), the violence which makes empty and uninhabited.

RAVENOUS. See RAPACIOUS.

RAY. See BEAM.

REACH. EXTEND. STRETCH.

REACH (A. S. *ræcan*, with other forms) is a more significant term, though a simpler one, than EXTEND (Lat. *extendere*, to stretch out), inasmuch as it involves not the mere abstract idea of extension, but such extension as attains to a given point; as, a tall man reaches to the top of the door. No such limitation is conveyed by extend or stretch; The latter, STRETCH (A. S. *streccan*), conveys the idea of effort, or is employed where continuity as the result of effort may be imagined; as, when we speak of a promontory stretching far out to sea, the analogy suggested is that of an outstretched arm. Extend is the most abstract of the three, and is applicable both to lines and spaces. In their secondary application, extend is effortless, as observation, power, influence may be extended, that is, simply carried out farther; they may be stretched unduly; they may reach or not to the desired point or amount. Extension is employed scientifically, as a property of matter or space.

"Being at liberty to indulge himself in all the immunities of invisibility, out of the reach of danger, he (Jnnius) has been bold; out of the reach of shame, he has been confident."—*Johnson*.

"If any one ask me what this space I speak of is, I will tell him when he tells me what his extension is. For to say, as is usually done, that extension is to have partes extra partes, is to say only that extension is extension. For what am I the better informed in the nature of extension when I am told that extension is to have parts that are extended, i.e., extension consists of extended parts?"—*Locke*.

"His slanting ray
Slides ineffectual down the snowy vale,
And tinging all with his own rosy hue,
From every herb and every spiry blade,
Stretches a length of shadow o'er the field."
Cowper.

READY. See APT.

REAL. See ACTUAL.

REALIZE. See FULFIL.

REALM. STATE. COMMON-WEALTH.

The STATE (Lat. *status*, a standing) is the body politic of a country, sometimes restricted to the legislative body, sometimes extended to the entire body of the people as governed by the laws of their representatives. It denotes government in the most abstract sense. REALM (Fr. *royaume*, *roi*, *rex*, a king) denotes such a nation as is monarchical and aristocratic in its constitution. Hence such emphatic expressions as, "a peer of the realm," "the parliament of the realm." We may also, with less regard to its aristocratic constitution, speak of "the parliament of the country;" but we do not commonly speak of "a peer of the country." COMMONWEALTH (common and wealth, weal, or well-being) is a term not bearing so distinctively upon the form of government, but belongs to a free country, as being so administered as to aim at the public good.

"His realm is declared to be an empire, and his crown imperial, by many Acts of Parliament, particularly the statutes 24 Henry VIII., ch. 12, and 25 Henry VIII., ch. 28, which at the same time declare the king to be the supreme head of the realm in matters both civil and ecclesiastical."—*Blackstone*.

"The Puritans in the reign of Mary, driven from their homes, sought an asylum in Geneva, where they found a state without a king, and a Church without a bishop."—*Choate*.

The term commonwealth has received a strong anti-monarchical tinge from the fact that this name was given to the government of England which intervened after the death of Charles I., and ended with the resignation of Richard Cromwell.

"The Commonwealth yet panting underneath
The stripes and wounds of a late civil war,
Gasping for life, and scarce restored to hope."
Ben Jonson.

REASON. CAUSE. SOURCE.
ORIGIN.

REASON (Fr. *raison*, Lat. *ratio*) relates originally to logical sequence. A reason is the CAUSE, not of the existence of a thing, but of our knowing it. It is the mode in which we take account of its being, so answering to the question, How? as, "How do you know that your friend has gone this road?" "Because I recognize his footmarks." In common conversation it is often used loosely instead of cause, either the physical cause, namely, that which produces an effect; or the final cause, namely, the purpose for which a thing is done. SOURCE (Fr. *source*, Lat. *surgere*, to rise) and ORIGIN (*origo*, *originis*) both have reference to physical, not logical, sequence. Source conveys more distinctively the idea of yielding or producing. A source of information is not only the point at which our information begins, but that to which, as to a spring or fountain, we may recur to draw fresh draughts of knowledge. Consciousness of right is a source of fortitude, that is, supplies continuously the power of endurance. Origin, on the other hand, is a term not expressive of continued action or operation. So that it may denote no more than a cause which acted for the moment, and then passed away. Families, dynasties, discoveries, languages, nations, facts, have their origins, which are the circumstances to which the mind refers as having brought them about. So we might say, "A casual meeting was the origin of a friendship which is now a source of much happiness." Reasons are logical; causes are natural. The cause of a vessel's sailing is the wind acting upon the sails. The reason of its sailing is the order given to its captain. The result of a reason is a conclusion; the result of a cause is an effect. The cause gives the physical, the reason, the metaphysical, account. Generally speaking, the cause is sufficient or insufficient; the reason is satisfactory or unsatisfactory; the origin is plain or doubtful and obscure; the source is fruitful or barren,

"Be ready always to give an answer to every man that asketh you a *reason* of the hope that is in you with meekness and fear."
—*English Bible*.

"In the notice that our senses take of the common vicissitudes of things, we cannot but observe that several particulars, both qualities and substances, begin to exist, and that they receive this their existence from the due application and operation of some other being. From this observation we get our ideas of *cause* and effect."—*Locke*.

REASONABLE. See FAIR and RATIONAL.

REBELLION. See INSURRECTION.

REBOUND. REVERBRATE. RECOIL.

REBOUND (Fr. *rebondir*) is simply to spring or start back on collision by the elastic force of the body struck or rebounding. REVERBERATE (*re*, back, and *verber*, a stroke) is now restricted to the rebounding of sound, and sometimes to the reflection of rays of light. RECOIL (*re* and Fr. *cueillir*, Lat. *colligere*, to collect) is employed in those cases in which the rebound strikes or closely affects the person causing the movement or projection, as when a gun recoils, or a plot for the injury of another recoils upon the plotter.

REBUKE. See BLAME.

RECALL. See ABJURE.

RECAUT. See ABJURE.

RECAPITULATE. See REPEAT.

RECEDE. RETREAT. RETIRE.
WITHDRAW. SECEDE.

To RECEDE (Lat. *recedere*) is to go back. To RETREAT (Fr. *rétracter*, *re* and Fr. *tract*, Lat. *trahere*, *tractus*) is to draw back. Hence recede is the more purely mechanical. A body passing away from us recedes into the distance. Retreat, except when it is employed in poetic analogy, involves a purpose in receding; such as the object of leaving one locality or position to go to another. RETIRE (Fr. *re* and *tirer*, to draw) is closely similar to retreat, but more strongly denotes the purpose of absenting oneself from view. A party of soldiers, unable to hold one post in fighting, may

retreat to another. A combatant, convinced that he has no chance of success, may retire altogether from the contest. **WITHDRAW** is in English exactly what retire is in French; but, as is common in such cases, withdraw is the more familiar and less dignified term. An army retires from the occupation of a country. An individual withdraws on finding the company uncongenial to him. **SECEDE** (Lat. *se*, apart, and *cedere*, to go) denotes a public and formal act of separation from a body with which one was associated, more especially religious and political bodies.

RECEIPT. RECEPTION.

These terms—both derived from the Latin *recipere*, *receptus*, to receive—differ in the applications to which usage has restricted them. **RECEIPT** applies to inanimate objects, as being simply taken into possession; **RECEPTION**, to persons, and to such objects as are connected with will and sentiment on the part of the givers. A receipt of goods is acknowledged. The reception of favours merits gratitude. “His friend met with a warm reception.” I acknowledge the receipt, not the reception, of a letter.

“At the receipt of your letter.”—*Shakespeare*.

“His reception is here recorded on a medal, on which one of the ensigns presents him his hand.”—*Addison*.

RECEIVE. See **ACCEPT** and **ADMIT**.

RECENT. See **MODERN**.

RECEPTION. See **RECEIPT**.

RECIPROCAL. See **MUTUAL**.

RECITE. See **REPEAT**.

RECKON. See **CALCULATE**.

RECLAIM. **REFORM**.

To **RECLAIM** (Lat. *reclamare*, to call back) always denotes an external influence, such as the exhortations and representations of friends. **REFORM** (Lat. *reformare*, to form anew) commonly implies motives springing from within. A man reforms himself, and reclaims his neighbour.

Reclaim is also more specific. **Reform** is of the character generally. **Reclaim** refers to some specific vice or error, to the latter of which reform does not apply so forcibly. **Reclaim** has also a more extended sense. We may be reclaimed from misery or error. We are reformed only from vice. On the other hand, individuals are reclaimed; systems or institutions also are reformed.

“A qualified property may subsist in animals *feræ naturæ* per *industriam hominis*, by a man’s *reclaiming* and making them tame by art, industry, and education.”—*Blackstone*.

“This shall certainly be our portion as well as his, unless we do prevent it by a speedy *reformation* of our lives.”—*Sharp*.

RECLINE. REPOSE. REST.

To **RECLINE** (Lat. *reclinare*) is to lean back for support. **REPOSE** (Fr. *reposer*, Lat. *reponere*) is to place oneself in the easiest position for rest. To **REST** (Fr. *rester*) is to cease from labour or exertion, and may be in a standing or any other posture.

“To their supper fruits they fell.
Nectarine fruits, which the compliant boughs
Yielded them side-long as they sat *recline*
On the soft downy bank, damask’d with
flowers.” *Milton*.

The word **recline** in the above is an adjective.

“So forth she rode, without *repose* or *rest*,
Searching all lands, and each remotest
part,
Following the guidance of her blinded
guest,
Till that to the sea-coast at length she her
address.” *Spenser*.

RECOGNIZE. ACKNOWLEDGE.

To **ACKNOWLEDGE** is opposed to keeping back or concealing. It is to avow our knowledge, where that knowledge had been previously confined to ourselves, and where the avowal of it on our part furnishes others with peculiar and complete evidence. The extent to which acknowledgment furnishes knowledge to others, in the sense of information which they did not previously possess, is a matter of degree. To acknowledge one’s obligations for the kindness of others, is little more than openly to

express them. To acknowledge one's fault, may or may not imply that it was not known to others. To acknowledge a secret marriage, is to give others a completeness of information which otherwise they had not possessed. The difference between acknowledge and RECOGNIZE (Lat. *re*, again, *cognoscere*, to know) turns on the previous state of our own minds. We acknowledge what we knew distinctly before, though we did not make that knowledge public. We recognize what we saw at first only *indistinctly*. That which we recognize we know, as it were, anew, and admit it on the ground of the evidence which it brings. A person is recognized as an ambassador when he produces his testimonials. We recognize a friend after a long absence when we have had time to put together the ocular evidence of his identity. We recognize truths, principles, claims, and the like when such grounds for them have been laid before us as we feel we cannot reject. Hence acknowledgment is for the sake of others; recognition is on our own account. In acknowledging we impart knowledge; in recognising we receive it.

"Hang, beg, starve, die in the streets!
For by my soul I'll ne'er *acknowledge* thee,
Nor, what is more, shall never do thee good."
Shakespeare.

"But the view in which the state regards the practice of morality is evidently seen in its *recognition* of that famous maxim by which penal laws in all communities are fashioned and directed, that the severity of the punishment must always rise in proportion to the propensity to the crime."—*Warburton.*

RECOIL. *See* REBOUND.

RECOLLECTION. *See* MEMORY.

RECOMPENSE. *See* COMPENSATION.

RECONCILE. *See* CONCILIATE.

RECORD. *See* ACCOUNT.

RECOUNT. RELATE.

These terms differ in the character of the subject-matter. The idea of giving an account of circumstances or occurrences is common to both;

but we RELATE (Lat. *referre*, *relatus*, to bring back) generally; we RECOUNT (Fr. *conter*, Lat. *computare*) specifically. Anything which has occurred of a complex character, and in order of occurrence may be related. We recount in closer detail what is personally connected with ourselves and matter of our own experience. We relate the story of another's adventures; we recount our own. The term relate is also broadly applicable to all modes of connected statements, as by writing or by word of mouth; recount is commonly restricted to word of mouth. We relate things that have occurred; we recount them *as* they occurred. We ought to recount fully, and to relate accurately.

"To all His angels, who with true applause
Recount His praises." *Milton.*

"Truth she *relates* in a sublimer strain
Than all the tales the boldest Greeks could
feign." *Waller.*

RECOVER. RETRIEVE. REGAIN.

RECOVER is the French *recouvrer*, the Latin *recuperare*, a form of *recipere*, to receive. RETRIEVE is from the French *retrouver*, to find again. We are said to recover what has been accidentally lost, or lost from want of reflection; to retrieve that the loss of which is more distinctly chargeable upon us as a fault. A man loses his purse, and by assiduous inquiry and search succeeds perhaps in recovering it. He retrieves his good name. A man may recover by good luck; but he retrieves through his own exertions. REGAIN (Fr. *regagner*) denotes the recovery of what is of simple and obvious value. We recover what is of general, even indirect, advantage. We retrieve what it is a positive loss to have parted with. We regain possessions; we retrieve losses; we recover advantages.

"Though wicked men be under the influence of their corrupt prevailing inclinations, in the ordinary course of their lives, yet at some certain seasons, and especially in the absence of temptations, their enchanted reason and understanding may *recover* its due force and spring."—*Waterland.*

"There is much to be done, undoubtedly, and much to be *retrieved*."—*Burke.*

"My soul attends thy voice; and banish'd
Virtue
Strives to *regain* her empire of the mind."
Johnson.

RECREATION. *See* AMUSEMENT.

RECTIFY. *See* AMEND.

RECTITUDE. JUSTICE.

RECTITUDE (Lat. *rectus*, right or straight) is conformity to the rule of right in principle and practice. JUSTICE (Lat. *justitia*, *jus*, right or law) refers more especially to the carrying out of law as regards the treatment of others. Rectitude is, therefore, in oneself; justice is on account of others. Justice is by moralists divided into—commutative, which assures to every man what is his own in fact or by promise; distributive, which deals out to several according to their deserts; and general, which through any channels, though not strictly commutative or distributive, carries out the ends of law, as in the government of his children by a parent.

"Nor is the lowest herd incapable of that sincerest of pleasures, the consciousness of acting right; for *rectitude* does not consist in extensiveness of knowledge, but in doing the best according to the lights afforded."—*Seurch.*

"The king-becoming graces,
As *justice*, verity, temperance, and stability,
I have no relish of them." *Shakespeare.*

REDEEM. *See* RANSOM.

REDRESS. RELIEF.

REDRESS (Fr. *redresser*, *re*, back, and Lat. *dirigere*, to direct) is, literally, the bringing back to the right, and is said only in regard to matters of right and justice; while RELIEF (Lat. *relevare*, *levis*, light) is said of the lightening of anything that may be regarded as of the nature of a burden, as pain, inconvenience, obligation, or necessity.

"Thus heavenward all things tend. For all
were once
Perfect, and all must be at length restored.
So God has greatly purposed; Who would
else
In His dishonour'd works Himself endure
Dishonour, and be wronged without *redress*."
Cowper.

"The inferior ranks of people no longer looked upon that order, as they had done before, as the comforters of their distress, and the *relievers* of their indigence."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations.*

REDUCE. *See* LOWER.

REDUNDANCY. *See* EXCESS.

REEL. STAGGER. TOTTER.

Involuntary and unsteady motion in animate beings is common to these terms. To REEL (connected with roll) is to move in such a way as to border on the loss of equilibrium. To STAGGER may be applied to standing as well as walking, and denotes a difficulty of preserving the power of standing upright (Old Dutch *staggeren*, to stagger). As reeling is the effect of force or misdirected movement, as in intoxication, so staggering indicates either great pressure, as of a burden, or unsteadiness of brain, and consequent weakness. TOTTER (allied to the Provincial German *tattern*, *dattern*, *dottern*, to tremble or shake) is the indication of weakness, especially in the support of the limbs, and is applied, as the others are not, to what is inanimate; as, a building tottering to its fall.

REFER. *See* ALLUDE.

REFINED. *See* POLITE.

REFINEMENT. *See* CULTIVATION.

REFLECT. *See* MEDITATE.

REFLECTION. *See* FEELING.

REFORM. *See* AMEND and RECLAIM.

REFORM. REFORMATION.

REFORMATION (Lat. *re*, again, and *formare*, *forma*, a form) is usually employed of matters of grave moral or political importance in the interests of nations and individuals. REFORM is oftener applied to practical details. We speak of a reformation in morals and in religion; a reform in government and administration or management. Whately has well remarked,

"It is a recent custom to speak of *reforming* abuses; but this is an impropriety of language. Abuses may be remedied or extirpated, but they cannot be *reformed*. In the

same way, we speak improperly of curing diseases. It is, correctly speaking, the patient who is cured."

Under another view, reformation and reform also differ as active and passive. Reformation is often used in the sense of the act of reforming; reform, of the state of being reformed. A reformation may be going on; a reform may be effected.

"This was a proper time to enter upon the business of a *reformation*, which every man who gave himself a moment's time to think must be satisfied was absolutely necessary."—*Pitt, Speech on Parliamentary Reform.*

"What vice has it subdued, whose heart reclaimed

By rigour? or whom laughed into *reform*?" *Cowper.*

REFORMATION. *See* REFORM.

REFRACTORY. UNRULY. UNGOVERNABLE.

REFRACTORY (*refringere, refractus*, to break off) is the active and positive condition of UNRULINESS. The unruly child is simply hard to keep under rule. The refractory child perversely breaks rule. An unruly temper or disposition is under no sound principle of control; a refractory temper rebels against it. UNGOVERNABLE (Lat. *gubernare*, to govern) denotes that extreme of refractoriness which successfully sets at defiance all attempts at control.

REFRAIN. *See* ABSTAIN.

REFRESH. REVIVE. RENOVATE. RENEW.

REFRESH (Fr. *rafraîchir, fraîche*, fresh) denotes the renewal of what is vital or vivid; as to refresh one who is faint, or a colour which has become faded. REVIVE (*re* and *vif*, alive) is to renew that which is of the nature of vital force, or may be regarded as analogous to it. RENEW and RENOVATE, which are different forms of the same word, the former coming to us through the French *neuf*, and the latter through the Latin *novus*, new, differ in being employed, the former more distinctively of moral, the latter, of physical, subjects; as, to renew a vow; to renovate

furniture. All involve the idea of a restoration of things to their former state. Revive and refresh belong specially to animal bodies. One who had fainted revives when the functions of life return. One who is weary is refreshed when those functions are performed with more animation; refresh thus implying an inferior degree of antecedent exhaustion than revive. Anything of which the force or action has lain dormant or in abeyance may be said to be revived, as a custom, a claim, a practice. In this application, revive belongs rather to things external, renew, to things internal, to oneself. To renew a custom, would mean a custom of one's own; to revive a custom, would indicate others than oneself. Dormant energies, and even weakened impressions, are said to be revived. Renovate never implies any cessation or interval of time; whereas renew is often employed of the taking up of what has been suspended.

"In order to keep the mind in repair, it is necessary to replace and *refreshen* those impressions of Nature which are continually wearing away."—*Reynolds.*

"Gross corruptions of the Christian doctrine, which the caprice and vanity of this licentious age have *revived* rather than produced."—*Bishop Horsley.*

"All Nature feels the *renovating* force
Of winter." *Thomson.*

"The old custom upon many estates is to let for leases of lives, *renewable* at pleasure."—*Swift.*

REFUGE. *See* ASYLUM.

REFUSE. DECLINE. DENY. REJECT. REPEL. REBUFF.

We REFUSE (Fr. *refuser*, which seems to be a combination of the Latin *refutare* and *recusare*), indicates the expression of an unwillingness to grant what others desire, request, or demand. DECLINE (Lat. *declinare*) is a gentle yet determined refusal to act in a manner proposed, and most commonly from motives of consideration or prudence. We may decline what is advantageous to ourselves as well as what is desired by others. We DENY (Fr. *denier*, Lat. *denegare*) what is desired of us by

others, except in the sense in which denial is opposed to affirmation. We REJECT (Lat. *rejicere*, *rejectus*, to cast back) what is strongly opposed to our judgment or inclination. We REPEL (*repellere*, to drive back) what others press upon us. REBUFF (*re* and Old Fr. *bouffe*, a blow) denotes such a refusal or repelling as by its decisive character inflicts a shock upon the other party—refusal that may be felt.

"A flat *refusal* on his (their prince's) part reduces them to the melancholy alternative of continuing to submit to one grievance and to stand exposed to the other danger, or of freeing themselves from both without his consent."—*Bolingbroke*.

"He (Evelyn's father) was a studious *decliner* of honours and titles."—*Evelyn*.

"Begin, then, sisters of the sacred well,
That from beneath the seat of Jove do spring,
Begin, and somewhat loudly sweep the string,
Hence with *denial* vain and coy excuse."
Milton.

"For always the weakest part of mankind are the most suspicious; the less they understand things the more designs they imagine are laid for them, and the best counsels are soonest *rejected* by them."—*Stillingfleet*.

"They *repelled* each other strongly, and yet attracted each other strongly."—*Macaulay*.

"Marvelling that he who had never heard such speeches from any knight should be thus *rebuffed* by a woman; and that marvel made him hear out her speech."—*Sidney, Arcadia*.

REFUSE. See DREGS.

REFUTE. See CONFUTE.

REGAL. See KINGLY.

REGAIN. See RECOVER.

REGARD. See BEHOLD and
MEDITATE.

REGIMEN. See DIET.

REGION. See DISTRICT.

REGISTER. See CATALOGUE.

REGRET. See COMPLAIN and
REPENTANCE.

REGULATE. See DIRECT and
GOVERN.

REGULATION. See DECREE.

REHEARSE. See REPEAT.

REJECT. See REFUSE.

REJOINDER. See ANSWER.

RELATE. See RECOUNT.

RELATION. See ACCOUNT.

RELATIVE. See KINSMAN.

RELATIONSHIP. See AFFINITY.

RELAX. REMIT.

As applied to the lessening of pains and penalties, RELAX (*relaxare*, *laxus*, loose) is partial, REMIT (*remittere*) is total. Transportation, as a punishment, is relaxed, if its conditions are made less rigorous or its term is shortened. It is remitted, if the offender is spared altogether. The former is applied to the force, which is abated; the latter to the thing itself, which is dispensed with. Moreover, it is generally laws or obligations that are relaxed; penalties, that are remitted. Relax is also applied, as remit is not, to the abatement of physical force or effort, or to the strength and manifestation of human passion.

"From that great hour the war's whole future turns,
Pallas assists, and lofty Ilion burns.
Not till that day shall Jove *relax* his rage,
Nor one of all the heavenly host engage
In aid of Greece."
Pope, Homer.

"The condition of a *remitted* forfeiture being as absolutely in the breast of the *remitter* as the condition on which the blessing was originally conferred, He was pleased it should be done by one man's willingly offering himself to death for an atonement for all."—*Warburton*.

RELEASE. See DELIVER.

RELENTLESS. See IMPLACABLE.

RELIANCE. See DEPENDENCE.

RELIEF. See REDRESS.

RELIEVE. See APPEASE and
HELP.

RELIGIOUS. See DEVOUT.

RELINQUISH. See ABANDON.

RELISH. See TASTE.

RELUCTANT. AVERSE. ADVERSE.
UNWILLING.

RELUCTANT (*re* and *luctari*, to struggle) is a term of the will, which, as it were, struggles against the deed, and relates always to questions of action. AVERSE (*Fr. a*, to, and *versus*, turned) is a term of the nature or disposition, and relates to objects or to actions, as a matter of taste. It indicates a settled sentiment of dislike, as reluctance is specific in regard to acts. ADVERSE denotes active opposition and hostility, as a matter of judgment. UNWILLING is the widest of all, and expresses no more than decided disinclination. It is, however, the weakest term of all, and refers to action only.

"Well, says I, since it must be so, here is my arm; but I go half *reluctantly*, for I like this place so well, I could be content to live here always."—*Search, Light of Nature*.

"It is not difficult for a man to see that a person has conceived an *aversion* to him."
—*Spectator*.

Averse is only predicated of beings of intelligence and will. Adverse may be employed even of physical influences, as adverse winds. When predicated of persons, adverse is much stronger than averse. The man who is averse to a measure only dislikes it, and may still perhaps adopt it. He who is adverse to it, thinks it his bounden duty to do all he can to oppose and prevent it.

"Happy were it for us all if we bore prosperity as well and wisely as we endure an *adverse* fortune."—*Southey*.

REMAIN. See LAST and STAY.

REMAINDER. REST. REMNANT.
RESIDUE.

REMAINDER (*see* REMAIN) is not so general as REST (*rester*, to stop or remain), which is indeed the most general of all these terms, and denotes, universally, that which remains or is left after the separation of a part or parts, whether in fact or contemplation, and may be so as the result of circumstances or purposely. The remainder is the rest under certain conditions, most commonly the smaller part which remains after

the greater part has been taken away. It is also more applicable to mental and moral, rest to physical, matters. REMNANT (*Fr. remaner*, to remain) has in itself much the same meaning as remainder, of which it is only another form, but differs from it in the implied process which preceded the leaving, which, in the case of remnant, is that of use, consumption, or waste. It is commonly a *very* small part. RESIDUE (*residuum*, *residere*, to remain behind) is that part which has not been disposed of; that is, either purposely omitted to be used, or untouched by a previous process of distribution or use. Neither remnant, remainder, nor residue can be employed, like rest, to express the result of purpose.

"Scarce seven, the thin remainder of my fleet,

From storms preserved, within your harbour meet."
—*Dryden, Virgil*.

It is possible that the rest may be the larger part, while in the case of the other it is the smaller. Out of a company of twenty, for instance, it might happen that *one* should give expression to a particular opinion, and that *all the rest* should dissent from it; on the other hand, the remainder would imply a minority, and the remnant a *small* minority.

"Plato and the *rest* of the philosophers."
—*Stillington*.

"And it shall come to pass in that day that the *remnant* of Israel, and such as are escaped of the house of Jacob, shall no more stay upon him that smote them, but shall stay upon the Lord, the Holy One of Israel in truth. The *remnant* shall return, even the *remnant* of Jacob, unto the mighty God. For though thy people Israel be as the sand of the sea, yet a *remnant* of them shall return."—*English Bible*.

"He burneth part thereof in the fire, with part thereof he eateth flesh, he roasteth roast, and is satisfied. Yea, he warmeth himself, and saith, Aha! I am warm, I have seen the fire. And the *residue* thereof he maketh a god."—*Ibid*.

REMARK. See NOTE.

REMARKABLE. See EXTRAORDINARY.

REMEDY. See CURE.

REMEMBRANCE. *See* MEMORY.

REMINDER. *See* MEMORIAL.

REMINISCENCE. *See* MEMORY.

REMISS. *See* INATTENTIVE.

REMIT. *See* RELAX.

REMNANT. *See* REMAINDER.

REMONSTRATE. *See* COMPLAIN.

REMORSE. *See* REPENTANCE.

REMOTE. *See* DISTANT.

REMUNERATION. *See* COMPENSATION.

REND. *See* BREAK.

RENEW. *See* REFRESH.

RENOVATE. *See* REFRESH.

RENOUNCE. *See* ABJURE.

RENOWN. *See* FAME.

RENOWNED. FAMOUS.

A person cannot be RENOWNED (*re* and *nomen*, a name) but for great and illustrious deeds; while he may be FAMOUS (*fama*, fame, report) for this and also for some incident of importance which is associated with him, but does not of necessity betoken any greatness of character; as, "Empedocles is famous for having been swallowed by a volcano, and Tarquin for having been expelled from Rome." Those only are renowned who are principals in great actions. The history of the famous is commonly better known than that of the renowned. Joan of Arc is more renowned than known.

"He was a wight of high *renown*."

Shakespeare.

"Henry the Fifth, too *famous* to live long."

Ibid.

REPAIR. REPARATION.

REPAIR (Fr. *réparer*, Lat. *re* and *parare*, to prepare) is the result of which REPARATION is the process. A bridge, for instance, is undergoing a process of reparation till it is placed in a condition of repair. Repair, too, is a physical process; reparation is a moral action. Repair is always physical or analogous in its use; reparation is purely moral. We speak of

repairing a house, a road, a bridge, or, analogously, of repairing shattered fortunes; but of making reparation for injury and wrong to the characters of others.

"Sunk down, and sought *repair*
Of sleep, which instantly fell on me."

Milton.

"I am sensible of the scandal I have given by my loose writings, and made what *reparation* I am able."—*Dryden.*

REPARATION. *See* REPAIR.

REPARATION. RESTITUTION.

RESTORATION.

All these terms denote the undoing of that which has been done to the injury of another; but REPARATION (*see above*) relates to moral injury; RESTITUTION, to the wrongful deprivation of property. A man who has stolen a sum of money from another will be compelled, if convicted, and his circumstances permit it, to make restitution (Lat. *restituere*, to restore). If injury has been done to a man's reputation, the injurer may find it hard, even if he should be willing, to make adequate reparation. RESTORATION (Lat. *restaurare*) differs in denoting the specific giving back of that which had been taken away. Restitution of stolen property may be made by paying its value in money. Restoration implies the giving back of the articles stolen.

REPARTEE. RETORT.

REPARTEE (Fr. *repartir*, to apportion back) is a far less grave word than RETORT (Lat. *retorquere*, *retortus*, to twist back again), being restricted to meaning a sharp, ready, and witty reply; while retort is applied to matters more earnest, as arguments, accusations, and the like.

"A man renowned for *repartee*

Will seldom scruple to make free
With friendship's finest feeling."

Cowper.

"I did dislike the cut of a certain courtier's beard; he sent me word, if I said his beard was not cut well, he was in the mind it was. This is called the *retort courtoise*."
—*Shakespeare.*

In repartee there is more of wit;

in retort there is more of logic. Repartee throws back a joke upon the joker; retort throws back the issues of an argument upon the arguer. It is plain that the same thing may often be called a repartee or a retort. Many a serious thing is said in jest. A repartee which veils argument under wit is a retort, and of a very effective kind.

REPEAL. See ABOLISH.

REPEAT. REHEARSE. RECITE. RECAPITULATE.

Of these, REPEAT (Lat. *repetere*) is the most comprehensive, and is applicable both to actions and words, the rest only to words. Again, we may repeat single words, or even inarticulate sounds. We apply the other terms only to many words consecutively. And again, we may repeat that which originally came from ourselves as well as that which came from others. REHEARSE (Fr. *herse*, a harrow) conveys the idea of solemnity or exactness in utterance. We rehearse as before an audience and in detail that which it is of public interest to listen to. A rehearsal may be subsequent or preliminary. We RECITE (Lat. *recitare*) when our avowed purpose is to give the exact words of another. Rehearsal applies equally to deeds and words; recital, more directly to words, and to deeds only as already committed to some form of relation. RECAPITULATE (*re*, again, and *capitulum*, *caput*, a heading) is to go over again, as the principal things mentioned in a preceding discourse, in a concise and summary manner, for the purpose of refreshing the memory of the hearers, whether the original statement or exposition were our own or another's.

"Yet I can repeat whole books that I have read, and poems of some selected friends which I have liked to charge my memory with."—Ben Jonson.

"Let Dryden with new rules our stage refine,

And his great models form by this design;
But where's a second Virgil to rehearse
Our hero's glory in his epic verse?"

Rochester.

"From this time forwards, I presume, the

Athanasian Creed has been honoured with a public recital among the other sacred hymns and Church offices all over the west."—*Waterland*.

"Hence we may see the reason why creeds were no larger nor more explicit, being but a kind of recapitulation of what the catechumens had been taught more at large, the main heads whereof were committed to memory, and publicly recited, and so became a creed."—*Ibid*.

REPEL. See REFUSE.

REPENTANCE. PENITENCE. COM-PUNCTION. CONTRITION. REMORSE. REGRET.

REPENTANCE (Fr. *repentir*, from the Low Latin *repentire*) is a practical state of mind, involving, with the sorrow for past acts, the resolution to avoid them for the future—deep REGRET and renunciation being combined. PENITENCE is the same thing, with a less general and more theological application. Repentance may have respect to our worldly interests; penitence, to the state of the soul. COMPUCTION (*con*, together, and *pungere*, *punctus*, to prick) is a warning of the conscience against the act, which, however, is not strong enough to prevent it, and so often accompanies its commission. Compunction may precede or follow the act; the rest only follow it. CONTRITION (*conterere*, *contritus*, to bruise) is a continuous state of grief and self-condemnation, which has not found relief in action, and is a mere painful condition of the conscience, either in regard to a specific act or to past conduct generally. Compunction may be for the present; but contrition is always for the past. Contrition may be either specific or general. Compunction is always specific. REMORSE (Fr. *remords*, Lat. *remordere*, to bite again) is the strongest form of compunction for the past; a gnawing anguish occasioned by reflection upon a past deed or course. Neither compunction nor remorse denote that genuine regret of wrong-doing for its own sake which is expressed by contrition. Regret (Fr. *regret*) does not carry with it either the energy of remorse or the sacredness of con-

trition, or the practical character of repentance.

"What this *repentance* was which the new covenant required as one of the conditions to be performed by all those who should receive the benefits of that covenant, is plain in the Scripture to be not only a sorrow for sins past, but (what is a natural consequence of such sorrow, if it be real) a turning from them into a new and contrary life."—*Locke*.

"Heaven may forgive a crime to *penitence*,
For Heaven can judge if *penitence* be true."
Dryden.

"*Repentance* extorted from us by the prospect of death can be only a sorrow for sin, perhaps rendered more passionate by our present fears. And this being only sorrow and *compunction*, and perhaps a good resolution, it is plain that still these are only the steps in the repentance of a sinner, and not complete repentance in all its parts."—*Hoadley*.

"If the sorrow arise merely from the fear of punishment, it is called, in the language of the schools, *attrition*, and is deemed the lowest and least honourable species of repentance; if from a desire to please God, and a tender sense of having offended so good a Father, it is styled *contrition*, and is of a more generous and noble kind."—*Bishop Horne*.

"When *remorse* is blended with the fear of punishment, and arises to despair, it constitutes the supreme wretchedness of the mind."—*Cogan*.

"Alike *regretted* in the dust he lies,
Who yields ignobly, or who bravely dies."
Pope, Homer.

We even apply the term regret to circumstances over which we have had no control; as, any untoward occurrence; the absence of friends or their loss. When connected with ourselves, it relates rather to unwise acts than to wrong or sinful ones; as, foolish or rash conduct, carelessness, the loss of opportunities, and the like, and may be entirely selfish.

REPETITION. TAUTOLOGY.

The latter stands to the former as species to genus. Not every REPETITION (*repetere*, to repeat) is TAUTOLOGY (*τὸ αὐτὸ*, the same thing, and *λέγειν*, to say). Repetition may be often necessary, justifiable, and effective. Tautology is such repetition as is none of these, and is therefore vain and tiresome.

"Our long-tongued chatterers do, after a sort, wound and weary the ears of their hearers by their *tautologies* and *vain repetitions* of the same things."—*Holland, Plutarch*.

REPINE. See COMPLAIN.

REPLY. See ANSWER.

REPORT. See FAME.

REPOSE. See EASE and RECLINE.

REPREHENSION. REPROOF.

Blame is involved in both terms, but more mildly in the former than the latter. The former (Lat. *reprehendere*) denotes little more than an expression of blame; the latter is its *authoritative* expression. Many might express reprehension who would not think themselves entitled to administer reproof. REPREHENSION may be indirect; REPROOF is personal and direct (*reprobare*). A master of a school may be reprehended by the parents of his scholars; while he visits the scholars themselves with reproofs.

"Foolish *reprehension*
Of faulty men." *Spenser*.

"Those best can bear *reproof* that merit praise."—*Pope*.

REPRESENTATION. See SHOW.

REPRESENTATIVE. DEPUTY. DELEGATE.

These all denote persons employed to act on behalf of others. The appointment makes the DEPUTY (Fr. *député*); the being sent elsewhere to act makes the DELEGATE (Lat. *delegare*, to send); the faithful transmission, or, literally, *presenting again*, of the will or sense of the constituent body makes the REPRESENTATIVE.

"In so large a state as ours, it is therefore very wisely contrived that the people should do that by their *representatives* which it is impracticable to perform in person—*representatives* chosen by a number of minute and separate districts, wherein all the voters are, or easily may be, distinguished."—*Blackstone*.

"Our Saviour pleads our cause and manages our affairs there, and the Holy Spirit, as His *Deputy* and Vice-gerent, doth it here."—*Sharp*.

"The bishops being generally addicted to the former superstition, it was thought necessary to keep them under so arbitrary a power as that subjected them to; for they hereby held their bishoprics only during the king's pleasure, and were to exercise them as his *delegates* in his name, and by his authority."—*Burnet*.

REPRESS. RESTRAIN. SUPPRESS.

REPRESS (Lat. *reprimere, repressus*), literally, to press back, is applied to matters of feeling, as to emotions which tend to manifest themselves in outward expression. **RESTRAIN** (Lat. *restringere*) bears reference, not so much to the manifestation of the impulse as the impulse itself. He restrains his feelings who does not allow them to rise beyond a certain pitch; he represses them who allows no expression of them by word or looks. **SUPPRESS** (Lat. *supprimere, suppressus*) is total, while repress may be partial, and denotes a more complete overcoming, or a keeping down to such an extent that it shall not be able to show itself; as, to suppress a rebellion, in the first instance; or a correspondence, in the second. On the other hand, an unseemly expression or manifestation of opinion, as in the plaudits of a law court, is said to be repressed.

REPRIEVE. RESPITE.

These words are used in common in the sense of a temporary relief from any pressure, burden, or trouble. The **REPRIEVE** (Lat. *reprobare*, to prove or try again) is, however, something given or granted. The **RESPITE** (*respectus, respicere*, to look back) comes to us in the course of circumstances. We commonly speak of a reprieve from punishment, a respite from toil.

"A *reprieve*, from *reprendre*, to take back, is the withdrawing of a sentence for an interval of time, whereby the execution is suspended."—*Blackstone*.

The derivation, however, given by Blackstone, is erroneous.

"If we may venture to declare more particularly in what sense God might be said to have hardened their hearts, it was very probably by forbearing to strike terror into them, by giving them *respite*, and not pur-

suing them constantly and without remission."—*Waterland*.

REPRIMAND. See **BLAME**.

REPRISAL. **RETALIATION.**

REPRISAL (Fr. *repriser*, Lat. *reprehendere*) is, literally, the taking again in return for something taken. Both in this case and in **RETALIATION** (*re*, again, and *talis*, such as) there is an implied suffering on the part of the party on whom the reprisal or retaliation is made. Retaliation, however, is the more general term, while reprisal is often restricted to cases of war and hostility. Retaliation may be simply in the making another to suffer loss, whereas reprisal implies gain to the party making it. "An eye for an eye, or a tooth for a tooth," is retaliation, not reprisal. Retaliation is seldom now employed, as it used to be, equally in the sense of returning or requiting good and evil, but is confined to the latter. In reprisal the satisfaction consists of solid benefit; in retaliation, of the indulgence of revenge.

"In this case, letters of marque and *reprisal* (words used as synonymous, and signifying, the latter, a taking in return, the former, the passing the frontiers in order to such taking) may be obtained in order to seize the bodies or goods of the subjects of the offending state until satisfaction be made wherever they happen to be found."—*Blackstone*.

"Revenge in this case naturally dictates *retaliation*, and that we should impose the like duties and prohibitions upon the importation of some or all of their manufactures into ours. Nations accordingly seldom fail to *retaliate* in this manner."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations*.

REPROACH. See **BLAME**.

REPROBATE. See **ABANDONED**.

REPROOF. See **REPREHENSION**.

REPROVE. See **BLAME**.

REPUDIATE. See **DISAVOW**.

REPUGNANCE. See **HATRED**.

REPUGNANT. See **ADVERSE**.

REPUTATION. See **CHARACTER** and **FAME**.

REPUTE. *See* FAME.

REQUEST. *See* ASK.

REQUIRE. *See* DEMAND.

REQUIRE (Lat. *requirere*, *re* and *quero*, to seek) is less strong than DEMAND (Fr. *demandeur*, Lat. *demandare*, to ask or claim). We demand on the ground of authority; we may require on the ground of expediency, necessity, or right. We demand what in some way redounds to our own gain, advantage, or use. We may require that another should act in a certain way, or do a certain thing for his own sake. We require when we lay down conditions of any kind. We demand when we employ our power, social, moral, or accidental, to exact such conditions, as founding the exaction upon some strong reason.

"That if the Gentiles, whom no law inspired,

By nature did what was by law required,
They who the written rule had never known

Were to themselves both rule and law alone."
Dryden.

"The directors of some of those banks sometimes took advantage of this optional clause, and sometimes threatened those who demanded gold and silver in exchange for a considerable number of their notes, that they would take advantage of it unless such demanders would content themselves with a part of what they demanded."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations.*

REQUISITE. *See* NECESSARY.

REQUITAL. *See* COMPENSATION and RETRIBUTION.

RESCUE. *See* DELIVER.

RESEARCH. *See* EXAMINATION.

RESEMBLANCE. *See* LIKENESS.

RESENTMENT. *See* INDIGNATION.

RESERVE. *See* RETAIN.

To RETAIN (Lat. *retinere*) is to keep back simply as an act of power. It is to continue to hold, to restrain from departure, escape, and the like, as against influences which might deprive us of things. RESERVE (Lat. *reservare*) is to keep back or retain contingently, as a portion of a larger quantity, or over against the fulfilment of some condition, or the acces-

sion of some circumstance. To reserve implies the exercise of judgment or discretion. To retain may be lawful or unlawful. When we reserve, we at least profess a reason for what we do; but we may retain by open violence. Retention implies nothing beyond itself; reservation implies a further purpose beyond the act.

"When a landed estate therefore is sold with a *reservation* of a perpetual rent, if it is intended that this rent should always be of the same value, it is of importance to the family in whose favour it is *reserved*, that it should not consist in a particular sum of money."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations.*

"We will add to all this the *retainment* of the same name which the deceased had here, unless there be some special reason to change it, so that their persons will be as punctually distinguished and circumscribed as any of ours in this life."—*More, Immortality of the Soul.*

RESIDE. *See* ABIDE.

RESIDUE. *See* REMAINDER.

RESIGN. *See* ABDICATE.

We can only ABDICATE (Lat. *abdicare*) a high dignity or station. We can RESIGN (Lat. *re*, back, and *signare*, to sign) any situation or office, high or low, or any advantage. A king abdicates the throne. A domestic servant may resign his situation. According to etymology, resignation would be by writing; abdication, by word of mouth; but this distinction is not adhered to practically. A more important difference is that resignation recognizes that the office or other thing given up flowed from the source to which it is given back. Resign has a much wider metaphorical use than abdicate. So we may resign expectations or hopes of what we never as a fact possessed. The monarch does not resign, or, if he do, it denotes the understanding that he owed his elevation originally to the people, the aristocracy, or others, as the case may be.

"Deaneries and prebends may become void, like a bishopric, by death, by deprivation, or by *resignation*, to either the king or the bishop."—*Blackstone.*

"The consequences drawn from these

facts, namely, that they amounted to an *abdication* of the government, which *abdication* did not affect only the person of the king himself, but also of all his heirs, and rendered the throne absolutely and completely vacant, it belonged to our ancestors to determine."—*Blackstone*.

RESIGNATION. See ENDURANCE and RESIGN.

RESIST. See OPPOSE.

RESOLVE. See DECIDE and SOLVE.

RESOLUTION. DETERMINATION. DECISION.

A choice between action and inaction is RESOLUTION. (It is remarkable that the English resolute has the opposite meaning to the Latin *resolutus*, resolved or relaxed.) Our idea of resolution is the *resolving* or reducing an act to its motives, and a determination to abide by them. A choice between one motive and another is DETERMINATION (*de* and *terminus*, an end). An irrevocable choice is a DECISION (*decidere*, to cut short). Resolution is opposed to practical doubt; determination, to uncertainty or practical ignorance; decision, to hesitation or incompleteness of final purpose. After consideration we resolve; after deliberation we determine; after decision nothing remains but action. Decision commonly implies a choice among several courses of action. We determine what to do, and resolve to carry out our determination. Determination is a less energetic form of decision. Resolution is a promise made to oneself to undertake a thing. It implies a finer moral choice. A stubborn man may be determined, a firm man is resolved, what to do. A decided character is quick in forming a judgment, and firm in adhering to it. He has a sharp understanding of distinct motives and lines of conduct. What he has decided he is likely to carry out resolutely.

"Be it with resolution, then, to fight."—*Shakespeare*.

"By determining the will, if the phrase be used with any meaning, must be intended,

causing that the act of the will or choice should be thus, and not otherwise; and the will is said to be *determined* when in consequence of some action or influence its choice is directed to and fixed upon a particular object."—*Edwards on Freedom of the Will*.

"The guidance of instinct, indeed, as it is more *decisively determinate*, seems to bring up an offspring with less deviation from the purposes of Nature than the superior faculty of reason."—*Knox, Essays*.

RESOURCE. See EXPEDIENT.

RESPECT. See DEFERENCE.

RESPITE. See REPRIEVE.

RESPONSE. See ANSWER.

RESPONSIBLE. See ACCOUNTABLE.

REST. See EASE and RECLINE.

REST. See REMAINDER.

RESTITUTION. See REPARATION.

RESTORATION. See REPARATION.

RESTRAIN (see REPRESS). CONTROL. CHECK. CURB.

We RESTRAIN (Lat. *restringere*) only vital or moral, not mechanical, force. We CONTROL (Lat. *contra* and *rotulus*, counter roll) any force which develops itself into continuous action or movement. Restrain may hinder action altogether; control implies its continuance under regulation. CHECK (Fr. *échec*, check, or chess) denotes a slight force of restraint in movement or action, interposed with some degree of suddenness. CURB (Fr. *courbe*, *courber*, Lat. *curvare*, *curvus*, to bend) is employed only of moral forces, impulses, emotions, and the like, denoting a pressure of restraint put upon the feelings, the desires, or the will, by the self-control of the individual.

"Nor is the hand of the painter more *restrainable* than the pen of the poet."—*Brown, Vulgar Errors*.

"If the seeds of piety and virtue be but carefully sown at first, very much may be done by this means, even in the most depraved natures, towards the altering and changing of them, however to the *checking* and *controlling* of our vicious inclinations."—*Tillotson*.

"Collier's attack upon the stage obliged the succeeding dramatic poets to curb that

propension to indecency which had carried some of their predecessors so far beyond the bounds of good taste and good manners."—*Lieattie*.

It may be observed that the objects of restraint, control, or check may be indifferent; while what requires to be curbed is generally a *vicious* inclination or action.

RESTRICT. RESTRAIN.

Although these are but different forms of the same verb (*restringere*, *restricere*, to restrain), they have acquired a different application in usage. RESTRAIN is employed of the simple exercise of power, whether physical or moral. RESTRICT implies moral restraint by prohibition to certain defined limits. Hence restrain is general; restrict, specific and relative. Restriction is relative restraint. The imprisoned man is under restraint. He who is abroad on parole is under restriction.

RESULT. See ACCRUE.

RESULT. - EFFECT. CONSEQUENCE.

Of these, EFFECT (Lat. *effectus*, *efficere*) may be regarded as the generic, of which the others are special forms. RESULTS (Lat. *resilire*, *resultus*, *re*, back, and *salire*, to leap or spring) and CONSEQUENCES (Lat. *consequentia*, *consequi*, to follow) are different forms of effect. The effect follows immediately from the cause, which may be physical, mental, or moral. They can therefore be generally calculated upon beforehand. Consequences are more remote, springing less directly from causes, following in the train of events, and involving collateral causes or influences. To foresee the consequences of a thing is a matter of comparison and sagacity; to foresee the effects, belongs to absolute knowledge; for, given the cause, the effect follows of course. The effect is, commonly speaking, the object of action, except where the action is complex and purposely indirect; as, for instance, in diplomacy, where the end directly aimed at may be something which will follow indirectly as a consequence.

A consequence is, in short, commonly the effect of an effect. Results are still more remote than consequences, and more general, being the sum of all prior causes or operations specified or unspecified. The effect of ploughing is the loosening of the soil; the consequence is the condition of preparation to receive the seed; the result, by the action of sun, frost, rain, snow, wind, and other causes, is the general fertility of the land.

"Such suppose a Deity that, acting wisely but necessarily, did contrive the general frame of things in the world, from whence, by a series of causes, doth unavoidably result whatsoever is now done in it."—*Cudworth*.

"Happy the man that sees a God employed
In all the good and ill that checker life,
Resolving all events, with their effects
And manifold results, into the will
And arbitration wise of the Supreme."
Cooper.

"There are, indeed, such consequences as are plainly necessary, and those which on their first sight carry in them no less certainty than the principles from which they were immediately derived. Of this nature are they which are reciprocally deduced from their certain and intrinsic causes to their effects."—*Bishop Hall*.

RETAIN. See HOLD and RESERVE.

RETALIATION. See REPRISAL.

RETARD. See CLOG.

RETINUE. See TRAIN.

RETIRE. See RECEDE.

RETIREMENT. See PRIVACY.

RETORT. See REPARTEE.

RETRACT. See ABJURE.

RETREAT. See ASYLUM.

RETREAT. See RECEDE.

RETRIBUTION. REQUITAL.

Both these terms denote the giving back, or giving, something the character of which depends upon past conduct, and may be either in the way of reward or punishment. But RETRIBUTION (Lat. *retribuere*, *retributus*, to give back) bears a more distinct relation to the justice of what is so done; while REQUITAL (from *requite*, which is *re* and *quit*, in the

sense of pay, something given to *quiet* the sense of obligation in another) may have no reference to justice or equity, but be simply the result of personal feeling. Ingratitude may even requite good with evil; but retribution bears reference to the demands and proportion of the case.

"But yet, in the state of Nature, one man comes by no absolute or arbitrary power to use a criminal, when he has got him into his hands, according to the passionate heats or boundless extravagancy of his own will, but only to *retribute* to him, as far as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression."—*Locke*.

"They find they had condemned themselves when they so readily passed so severe a sentence upon those husbandmen who had so ill *requited* the lord of the vineyard for all the care he had taken about it, that instead of sending him the fruits of it, they abuse his messengers, and at last murder his son."—*Stillingleet*.

RETURN. *See* REVERT.

RETURN. RESTORE.

We RETURN (Fr. *retourner*) what was borrowed or lent. We RESTORE (*see above*) what was taken or given. It is in such cases a duty to return with punctuality and exactness; to restore wholly, and without diminution. We return that which came to us under conditions and expectations, as civilities or loans. We restore that of which the alienation was not expressed, or unconditional, as confidence, deposits, stolen goods, and goes back in its original form; while we may return one thing by another, being of a different form but equivalent.

REVEAL. *See* DISCLOSE and PROMULGATE.

REVENGE. *See* AVENGE and VENGEANCE.

REVERBERATE. *See* REBOUND.

REVERE. *See* ADORE.

REVERENCE. *See* ADORE and DEFERENCE.

REVERIE. DREAM.

These are etymologically coinci-

dent, REVERIE being a dreaming, from the French *rever*, to dream; but a reverie is a day, or wakeful, DREAM. In their remoter and metaphorical applications, reverie points rather to the inconsequentiveness, dream, to the unreality, of the subject of thought. Men, from absence of mind, wander off into reveries. Ardent and ambitious minds entertain dreams of happiness or greatness, which are, in the multitude of cases, not realized.

REVERSE. INVERT. SUBVERT.

These are compounds of the Latin verb *vertere*, to turn; but there are points of usage in which they differ, though in some cases they may be used interchangeably. We might say, for instance, "to reverse or to invert an order." Now to REVERSE is literally to turn so as to face another way. To INVERT is to turn over or upside down. But it will be easily understood that to reverse, in the sense of turning that side before which ought to be behind, may be as violent an alteration, when we come to speak metaphorically, as to place that below which ought to be above. To invert, in the above phrase, is a stronger form of expression than to reverse. We may reverse in some cases without contravening nature or propriety. Such contravention is commonly employed in invert. We may reverse a proposition by making it negative instead of affirmative; or a decree, by giving it a contrary effect. Such procedure may be right or wrong according to circumstances. SUBVERT is a stronger term, implying the violent overturning of what used to stand as it were firm and erect.

"Each court of appeal, in their respective stages, may, upon hearing the matter of law in which the error is assigned, *reverse* or affirm the judgment of the inferior courts; but none of them are final, save only the House of Peers, to whose judicial decisions all other tribunals must therefore submit and conform their own. And thus much for the *reversal* or affirmance of judgments at law."—*Blackstone*.

"The sagacious Kepler first made the noble discovery that distinct but *inverted* pictures of visible objects are formed upon

the retina by the rays of light coming from the object."—*Reid*.

"Now, whether we suppose this chain upheld by one intelligent being, or self-sustained, it is all one to our present purpose, for in either case, if the acts of voluntary agents follow necessarily upon the impulse of external causes, there will be a constant fatality upon them, utterly *subversive* of liberty, estimation, and prudence."—*Search*.

REVERT. RETURN.

To RETURN may be physical or mental, indicating the simple going back to a former point. To REVERT, though no more than its Latin equivalent (*re*, back, and *vertere*, to turn) is never used in any but a mental sense. Return may be used of unconscious, revert can only be used of conscious, agents. As employed of intellectual matters, return denotes simply the going back to a certain point. To revert is to carry back one's attention with more specific effort. Things return to a point, and revert to a state, more especially to the same state as formerly. Revert being Latin, is used in the higher or more thoughtful style; return, in that which is the more simple.

"All things *reverted* to their primitive order and regularity, calm, quiet, and composed."—*Waterland*.

"When the unclean spirit is gone out of a man, he walketh through dry places seeking rest, and findeth none. Then he saith, I will *return* unto my house from whence I came out; and when he is come, he findeth it empty, swept, and garnished."—*English Bible*.

REVIEW. See SURVEY.

REVILE. See CALUMNY.

REVISAL. See SURVEY.

REVISION. See SURVEY.

REVIVE. See REFRESH.

REVOKE. See ABJURE and ABOLISH.

REVOLT. See INSURRECTION.

REVOLUTION. See INSURRECTION.

REWARD. See COMPENSATION.

RHETORIC. See ELOCUTION.

RICHES. See WEALTH.

RIDICULE. DERIDE.

As common laughter may be either sympathetic or hostile—that is, we may laugh *with* others, or laugh *at* them—so RIDICULE and DERISION (both forms of the Latin *ridere*, to laugh) are always hostile; but ridicule is the lighter term of the two. Ridicule indicates a merry, good-humoured hostility. Derision is ill-humoured and scornful. It is anger wearing the mask of ridicule, and adopting the sound of laughter. We ridicule what offends our taste. We deride what seems to merit our scorn.

"Jane borrowed maxims from a doubting school,

And took for truth the test of *ridicule*.

Lucy saw no such virtue in a jest;

Truth was with her of *ridicule* the test."

Crabbe.

"British policy is brought into *derision* in those nations that awhile ago trembled at the power of our arms, whilst they looked up with confidence to the equity, firmness, and candour which shone in all our negotiations."

—*Burke*.

RIDICULOUS. See DROLL.

RIGHT. See DIRECT and BECOMING.

RIGHT. See CLAIM.

RIGHTEOUS. GODLY.

These terms are of a spiritual character. The GODLY man is he who has a mind which habitually converses with God, as in prayer, meditation, the reading and study of the Scriptures, public worship, and a temper consonant with such things. The RIGHTEOUS man is he who practically recognizes righteousness; that is, that morality which is based upon revealed religion, doing that which is right, as being in conformity with the Divine will.

"A *godly, righteous, and sober life*."—*English Liturgy*.

RIGID. RIGOROUS.

RIGID, the Latin *rigidus*, and RIGOROUS, from the Latin *rigor*, are both derivatives of *rigere*, to be stiff; but rigid is applicable to physical

conditions; rigorous, not. Rigid muscles. Rigorous justice. When rigid is employed of moral subjects, it indicates a character or condition; rigorous, a force. Rules are rigid when they are inflexible to relaxation. Rules or rulers are rigorous when they are hard and energetic in what they exact. Hence we speak of "the rigidity of a statute," "the rigour of a law" when applied, as, for instance, in enforcing penalty. The rigid man binds himself; the rigorous man binds others. So that rigid is generally passive, rigorous, active, in its force. Rigidity of nature, character, principle, or disposition shows itself in rigorousness of action, operation, or treatment. Hence the words may often be used interchangeably; but to deal rigidly is to deal with inflexible adherence to principle. To deal rigorously is to deal in the energetic application of that principle.

"Be not too *rigidly* censorious.

A string may jar in the best master's hand,

And the most skilful archer miss his aim."
Roscommon, Horace.

"Capitation taxes are levied at little expense, and where they are *rigorously* exacted afford a very sure revenue to the state."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations.*

RIGOROUS. See RIGID.

RIM. See BRIM.

RIND. See PEEL.

RIPE. See MATURE.

RISE. See ASCEND.

RISE. See BEGINNING.

RISK. See DANGER.

RITE. See CEREMONY.

RIVALRY. See COMPETITION.

ROAD. ROUTE. COURSE.

ROAD (A. S. *rād*, a riding) is, strictly, a public way for horses and carriages, and when used metaphorically conveys the ideas of public or common recognition and directness of end; as in such phrases as, "the sure road to honour," or, "to ruin." ROUTE (Fr. *route*, the Old Fr. *rote*, is from the Latin *ruptu* (*scilicet via*), a

broken way) is a circular or circuitous travel, which may consist of more than one road successively. COURSE (Lat. *cursus*, *currere*, to run) differs from route as the defined from the indefinite. A traveller finds his way to a town by a circuitous route. The sun runs his course. A road is fixed or marked naturally. A route is unmarked or unfixed. A course is fixed by necessity or by appointment.

"At our first sally into the intellectual world, we all march together along one straight and open road."—*Johnson.*

"Wide through the furzy field their *route* they take."
Guy.

"He rejoiceth as a giant to run his *course*."
—*English Psalms.*

ROAM. See RAMBLE.

ROBBERY. DEPREDACTION. THEFT.

These words denote the taking away of that which is the property of another, but differ somewhat in the character of the actions. ROBBERY (Old Fr. *rober*, New Fr. *dérober*) differs from THEFT (A. S. *theof*, and other forms, a thief) in being effected by open violence; while theft is committed by stealth or privately, and of articles of comparatively small value. DEPREDACTION (*de* and *præda*, prey) is desultory robbery, with no direct violence, and in the absence of the lawful owners, the property being left unguarded. It is more commonly a collective than an individual act, and of a desultory character.

"Larceny from the person is either by privately stealing, or by open and violent assault, which is usually called *robbery*."—*Blackstone.*

"Nevertheless, I shall in this case send my brother with a detachment of horse to harass Antony in his retreat, and to protect Italy from his *depredations*."—*Mcintosh, Cicero.*

"One of our men in the midst of these hardships was found guilty of *theft*, and condemned for the same to have three blows from every man in the ship with a two inch and a half rope on his bare neck."—*Dampier's Voyages.*

ROBUST. STRONG. STURDY.

ROBUST (Lat. *robur*, strength) implies some degree of size and muscu-

lar power, combined with soundness of constitution. A man of small size would not be called robust, nor one who, though possessed of muscular strength, was of a sickly constitution.

STRONG (A. S. *strang*, *strong*, *strange*) is the simple and generic term applicable to both, and as robust is not, to other substances and objects, as a strong rope. Strong may denote power of mental or muscular action; passive power, as of resistance, endurance, or cohesion; powerful in the sense of influential; or powerful mechanically; impetuous; logically cogent or convincing; or powerfully affecting the organs or senses. STURDY is the Old French *estourdi*, New French *étourdi*, passive participle of the verb *étourdir*, to stun, and so stunned, dazed, giddy. Its earlier meaning in English was, accordingly, foolishly obstinate. It is now only physically employed, and that of persons, and denotes the strength which belongs to compactness and solidity. Where it is employed of certain impersonal objects, this seems rather by way of poetic analogy; as a sturdy oak. It is also sometimes transferred from the actor to the work; as a sturdy opposition. The sturdy man is of no great size, but well-knit of limb, and, without being powerful, can keep his ground and hold his own.

"Survey the warlike horse! Didst thou invest

With thunder his *robust* distended chest?"
Young.

"No man can enter into a *strong* man's house and spoil his goods except he will first bind the *strong* man, and then he will spoil his house."—*English Bible.*

"Even in this early dawning of the year,
Produce the plough and yoke the *sturdy*
steer,
And goad him till he groans beneath his
toil,
Till the bright share is buried in the soil."
Dryden.

ROLL. See CATALOGUE.

ROMANCE. See FABLE.

ROMANTIC. See SENTIMENTAL.

ROOM. SPACE.

SPACE (Lat. *spatium*) is absolute.

ROOM (A. S. *râm*) is relative. Room is space set apart for a purpose, or regarded in reference to such purpose. Space is used indefinitely to express that which surpasses our comprehension. It may be infinitely extended in idea, or bounded. Room is always bounded. Space is a term more commonly associated with the facts of Nature; room, with the requirements of man. Room is space specifically sufficient.

"The ground of a certain rich man brought forth plentifully, and he thought within himself, saying, What shall I do, because I have no room where to bestow my fruits?"—*English Bible.*

"This *space*, considered barely in length between any two beings, without considering anything else between them, is called distance; if considered in length, breadth, and thickness, I think it may be called capacity. The term extension is usually applied to it, in what manner soever considered."—*Locke.*

ROT. See PUTREFY.

ROTUNDITY. ROUNDNESS.

These words both spring from the Latin *rota*, a wheel, *rotundus*, Fr. *ronde*, round; the former directly from the Latin, the latter mediately through the French. ROUNDNESS is the general term. ROTUNDITY is that specific roundness which belongs to solid bodies. So we might speak at discretion of the roundness or the rotundity of a turnip, but of the roundness, not the rotundity, of a mathematical circle; roundness is applied to a very *partial* convexity, as in the roundness, but not rotundity of a hill.

"Make it thy vernal care, when April
calls

New shoots to birth, to trim the hedge
aslant,

And mould it to the *roundness* of the
mound,

Itself a shelving hill." *Mason.*

"And thou all-shaking thunder,
Strike flat the thick *rotundity* of the world."
Shakespeare.

ROVE. See RAMBLE.

ROUGH. See COARSE, ABRUPT,
and HARSH.

ROUND. TOUR. CIRCUIT.

A ROUND (*see* ROTUNDITY) is made in the way of personal business of an ordinary and familiar kind, as when visitors, watchmen, or tradesmen go their rounds. A TOUR (*Fr.* *tour*, a turn) is made in the way of pleasure, as a tour through the Lake District. We speak, however, of a round of pleasure as well as of business, and in either case a definite course seems implied. A CIRCUIT (*Lat.* *circuitus*, *circa*, around, and *ire*, to go) is official and pre-defined, and seems to imply primarily a purpose of visitation and inspection. Rounds, in the plural, is physically applied; round, in the singular, is used in the secondary sense, as a round of pleasure or gaiety.

ROUNDNESS. *See* ROTUNDITY.

ROUSE. *See* EXCITE.

ROUTE. *See* ROAD.

ROYAL. *See* KINGLY.

RUB. *See* CHAFE.

RUDE. *See* COARSE.

RUEFUL. *See* DOLEFUL.

RUGGED. *See* ABRUPT.

RUIN. *See* BANE.

RUINOUS. *See* DESTRUCTIVE.

RULE. *See* DECREE and GOVERN.

RULING. *See* PREDOMINANT.

RUMOUR. *See* FAME.

RUPTURE. *See* FRACTION.

RURAL. RUSTIC.

These words are both derived from one source—*rus, ruris*, the country, from which is formed the adjective *rusticus*. RURAL, however, is employed of the country, or matters belonging to it, as distinguished from man, or from towns, and is so associated with the pleasant things of Nature. RUSTIC is applied to the persons or conditions of men in reference to simplicity or rudeness of manners. Etymologically, it is opposed to such words as civil, urbane, denoting the refinement of cities. A rural abode means

one pleasantly situated in the country; a rustic abode, one wanting in elegance. We, however, use the term rustic in reference to certain styles of construction, in which there is an affectation of rudeness combined with real elegance; as an elegant country retreat built in a rustic style of architecture; that is, with stone or wood which shall wear an appearance of undesigned irregularity.

“For I have loved the rural walk through lanes

Of grassy swarth, close cropp’d by nibbling sheep,
And skirted thick with intertexture firm
Of thorny boughs.” *Cowper.*

“Lay bashfulness, that rustic virtue, by;
To manly confidence thy thoughts apply.”
Dryden.

RUSTIC. *See* PEASANT.

S.

SACRED. HOLY. DIVINE.

SACRED (*Lat.* *sacer*) is less strong than HOLY (*A. S.* *hālig*, and other forms), though many cases occur in which the words might be used indifferently, as the sacred vessels, or the holy vessels of the sanctuary. But sacred denotes rather the character conferred upon objects or persons by setting them apart for certain purposes; holy, an intrinsic character which they possess in themselves. So we speak of a holy man, not a sacred man. It is well if, in cases where the office is sacred, the man himself is holy. Holy is opposed to unholy; sacred, to profane. We speak of the Holy Scriptures, and the Sacred Scriptures; the former as embodying and reflecting the holy person, will, character, and attributes of an all-holy God; the latter as unlike or apart from other books, and deserving of peculiar treatment and reverence. DIVINE is a weaker and vaguer word, meaning like a Deity or the Deity, or in any way connected with Him; as, the Divine justice, Divine worship. Divine is opposed to human. The expression of the holy in garb or appearance generally is denoted by the term sanctity (*Lat.* *sanctus*, holy).

"For how can we think of Him without dread and reverence, when we consider how He is secluded by the infinite *sacredness* of His own Majesty from all immediate converse and intercourse with us?"—*Scott, Christian Life.*

"When Christ not only triumphed over hell and the grave, but was exalted to the right hand of God, He then not only bestowed these miraculous gifts of the *Holy Ghost* on the apostles, but settled a constant order of such in the Church, who were to attend to the necessities of it, till there will be no further need of instruction."—*Stillingfleet.*

"Therefore there was plainly wanting a *Divine* revelation to recover mankind out of their universally degenerated estate into a state suitable to the original excellence of their nature; which *Divine* revelation both the necessities of men and their natural notions of God gave them reasonable ground to expect and hope for."—*Clarke.*

SAD. GLOOMY. MOURNFUL. DEJECTED. MELANCHOLY. MOODY.

SAD is the most generic of these terms (A. S. *sād*). It is connected with seat and sit, and so is literally an excessive sedateness. Its earlier uses were purely physical, in the sense of heavy, close, hard. As Spenser, "His hand more *sad* than lump of lead." Hence producing a heavy or sombre impression or effect; as, "sad-coloured clothes."—*Walton.* From this it passed to a moral sense, and was applied to temper, mood, or character, in the sense in which we now employ the term serious; as Bacon says, "A *sad* and religious woman;" hence affected with unhappiness, or, reflexively, producing depression; as, "a sad misfortune." Sadness is reflective. It implies some cause or ground for the feeling. To be sad without knowing why, would be folly and unreason. We are sad when we reflect upon loss, privation, disappointment, and the like.

"Man's feeble race what ills await :
Labour and Penury, the racks of Pain,
Disease and Sorrow's weeping train,
And Death, sad refuge from the storms of fate."
Gray.

GLOOMY (Old Eng. *glome*, *glombe*, gloam or twilight) has preserved its etymological force, and differs from

sad in its indefiniteness and indistinctness. Men are often gloomy without knowing why, as under a general foreboding of misfortune. Sadness is almost always the result of the past; gloominess more commonly bears upon the future, which is contemplated with misgiving.

"For the English are naturally fanciful, and very often disposed by that *gloominess* and melancholy of temper which is so frequent in our nation to many wild notions and visions to which others are not so liable."—*Spectator.*

MOURNFUL (A. S. *murnan*, *mcornan*, to mourn) applies more distinctively to the *expression* of the sad; as, the mournful sound of a bell; a mournful sight or sound; a gloomy prospect.

"Yet if he steps forth with a Friday look and a Lenten face, with a blessed Jesu, a *mournful* ditty for the vices of the times, oh ! then he is a saint upon earth, an Ambrose or an Augustine."—*South.*

DEJECTED (Lat. *dejacere*, *dejectus*, to cast down) is, literally, cast down, and, like sad, betokens a specific cause, the subject of reflection. It is a term denoting the external effect as well as state of sorrow, and brings before the eye of the mind the down-cast look and hanging head. Yet it is not a term of the greatest seriousness. Dejection is not overwhelming sorrow, but betokens sadness and disappointment rather than bitter grief. It is a transient rather than a permanent state.

"When our souls are *dejected*, distressed, tormented with the remembrance of our former sins, He saith to us, as He said to the man in the Gospel, 'Be of good cheer. My son, thy sins are all pardoned.'"—*Beveridge.*

It may be observed that dejected and Moody differ from the rest of these synonyms in being only passive, while they may also be used actively; that is, as not only occupied by but producing a feeling of sadness, and the like. MELANCHOLY (Gr. *μέλας*, black, and *χολή*, bile) denotes a continued if not chronic state of depression of spirits arising from any cause. Melancholy is commonly the concomitant of over-thoughtful dispositions, which suspect life of dissatisfaction,

though they may not have had bitter experiences.

"And *Melancholy* marked him for her own."
Gray.

Moody (A. S. *môdig*, *môdeg*) differs from melancholy, dejected, sad, and gloomy, in being more fitful and capricious. It is less passive, and expresses itself in discontent, ill-humour, peevishness, and a desire to commit harm, as if brooding in sullenness.

"And *moody* madness laughing wild
Amid severest woe." Gray.

SADNESS. See SAD.

SAFE. SECURE.

The word SAFE (Fr. *sauf*, Lat. *salvus*) is employed in an abstract way, in which SECURE (Lat. *securus*, without care) is not. We may say, "It is safe, or safer, to travel by day," where we could not say, "It is secure." Safety differs from security, as the objective from the subjective, security being the sense or recognition of safety. If I say, "He is safe," I mean in a state removed from danger; if I say, "He is secure," I mean in a state which he or I can recognize as removed from danger. Hence secure has travelled on to mean entertaining a sense of safety, which may be even in opposition to the facts of the case. "While they slept secure the enemy attacked the camp;" where the security was not safety, but emphatically the contrary. But there are further differences to be noted between safety and security. Safety is absolute, security relative; or, in other words, those who are simply out of danger are safe; those who are removed beyond the reach of danger are secure. Safety regards the present in connection with the past; security is also for the future. Safety is a more abstract term than security. If effectual measures have been taken for the security of a thing, it is in a condition of safety. Again, *security* sometimes implies such restriction upon the individual as prevents him from being a cause of alarm or danger. In looking at a caged lion, we think less of his safety than of our own security. The felon, cap-

tured and imprisoned, is secure, without being safe.

"Secure from Fortune's blows."
Dryden.

"And so it came to pass that they escaped all safe to land."—*English Bible*.

SAGACIOUS. See ACUTE.

SAGACITY. See SAGACIOUS.

SAILOR. See MARINER.

SALARY. See PAY.

SAKE. ACCOUNT.

SAKE (see FORSAKE) is employed both of persons and things, as also is ACCOUNT (Fr. *acompte*, Lat. *ad* and *computare*). We say, grammatically, "for the sake" and "on account." But sake denotes an ulterior purpose which is contemplated; account, an anterior cause or motive which induces. Moreover, account is no more than a cause; sake, a cause in which one is concerned. If I say, "I am doing this for his sake," I mean that I am doing it because I have an end in view, which I believe it will be to his interest that I should accomplish. If I say, "I am doing it on his account," I mean, broadly, that he is in some way the cause of my doing it. Hence it follows that where the object is serviceable, we use sake; as, "to make sacrifices for the sake of peace;" that is, to promote the ends of peace. On the other hand, "I took the high-road rather than the fields, on account of the darkness," where the darkness is no more than the subject of consideration which influenced my choice.

"Knowledge is for the sake of man, and not man for the sake of knowledge."—*Sir W. Hamilton*.

"In matters where his judgment led him to oppose men on a public account, he would do it vigorously and heartily."—*Atterbury*.

SALUBRIOUS. See HEALTHY.

SALUTARY. See HEALTHY.

SALUTATION. SALUTE.

These words, coming from the Latin *salus*, health, safety, refer more directly, the former to the person, the latter to the thing. A SALUTATION may be in words or any other way, implying personal expression of

feeling. The SALUTE is never in words. There is more of familiarity in salutation, and of respect or formal demonstration in salute.

"But at the very time while he is bowing at the threshold of the rich man, the philosopher shall pass by, and because he possesses only a competency, without superfluity and without influence, he shall not be honoured with the common civility of a *salutation*."—*Knox, Essays*.

"I sent a lieutenant ashore, to acquaint the governor of our arrival, and to make an excuse for our not *saluting*; for as I could *salute* only with three guns, except the swivels, which I was of opinion would not be heard, I thought it was better to let it alone."—*Cook's Voyages*.

SALUTE. See SALUTATION and ACCOST.

SAMPLE. See EXAMPLE.

SANCTION. COUNTEenance. SUPPORT.

We COUNTEenance (Lat. *continentia*, sc. *vultus*, the holding together or cast of face) persons; we SANCTION things; we SUPPORT things and persons. Persons are countenanced by the apparent approval of others. Mere numbers may countenance. Proceedings are sanctioned (Lat. *sancire*, *sanctus*, to sanction or ratify) by the approval, especially of persons of weight or authority. Persons or measures are supported (Lat. *sub*, under, and *portare*, to carry) by any means which may give assistance or encouragement, or promote the end in view. Superiors only can countenance and sanction; all of every degree may support, which implies, more than the rest, active co-operation.

"The strictest professors of reason have added the *sanction* of their testimony."—*Watts*.

"But as to the civil religion, Socrates never opposed it, but always *countenanced* it both by discourse and example."—*Bentley*.

"The apparent insufficiency of every individual to his own happiness or safety compels us to seek from one another assistance and *support*."—*Johnson*.

SANCTITY. See SACRED.

SANE. See SOUND.

SANGUINARY. See BLOODY.

SARCASM. See BURLESQUE.

SATIATE. See GRATIFY.

SATIRE. See BURLESQUE.

SATISFACTION. See COMPENSATION and CONTENTMENT.

SATISFY. See GRATIFY.

SAVAGE. See BARBAROUS and FEROCIOUS.

SAVE. SPARE.

We may be SAVED (Fr. *sauver*, Lat. *salvus*, safe) from any evils. We are SPARED (A. S. *sparian*, to spare) only from those which it is in the power of some one to inflict. To save may be the effect either of accident or design. To spare is always designed, denoting intentional forbearance. "He was to have been shot as a deserter, but the clemency of his commander spared his life." "He was struck by a bullet, but the watch in his pocket saved his life." The difference may be seen at once in the two phrases, "he saved my life," and "he spared my life."

"Then he called for a light, and sprang in, and came trembling, and fell down before Paul and Silas, and brought them out and said, Sirs, what must I do to be *saved*?"—*English Bible*.

"God *spared* not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to hell, and delivered them into chains of darkness, to be reserved unto judgment; and *spared* not the old world."—*Ibid*.

SAVING. See ECONOMICAL.

SAUNTER. See LAY.

SAVOUR. See TASTE.

SAW. See PROVERB.

SAYING. See PROVERB.

SCAN. See BEHOLD.

SCANDAL. REPROACH.

The same thing may be matter of both SCANDAL (Gr. *σκάνδαλον*, a stumbling-block) and REPROACH (Fr. *reprocher*, *proche*, *prope*, near, the bringing near or home of an offence); but reproach points rather to the intrinsic blame of the act; scandal, to the

offence caused by it in the minds of others, and of society at large. It may be observed that scandal is used for the offensive act, and for the imputation, even including the unfounded imputation of it.

"The loss in war sustained through his name,
A lasting scandal to the English name."
Drayton.

"The Chevalier Bayard, distinguished among his contemporaries by the appellation of the knight without fear and without reproach."—*Robertson.*

SCANDALOUS. INFAMOUS.

SCANDALOUS (*see* SCANDAL) is applied only to deeds and transactions; while INFAMOUS (*in*, privative, and *fama*, fame) is used both of transactions and persons. Infamous is the stronger term of the two; a scandalous act being one which is calculated to excite a high degree of social blame; an infamous act, one which is calculated to brand the character of the doer with detestation for life.

"Nothing scandalous or offensive to any."
—*Hooker.*

"If anything be of ill-report, and looks infamously to the sober part of mankind, why, that very consideration is enough to deter you from the practice of it, for you are to recommend your religion to all the men in the world by all the ways that are possible."—*Sharp.*

SCANTY. MEAGRE.

These terms are closely similar; and when employed as synonyms, as a meagre supply, a scanty supply, seem nearly identical. But SCANTY (A. S. *scænan*, to break, wound, or mutilate) refers rather to the relation of the thing supplied to the will of the supplier; MEAGRE (Fr. *maigre*, Lat. *macer*, thin), to the littleness or poverty of the thing in itself. A meagre supply may be the result of circumstances. A scanty supply reflects upon the giver or provider. Scanty relates more to number, measure, or rule; meagre, to quantity generally. The *proportionately* meagre is the scanty. Scanty is therefore applicable to number as well as quantity or amplitude; meagre, only to the latter.

"The lowest class of labourers, therefore, notwithstanding their scanty subsistence, must, some way or another, make shift to continue their race so far as to keep up their usual numbers."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations.*

"His education had been but meagre."—*Molloy.*

The terms scanty hope and meagre hope would thus mean—the latter, that the amount of hope was very small; the former, that the circumstances of the case afforded little ground for hope.

SCARCE. *See* RARE.

SCARCELY. *See* HARDLY.

SCARCITY. FAMINE. DEARTH.

SCARCITY (*see* SCARCE) is a generic term, and expresses the scant supply of any article needful or desirable. DEARTH, which is *dearness*, is applied to articles of food primarily, though, by a poetic analogy, extended to mean poverty in supply generally; as, "a dearth of plot and narrowness of imagination."—*Dryden.* FAMINE (Lat. *fames*, hunger) is restricted to a grievous scarcity of food or provisions, and expresses the condition as well as the fact of such want. It is used, unlike the others, only generally, and not of specific articles or commodities.

"Value is more frequently raised by scarcity than by use."—*Idler.*

"The famine is sore in the land."—*English Bible.*

"For I find the dearth at this time was very great; wheat was at four marks the quarter, malt at two pounds four shillings, pease at two pounds five shillings."—*Burnet.*

SCATTER. SPREAD. DISPERSE. SPRINKLE.

SCATTER (A. S. *scateran*) is applicable only to separable or separated bodies: as, to scatter seed upon the ground; to scatter papers about a room. It is mostly, but not absolutely, a deed of design, but done without exactness. It involves also dissipation from one point or centre, but not so systematically as disperse. SPREAD (A. S. *sprædan*), on the other hand, applies both to separable and

inseparable or unseparated bodies; as, to spread butter upon bread; to spread documents upon a table. Yet the idea of collectiveness is always more or less retained in spread; while it is contradicted and lost in scatter. The term spread may indicate extension in one direction, or in more than one, and it carries with it the idea of design. DISPERSE (Lat. *dispergere*, *dispersus*, *dis*, separately, and *spargere*, to sprinkle or scatter) is the consequence of intelligent will, or of mere force; as, the troops were dispersed by the enemy; the sun disperses the clouds. What is especially implied in disperse is the disruption of a previously compact body. Scatter is a stronger term than disperse when the term is applied to acts of man's volition or the force of circumstances. "The Jews have, by the providence of God, been scattered throughout all lands." A party of pleasure may disperse themselves over the hills. Scatter and disperse are terms without limit. Spread may be with limit as well as design, as when manure is spread over a field, or a given part of it. It may be purposely scattered, or purposely spread; in the former case it would be in patches; in the latter, it would form a continuous covering to the soil. To SPRINKLE (A. S. *sprengan*, *sprencan*) is to cause to fall lightly and scantily in drops, or solid particles like drops, of liquid.

"Our bones lie scattered before the pit."—*English Psalms*.

"As touching the spreading of mucke, and mingling it with the mould of a land, it is exceeding good to do it when the wind setteth full west."—*Holland, Pliny*.

"Not in a professed history of persecutions, or in the connected manner in which I am about to recite it, but *dispersedly* and occasionally, in the course of a mixed general history, which circumstance alone negatives the supposition of any fraudulent design."—*Paley*.

SCENT. See FRAGRANCE.

SCHEME. See PLAN.

SCHISM. See HERESY.

SCHOOL. See ACADEMY.

SCIENCE. See KNOWLEDGE,

SCOFF. See JEER.

SCORCHING. See BURNING.

SCORN. DESPISE. CONTEMN. DISDAIN.

These terms all express a feeling of dislike, coupled with a sense of one's own superiority to a person or object. CONTEMN (Lat. *contemnere*) is less frequently used than phrases into which it enters, as to show or feel contempt. We are not commonly said to contemn individuals, but objects, qualities, character, and the like. Hence there is a moral element inherent in contemn, which does not of necessity belong to DESPISE (Lat. *despicere*, to look down upon). The naturally proud man despises his inferiors. Despise, however, often stands as the verb, to which the noun contempt (instead of *despite*) belongs. Contemn lends itself, as the others do not, to a collective expression of feeling. Society contemns, but does not disdain or despise or scorn. Men are sometimes called contemnners of that which, professing to be good or useful or authoritative, is deemed by them to be wanting in these qualities. To SCORN (Old Fr. *escorner*, from Lat. *ex* and *cornu*, a horn, literally, to break off the horns of an animal, and so reduce him to defencelessness, and, as it were, shame) and to DISDAIN (Old Fr. *desdigner*, Lat. *dis* and *dignus*, worthy) are used in stronger senses than contemn and despise. Yet they are not used toward persons, though their conjugate nouns are. We do not say, "He scorned him," but "He scorned his efforts or threats;" nor "I disdain you," but "I disdain your acts, words, insinuations, character," and the like. Yet we should say, "He was treated with scorn," or, "regarded with disdain." Disdain shows itself in supercilious haughtiness when exhibited towards persons, and may have no better foundation than a contemptuous disposition. To disdain is to feel unworthy of oneself. We scorn the coward. We are too apt to despise the lowly and weak. We disdain the presumptuous. Contempt implies an

exercise of judgment on the character or capabilities of another, and an inference drawn disparaging to them. Hence contempt is used of impersonal things, as a contempt of danger, which means a low estimate of its nature or power to intimidate. There is a further difference between disdain and scorn. We disdain *on comparison with ourselves personally*. We scorn what is *in itself* contemptible or disgraceful. Alexander disdained to share the Persian empire with Darius. A man of honour scorns to deceive another. Scorn is energetic contempt.

"I am, ridiculously enough, accused to be a *contemner* of universities—that is, in other words, an enemy of learning, without the foundation of which I am sure no man can pretend to be a poet."—*Dryden*.

"It was this that raised his spirits and made him (Job) stand his ground against the opposition of his friends and the *scorn* of his enemies."—*Stillingfleet*.

"For he (Pyrrhus) was a man that could tell how to humble himself towards the great, by whom he might win benefit, and know also how to creep into their credit; and in like manner was he a great *scorner* and *despiser* of such as were his inferiors."—*North, Plutarch*.

"Let not ambition mock their useful toil,
Their homely joys and destiny obscure;
Nor grandeur hear with a *disdainful* smile
The short and simple annals of the poor."
Gray.

It may be observed that disdain, unlike scorn or contempt, may be in some cases a virtue, as where a man disdains to take an unfair advantage of another.

SCORNFUL. *See* DISDAINFUL and SCORN.

SCREAM. SHRIEK.

A SCREAM (connected with the Icelandic *hreiina*, to resound) is a cry, shrill, sharp, and sudden, as in fright or pain; and a SHRIEK (connected with screech and the Icelandic *skroekia*, to howl) might be defined nearly in the same way; but screaming may be voluntary or involuntary. Shrieking is only involuntary. We do not shriek, except when suddenly overborne; but we sometimes scream

with the object of being heard at a distance. Shriek is more forcible than scream. The ill-tempered child screams with disappointment. A shriek of horror may rise at the sight of a sudden and disastrous accident.

SCREEN. *See* HIDE.

SCRIBE. *See* WRITER.

SCRUPLE. *See* DEMUR.

SCRUPULOUS. *See* CONSCIENTIOUS.

SCRUTINY. *See* EXAMINATION.

SCURRILOUS. ABUSIVE.

SCURRILITY (Lat. *scurra*, a buffoon) is low and virulent ABUSE (Lat. *abuti, abusus*), but without the sustained earnestness of abuse. It depends upon taunts and contemptuous ridicule, rather than upon anything else. There is an argumentative consistency about abuse, whether it be merited or unmerited; while scurrility will condescend to mean, vile, or obscene vituperation. The angry, resentful man may be abusive; the coarse-minded man is scurrilous. Abuse is virulent condemnation. Scurrility is virulent derision.

"The absurd and *scurrilous* sermon which had very unwisely been honoured with impeachment."—*Macaulay*.

"Barbarous *abusiveness*."—*Milton*.

SEAMAN. *See* MARINER.

SEARCH. *See* EXAMINATION.

SEASON. *See* TIME.

SEASONABLE. *See* TIMELY.

SECEDE. *See* RECEDE.

SECLUSION. *See* PRIVACY.

SECOND. *See* INFERIOR.

SECONDARY. *See* INFERIOR.

SECRECY. CONCEALMENT.

CONCEALMENT (Lat. *con* and *celare*, to hide) may be employed to express the act as well as the state of concealing; while SECRECY (Lat. *secretus, secernere*, to set apart) expresses the state or quality alone. Secrecy involves limited knowledge; while concealment is consistent with total ignorance of the existence of a thing. There cannot be secrecy without con-

cealment; but there may be concealment without secrecy. Concealment is oftener against others; secrecy, for the sake of ourselves. The commission of a crime is commonly both secret and concealed. Secret, in being kept to himself by the author; concealed, as being hidden from the knowledge of others. Secrecy is purposed concealment.

"When King John of France, in order to pay his debts, adulterated his coin, all the officers of his mint were sworn to *secrecy*."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations*.

"Some to the rude protection of the thorn
Commit their feeble offspring; the cleft
tree
Offers its kind *concealment* to a few,
Their food its insects, and its moss their
nest." *Thomson*.

SECRET. CLANDESTINE.

CLANDESTINE (*clandestinus, clans*, secretly) is less wide, but more distinctive in meaning, than SECRET (*see above*). Clandestine applies only to matters of human action; while secret may be employed of anything unknown. The idea of the clandestine carries with it that of a purposed and unlawful secrecy. When Johnson uses the term clandestine in the following unusual way, "I went to this clandestine lodging, and found, to my amazement, all the ornaments of a fine gentleman," there is still involved the idea of continued secrecy in keeping up a clandestine mode of life.

"An Englishman will do you a piece of service *secretly*, and be distressed with the expressions of your gratitude."—*Knox, Essays*.

"But it will be urged still that civil assemblies are open and free for any one to enter into, whereas religious conventicles are more private, and thereby give opportunity to *clandestine* machinations."—*Locke*.

SECRETE. *See* HIDE.

SECULAR. *See* WORLDLY.

SECURE. *See* SAFE.

SECURITY. *See* PLEDGE.

SEDATE. COMPOSED.

COMPOSED (Lat. *componere, compositus*) relates to a specific state on a

specific occasion; SEDATE (Lat. *sedatus*, participle pass. of *sedare*, to allay), to an habitual temper and demeanour. Composed denotes tranquillity, in opposition to any excitement of feeling, as alarm or anger. Sedate denotes quietness, as opposed to levity or any extravagance of conduct or appearance.

"Go! fair example of untainted youth,
Of modest wisdom and pacific truth;
Composed in sufferings, and in joy *sedate*,
Good without noise, without pretension
great." *Pope*.

SEDIMENT. *See* DREGS.

SEDITION. *See* INSURRECTION.

SEDITIONOUS. *See* FACTIONOUS.

SEDUCE. *See* ENTICE.

SEDULOUS. *See* DILIGENT.

SEE. *See* BEHOLD.

SEEK. SEARCH.

Both these terms are employed to express the looking after something not in sight. Grammatically, SEEK is employed directly of the object sought; while SEARCH is applied directly to the place in which it is expected to be found. We seek a thing, and search for it. To search is to seek speculatively, widely, and laboriously. We are said to seek eagerly, to search carefully.

"Ask, and it shall be given you; *seek*, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you."—*English Bible*.

"*Search* the Scriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal life."—*Ibid*.

SEEM. APPEAR.

SEEM (A. S. *sēman*, to judge) is a term of which the meaning rises upon that of APPEAR (Lat. *apparere*). An object appears when it becomes simply visible to the eye or recognizable to the mind. It seems when it is referred to something beyond itself either in the mind or outside it; as, "such a proposal seems fair." Appear expresses more directly the phenomena or facts as they are presented to us; seem, the impression of likeness or probability which we derive from them. So the probability of a fact is expressed more naturally

by appear; the probability of an inference, by seem. "From the state of the ground, it appears that it rained last night." "From the look of the clouds, it seems likely that we shall have rain before long." It seems probable. It appears certain. A seeming likelihood. An apparent truism. Apparent *sometimes* means obvious; but seeming *never* means certain, but always uncertain.

"It is not that I am ignorant how many texts of Scripture *seemingly* support that cause, but neither am I ignorant how all these texts may receive a kinder and more mollified interpretation."—*Dryden*.

SEEMLY. See BECOMING.

SEIZE. See CATCH.

SEIZURE. See CAPTURE.

SELECTION. See CHOICE.

SELFISH. See EGOTISTICAL.

SELF-CONCEIT. See ARROGANCE and SELF-WILL.

SELF-SUFFICIENCY. See SELF-WILL.

SELF-WILL. SELF-CONCEIT.
SELF-SUFFICIENCY.

The SELF-WILLED person is governed by his own will, and does not yield to the will or wishes of others, unaccommodating, uncompliant. The SELF-CONCEITED person has a high and over-weening opinion of his own powers or endowments. The SELF-SUFFICIENT person has the same opinion of his own strength or abilities; hence he despises the assistance as well as the suggestions of others. Self-will is in determination and purpose; self-conceit, in personal judgment and estimation; self-sufficiency, in opinion and action.

SEMBLANCE. See SHOW.

SENIOR. See ELDER.

SENSATION. See FEELING.

SENSE. See FEELING.

SENSIBILITY. See FEELING.

SENSIBLE. See AWARE.

SENSIBLE. SENSITIVE. SENTIENT.

All these terms are derived from the same source, the Latin *sensitive*, to feel. SENSIBLE expresses either a habit of the body or mind, or only a state relating to a particular object, as a person may be sensible of cold, injury, kindness. SENSITIVE expresses a permanent or habitual condition, in which the sense or feeling is quickly acted upon, being naturally keenly alive to external influences. SENTIENT expresses a character of nature, the possession of the power or faculty of feeling, and of reflecting upon the feeling, as, "angels or men are sentient beings." It is the fact that beings are of a sentient nature which qualifies them for being sensible of certain impressions in particular. Sensitive denotes a very energetic, and at the same time a very restricted, property. There is a plant called "the sensitive plant," which is neither sentient nor sensible. Sensitive and sentient are always active. Sensible is both active and passive, in the sense of recognizing and recognized by the feelings. When sensible is employed in the sense of wise or prudent, it denotes the exercise actively of sense, in its meaning of mental perception or understanding. The two uses of sensible are illustrated in the two following quotations:—

"Our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them, and thus we come by those ideas we have of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call *sensible* qualities."—*Locke*.

"For, as in the collation it is not the gold or the silver, the food or the apparel, in which the benefit consists, but the will and benevolent intention of him who bestows them; so reciprocally it is the good acceptance, the *sensibleness* of and acquiescence in the benefactor's goodness that constitutes the gratitude."—*Barrow*.

"This spiritual sword of God's awful word penetrates the inmost recesses of the human mind, pierces to the very line of separation, as it were, of the *sensitive* and the intelligent principle."—*Bishop Horsley*.

"From hence we may gather that the

providence of God is over all His works, and that in the formation of *sentient* as well as *unsentient* natures, He had in view that series of changes and events they would produce, and ordered His whole multitude of second causes so as to execute that plan of providence He had in His intention."—*Search, Light of Nature.*

SENSITIVE. *See* SENSIBLE.

SENSUALIST. *See* EPICURE.

SENTENCE. *See* PHRASE.

SENTIENT. *See* SENSIBLE.

SENTIMENT. *See* OPINION.

SENTIMENTAL. ROMANTIC.

The SENTIMENTAL person is one of wrong or excessive sensibility, or who imports *mere* sentiment into matters worthy of more vigorous thought. The ROMANTIC (Old Fr. *romance*, Roman, or Romant, the dialects formed from mixture of the Latin language with those of the barbarians who invaded the Roman empire, and so a species of fictitious writing in that mixed language, generally treating of marvels and adventures) creates ideal scenes and objects by the extravagant exercise of the imagination. The sentimental character is soft and sickly; the romantic is extravagant and wild.

"She has even the false pity and *sentimentality* of many modern ladies."—*Warton, English Poetry.*

"I cannot but look on an indifferency of mind as to the good or evil things of this life as a mere *romantick* fancy of such who would be thought to be much wiser than they ever were or could be."—*Stillington.*

SEPARATE. DETACH. DISJOIN.
DISCONNECT. DIVIDE. PART.
SEVER. SUNDER.

To SEPARATE (Lat. *separare*, *se*, apart, and *parare*, to prepare) is employed both of physical and mental objects. We may separate one thing in its entirety from another or from other things, or a part from the whole to which it belongs. The leading idea of separation is the establishing an interval of distance between objects, or the reversing of contiguity, whether that contiguity be by natu-

ral adhesion, or by artificial or casual collocation. To DETACH (Fr. *détacher*) is to undo a link or fastening which kept any two things connected. It is a word of physical, not mental or moral, import. To DISJOIN is the opposite of to join, and therefore expresses the reversal of an union which is the effect of design. DISCONNECT (Lat. *dis* and *connectere*, *con*, together, and *nectere*, to knit) is a more complex word than disjoin, as connect is more complex than join, and expresses any kind or degree of junction, union, coherence, or even relationship, which is metaphysical junction. To disconnect is to part things which are commonly associated. We disconnect in order to neutralize common or reciprocal action. DIVIDE (Lat. *dividere*) is applicable only to the whole and entire object, which is *intrinsically* separated into two or more parts. Yet it is to be observed that, even in physical objects, it is not necessary that the thing divided should have actually ever been one, only it *would be* one but for the division. In this way a wall may be said to divide two houses. PART (Lat. *partire*, from *pars*, *partis*, a part) is very nearly identical. We part in order to neutralize union; but, as we separate what was contiguous, so we part what was whole. We divide what was one. We detach what was fastened. We disconnect what was associated. We SUNDER (A. S. *sunder*, separate) what was comprehended. We SEVER (Old Fr. *severer*, to separate) or dis sever (which seems only a redundancy) what requires some effort to part. Both sever and sunder commonly involve the inferiority of what is severed or sundered to that from which it is taken. Sever seems to lend itself more readily to expressing repeated acts of disconnection, as to sever limb from limb, where we should hardly use sunder. To divide and to separate need especially to be distinguished. To divide is to cut or resolve into parts. To separate is to place those parts at a distance from each other. Objects may be divided, yet near. When separated, they are mutually removed. The object of division is to preserve unity under

certain conditions; of separation, to dissolve unity altogether. Society is divided into classes. The hermit is separated from society. Division usually follows some principle of nature or arrangement. Separations are often unnatural, violent, or unavoidable. Every separation involves a division; but there is many a division without separation.

"The Latin word (*colonia*) signifies simply a plantation. The Greek word *ἀποικία*, on the contrary, signifies a separation of dwelling, a departure from home, a going out of the house."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations.*

"They are, in short, instruments in the hands of our Maker to improve our minds, to rectify our failings, to detach us from the present scene, to fix our affections on things above."—*Porteus.*

"The Athenian Sophists taught it (logic) in conjunction with rhetoric and philosophy; but Aristotle brought it to perfection, and seems to have been the first who professedly disjoined it from other arts and sciences."—*Beattie.*

"The Episcopal Church of England, before the Reformation connected with the See of Rome, since then *disconnected*, and protesting against some of her doctrines, and against the whole of her authority as binding on our National Church."—*Burke.*

"Caesar had made a law for the *dividing* of the lands of the Campania unto the soldiers."—*North, Plutarch.*

"But, indeed, the chief *part* of the fray was night."—*Sidney, Arcadia.*

"The angels shall come forth, and sever the wicked from among the just."—*English Bible.*

"He cutteth the spear in *sunder*."—*English Psalms.*

SEPULCHRE. *See* TOMB.

SEPULTURE. *See* BURIAL.

SEQUENCE. *See* SERIES.

SERENE. *See* CALM.

SERIES. SEQUENCE. SUCCESSION.

SERIES (Latin connected with *serere*, *sertum*, to join or bind) denotes a number of individuals or units standing in order or following in succession. SEQUENCE (Lat. *sequentia*, *sequi*, to follow) denotes of necessity a moving series or the quality of it, in which that which follows does so by virtue

of that which went before. Sequence is succession by a regular *force* or law. SUCCESSION may be with or without interconnection. Succession to the throne is according to rule or law. On the other hand, a succession of misfortunes may be without such common rule or cause, but casual. Series implies of necessity a number more than two. Sequence and succession may denote no more than one thing following upon another.

"Such divine fatalists make fate to be an implexed *series* or concatenation of causes, all in themselves necessary, whereof God is the chief."—*Cudworth.*

"Tell my friends,
Tell Athens, in the *sequence* of degree,
From high to low throughout."

Shakespeare.

"Of the same kind is the Dutch tax upon *successions*. Collateral *successions* are taxed according to the degree of relations from five to thirty per cent. upon the whole value of the *succession*."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations.*

SERIOUS. *See* GRAVE.

SERVANT. *See* DOMESTIC.

SERVICE. *See* UTILITY.

SERVITUDE. *See* CAPTIVITY.

SET. *See* LAY.

SETTLE. *See* ESTABLISH.

SETTLED. *See* CALM.

SEVER. *See* SEPARATE.

SEVERAL. *See* DIVERS.

SEVERITY. *See* AUSTERITY.

SEX. *See* GENDER.

SHACKLE. *See* CLOG.

SHADE. SHADOW.

Light intercepted produces the effect denoted by these terms. But SHADE (A. S. *scadu*, and other forms) denotes no more than the general effect of comparative darkness; while SHADOW implies a limit or form in accordance with the object intercepting. The shadow of a tree has an outline agreeing with the shape of the tree itself. The shade of a tree is that variable quantity of ground and atmosphere which is screened from the sun's rays.

"The means by which the painter works, and on which the effect of his picture depends, are light and *shade*, warm and cold colours."—*Reynolds*.

"They say that in the town Syene, which is above Alexandria fifty stadia, at noone tide in the middes of summer, there is no *shadow* at all; and for farther experiment thereof, let a pit be sunke in the ground, and it will be light all over in every corner; whereby it appeareth that the sunne then is just and directly over the place as the very zenith thereof."—*Holland, Pliny*.

SHADOW. See SHADE.

SHAKE.

SHAKE. This verb would have different synonyms, according to its acceptation as a transitive or intransitive verb, as follows:—

SHAKE. TREMBLE. SHUDDER. QUIVER. QUAKE.

SHAKE may be regarded as the generic term, of which the others are modifications. To TREMBLE (Fr. *trembler*, Lat. *tremulare*) is said both of persons and things, and is a quick vibratory and involuntary shaking, as in persons from cold or fear; in things from weakness or jarring forces. To SHUDDER (Low Germ. *schuddern*) is only applied to sentient beings, as the effect of fear, horror, aversion, or anticipation. QUIVER (Old Eng. *quave*, whence *quaver*, Low Germ. *quabbeln*, represented by the English wabble) is a quick vibration of the particles of a body resulting from their own inherent elasticity. To QUAKE (A. S. *cwacian*) is to shake from want of compactness or tenacity in the material affected; as, to quake with fear comes from a loss of muscular consistency; the quaking mire or moss, from the want of firmness and solidity.

"The foundations of the earth *shook*, and were removed, because He was wroth."—*English Bible*.

"*Tremble*, thou earth, at the presence of the Lord."—*Ibid*.

"Who see dire spectres through the gloomy air

In threatening forms advance, and *shuddering* hear

The groan of wandering ghosts and yellings of despair." *Blackmore*.

"With that at him a *quie'ring* dart he threw,

With so fell force and villanous despite,
That through his habergeon the fork-head flew." *Spenser*.

"Anon she 'gan perceive the house to *quake*,

And all the dores to rattle round about." *Ibid*.

SHAKE. AGITATE. TOSS.

Here, as in the case of the intransitive verb, SHAKE is indefinite. AGITATE (Lat. *agitare*, frequentative of *agere*, to drive) is to shake relatively, that is, to a normal or ordinary state of quietude; as, "the sea is agitated by a storm." TOSS (Welsh *tossiau*, to jerk) differs from the others in implying change of place in the thing tossed, which is either once or more than once thrown up so as to fall on another spot.

"It seems highly probable that the *shake* that is given to one part of the earth by the firing and explosion of subterranean exhalations, if that be the true and only cause of earthquakes, is not capable of reaching near so far as divers earthquakes have done, but that the fire passes through some little subterranean clefts or channels, or hidden conveyances from one great cavity or mine to another."—*Boyle*.

Agitate is used of the mind, in its secondary application; and shake, of what the mind entertains, as, for instance, convictions, beliefs, and the like.

"Winds from all quarters *agitate* the air,
And fit the limpid element for use,
Else noxious." *Cowper*.

"Fear ye not Me? saith the Lord; will ye not tremble at My presence, which have placed the sand for the bound of the sea by a perpetual decree, that it cannot pass it, and though the waves thereof *toss* themselves, yet can they not prevail, though they roar, yet can they not pass over it."—*English Bible*.

SHALLOW. SUPERFICIAL.

The *SUPERFICIAL* is that which lies at the surface (Lat. *superficies*, surface), and is so closely related in sense to SHALLOW (A. S. *scelfe*, *schylfe*, a shelf), which is wanting in depth. The terms might, in the majority of cases, be used indiscriminately, as a person of shallow or of superficial

understanding. But shallow is, by usage, more frequently associated with matters of understanding; superficial, with matters of observation. A superficial view. A shallow decision. Shallow is always a term of reproach; not so superficial. A superficial consideration of a subject may be all that time and opportunities permit. A shallow consideration would indicate want of due investigation or capacity in the investigator. A superficial acquaintance with a subject will lead to a shallow treatment of it.

"It then evidently will appear that upright simplicity is the deepest wisdom, and perverse craft the merest shallowness."—*Barrow*.

"These things are never to be understood without much more than a *superficial* knowledge of the Scriptures, and especially the Scriptures of the New Testament."—*Bishop Horsley*.

SHAME. See IGNOMINY.

SHAMELESS. See BOLDNESS.

SHAPE. See CHARACTER and FORM.

SHARE. See PART and PARTAKE.

SHARP. See ACUTE and KEEN.

SHED. See POUR.

SHELTER. See ASYLUM and HIDE.

SHIFT. See EXPEDIENT.

SHINE. See BEAM.

SHOCK. CONCUSSION.

SHOCK is a violent and sudden *shake*. CONCUSSION is from *concutere*, *con*, together, and *quater*, to shake. A concussion is the violent collision of two bodies physically. Shock is used, besides, in cases where the result is not physical, but mental; as, a shock of the nervous system; a shock to the mind. A concussion of the brain.

"The infidel principles which have been recently diffused with uncommon industry and art, have an immediate tendency to produce in a reading age this *shocking* corruption."—*Knox, Essays*.

"How can that *concussion* of atoms be capable of begetting those internal and vital

affections, that self-consciousness, and those other powers and energies that we feel in our minds? Seeing they only strike upon the outward surfaces, they cannot inwardly pervade one another; they cannot have any penetration of dimensions, and conjunction of substance."—*Bentley*.

SHOCKING. See HIDEOUS.

SHOOT. See BUD.

SHORT. BRIEF. CONCISE. SUCCINCT. SUMMARY.

SHORT (A. S. *scort*, *sceort*, from the root *shear*) may be regarded as the generic term here, of which the others represent specific forces. Everything may be called short which possesses relative length in an inferior degree, whether naturally or artificially, being either mentally or physically measured. BRIEF (Lat. *brevis*, short) is employed only of matters of speech, which have taken comparatively *short time* to utter. CONCISE (Lat. *concidere*, *concisus*, to cut short) and SUCCINCT (Lat. *succingere*, *succinctus*, to gird up) are employed, not of mere matter as such; both terms signify brevity and comprehensiveness combined; but we speak of a concise phrase or style, a succinct narrative or account. Conciseness indicates the master of language, who can produce, like the bold style in painting, effect with the least expenditure of words. Succinctness indicates the man of judgment and quick discrimination, who can select from a quantity of material that which is most important and characteristic for purposes of relation. SUMMARY (Lat. *summa*, a sum or total) is a term applicable to both speaking and acting. It often gains time at the loss of fullness and correctness, indicating mental activity and practical decision, and sometimes unscrupulousness. Where it belongs to exposition in words, it denotes that brevity which comes from touching only main topics and not details.

"After *short* silence then
And summons read, the great consult began."
Milton.

"I shall content myself to show very *briefly* how a religious and virtuous life doth conduce to our future happiness."—*Tillotson*.

"He expresses himself so *concisely*, employs words so sparingly, that whoever will possess his ideas must dig for them, and oftentimes pretty far below the surface."—*Richardson, Life of Milton.*

"A tale should be judicious, clear, *succinct*, The language plain, and incidents well-link'd." *Cowper.*

"Now, for this present I will briefly and *summarily* touch those principall points which are confessed and agreed upon as touching the said eclipses."—*Holland, Pliny.*

SHOVE. See PUSH.

SHOW. EXHIBITION. REPRESENTATION. SIGHT. SPECTACLE.

SHOW is here the most general and comprehensive term (A. S. *scavian*, *seeavian*, *scewian*, to look, see, view). A show is commonly something set forth to be seen of a more or less aggregate or complex character for the amusement of others. We do not speak of the exhibition of a single object, however curious, as a show. Like most simple terms, it has its vulgar side. A show appeals to the eye as a matter of curiosity or imposing effect, rather than to the taste. A show does not absolutely involve design, as, a fine show of blossom on fruit-trees. EXHIBITION (Lat. *exhibere*, *exhibitus*, to show), especially since the establishment of national, local, or international exhibitions, denotes a show of works eminent as works of art or industry. In the case of natural objects, they are shown or exhibited, according as we contemplate their natural beauty or attractiveness, or the skill which has produced, and the taste which has collected them. So we speak sometimes of a flower-show, sometimes of a horticultural exhibition. An exhibition always involves design. It is a preconcerted show. REPRESENTATION (Lat. *re*, again, and *præ-sens*, present) is the exhibiting or, as it were, recalling and reproducing an object by art, and may be of one or more than one such object at a time, as, the representation of a beast or bird on canvas; a theatrical representation of an historic scene. A SIGHT (A. S. *siht*, *gesiht*) is a term expressing not the effort which pro-

duces the object contemplated or exhibited, but the interest of the object itself; hence a sight exhibits itself, and may be, and commonly is, natural, not artificial and casual. It may be of a single object or of many. SPECTACLE (Lat. *spectaculum*, *spectare*, to look at) is a sight preconcerted for public view, and full of interest in its details, and striking in its arrangements, being of a complex character, connected with the social life of man.

"There is nothing which lies more within the province of a spectator than public *shows*, and diversions, and as among these, there are none which can pretend to vie with those elegant entertainments that are *exhibited* in our theatres."—*Spectator.*

"If we consider what Numa ordained concerning images and the *representation* of the gods, it is altogether agreeable unto the doctrine of Pythagoras, who thought that God was neither sensible nor mortal, but invisible, incorruptible, and only intelligible."—*North, Plutarch.*

"Moses said, I will now turn aside and see this great *sight*, why the bush is not burned."—*English Bible.*

The spectacle, being closely allied to human life and manners, differs from the rest in commonly exciting some sentiment or emotion, as of horror, pity, approbation. The spectacle, therefore, may be striking and imposing, or quite the contrary, so that the feeling raised in the mind may be out of proportion to what is exhibited or displayed, as in the following of Cowper:—

"The paralytic, who can hold her cards,
But cannot play them, borrows a friend's
hand
To deal and shuffle, to divide and sort
Her mingled suits and sequences, and sits
Spectatress both and *spectacle*, a sad
And silent cipher, while her proxy plays."

SHOW. EXHIBIT. DISPLAY. DEMONSTRATE. INDICATE. EVINCE. ARGUE. MANIFEST.

SHOW, here, as in the case of the noun, must be taken as the generic term, of which the rest are specific forms. It is indefinite, and means no more than to bring to view. EXHIBIT (*see above*) commonly denotes

to show in order to attract notice to what is rare or interesting, with more or less of publicity; while show may be public or private to one or to many, and may even be indirect and undesigned. **DISPLAY** (Old Fr. *des-ployer*, Lat. *dis*, abroad, and *plicare*, to fold) is to exhibit from personal desire that the object should be seen as extensively as possible, and with such publicity as redounds to the honour or importance of the person exhibiting. We exhibit in public. We display for the sake of publicity. To **DEMONSTRATE** (Lat. *demonstrare*) is to show as the result of argument or scientific experiment. Demonstration is planned or purposed showing, through media specifically chosen or adapted to the purpose. **INDICATE** (Lat. *indicare*) differs from demonstrate in being wanting in such plan and purpose; the indication being in the inherent nature or force of the thing itself. Indication involves a conscious power of judgment and interpretation brought to bear upon the object, which only has a power of indication if reflection, comparison, and experience are present in the observer. Indication, unlike the preceding, is indirect. **EVINCE** (*e* and *vincere*, to conquer) is to show by particular and convincing proof. It had originally the sense of conquer or subdue in argument, a sense which is now obsolete. As Milton—

“Error by his own arms is best evinced.”

It is most correctly employed when it is referred to some conclusion, either true, or maintained to be true; as to evince the truth or falsehood of a statement. There is a loose sense, in which it is used instead of manifest or exhibit; as, “He evinced great emotion.” This has probably sprung from its likeness in sound to evidence. **ARGUE** (Lat. *arguere*) is nearly related to indicate, and stands to probability and inference as indicate stands to fact. If I say, “Such expressions indicate ill-will,” I mean that they point it out as actually existing. If I say, “They argue ill-will,” I mean that ill-will is naturally suggested to account for them.

MANIFEST (Lat. *manifestus*, manifest) is, in its simplest aspect, the opposite to conceal; but it seems specially applicable to the indirect exhibition of feeling or motive in sentient beings. So we speak of persons manifesting joy or grief at announcements, or manifesting a strong desire for an object, or manifesting signs of impatience. A manifestation is an external, visible, and tangible token of what would otherwise be more or less concealed.

“In some disorders it is no more possible for men to hinder wicked thoughts from taking possession of their minds, or blasphemous words from coming out of their mouths than to hinder any other distemper (for plainly this is one) which may attack any other part of them from *showing* itself by its common effects.”—*Secker*.

“Instead of the shadows and figures of the Mosaic law, which veiled and in a great measure concealed what they *exhibited*, it presents us with the undisguised truth and very substance, sets before our eyes that great atonement to the justice of heaven which other victims were appointed to pre-signify, and opens the whole treasure of Divine bounty.”—*Ibid*.

“Some grains must be allowed to a rhetorical *display* which will not bear the rigour of a critical severity.”—*Glanvill*.

So entirely does demonstration depend upon evidence, that the term is applied, not only to persons, but to the subject-matter of the evidence itself, as in the following of Burke:—

“May no storm ever come which will put the firmness of their attachment to the proof, and which, in the midst of confusions and terrors and sufferings, may *demonstrate* the eternal difference between a true and severe friend to the monarchy and a slippery sycophant of the court.”

“I believe what you scholars call just and sublime, in opposition to turgid and bombast expression, may give you an idea of what I mean when I say modesty is the certain *indication* of a great spirit, and impudence the affectation of it.”—*Spectator*.

“And give me leave to tell you that it is no weak *evinement* of my passion for and concern in your happiness that I can refrain envying you.”—*Boyle*.

“Eve, thy contempt of life and pleasure seems
To *argue* in thee something more sublime
And excellent than what thy mind con-
tains.” *Milton*.

"The magistrate is not to be obeyed in temporals more than in spirituals, where a repugnancy is perceived between his commands and any credited *manifestations* of the Divine will."—*Paley*.

SHOW. See OSTENTATION.

SHOW. SEMBLANCE.

SHOW, in the sense in which it is a synonym with SEMBLANCE (Fr. *sembler*, Lat. *simulare*, *similis*, like), has a more varied meaning. Show may denote a *purposed* exhibition; while semblance is naturally inherent. A person may make a show of learning, but there will be a semblance of it if only there actually exist in him some amount of learning, or it be attributed to him by the ignorance of observers. A semblance is a show of similarity.

SHOWY. See GAUDY.

SHREWD. See ACUTE.

SHRIEK. See SCREAM.

SHRINK. CONTRACT.

SHRINK (A. S. *scrinean*) expresses the contraction of conscious beings under the influence of fear; while CONTRACT (Lat. *contrahere*, *contractus*, to draw together) is never used but of physical substances; nor are these said quite indiscriminately to shrink and contract. Contract is the more scientific term of the two, hence is employed of the shrinking of bodies less in common use. We speak of the shrinking of flannel by washing; of the contraction of metals under the influence of cold. Shrink is also used of such contraction as intimately affects the particles of which a substance may be composed; while contract is used of the mere closer collocation of such parts or particles. The rings of the snake do not shrink, but contract. In their *secondary* application, shrink belongs to the reluctance to action or endurance; contract, to the narrowing of the field of observation, or the scope of privilege and indulgence.

"Return, Alpheus; the dread voice is past
That *shrunk* thy streams." *Milton*.

"It is given very well in cases of *contraction* and *shrinking* of sinews."—*Holland, Pliny*.

SHUDDER. See SHAKE.

SHUN. See ESCAPE.

SHUT. CLOSE.

To CLOSE (Lat. *claudere*, *clausus*) is merely to put close together. To SHUT (A. S. *scyttan*, *scittan*) is to close so as to hinder ingress or egress. So shut is a stronger term, capable of implying more substantial obstruction, than close. The petals of a flower close. The gates of a city are shut at night. Inasmuch, however, as the word close is simply the Latin equivalent of shut, there are numberless cases in which the words may be used indiscriminately. But, like most cases of this kind, the Saxon is the commoner term for physical and common, close for metaphysical and secondary, processes of termination. "He closed his discourse by shutting his book."

"If, after all, some headstrong, hardy lout
Would disobey, though sure to be shut
out,
Could he with reason murmur at his
case,
Himself sole author of his own disgrace?"
Cooper.

"The Lord Himself hath not disdained so exactly to register in the Book of Life after what sort His servants have *closed* up their days on earth."—*Hooker*.

SICKNESS. See DISEASE.

SIGHT. See SHOW.

SIGN. See EMBLEM.

SIGNAL. See EMBLEM.

SIGNAL. See MEMORABLE.

SIGNALIZE. DISTINGUISH.

The former term is stronger than the latter. To SIGNALIZE oneself (Fr. *signaliser*, Lat. *signum*, a sign) is eminently and *conspicuously* to DISTINGUISH oneself (Lat. *distinguere*). He distinguishes himself who gains honour. He signalises himself who performs striking deeds, for which he obtains renown. So signalise is especially applicable to individuals; while many may be distinguished.

"The knight of La Mancha gravely recounts to his companion the adventures by which he is to *signalise* himself."—*Johnson*.

"Few are formed with abilities to discover new possibilities, and to *distinguish* themselves by means never tried before."—*Rambler*.

SIGNIFICANT. EXPRESSIVE.

SIGNIFICANT (*significare, signum*, a sign, and *facere*, to make) is specific; EXPRESSIVE (*exprimere, expressus*, to express) is general. That is expressive which habitually and forcibly shows expression, as opposed to inexpressive. That is significant which strongly expresses or indicates some particular thing. An expressive countenance manifests clearly successive and varied emotions. A gesture is significant which plainly and forcibly illustrates what is on the mind. Expressive carries with it the idea of excellence. Significant is neutral for bad or good, and may be either. Expressive is restricted to looks and words; as, an expressive eye; an expressive phrase. Significant is applicable to complex actions or measures; as, "Such a measure is significant of a liberal policy." Expressive belongs to the present. Significant is indicative also of the future. The expressive appeals more directly to senses; the significant, to the understanding. Expressive stands to feeling as significant to fact.

"The new name was always *significant*, and for the most part, when given by Divine authority, predictive of some peculiarity in the character, the life, the achievements, or the destiny of the person on whom it was imposed."—*Bishop Horsley*.

"The murrain at the end of the Third Georgic has all the *expressiveness* that words can give it."—*Addison*.

SIGNIFICATION. See IMPORT.

SIGNIFY. See EXPRESS and IMPLY.

SIGNIFY. DENOTE.

DENOTE (Lat. *denotare, de* and *nota*, a sign) is to SIGNIFY (see SIGNIFICANT) by an outward sign, and so is less wide in its application than signify, inasmuch as it is always patent and direct, while signify may be covert and indirect. There is a distinctness of exposition in denote which does not belong to signify.

The dove does not signify innocence, nor the lamb gentleness; but they denote those qualities when employed as symbols. As signify stands to sign, so denote stands to symbol. That which denotes marks out plainly; whereas we often require a key to ascertain a signification. The hands of the clock do not signify, they denote, the hour. Simple things or objects are denoted, complex signified.

"Nobody ever saw one animal by its gestures and natural cries *signify* to another, 'This is mine; that is yours; I am willing to give this for that.'"—*Smith, Wealth of Nations*.

"'He hath given to the poor.' These words *denote* the freeness of his bounty, and determine the principal objects thereof."—*Barrow*.

SILENT. See DUMB.

SILLY. SIMPLE.

SILLINESS (A. S. *sælig, gesælig*, happy, good), like innocence, has deteriorated in meaning. An innocent is now sometimes used for an imbecile or idiotic person. So silly meant at first innocent, happy; hence, not up to the world's ways—*childlike*, and afterwards *childish*. Silliness is energetic SIMPLICITY (Lat. *simplex*, simple). The simple person is behind the world, and so in the transactions of life likely to be duped. The silly person wants judgment or experience, and so is continually acting out false ends and mis-estimating the comparative force, value, and significance of things. Silly is active; simple, passive. The simple is deceived by others. The silly betrays himself. Simplicity is allied to ignorance; silliness, to folly. In the present sense, simple is more peculiarly an epithet of persons. Silly extends farther; as, a silly speech, book, notion, manner. Simplicity is stolid. Silliness is frivolous.

"What can be more *silly* arrogant and misbecoming than for a man to think that he has a mind and understanding in him, but yet in all the universe beside there is no such thing?"—*Locke*.

"Beseeching your excellence to defend
My *simplesse*, if ignorance offend
In any wise," *Chaucer*.

SIMILARITY. See LIKENESS.

SIMILE. See METAPHOR.

SIMILITUDE. See LIKENESS and METAPHOR.

SIMPLE. See SILLY.

SIMPLE. SINGLE.

SIMPLE (see SILLY) denotes the existence of a thing apart from other things of any kind; SINGLE (Lat. *singulus*), from other things of the same kind. If a direction began, "Take a simple sheet of paper," this would mean that no other article was required. If, "Take a single sheet," this would mean that only one sheet was required.

SIMULATE. See FEIGN.

SIN. See CRIME.

SINCE. See CONSEQUENTLY.

SINCERE. See HEARTY.

SINCERITY. See HONOUR.

SINFUL. See BAD.

SINGLE. SEE INDIVIDUAL, SIMPLE, and ONLY.

SINGULAR. See ECCENTRIC.

SINK. See DROP.

SITE. PLACE. SPOT.

The SITE (Lat. *situs*) is the area on which stands a building or a collection of buildings, and is not employed in any other relation; as the site of a mansion or a city. PLACE (Fr. *place*, Lat. *platea*, a street or square) is, in its broadest acceptation, any portion of space measured off, either actually or by the mind, from other space. A SPOT (from the root of *spit*) is a small extent of space defined with exactness. "I search for the site of an old house. I know, generally, that this is the place to look for it; yet I cannot find the spot."

"These spacious streets, where every private house

Appears a palace to receive a king.

The site, the wealth, the beauty of the place,

Will soon inform thee 'tis imperious Rome,

Rome, the great mistress of the conquered world."

Beaumont and Fletcher.

"As in simple space we consider the relation of distance between any two bodies or points, so in our idea of *place* we consider the relation of distance betwixt anything and any two or more points, which are considered as keeping the same distance one with another, and so considered as at rest."—Locke.

"A jolly place, said he, in times of old,
But something ails it now; the spot is
cursed."
Wordsworth.

SITUATION. See CIRCUMSTANCE, POSITION, and STATE.

SIZE. See BULK.

SKETCH. DELINEATION. OUTLINE.

The first (Fr. *esquisser*) fills up the outline in part, giving a few broad touches, by which a lively though imperfect idea is gained; while OUTLINE gives no more than the bounding lines of the scene or picture. DELINEATION (*de* and *linea*, a line) goes further than the others, having for its aim a fuller conception and larger representation. The object of an outline is to give some notion, however meagre; of a SKETCH, some representation, however imperfect; of a delineation, some amount of accurate knowledge. In the secondary sense, we speak of the outline of a plan, work, or project; a sketch of an object, character, or proceedings, where a *lively*, a delineation where an *accurate*, impression is sought to be conveyed. An outline is drawn for one's own guidance. A delineation is given for the information of another. Delineation being Latin, lends itself better to mental, as sketch to physical, objects. A delineation is an imperfect description; as a sketch is an imperfect representation.

"The method of Rubens was to *sketch* his compositions in colours, with all the parts more determined than *sketches* generally are. From this *sketch* his scholars advanced the picture as far as they were capable; after which he retouched the whole himself."—Reynolds.

"Pen the contours and outlines with a more even and acute touch."—Evelyn.

"We, in the writings of the Evangelists, have a complete summary of His triennial preaching; we have joined with the detail

of many of His miracles the *delineation* of His character, and the history of His wonderful life of piety and love."—*Bishop Horsley*.

SKILFUL. See ADROIT.

SKILL. See ABILITY.

SKIN. HIDE.

The SKIN (A. S. *scinn*) is the external membranous covering of animal bodies, which in man is composed of two layers, the corium and the epidermis. It is used generically for the same covering, whether in life, or after it is stripped from the body, as green, dry, or tanned. HIDE (A. S. *hyd*, *hūd*) is also used of the skin dressed or raw, but commonly used of the undressed skins of pachydermatous animals, as oxen and horses, and especially such as are prepared as leather. It is only used contemptuously of the human skin.

SLACK. LOOSE.

SLACK (A. S. *sleac*, *slāc*) is used in secondary physical senses, as a slack pace; but in its primary physical sense it is only employed of such cord-like substances as are capable of tying and tension. LOOSE, on the other hand, has a wider meaning, and extends to substances which do not admit of these, as, to go about loose, which means unfastened. "His coat sits loose." In the moral application we speak of slackness in reference to energy and enterprise; looseness, in reference to principles of conduct or obligation. Looseness is unfixedness. Slackness is fixedness without tension.

"What means the bull,
Unconscious of his strength, to play the
coward,
And flee before a feeble thing like man,
That knowing well the *slackness* of his arm,
Trusts only in the well-invented knife."

Blair.

"All the bonds and restraints under which men lay, He so far *loosed*, that any man might be free who would concur to his own liberty and enlargement."—*Barrow*.

SLANDER. See CALUMNY.

SLANT. SLOPE.

A SLANT (Sw. *slinta*, to slide) is a deviation from a perpendicular line.

A SLOPE inclines from an horizontal plane, and so is a direction downwards. The masts of ships are often purposely made to slant. The side of a hill slopes. The inclined plane is made to slope.

"The *slant* lightning, whose thwart
flame driv'n down,
Kindles the gummy bark of fir or pine."
Milton.

"The *slope* of faces, from the floor to th'
roof,
As if one master-spring controlled them
all,
Relaxed into a universal grin." *Cooper.*

SLAVERY. See CAPTIVITY.

SLAUGHTER. See KILL and
MASSACRE.

SLAY. See KILL.

SLEEP. SLUMBER. DOZE.

SLEEP (A. S. *sleepan*, *slapan*) is the natural and periodical suspension of the functions of the organs of sense. SLUMBER (A. S. *slumerian*, to slumber, Old Eng. *sloerber*, *stomer*) is to sleep lightly, except in the poetic style, in which it means sleep.

"He at last fell into a *slumber*, and thence into a fast *sleep*."—*Bunyan*.

DOZE (Dan. *döse*, to make dull, *dösig*, drowsy) indicates an unsound sleep, such as may be taken at regular hours under indisposition, or at irregular hours at uncertain intervals.

"From carelessness it shall fall into a *slumber*, and from a *slumber* it shall settle into a deep and long *sleep*."—*South*.

"The one side resembles Cerberus barking for a sop. The other resembles him when, after he has received it, he wraps himself up in his own warm skin and enjoys a comfortable *doze*."—*Knox, Essays*.

The last of these terms is too familiar to be employed in secondary meanings; but we speak of the slumber of indolence and the long sleep of death.

SLEEPY. See DROWSY.

SLENDER. THIN. SLIGHT. SLIM.

SLENDER (Old Dutch *slinder*, thin) is thin or narrow in proportion to circumference or width, as, a slender

stem or stalk of a plant. It is used in secondary senses, as feeble, inconsiderable, meagre, spare. A slender hope, argument, pittance, diet. THIN (A. S. *thyne*, *thyn*, thin) is the generic term. A thing may be thin and short at the same time; but slender denotes proportionate length. Thin has its secondary and analogous senses; as, the opposite to dense, thin air, or thin crops; flimsy, as a thin disguise or pretext. SLIGHT (Goth. *slaiht*, smooth, even) has the wide sense of wanting in force, mark, and so in strength or importance; as, a slight bruise; a slight figure; hence, secondarily, a slight impression; slight importance. SLIM (Dutch and Germ. *slim*) is restricted to the human figure, or what is analogous to it, that is, to objects which may be supposed to stand erect, like it, as a tree or a column.

SLIDE. See GLIDE.

SLIGHT. See SLENDER.

SLIGHT. See NEGLECT.

SLIM. See SLENDER.

SLIP. See GLIDE.

SLOPE. See SLANT.

SLOTHFUL. See INACTIVE.

SLOW. TARDY.

SLOW (A. S. *slaw*, *slaw*), the simple and generic term, has many meanings which are not comprised by TARDY (Lat. *tardus*, slow) as, wanting rapidity of movement, a slow stream; long or late in happening, as the time comes slowly; not ready in thought or in action, as slow of speech. Tardy is a term of habit, denoting a habit of being behind-hand. Tardiness implies only a slowness antecedent to a certain point, which may be followed by activity; but slowness is characteristic of movement, operation, and process throughout.

"Having uttered some words which we were very sorry we could not understand, he went back to his companions, and the whole body slowly retreated."—Cook's Voyages.

"Those words of our Lord to Nicodemus express some kind of marvel at his slowness of apprehension: 'Art thou a master of

Israel and knowest not these things?'"—Waterland.

Tardiness being Latin, and so a more polite term, lends itself more easily to express the idea of slowness in its most abstract form. Yet merely mechanical motion is not expressed by tardiness, which is only employed where slowness is contemplated in connection with some quality which has induced it.

"His tardiness of execution exposes him to the encroachments of those who catch a hint and fall to work."—Idler.

SLUGGISH. See INACTIVE.

SLUMBER. See SLEEP.

SLY. See CRAFTY.

SMALL. See LITTLE.

SMEAR. See DAUB.

SMELL. See FRAGRANCE.

SMOOTH. EVEN.

That is SMOOTH (A. S. *smedhian*, *gesmedhian*, to smooth) which is so EVEN (A. S. *even*) as to be absolutely free from all inequalities. That is even which is free from any considerable protuberances and depressions. A polished table-top is smooth. A country in which are no abrupt undulations is even. In their secondary application, we use even of character and temper in a favourable, smooth of demeanour in an unfavourable, sense. A smooth speech or smile is one which avoids offence, but is of doubtful sincerity. Evenness of disposition. Smoothness of tongue.

"So the carpenter encouraged the goldsmith, and he that smootheth with the hammer him that smote the anvil."—English Bible.

"This even-handed justice
Commends the ingredients of our poisoned
chalice

To our own lips." *Shakespeare.*

SMOTHER. See CHOKE.

SNATCH. See CATCH.

SNEER. See JEER.

SO. See CONSEQUENTLY.

SOAK. See DRENCH.

SOBER. See ABSTINENT.

SOCIABLE. *See* SOCIAL.

SOCIAL. CONVIVIAL. SOCIABLE.

SOCIAL (Lat. *socius*, a companion) has the senses of pertaining to society, or the aggregate body of the public, and disposed to mix in friendly converse, or consisting in such converse. It is therefore a term of much wider extent than the other two. The CONVIVIAL (*convivium*, a banquet, *con*, together, and *vivere*, to live) is the social in matters of feasting or festivity. We speak of convivial meetings in reference to the enjoyments of the table; of social meetings, in reference to the interchange of kindly or congenial conversation. SOCIABLE superadds to the idea of social, as a personal quality, a certain aptitude to promote the ends of conversation and society. A man fond of mixing in company, but of a taciturn disposition, is social, not sociable. Social implies, in short, active, sociable, passive, aptness for society. He is social who associates with others. He is sociable who is capable of being associated with. Man is a social animal; but all men are not sociable. Social is a property of the race; sociable, of the individual. Social, therefore, refers to the natural desire of men, collectively, to congregate in society; sociable, to the particular inclination of some to continual intercourse with their neighbours, or with friends and acquaintances, whom, for the most part, they are not scrupulous, diffident, or nice in selecting. Hence social is more an epithet of manners or nature; sociable, of persons.

"Thou, in thy secrecy, although alone,
Best with thyself accompanied, seek'st
not
Social communication." *Milton.*

"Rather he was a man of great benignity, and pleasantness, and *sociableness* in his conversation, witness his frequent vouchsafing his presence at feasts and entertainments."—*Sharp.*

"Kind laughter and *convivial* joy."
Akenside.

SOCIETY. *See* BAND, COMMUNITY, and FELLOWSHIP.

SOFT. *See* GENTLE

SOIL. *See* LAND.

SOIL. *See* SULLY.

SOJOURN. *See* ABIDE.

SOLACE. *See* CHEER.

SOLDIERLIKE. *See* MARTIAL.

SOLE. SOLITARY.

SOLITARY and SOLE, both derived from the Latin *solus*, alone, differ as synonyms in expressing, the former, that oneness which is the result of the limitation of human nature; the latter, that which results from the limitation of human power or circumstances. "The landscape did not furnish even a solitary tree." "This was the sole ground of his defence." This comes of the fact that solitary commonly expresses physical isolation, or isolation as a bare fact; sole, isolation morally. Solitary is also negative; sole, positive. Solitary is that which is simply unaccompanied. Sole denotes that which is capable of acting by itself. A solitary instance of patriotism; or, the sole defender of his country's cause. That is sole which is able to exist alone. That is solitary which is compelled to exist apart. The force of sole has been exactly hit in a passage given from Sir E. Dering's speeches under the article SOLE in Richardson's Dictionary.

"This ambition of a *sole* power, this dangerous *soleship*, is a fault in our Church indeed."

"Who out of smallest things could without end
Have raised incessant armies to defeat
Thy folly; or with *solitary* hand,
Reaching beyond all limit, at one blow,
Unaided, could have finished thee, and
whelmed
Thy legions under darkness." *Milton.*

SOLEMN. *See* GRAVE.

SOLICIT. *See* ASK.

SOLICITATION. *See* IMPORTUNITY.

SOLICITUDE. CARE. CONCERN.

ANXIETY.

CARE (Lat. *cura*) is the most indefinite of these, being sometimes attended with pain, and sometimes

not, according to the nature of the object and the degree of intensity of mental application; from the corroding care which besets him who can with difficulty find means of subsistence for himself and his family, to the ordinary care which is bestowed upon objects which ought not to be neglected or injured, and is altogether painless. SOLICITUDE (Lat. *solicitudo*), ANXIETY (Lat. *anxius*, *angere*, to throttle), and CONCERN (Fr. *concerner*, Lat. *concernere*, to regard) are all confined to the mind, being, not, like care, capable of a practical meaning. Solicitude is made up of desire and a feeling of uncertainty. Anxiety is made up of fear and a feeling of uncertainty. I feel solicitude when I wish strongly that something shall be according to my intentions, hopes, or plans, yet feel the probability of its not being so. I feel anxiety when I desire that harm or disappointment may not come, yet feel from how many sources it may spring up at any moment. Anxiety is against possible evils. Solicitude is for positive good. Solicitude is confined to the present and the immediate future. Anxiety may run out into the distant future. Anxiety is with some persons habitual. Solicitude is felt on specific occasions. CONCERN is very strong interest, and, specifically, such excitement of feeling as may spring out of this; but as it is felt only in connection with persons, it differs from the others in being less felt in regard to the future and more to the present, and even the past. I may feel deeply concerned, not only for what may happen, but also for what *has* happened to my friend. Anxiety and solicitude, on the other hand, belong only to the future.

"Others, in virtue placed felicity—

But virtue joined with riches and long life;

In corporal pleasure, he, and *careless* ease."

Milton.

"The statesman, lawyer, merchant, man of trade,

Pants for the refuge of some rural shade,

Where, all his long *anxieties* forgot,

Amid the charms of a sequestered spot,

He may possess the joys he thinks he sees."

Cowper.

"Hence we are bid to work out our salvation with fear and trembling, with a holy *solicitude*."—Scott, *Christian Life*.

"I strove a thousand ways to lessen her care, and even forgot my own pain in a *concern* for hers."—Goldsmith.

SOLID. FIRM. SUBSTANTIAL.

SOLID (Lat. *solidus*) denotes that which has firm texture and consistency of parts. It is opposed to liquid or hollow. It differs in degree according to the degree of such firmness or consistency. SUBSTANTIAL (Lat. *substantia*) is opposed to that which has no consistency at all. FIRM (Lat. *firmus*) denotes that which either in its integral form or its component particles resists movement or displacement. Meat, in distinction to drink, is solid food. Substantial food is that which is capable of giving fullness, nourishment, and support to the body. The post driven fast and deep into the ground is firm. The flesh which is not flabby is firm. We use these terms in secondary senses. Solid attainments, substantial benefits, firm convictions, and the like.

"The idea of *solidity* we receive by our touch, and it arises from the resistance which we find in a body to the entrance of any other body into the place it possesses till it has left it."—Locke.

"For if you speak of an acquired, rational, and discursive faith, certainly these reasons which make the object seem credible must be the cause of it, and consequently the strength and *firmity* of my assent must rise and fall together with the apparent credibility of the object."—Chillingworth.

"Even as his first progenitor, and quits,

Though placed in Paradise (for earth has still

Some traces of her youthful beauty left),
Substantial happiness for transient joy."

Cowper.

SOLITARY. See DESOLATE, INDIVIDUAL, LONELY, and SOLE.

SOLVE. RESOLVE.

These are the simple and a compound form of the Latin *solvere*, to loose or melt. SOLVE is used when there is but one fixed and positive explanation to be arrived at; RESOLVE, when there is a difficulty to

be disposed of. We solve a problem by doing it. We resolve a difficulty by undoing it. To solve is simply to remove doubt or difficulty. To resolve is to remove it by *referring* it to first principles or corresponding ones. Hence the phrase, "Resolve into." "A body of very considerable weight has to be raised. How is the problem to be solved? It is resolved, or resolves itself, into a question of mechanics."

"And as that Theban monster that proposed
Her riddle, and him who *solved* it not devoured,
That once found out and *solved*, for grief and spite,
Cast herself headlong from th' Ismenian steep,
So, struck with dread and anguish, fell the fiend." *Milton*.

"Positive precepts, though we are used to consider them merely as prescribed, and to *resolve* them commonly into the mere will and pleasure of the Legislator, yet are always founded upon reasons known, perhaps, in part to us, but perfectly known to God; and so they are ultimately *resolvable* into infinite wisdom and goodness."—*Waterland*.

SONOROUS. *See* LOUD.

SOON. *See* EARLY.

SOOTHE. *See* APPEASE.

SOPHISTICAL. *See* FALLACIOUS.

SOPHISTICATE. *See* COUNTERFEIT.

SORDID. *See* NIGGARDLY.

SORROW. *See* AFFLICTION.

SORRY. GRIEVED. HURT.

SORRY (*see* SORROW) and GRIEVED (Lat. *gravis*, heavy) differ from the nouns sorrow and grief in being used in a lighter sense and of more ordinary matters. We are commonly sorry for what is on our own account, and grieved on account of another. To be grieved is more than to be sorry. "I am sorry that I was not at home when you called." "I was much grieved to hear the loss he had sustained." HURT (*see* HURT) is used of wounded feelings, and denotes the sense of having been treated unfairly, inconsiderately, or without due respect. We are sorry for circumstances. We are grieved

at acts and conduct. We are hurt by treatment or behaviour.

"I am sorry for thee, friend, 'tis the Duke's pleasure."—*Shakespeare*.

"He doth not willingly afflict nor grieve the children of men."—*English Bible*.

"No man is *hurt*, at least few are so, by hearing his neighbour esteemed a worthy man."—*Blair*.

SORT. *See* CHARACTER.

SOVEREIGN. *See* MONARCH.

SOUL. *See* MIND.

SOUND. *See* NOISE.

SOUND. SANE. HEALTHY.

SOUND (A. S. *sund*, *gesund*) is extended to all bodies, animate or inanimate, which are materially in their normal condition; not subject, that is, to rupture, decay, or imperfection. Hence it is employed in a secondary sense of what is efficient; as, a sound opinion; sound advice; sound sleep, that is, unbroken; sound justice, that is, impartial. SANE (Lat. *sanus*) is, in modern English, seldom employed of the body, but only of the mind. A sane man is a man of sound mind. HEALTHY (A. S. *hāl*, hale) denotes more than sound, though it is applicable only to the frames and constitutions of organized things. A sound body is without defect. A healthy body is in the enjoyment of life. A sound tree grows. A healthy tree is luxuriant in growth. Soundness may be tested. Healthiness speaks for itself. It is analogously applied; as, a healthy tone of public morals.

"I would I had that corporal *soundness* now,

As when thy father and myself in friendship

First tried our soldiership."

Shakespeare.

"A happiness that often madness hits on,
Which *sanity* and reason could not be
So prosperously delivered of." *Ibid*.

"Charles of Sweden is of a very vigorous and *healthy* constitution, takes a pleasure in enduring the greatest fatigues, and is little curious about his repose."—*Burnet*.

It may be observed that, while sound and sane are only expressive of

passive qualities, healthy has also an active force, in the sense of imparting health; or a relative force, as consistent with health; as, a healthy draught; a healthy climate.

SOURCE. *See* BEGINNING, REASON, and SPRING.

SPACE. *See* ROOM.

SPACIOUS. *See* AMPLE.

SPARE. *See* SAVE.

SPARING. *See* ECONOMICAL.

SPARKLE. *See* BEAM.

SPEAK. TALK.

Communication by verbal signs is common to these words. SPEAK (A. S. *sprecan*, and other forms) is indefinite, and may involve one word or many. A person recovering from insensibility may be just able to speak, though not to TALK, which is to speak consecutively and on divers subjects. The word is allied to "tell." Speech is of one. Talk may be mutual. To speak is a characteristic of man; to talk, of loquacious man.

"They sat down with him upon the ground seven days and seven nights, and none *spoke* a word unto him."—*English Bible*.

"Their *talk*, when it was not made up of nautical phrases, was too commonly made up of oaths and curses."—*Macaulay*.

SPECIAL. SPECIFIC. PARTICULAR. PECULIAR.

SPECIAL and SPECIFIC are both derived from species; PARTICULAR, from *particularis*, *pars*, *partis*, a part. Special comes under general, as species under genus. A general rule applies to the largest range of cases; a special rule, to a narrower range; while specific and particular point to individual cases, yet as coming under the species or the whole. Particular divides the individual from others; specific connects it with what is predicated concerning it. This appears in the verbs specify and particularise. To particularise is to take the subject to pieces, and show what it is made up of. To specify is distinctly to point out what it is we speak about. We specify by one. We particularise by many in detail.

PECULIAR (Lat. *peculium*, what is distinctively one's own property) qualifies that which belongs to an individual or to a class. Particular qualifies what belongs to one sort or kind only, exclusively of others; hence peculiar stands to particular as the individual to the species or genus. "The particular flavour of the pineapple is that which distinguishes it from other kinds of fruit." But if we were doubtful about the taste of a particular pineapple, we should say that it had a peculiar flavour. As to the substantives, particulars are minor circumstances, which constitute the details of complex ideas or occurrences; peculiarities are qualities which attach to individual objects or persons.

"But it is rather manifest that the essence of spirits is a substance *specifically* distinct from all corporeal matter whatsoever."—*More*.

Both special and specific mean, in the first instance, pertaining to or constituting a species; but specific generally means indicative of a particular thing; special, relating to a particular purpose. "I mentioned it *specifically*." "I have reserved it *specialy*." And in this way both seem often to belong to individuals, the whole idea of *species* being lost. A specific Act of Parliament is one definitively pointed out. A special Act of Parliament is one framed to meet a particular case. Hence special has sometimes the force of chief, prominent, and the like, as being that to which observation or regard is more particularly directed.

"Our Saviour is represented everywhere in Scripture as the *special* patron of the poor and afflicted."—*Bishop Atterbury*.

"In fact, all medicines will be found *specific* in the perfection of the science."—*Coleridge*.

"Of this prince there is little *particular* memory."—*Bacon*.

That which is particular is *distinguished* from the rest. That which is peculiar is *unlike* the rest. Particular is an absolute term; peculiar is relative. A particular property is *one*, and not another. A peculiar property belongs to *one thing*, and not to another.

"The gods still listened to their constant prayer,
And made the poets their *peculiar* care."
Pitt.

SPECIE. *See* CASH.

SPECIES. *See* CHARACTER.

SPECIFIC. *See* SPECIAL.

SPECIMEN. *See* EXAMPLE.

SPECIOUS. *See* OSTENSIBLE.

SPECK. SPOT. MOTTLE.

A SPECK (A. S. *specca*) is a small spot. So a ground of one colour, as the tawny hide of a leopard, would be called SPOTTED, if the foreign maculations bore some considerable proportion to the ground covered; SPECKLED, if each were inconsiderable in itself, and especially if they were not conspicuous. If they were still further so, and the colours were different, or of different shades, it would be said to be MOTTLED (*motley*, Welsh *mudliw*, *mud*, a move, and *lliw*, colour).

SPECTACLE. *See* SHOW.

SPECTATOR. BEHOLDER. OBSERVER.

A SPECTATOR (Lat. *spectare*, to look on) is a looker on. The term is indefinite. He may be concerned or unconcerned with what he sees. The term, however, implies a more or less complex character in that which engages his attention. The BEHOLDER views with some degree of interest what he sees. The OBSERVER looks on attentively, and takes account of particulars, and receives impressions, on which he subsequently reflects. Generally speaking, the spectator is interested or uninterested; the beholder is attentive or inattentive; the observer is close or casual.

"Two powers divine the son of Atreus aid,
Imperial Juno and the martial maid;
But high in heaven they sit, and gaze from far,
The tame spectators of his deeds of war."
Pope, Homer.

"I frequently offered to turn my sight another way, but was still detained by the fascination of the peeper's eyes, who had long practised a skill in them to recall the parting glances of her beholders."—*Spectator.*

"I do love
To note and to observe, though I live cut
Free from the active torrent; yet I'd mark
The currents and the passages of things
For mine own private use, and know the ebbs
And flows of state."
Ben Jonson.

SPECTRE. *See* GHOST.

SPECULATION. THEORY.

SPECULATION (Lat. *speculare*, to look out) is closely akin, etymologically, to THEORY, which is the Greek *θεωρία*, from *θεωρεῖν*, to speculate. But speculation is carried on by the use of common judgment and common sense upon the transactions of life; theory, upon scientific matters by the exercise of the scientific faculties.

"Sudden fortunes, indeed, are sometimes made in such places by what is called the trade of speculation. The speculative merchant exercises no one regular established or well-known branch of business."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations.*

"Theory is a general collection of inferences drawn from facts and compressed into principles."—*Parr.*

SPEECH. *See* ADDRESS and LANGUAGE.

SPEECHLESS. *See* DUMB.

SPEED. *See* ACCELERATE.

SPEND. EXPEND.

These are only forms of the same word, SPEND being an abbreviation of EXPEND (Lat. *expendere*, to weigh or pay out). But we use the term spend indefinitely; expend, relatively. He who spends simply pays out. He who expends pays out from a particular source and on a particular object. "He spent so much at college," tells no more than the amount. "He expended so much," would mean such a proportion of his income as he set apart for some purpose, whatever it may have been. Yet it deserves to be remarked that expend has generally the character of sober purpose. We spend, not expend, money upon frivolities.

"Why do ye spend money for that which is not bread?"—*English Bible.*

"This duty implies a due esteem and valuation of benefits, that the nature and quality,

the measure and quantity, the circumstances and consequences of them be well *expended*; else the gratitude is like to be none, or very defective."—*Barrow*.

SPHERE. See BALL.

SPILL. See POUR.

SPIRIT. See ANIMATION and MIND.

SPIRITUAL. See IMMATERIAL.

SPITE. See GRUDGE.

SPLENDID. See GRAND.

SPLENDOUR. See SPLENDID.

SPLIT. See BREAK.

SPOIL. See PILLAGE.

SPONTANEOUS. WILLING. VOLUNTARY.

These terms diminish in force in the order here given. SPONTANEOUS (Lat. *sponte*, of one's own accord) is employed of that which bursts forth from some inherent force of nature, and may be even independent of will; as, a spontaneous burst of applause. Hence it is applicable to inanimate things. WILLING expresses a free action of the will congenially exercised; but it more commonly relates to what is done in accordance with the desire of others; while VOLUNTARY (*voluntas*, will) implies that the motive lay in oneself. "He did it voluntarily," that is, he proceeded to do it of his own accord. "He did it willingly," that is, he readily acceded to the request or proposal to do it. Voluntary is not so strong as willing; for willing implies a preference of the will; while any deed may be called voluntary which is *not involuntary* or compulsory.

"By *spontaneity* is meant inconsiderate action, or else nothing is meant by it."—*Hobbs*.

"'Tis impossible but they must wish God would be pleased particularly to signify expressly the acceptableness of repentance, and His *willingness* to forgive returning sinners."—*Clarke*.

"Nothing is more certain than that God acts not necessarily but *voluntarily* with particular intention and design, knowing that He does good, and intending to do so freely and out of choice, and when He has no other

constraint upon Him but this, that His goodness inclines His will to communicate Himself and to do good."—*Clarke*.

SPORT. See AMUSEMENT and JEST.

SPORTIVE. See CHEERFUL.

SPOT. See SITE.

SPRAIN. See STRAIN.

SPREAD. See PROPAGATE and SCATTER.

SPRIGHTLY. See CHEERFUL.

SPRING. See PROCEED.

SPRING. FOUNTAIN. SOURCE.

The SPRING (A. S. *spring*) is the hidden origin of the stream where the water rises mechanically from the earth. The FOUNTAIN (Lat. *fons*, *fontis*), as now employed, denotes a jet or stream of water artificially produced. The water from a fountain falls splashing from some degree of elevation. The Geyser springs of Iceland project themselves to a considerable height into the air like a natural fountain; but, being natural, are not called fountains. The SOURCE (Fr. *source*, Lat. *surgere*, to rise) of a stream follows upon the spring, and is measured from the point where the water begins to flow laterally. The two latter are used in a secondary sense; source, in the way of that which produces a continuous supply; fountain, in the higher and more mystical style, as, "The eternal Fount of truth and light." "The king is the fountain of honour." The former less often directly, as Bentley, "A secret spring of spiritual joy."

"Upon the *springe* of freshe welles,
She stope to dwell and no where elles."
Gower.

"And in the midst of all a fountain stood,
Of richest substance that on earth
might be,
So pure and shiny, that the silver flood
Through every channel running one
might see."
Spenser.

"If there is any one English word which is now become virtually literal in its metaphorical application, it is the word *source*. Who is it that ever thought of a *spring* or *fountain* of water in speaking of God as the source of existence of the sun as the *source*

of light and heat, of land as one of the *sources* of national wealth, or of sensation and reflection as the only sources (according to Locke) of human knowledge?—propositions which it would not be easy to enunciate with equal clearness and conciseness in any other manner.”—*Stewart*.

SPRINKLE. See SCATTER.

SPROUT. See BUD.

SPRUCE. See FOPPISH.

SPURIOUS. See COUNTERFEIT.

SPY. EMISSARY.

The SPY (a shortened form of *espy*, from the French *espier*, the Latin *exspicere*) is a less formal term than EMISSARY (Lat. *emissarius*, one sent forth, *emittere*, to send forth). A spy is, indefinitely, one set to watch others. In war, or between hostile nations, the spy enters the enemy's camp or territory, but for the mere purpose of observation. His safety depends on his being unrecognized. The emissary is sometimes not afraid of being recognized, and mingles in the councils of the enemy, which he endeavours to influence. The commonest and meanest of men may be spies. A certain degree of intelligence and responsibility are associated with the emissary, who is more fully acknowledged by those who depute him; while spies generally carry on their business on their own account. A clever spy may be promoted to be an emissary. A person may turn spy for himself; but appointment makes the emissary.

“As each is known to be a *spy* upon the rest, they all live in continual restraint, and having but a narrow range for censure, they gratify its cravings by preying upon one another.”—*Idler*.

“But as pain is stronger in its operation than pleasure, so death is in general a much more affecting idea than pain; because there are very few pains, however exquisite, which are not preferred to death; nay, what makes pain itself, if I may say so, more painful is, that it is considered as an *emissary* to this King of Terrors.”—*Burke*.

SQUANDER. See WASTE.

SQUEAMISH. See FASTIDIOUS.

SQUEEZE. See BRUISE and PINCH.

STABILITY. See CONSTANCY.

STAGGER. See REEL.

STAIN. See COLOUR.

STAMMER. STUTTER.

He is said to STAMMER (Low Germ. *stammern*) who from any cause speaks inarticulately and disjointedly, as from indecision, want of words, or natural defect of speech. He only is said to STUTTER who suffers from the last. The stammerer utters words though with difficulty. The stutterer is frequently unable to form a word at all (Germ. *stottern*).

STAMP. See CHARACTER and IMPRESSION.

STANDARD. CRITERION. TEST.

A STANDARD (Old Fr. *estendard*, Lat. *extendere*) is a measure of quantity or excellence. A CRITERION (Gr. *κρίνειν*, to discern) is a measure of judgment; TEST, a measure of quality. We employ a standard to demonstrate the degree of excellence which a thing may have reached. We use a criterion as something established and approved, by which facts, principles, or acts are tried, in order to a correct judgment respecting them. A test (Lat. *testum*, from *testa*, an earthen pot, a cupel) is a trial or criterion of the most decisive kind, by which the internal properties of things or persons are tried and proved. In consonance with its etymology, it is capable of a *more purely physical* application than the others, as, the strength of a rope may be tested by the weight suspended.

“It is therefore necessary to have recourse to some visible, palpable, material *standard*, by forming a comparison with which all weights and measures may be reduced to one uniform size; and the prerogative of fixing this standard our ancient law vested in the crown.”—*Blackstone*.

“Our knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things. But what shall be the *criterion*? How shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas,

know that they agree with things themselves?"—*Locke*.

"Life force and beauty must to all impart,
At once the source, the end, and test of
art." *Pope*.

STARE. *See* GAZE.

STATE. *See* REALM.

STATE. CONDITION. SITUATION.

STATE (Lat. *status*, *stare*, to stand) expresses an habitual or permanent, CONDITION (*condere*, to build) an accidental, and SITUATION (Lat. *situs*, a site) a relative, aggregate of personal surroundings or circumstances of things. A man is born in a high, low, or intermediate state of life. His house is in good or bad condition as it wants much or little repair. If it is in a very bad state, it may have to be pulled down. The same house is in an eligible or ineligible situation, according to the relation it bears to aspect, neighbourhood, and the like. If one is in a bad state of health, the restoration will be at least long; if in a bad condition, lighter remedies will be sufficient.

"The very nature of a *state* of trial shows us the necessity of being satisfied with God's appointment of it."—*Gilpin*.

"Whilst the Church of Christ was subject to insults and persecution from the Pagan powers, and in a low and distressed condition, the Christians assembled together as often as they could, and took all possible care to instruct and animate and comfort and relieve one another."—*Jortin*.

"Thus *situated*, we began to clear places in the woods, in order to set up the astronomer's observatory, the forge to repair our iron work, tents for the sail-makers and coopers to repair the sails and casks in, to land our empty casks, to fill water, and to cut down wood for fuel, all of which were absolutely necessary occupations."—*Cook's Voyages*.

STATION. *See* POSITION.

STATELY. *See* GRAND.

STATUTE. *See* DECREE.

STAY. REMAIN.

To STAY (Lat. *stare*, to stand) is to desist from motion. REMAIN (Lat. *remanere*) is to persevere in rest. Stay is not used of impersonal ob-

jects; as we say, "when two is taken from four, two remains." To stay is a voluntary act. "I will gladly stay here;" or, "I shall be compelled to remain here." A stone remains, not stays, in the place where it is put. This is unlike the general rule, according to which the Latin form commonly expresses the more abstract, the Saxon the physical, idea. Yet in matters of abstract calculation this is still so. "The only hope that remains," we say, not stays. Stay is in some respects absolute; remain, relative. That stays which no will is exerted to remove. That remains which is left after the exercise of some power or influence, especially such as remove other things in the same condition. Stay has often a reference to future, remain to past, movement. "I was so fatigued with my journey that I determined to stay a day longer;" or, "I shall not remain here more than another day." Practically, the words are often interchangeable. Remain can hardly be employed independently when the case is one of human action, but requires the addition of words. "I cannot stay," or, "I cannot remain here any longer."

"After a *stay* of more than two months at Concordia, their number was diminished nearly one half by sickness, in consequence of the fatigue and hardship which they had suffered by the shipwreck; and the survivors were sent in a small vessel to Europe."—*Cook's Voyages*.

"That an elder brother hath power over his brethren *remains* to be proved."—*Locke*.

STEADINESS. *See* CONSTANCY.

STEADFASTNESS. *See* CONSTANCY.

STEEP. *See* DRENCH.

STIEP. *See* PACE.

STERNNESS. *See* AUSTERITY.

STICK. *See* CLEAVE.

STIFLE. *See* CHOKE.

STIMULATE. *See* EXCITE.

STILL. *See* CALM.

STILL. *See* HOWEVER.

STIPEND. *See* PAY.

STIPULATION. *See* CONDITION.

STIR. *See* MOVE.

STOCK. STORE.

A STOCK (A. S. *stocce*, a stock, trunk) and STORE (Old Fr. *estoire*, connected with the Latin *stare*, to stand) are employed to denote a supply of accumulated property or goods. The stock is that which is available as the means of its own increase. The store is that to which additions have to be made. The store is the result of industry; the stock is the source and foundation of it.

"The revenue or profit arising from *stock* naturally divides itself into two parts, that which pays the interest and which belongs to the owner of the *stock*, and that surplus part which is over and above what is necessary for paying the interest."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations*.

"He not only uses the whole profit of the *stock* which he employs in this manner, but a part of the *stock* itself, by the expense and loss which necessarily attend the *storing* and keeping of corn."—*Ibid*.

STORE. *See* STOCK.

STORM. TEMPEST. HURRICANE.

STORM (A. S. *storm*) being of northern origin, TEMPEST (Lat. *tempestas*, *tempus*, time or weather) of southern origin, and HURRICANE (originally a Carib word) of tropical origin, express the same phenomenon, varied according to the peculiarities of different latitudes. A storm implies violent wind disturbing clouds, woods, and seas, with rain, or perhaps snow or hail. Tempest is violent wind accompanied by rain, thunder, and lightning. Hurricane is a storm of that degree of intensity which is, strictly speaking, known only within the tropics.

"A daring pilot in extremity,
Pleased with the danger when the waves
went high,
He sought the *storms*." *Dryden*.

"The afternoon was *tempestuous*, with much rain, and the surf everywhere ran so high, that although we rowed almost round the bay, we found no place where we could land."—*Cook's Voyages*.

"I shall speak next of *hurricanes*. These are violent storms, raging chiefly among the Caribbee Islands, though by relation Jamaica

has of late been much annoyed by them. They are expected in July, August, or September."—*Dampier's Voyages*.

STORY. *See* ACCOUNT.

STOUT. FAT. CORPULENT.
LUSTY. BRAWNY.

STOUT (Old Fr. *estout*, *estot*, bold), in our older writers, was employed to express the combination of physical strength and courage, and when it stood for either of these separately it was for the latter. Traces still remain of this use in such phrases as, "A stout heart;" "A stout resistance." It is now commonly used for thick-set or bulky, but not in excess, unless this is specifically said. It describes an appearance characteristic of strength and vigour. It is employed analogously of material substances; as, a stout plank; stout cloth; a stout vessel. In the human subject it respects the state of the muscles and bones. FAT (A. S. *fāt*) denotes an exhibition of the oleaginous substance deposited in the cells of the adipose or cellular membrane. When this exists in superabundance, the person is said to be CORPULENT (*corpus*, a body). Fat may be local or partial. Corpulent applies to the whole body. LUSTY is less in use now than formerly. Like stout, it denotes abundance of life and vigour, and thus differs from corpulence, which may be the effect of disease. BRAWNY (Old Fr. *braon*, *braion*, the fleshy part of the body) indicates the union of stoutness or corporal development with muscular power.

"He was to wit a stout and sturdy thief,
Went to rob churches of their ornaments,
And poor men's boxes of their due relief,
Which given was to them for good intents." *Spenser*.

"All the superfluous weight of an animal beyond the vessels, bones, and muscles, is nothing but *fat*; but the conversion of the aliment into *fat* is not properly nutrition, which is a reparation of the solids and fluids."—*Arbuthnot*.

"Some labour fasting, or but slightly fed,
To lull the grinding stomach's hungry rage.
Where Nature feeds too corpulent a frame,
'Tis wisely done." *Armstrong*.

"Young and *lusty* as an eagle."—*English Bible*.

"*Brawny* limbs."—*Washington Irving*.

STRAIN. STRESS. SPRAIN.

STRAIN (Lat. *stringere*) is great, perhaps undue, tension, but in a normal way or direction; as when an unusually heavy weight is suspended to a rope. We strain the voice, and, figuratively, we strain an expression; that is, we put a great or undue stretch upon it, so as to make it extend to some meaning which it does not easily and naturally express. **SPRAIN** (Old Fr. *espreindre*, Lat. *exprimere*) denotes abnormal and usually sudden straining of the muscles or ligaments of a joint, and belongs to animal bodies. **STRESS** (Old Eng. *stresse*, equivalent to distress, Lat. *distringere*) is strain, pressure, or force peculiarly and specifically exerted, whether mechanical or voluntary; as, a ship puts into port under stress, that is, peculiar pressure, of weather. We lay great stress, that is, peculiarly strong accentuation, on a particular word, or, in a secondary sense, upon an observation, remark, argument, or consideration. The distinctive idea of strain is force; of sprain, distortion; of stress, *specific* force.

"Now every English eye intent

On Branksome's armed towers was bent;
So near they were, that they might know
The *straining* harsh of each cross-bow."

Walter Scott.

"The single-twyned cordes may no such
stresse indure,
As caybles brayded threhold may, together
wrethed sure." *Surrey*.

"The sudden turn may stretch the swelling
vein,
The cracking joint unhinge, or ankle
sprain." *Gay*.

STRAIGHT. See **DIRECT**.

STRAIT. NARROW. TIGHT.

It is to be regretted that the former of these terms seems gradually to have dropped more and more into disuse, till it bids fair to part with itself in two directions, and to divide its meaning between tight and narrow, neither of which can be equiva-

lent to it. The fundamental idea of the strait is restriction. If restriction from deviation, then the word means direct. If restriction from expansion, then it means narrow. **NARROW** (connected with near) is altogether indefinite, as the mere opposite to broad; as, a narrow road, a narrow ribbon. But **STRAIT** (Lat. *strictus*, from *stringere*, to strain or draw tight, Old Fr. *estroit*, New Fr. *étroit*) denotes that kind of narrowness which is accompanied by some degree of practical pressure, confinement, restriction, or inconvenience. So we speak of straitened circumstances; a strait waistcoat. **TIGHT** (Old Eng. participle passive of the verb to tie) denotes that which is firmly held together in its component parts, as a tight cask; fitting close to another body, as a tight coat; stretched as a rope, as opposed to loose. It is in the second of these senses that it is synonymous with strait and narrow.

"*Strait* is the gate, and *narrow* is the way which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it."—*English Bible*.

Tight originally meant well adapted and close fitting. The notion of violent compression is an after-growth in the use of the word.

"While they are among the English they wear good clothes, and take delight to go neat and *tight*."—*Danpiet's Voyages*.

"Placed so *tightly* as to squeeze myself in half my natural dimensions."—*Knor*.

STRANGE. See **ECCENTRIC**.

STRANGER. See **FOREIGNER**.

STRANGLE. See **CHOKE**.

STRATAGEM. See **TRICK**.

STRAY. See **WANDER**.

STREAM. See **GUSH**.

STREAM. CURRENT. TIDE.

STREAM (A. S. *stream*) denotes the uniform movement of a fluid or liquid body, or a body which, being composed of separate moving parts or particles, may be regarded as fluid; as, for instance, a crowd in a certain direction. It conveys the idea of uniform force operating as a cause, and a consequent steadiness in the

movement of the body. **CURRENT** (Lat. *currens*, running, *currere*, to run) expresses no more than a flow of some degree of force, and may be unsteady as to strength and direction. Hence we say, "a steady stream," "shifting currents." Smaller currents sometimes run in different, and even contrary, directions to the main stream. • **TIDE** (Old Eng. *tide*, meaning time) is periodical flux and reflux of the waters of the ocean, or other waters connected with it. It originally meant season. So Fuller: "At the *tide* of Christ his birth." In poetry or poetical speech the periodical idea is dropped, and that of flow only retained. The secondary uses of the terms correspond with the primary. We go with the stream when we make our opinions or actions accord with prevalent powers and influences. We speak of the current of popular opinion as something which may at any time change its direction; of the current of our thoughts, meaning their temporary direction and flow; and of the tide of folly or of fashion, as a periodically recurrent force.

"Streams never flow in vain; where streams
abound,
How laughs the land, with various plenty
crowed!" *Couper.*

"It is extremely vexatious to a man of eager and thirsty curiosity to be placed at a great distance from the *fountain* of intelligence, and not only never to receive the *current* of report till it has satiated the greatest part of the nation, but at last to find it muddled in its course and corrupted with taints or mixtures from every channel through which it flowed."—*Rumbler.*

"There is a *tide* in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries."
Shakespeare.

STRENGTH. See **ENERGY.**

STRENGTHEN. See **INVIGORATE.**

STRENUOUS. **ENERGETIC.**

STRENUOUS (Lat. *strenuus*) stands to **ENERGETIC** (see **ENERGY**) as effort does to force. The strenuous endeavour is that which is made with

vigour and perseverance, directed to the gaining of a certain end in a certain way; while the energetic endeavour is only that which is made with lively effort. Hence strenuous is only used of conscious labour, and not abstractedly. Measures and steps may be energetic, but not strenuous; though legislators may make strenuous efforts to carry certain measures, and give them legal force. An energetic attempt may be misdirected; but a strenuous attempt, whether successful or not, indicates a strength of purpose well applied. Energetic qualifies both disposition and act. Strenuous act, but not disposition. An energetic act or person. A strenuous endeavour, not a strenuous person.

"But what more oft in nations grown corrupt,
And by their vices brought to servitude,
Than to love bondage more than liberty,
Bondage with ease than *strenuous* liberty?"
Milton.

The original idea of energy, as derived from the Greek philosophy, was the power and mode of operation peculiar to each thing in the order of Nature.

"If, then, we will conceive of God truly, and as far as we can adequately, we must look upon Him not only as an eternal, but also as a Being eternally *energetic*."—*Grew.*

STRESS. See **ACCENT** and **STRAIN.**

STRETCH. See **REACH.**

STRICTNESS. See **AUSTERITY.**

STRICTURE. See **CRITICISM.**

STRIFE. **CONTENTION.** **DISCORD.**

STRIFE (Old Germ. *streban*, Mod. Germ. *streben*, to strive) differs from **CONTENTION** (Lat. *contendere*, *contentus*, to contend) more in the matter of dignity than anything else. Strife is the plainer and commoner word, employed of plainer and commoner things, and carries with it the idea of low, noisy contention about things which are not worth the words and temper spent upon them. Strife is noisy contention about trifles, and with the selfish and narrow end of mere personal superiority or mastery in talk. Contention involves the idea

of something better worth fighting for—some desired possession or end. Both words are commonly used in an unfavourable sense, though not exclusively; for we speak sometimes of a generous strife or contention in a matter of right. DISCORD (Lat. *dis* and *cor* the heart) differs from strife as the negative from the positive. Discord involves want of unity or harmony of will or feeling, and shows itself in an inability to act in concert. Strife is positive and active, expressed by words and acts of violence, and is emphatically emulative; while it is quite possible that discord may exist without emulation. Strife commonly arises from a quarrelsome temper, and contention from a selfish disposition.

“Where there is then no good
For which to *strive*, no *strife* can grow up there
From faction; for none sure will claim in hell
Precedence, none whose portion is so small
Of present pain, that with ambitious mind
Will covet more.” Milton.

“Contentions and strivings about the law.”
—English Bible.

Discord, unlike strife and contention, may be not only exhibited by persons, but inherent in the nature of things, though where this is the case with things moral, it is better expressed by the word discordance. In the following passage discord is used for an inherent or essential disharmony, and discordance for the operation or manifestation of it:—

“While genuine revelation and sound philosophy are in perfect good agreement with each other, and with the actual constitution of the universe, the errors of the religious on the one side, and the learned on the other, run in contrary directions; and the *discordance* of these errors is mistaken for a *discord* of the truths on which they are severally grafted.”—Bishop Horsley.

STRIKE. See BEAT.

STRIP. See BEREAVE.

STRIVE. CONTEND. VIE.

STRUGGLE. ENDEAVOUR.

To STRIVE (*see above*) is the most common and generic of these terms. It signifies simply to use effort, and may be regarded as the verb representing the idea of the noun effort. To make an effort is to strive. It may express such effort

relatively to, or irrespectively of, any efforts of others; as, to strive to gain an honest living, or to strive for a prize or mastery. It commonly involves a desirable object, or what is deemed so. CONTEND (*see above*) denotes such effort as is contravened by other effort. The uppermost idea in strive is effort; in contend, competition. VIE (A. S. *wigian*, *wiggan*, to contend) is, as its derivation shows, a sort of contending; but it does not imply, as contend does, the substantial acquisition of anything, but something which is indirectly advantageous, or thought to be so; as, to vie with another in the good opinion of a third party; or to vie with others in beauty, or the exhibition of wealth, grandeur, hospitality, and so on. It is capable, as the others are not, of application to inanimate things; as flowers may vie. STRUGGLE (Icelandic *striugr*, a feeling of hostility) denotes such striving as proceeds from necessity, either from the absolute need of the thing struggled for, or from the disproportion of power to the means requisite for attaining the object. Hence there is a desultoriness or irregularity in struggle, which contrasts with a steadiness and regularity in strive. ENDEAVOUR still preserves, though perhaps faintly, the force of its derivation (Fr. *en devoir*, to put in duty, and so act on principle). The characteristic idea of endeavour is now principle, though not necessarily conscientious principle. To endeavour is to strive to do that which falls to us to do under the circumstances, that which bears a relation to our duty, wants, or requirements. It is a word of the widest possible application. Endeavour is consistent, thoughtful, and prolonged effort. We endeavour to do a thing when we combine with effort a calculation of all available means which may be brought to bear on the accomplishment of our purpose.

“The state that *strives* for liberty, though
foiled,
And forced t’ abandon what she bravely
sought,
Deserves at least applause for her attempt,
And pity for her loss.” Cowper.

To contend is sometimes used in the simple sense of vigorously maintain; as, "To contend for the sufficiency of the Scriptures as a rule of faith." Here, however, indirect opposition, at least, though not direct competition, is implied. It may be observed that, while strive is employed of simple physical effort without any competition, as, to strive to ascend a precipitous mountain, contend is not so employed, but only of matters of truth, argument, and the like; as, "to contend for the faith once delivered to the saints."

"When the wills of divers men produce such actions as are reciprocally resistant one to the other, this is called *contention*."—*Hobbs*.

"We are all embarked in one bottom, and have our mutual dangers to *struggle* with."—*Gilpin*.

There was in Old English a noun *vie*, meaning a challenge, which is now obsolete.

"Though some of the more potent chiefs may *vie* with the king in actual possessions, they fall very short in rank and in certain marks of respect, which the collective body have agreed to pay the monarch."—*Cook's Voyages*.

The Old English phrase, in connection with the word endeavour, was a reflective verb, "to endeavour oneself;" in French, *se mettre en devoir*.

"Let us *endeavour ourselves* diligently to keepe the presence of His Holy Spirit."—*Homily for Rogation Week*.

"Daily *endeavour ourselves* to follow the blessed steps of His most holy life."—*English Prayer Book, Collect for Second Sunday after Easter*.

"That by the grace of God they will evermore *endeavour themselves* faithfully to observe such things as they by their own confession have assented unto."—*Ibid., Confirmation Service*.

STROKE. See BLOW.

STROLL. See RAMBLE.

STRONG. See MIGHTY and

ROBUST.

STRUCTURE. See EDIFICE.

STRUGGLE. See STRIVE.

STUBBORN. OBSTINATE.

These terms stand to each other as the negative to the positive. To persist in one's own ways of thought or action, in spite of the efforts or wishes of others, is common to both. But an OBSTINATE man *will do* what he has determined upon (Lat. *obstinatus*, from *obstinare*, for *obstare*, to stand out). A STUBBORN man (Old Eng. *stub*, the stump of a tree) *will not do* what others would have him do. Stubbornness is an asinine exhibition of passive obstinacy. A stubborn resistance, in the secondary sense, might be shown by the walls of a castle against the besiegers; an obstinate resistance, by the defenders.

"Thus the main difficulty is answered; but there is another near as *stubborn*, which this solution likewise removes."—*Warburton*.

"But stubbornness and an *obstinate* disobedience must be mastered with force and blows; for this there is no other remedy."—*Locke on Education*.

STUDY. See APPLICATION.

STUPID. DULL.

STUPID (Lat. *stupidus*, *stupere*, to be stupefied) denotes that sluggish, lumpish character of intellect which comes of natural want. DULL (A. S. *dol*, with other forms) is not quite the same. It implies slowness, but not necessarily deficiency of intellect. A boy apparently dull may understand a subject well, and retain it when once he has mastered it. The stupid boy will never grasp it at all. Dullness is the heavy clod, which may be tilled and fertilized. Stupidity is the hard rock, on which nothing will grow. Dullness often sees surely but slowly. Stupidity is always gaping through a fog. Dullness is at worst a want of adequate perception. Stupidity is mental insensateness. Dullness belongs to the province of knowledge; stupidity, to matters of the practical understanding in the affairs of life.

"But bycause that in cunning I am young, and can yet but creepe, this lewd A B C have I set into learning; for I cannot passen the telling of three as yet; and yf God will, in short time I shall amend this

lewdnesse in joyning of syllables, which thyng for *dulnesse* of witte I may not in three letters declare.”—*Chaucer, Testament of Love.*

“Is not your father grown incapable Of reasonable affairs? Is he not *stupid* With age?” *Shakespeare.*

STURDY. See ROBUST.

STUTTER. See STAMMER.

STYLE. See PHRASEOLOGY.

SUAVITY. See URBANITY.

SUBDUE. See CONQUER.

SUBJECT. See MATERIALS.

SUBJECT. LIABLE.

SUBJECT (Lat. *subjicere*, *subjectus*, to cast under) stands to nature as LIABLE (Fr. *lier*, to bind) to circumstances. Men are subject to error from their mental, to death from their physical, to temptation from their moral, constitution; to anger, from the irritability of their temperament. They are liable to cold in draughts, and arrest for debt. We are subject. We become liable.

“The creature was made *subject* to bondage.”—*English Bible.*

“For what is strength without a double share

Of wisdom? Vast, unwieldy, burdensome,

Proudly secure, yet *liable* to fall By weakest subtleties.” *Milton.*

SUBJECT. See SUBORDINATE.

SUBJECT. OBJECT.

These terms are made from different forms of the Latin *jacere*, *jactus*, to cast in composition; the one being what is cast or placed *under*, the other what is cast or placed *over against*. The term OBJECT commonly represents that which is perceived by the sight — sensible images of things; SUBJECT, that which the mind deals with and reflects upon. A shell lying upon the beach is an object of the sea-shore. When taken up and observed, it becomes the subject of contemplation or remark. The object when reflection is combined with observation becomes a subject, as in the following :—

“An eye like his, to catch the distant goal,
Or, ere the wheels of verse begin to roll,
Like his to shed illuminating rays
On every scene and *subject* it surveys.”
Cowper.

“Philosophically, *object* is a term for that about which the knowing *subject* is conversant; what the schoolmen have styled the *materia circa quam*.”—*Sir W. Hamilton.*

SUBJOIN. See AFFIX.

SUBJUGATE. See CONQUER.

SUBLIME. See GRAND.

SUBMISSIVE. See OBEDIENT and PASSIVE.

SUBMIT. See ACCEDE.

SUBMERGE. See DELUGE.

SUBORDINATE. SUBJECT. SUBSERVIENT.

SUBORDINATE (*sub*, under, and *ordo*, rank) respects the station and office of one person to another, and, when employed of things, denotes an inferior relative degree of importance. In society some act in higher, others in subordinate, capacities. A man's integrity and honour are paramount, his ease and comfort subordinate, considerations. Where subordination carries with it submission or obedience, this comes from the specific nature of the orders or grades as being interrelated. SUBJECT is amenability to power or influence founded upon a law of relationship natural or conventional; as, a child is subject to his parents. SUBSERVIENT (*sub*, under, and *servire*, to serve) bears reference to the promotion of ends. One thing is subservient to another when it helps to bring it about. One person is subservient to another when he allows himself to be made a tool of. The leading idea in subordination is relative importance; in subjection, relative power; in subservience, relative instrumentality.

“God hath bestowed, for His own wise reasons, different talents on different men; to one man He hath given ten, to another only one. Now, this *subordination*, in fact, pervades all the works of God.”—*Gilpin.*

“Every man, being as has been showed, naturally free, and nothing being able to put him into *subjection* to any earthly power, but

only his own consent, it is to be considered what shall be understood to be a sufficient declaration of man's consent to make him *subject* to the laws of any government."—*Locke*.

SUBORN. BRIBE.

Of these, *BRIBE* (Old Fr. *bribe*, Low Latin *briba*, a scrap) is the simplest and most comprehensive. Anything may be termed a bribe which is given with a view to corrupt the conduct of another in whatsoever station or relationship. *SUBORN* (*sub*, under, and *ornare*, to arrange) means primarily to procure or provide in a furtive or underhanded way, till it came to be restricted to the legal application of procuring a person to take a false oath. The idea of a gift of value, which is essential to bribe, does not belong to suborn. A false witness may be suborned by *any* persuasion or inducement. He is only bribed when he receives a *valuable* consideration.

"Subornation of perjury is the offence of procuring another to take such a false oath as constitutes perjury in the principal."—*Blackstone*.

"The Roman law, though it contained many severe injunctions against *bribery*, as well for selling a man's vote in the senate or other public assembly as for the bartering of common justice, yet, by strange indulgence in one instance, it tacitly encouraged this practice, allowing the magistrate to receive small presents, provided they did not in the whole exceed a hundred crowns in the year."—*Ibid*.

SUBSERVIENT. See SUBORDINATE.

SUBSIDE. ABATE.

These words, as here compared, imply a coming down from a previous state; but *ABATE* refers to degrees of force or intensity; *SUBSIDE* (Lat. *subsidere*), to degrees of quantity, agitation, or commotion. To abate is to diminish in force. To subside is to settle down either materially or analogously. The wind abates. The sea subsides. The popular rage abates. The popular tumult subsides. There are cases in which both words would be equally applicable, according to the point of view from which we regarded the subject. Anger might be said to abate or to subside; the former in regard to its violence, the latter in

regard to the agitation and disturbance of mind which accompany it. (*See ABATE*.)

"It is indeed very difficult to conceive how anything which was not deposited here at its creation, or brought here by the diligence of man, could find its way to a place so severed from the rest of the world by seas of immense extent, except the hypothesis which has been mentioned on another occasion be adopted, and the rock be supposed to have been left behind when a large tract of country of which it was part *subsided* by some convulsion of Nature, and was swallowed up in the ocean."—*Cook's Voyages*.

SUBSIST. See EXIST.

SUBSISTENCE. See LIVELIHOOD.

SUBSTANTIAL. See SOLID.

SUBSTITUTE. See BARTER.

SUBTERFUGE. See TRICK.

SUBTLE. See CRAFTY.

SUBTRACTION. See DEDUCTION.

SUBVERT. See REVERSE.

SUCCEED. See FOLLOW.

SUCCESSION. See SERIES.

SUCCINCT. See CONCISE and SHORT.

SUCCOUR. See HELP.

SUFFER. See ALLOW.

SUFFER. BEAR. ENDURE.

When *SUFFER* (Lat. *sufferre*, *sub*, under, and *ferre*, to bear) is used as an intransitive verb, it implies no more than simply to be in pain of body or mind. So to suffer pain (transitively) means simply to feel it. *BEAR* and *ENDURE* (A. S. *beran*, *boran*, *geberan*, allied to *fero*, and Fr. *endurer*, Lat. *in* and *durus*, hard) imply some degree of fortitude in the feeling. We might say, "My suffering is greater than I can bear." Suffer, bear, and endure have also the secondary sense of tolerate, or sustaining with complacency. In such cases bear is the common and generic term, and a difference may be noted between suffer and endure. "I cannot suffer his remarks to pass unnoticed," has the sense of allow or permit. "I cannot endure such conduct," has the sense of, "I cannot

bear up under it. It grieves me." We speak of moral sufferance and physical endurance; the former is active, the latter passive. When employed of moral subjects, as, for instance, the conduct of men, suffer has a much lighter force than endure. "I cannot suffer such behaviour," would imply that the speaker had it in his power authoritatively to stop it. "I cannot endure it," would mean that is excessively irksome or annoying to me, and that I should be glad to be rid of it.

"Thou hast given Me to possess
Life in Myself for ever; by Thee I live,
Though now to Death I yield, and am his
due,
All that of Me can die; yet, that debt paid,
Thou wilt not leave Me in the loathsome
grave,
His prey, nor suffer My unspotted soul
For ever with corruption there to dwell."
Milton.

"From henceforth let no man trouble me,
for I bear in my body the marks of the Lord
Jesus."—*English Bible.*

"And I am sure it will be no comfort to them in another world that they were accounted wits for deriding those miseries which they then feel and smart under the severity of. It will be no mitigation of their flames that they go laughing into them; nor will they endure them the better because they would not believe them."—*Stillington.*

SUFFERING. See PAIN.

SUFFICIENT. See ADEQUATE.

SUFFOCATE. See CHOKE.

SUFFRAGE. See VOTE.

SUGGEST. See DICTATE.

SUGGESTION. See HINT.

SUIT. See AGREE and FIT.

SUITABLE. See APPROPRIATE,
BECOMING, and CONVENIENT.

SUITOR. LOVER. WOOR.

The SUITOR (Fr. *suite*, a following, Lat. *sequi*, *secutus*, to follow) is the more dignified; LOVER (A. S. *lufe*, *lufu*, love) is the more ordinary; WOOR (A. S. *wogian*, to woo, from *wôg*, *wôh*, *wô*, a bending) is the more warm and eager. The latter is confined to the courting of the tender sex;

the former, not. We have lovers of money, lovers of pleasure, and suitors at court for the favours of monarchs.

"But Cinyras, who daily sees
A crowd of noble suitors at his knees,
Among so many knew not whom to choose,
Irresolute to grant, or to refuse."

Dryden, Ovid.

"The Revolution showed them (the Tories) to have been in this respect nothing but a genuine court party, such as might be expected in a British government, that is, lovers of liberty, but greater lovers of monarchy."—*Hume.*

"Yet was she fair, and in her countenance
Dwelt simple truth in seemingly fashion.
Long thus I woo'd her with due observ-
ance,
In hope unto my pleasure to have won,
But was as far at last as when I first
began."

Spenser.

SULLEN. See MOROSE.

SULLY. SOIL. TARNISH.

Both are derived from the French *souillir*; but SOIL is the more comprehensive, and admits of a simply physical application; while SULLY is almost confined to the moral. We speak of sullyng brightness and purity; of soiling cleanliness, or the natural hue and condition. A soiled garment. A sullied reputation. TARNISH (Fr. *ternir*) points not to external disfigurement by the contact of foreign matter, but to the marring of the intrinsic colour or brightness. Dirt soils common things. Impurity sullies things spotless. Damp tarnishes colour or brightness. Brightness and honour may be sullied, cleanness and virtue soiled, brightness and reputation tarnished.

"The over-daring Talbot
Hath sullied all his gloss of former honour
By this unheedful, desperate, wild adventure."

Shakespeare.

It may be observed that, in their secondary applications, tarnish belongs only to the account in which human character is held; soil and sully, to the character itself as well, by intrinsic defilement or corruption.

"Beside them both, upon the soiled grass,
The dead corse of an armed knight was
spread,
Whose armour all with blood besprinkled
was."

Spenser.

"So far as they either want anything of original exactness, or have lost any of their first freshness, and are, as it were, faded and tarnished by time, so far are they obscure."—*Locke.*

SUMMARY. *See* ABRIDGMENT.

SUMMARY. *See* CURSORY and SHORT.

SUMMON. *See* BID.

SUNDRY. *See* DIVERS.

SUPERB. *See* GRAND.

SUPERSEDE. OVERRULE.

SUPERSEDE (Lat. *supersedere*, to sit above, to be superior to) is employed both of persons and facts or operations; OVERRULE, only of the will of persons consciously exercised. When the subject of the verb supersede is a person, the object is commonly a person, as when one supersedes another in an appointment; when a thing, the object also is commonly a thing; as, "What he has done supersedes the necessity of further action on my part." What is superseded is a fact or a person. What is overruled is a power or an operation, or a person in regard to them. To overrule is to bring to pass by interference results not purposed or contemplated by the agent. Hence to supersede has often a negative, while overrule has a positive effect. He who supersedes, causes that a thing shall not be done. He who overrules, causes that it shall be done in his own way.

"It seems neither decorous in respect to God, nor congruous to reason, that He should do all things Himself immediately and miraculously, Nature being quite superseded, and made to signify nothing."—*Cudworth.*

"Had not th' Eternal King Omnipotent
From His stronghold of heaven high over-
ruled
And limited their right." *Milton.*

SUPERFICIAL. *See* SHALLOW.

SUPERFICIES. *See* SURFACE.

SUPERFLUITY. *See* EXCESS.

SUPERINTENDENCE. *See* OVERSIGHT.

SUPERIORITY. *See* EXCELLENCE.

SUPINE. *See* LISTLESS.

SUPPLE. *See* PLIABLE.

SUPPLICATE. *See* ASK.

SUPPLY. FURNISH. PROVIDE.

SUPPLY (Lat. *supplere*) is, literally, to fill up; hence, to fill up a deficiency, or furnish what is wanting. Hence it stands related to *want*, as FURNISH (Fr. *fournir*) to *use*. What is wanting to make a thing complete must be supplied. What is required for immediate or eventual use must be furnished. "I want a horse. My friend furnishes me with one." "I have lost my horse. My friend supplies me with another." A house is furnished, not supplied, with chairs and tables. A larder is not well furnished, but well supplied with provisions. Furnish does not necessarily refer to any antecedent want. It denotes simply the placing ready for use; as, "His book-shelves were well furnished with books." Hence common wants are said to be supplied. Superfluous luxuries are furnished. Fortune furnishes the rich man's table with delicacies; while the poor man can hardly supply his family with the common necessities of life. PROVIDE (Lat. *providere*, to see before) is to furnish or supply with care or calculation, as against the future, or so as to secure sufficiency or proportion in the thing provided.

"Why are useful things good? Because they minister to the *supply* of our wants and desires. Why is this *supply* good? Because it satisfies the mind. Why is satisfaction good? Here you must stop."—*Search, Light of Nature.*

"His writings and his life *furnish* abundant proofs that he was not a man of strong sense."—*Macaulay.*

"The pleasures of a healthy infant are so manifestly *provided* for by another, and the benevolence of the *provision* is so unquestionable, that every child I see at its sport affords to my mind a kind of sensible evidence of the finger of God, and of the disposition which directs it."—*Paley.*

SUPPORT. *See* LIVELIHOOD.

SUPPORT. *See* SANCTION and MAINTAIN.

SUPPORT. SUSTAIN.

The idea of keeping up so as to prevent from falling is common to these terms. SUPPORT (Lat. *sub*, under,

and *portare*, to carry) is applicable to anything superimposed, whether heavy or light. **SUSTAIN** (Lat. *sub*, under, and *tenerere*, to hold) implies a certain degree of weight in the thing sustained. Sustain implies also greater continuance than support. Support, as regards persons, conveys the idea of help, which is foreign to sustain. So we might say, "The support which you render me will enable me to sustain my many heavy losses." To sustain is often a more complex matter than to support. Common food, under ordinary circumstances, is sufficient to *support* life. When the body is in the last stage of exhaustion, it will require extraordinary skill and care to *sustain* life. Both are used in secondary senses. Thus we may support a resolution by simply voting for it. It is a harder matter to sustain an argument in its favour.

"The question is not whether a thing be mysterious, for all things are mysterious, but whether the mystery be *supported* by evidence."—*Gilpin*.

"He is not Creator only once, but perpetual Creator, being the *sustainer* and preserver of the whole universe."—*Waterland*.

SUPPOSE. See **APPREHEND**.

SUPPOSITION. See **GUESS**.

SUPPOSITITIOUS. See **COUNTERFEIT**.

SUPPRESS. See **REPRESS**.

SURE. **CERTAIN.**

Both these terms are employed both objectively and subjectively. The thing is **SURE**, or I am sure of it (Fr. *sur*, Lat. *securus*, secure). The thing is **CERTAIN**, or I am certain of it (Fr. *certain*, Lat. *certus*). Certain stands connected with fact and knowledge, as sure with operation and action. The fact is certain. The operation is sure. Necessary sequence in action, or cause and effect, is expressed by sure; as, a sure remedy; a sure road to success. In proportion as we speak of truth of Nature, we use the term sure. In proportion as we speak of the conviction of our own minds, we use the term certain. Men are sure of what

they have seen, and certain of what they have heard. I am sure of a fact; certain of a theory. Sure that the sun is in the sky to-day; certain that it will rise to-morrow. On this supposition that things are, generally speaking, sure in themselves, and certain to us, there is no tautology in the phrase "sure and certain;" as, in the Burial Service of the Church of England, "In sure and certain hope of the resurrection to eternal life." There is a sense in which sure stands alone; that is, as meaning productive of certainty, or that may be depended upon. So a rule, principle, method, or guide may be said to be sure, as surely bringing about an object, or conducting to a result. In this sense we speak of a sure road to happiness or to ruin; certain, in regard to ourselves, as that which will not fail us in our need.

"It shows, indeed, supposing they took up this practice as a matter of duty, that they were in doubt which was the right way they were obliged to keep, and therefore, for *sureness* they would keep both."—*Sharp*.

"That something, therefore, has really existed from eternity, is one of the *certainties* and most evident truths in the world, acknowledged by all men, and disputed by none."—*Clarke*.

SURFACE. **SUPERFICIES.**

These, which are the same word, the latter being Latin, the former a French modification of it, differ as the more common from the scientific. The **SUPERFICIES** is the scientific surface. The **SURFACE** is the popular superficies. A surface is of such or such a colour, smooth or rough. A superficies is plane, and contains such or such extent.

SURGE. See **WAVE**.

SURMISE. See **GUESS**.

SURMOUNT. See **CONQUER**.

SURPASS. See **EXCEED**.

SURPRISE. **ASTONISHMENT.**

Both these terms express feelings which arise from that which happens unexpectedly. They differ in mode and in degree. We are **SURPRISED** (Fr. *surpris*, *surprendre*, Lat. *superprehendere*, to come upon suddenly) if

that happens which we did not anticipate, or that does not happen which we did. Surprise thus contradicts calculation or expectation. A greater degree of unaccountableness in the cause, or of importance in the effect, raises the surprise into **ASTONISHMENT** (Oll. Fr. *estonner*, Lat. *attonare*, to thunder, English *stun*). We are surprised at what was unexpected. We are astonished at what is above our comprehension. We are *taken* by surprise. We are *struck* with astonishment. We are not surprised by what we expected, nor astonished by what we are familiar with.

"Whatever presents itself in a sudden and unexpected manner has, in most cases, a much greater effect upon us than subjects of very superior importance for which we have been gradually prepared. The more sudden, that is, the greater the improbability of its appearing at that instant, and the more unexpected, that is, the greater distance the train of thought was from the expectancy, the more violent will be the first percussion; and this circumstance will give peculiar energy to the exciting cause, whatever its peculiar complexion may be. A strong impulse is given by the very mode of its appearance previous to our being able to acquire a distinct knowledge of its nature. This impulse is the emotion we term *surprise*."—*Cogan*.

"*Astonishment* is that state of the soul in which all its motions are suspended with some degree of horror."—*Burke*.

SURRENDER. See **DELIVER**.

SURROUND. See **CIRCUMSCRIBE**.

SURVEY, n. See **VIEW**.

SURVEY, v. See **VIEW**.

SURVIVE. See **OUTLIVE**.

SUSCEPTIBILITY. See **FEELING**.

SUSPENSE. See **UNCERTAINTY**.

SUSPICION. See **DIFFIDENCE**.

SUSPICIOUS. See **ENVIOUS**.

SUSTAIN. See **SUPPORT**.

SUSTENANCE. See **LIVELIHOOD**.

SWAIN. See **PEASANT**.

SWARM. See **CROWD**.

SWAY. See **INFLUENCE**.

SWELL. **HEAVE.**

To **SWELL** (A. S. *swellan*, *swillan*)

is to dilate so as to exhibit increased bulk or surface. It is indefinite as to scale or degree. The ocean swells, and sometimes the little finger. To **HEAVE** (A. S. *hebban*, *hefan*) necessarily implies a scale of magnitude and more accelerated motion. The waves of the ocean heave and swell. They heave as they are bodily thrown upwards; they swell, as by that means a greater superficies belongs to each wave. The bosom struggling with emotion heaves, and swells as a consequence of the heaving.

"Though the waters thereof rage and *swell*, and though the mountains shake at the tempest of the same."—*English Psalms*.

"Back to th' assembly roll'd the thronging train,
Desert the ships, and pour upon the plain,
Murmuring they move, as when old Ocean roars,
And *heaves* huge surges to the trembling shores."
Pope, Homer.

SWERVE. See **WANDER**.

SWIFTNESS. See **QUICKNESS**.

SYCOPHANT. See **FLATTERER**.

SYMBOL. See **EMBLEM**.

SYMMETRY. **PROPORTION.**

PROPORTION (see **PROPORTION**) is that abstract relation in dimensions, of which **SYMMETRY** (Gr. *σύν*, together, and *μετρέιν*, to measure) is an external manifestation. Both denote a due and harmonious admeasurement of the parts to each other and to the whole; though proportion means also this relation, without of necessity implying that it is harmonious, and applies also to numbers as well as magnitude; while symmetry is only employed of the latter. Symmetry is harmonious proportion in structure or construction. It is the graceful conformity of the parts to the whole, or the members to the body. Symmetry is artistically of two kinds—respective and uniform. In the former, opposite sides are equal to each other; in the latter, the same balance co-ordinates the whole. It is of the former that mention seems to be made in the following:—

"Symmetry and proportion contribute greatly to order, because the one gives

despatch to the eye by enabling it to take in objects by pairs, and the other smooths the passage over them by mutual dependence of parts."—*Search, Light of Nature.*

SYMPATHY. *See* MERCY.

SYMPTOM. *See* INDICATION.

SYNCHRONOUS. *See* COEVAL.

SYSTEM. METHOD.

SYSTEM (Gr. σύστημα, from συνιστάειν, to place together) regards fixed subjects which have rational dependence or connection. METHOD (Gr. μέθοδος, after, and ὁδός, a way) regards fixed processes. System is logical or scientific collocation. Method is logical or scientific procedure. But, inasmuch as a mode of procedure may be itself harmonized, system is frequently used in place of method. We sometimes say, "to go systematically to work," meaning methodically. Method lays down rules for scientific inquiry, and is the way which leads to system. "All method," says Sir W. Hamilton, "is a rational progress—a progress toward an end." When Watts says, "The best way to learn any science is to begin with a regular system, or a short and plain scheme of that science well drawn up into a narrow compass," he is recommending a method.

T.

TACIT. SILENT.

TACIT (Lat. *tacitus*, *tacere*, to be mute) is employed only of things abstract, as, a tacit consent, agreement, recognition. SILENT (Lat. *silens*, from *silere*, to be silent) characterises either persons or things as opposed in persons to talkative or talking, and in things to noisy or sounding.

"Friendship, when strict, comprehends a tacit agreement and covenant between those who enter into it, to look upon the concerns of each other in a great measure as their own."—*Secker.*

Silence may have the effect of affirmation and consent, or the opposite. In the one case, it would be equivalent to tacit assent; in the other, to

tacit denial. It has the latter effect in the following:—

"What the compilers recommended chiefly to our faith, he *silently* passes over, and instead of recommending the same doctrine, seems to throw it quite out."—*Waterland.*

TACITURNITY. SILENCE.

As at present employed, silence is more general and less specifically expressive than taciturnity (*see above*). SILENCE may be occasional or habitual. TACITURNITY is habitual. A man may be at once talkative and silent; but he cannot be at once talkative and taciturn. He is silent who does not speak. He is taciturn who shuns to speak.

"Here, I have said, at least I should possess

The poet's treasure, *silence*, and indulge
The dreams of fancy, tranquil and secure."
Cowper.

"Let it, however, be remembered by those who bring such instances in their own justification, that the cause of Addison's *taciturnity* was a natural diffidence in the company of strangers."—*Knox, Essays.*

We may infer from such a saying as the above, that taciturnity may spring from other causes besides constitutional temperament. Even a talkative person would be taciturn on any occasion on which he imposed a certain degree of silence upon himself; but this is a limited use of the term taciturnity.

TACT. *See* ADDRESS.

TAINT. *See* CONTAMINATE.

TAKE. *See* ACCEPT.

TALE. *See* ACCOUNT.

TALENT. *See* ABILITY.

TALK. *See* SPEAK.

TALKATIVE. *See* LOQUACIOUS.

TALL. *See* HIGH.

TALLY. CORRESPOND. MATCH.

TALLY is from the French *tailleur*, to cut. The old tally was a cut or notched stick kept by the purchaser, answering to another in the possession of the seller; a mode of keeping accounts anterior to the common use of writing. Hence, metaphorically, one thing is said to tally with

another where a certain agreement exists between them, whether physical or moral. Agreeably to its derivation, tally expresses that kind of correspondence which has the nature of evidence. A tally is evidential agreement. Such a juxtaposition of two things as amounts to a probability or proof of some proposition stated relative to one of the two. Evidence which goes to substantiate in one shape what independent evidence substantiates in another shape, is said to tally. So, for instance, an act of an individual may tally with what one has heard of his character and habits generally, and so goes to confirm that account.

"Then the mention of the Sacrament as taken in the antelucan meetings *tallies* exactly with Tertullian's account of the Eucharist."—*Waterland*.

CORRESPOND (Lat. *con*, together, and *respondere*, to answer) is a wider term, including the sense of tally. It expresses adaptation in design and use; congruity or harmony of appearance, character, arrangement, statement, description, and the like. It expresses agreement of the most remote kind, as where actions are said to correspond with professions, or the contrary, or results with expectations. **MATCH** (A. S. *maca*, and so connected with make) is confined to physical objects and facts, and is not applicable to inferences drawn from the latter. One colour matches another (in nature and appearance). One man matches another (in skill or strength). To match is to produce as similar or equal; or, intransitively, to show oneself or itself as such. Ideas, for instance, tally with descriptions, or correspond to one another; but they never match. On the other hand, we might say, "It would be difficult to match such villainy;" that is, to place a similar instance of fact by the side of it.

"Each object must be fixed in the due place,
And different parts have *corresponding*
grace ;

Till, by a curious art disposed, we find
One perfect whole, of all the pieces joined."

Dryden.

"No history or antiquity can *match* his policies or his conduct."—*South*.

TAME. See **GENTLE**.

TARDY. See **SLOW**.

TARNISH. See **SOIL**.

TARRY. See **LAG**.

TARTNESS. See **ACRIMONY**.

TASK. **WORK**.

TASK (Old Fr. *tasque*, of which *tâche* is the modern form) is to **WORK** (A. S. *weorc*, *weorc*, *worc*) as the specific to the general. A task is a definite amount of labour, mental or physical, imposed by another, or self-imposed. Work in some form falls to all, and to every man every day. A task falls to him specifically and occasionally. A series of minor tasks may make up the work of the day.

"Dare to be wise, begin ; for once begun,
Your *task* is easy ; half the *work* is done."
Francis, Horace.

TASTE. **FLAVOUR.** **RELISH.**
SAVOUR.

Of these, **TASTE** (Old Fr. *taster*, of which the modern form is *tâter*, to touch or feel) is the most generic and indefinite, denoting, generally, the faculty or the feeling excited by the application of certain substances to the tongue. It may be pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral. **FLAVOUR** is predominating, peculiar, or *distinctive* taste, and is sometimes extended to comprise the meaning of distinctive odour as well as taste, in consonance with its Latin root *fragare*, to be fragrant. There is a certain taste common to all apples, and a certain flavour belonging to specific kinds. **RELISH** (*re lécher*, to lick again) is the continued enjoyment of the taste, and is sometimes an artificial flavour, or, at least, artificially employed. It may be a flavour introduced as *accessory* to another, or a stimulant to it. Flavour is either naturally inherent, or artificially imparted, and in either case is inherent in the substance itself. Relish is used analogously of the enjoyment of any pleasure. **SAVOUR** (Lat. *sapor*, *sapere*, to taste or savour) is, in modern English, of less common use, designating that which tastes as well as smells. The term savour is, however, very commonly employed

in the secondary sense, to which it is now nearly confined; as when we say that a man's actions savour of vanity, that is, betray indications of it. The savour is to the flavour as the manifestation of the character to the character itself.

"The organ of *taste* is the tongue and palate; bodies that emit light, sounds, and smells are seen, heard, and smelt at a distance; but bodies are not tasted but by immediate application to the organ; for till our meat touch our tongues or palates we taste it not, how near soever it be."—*Locke*.

"Had there been a taste in water, be it what it might, it would have infected everything we eat or drink with an importunate repetition of the same *flavour*."—*Paley*.

"Go whither Fate and Inclination strong
Leads thee; I shall not lag behind, nor err
The way; thou leading, such a scent I draw
Of carnage, prey innumerable, and taste
The *savour* of death from all things there
that live." *Milton*.

"On which with eager appetite they dine;
A savoury bit that served to *relish* wine."
Dryden, Ovid.

TAUNT. REPROACH.

A TAUNT (connected with the French *tancer*, to taunt) is a species of REPROACH, involving severity and insult. Reproach is dictated, commonly, by a strong sense of justice or of wrong received or exhibited towards another, or of wrong done in any way. Taunt involves a desire to annoy, as by contemptuousness, provocation, or sarcasm. We may reproach unselfishly. Taunt is always selfish, and is a kind of derision. Strictly speaking, nothing is a reproach to a man but his own actions; but we sometimes taunt others with the meanness of their birth.

"Being *taunted* by the way that he (John Davies) was a Papist, he denied not but that in Oxon he was instructed in the Romish religion by his tutor, and confirmed in the same by Sir Christopher Blount, one of the conspirators, while he was in the Irish wars."
—*Wood, Athenæ Oxon*.

"Consenting to the safeguard of your honour,
I thought your marriage fit; else imputation
For that he knew you might *reproach*
your life,
And choke your good to come."
Shakespeare.

TAUTOLOGY. REPETITION.

TAUTOLOGY (Gr. *ταὐτό*, the same thing, and *λέγειν*, to say) is vain and vicious REPETITION (Lat. *repetere*, to repeat). Repetition is generic; tautology, specific. Repetition may be needless and faulty, or it may be necessary and emphatic. "That is truly and really *tautology* where the same thing is *repeated*, though under never so much variety of expression." And this variety of expression is necessary to the term, for mere repetition of the same words or phrases is not in itself tautology, but tiresome repetition or reiteration. Yet Warburton says:

"A *repetition* of this kind, made in different words, is called a pleonasm, but when in the same words, as it is in the text in question, if there be any repetition at all, it is then a *tautology*."

Richardson, in his dictionary, comprises both forces of the word, when he says that tautology is "a repetition, or repeated use of the same words, or words of the same or equivalent signification." And this, perhaps, is the best.

TAX. ASSESSMENT. IMPOST. RATE. DUTY. CUSTOM. DUE. TRIBUTE. TOLL. CHARGE. LEVY.

All these terms denote payments in some form or another, made by the people to the government, or by subjects to those who exercise power and authority over them. TAX (Fr. *taxe*, Lat. *taxare*, to value) is the most generic, and so admits very readily of a secondary application; as, a tax upon corn, and a tax upon patience. It denotes no more than a compulsory payment according to an estimate, commonly in money, and for defraying the general or any specific expenses of the ruling body, as, an education tax.

"A farmer of *taxes* is of all creditors proverbially the most rapacious."—*Macaulay*.

ASSESSMENT (*assidere*, to sit by or near) is a valuation of property or profits for the purpose of taxation, or the specific sum so raised. It is made by authorized persons accord-

ing to their discretion, as distinguished from a fixed sum demanded by law.

"In the beginning of the civil wars between Charles the First and his Parliament, the latter having no other sufficient revenue to support themselves and their measures, introduced the practice of laying weekly and monthly *assessments* of a specific sum upon the several counties of the kingdom."—*Blackstone*.

The IMPOST (*imponere, impostus*, to impose) is a term of wide signification, comprising state-enforced payments, both of money and in kind.

"Trade was restrained, or the privilege granted on the payment of tolls, passages, portages, pontages, and innumerable other vexatious *imposts*, of which only the barbarous and almost unintelligible names subsist at this day."—*Burke*.

RATES (Lat. *ratus*, reckoned) are payments upon assessed property or supplies, and are now confined to the smaller local taxes of parishes or local districts, as, rates for the relief of the poor, upon water, gas, houses, highways. We do not speak of rates upon land or commodities.

"I collect out of the Abbey Booke of Burton that xx one were *ratable* at two marks of silver."—*Camden*.

DUTY, literally, that which is given as a due or debt, is used in the sense of a tax paid upon the importation, exportation, and consumption of goods, as CUSTOM (Old Fr. *coutume*, now *coutume*, from *consuetudo*, and a later form *consuetumen*) is upon the same in reference to importation and exportation only, according to the rules of the Custom House, especially in regard to the payment on *excisable* goods. The ordinary use of the term duty is familiar enough. There was a time when the term was used to mean that which was fairly due to individuals.

"When thou receivest money for thy labour or ware, thou receivest thy *duty*."—*Tyndale*.

Or, more legally—

"The man shall give unto the woman a ring, laying the same upon the book, with the *accustomed duty* to the priest and clerk."—*English Rubric*.

DUE differs slightly from duty in

denoting what municipalities, companies, or private persons are entitled to claim on the ground of certain authority, office, occupation, or specific rights; as, the port dues paid by ships on entering a harbour; or church dues for religious services, now called often "fees," as of old "duties." TRIBUTE (Lat. *tribuere*, to give, and that from *tribus*, from the old Roman custom of voting money by tribes) is enforced and arbitrary payment of a governor upon subjects, or of a government upon a province, especially when subjugated in war. Tribute lends itself more readily than any other of these terms to the secondary meaning of a deferential offering, and in this sense loses all character of compulsion, and, indeed, denotes a *voluntary* offering.

"As such we loved, admired, almost adored,
Gave all the *tribute* mortals could afford."

Dryden.

TOLL (A. S. *toll*) meant, anciently, the payment of a sum of money for the privilege of buying and selling within the bounds of a manor; afterwards, more generally, a tax upon any liberty or privilege, and, at present especially, for that of passing over a bridge or along a highway, or of vending goods in a fair or market. CHARGE (Fr. *charge*) is now commonly restricted to payments on land or incomes accruing from land in rental; as a rent-charge. LEVY (Fr. *lever*, to raise) is the most widely applicable term of all, being employed of taxes, tolls, tributes, contributions, fines, and troops.

TEACH. See INFORM.

TEAR. See BREAK.

TEASE. See ANNOY.

TEDIOUS. IRKSOME.

IRKSOME is from the Old English verb to *irk*, meaning to tire. So Shakespeare:

"To see this sight, it *irks* my very soul."

TEDIOUS, from the Latin *tædium*, denotes weariness caused by time. The nature of the thing to be done makes it irksome. The time taken up in

doing it makes it tedious. Hence tedious denotes what is felt after a work is begun or a process commenced; while irksome may denote the feeling which prevents one from undertaking it at all.

TEEM. ABOUND.

ABOUND (Lat. *abundare*) is generic, having the wide meaning of possessing largely. TEEM (Saxon *tyman*, with other forms, to produce) is specific. It is to abound in such a way as to be prolific of life, or in a manner analogous to this. A river abounds in fish, as to their quantity. It teems with fish, as to their quality of living animals. For, in old English, the word to teem meant to be pregnant or to produce, as Shakespeare—

“If she must teem,
Create her child of spleen.”

Dryden's use of the term is literally correct when he speaks of

“Teeming birds.”

“His mind *teeming* with schemes of future deceit to cover former villainy.”—Walter Scott.

i. e. Alive and engendering them in abundance.

TELL. See DISCLOSE.

TEMERITY. See HASTINESS.

TEMPER. See DISPOSITION and MIND.

TEMPERAMENT. See FRAME.

TEMPERATE. See ABSTINENT.

TEMPEST. See STORM.

TEMPORAL. See WORLDLY.

TEMPORARY. TRANSIENT. TRANSITORY. FLEETING.

TEMPORARY (Lat. *tempus*, time) denotes not only that which lasts but for a time, as opposed to permanent, but that which was *intended* only so to last. A temporary substitute will be superseded when a permanent one has been found. The cessation of that which is temporary has been foreseen and calculated upon, perhaps prearranged. TRANSIENT (*transire*, to pass over) denotes that which,

by its own nature or inherent force, rapidly passes by, and so is of no long continuance. TRANSITORY adds to the mere idea of transience that character by virtue of which a thing is transient. FLEETING expresses the idea of transitory in a more vivid manner (Icelandic *fljóta* quick), placing, as it were, before the mind's eye the tendency and the fact at the same time. What is transient is in itself momentary or of short duration. What is transitory is *liable* to pass away. Brevity is more denoted by the former; uncertainty, by the latter. Short-lived enjoyments are transient; but it is of the nature of all earthly pleasures to be transitory. Fleeting is still more strong than transient. That is transient which stays but for a little while. That is fleeting which hardly stays at all, but seems, even while we contemplate or possess it, to be hurrying past or away. Transitory is capable only of a moral and abstract use, while transient and fleeting are applicable to objects of physical sense, as sights, sounds, or colours.

“For this purpose a large space had been cleared before the *temporary* hut of this chief, near our post, as an area where the performances were to be exhibited.”—Cook's *Voyages*.

“Give them as much as mortal eyes can bear,

A *transient* view of Thy full glories there.”
Dryden.

“And thou, fair Freedom, taught alike to feel

The rabble's rage, and tyrants' angry steel;

Thou *transitory* flower, alike undone

By proud contempt, or favour's fostering sun,

Still may thy blooms the changeful clime endure.”
Goldsmith.

“'Tis sooner past, 'tis sooner done,
Than summer's rain, or winter's sun;
Most *fleeting* when it is most dear,
'Tis gone while we but say, 'tis here.”

Coree.

TEMPT. See ENTICE.

TENACITY. PERTINACITY.

TENACITY (Lat. *tenax*, from *tenere*, to hold) is that quality which leads to holding a thing close and letting it go with reluctance. It is employed of

the physical and the moral properties. **PERTINACITY** (*pertinax*, a compound of the above, *per* denoting intensity and continuance) is exclusively a moral quality. Tenacity is passive; pertinacity, active. We are tenacious in desiring to keep; pertinacious, in persisting to act. Men may be tenacious in a good sense, as, to be tenacious of the right or the truth, or of what personally concerns themselves, as to be tenacious of one's reputation. Pertinacious is always somewhat unfavourable. Pertinacity is an excessive sticking to one's purpose. Persistence at the blameable or weak point becomes pertinacity.

"*Tenaciousness*, even of a resolution taken for opposition's sake, serves either to good or to bad purposes; when to the former, it is called steadiness and bravery; when to the latter, perverseness and obstinacy."—*Search, Light of Nature*.

"The tenacity of wax."—*Ibid*.

"For to be like God was the first temptation which robbed man of his innocence, and so *pertinaciously* was this urged upon these two apostles by the men of Lystra, that it is said that Paul and Barnabas could scarcely refrain them from doing sacrifice to them."—*South*.

TENDENCY. See **BENT** and **DRIFT**.

TENDER. **OFFER.**

We **OFFER** (see **OFFER**) absolutely for acceptance. We **TENDER** (Fr. *tendre*, Lat. *tendere*, to reach or stretch) when we offer contingently upon the pleasure of another to accept with satisfaction to himself; as, to tender something in satisfaction of a debt. There is more of formality in tendering; more of voluntariness in offering. We offer in the first instance. We commonly tender in return. So we are said to tender (not to offer) or to return thanks.

TENDERNESS. See **BENIGNITY**.

TENET. See **DOCTRINE**.

TENOR. See **IMPORT**.

TERM. See **WORD**.

TERMINATE. See **FINISH**.

TERRIBLE. See **DREADFUL**.

TERRIFIC. See **DREADFUL**.

TERRIFY. See **FRIGHTEN**.

TERRITORY. **DOMINION.**

Both terms indicate extensive tracts of country; but **DOMINION** (see **DOMINION**) points to the sovereignty over the land, **TERRITORY** (Lat. *terra*) to its extent and to the jurisdiction short of actual sovereignty exercised over it. We speak of the dominions of a king; of the territories of a republic, state, city, or company. The Queen's dominions. The territory of the Hudson's Bay Company.

"The kingdom of England, over which our municipal laws have jurisdiction, includes not by the common law either Wales, Scotland, or Ireland, or any other part of the king's dominions, except the territory of England alone."—*Blackstone*.

TERROR. See **ALARM**.

TEST. See **STANDARD**.

TESTIFY. See **EXPRESS**.

TESTIMONY. See **PROOF**.

THANKFULNESS. See **GRATITUDE**.

THEOLOGIAN. **DIVINE.**

The **THEOLOGIAN** (Gr. *θεός*, God, and *λόγος*, science) studies; the **DIVINE** (Lat. *divinus*, divine) teaches. It constitutes a theologian to be learned in theology, whether he expound or not; but the divine teaches in public or writes, and is an ecclesiastic, while the theologian may be a layman.

"The old theologians and divines, who of all philosophers are the most ancient."—*Holland, Plutarch*.

THINK. **BELIEVE.**

To **THINK** is used in three senses (A. S. *thencean*, and other forms): 1, to express the ordinary operation of the intellect; 2, an opinion formed in the mind; and 3, a belief in something as nearly, but not quite, certain. As, "Man is athinkingbeing." "I think him a sensible man." "I think that he has left the house." To **BELIEVE**

(prefix *be* and *lyfan*, with other forms, to allow or permit) has also two meanings: 1, a decided faith; the other, nearly synonymous with the third meaning of think, but with a rather stronger conviction. "I believe so;" or, "I think so, but am not certain." In this sense, believe rises upon think. For instance, I ask another, "Were these words uttered in the course of the conversation?" Answer: "I think so." Question: "But do you say that you believe they were?" In this way, to think is to be disposed to believe; and to believe is to have made up one's mind to think.

THOUGHT. IDEA. IMAGINATION.

The IDEA (*see* IDEA) represents the object; the THOUGHT (*see* THINK) considers it; the IMAGINATION (Lat. *imaginare, imago*, an image) forms it. The first paints; the second examines and weighs; the third too often betrays. An idea should be just and true, a thought fine, an imagination brilliant. In argument, especially, men are bound to simplify, adjust, and clear up their ideas. Thoughts ought not to be far-fetched. Imaginations are not to be confounded with realities. The idea belongs both to the external object and to the mind which entertains it. A thought is an act of judgment and comparison among many ideas. Thoughts are more personal than ideas; for some ideas exist necessarily. It cannot be said of any thoughts that they so exist; and so we are not always responsible for false ideas, though we are to be blamed for entertaining wrong thoughts. Right thoughts are based upon exact ideas. A thought is made up of the combination of an idea and a sentiment; and so great and noble thoughts come not only from the intellect but the heart. An idea has, as it were, an independent existence. A thought does not live fully till it is expressed. A good idea is a felicitous, appropriate, or useful one. A good thought is the germ of a good action.

"I hope it will not be thought arrogance to say that perhaps we should make greater

progress in the discovery of rational and contemplative knowledge, if we sought it in the fountain, in the consideration of things themselves, and made use rather of our own *thoughts* than other men's to find it."—*Locke*.

"Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or as the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call *idea*."—*Ibid*.

"Every *imagination* of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually."—*English Bible*.

THOUGHTFUL. CONSIDERATE.

The THOUGHTFUL person (*see* THINK) considers carefully, and acts with reflection in regard to the circumstances of a case. The CONSIDERATE person (Lat. *considerare*, to consider) does the same in reference to the relation borne to it by other persons. We should be thoughtful of particulars and details, considerate towards the feelings and position of others. There is reflection in thoughtfulness; anticipation, in considerateness. Considerateness may be positive or negative, or, in other words, may show itself in kindness or forbearance. Thoughtfulness of others is considerateness.

"*Thoughtfulness* concerning our deportment, our welfare, that of others, and the public, so far as it will really be of use, is a duty of indispensable obligation."—*Secker*.

There was a time when considerate meant simply reflective, without any reference to others; as,

"We apply it (the term enthusiasm), through an indolent custom, to sober and *considerate* asserters of important truths as readily as to wild and extravagant contenders about them."—*Byrom on Enthusiasm*.

And so Milton—

"*Considerate* pride, waiting revenge;" that is, pensive, brooding.

"Æneas is patient, *considerate*, and careful of his people."—*Dryden*.

THOUGHTLESS. *See* INATTENTIVE. THREAT. MENACE.

These words being derived, the former from a Saxon, the latter from a Latin root, differ, as such words so

related commonly do, in representing, the former, the physical and ordinary, the latter, the moral and more remote or dignified. **THREAT** (A. S. *threat*) may be used of small or great evils. So of the verb threaten. One boy may threaten to strike another. On the other hand, we speak of the land as **MENACED** with the evils of war or famine. Hence to menace (Lat. *minæ*, threats) involves the action of conscious beings; while threaten is used of common influences and phenomena. The clouds are said to threaten (not to menace) rain.

THRIFTY. See **ECONOMICAL.**

THRIVE. See **FLOURISH.**

THROW. See **CROWD.**

THROW. HURL. TOSS. CAST.

THROW (A. S. *throwan*) denotes method and some amount of aim.

"I have thrown
A brave defiance in King Henry's teeth;"
Shakespeare.

HURL, a certain amount of force, and weight in the thing hurled.

"And oft the swain,
On some (sheep) impatient seizing, *hurls*
them in."
Thomson.

CAST is more dignified, and has less of effort, meaning sometimes little more than to let go; as, to cast anchor.

"Let us *cast* lots for it whose it shall be."
—*English Bible.*

Toss denotes no great violence or distance, but a sudden rapid throwing, as of a light body.

"They look upon little matters as unworthy the notice of God, and esteem it derogatory from the Divine Majesty to suppose Him attentive to the crawlings of an emmet, or *tossings* of a feather in a tempestuous air."—*Search.*

THRUST. See **PUSH.**

THWART. See **OPPOSE.**

TIDE. See **STREAM.**

TIDINGS. See **NEWS.**

TIE. See **BIND.**

TIGHT. See **STRAIT.**

TILLAGE. See **CULTIVATION.**

TIME. See **DATE.**

TIME. **SEASON.**

TIME (Lat. *tempus*) is here the generic term. **SEASON** (Fr. *saison*) is a certain time; that is, time measured not merely chronologically, but in reference to anything to which it is especially adapted. A season is a fit period; as, youth is the season of enjoyment.

"Our conception of *time* originates in that of motion; and particularly in those regular and equable motions carried on in the heavens, the parts of which, from their perfect similarity to each other, are correct measures of the continuous and successive quantity called *time*, with which they are conceived to co-exist. *Time*, therefore, may be defined the perceived number of successive movements."—*Gillies, Analysis of Aristotle's Ethics.*

"Still sing the God of *seasons* as they roll.
For me, when I forget the darling theme,
Whether the blossom blows, the summer
ray
Russets the plain, inspiring autumn
gleams,
Or winter rises in the blackening east,
Be my tongue mute, my fancy paint no
more,
And, dead to joy, forget my heart to beat."
Thomson.

TIMELY. **SEASONABLE.** See *above.*

TIMELY means in *good* time; **SEASONABLE**, in *right* time. **Timely** aid is that which comes before it is too late. **Seasonable** aid, that which meets the nature of the occasion.

"And Brett, with his men, manfully endured their charge till more English and Portuguese coming *timely* in to their succour, beat them back into the city."—*Camden.*

"Mercy is *seasonable* in the time of affliction."—*Ecclesiasticus, English Bible.*

TIMID. TIMOROUS. AFRAID.

AFRAID (for *affrayed*) denotes a temporary state. **TIMID** and **TIMOROUS** (Lat. *timere*, to be afraid) denote qualities or habits. **TIMID** is, however, sometimes employed of the state of mind at the moment, without denoting a permanent quality. **Timorous** is only used of the permanent quality. **Timid** lends itself

better to express physical, and timorous, moral timidity. A timorous disposition is opposed to an adventurous one; a timid disposition, to a courageous one. Extreme caution in statesmen shows itself in timorous measures and a timorous policy. Though of no small moral courage, yet some men, in conditions of physical danger, have shown themselves timid as children.

TIMOROUS. See TIMID.

TINGE. See COLOUR.

TINT. See HUE.

TIRE. See JADE.

TIRESOME. WEARISOME. TEDIOUS. TROUBLESOME.

TIRESOME and TROUBLESOME are applicable both to things and persons. WEARISOME and TEDIOUS only to things, and not persons. The force of that which is tiresome (A. S. *terian*, *trian*, to vex, irritate) is more active and energetic, producing a feeling of physical annoyance and exhaustion of patience. Wearisome (A. S. *wérig*, weary) is said of things more continuous in their operation, and producing the impression of monotony and want of relief. A refractory child is tiresome; a long journey through an uninteresting country is wearisome. Tedious (Lat. *tedium*) denotes the weary length of time occupied; troublesome, that which causes trouble (Fr. *trouble*, Lat. *turba*, *turbula*, a crowd), discomposure, annoyance, or difficulty in our own minds, as when the same child, by his refractoriness, sets us a difficult task in managing him. Such things as vain repetitions, importunate requests, slight disappointments and checks are tiresome. Monotonous tasks and journeys are wearisome. Prolix speeches are tedious. Complicated tasks, and problems difficult to solve, or threads difficult to unravel, are troublesome.

"This being a religion founded only on temporal sanction, and burdened with a minute and tiresome ritual, had the people known it to be only preparatory to another, founded on better promises and easier observ-

ances, they would never have borne the yoke of the law."—Warburton.

"But no worthy enterprise can be done by us without continual plodding and wearisomeness to our faint and sensitive abilities."—Milton.

"It required no such metaphysical apparatus as Clarke employs, somewhat tedious, to prove that all perfections, natural and moral, must be attributes of the self-existent all-perfect Author of all being."—Bolingbroke.

"We found walking here exceedingly troublesome, for the ground was covered with a kind of grass, the seeds of which were very sharp, and bearded backwards."—Cook's Voyages.

TITLE. See NAME.

TOIL. See WORK.

TOKEN. See INDICATION.

TOLERATE. See ALLOW.

TOLL. See TAX.

TOMB. GRAVE. SEPULCHRE.

TOMB (Fr. *tombe*, Low Lat. *tumba*) at present implies a construction having walls of stone or other such durable material; while GRAVE (A. S. *gräf*, from *grafan*, to dig) denotes no more than a simple excavation of the earth for the reception of a dead body. SEPULCHRE (Lat. *sepulchrum*, from *sepelire*, to bury) being a word of Latin origin, and so carrying our minds back to times when the dead were buried in ancient fashions, as, for instance, in sepulchres hewn out of the rock, is naturally a word of rare use, and occurs principally in moral and reflective expressions. In such expressions the grave represents in a simple manner the end of mortal life; the tomb, the silence and inactivity of death; the sepulchre, the conventional associations of death and burial. To go down to the grave. The silence of the tomb. The sepulchres of departed kings.

TONE. SOUND.

SOUND (see NOISE) is no more than the effect produced upon the auditory nerves by the vibration of the waves of the atmosphere, and is determined by the physical structure of the organ, or more generally by the phy-

sical character of the substance or cause producing it. A sound is loud or soft. The TONE (Gr. *τῶνος, τείνειν*, to stretch) is the character of the sound, which does not belong to it till it has reached that point of regularity and distinctness of vibration which constitute a musically appreciable note. The sound of a musical instrument is loud or soft; the tone is high or low-pitched, melodious or not, and the like. Hence the term tone is capable of a secondary meaning, according to which it expresses the accordance of words or acts with a certain condition of mind, temper, disposition, character, and the like; as, a high tone of mind; the general tone of his writings.

"To almost every sentiment we utter, more especially to every strong emotion, Nature hath adapted some peculiar *tone* of voice, inasmuch that he who should tell another that he was very angry, or much grieved, in a *tone* which did not suit such emotions, instead of being believed, would be laughed at."—*Blair*.

"That which is conveyed into the brain by the ear is called *sound*, though in truth, until it come to reach and affect the perceptive part, it be nothing but motion. The motion which produces in us the perception of sound is a vibration of the air, caused by an exceeding short but quick tremulous motion of the body from which it is propagated, and therefore we consider and denominate them as bodies *sounding*."—*Locke*.

TONGUE. See LANGUAGE.

TOO. See ALSO.

TOOL. See INSTRUMENT.

TORMENT. TORTURE.

Both are modifications of the Latin verb *torquere*, to twist. As now employed, TORTURE is an excess of TORMENT. So in the verbs, to torment is only a little stronger than to annoy; while to torture is to put to extreme agony. Both are employed both of the body and of the mind.

"Perfect love casteth out fear, because fear hath torment."—*English Bible*.

"Such passion here,
Such agonies, such bitterness of pain,
Seem so to tremble through the tortured stone,
That the touched heart engrosses all the view.
Almost unmarked the best proportions pass
That ever Greece beheld." *Thomson*.

TORPID. BENUMBED.

The latter (Old Eng. *num*, dull, stupid) denotes a temporary and even transient state, as when the fingers are benumbed with cold. TORPID (Lat. *torpidus*) denotes a more continued condition, and is only applicable to creatures in their whole nature, while benumbed is applicable to portions of their organization. Hybernating animals, their faculties being easily benumbed by cold, lie torpid through the winter. In the secondary sense, benumbed denotes the operation of an external influence; torpid, a natural sluggishness of mental constitution or feeling.

"For ere the beech and elm have cast their leaf

Deciduous; when now November dark

Checks vegetation in the torpid plant

Exposed to his cold breath, the lack begins." *Cowper*.

"Some on a broken crag were struggling cast,

And there by oozy tangles grappled fast;
Awhile they bore the o'erwhelming bil-

lows' rage,

Unequal combat with their fate to wage,

Till all benumbed and feeble, they forego
Their slippery hold, and sink to shades

below." *Falconer, Shipwreck*.

TORTURE. See TORMENT.

TOTAL. See ENTIRE.

TOTTER. See REEL.

TOUCH. CONTACT.

TOUCH (Fr. *touche*) involves both the act or faculty and the state. CONTACT (Lat. *contingere, contactus*, to touch upon) refers only to the state. A substance is soft to the touch when it comes in contact with us. The physical condition, apart from all volition or sensation, is all that is denoted by contact.

"The fifth and last of our senses is *touch*, a sense spread over the whole body, though it be most eminently placed in the tip of the fingers. By this sense the tangible qualities of bodies are discerned, as hard, soft, smooth, rough, dry, wet, clammy, and the like. But the most considerable of the qualities that are perceived by this sense are heat and cold."—*Locke*.

"The basking sharks will permit a boat to follow them without accelerating their

motion till it comes almost within *contact*.”
—*Pennant, British Zoology.*

TOUR. See JAUNT and ROUND.

TRACE. See DERIVE.

TRACE, *n.* See TRACK.

TRACK. TRACE. VESTIGE.
FOOTSTEP.

TRACK (Old Fr. *trac*) is a mark or impression left by some body or bodies, animate or not, that have passed along a given line of movement; as, the track of a ship in the sea; of a caravan in the sand. It is not a path or road, but the indication of a line of travel (where it is on land) which may become such. A track is a new path, as a path is a beaten track. A track may, however, be no more than a line of travel without visible trace. TRACE, which has the same origin, is a line or series of marks or prints. It is more vague than track. We speak of the track of wheels, hoofs, or human feet, and of the traces of some body which we cannot verify particularly. A track is a plain, a trace is an uncertain and defective indication. A FOOTSTEP is a stepping-place of the foot, and may be made by present feet. A VESTIGE (Lat. *vestigium*) is a footstep of the past, and seldom used but in a secondary meaning. In this secondary way, we speak of a vestige as an isolated mark; while a trace implies more or less of continuity and connection. When as ocular evidences of the past vestiges increase in number and connectedness, they become traces. A skeleton dug up in an uninhabited island, would be a vestige of human life at some unknown period of the past; but the finding in the same neighbourhood of domestic utensils, weapons, and the like, would be to discover traces of the former occupation of the country. In its secondary application, footstep rather serves as an emblem of sureness and guidance than of uncertainty. It is well when men tread in the footsteps of the great and wise and good that have gone before them.

“From the Spanish trade in the South Seas running all in one *track*, from north

to south, with very little deviation to the eastward or westward, it is in the power of two or three cruisers, properly stationed in different parts of this *track*, to possess themselves of every ship that puts to sea.”—*Anson's Voyages.*

“And such is Virgil's Episode of Dido and Æneas, where the sourest critic must acknowledge that if he had deprived his Æneis of so great an ornament because he found no *traces* of it in antiquity, he had avoided their unjust censure, but had wanted one of the greatest beauties of his poem.”—*Dryden.*

“There may, perhaps, be some reason to suppose that men became gradually acquainted with the nature and effects of fire by its permanent existence in a volcano, there being remains of volcanoes, or *vestiges* of their effects, in almost every part of the world.”—*Cook's Voyages.*

“How on the faltering footsteps of decay
Youth presses!” *Bryant.*

TRACT. See ESSAY and DISTRICT.

TRACTABLE. See DOCILE.

TRADE. COMMERCE. TRAFFIC.
DEALING.

TRADE (Lat. *trahere*, to draw) denotes, in the first instance, simple drawing from the source of supply, whether at home or from abroad. It is the exchange of commodities for money. COMMERCE (Fr. *commerce*, Lat. *con*, together, and *merx*, *mercis*, merchandize) is trade on a large scale between different places and communities, involving the accessories of such trade, the rules and mode of carrying it on. Treaties between different nations, brokerage, ship insurances, and many other such things, associate themselves with the use of the comprehensive term commerce. An extensive and flourishing commerce has often followed in tracks first opened by a few enterprising traders. TRAFFIC (Fr. *trafic*) is specific and local trade, as along a particular line of road, or between two towns. It is extended in common parlance to comprise not only trading, but travel or intercourse. We speak of the traffic along a main street as comprehending every sort of passenger and carriage frequenting it. DEALING (A. S. *dælan*) is, in its primary sense, a dividing or distribu-

ting. Hence dealing is the doing of a distributing or retailing business, as distinguished from that of a manufacturer or producer. Dealers in particular goods or articles buy them up in portions, according to the state of the market, and make profit on them in detail.

"Thy sin's not accidental, but a *trade*."
Shakespeare.

"The greatness of a state and the happiness of its subjects, how dependent soever they may be supposed in some respects, are commonly allowed to be inseparable with regard to *commerce*; and as private men receive greater security in the possession of their *trade* and riches from the power of the public, so the public becomes powerful in proportion to the opulence and extensive *commerce* of private men."—*Hume, Essay on Commerce.*

"As soon as he came aboard, he gave leave to his subjects to *traffic* with us; and then our people bought what they had a mind to."
—*Dampier's Voyages.*

"They buy and sell, they *deal* and traffic."
—*South.*

TRAGIC. See PATHETIC.

TRAIN. PROCESSION. RETINUE.

In a TRAIN (Fr. *train*) there are persons of all conditions; indeed, the fundamental idea of train is no more than a continuation of connected things in movement. Where trains are personal, they are composed of different individuals, all subordinate to one leading person. But we speak of trains of many things; as a train of ideas. It is in the personal sense that it is synonymous with RETINUE (Fr. *retinue*, from *retenir*, to retain). Retinue is applicable only to persons. We may not speak of a retinue of carriages. The idea of PROCESSION (Lat. *procedere*, to go forth) is that of a number of persons or conspicuous objects, as carriages, banners, moving in order and in line. The term is, however, civil, and not military. Retinue strictly denotes the retained or engaged followers. A prince entering a public hall with his own retinue might be joined by the authorities of the place, who would follow in his train.

"If we look immediately into ourselves, and reflect on what is observable there, we shall find our ideas always, whilst we are awake or have any thought passing in *train*, one going and another coming without intermission."—*Locke.*

"Ranked in *procession* walk the pious train,
Offering first-fruits, and spikes of yellow grain."
Dryden, Ovid.

"The great Lord Mortimer erected again the round table at Kenelworth, after the ancient order of King Arthur's Table, with the *retinue* of an hundred knights and an hundred ladies in his house, for the entertaining of such adventurers as came thither from all parts of Christendom."—*Drayton.*

TRAINING. See EDUCATION.

TRAITOROUS. See TREACHEROUS.

TRANQUILLITY. See CALM.

TRANSACT. NEGOTIATE.

We TRANSACT (*transigere*, *transactus*) business generally. We NEGOTIATE (Lat. *negotium*, *ne*, negative, and *otium*, idleness) a particular business. No more is involved in transaction than the performance of a complex action by more than one person. Negotiate implies that in the transaction there is an adjustment of mutual interests. Doing makes transaction; while deliberating is necessary for negotiation. Terms and a common basis have to be found in negotiation, as well as a common end.

"In a country fully stocked in proportion to all the business it had to *transact*, as great a quantity of stock would be employed in every particular branch as the nature and extent of the trade would permit."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations.*

"A *negotiator* must often seem willing to hazard the whole issue of his treaty, if he wishes to secure any one material point."—*Burke.*

TRANSACTION. PROCEEDING.

TRANSACTION, with the article prefixed, a *transaction* (see above), is something done and completed. A PROCEEDING (see PROCEEDING) is either yet incomplete, or is contemplated in its stages or continuity, not in its consummation. The transactions of the reign of such a mon-

arch denote what was done in that reign. The proceedings involve the acts in detail, motives, and mutual behaviour, as exhibiting justice or injustice, civilization or the want of it, and the like, and are regarded as events in progress. We speak of the proceedings of individuals, and of the transactions of companies or of individuals collectively. Transaction is sometimes used in the sense of an account of a complex proceeding, as transactions of a philosophical society.

"Tis said they all, with one consent,
Agreed to draw up th' instrument,
And, for the general satisfaction,
To print it in the next *transaction*."

Butler.

TRANSCEND. See EXCEED.

TRANSCRIBE. COPY.

To TRANSCRIBE (Lat. *transcribere*) is to write over from something else. It applies only to writing and printing, or the engraving of letters, as inscriptions. Nor does it denote of necessity a similarity of style in the printing to the original, but only an accurate representation of the words and matter. COPY (*copia*, plenty, a multiplication of the original) goes beyond writing, as, for instance, to painting, and, moreover, implies something of the character and appearance of the original as reproduced.

"We can distinguish in the present case, as perhaps a good critic may, the peculiarities of the author from those of his *transcribers*."—Waterland.

"This order has produced great numbers of tolerable *copyers* in painting, good rhymers in poetry, and harmless projectors in politics."—Tatler.

TRANSFER. See DELIVER.

TRANSFIGURE. See METAMORPHOSE.

TRANSFORM. See METAMORPHOSE.

TRANSGRESS. INFRINGE. VIOLATE.

That which is TRANSGRESSED (Lat. *transgredior, transgressus*, to step be-

yond) is the moral law generally, or any command to which moral authority belongs, as if a child should transgress the command of his parent. That which is VIOLATED (Lat. *violare*, from *vis*, force) is a known law, obligation, or compact. That which is INFRINGED (see INFRINGE) is civil laws and rights, regulations of minor force, as the customs of society.

"Human laws oblige only that they be not despised, that is, that they be not *transgressed* without a reasonable cause; but the laws of God must be obeyed in all cases, and there is no cause to break them, and there can be no necessity upon us to commit sin."—Bishop Taylor.

Violate has a wider application than either transgress or infringe. It not only involves a more defiant and forcible contradiction and disobedience, but it extends to other matters than those of law and custom, as to principles, and abstract truth, justice, and right.

"When it comes to be these men's own case to be oppressed by violence or overreached by fraud, where, then, are all their pleas against the eternal distinction of right and wrong? How, on the contrary, do they then cry out for equity, and exclaim against injustice! How do they then challenge and object against Providence, and think neither God nor man severe enough in punishing the *violators* of right and truth!"—Clarke.

"We promise that such a course shall be taken with him as may sufficiently testify that we no less heinously brook the *violation* of your right than the infringement of our own authority."—Milton.

TRANSGRESSION. See CRIME.

TRANSIENT. See TEMPORARY.

TRANSITORY. See TEMPORARY.

TRANSLUCENT. See TRANSPARENT.

TRANSMUTE. See METAMORPHOSE.

TRANSPARENT. TRANSLUCENT. PELLUCID.

That is TRANSPARENT (Lat. *trans*, beyond, and *parere*, to appear) which admits of objects on the other side of it being seen distinctly. That is

TRANSLUCENT (*trans* and *lucere*, to shine) which merely admits of a penetration or passage of light through it. Fine glass and pure water are transparent. Some stones, as, for instance, that called jade, are translucent. **PELLUCID** (Lat. *pellucidus*, for *perlucidus*, very lucid) in our older writers was used in the sense of transparent. It now denotes, as in the term "pellucid stream," that which is in its nature transparent, but in fact can only be seen clearly into, and not through, admitting, from the nature of the case, a perfect penetration, but not passage through, of light.

TRANSPORT. See **BANISH** and **BRING**.

TRANSPORT. See **ECSTASY**.

TRAVESTY. See **BURLESQUE**.

TREACHEROUS. See **FAITHLESS** and **INSIDIOUS**.

TREACHEROUS. **TRAITOROUS.**
TREASONABLE.

TREACHEROUS (Fr. *tricherie*, trick-ery) is moral, and respects private relationship between man and man. **TRAITOROUS** (Lat. *traditor*, from *tradere*, to deliver or betray) is civil, social, or political, and respects the relationship between man and any person or power to which he owes allegiance. That is **TREASONABLE** (Fr. *trahison*, treason) which comes under what has been authoritatively defined to be of the nature of treason. A man's conscience tells him when he is treacherous. His conscience or his understanding would tell him when he had been traitorous; but he might have done a treasonable act through ignorance, and without intent to commit treason, and so find that he had unwittingly made himself amenable to the law.

"The promontory or peninsula which disjoins these two bays, I named Traitor's Head, from the *treacherous* behaviour of its inhabitants."—*Cook's Voyages*.

TREASONABLE. See **TREACHEROUS**.

TREASURE. See **HOARD**.

TREAT. See **BANQUET**.

TREATISE. See **ESSAY**.

TREATMENT. **USAGE.**

TREATMENT (Fr. *traiter*, Lat. *tractare*, from *trahere*, to draw) is casual or occasional, or at least implies no more, unless more be said. **USAGE** (Fr. *use*, usage) is continuous and habitual. A man may meet with ill-treatment in a crowd. Some domestic animals suffer much from ill-usage. It may be observed that treatment is employed of favourable or unfavourable treatment. Usage is not employed in a favourable sense. Ill-usage is also stronger than ill-treatment. The former is always positive and demonstrative; the latter may be through contempt and neglect.

TREMBLE. See **SHAKE**.

TREMENDOUS. See **DREADFUL**.

TREMOR. See **AGITATION**.

TREPIDATION. See **AGITATION** and **ALARM**.

TRESPASS. See **CRIME**.

TRIAL. See **EFFORT**.

TRIBUTE. See **TAX**.

TRICK, v. See **CHEAT**.

TRICK. **ARTIFICE.** **STRATAGEM.**
SUBTERFUGE.

Of these, **TRICK** (Old Fr. *tricher*, *trichier*, *trecher*, to trick) is the simplest and most generic, the rest being modifications of this fundamental and simple idea. Trick commonly involves deception for self-interest. An **ARTIFICE** (Lat. *artificium*, *ars*, art, and *facere*, to make) is an elaborate, artful, or ingenious trick. As artifice turns upon false manipulations, arrangements, or appearances, so **STRATAGEM** (Gr. *στρατηγός*, a general, from *στρατός*, an army) turns upon false judgments and movements. Children play tricks. Designing persons have recourse to artifice. Those who convert life into a complicated game employ stratagem. **SUBTERFUGE** (Lat. *subter*, under, and *fugere*, to fly) is something under cover of which one

makes an escape. It is an artifice employed to escape censure, or to elude the force of an argument, or to justify opinions or actions. Trick expresses more directly deceptive ingenuity in the agent, which may or may not practically affect others. A trick at cards need not do so. On the other hand, an artifice touches the condition of others to their misleading. The three first involve acts; the subterfuge may be by words or acts, and commonly is made up of both. The term trick has other meanings, as a vulgar or unseemly habit; and such manipulation in art as is calculated to produce a telling effect by means not strictly artistic is sometimes called a trick.

"As his pre-eminence depends not upon a *trick*, he is free from the painful suspicions of a juggler, who lives in perpetual fear lest his *trick* should be discovered."—*Reynolds*.

The trick is generally something petty. The artifice is more elaborate and dignified. A trick is a cheat on the senses; an artifice, on the understanding; a stratagem, on the reason or judgment. A clever trick dupes us. An ingenious artifice misleads us. A deep stratagem captivates or entraps us. A subterfuge is either transparent, or, if successful, leaves us in the lurch.

"The skill of *artifice*, or office mean."

Milton.

"I always consider his (the Spectator) making them and their dress so frequently the subject of his lucubrations an innocent *stratagem* to draw their attention to his book, and thus to allure them to the noblest speculations on subjects moral and divine."—*Knox*.

"By a miserable *subterfuge*, they hope to render this proposition safe by denying its authority."—*Burke*.

TRIFLING. See IMMATERIAL.

TRIP. See JAUNT.

TRIVIAL. See IMMATERIAL.

TROUBLE. See AFFLICTION.

TROUBLESOME. See TIRESOME.

TRUCK. See BARTER.

TRUE. See ACTUAL.

TRUST. See BELIEF.

TRUSTY. See FAITHFUL.

TRUTH. VERACITY.

TRUTH (A. S. *treowdhe*, *treódh*, *tryedh*) regards things. VERACITY (*verax*, *verum*, true) regards the true representation of things. We speak of the truth of history, and the veracity of the historian. The thing said is true or not. The relator is veracious or otherwise.

"Those propositions are true which express things as they are; or *truth* is the conformity of those words or signs by which things are expressed to the things themselves."—*Woolaston*.

"*Truth* or falsehood lying always in some affirmation or negation, mental or verbal, our ideas are not capable any of them of being false till the mind passes some judgment upon them, that is, affirms or denies something of them."—*Locke*.

"To the honour of their author (Suetonius), it must be said that he appears to have advanced nothing through flattery or resentment, nor to have suppressed anything through fear, but to have paid an undaunted regard to *veracity*."—*Knox*.

TRY. ATTEMPT. ENDEAVOUR.

To TRY is the generic (Fr. *trier*, to cull, pick out). ATTEMPT (Fr. *attenter*, Lat. *attentare*, from *attendere*, to stretch towards) and ENDEAVOUR (Fr. *en devoir*, to put in duty) are specific. We cannot attempt without trying, though we may try without attempting. We attempt with an intention to compass a certain end. When we try, we are altogether uncertain as to the result. An endeavour is a systematic or continuous attempt. A single attempt may be fruitless, yet at last we may succeed in our endeavours. It may be remarked that all three of these terms imply a partial failure where they are used of the past, though not of the future. I shall try, attempt, or endeavour, from the nature of the case, leaves the issue uncertain. I tried, attempted, or endeavoured, implies that success did not follow, inasmuch as if it had, it would, of course, have been stated rather than the fact of the trial.

"A natural and unconstrained behaviour has something in it so agreeable, that it is no

wonder to see people *endeavouring* after it. But at the same time it is so very hard to hit when it is not born with us, that people often make themselves ridiculous in *attempting* it."—*Addison*.

Both attempt and endeavour are weightier words than try, and involve more dignified or more difficult ends. One may try to do a very commonplace thing. One attempts what is at all worthy to be called an aim, though not necessarily a high one.

TUG. See DRAW.

TUMBLE. See DROP.

TUMID. TURGID.

TUMID (Lat. *tumidus*, *tumere*, to swell) denotes a swelling proceeding from an alteration of the internal structure; as, tumid flesh, the tumid waves. TURGID (Lat. *turgidus*, *turgere*, to swell) is that which wears a swollen or inflated aspect. Both are employed in a moral sense; as, a turgid style, turgid language; tumid expressions.

TUMULT. See CLAMOUR.

TUMULTUARY. See TUMULTUOUS.

TUMULTUOUS. See BOISTEROUS.

TUMULTUOUS. TUMULTUARY.

TUMULTUOUS expresses that tumult has taken place, and is actually going on; TUMULTUARY, no more than that there is a tendency to tumult. The former expresses confusion and violence and noise; the latter, disorderliness and sedition. A rabble is tumultuary in disposition, or favours tumultuary measures, before it breaks out into tumultuous acts.

"The workmen, accordingly, very seldom derive any advantage from the violence of those *tumultuous* combinations, which generally end in nothing but the punishment or ruin of the ringleaders."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations*.

"Insolence and noise,
The tempest of *tumultuary* joys."
Couper.

TURBULENT. See BOISTEROUS.

TURGID. BOMBASTIC.

As applied to persons and their

style, TURGIDITY (see TUMID) denotes an inflated diction; BOMBASTIC (bombast, cotton, Gr. *βόμβυξ*, a silk-worm) that particular turgidity which is connected with personal pomposity and self-importance, and exaggerates not only style, but facts. A style is bombastic which is inflated and nonsensical. It is turgid when its expressions are pompously inflated, though it may be not otherwise than sound in sense.

"The turgidness of a young scribbler."—*Warburton*.

"A theatrical, bombastic, windy phraseology of heroic virtue."—*Burke*.

TURN. See BENT.

TWIRL. TWIST. DISTORT.
WHIRL.

TWIRL (A. S. *thwiril*, anything that is twirled, as a churn-staff or flail) involves the exercise of force so as to be circulatory, and commonly comes from the hand or fingers. TWIST (A. S. *twi*, two) is to turn sharply from a given line, without of necessity completing a circle, as to twist a stick is to destroy its straightness. To twirl is to turn it rapidly round in the air. The former does not lend itself to secondary meanings. On the other hand, we are said to twist words when we bend them violently to our own meaning. DISTORT (Lat. *distorquere*, *distortus*, to twist aside) is used both physically and morally of such twisting as denaturalizes the subject; as, a distorted countenance wears an unnatural expression. As we are apt to twist words, so we distort meaning. A distorted understanding is one which is falsified by powerful and wrong influences. WHIRL is rapidly to twist circularly, having so far the meaning of twirl, but more equably, with more violence, and in a larger circle.

TYPE. FORM.

The TYPE (Gr. *τύπος*, a form or impression, *τύπτειν*, to beat) is a characteristic FORM (Lat. *forma*); that is, it is the aggregate of characteristic qualities, either an ideal representation or an actual specimen, com-

bining all the particulars of the class which it is employed to illustrate.

"Great Father of the gods, when for our crimes

Thou send'st some heavy judgment on the times,

Some tyrant king, the terror of his age,
The *type* and true vice-gerent of thy rage,

Thus punish him." *Dryden, Persius.*

"But supposing the self-subsistence of matter from eternity, could the world, full of innumerable *forms*, spring by an impetus from a dead formless principle?"—*Bates.*

TYRANNICAL. *See* ABSOLUTE.

U.

ULTIMATE. *See* CONCLUSIVE and LATEST.

UMPIRE. *See* JUDGE.

UNBELIEF. *See* DISBELIEF.

UNBOUNDED. *See* BOUNDLESS.

UNCERTAIN. *See* DOUBTFUL and PRECARIOUS..

UNCERTAINTY. SUSPENSE. DOUBT.

DOUBT (Lat. *dubitare*, *duo*, two, to doubt) indicates the absence of sufficient study and inquiry; UNCERTAINTY (*see* CERTAIN), the absence of judgment formed; SUSPENSE (Lat. *suspendere*, to hang), the absence of determination. He is doubtful who hesitates from ignorance. He is uncertain who hesitates from irresolution. He is in suspense who cannot decide. It has to be remarked, however, that of late the term suspense has come to mean that anxiety of mind which comes from ignorance of the intentions of another, where our interests hang on those intentions. Of old the king would be said to be in suspense who had not made up his mind whether or not to pardon the offender. Now the offender is said to be in suspense until his fate is made known to him.

"All which together seldom or never fail to produce that various and doubtful signification in the names of substances which causes such *uncertainty*, disputes, or mistakes when we come to a philosophical use of them."—*Locke.*

In the following passage we have the union of the old sense of suspense and the new.

"While a great event is in *suspense*, the action warms, and the very *suspense*, made up of hope and fear, maintains no unpleasing agitation in the mind."—*Dolingbroke.*

"Modest *doubt* is called
The beacon of the wise."

Shakespeare.

UNCONQUERABLE. *See* INSUPERABLE.

UNCOUTH. *See* COARSE.

UNCOVER. *See* DISCLOSE.

UNCOVERED. *See* NAKED.

UNDAUNTED. *See* BOLD.

UNDENIABLE. *See* INCONTROVERTIBLE.

UNDER. BELOW. BENEATH.

That which we are UNDER (A. S. *under*) is that by which we are covered, overhung, or overtopped. That which we are BELOW (be and low) is simply something which is higher than ourselves. That which we are BENEATH (A. S. *beneodh*) is much higher than we.

UNDERSTAND. COMPREHEND.

To UNDERSTAND is to have the free use of one's reasoning faculty in regard to the relation of cause and effect, or one thing and another. The understanding is employed upon ordinary discourse and the practical business of life. COMPREHEND (Lat. *comprehendere*, to grasp) requires a greater exertion or force of intellect, and denotes an employment of the intellect upon what is obscure and difficult, upon theoretical systems or speculative truths. A simple fact is understood. A process of reasoning is comprehended.

"Understandest thou what thou readeſt? And he ſaid, How can I, except ſome man ſhould guide me?"—*English Bible.*

"And how much ſoever any truths may ſeem above our *underſtanding*, and *comprehension*, yet, if they come attested by His divine infallible authority, we have infinitely more ground to be persuaded of them than we are of anything that we ourselves may

seem to comprehend or understand."—Beveridge.

UNDERSTANDING. See INTELLECT.

UNDERTAKING. ENTERPRISE.

A work projected is the idea common to both these terms; but an UNDERTAKING denotes something which involves reflection and perseverance with other mental and moral qualities. ENTERPRISE (Fr. *entreprise*, Lat. *entreprendre*, to undertake) involves the personal qualities of activity, courage, endurance, and the like. Undertakings are usually the works of individuals. Enterprises may be made conjointly by bodies of men. An undertaking lies more in the path of ordinary duty. We go out of our way to make enterprises. Undertakings may be from a sense of obligation; enterprises are more speculative, and turn on some prospect of personal gain. The undertaking may be arduous; the enterprise, hazardous. Yet the verb undertake has so broad a meaning that it is a common phrase, "to undertake an enterprise."

"These critics, by their very imperfect knowledge of the Hebrew language, which in their time had been a dead language among the Jews themselves for many ages, and by their prejudices against our Saviour, were but ill qualified for their arduous undertaking."—Bishop Horsley.

"And yet the undertakers, nay, performers Of such a brave and glorious enterprise Are yet unknown."

Beaumont and Fletcher.

UNESSENTIAL. See IMMATERIAL.

UNFOLD. See DEVELOP.

UNGAINLY. See AWKWARD.

UNGOVERNABLE. See REFRACTORY.

UNHAPPY. See MISERABLE.

UNIFORM. See EQUAL.

UNIMPASSIONED. See DISPASSIONATE.

UNIMPORTANT. See IMMATERIAL.

UNISON. See CONCORD.

UNITE. See COALESCE and CONNECT.

UNIVERSAL. GENERAL.

What is UNIVERSAL (Lat. *universus*) includes every particular. What is GENERAL includes the majority of particulars. A general rule (Lat. *genus, generis*, kind) admits of exceptions. What is universal has no exceptions. Universal is opposed to individual; general, to particular. "The foresight of government is directed to the general welfare." "The Providence of God contemplates the universal good." "The faculty of speech is general, not universal, among men."

"For Catholic in Greek signifies *universal*; and the Christian Church was so called, as consisting of all nations to whom the Gospel was to be preached, in contradistinction to the Jewish Church, which consisted for the most part of Jews only."—Milton.

Although universality does not, strictly speaking, admit of degrees, yet it is sometimes loosely so employed. In that way, that is general which is most universal, as in the following:—

"A writer of tragedy must certainly adapt himself to the *general* taste, because the dramatic, of all kinds of poetry, ought to be most *universally* relished and understood."—Mason.

UNLEARNED. See IGNORANT.

UNLETTERED. See IGNORANT.

UNLESS. See EXCEPT.

UNLIKE. DIFFERENT. (See DIFFERENCE.)

DIFFERENT (Lat. *differre*, to differ) is applicable both to quality and number; hence two things may be different (numerically) without being UNLIKE (in character). Furthermore, unlike is negative; different is positive. Unlike is wanting in similarity; different is possessing dissimilarity. Things which come under the same genus or species are called different, not unlike; while things specifically distinct are said to be unlike. So a rose is utterly unlike a stone. But both blue and green being colours, we say, "Blue is different from green." Unlike-ness is the absence of details in com-

mon. Difference is general dissimilarity.

UNLIMITED. *See* BOUNDLESS.

UNOFFENDING. *See* HARMLESS.

UNQUESTIONABLE. *See* INCONVERTIBLE.

UNRAVEL. *See* DEVELOP.

UNRELENTING. *See* IMPLACABLE.

UNRULY. *See* REFRACTORY.

UNSEARCHABLE. *See* INSCRUTABLE.

UNTRUTH. *See* FALSEHOOD.

UPBRAID. *See* BLAME.

UPON. *See* OVER.

UPRIGHTNESS. *See* HONESTY.

UPROAR. *See* CLAMOUR.

URBANITY. SUAVITY.

Both are forms of polite behaviour. Both are more appropriately said of elders or superiors than of juniors or inferiors. URBANITY (Lat. *urbanus*, *urbs*, a city, the refinement of the city) is more than SUAVITY (Lat. *suavis*, soft or sweet), and indeed comprises it. Suavity belongs to the disposition; urbanity, to the manners and demeanour. Suavity shows men as gentle in themselves. Urbanity makes them agreeable to others. Suavity is a matter of looks and voice; urbanity, of observation and words.

"You cannot read and taste his (Horace's) beauties without improving your *urbanity* of manners, together with your knowledge of polite literature."—*Knox*.

"I know not whether the *curiosa felicitas*, or that charm of his writings which resulted from study and happiness united, may not be said to consist in delicacy of sentiment and *suavity* of expression."—*Ibid*.

URGE. *See* ACCELERATE.

URGENT. *See* IMPORTUNATE.

USAGE. *See* CUSTOM and TREATMENT.

USE, *n.* *See* UTILITY.

USE, *v.* *See* EMPLOY.

USUALLY. *See* FREQUENTLY.

USURP. *See* APPROPRIATE.

UTILITY. SERVICE. USE. AVAIL. USEFULNESS.

UTILITY (Lat. *utilis*, useful, *uti*, to use) is that abstract quality of anything which makes it of USE, or useful in the concrete. If an improvement were made in a machine, we should speak of the utility of the invention, and of the machine itself as being of greater use or more useful. That is useful which we habitually want for familiar ends, as a useful walking-stick, or which meets more rare and important ends, and fulfils them in a higher manner, and with wider applicability. A useful thing is good for a purpose only. A SERVICEABLE thing is good in itself, having many properties of usefulness. Hence serviceable is commonly said of those things which have to meet more complex or urgent requirements, or which aid us in effectively compassing some peculiar end. In the case of the useful this requirement is ordinary; in the serviceable, it is extraordinary, or at least uncommon. A distinction has to be observed between utility and USEFULNESS. Utility is the active, usefulness the passive, term. Our utility is shown by what we actually do; our usefulness, by what we are able to do. Utility is usefulness exerted. Utility is in action; usefulness, in inherent nature, character, property, or quality. Use is the habitual or *systematic* application of that which has usefulness.

"In common life we may observe that the circumstance of *utility* is always appealed to, nor is it supposed that a greater eulogy can be given to any man, than to display his *usefulness* to the public, and to enumerate the services which he has performed to mankind and to society."—*Hume*.

AVAIL (Lat. *valere*) expresses practical value, and, like the term value, is wholly indefinite. It points to that kind of usefulness or serviceableness which depends not on adaptation or instrumentality, but on the inherent efficacy of things to effect a purpose. As if it should be said, "Entreaties and tears availed nothing."

"But prayer against His absolute decree,
No more *avails* than breath against the
wind
Blown stifling back on him that breathes
it forth." *Milton.*

UTTER. See PRONOUNCE.

V.

VACANCY. See INANITY.

VACANT. See EMPTY and IDLE.

VACUITY. See INANITY.

VAGUE. See LAX.

VAIN. FRUITLESS. INEFFECTUAL. USELESS.

VAIN (Lat. *vanus*) extends to thoughts, deeds, and efforts. That is vain which wants substance, reality, solidity. FRUITLESS (Lat. *fructus*, fruit) is generally applied to an undertaking which fails, not from inherent weakness or unsoundness, but from some external obstacle, accidental or designed, which has frustrated it. A man may give the best possible advice to another; but where prejudice and obstinacy exist such advice will be fruitless. On the other hand, USELESS points to what is in itself and permanently uncalculated to compass the end proposed, often implying that means are employed which do not suit the case, or efforts that are misdirected or misemployed. Fruitless points to the disappointment of the agent as well as the failure of the act. INEFFECTUAL (*in*, not, and *efficere*, effectus, to effect) has no reference to this, and is employed in simple reference to cause and effect. An ineffectual attempt fails. A fruitless attempt disappoints as well as fails. A vain attempt ought never to have been made.

"Full sure, he thought, Troy's fatal hour arrived.

Vain thought! he knew not the designs of
Jove,

That both to Greeks and Trojans he ordained

Hard conflicts yet, and agonies and groans." *Corper, Iliad.*

"One can scarcely read such accounts as these without condemning the vain efforts of

dying patriotism which laboured so fruitlessly (may one not almost say so weakly?) to protract the liberty of such a people."—*Bishop Hurd.*

"But yet the most careful endeavours do not always meet with success, and even our blessed Saviour's preaching, who spake as never man spake, was ineffectual to many."—*Stillingfleet.*

"Nature never makes excellent things for mean or no uses; and it is hardly to be conceived that our infinitely wise Creator should make so admirable a faculty, which comes nearest the excellency of His own incomprehensible being, to be so idle and uselessly employed, at least a part of its time here, as to think constantly without remembering any of those thoughts, without doing any good to itself or others, or being any way useful to any other part of the creation."—*Locke.*

VALIANT. See BOLD.

VALUABLE. See PRECIOUS.

VALUE, *n.* See COST.

VALUE, *v.* See PRIZE and APPRAISE.

VANISH. DISAPPEAR.

VANISH (Lat. *vanesco*, to become vain, empty, and so invisible) betokens a rapid DISAPPEARANCE (Lat. *dis* and *apparere*, to appear); while disappearance is generic, and may be gradual or sudden. Ordinary laws, movements, or causes lead to things disappearing; sudden, unusual, or strange causes, to their vanishing. That which vanishes is commonly not expected to appear again. That which disappears may do so periodically, and periodically reappear.

"For when he bowed
His hoary head, and strove to drink the flood,
Vanish'd, absorb'd, and at his feet adust,
The soil appeared, dried instant by the gods."

Corper, Odyssey.

"Thus then he *disappeared*, was rarified,
For 'tis improper speech to say he dy'd.
He was exhal'd; his great Creator drew
His spirit, as the sun the morning dew."
Dryden.

VANITY. See ARROGANCE.

VANQUISH. See CONQUER.

VARIABLE. See INCONSTANT.

VARIABLENESS. See CAPRICE.

VARIANCE. See DISSENT.

VARIATION. *See* DIFFERENCE.

VARIETY. *See* DIFFERENCE.

VARIOUS. *See* DIVERS.

VARY. *See* CHANGE.

VAST. *See* HUGE.

VAUNT. *See* BOAST.

VEHEMENT. *See* FURIOUS.

VEIL. *See* CLOAK.

VELOCITY. *See* QUICKNESS.

VENAL. MERCENARY.

VENAL (Lat. *venalis*, *veneo*, to be sold) is a far stronger term than MERCENARY (*merces*, pay or wages). The mercenary character is influenced by desire of gain, rather than by other influences. The venal character is ready to sacrifice honour to gain, and, as it were, to sell himself for profit. The mercenary man merely calculates the profit of all he does. Venal stands to mercenary as sale to hire. The barbarian troops who served in the Roman army for pay were mercenary. The Prætorian guards, who would murder one emperor or elect another for the highest bribe, were venal. The venal person parts with his individuality; the mercenary only partially surrenders himself. A saying of Brissot is quoted, "My pen is venal, that it may not be mercenary;" as if he had said, "I sell my writings, that I may not have to let out my pen."

"Oh, through her strain
Breathe thy pathetic eloquence, that moulds
Th' attentive senate, charms, persuades,
exalts,
Of honest zeal th' indignant lightning
throws,
And shakes Corruption on her *venal* throne."
Thomson.

"Thus needy wits a vile revenue made,
And verse became a *mercenary* trade."
Dryden.

VENERATE. *See* ADORE.

VENGEANCE. *See* REVENGE.

VENIAL. PARDONABLE.

VENIAL (Lat. *venia*, pardon) is nearly equivalent with PARDONABLE (*see* PARDON). Pardonable, however, may be employed of things of less

moment than venial. We speak of venial sins or offences; of pardonable weaknesses, oversights, mistakes, and the like. This comes of the circumstance that venial is a technical term theologically. The venial are opposed to the mortal sins.

"There is no certainty of distinction between the mortal and *venial* sins, there being no catalogues of one and the other, save only that they usually reckon but seven deadly sins, and the rest are, or may be easily by the ignorant supposed to be, *venial*; and even those sins which are under those seven heads are not all mortal, for there are amongst them many ways of changing their mortality into veniality."—*Bishop Taylor.*

"That most interesting and *pardonable* of human weaknesses, love."—*Dickens.*

VENOM. *See* POISON.

VENTURE. *See* DANGER.

VERACITY. *See* TRUTH.

VERBAL. *See* ORAL.

VERGE. *See* BRIM.

VERSATILE. *See* INCONSTANT.

VESTIGE. *See* TRACK.

VESTMENT. *See* DRESS.

VESTURE. *See* DRESS.

VEX. *See* OFFEND.

VEXATION. MORTIFICATION.

VEXATION (Lat. *vexare*, to vex) arises from troubles of a teasing nature, especially such as are repeated or recurrent. It is the petty crossing of our wishes and views. MORTIFICATION (Lat. *mors*, death, and *facere*, to make) relates to what is more closely personal, as our hopes, pride, and the like. That vexes which annoys; that mortifies which both disappoints and humiliates us; or, while it vexes us, interferes with our self-complacency, and reverses what we had set our minds upon.

"Her taxes are more injudiciously and more oppressively imposed, more *vexatiously* collected."—*Burke.*

"How often is the ambitious man *mortified* with the very praises he receives, if they do not rise so high as he thinks they ought!"—*Addison.*

VICE. *See* CRIME.

VICIOUS. *See* BAD.

VICINITY. *See* NEIGHBOURHOOD.

VICISSITUDE. CHANGE.

As CHANGE (Fr. *changer*, Ital. *cambiare*) is generic, so VICISSITUDE (Lat. *vicissitudo*, *via*, *vicis* (not occurring in the nominative), change) is change of state in those things by which men are affected; as the vicissitudes of fortune or the seasons. Mere alteration of state is change in the literal and physical sense. Vicissitude is that which exhibits the character of changefulness.

"Such are the *vicissitudes* of the world through all its parts, that day and night, labour and rest, hurry and retirement endeavour each other; such are the *changes* that keep the mind in action. We desire, we pursue, we obtain, we are satiated, we desire something else, and begin a new pursuit."—*Rambler*.

VICTOR. *See* CONQUEROR.

VICTUALS. *See* FOOD.

VIE. *See* STRIVE.

VIEW. *See* AIM and LANDSCAPE.

VIEW. SURVEY.

To VIEW (Fr. *vue*, *voir*, to see) and to SURVEY (Fr. *survoir*, to overlook) both denote looking, for the purpose of examination; but view is an instantaneous taking in of the whole of an object. Survey denotes a gradual and measured inspection of it in detail. To view a thing is to look at it; to survey is to look over it.

"In her arch'd recess
He slept the night beside her, and by day
Reclining on the rocks that lined the shore,
And viewing wishfully the barren deep,
Wept, groan'd, desponded, sigh'd, and wept
again." *Cowper, Odyssey*.

"Let observation, with extensive view,
Survey mankind from China to Peru."
Johnson.

VIGILANT. *See* WATCHFUL.

VIGOUR. *See* ENERGY.

VILE. *See* BASE.

VILIFICATION. *See* CALUMNY.

VINDICATE. *See* AVENGE and
MAINTAIN.

VIOLATE. *See* TRANSGRESS.

VIOLENCE. FORCE.

VIOLENCE (Lat. *violentia*, *vis*, force) is undue or abnormal FORCE, whether of the powers and influences of Nature or of the will of sentient beings. The violence of men exceeds law. The violence of the elements exceeds average. (*See* FORCE.)

"Violences and extremities of Nature."—*Bishop Taylor*.

VIOLENT. *See* FURIOUS.

VIRTUE. *See* GOODNESS.

VISAGE. *See* FACE.

VISIBLE. *See* APPARENT.

VISION. *See* GHOST.

VISIONARY. *See* ENTHUSIAST.

VISITANT. VISITOR.

VISITORS (Lat. *visitare*, from *videre*, to visit) are always persons. VISITANTS is employed with more of poetic latitude to denote any living creatures which visit. An angel might be called a celestial visitant. The birds which come back in the spring may be called the visitants of the grove.

"The princely Hierarchy,
In their bright stand there left his powers
to seize
Possession of the garden; he alone,
To find where Adam, sheltered, took his way,
Not unperceived of Adam, who to Eve,
While the great *visitant* approached, thus
spake." *Milton*.

"Distinguishing the familiar friend or
relation from the most modest *visitor*."—*Tutler*.

VIVACIOUS. *See* CHEERFUL.

VIVACITY. *See* ANIMATION.

VIVID. *See* BRIGHT.

VOCABULARY. *See* DICTIONARY.

VOCAL. *See* ORAL.

VOCIFERATION. *See* CLAMOUR.

VOICELESS. *See* DUMB.

VOID. *See* DESTITUTE and
EMPTY.

VOLATILITY. *See* LEVITY.

VOLUNTARY. See GRATUITOUS and SPONTANEOUS.

VOLUPTUARY. See EPICURE.

VORACIOUS. See RAPACIOUS.

VOTE. SUFFRAGE.

VOTE (Fr. *vote*, Lat. *votum*, a vow) is generic. SUFFRAGE (Lat. *suffragium*) is specific. A vote may be given on any subject, being a formal or constitutional expression of opinion on the part of a member of a body in regard to the actions or interests of the body. A suffrage is a vote on certain matters, as on a controverted opinion, or on the appointment of a person to an office of trust. The suffrage seems to imply more than the support implied by a vote. A suffrage is an expression of sentiment, so strong that it carries sometimes the meaning of a petition.

"To vote in this way, to vote incorruptibly, to vote on high motives, to vote on large principles, to vote honestly, requires a great amount of information."—*F. W. Robertson*.

"I ask your voices and your suffrages."—*Shakespeare*.

"I firmly believe that there is a purgatory, and that the souls therein detained are helped by the suffrages (prayers) of the faithful."—*Creed of Pius IV*.

VOUCH. ATTEST.

VOUCHING (Old Fr. *vocher*, Lat. *vocare*, to call, as to witness) is a kind of ATTESTATION (*ad*, to, and *testis*, a witness) in which the witness voluntarily undertakes to make himself responsible for the truth of what he says. Hence the term is sometimes employed in the sense of making a promise for another, or undertaking that he shall do something. Attestation relates to the past, or what has happened; vouch, also to the future, or what has been undertaken to be done.

"I write concerning a man so fresh in all people's remembrance, that is so lately dead, and was so much and so well known, that I shall have many vouchers who will be ready to justify me in all that I am to relate."—*Burnet*.

"Attestation of the chief priests and scribes to the fore-appointed place of our Saviour's nativity."—*Bishop Hall*.

VOYAGE. See JOURNEY.

VULGAR. See COMMON.

W.

WAGES. See PAY.

WAKEFUL. See WATCHFUL.

WALK. See CARRIAGE.

WAN. See PALE.

WANDER. See RAMBLE.

WANDER. DEVIATE. ERR.

STRAY. SWERVE.

WANDER (A. S. *wandrian*, *wandrian*) is indefinite and continuous. It is the continuous result of mind or purpose. It does not imply a dereliction of any straight line or appointed course, though certain wanderings are of this nature. In wandering there is discontinuity of progress, whether the case be one of bodily or mental wandering. It does not involve of necessity any departure from a line of obligation or right. DEVIATE (Lat. *de*, from, and *via*, a way) is definite and instantaneous. A person or thing has deviated the moment that it has left an appointed or regular line of movement, plan, or rule. It is, unlike wander, applicable to merely mechanical movement.

"There Nature deviates, and here wanders will." *Pope*.

ERR (Lat. *errare*) is always purely intellectual, involving a misconception or miscalculation of truth. It is employed only in a secondary sense of moral things in relation to an analogous line or path of rectitude. STRAY (Old Fr. *estraye*, Low Latin *extravagare*) denotes illicit wandering, as from a direct course, or from a constituted company, or from prescribed limits. It is the result, not so much of deliberate purpose, as of the absence of purpose, and the effect of heedlessness. It is the fault of the young, the idle, and the thoughtless to stray, as it is the lot of humanity at large to err. SWERVE (Old Eng. *swarve*, Low Germ. *swarven*) is to deviate from the line of right purposely and consciously, or mechanically.

"Alas! where at this moment is the Church of France? Her altars demolished, her treasures spoiled, her holy things profaned, her persecuted clergy and her plundered prelates *wanderers* on the earth."—*Bishop Horsley.*

"We have *erred* and *strayed* from Thy ways like lost sheep."—*English Prayer Book.*

"Our affections and passions put frequently a bias so secret and yet so strong on our judgments, as to make them *swerve* from the direction of right reason."—*Bolingbroke.*

WANT. *See* LACK.

WARE. *See* GOODS.

WARLIKE. *See* MARTIAL.

WARM. *See* HEARTY.

WARMTH. *See* GLOW.

WARN. *See* ADMONISH.

WARRANT. GUARANTEE.

These words are etymologically identical, warrant being the English form of the French *garantir*; and in their primary senses they are identical also, namely, to undertake that something shall be forthcoming from another; as the payment of a debt or the performance of a duty. Hence, to undertake to secure anything to another. But to WARRANT has passed beyond this into the sense of holding a person harmless for doing an act; hence, to authorize.

"Canst thou, and honoured with a Christian name,

Buy what is woman-born, and feel no shame,

Trade in the blood of innocence, and plead Expedience as a warrant for the deed?"

Cowper.

"The treaty of Nimeguen, of which the King of England was *guarantee*."—*Burnet.*

WARY. *See* CAUTIOUS.

WASHING. ABLUTION.

WASHING is simple; ABLUTION, formal and ceremonial.

WASTE. SQUANDER. DISSIPATE.

The two last are modes of the first. To WASTE (A. S. *westan*) is primarily to desolate, then to wear away; then to spread, or spread unwarily, unnecessarily, or without return. He

wastes who lavishes. He also very often wastes who neglects. SQUANDER (Old Germ. *schwenden*, to vanish, dwindle) is always active and positive—to spend lavishly or profusely without need and without return. As to squander is to waste *in the gross*, so to DISSIPATE (Lat. *dissipare*) is to waste *in detail*, bit by bit. Want of plan may lead to squandering. Want of self-constraint in the purchase of pleasure in all forms leads to dissipating. Extravagance squanders. Levity dissipates. Waste is more general than squander and dissipate. We may waste resources of any kind; as time, opportunities, power, talents. We are not said to squander or dissipate anything but money, or such resources as are analogous to it.

"What honour that,

But tedious waste of time, to sit and hear
So many hollow compliments and lies—
Outlandish flatteries?" *Milton.*

"And such expense as pinches parents blue,
And mortifies the liberal hand of love,
Is *squandered* in pursuit of idle sports
And vicious pleasures." *Cowper.*

"We see the vanity of the living in their boundless provision for futurity, and in the *dissipation* of the large fortunes of covetous persons by the extravagance of their heirs."
—*Priestley.*

WATCH. OBSERVE.

WATCHING (identical in Saxon with *waking*) is a strict, constant, close, and eager observation (Lat. *observare*). We OBSERVE with coolness the present state of a case. We watch for what is to take place hereafter. Where we are interested we observe. Where we are suspicious we watch.

WATCHFUL. WAKEFUL. VIGILANT.

He is WAKEFUL who does not or cannot sleep; or, in a more extended sense, whose senses are alive and ready to be acted upon. He is WATCHFUL who is careful to observe closely. He is VIGILANT (Lat. *vigilare*, to keep awake) who is actively watchful. A policeman must be wakeful, or he will go to sleep on his rounds; he must be watchful, or much will escape his notice which he ought

to have observed, or robberies will be committed which might have been prevented. He must be vigilant, if he has taken upon himself to act as a detective. We speak of a watchful observer ; of a vigilant inquirer.

"He must *watchfully* look to his own steps who is to guide others by his authority and example."—*Barrow*.

"It is not iron bands nor hundred eyes,
Nor brazen walls, nor many *wakeful* spies."
Spenser.

"While we watch *vigilantly* over every political measure, and communicate an alarm through the empire with a speed almost equal to the shock of electricity, there will be no danger that a king should establish despotism, even though he were to invade the rights of his people at the head of a standing army."—*Knox*.

WATERMAN. See BOATMAN.

WAVE. BILLOW. SURGE.
BREAKER.

WAVE (A. S. *wæg*, *weg*, connected with *weagan*, to weigh) is generic, being an oscillating mass or ridge of fluid, commonly water, though we speak analogously of waves of the atmosphere and of light. The rest are specific. BILLOW (Dan. *bølge*, connected with *bulge*, *bilge*, and *belly*) is the largest kind of sea-wave. SURGE (Fr. *sourdre*, Lat. *surgere*, to rise) is a swelling and subsiding wave, the term being more commonly used in the plural. BREAKER is a wave of which the top is separated into foam, and broken off from the body of the wave either by the force of the wind or the gravitation of the body of water upon rocks or a shallow bottom.

WAVER. See DEMUR.

WEAK. See FEEBLE.

WEAKEN. See ENERVATE.

WEAKNESS. See FAILING.

WEALTH. AFFLUENCE. OPU-
LENCE. RICHES.

WEALTH (A. S. *weal*) is the simplest and the generic term, denoting at first prosperity, weal as opposed to woe, and afterwards large possessions of money, goods, or land. AFFLUENCE (Lat. *affluere*, to flow towards) carries

with it the idea of large sources and unfailing supplies of the good things of this life, especially of those elegances and luxuries which are the tokens of wealth. OPULENCE (Lat. *opes*, wealth, resources) carries with it the idea of abundance, as RICHES (Fr. *richesse*, the noun being therefore in English properly singular, not plural) of value. Riches express an abundance of valuable things irrespectively of ownership, as wealth may express the same ; while affluence and opulence are not spoken of irrespectively of the subjects of them ; as, riches is a snare to many ; the wealth of London is enormous. Affluence, opulence, and riches are used only in the sense of material possessions. Affluence is hardly applicable, like opulence, to localities. Opulent (not affluent) provinces or cities. So much more strictly relative to persons are wealth, affluence, and opulence, that men's condition might be spoken of as one of either of these ; but it would be impossible to speak of a condition of riches.

"That *wealth* consists in money, or in gold and silver, is a popular notion which naturally arises from the double action of money as the instrument of commerce and as the measure of value."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations*.

"Though an unwieldy *affluence* may afford some empty pleasure to the imagination, yet that small pleasure is far from being able to countervail the enbittering cares that attend an overgrown fortune."—*Boyle*.

"The *wealth* of the Medici made them masters of Florence, though it is probable that it was not considerable compared to the united property of that *opulent* republic."—*Hume*.

"With the greater part of rich people, the chief enjoyment of *riches* consists in the parade of *riches*, which, in their eye, is never so complete as when they appear to possess those decisive marks of *opulence* which nobody can possess but themselves."—*Smith, Wealth of Nations*.

WEAPONS. See ARMS.

WEARINESS. See FATIGUE.

WEARISOME. See TIRESOME.

WEARY. See JADE.

WEDDING. See MARRIAGE.

WEDLOCK. *See* MARRIAGE.
 WEIGHT. *See* BURDEN, HEAVINESS, and IMPORTANCE.
 WEIGHTY. *See* BURDENSOME.
 WELL-BEING. *See* PROSPERITY.
 WELCOME. *See* ACCEPTABLE.
 WELFARE. *See* PROSPERITY.
 WHEEL. *See* CAJOLE.
 WHIM. *See* CAPRICE.
 WHIRL. *See* TWIST.
 WHOLE. *See* ALL and ENTIRE.
 WHOLESOME. *See* HEALTHY.
 WICKED. *See* BAD.
 WICKEDNESS. *See* CRIME.
 WIDE. *See* BROAD.
 WILLING. *See* GRATUITOUS and VOLUNTARY.
 WILY. *See* CRAFTY.
 WIN. *See* ACQUIRE.
 WIND. BREEZE. BLAST. GALE. GUST.

Of these, WIND is the most comprehensive and indefinite. BREEZE (Fr. *brise*) is a gentle, orderly wind. BLAST (A. S. *blast*) denotes violence or effort of blowing; as the blast of a trumpet, of bellows, of artillery. A GALE (Icelandic *gala*, to blow) is a strong but steady wind. A GUST (Icelandic *gustr*, *giöstr*) is a wind at once violent and fitful, or, rather, it is itself a fit of wind.

WISE. *See* PRUDENT.

WISH. DESIRE.

In WISH (A. S. *wyscan*) the feeling is gentler, and the object more remote. In DESIRE (Fr. *désir*, Lat. *desiderium*) the feeling is more eager, and the object more at hand. Wishes are at most warm and strong. Desires may be impetuous and ungovernable. In expressing one's feelings toward others over whom we have authority, it is a much milder form of command to say, "I wish you to do this," than to say, "I desire you to do this," though the feeling prompting the injunction may be the same.

The former is the gentler, the latter the more authoritative mode of speech.

"A *wish* is an inactive *desire*. It is the result of that longing after happiness so natural to man in cases where no expectations can be formed, no efforts can be made."
 —Cogan.

"*Desire* influential to action may be defined that uneasy sensation excited in the mind by the view or by the contemplation of any desirable good which is not in our possession, which we are solicitous to obtain, and of which the attainment appears at least possible."—*Ibid*.

WIT. *See* BUFFOON and BURLESQUE.

WITHDRAW. *See* RECEDE.

WITHSTAND. *See* OPPOSE.

WITNESS. DEPONENT.

The WITNESS (A. S. *witness*, from *witan*, to know) is he who knows from personal perception or observation, and, in an extended sense, a person who for legal purposes attests generally; while DEPONENT (Lat. *deponi*, to depose) is one who gives his evidence in a court of law. Every deponent is a witness; but every witness is not a deponent, as, for instance, he who witnesses the signing of a document. Witness is the generic, deponent the specific and technical, term.

"There is satisfactory evidence that many professing to be original *witnesses* of the Christian miracles passed their lives in labours, dangers, and sufferings, voluntarily undergone in attestation of the accounts which they delivered, and solely in consequence of their belief in the truth of those accounts, and that they also submitted from the same motives to new rules of conduct."
 —Paley.

"The pleader having spoke his best,
 Had witness ready to attest,
 Who fairly could on oath depose,
 When question on the fact arose,
 That every article was true;
 No further these *deponents* knew."
 Swift.

WOEFUL. *See* DOLEFUL.

WONDER. *See* MARVEL.

WOOR. *See* SUITOR.

WORD. *See* EXPRESSION.

WORK. *See* TASK.

WORK. LABOUR. TOIL.

WORK (A. S. *weorc*) is the generic term. It may be hard or light. LABOUR (Lat. *labor*) is *hard* work. TOIL (Old Dutch *tuyl*, labour) is *grievous* work.

WORK. *See* OPERATE.

WORLD. *See* LAND.

WORLDLY. SECULAR. TEMPORAL.

WORLDLY (A. S. *woroldlic*) means relating to the world, especially relating to *this* world or life in contradistinction to the life to come; as worldly pleasures, affections, maxims, actions, and the like. SECULAR (Lat. *seculum*, the age or fashion) means relating to the world, in the sense of worldly fashions, habits, or modes of living. TEMPORAL (*tempus*, time, as distinguished from eternity) means, literally, lasting for a time, as distinguished from eternal. In common parlance, worldly is opposed to heavenly; temporal, to eternal; secular, to ecclesiastical or religious. Secular is morally an indifferent term. The same may commonly be said of temporal; but worldly has generally a bad sense, as a worldly spirit is one which is imbued by sordid principles of gain, and is wanting in high-mindedness or purity of motive. The Upper House of Parliament in Great Britain consists of Lords spiritual and temporal. The office of a clergyman is ecclesiastical; that of a schoolmaster in itself secular, though the two are often combined in the same person.

"When we have called off our thoughts from *worldly* pursuits and engagements, then, and not till then, are we at liberty to fix them on the best, the most deserving and desirable of objects, God."—*Atterbury*.

"For it is to be considered that men of a *secular* life and conversation are generally so engaged in the business and affairs of this world, that they very rarely acquire skill enough in religion to conduct themselves safely to heaven through all those difficulties and temptations that lie in their way."—*Scott, Christian Life*.

"This act
Shall bruise the head of Satan, crush his
strength,
Defeating Sin and Death, his two main aims,
And fix far deeper in his head their stings,
Than *temporal* death shall bruise the Victor's
heel,
Or them whom He redeems." *Milton*.

WORSHIP. *See* ADORE.

WORTH. *See* MERIT and COST.

WRANGLE. *See* JANGLE.

WRATH. ANGER. CHOLER. IRE.
RAGE.

An impatience and disturbance of spirit against others is characteristic of these terms. WRATH (A. S. *wræðh*) is commonly connected with a proud, vindictive, or imperious nature. We speak of the wrath of kings and mighty men, and so the term hardly seems to harmonize with the idea of anger in inferior mortals. We speak especially of the wrath of the Almighty. The term wrath, unlike anger, is inapplicable to the passions of inferior animals. Wrath is violent and continuous anger, accompanied by vindictiveness, or, at least, by a desire of inflicting suffering upon its object.

"A revenger to execute *wrath* upon him that doeth evil."—*English Bible*.

ANGER, on the other hand (Lat. *angor*, compression of the neck, from *angere*, to choke, connected with Gr. *ἄγχειν*, to press tightly), is the term to express the common feeling of men, who are ready to feel keen displeasure against wrong, real or supposed, whether in the case of others or themselves.

"*Anger* is the strong passion or emotion impressed or excited by a sense of injury received or in contemplation, that is, by the idea of something of a pernicious nature and tendency being done or intended in violation of some supposed obligation to a contrary conduct."—*Cogan*.

CHOLER (Fr. *colère*, Gr. *χολή*) denotes the constitutional aspect of anger, or the feeling as it affects the frame, gestures, and countenance of men. The choleric is quick to anger.

"His constitution, indeed, inclined him to

be *choleric*; but he gained so perfect an ascendant over his passion that it never appeared, except sometimes in his countenance upon a very high provocation.”—*Boyle*.

IRE (Lat. *ira*) may be taken as sometimes a poetic equivalent of anger. But anger is more sour and enduring; ire, more explosive, less reasoning, pretending less of cause and ground of offence.

“Breaches through which the wrath of an *ireful* Judah may hereafter break in upon us.”—*South*.

RAGE (Fr. *rage*, Lat. *rabies*, is a vehement, ungovernable ebullition of anger akin to the influence of a disease, breaking forth into extravagant expressions and violence of demeanour. Wrath may be justifiable, and anger may be just; but rage is a distemper of the soul to be regarded only with abhorrence.

“Anger, in the excess of its violence, when it is excited to a degree of frenzy, so that the mind has totally lost self-command, when it prompts to threats and actions extravagant and atrocious, is termed *rage*.”—*Cogan*.

WRENCH. WREST. WRING.

WRENCH (A. S. *wrencan*) denotes the combination, in the exercise of force, of pulling and twisting. WREST (A. S. *wrestan*) denotes the same thing, but superadds the idea of disengagement. A thing is commonly said to be wrenched out, and wrested away, the action of wrestling originating in a desire to twist the thing out of some position or possession in which it is held. WRING (A. S. *wringan*) denotes the exercise of a force by twisting, which does not pass beyond the structure of the thing or substance twisted; as to wring one's hands, to wring a wet cloth. To wring and to wrench may be the work of accident or design; to wrest, always of design. The two former are only used in physical and analogous senses. To wrest has also the moral meaning of distort, as by violent twisting to misinterpret words.

WRETCHED. See MISERABLE.

WRING. See WRENCH.

WRITER. PENMAN. AUTHOR. SCRIBE.

Of these, the most generic is WRITER, meaning one who writes, whether by writing be meant literary composition or the mere formation of letters by the pen, or any similar process (A. S. *writan*). PENMAN is a man who handles a *pen* (Lat. *penna*, a feather), and properly means one skilled in the use of the pen mechanically—a master of caligraphy. AUTHOR (Lat. *auctor*) is one whose pen or writing is the medium of original thoughts. The term has a familiar and a more dignified meaning. A writer of a letter is not termed technically an author, unless the letter passed into a literary form. On the other hand, he who wrote the letter might be called, in the general sense of the term, the author of it, if its contents were canvassed. SCRIBE (Lat. *scribere*, to write) is a professional writer officially and publicly appointed, or exercising the art of transcribing or writing from dictation as a trade. The office belongs to ancient times and foreign countries, rather than to ourselves.

“The crucifixion of Christ under Pontius Pilate is related by Tacitus, and divers of the most remarkable circumstances attending it, such as the earthquake and miraculous darkness, were recorded in the public Roman registers, commonly appealed to by the first Christian writers, as what could not be denied by the adversaries themselves.”—*Clarke*.

“Sanderson calls him a common *penman*, who penciled the dialogue (probably the decalogue) in the Dutch Church, London, his first rise of preferment.”—*Walpole, Anecdotes of Painting*.

“An *authorless* pamphlet.”—*Fuller*.

“*Scribe* was a name which, among the Jews, was applied to two sorts of officers: 1. To a civil; and so it signifies a notary or, in a large sense, any one employed to draw up deeds and writings. 2. This name *scribe* signifies a church officer, one skilful and conversant in the law to interpret and explain it.”—*South*.

WRONG. See CRIME and HURT.

Y.

YET. See HOWEVER.

YIELD. See ACCEDE, AFFORD, and CEDE.

YIELDING. See OBEDIENT.

YOUNG. JUVENILE. PUERILE.

YOUTHFUL.

YOUNG (Lat. *juvenis*) denotes the age of youth; the rest its characteristics. JUVENILE denotes the character of youth in regard to its tendencies, training, pursuits, and the like; PUERILE (Lat. *puer*, a boy), the character of such actions or thoughts as savour of youth in grown-up persons, whose judgment and tastes are presumed to be mature. YOUTHFUL, on the other hand, denotes the normal character of youth, and expresses the quality which rightly and naturally belongs to the period of youth, and may be expected to manifest itself in connection with the earlier times of human life. Young is simply opposed to old.

"I have been *young*, and now am old; yet never saw I the righteous forsaken, nor his seed begging their bread."—*English Psalms*.

"Here (in 'Romeo and Juliet') is one of the few attempts of Shakespeare to exhibit the conversation of gentlemen to represent the airy sprightliness of *juvenile* elegance."—*Johnson*.

"'Tis sure a practice that favours much of pedantry, a reserve of *puerility* we have not shaken off from school."—*Brown, Vulgar Errors*.

Z.

ZEAL. ARDOUR. FERVOUR.

ZEAL, in reference to these other synonyms, is specific, while they are characteristic or habitual. Zeal (Fr. *zèle*, Gr. *ζῆλος*) is passionate ardour in favour of a person or a cause. ARDOUR (Lat. *ardor*, *ardere*, to burn) is simply warmth or heat of passion in love, pursuit, or exertion. FERVOUR (Lat. *fervor*, *fervere*, to be hot) denotes the constitutional state or temperament of individuals. We speak of the fervour of passion, declamation, supplication, desire, as *demonstrative* of warmth. Ardour is more deeply seated; as ardent friendship, love, zeal, devotedness. "The ardour of his friendship prompted the fervour with which he spoke."

"There is nothing in which men more deceive themselves than in what the world calls *zeal*. There are so many passions which hide themselves under it, and so many mischiefs arising from it, that some have gone so far as to say it would have been for the benefit of mankind if it had never been reckoned in the catalogue of virtues."—*Spectator*.

"All martial fire herself, in every breast
She kindled *ardours* infinite, and strength
For ceaseless fight infused into them all."
—*Cowper*.

"Wing'd with the *fervour* of her love."
—*Shakespeare*.

ZEALOT. See ENTHUSIAST.

"Is she not more than painting can express,
Or *youthful* poets fancy when they love?"
—*Rove*.

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
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